THE FIRST CHAPTER. Of a Citie or Common-wealth, and the parts thereof.

B FOrasmuch as wee see that euery Citie or Com­monweale 1 is a companie, and euery company is or­dained 2 to some good: (for all men attempt and doe all things for that end and purpose, which in their opinion is good:) It is certaine that all companies tend vnto some good, and most chiefly and specially that the principall and most excellent companie of 3 all companies, and comprehending all other socie­ties, namely, the Citie or Ciuill societie; doth tend 4 and endeauour to attaine vnto the principall and C most excellent good of all others.

In this entrance is shewed the excellencie and originall of a Common-weale, of what parts it consisteth, and to what end it is natu­rally ordained.

FORASMVCH as we see that euery Common-weale is a companie.] Aristotle proueth the 1 excellencie of a Common-weale by the soueraigne good which it purposeth, and by the ends thereof, which comprehendeth the ends of all humane things. His reason is this: Euery companie is ordained for some good; and euery Common-weale is a com­panie: therefore euery Common-weale is ordained for some good. And if all compa­nies D be ordained to some good; the better that the companie is, the greater good is it ordained for: But a Common-weale is the best of all companies; therefore of all com­panies it hath the greatest and chiefest good: and that is the soueraigne felicitie or wel­fare, consisting both in the publique and in the priuat fruition of all kind of goods both of soule and bodie, and also of fortune. For that Common-weale is counted happie, which enioyeth all the three sortes of goods togither; the which to maintaine it selfe long time in prosperitie and safetie, it behooueth to be wise, mild, rich, iust, mightie, friendly to it selfe, and religious: wherein consist the common commodity, sufficiencie, discipline and honour of a Common-weale; as is affirmed by Aristotle himselfe in his E first booke of Morals, & in his seuenth booke of Gouernment or Matters of State: and by Plato in his fourth booke of his Common-weale, and in his third booke of Lawes. Now the linking in and communicating of men togither in a Common-weale, is to di­uers ends according to the gouernment thereof. If the gouernment be vnder one Mo­narch or Soueraigne, it is to be defended against Strangers, and to liue lawfully and peaceably among themselues. If vnder a Senate or certaine number of Magistrates, it is to be regarded according to their riches, nobilitie, and vertue. If vnder popular gouern­ment, it is to enioy libertie and equalitie; and the better that any Common-weale is ordered, the more welfare and good doe men hope for therein.

[Page 2] 2 EVERIE companie is ordained for some good.] A companie, societie, or fellowship, is G a knitting of many persons togither in consent, tending to some good or to some euill, carrying an outward shew or resemblance of good. For there is a good which is good in very deed; and there is a good which beareth but a likelihood of good, & is not good in truth. Of this latter sort are euill gotten riches, and vice couered with vertue: as craft and subtiltie vaunting it selfe for wisdome, and prodigalitie for liberalitie. Now as there be three sortes of good, namely honest, profitable, and pleasant; so be there likewise three sortes of companies: one for profit, as Merchants; another for pleasure, as young folkes; a third for honestie, as the vertuous and skilfull. Aristotle speaketh here of the good companie, which is a consenting of many in the things that are good in truth, H where right and order are to be found. As for the euill companies, they be made vnder pretence of good in shewe, wherethrough men are deceiued by taking the pretenced good for the true good indeed. That is to wit, by taking those things for profitable, plea­sant, or honest, which in truth are not profitable, pleasant, nor honest, but hurtfull, te­dious, and loathsome. Of this sort are the companies of murtherers and theeues, which lie in waite to bereaue men of their goods and liues. Of the same sort are the routes of Ruffians, which follow shamefull delights: of the same sort also be the seditious and the conspirers against States and Princes, vnder some gay pretence of publicke libertie or of reformation of Gouernment, albeit that they seeke nothing but their owne pecu­liar I aduantage.

3 AND most chief [...]y and specially that the principall and most excellent companie of all com­panies doth tend to the principall and chiefe good of all others.] Forasmuch (saith Aristotle in the eight Chapter of the third booke of his matters of State) as the end of all Artes and Sciences, is some good; and the greatest and principallest good is in the science of Gouernment, as in the chiefest of all sciences. And againe, forasmuch as in all Artes and Sciences the end that they aime at is some good or other, and the greatest and chie­fest good is aimed at by the chiefest of all Sciences, that is to say, the welfare of the pub­licke state. The nature of things is knowen chiefly by the end whereto they be ordai­ned. K Now then, if the good for the which and the end whereunto a Common-weale is ordained, containe the ends of all other companies, and haue them comprehended vnder it; it followeth consequently that a Common-weale is the best companie, as saith Aristotle in the first chapter of his first booke of Morals to Nichomachus. For the more common that a good thing is, the more excellent also is it; like as it is more honorable and worthy of loue to prouide for whole Nations and Common-weales, than for pe­culiar persons.

4 NAMELY the Citie or ciuill societie.] That is to say, a multitude of people of vnlike sorts, (for so doth he himselfe say in the first chapter of his matters of State, and in the L third chapter of his third booke) as rich and poore, free and bond, gentlemen and com­moners, learned and vnlearned, handicrafts men and labourers, obeyers and comman­ders, communicating their Artes, trades, misteries, and exercises one to another in one place, to the end to liue the better and to haue the more sufficiencie. And also which obey the selfesame Lawes, Magistrates, and Soueraigne councill, called (by Plato in his twelfth booke of Lawes) the Anker, the head, and the Soule of a Common-weale. Af­ter this manner all the Venetians make one Common-weale, the people of Geneua another, and the people of Bern in Swisserland another. And it makes no matter whe­ther they dwell all within walles or without, for a Citie or Common-weale is not to be M accounted of by the walles, as Aristotle saith in the second chapter of his third booke of Matters of State. After the same manner all the naturall subiects of the French king, which acknowledge him for their Soueraigne lorde and obey his commandements and the ordinances of his councill, doe represent one Common-weale or bodie politique by diuers Townes, Cities, and Prouinces, of diuers Prouostships, Bailyships, Steward­ships, Lieutenantships, Gouernments, & Parliaments: of sundry Baronies, Earldoms, [Page 3] A Marquiships, and Dukedomes: and of sundry Curatships, Bishoprickes, and Archbi­shoprickes, sufficiently furnished in and by it selfe of all things needfull, as well in things necessarie as honest, not onely wherewith to liue well according to vertue, but also wherewith to liue commodiously and bountifully, hauing little or nothing to doe with others. Wherein no stranger may holde any office or benefice, or dispose of his owne goods, but that they shall become excheated after his decease, vnlesse he be made a free denison afore, and his letters patents ratified by the Iudges of accounts. On the contrarie part, there is not so meane a Frenchman borne of how base degree soeuer he be, but he may be aduanced to worship and honour for his valiantnes, or be preferred B to the chiefest Ecclesiasticall dignities, or to the highest offices of Iustice, and of the princes reuenues, by his skilfulnes and vncorrupt behauiour.

THEY therefore thinke not aright, which thinke that the gouernour of a Citie or Common­weale, and a King, a housholder, and a lord or master ouer seruants are all one thing, esteeming them to differ one from another but onely in respect of moe or fewer in number (but not in kind and scope of gouernment) so as if a man haue the commanding of fewe folke, he shall bee but a Master; if of moe, an Housholder; and if yet of a greater number, the Gouernour of a Citie or Commonweale, or a King: as though a great house differed nothing at all from a little Citie C or Commonweale, nor a Gouernour of a Commonweale from a King: and that a man were a King when hee ruleth alone; and a Gouernour of a Commonweale, when he both commaundeth and also obeyeth by turnes, according to the Reasons and Rules of that Science: which things are not true.

ARISTOTLE hauing shewed the Ciuill companie (which is called a Citie or Com­monweale) to be better than all other particular societies of peculiar houses, hamlets, borowes, and other inferiour companies: all which, the ciuill societie or companie of a Citie or Common-weale comprehendeth, being perfecter than all the rest, for that it is more common and referred to a better end. He findeth fault with such as confound the D publicke and priuate gouernments togither, and affirme that they are both one & haue none other difference at all, sauing that the publick gouernments haue authoritie ouer greater numbers of people than the priuat haue. Wherein he noteth Plato, who in his Dialogue entituled The ciuill Magistrate, or as concerning Reigning, holdeth this opi­nion which Aristotle reprooueth. For Aristotle affirmeth that those Gouernments dif­fer one from another in kinde, not in respect of the persons that command and obey, which are both of one selfesame kind, but in respect that the gouernments themselues are diuers. The two priuat ones, that is to wit, that gouernment which the housholder vseth, and that which the lord or master vseth, do serue for the house, and doe differ both E betweene themselues and from the publicke. For the houshelder vseth another manner of commaunding towards his free folkes, that is to wit, his wife and children, than the Master doth towards his bondfolkes and seruants. The two publicke gouernments are the Regall and kingly gouernment, and the gouernment of a Citie or Commonweale, which likewise differ one from another, and also from the other afore-mentioned. For the gouernour of a citie or Commonweale commandeth his citizens and countrymen but for a time and by turnes, according to the lawes and customs of his commonweale: But the King commaundeth his subiects continually and according to his owne discre­tion, specially the King that is called an absolute King, Aristot. 3. Polit. ca. 12. who resembleth the houshol­der F in this, that he procureth the profit, libertie, and welfare of his subiects, Plato in his Cōmon­weale. lib. 1. & Arist. Po­lit. 3. cap. 5. as the fa­ther doth of his children: Arist. Pol. 1. cap. vlt. & Lib. 3. cap. 4. and also so farre forth as concerneth the commaunding of his wife, he resembleth the gouernour of the Citie or Common-weale, in which there is a certaine interchangeable course of obeying and of comma [...]nding by turnes. Arist lib. 1. cap. vlt. The lordly or masterly commmanding pricketh verie neare vnto tyrannie, vnlesse the master and the seruant be naturally disposed to the same: that is to say, vnless [...] the one be borne to command and the other to obey, so as the one can not be without the other. Arist. lib. 1. cap. 3.

[Page 4]THE thing that I speake of will manifestly appeare, if we consider the method going afore: G for as in other things it is needfull to de [...]ide the thing that is compounded into the simple and vncompounded, because they be the smallest parts of the whole; So shall we know a citie by consi­dering the things whereof it consisteth, and we shall see the more cleerely wherein they differ one from another, if we can reduce the matter by any meanes into Art.

HERE the Philosopher sheweth the method or manner of handling which he inten­deth to vse in treating of this matter of Gouernment: that is to wit, his owne ordinary, which is to begin his bookes at the first grounds and principles of the things which he vndertaketh to speake of: as for example, intending in naturall Philosophie to speake of Nature, he beginneth at substance and shape: and in his booke of Wights, he spea­keth H first of the soule, and afterward of the parts of the wightes. Likewise hauing taken in hand to treat of common Societie, hee beginneth at the first and most single partes thereof, which are the companies of man and wife, of master and seruants, of father and children.

1 SO SHALL wee knowe a Common weale by considering the parts whereof it is composed.] Like as a Wight may be deuided into head, brest, armes, feet, legges, heart, liuer, lights, and kidnies; and these againe into other parts till a man come euen to the first grounds which are the smallest and simplest parts of all: Likewise a Citie is deuided into streets, streetes into houses, houses into sortes of companies, and so forth to seuerall persons, I which are the least vncompounded parts thereof, howbeit not simply as things naturall, but onely as in respect that they be parts of a Citie or of a Commonweale: for the arme or foot of a man is not a citizen, nor to be tearmed a part of a Common-weale.

THEN if a man consider from the beginning how things are produced by nature, the order of proceeding in this behalfe will be verie good, as it is in all other cases. First it is requisite to ioyne these partes togither, which can not be one without the other, as the man and the woman for procrcation: and that not by way of choice, but in such sort as that there is a certaine naturall desire in all other liuing wights, and euen in the verie plants, to leaue a like of their owne kinde K behind them.

HITHERTO hath continued the Preface of the booke, wherby we haue vnderstood the excellencie of a Common-weale, and the order which the Philosopher intendeth to keepe in treating of Gouernment. Now to declare the better what a Commonweale is, he entreth into the matter, and shewing that men are carried by a certaine naturall instinct to gather themselues togither into one place and into one companie, for the mutuall succouring one of another in their necessities: he treateth first of the principall parts of a Common-weale: that is to wit, of a house, and of a street, lane, or hamlet; de­claring that those haue a beeing by nature, and the [...]efore that in all reason, a Citie or L Common-weale beeing [...]ompounded of them, and being the end of all assemblies or drawings of men togither into one place, hath the beginning thereof by nature.

1 IT IS requisite to ioyne those partes togither which can not be one without another.] The first assembly necessarie for the constitution of a house or family, is the companie of the man and woman, for the continuall and perpetuall continuance of mankind by the meane of generation: for els there could be no mo families nor cities for want of men and women.

2 AND that not by way of choice.] Not through reason and counsell which ioyne not man and wife togither, but naturall desire. Plato in his Banquet saith thus: See yee not M with what great feruencie all liuing things as well those that flie in the aire as the rest that goe vpon the ground, are mooued and stirred when they enter into loue, and are desirous of generation? First of all they are very earnest to come togither, and then to prouide food for their little ones, for whome they are readie to fight, yea the weakest against the strongest, and to loose their liues in their behalfe: also they abide the extre­mitie of hunger to bring their young ones vp, and all other things to the same effect. [Page 5] A A man would thinke that these things were done by men through reason: but can yee yeeld any reason of the great desire in bruit beasts?

BVT in such sort as there is a naturall desire in all other liuing Wightes, and euen in 3 the verie plantes to lea [...]e a like of their owne kind behind them.] Plato in the fourth booke of his lawes faith thus much: Euery man ought to take a wife from the thirtieth till the fiue and thirtieth yeere of his age, in consideration that through a certaine nature, mankind in some sort obtaineth immortalitie (a thing that all men by nature are greatly desirous of) insomuch that there is no man liuing but desireth the continuance of his name for euer to the posteritie which commeth after him. Thus mankind being in this B manner immortall, perseuereth to haue euerlasting being and continuance, in that by leauing children of children, the selfesame partie getteth immortalitie by way of pro-creation. Now it is not lawfull for any man voluntarily to depriue himselfe of the bene­fite of immortalitie, whereof he frustrateth himselfe wittingly that neglecteth wife and children. Aristotle in his second booke of the Soule, and the fourth Chapter, writeth thus: The act of generation is verie naturall to all liuing creatures, I meane such as be perfect, and not lame or defectiue in their members, and come not without seed: for from euerie one of them issueth his like, as the liuing creature issueth and commeth of one that hath life, and one plant commeth of another, to the end that in this sort they C may be for euer, and as much as in them lieth, attaine to some diuine condition: where­of they are all very desirous, and for the same effect doe all whatsoeuer they doe accor­ding to nature. Forasmuch therefore as liuing wightes can not remaine alwaies, nor by continuance atchieue to any diuine estate (by reason that fraile and mortall things con­taine not alwaies the selfesame and one in number) euery one goeth about and endeuo­reth as much as he can by any possible means, to attaine to the participation of eternitie & diuine condition, some more, some lesse, & continueth not alwaies the selfesame, but rather such as he is, not in number, but in kind. The same Author in his second booke of the generation of liuing Wig [...]ts in the first Chapter, writeth after this sort: Wher [...]s D the Wight ingendred can not continue for euer, he is eternall in such sort as hee may; which in number he can not be, for the substance of all things is in the vndeuided ones, the which if they were such they should be eternall: but in kind hee may well be eter­nall: therefore the kind of men, beastes, and plantes lasteth alwaies. Also in the second booke of the Heauen and in the third chapter he writeth: There must of necessitie be generation, forasmuch as nothing lasteth alwaies: for contraries come togither, suffer one another, and are corrupted. He sheweth in his first booke of Generation and Cor­ruption, how generation lasteth for euer without any want thereof in the whole world. And in the tenth Chapter of the second booke, hee attributeth the cause of the same E continuance, to the moouing of the Heauen and the obliquity of the Zodiacke. For when the Sunne draweth neere, it stirreth vp the springing and growth of all things, and when it withdraweth it selfe a farre off, it is the cause of their death and ruine. And withall that the life of all things and the times, are bounded and limited by numbers, some shorter, some longer, according to the disposition and aptnes o [...] the matter or stuffe. Galen in the fourteenth Booke of the vse of the parts of mans bodie, writeth in this sort: Nature (saith he) would most willingly haue made her creature immortall, if by any meanes it had been possible for her: but the matter or stuffe would not suffer it: for the composition of the arteries, veines, sinewes, and flesh could not be free from cor­ruption. F Therefore she gaue it as much forwardnes and helpe toward im [...]ortality as she could: according to the discretion and manner of a wise founder of a to [...]ne, who first of all doth not make prouision only for habitation, but also for lasting and continu­ance, desiring and seeking the meane how to make it such a one as may continue for euer, or at least for a great number of yeeres. Notwithstanding there i [...] not any Cittie so [...]ortunately established, that it can continue for euer. But yet the wor [...]e [...] of Nature haue alreadie lasted infinite yeeres, and still continue by meanes that Nature hath so [Page 6] prouided through maruellous skill, in substituting continually one new wight in steed G of another already dead or perished. What manner of skill then is this, as well in all li­uing wights as in man, that no kind of them fadeth away, and lasteth euer perfect and immortall? Nature hath giuen to all liuing creatures apt instruments with speciall de­light to conceiue, for generations sake: and to the soule maruellous and vnspeakeable desire to vse the same: By which all creatures are stirred and pricked on, as well sots and fooles, as yong folke and those that be void of reason: prouiding thereby for the conti­nuance of their kind, as though they were endued with wit and discretion. For (in mine opinion) when Nature perceiued that the substance whereof she had created them, re­ceiued not perfect wisedome, shee gaue them in steed thereof delight, and as it were a H certaine kind of bait, which they might receiue for the welfare, preseruation, and kee­ping of their kind, ioining a vehement delight to the vse and exercise of those parts.

NEXT of all it is expedient to ioine together, one that commandeth by nature, and another that obayeth, for their mutuall preseruation. For he that is able by reason and the forecasting of his mind to foresee and prouide aptly in affaires, commandeth by nature, and beareth the mai­stership by nature: and whosoeuer i [...] able by the strength of his body to put those commandements in execution, is a subiect and ser [...]ant by nature. Therfore one and the selfesame thing, is behoofe­full for the maister and seruant. I

THE second assembly necessary for the constitution of a house or family proceeding from nature, as the former; is that of the maister and seruant naturally affected one to another: which the Philosopher tearmeth, Lordly or maisterly. For euen as naturall de­sire is that that ioineth the man and the woman together, so doth that vnite the maister by nature, and the seruant by nature, for their enterchangeable succour and aide, and to prouide for their mutuall preseruation; the one by commanding, that hath most vnder­standing: the other by obeying, who is most mighty and stronger of body. Hereafter in t [...]e fourth Chapter of this first booke, he will shew by many and most certaine reasons, K that there is maistership and bondage by nature.

THEREFORE the wi [...]e and seruant differ by nature: for nature worketh not like to cutlers, 1 who fashion the knife of Delphos fit for many purposes: but appointeth euery thing to a proper 2 office and exercise for the same. In this sort euery toole is the better, when it serueth not for many 3 vses, but for one alone. Notwithstanding the barbarous people haue the wife and seruant in equal 4 estimation: the occasion whereof is, because they haue no man amongst them, commanding by 5 nature, but their societie consisteth of the bondman, and bondwoman: Therefore the Poets af­firme, 6 that the Grecians should haue dominion ouer the Barbarians: accounting the Barbarians L 7 the selfesame by nature that a bondman is.

HAVING set downe the two first ass [...]mblies of man and wife, and of the maister and seruant, necessary by nature for the est [...]blishment of a house, hee sheweth what diffe­rence is naturally b [...]tweene the wife and seruant: The wife is for the most part tender and weake, and the seruant strong and sturdy.

1 THE knife of Delphos fit for many purposes.] It was a kind of knife fit for many vses, as to cut, file, and cleaue, like those that in these daies are made with edge, point, and file, M which the grafters occupie. The poore folkes of Greece bought them in the Isle of Del­phos, where there was a mart and great concourse, by reason of the Temple and Oracle of Apollo, who was had in great reuerence. Strabo in the nineteenth booke of his Geo­graphie or description of the earth writeth, that this place called Delphos was almost in the middest of all Greece, tearming it, The nauell of the earth: and that by reaso [...] of the commodious scituation thereof, they gladly resorted thither from all parts of the [Page 7] A worlde. There was great treasure in this temple, and plentie of rich offerings, whereof mention is made at large in the Greeke Histories.

BVT appoint [...]th euery thing to a proper office and exercise for the same.] Plato in the se­cond 2 booke of his Common-weale: first of all, saith Socrates, I consider that we are not borne one altogither like another, but differing in nature, euery one being fitte for his owne worke. And a little forward: It followeth (saith hee) that all things are done best, with most ease, and in greatest quantitie, when according to nature and in conuenient time, one person followeth but one trade and occupation, laying all others aside, [...]B B as Aristotle saith.

NOTVVITHSTANDING the barbarous people.] Plato in Menexenus writeth, that in 3 Greece they called all other people Barbarous, that had no communion of liuing or language with the Grecians, and that they accounted them for slaues. Plutarch in his small treatise of Alexanders fortune and vertue witnesseth, that Aristotle counsailed A­lexander to shew himselfe a guide and conducter of the Grecians, and Lord and Master of the Barbarians; and to honour and respect the Grecians as his friendes, and to beare himselfe toward the others as beastes and plants. To the contrarie whereof, Strabo in the first booke of his Geographie, maketh mention of a certaine man, who complained C of all them that not only deuided all men into Grecians and Barbarians, but also coun­s [...]iled Alexander the Great to vse the Grecians as his friends, & the Barbarians as ene­mies: which partie affirmed, that it was more seemely and meete to make a difference betweene them according to their vertue and vice; for that there were many wicked Grecians, and a great number of good and ciuill Barbarians: As for example, the Ro­manes and people of Carthage, who vsed a verie good kind of Gouernment in their Common-weales.

HAVE the wife and seruant in equall estimation.] The Barbarians not rightly obseruing 4 the order and prouidence of nature, employ their wiues as much in all respects as their D slaues, laying as great burdens vpon them as vpon their seruants. As in these dayes the Lan [...]quenets going a warfare, cause their wiues to carrie their necessaries with them. The Turkes and Africans suffer not their wiues to goe abroad with their faces vncoue­red, nor to frequent temples, markets, and other places where the people vse to make their assemblies, but keepe them close in their houses, without acquainting them with any common affaires whatsoeuer: for that by the religion which they follow, they may lawfully take diuers wiues, and put them away for a small cause: which causeth them to loue & esteeme their wiues the lesse. They that haue written of the Muscou [...]tes (a Nor­thern people, and Christians after the Greeke manne [...]) affirme, that the wiues in those E parts are accounted but as Chamber-maids, and are neither called to feasts, nor suffered to go to Church, or walke abroad openly: but contrariwise they are otherwise honou­red as goddesses, and doe what pleaseth them, without gainsaying of their husbands.

THE occasion whereof is, because they haue no man amongst them commanding by nature.] 5 The Barbarians knowe not how to put such difference as is conuenient betweene the wife and the slaue, because they are brutish and void of ciuilit [...]e, hauing no man of vn­derstanding amongst them apt by nature to command: but commonly chuse for their superiours the sturdiest and strongest of bodie, neglecting those that be better & wiser.

THEREFORE the Poets affirme, that the Grecians ought to haue dominion ouer the Bar­barians.] 6 F If the case so stand, that the wisest and clearest sighted ought to rule ouer the blockish and and ig [...]orant sort, then the Grecians, who are learned and wise, ought to rule ouer the Barbarians: by which reason they maintained, that t [...]e Empire ouer others was theirs. All men naturally loue and commend their owne countrey: therefore Ari­stotle in this place, and in the seuenth booke of this Worke and the seuenth Chapter, commendeth the G [...]eeke Nation, affirming the same to be valiant, couragious, & wit­tie withall, as inhabiting a conuenient [...]oile betweene the North and South [...] by reason [Page 8] whereof shee continueth in her libertie and is well gouerned: and that she might rule G the whole world if shee had but one kind of gouernment. Also Plato in Menexenus and Isocrates in his P [...]negyricall oration, greatly commendeth this Nation, which then flourished in learning and feats of armes, and in all Liberall sciences and handy occupa­tions: but after, their chance turned cleane contrarie, in as much as they were brought in subiection, first by the Macedonians, next by the Romanes a long time, so farre, that they changed their name after the translating of the Empire to Constantinople, and in stead of Grecians were called Romanes, and the countrey of Greece was named RO­MANIA, and at this day they remaine vnder the dominion of the Northerne Turkes of Asia, who are a verie barbarous kind of people. Plutarch in his booke of the Defection H of Oracles, complaineth that in his time there could not be found three thousand men of warre in all the land of Greece: so farre at that time was it gone out of kind.

7 ACCOVNTING the Barbarian the selfe same by nature that a bondman is.] As though the Barbarian were not borne with reason and vnderstanding, but only strong and stur­die like him which naturally is a slaue.

OF these two assemblies, a house or family is first compacted: and rightly saide Hesio­dus the Poet, how it was expedient before any other kinde of worke, to haue a house, a wife, and an Oxe to till the ground: for an Oxe serueth poore folke in stead of a seruant. So then the as­sembly I made and ordained by nature for to communicate and reigne togither euery day, is the familie or house. Charondas calleth them that are assembled [...], liuing togither by one and the selfe same prouision: and Epimenides of Candia termeth them [...], vsing one and the selfe same hearth or chimney.

OF the societies of man and wife, of the master and seruant, a houshold or family is naturally compact, to communicate in necessities daily happening: as to eate, drinke, warme, rest, and sleepe: [...] in Greeke, and Domus in Latin, and also the French word Maison, signifie not onely the walles and couering of a building, but also must be ta­ken K for a family. Cic. de Senectute. Tantam domum Appius regebat & senex & caecus. Virg. 4. AEneid. Miserere domus labentis.

BVT the first assembly consisting of many houses, not for things dayly necessarie, is called a Streete or companie of neighbours dwelling togither in one precinct or place, which also accor­ding 1 to nature seemeth to proceed from the house, and of such persons as some men call [...], that is to say, nourced with the selfe same milke, both childrens, and nephewes, and others descending from them.

L

AS the house is by nature made of the two assemblies afore-declared, so is the Bo­rough, Streete, Village, or Parish, according to naturall order framed of many houses or families, which by reason they are so greatly encreased in number, can not any lon­ger communicate togither in their daily necessities of taking their foode and rest togi­ther, which must be done euery day: but being separated by reason of their multitude, must follow merchandise, contract, goe to law, and conferre togither of the Common­wealth, which be no matters that are done euery day, but at certaine times prefixed or conuenient, as we see faires and markets, Tearmes for pleading, and assises.

1 WHICH also according to nature seemeth to proceed from the house, and such persons as M are nourced with the selfe same milke.] Cicero in the first Booke of his Offices, writeth after this sort: As the desire of procreation is by nature common to all liuing wightes [...] the first societie is in marriage, the next in children, then a house where all is common, which is the beginning of a towne, and as it were, the seed of the commonwealth: the linkings togither of brethren follow, then cousen germanes and such as are further off in kindred: who when they can dwell no longer togither in one house, seuer themselues [Page 9] A into other houses, as Colonies or men flitting into other townes. Marriages and affini­ties ensue, whereof kindreds doe spring: which multiplication and augmentation of linages, is the originall and foundation of Commonweales. He hath the like speech in his fift booke of Ends, and first booke of Lawes.

THEREFORE at the first, Citties were gouerned by Kings, and so still at this day are 1 such Nations as descended of men accustomed to the Kingly gouernment: For euerie hous­holde 2 is gouerned by the eldest as it were by a King, and so consequently are the Colonies 3 or companies multiplied from thence, gouerned in like sort for kindreds sake. And this B is the selfesame that Homer saith, Euerie man of right gouerneth his wife and children: for that in olde time they liued thus dispearsed here and there. By occasion whereof, as men of auncient time liued, and yet till this present time liue vnder the gouernment of 4 Kings, so did they all suppose that the gods had a King: for as they iudge the shape of 5 th [...] gods like to theirs, so did they their manner of liuing.

As the house or family is ordinarily gouerned by the most ancient of the race, which it reuerenceth as a King, euen so is the Borough or Village, and consequent­ly the Cittie, by reason they tooke their beginning from men accustomed to such C kinde of gouernment as the Kingly one is. Therefore Aristotle in the fift Chapter of this first booke calleth Oeconomie or House-gouernment, The kingdome of the house: and in the third booke and the eleuenth Chapter, he calleth Oeconomie, Roy­altie of the house.

THEREFORE at first, Citties were gouerned by Kings.] Cicero in his third booke 1 of Lawes writeth in this sort: All nations in ancient time, were obedient to Kings, which kinde of Empire was first transferred to most vpright and iust men: And this hath greatly profited in our Common-weale, that it was at the beginning vnder D kingly go [...]ernment. And in his second booke of Offices. Good Kings (saieth hee) seeme to haue beene ordained of olde time, not onely amongst the Medes, as He­rodotus affirmeth, but also amongst our ancestors, that iustice might bee ministred and enioyed. Salust in his Preamble of the conspiracie of Catiline, saieth: In the be­ginning Kings (which was the first name of Emperie known vpon the earth) exer­cised, some their mindes, others their bodies: At that time also men liued free from couetousnesse, euerie one holding himselfe well content with that which was his owne: but afterward Cyrus in Asia, the Lacedemonians and Athenians in Greece, began to subdue townes and Nations, taking pleasure in hauing rule and dominion E for warrefares sake, and accounting the enlargement and great circuit of their Em­pire for a great glorie and renowme, &c. Trogus Pompeius, and Iustine in the begin­ning of the briefe Historie: The Empire and Soueraigne gouernment (saieth hee) was in the handes and power of Kings; when all people, Nations, and things were and began first: which Kings were not exalted to that high degree of Maiestie tho­rough popular ambition, but in respect of their modestie, approoued and well knowen of the better sort. Then were not the people kept and ordered by lawes, but the Princes pleasure stoode for lawe: The custome in those dayes was rather to keepe the frontiers of their Empire, then to seeke meanes to augment and encrease F them: Kingdomes were bounded and limited by the countrey of him th [...]t reigned. Ninus king of the Assyrians was the first that through the greedie desire to beare rule, changed the ancient customes of Nations, and was likewise the first that be­ganne to make warre vpon his neighbours: who finding the people at that time vn­skilfull of meanes how to make resistance, brought them all in subiection vnto him, euen from his owne Realme vnto the furthest partes of all the country of Lybia. [Page 10] Vexores king of Egypt, and Tanais king of Scithia were ancients: the one of them con­quered G as farre as the countrey of Pont, the other euen into Egypt: Howbeit they made wa [...]re farre from their owne territories, and not neere, and sought not Empire and so­uerainty for themselues, but the glory of their people: and holding themselues content with the victory, let the signiorie alone. But Minus established the large and ample do­minions that he had gotten, for a continuall possession; in such sort, that hauing tamed and ouercome his neighbours: waxing the stronger thereby to assaile others, and ma­king euery victory an instrument to get another after, he subdued all the people of the East to his rule and dominion.

2 AND so still at this day are such Nations.] In a manner all the auncient, most famous H and renowmed Nations, liued vnder roiall gouernement: as the Scithians, Ethiopians, Indians, Assyrians, Medes, AEgyptians, Bactrians, Armenians, Macedonians, Iewes [...] and Romanes, when they were vexed and wearied with other sorts of Gouernement. Also the most notable in these daies, liue in the like sort, as the Frenchmen, Spaniards, En­glishmen, Polanders, Danes, Moscouites, Tartarians, Turkes, Abyssines, Moores, Agia­mesquians, Zagatynes and Cathaians. The wilde and sauage people themselues newly discouered, are in a manner all vnder Kings: And they that liue in a Common-weale, as the Venetians, retaine the outward shew and apparance of a King, whome they name Duke, being eligible and continuing in that degree from his election during his life. I In other places they haue Confalonners, as at Luke, and were accustomed to haue a [...] Florence and Sienna: or Aduoyers and Burgemaisters as in the Cantons of Suessia, and enfranchised Cities of Germany, which acknowledged one Emperour for their so­ueraigne. In time past the Carthaginians and Lacedemonians (esteemed the best mana­ged Common-wealths) vse in time of peace an Oligarchicall Gouernement, that is to say, the gouernement of some few of greatest note amongst them in regard of cre­dite, riches, and nobility: and in time of warre remitted all the superintendance of the army into the hands of one alone. In like manner the Athenians who held the name of kings in great detestation, and did vaunt themselues in this, to be esteemed popular, yet K notwithstanding had one aboue the rest, whome they called their [...], that is, their President or Pretor, in whose name they stiled all their publicke decrees. Thus we see that almost all nations doe leuell and aime at the Monarchicall and Royall go­uernment: and that those which continue long in that forme, prooue at length verie puissant and mightie: and further, that the best polliced citties haue been constrained in affaires of importance to elect certaine officers in stead of kings, to whome for a sea­son they committed all authoritie.

3 FOR euerie familie is gouerned by him that is most aged in yeeres, as if it were by a King, and also the townes which proceed therefrom.] Euen as a house or family is ordinarily go­uerned L by the most ancient of the kindred: so also are hamlets, villages, and townes, by reason of their affinitie: for the children and offspring of one family being multiplied, dispearse themselnes abroad, and of one create many families. From thence (they aug­menting also as in the former) are deriued little hamlets into some neighbour and ad­ioyning places: where liuing scattered here and there they grow into incorporations, and from thence by succession of time arise citties: now in all these particular degrees they acknowledge the most ancient for their king. This commeth to passe so often as a land hauing been long vnhabited, beginneth to repeople it selfe, as Plato grauely and learnedly reporteth in the third booke De Legibus. M

4 THEY all supposed that the gods had a King.] Isocrates in his Oration to Nicocles or Symmachus saith: If wee search antiquitie, we shall find that it is helde, that the gods are gouerned by Iupiter: The which opinion if it be true, wee must be persuaded that the gods themselues preferred this estate of gouernment before all others: But if it be a mat­ter altogither vncertaine and doubtfull, depending only vpon opinion grounded vpon hearesay, yet it is a great argument for the preheminence of a Monarchie, seeing that [Page 11] A they would neuer haue ascribed it to the gods if they had not esteemed it the best.

FOR as they imagined the shapes of their gods to be like vnto theirs.] Aristotle in the 5 twelfth booke of his Metaphisickes and the eight Chapter saith, that our predecessours and ancestours in a fabulous manner, conueyed certaine traditions to their posteritie of the essence of gods, and that the deitie should comprehend in it the vniuersalitie of na­ture: and that other such like fabulous deuises were deuised for the persuasion of the people and for the opportunitie of lawes and common good: for they conceiued them to be shaped either like men or other liuing creatures, with other consequences and si­militudes as their fantasticall braines excogitated. This said Aristotle: from the which B if wee shall separate the former only conceit touching the first essences and beeing of the gods, surely we may account this to be a diuine saying: and that Philosophie, as it is likely, often times found out as farre as it was possible (though afterwards lost them againe) such excellent opinions, which as rare reliques it preserued vntill our age. Ci­cero in his first booke. De Legib: declareth the similitude which man hath with God: and in his first booke De natur. Deor. hee saith thus: You haue no want of reasons to demonstrate that the formes of the gods are like to men, because we are so fore-enfor­med and forestalled in our minds, that as soone as we thinke of God, presently the shape and figure of a man commeth into our mindes. Moreouer, because that the deuine na­ture C surpasseth in excellencie all other things: therefore the forme of it ought to bee most beautiful and excellent. Now, than the forme of man what is more excellent? You may annex a third reason, and that is, that the dwelling place of vnderstanding can set­tle and remaine in no other forme nor subiect, then in it. Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis saith: God created man after his owne Image, after the image of God created he him, male and female created hee them. And in the fift Chapter: This is the booke of the Generation of Adam in the day wherein God created man, after the sim [...]itude of God created he him. Plato in Thaeetet. saith thus: Wisdome, iustice, and holinesse, conforme vs like vnto God. And a little after: God is at no time nor in no respect vn­iust, D but most iust, containing in him all the power of iustice: neither is there any thing which more resembleth him, than a most iust man. Wherefore we must vnderstand this similitude betwixt God and man to consist onely in spirit and goodnes, and not in any outward proportion: for what likenes in this respect can there be betwixt the Creator and the creature, betwixt a humane and diuine nature, betwixt corruption and eterni­tie, visibilitie and inuisibilitie, betwixt a finite small thing contained within the com­passe of a little roome, and him that is infinite, incomprehensible, and containing all things? Lactantius Lib. 2. cap. 11. entreateth of the Creation of man, and how hee was made after the image of God. So Mercurius Tresmegistus also, who not only saith so, E but also goeth about to render a reason why and for what cause euery member of the body was made.

CHAP. II. What is a Citie: and that it consisteth by nature: and that man is naturally a sociable and ciuill creature.

A Citie is a perfect and absolute assembly or communion of ma­ny 1 F townes or streets in one, hauing alreadie attained to the highest pitch of perfection and selfe- [...]ufficiencie, and being ordained not onely to this end to liue, but also to liue well: And seeing that the former simpler societies haue their beginning from nature, therefore also a cittie doth subsist by nature, this beeing vnto them their end and scope, as nature 2 is to this. For as is each thing, the generation thereof being perfected, 3 such say wee the nature thereof to be, as of a man, a horse, or a house. Moreouer, that for which 4 [Page 12] 5 cause other things are done, & which is the end, is good; now selfe-sufficiencie is the end, & ther­fore G 6 exceeding good. Out of all which it appeareth, that a Cittie is by nature: and that by nature also a man is a Ciuill and sociable creature: and also that he which naturally and not by acci­dent or chaunce is cittilesse and vnsociable, is to be esteemed either a wicked wretch, or more then a man, as hee on whome Homer raileth saying: That hee was both tribelesse, lawlesse, and houselesse. For as soone as a man findeth himselfe by nature to be such, forthwith hee hun­teth after warre, as being not restrained by the yoke of marriage, euen as it falleth out among [...]oules of the aire.

A CITIE is an assembly of many townes sufficiently furnished of all things re­quisite, H as well necessarie as honest, to this end to liue well, not onely in regard of vertue, but also of commoditie and profite, hauing verie little or no need at all of the aide of others. The which is a thing naturall, because it consisteth of naturall partes, to wit, a family and a towne, whereof it is the end and accomplishment: be­cause they are subordained vnto it, and naturally tende vnto it as vnto their chie­fest perfection: considering that the nature of euery thing is most knowen and dis­cerned in the end. Moreouer, forasmuch as it is composed of men naturally Ciuill and publicke, that is to say, by their naturall disposition, enclining to liue in socie­tie: as it appeareth by Speech, which was in vaine bestowed vpon them if they should I liue solitarily without companie and conuersation. And if by chance there be any such monster extant, which by a particular inclination should shun and auoid Ciuill societie, hee ought to be reputed as most wicked, a louer and stirrer vp of warres and seditions, and a most bloody and cruell tyrant. Wherefore all men that are well and liberally borne, are naturally incited to desire and loue it: and hee amongst the rest whi [...] first instituted and ordained societie, deserueth most high commendations, as the authour of great good.

1 A CITIE.] When many dwell togither, and by the mutuall communicating of their seuerall labours, workes, and goods, liue sufficiently and vse the same lawes and K customes, they are called Citizens, and their place of habitation a Citie: but when they reach not vnto that sufficiencie which I haue spoken of, then they violate their societie and loose the title of a Citie and Citizens: which is a most euident argument, that the verie essence of a City consisteth in that. Plato in his fourth booke De Legib. complai­neth of many Common-wealthes that were not Cities, but certaine habitations in vil­lages where the weaker yeelded seruice to the stronger, and the whole gouernment was denominated of the part that ouer-ruled. Aristotle Lib. 3. Polit. restraineth the name of a Citizen to those onely that partake publicke honours and offices, as those which haue right to enter into the Councill and to giue iudgement, excluding all Me­chanicall L artificers from that title.

2 AS nature is to this.] Nature sometimes signifieth the principles and beginnings of naturall substances, as in Naturall Philosophie: sometimes also the perfection and con­summation of them. Arist. de generat. Animal. Lib. 2. cap. 1.

3 FOR such as is each thing, the generation thereof being perfected, such say we the nature thereof to be.] He declareth that which he propounded before, to wit, that nature is the end, because the nature of euery thing is principally perceiued in the end, and the end is to come vnto a generalitie and perfection. Also the generation of things is not per­fect, before they be come to that passe that they grow no more: so that the forme is the M perfection of euery thing, hauing then it nature in possession, when it getteth vnto it selfe perfection: as, albeit an infant be a creature partaking of reason, yet is not in his naturall perfection, vntill it haue the full vigor of bodie and soule accomplished.

4 MOREOVER, that for which cause other things are done, and which is the end, is good.] The End and Good are but one and the selfesame thing. Arist. Polit. Lib. 3. Cap. 8. In all Artes and Sciences their Good is their end, and in the greatest and principallest of [Page 13] A them, which is the facultie of pollicie, is the greatest and principallest good: and this is by good right called the Politicall good: which is nothing else but the publicke and common vtilitie. The same Aristotle Ethic. Lib. 1. Cap. 182. saith, that the end Politicall compriseth in it all other ends, and is the chiefe and soueraigne good of man.

SELFE- sufficiencie is the end.] To haue all things, and to want or desire nothing, is 5 Selfe-sufficiencie, Aristot. Polit. Lib. 7. Cap. 5. This autarchie or selfe-sufficiencie, is the end and the good contained in the forme of a Citie, and consequently is the end of all other societies.

OVT of all which it appeareth that a Citie is by nature.] A Citie is yet further by nature, 6 B because that it is compounded of men naturally Ciuill and Politicke.

MAN therefore is more sociable then any Bee, or other creature whatsoeuer that desires so­cietie: which is manifest by this, that Nature who hath bestowed the power of Speech vpon man, maketh nothing in vaine. Voice which is the signifier of ioy and sadnes, is bestowed for 1 this cause vpon other creatures, for euen Nature proceedeth so farre in them, that shee giueth them a feeling of ioy and griefe, and a power to declare the same vnto others. But Speech is giuen vnto vs to signifie what is profitable and what vnprofitable, and consequently what is iust and what uniust. For this is a proprietie belonging vnto man aboue all other liuing creatures, C that he onely hath a sense and feeling of good and euill, and of iust and uniust. The communion of which things begetteth and establisheth a house and a Citie.

NATVRALLY all liuing creatures Terrestriall, Aquaticall, Aëriall, or winged, both domesticall and sauadge, tame and wild, desire to liue togither in companies and assemblies of their owne kinde. Thus we see flockes of sheepe, heards of cattell, Hartes and Deere to feed by troupes; Horses, Asses, and Mules by droues: Crowes, Stares, and Cranes by flights: Fishes both of salt and fresh water by skulles: Bees to dwell in hiues, Pigeons in douehouses, Pismiers in hollow places: But men adorned more sin­gularly D with an immortall Soule, with Reason and Speech, and by those prerogatiues more communicable then all other creatures, as borne to honour God, loue one ano­ther, to liue in Ciuill gouernment, vnder Lawes, Magistrates, and Iudgements, hauing alone the sence and vnderstanding of that which is good and bad, honest and dishonest, iust and uniust: knowing the originall and causes of things, their progressions, antece­dents, and consequences, their likenesses and repugnances, doe more commodiously and prosperously lead their liues togither, doing that by law, which other creatures do onely by naturall instinct. The first societie of mankind is of the husband and his wife: the second of parents and their children, where seruants haue their place as ioynt-helpers: E then the companies of brethren, cousen-germanes, and cousens remooued, who growing into great numbe [...]s, can no longer haue their food and lodging togither, but by occasion of their multitude are constrained to seuer themselues into sundrie fa­milies: who neuerthelesse meete togither at certaine daies and places, and can not one be without another: as in the Temple, to make their prayers vnto God vpon festiuall dayes; to traffique, buy, and sell in markets and faires, to discusse their controuersies in Courts and places appointed for administration of iustice, to conferre togither of the Common-wealth in Towne-houses: which multiplication, is the originall of Pari­shes, Boroughes, Townes, and Citties, in all the temperate partes of the inhabitable F earth, reckening the length thereof from the West to the East, as Spaine, France, Italie, Greece, Anatolia, Persia, Narsingnia, the triple India, and the breadth of the same from the South to the North, from the third climate to the seuenth. For in those countries that are extreame hote or cold, men [...]aue neither houses, boroughes, nor townes, nei­ther sow nor plant, helpe themselues little or nothing at all with Arts and occupations, nor vse any kinde of money at all: but desiring to helpe one another in their mutuall wants, they vse the exchange of one thing for another: they wander continually in huge [Page 14] companies like great walking Citties, vnder the guiding and conduction of diuers G heads and lords: taking with them their small lodgings or sillie cotes couered with leather, mattes, reedes, or course wooll, to saue themselues from heat, cold, and show­ers: and without long stay in any place pursue and follow the commoditie of grasse, hearbs, and fresh water to feed their cattell, which they haue innumerable of all sorts, as horses, camels, sheepe, and kine, wherewith togither with venison they sustaine themselues, beeing destitute of all manner of corne, pulse, and fruites. Such in ancient time were the Scithians and Sarmatians or Sauromatians, dwelling in most large and spatious fieldes, vncouered, without either wood, trees, or bushes, hauing neither high wayes nor limits, carrying their little houses vpon charrets, wherein they placed and H bestowed their wiues and children, and were therefore called NOMADIANS and AMAXOVIANS: being vtterly ignorant of tillage: their foode was flesh and milke, by reason the plaine and smooth land was fit to yeeld such kind of victuals, beeing furthe­red therein by diuers great riuers, which passing ouerthwart, made the same fertile and well stored with fresh water. Herodotus in the fourth booke, Iustine in the second, Dio­dorus the Sicilian in the second, and Hippocrates in his litle worke of the Aire, of Wa­ters, and Places. To these Scithians succeeded the Tartarians, deuided by swarmes of Zauoglians, Cosanians, Nogatians, Precopians, and other most vnciuill companies, alwaies wandring vp and downe, ignorant of riches and pleasure, by reason they liue I in small charrets with two wheeles couered with poore feltes, and go for the most part clad in skinnes against their continuall frosts and snow: They possesse huge droues and flockes of cattell, eate flesh either rawe or halfe baked or sodden, specially the flesh of horses, cattes, and dogges, and are abhorred of all other men: they drinke mares milke which of purpose they make sower first: They goe in a manner alwaies on horsebacke, swarming as thicke as Antes, and with all their baggage passe ouer great, deepe, and rough riuers, by swimming, without either bridges, boates, or any other kind of vessell. They haue the reputation to be good archers and valiant men, though commonly they be but of a meane stature, verie foule, sallowe coloured, flatte nosed, hollow eyed, K and either smally or not at all bearded: They were vtterly vnknown in all ancient time, and shewed themselues openly about the yeere of our Lord and Sauiour Christ 1211. vpon the appearing of a great blasing starre by the space of sixe moneths before, and vnder the conduction of Cynkys their Prophet and first Emperour, and of his succes­sours, occupied in short time the greatest part of the North, East, and South, whence came the great Tamerlane, in the yeere 1400. who ledde an armie of twelue hundred thousand fighting men, terrifying all the whole earth that is inhabited, with this incre­dible multitude, and the feare of his owne valiancie. At this day they hold all the coun­tries which reach from the riuer of Tanais and the seas of Pontus and Bachu, vnto Ca­thaia L and China, most rich and mightie prouinces in the East. They be great theeues, of [...]en molesting their neighbours with sodaine incursions, as well in Asia as Europe. Paulus Iouius in his thirteenth booke of Histories, and in his Treatise of the Mo [...]co­uites: Hayton Armenian in his booke of the Tartarians: Matthias Mychau, of Sarma­tia, Europe, and Asia: Iosaphat Barba [...]o Venetian, in his voyage of Tana and ambassage of Persia: Sebastian Erbestine in his Moscouian ambassage: Sabellicus in his sixt booke of Enneades. On the other side toward the South, in olde time were the Numidians, who liued abroad in the aire without houses, continually labouring and trauailing, vsing for drinke no wine, and for meate verie simple and poore fare, to relieue naturall M necessitie onely, and not to serue to pleasures: who by occasion thereof were most actiue, mightie, healthfull, and of long life, as writeth Appian in the Lybian warre, and Salust in that of Iugurth. The Arabians liue at this present after the same sort since the comming of Mahomet, carrying about with them their houses, villages, & townes; which they drawe vpon charrets or cammels backes, seeking for good pastures in the mountains & deserts, from Arabia and the riuer of Euphrates vnto the sea of Atlantus, [Page 15] A being verie harmefull to the plaine fieldes of Syria, Egypt, and all hither Africa that lie next vnto them, specially in the haruest and fruit times: for then descend they in great and huge troupes; as close and thicke as Stares amongst the vine trees: and after they haue got and spoiled what they can, retire themselues againe so swiftly, that they ra­ther seeme to flie then to runne: insomuch, that it is altogither both vnpossible to ouer­take them, or follow after them in places destitute of waters. They be a Nation vaga­bondish and innumerable, howbeit deuided into people and lordes called SCHETZ, agreeing not well togither, and hauing no stable habitation: they ordinarily dwell in tents and pauillions made of poore and the worst wooll that is: they eate flesh & milke, B specially of Camels, vsing thereto a little quantity of Rice, hony, dates, raisons, drie figges, oliues, and venison when they can catch it, going often a hunting with hounds and hawkes for Stagges, Buckes, Does, Ostriges, and after all other kind of wild beasts and foules. Commonly they be in person deformed, in visage leane and euill fauoured, of a small stature [...] tawnie and darke coloured, blacke eyed, with a shrill and womanish voice, wearing no apparell but their shirtes, vnlesse it bee those that are the chiefest amongst them: They ride for the most part without any saddles, spurres, & horseshoes: Their weapons are great reeds of India, ten or twelue fadome long, with a little Taffata in manner of a banner. Notwithstanding this pouertie and miserie wherein they leade C their liues, they boast themselues for the chiefe and peerelesse men of the worlde, be­cause they neuer were mingled with other Nations, and haue entirely preserued the nobilitie of their blood. Iohn Lyon in his first booke of the description of Africa Loys Bartheme in the first booke of the Voyages. Paulus Iouius in his 18. and 33. booke of Histories.

THE voice which is the signifier of sadnes and ioy, was bestowed for this cause vpon other 1 creatures: But speech was giuen to vs to signifie what is profitable, what vnprofitable.] There is a diffe [...]ence betweene the Voice and Speech: For the beast [...] haue a voice wherewith they can expresse their sadnes and ioy one to another, and proceed no furthe [...] [...]t man D with his Speech vttereth what is profitable, what hurtfull; what iust, what [...] the cause is, for that the beastes haue a sensitiue soule, which stretcheth with the [...] thereof to such effectes, as proceede from brut [...] and sen [...]ll app [...]ite: But man hath a resonable soule, which discoursing with the faculties thereof, is able to consid [...]r of vertue and manners; as is at large entreated of in the Ethiques.

HOVVBEIT the Citie is before the house and euery one of vs: for of necessitie the [...] is 1 before the part: for of the whole perish, there will remaine neither foote nor han [...], sauing in name onely: as for example, if one should call that a hand which is made of sto [...]e, because a E dead hand would be like vnto it. All things are defined by their operation and power, inso­much that when they c [...]se to be such, they must no longer be called such in substance, but in name onely. Therefore is it cleere and manifest without all doubt, that a Cittie is by nature and before any one of vs: For if euery man seuered and set alone, is nor sufficient for himselfe, hee will be so affected toward the whole, namely the Cittie, as other partes that are sundred from their whole. But he that can not abide to liue in companie, or through sufficiencie hath need of nothing, is not esteemed a part or member of a Cittie, but is either a beast or a God. 2

A CITIE not only consisteth by nature, as hath been declared, but also by nature 1 F is before a house and the parts thereof: that is to say, more worthy; for the perfect is by nature before the vnperfect, as Aristotle affirmeth in his first booke of Heauen. There­fore a Cittie (being a perfect company) is by nature before (to wit, in exce [...]lencie and dignitie) a house, (which is an vnperfect company) and also euery particular man. As, when any peece of worke is to bee taken in hand, consideration is rather had of the whole as the end and perfection, than of the partes; although the worke must begin at the partes: For that which is latter in generation is former in nature, a [...] [...] downe in [Page 16] the eight booke of Naturall Philosophie, and in the first booke of Supernaturall Phi­losophie. G Adde hereunto, that when the whole perisheth, the partes perish and loose their vse, and so consequently their right name: As for example, when a man is dead, there remaineth no longer in him neither eye, foote, nor hand, because their opera­tion and power (sauing in name onely) is gone: I meane, the eye wherwith we see, and wherin lyeth the power of seeing; the foot wherwith we walk, & wherin lieth the power of walking; the hand wherewith we handle, and wherein lyeth the power of handling: which members when they cease to be such, must be no more taken for the same, sauing vnproperly, by retaining the common name onely and not the reason of the name, which is called Equiuocation. In like case, if euery of vs seperated and put asunder, can H not enioy sufficiencie, there is the selfe same reason of him toward a Cittie, as other parts are accustomed to haue to their whole. Neuerthelesse as concerning time, a house is before a Cittie, beeing composed of the assembly of houses, the house being part of the same, as is declared in the first book of the Oeconomickes or houshold affairs in the first Chapter: as a sheepe is in nature before a flocke, compounded of many sheepe. But howsoeuer the whole is thus made by partes, yet neuerthelesse before the full ac­complishment of the whole, the partes remaine vnperfect; but the whole being per­fected, they become also perfect, by obtaining their perfect vse.

2 BVT is either a beast or a God.] [...]. Aristotle in his Ethickes, Lib. 7. 1 cap. 1. mentioneth, [...]: that is, a certaine Heroi­call and diuine vertue, surpassing the ordinarie vertue of men in excellencie and perfe­ction of goodnes: to the which hee opposeth [...], that is, brutishnes or sauage­nes, a vice that exceedeth the common malice and naughtines of men.

WHEREFORE all men desire such societie, and he which first inuented and instituted it, 1 was the cause of much good: for euen as man in perfection is the best of all liuing creatures; so 2.3 being void of lawe and iustice is the worst, for armed improbitie is vntollerable: for man is 4 from his birth armed by nature with the armour of wisdome and vertue, which he may abuse K 5 to contrarie effectes: and by that meanes forsaking vertue, hee becommeth most wicked and 6.7 cruell, giuen ouer to all manner of lust and vnsatiable pleasure of gluttonie: but iustice is a 8.9 thi [...]g belonging to pollicie, sith the order of a ciuill societie is the lawe, and iudgement is no­thing 10 else but the decision of that which is iust.

A CITIE being prooued to be a thing naturall by the fore-alledged reasons, all men are naturally enflamed to desire it: and hee which first ordained it, deserueth high com­mendation, as the author of great good: the which praise is ascribed by Virgill AEnead. lib. 8. to Saturne: by Horace in his Art of Poetrie to Orpheus and Amphion: and in L his Odes to Mercurie: by Cicero lib. 1. de Oratore to Eloquence and eloquent men: who also in his 6. book de Repub. or Dreame of Scipio, saith thus: To the end you may be more affectioned to defend the Common-weale, knowe, that there is a certaine place in heauen designed to those which shall preserue, releeue, or amplifie their countrey, where they shall enioy euerlasting happinesse: For there is nothing here below more agreeable vnto the great God that gouerneth the worlde, than the societies and assem­blies of men covnited togither by lawfull equitie, which men call, Cities: The gouer­nours and preseruers of them, as they first descended from heauen, so shall they returne thither againe. And in his Oration for P. Se [...]tius: Who knoweth not (saith he) that the M nature and condition of man hath heretofore been such, that they, not hauing either the law Naturall or Ciuill prescribed, wandred vp and downe dispersed in the wide fieldes, and possessed nothing saue that which by violence they could dispoile others of, and be­ing thus gotten, retaine by force, euen by murder and blowes? For which cause there arose vp some excellent persons both in regard of valour and wisdome, who knowing the excellent docilitie & vnderstanding of mankind, assembled togither these dispersed [Page 17] A wights into one place, and transformed them from their rude and sauage disposition, to mildnes and iustice. Then they established those things which contained in them any common commodity, which we call Publicke; and ordained societies, which after were called Cities; and incompassed about with walles their conioyned houses, which we call, walled Cities: the diuine and humane law being found out. Plato lib. 3. & 6. de Leg. rehearseth the beginning and proceeding of policie. Arist. Pol. Lib. 7. Cap. 10. is of opinion, that matters belonging to policie haue ben long time since deuised, & after lost againe many times, as they shalbe hereafter in like sor [...], as it hath happened in all Arts.

FOR euen as man in perfection is the best of all liuing creatures.] A man well shaped, 1 B well borne, well brought vp and instructed, and withall, perseuering all his life long in vertuous actions, is not onely the best of all other creatures, but more, euen the best and most excellent thing which is to be found in this inferiour worlde. Abdala, one of the wise Sarazens or Arabians, beeing at a time demanded, What was the most admirable thing in the habitable earth, answered: That there was nothing in the world to be seen more admirable & wonderful then Man: with whom conspireth Mercurius Trismegist, who calleth Man, a great miracle. And most certaine it is, that Man is begotten of an excellent quality and condition, euen after the image and similitude of God, and as it were, of the stocke and linage of God, to celebrate his honour and imitate his good­nes, C to the end hee may view the order of celestiall bodies, and keepe and defend the ha­bitation of this middle terrestriall globe. He is adorned with a diuine vnderstanding, togither with knowledge able to discerne betwixt truth and falshoode, and put a diffe­rence betwixt good and euill; and with wisdome to consider the principles and causes of things, with their consequences and repugnances; and with memory to call to mind things past, and combine that which is to come with the time present. He is partaker of reason, by means whereof men are associated to ech other in the communion of speech and life. The shape of his body is proportioned agreeable to his vnderstanding, togither with many commodities and fitnesses of exterior and interior members, accompanied D with senses and affections: he is sharpe, prouident, subtill, borne to contemplation and action: amongst all creatures (ouer whome he is placed as prince and ruler) hee onely hath the knowledge of God his Creator: And wheras other creatures do either looke downeward to their food, or creepe on the earth, or liue couered with water, hee is of stature straight erected towards the aspect of heauen, the originall place of his true pe­digree, beholding both that which is aloft and below, first, last, and middest, because the inquisition and search of truth belongeth properly vnto him: and contemplating the heauen, starres, earth, water, liuing creatures, plants, stones, and mettals, and the na­tures of all things; he commeth at last to know God the moderator and gouernour of E all: to whome also in his ordinary affaires and continuall afflictions, he hath recourse by prayer, imploring his aid: and seruing him sincerely by a true religion, aspireth at length to eternall felicitie. By man all lawes and customes were appointed, equitie iustly prescribed, and a certaine discipline of liuing inuented, the better & more hap­pily to conduct our liues. What should I reckon the innumerable Arts, inuentions, and excellent sciences found out by him, to furnish life with things necessary and honest? wherfore it seemeth that by good reason he holdeth the chiefe roome of dignity in this world, being also called of many, A little world; in as much as the same things which are in the great world, are also found to haue place in him: the fire, the aire, the water, and F the earth, mingled and tempered togither, are really & substantially in his compound body: within the wals wherof dwelleth a spirit more pure and diuine then the elements, answering proportionably to heauen, & coupling (as Aristotle saith) the soule to the bo­dy. In him is the life of plants, performing the same offices, namely, to ingender, norish, and grow, as in them. In him is the sense of bruit beasts, both interior and exterior. In him inhabites a soule ful of reason, an vnderstanding diuinely added therunto, bodiles, passionles, and immortal: and lastly, a conuenience and agreement of all these natures [Page 18] togither, in such sort, that no substance disdaineth to minister aide and succour vnto G him: the superiour essences are fauourable vnto him, and the inferiour, obedient: The earth, with the other elements and their creatures, are his Seruitours: Heauen labou­reth for his good by continuall motion, and Angels procure his safetie by their mini­strie; Almightie God that gouerneth all by his diuine prouidence, hath care ouer him, euen to his least members. So that being endued with so many fauours, he might enioy all things comprised within the circle of the worlde, which are innumerable in multitude, wonderfull in beautie, and besides mount vp euen vnto heauen, by retiring himselfe in contemplation from this world to Godward: from darkenesse to light, from corruption to eternitie, from ignorance to wisedome and knowledge of that true iu­stice, H which in times past was constrained to forsake the fellowships of men, because of their peruerse and obst [...]nate malice.

2 SO being void of law and iustice, is the worst.] As a man absolutely iust, is the best of all; so the vniust m [...]n is most wicked and pernicious, what good soeuer hee otherwise hath. Plato de Legib. Lib. 2. saith thus: To enioy health, to see, heare, and perceiue sen­sibly all things, and to liue long, euen to the attaining of immortalitie, is a thing vtter­ly euill, if a man be withall depriued of iustice and other vertues: and that to liue a little while is a lesse euill to him that is so disposed. And yet lower: It may be I shall not per­suade you, that the vniust and reprochfull man is so farre from happinesse, that he is ra­ther I miserable, albeit hee possesse health, riches, and a perpetnall tyrannie in gouern­ment, huge strength of bodie, inuincible courage of mind, immortalitie of both, and doeth not endure any thing which in vulgar estimation is deemed euill. And a little af­ter: Although he be puissant, faire, rich, and at libertie all his life time to doe what hee list, yet if he be vniust, for this onely, his life is dishonest, sorrowfull, and incommodious.

3 FOR armed improbitie is vnsupportable.] As if you should say, a licentious tyranni­call libertie, or a wittie fitnes and abilitie applying it selfe to commit euil. According to that which he saith afterwards, That a man is naturally armed with vnderstanding and vertue: that is to say, with such naturall aptitudes, as may be applied as well to euill as K good, and which without discretion and reason, doe much hurt: as hee sheweth in his Ethickes, Lib. 6. Cap. vlt.

4 FOR man is from his birth armed by nature with the armour of wisdome and vertue, which he may vse to contrary effects.] To wit, to good and euill, designing that vertue and wise­dome which is naturall, or certaine habits acquired, like vnto them: which may be vsed both towares vice and vertue: as for example, Craftines in stead of wisdome, rashnes in stead of fortitude, rigor in stead of iustice, softnes and cowardlines in steade of tempe­rance. To vnderstand the better this place, it is to be obserued, that vertue is taken in a double sense, the one properly, as it is defined in the 2. booke of Ethickes, namely to be L an electiue habite consisting in mediocritie, referred vnto vs, and limited by reason. In this signification vertue is not seuered from a right reason, neither can any abuse it to vice or dishonestie. In the other sense it signifieth improperly, a certaine ability or rea­dines, wherewith some can easily perfourme that which good men accomplish by true and sound vertue, as to abstaine from whoredome, prodigality, and rashnes, although they doe it with an euill will and intent. Such vertue as this a wicked man may easily a­buse to ill and dishonestie, for he that doth iust, is not forthwith a iust man, as it is decla­red in the 2. booke of Ethickes: nor a temperate man that performeth temperate Actes: but he that doth them, their ci [...]cumstances obserued, iustly and temperately. The same M reason is of Prudence or Wisdome, the which if it be taken properly, to wit, for a habit of gouerning our selues by reason in things that are good or hurtfull to man (as it is defined in the sixt booke of Ethickes) no man can in this sence abuse it to an euill ende, because it is as it were the Architect and builder of other vertues, by prescri­bing vnto them what is most meete and conuenient for them. For euen as it is writ­ten in the first booke of the great Morals: Prudence or Wisdome is nothing else [Page 19] A but to desire good things, and to doe them well beeing desired: but sometimes it is taken improperly for a certaine abilitie in dispatching affaires, and bringing them to the end which is propounded: of the which abilitie called in Greeke [...] is spo­ken in the 6. booke of Ethickes, and in the first of the great Morals. In this sense an vniust man may right well abuse this Prudence improperly taken, which is indeede nothing else but craft and subtiltie. Cicero Lib. 3. De natur. Deor. saith thus: Sure it had been far better for mankind if this quicke and prompt motion of thinking, togither with that subtiltie and abilitie which is called Reason, had neuer in some sort been giuen vnto man, because it is hurtfull vnto so many and helpfull vnto so few, then to haue been B bestowed by the gods so liberally and bountifully: for what inordinate desire, what aua­rice, what wickednes could there be without a setled purpose, or a perceiuing vnder­standing, or without thinking, that is to say, without reason? what seeds of iniustice, in­temperance, and timiditie could there be, if Reason had not a hand in these vices? We spake not long since of Medea and Atreus, heroicall persons, how they consul­ted with discourse of reason about their horrible villanies. What shall we say of the Comicall harlots? vse they thinke you but little reason, or deale they without subtilty? what of those cousenings, deuises, deceits, and fallacies, can they be without reason? Let vs come from the Theatre, and survey the place of iustice where causes are pleaded & C decided: I pray you goe sit downe: why? you will say: to the end that he which burned the Charters and Rolles of the Empire, may be arraigned: What wickednes more se­cret! and yet Q. Socius, a magnificall Romane knight, confesseth that hee had done it. Or he which copied out the publicke letters: This also did L [...] Alenius in counterfaiting the seales of the sixe principals. You are not ignorant of other criminall causes tou­ching the golde of Tholossa, and the conspiracie of Iugurtha. Rehearse the presidents against Tubullus, who tooke a bribe to giue iudgement: the subsequents of incest, by the law Peducia: and after the ordinaries of stabbings, poisonings, robbing the com­mon treasurie, and of suborning testaments. From what spring proceeded such acti­ons? D I answere, that the robbery was committed by your aduise and counsell. More­ouer, so many suites by breach of faith in wardships, commandements, fellowships, re­demptions of sold landes, and such other things of like nature which are done against faith, in buying, selling, giuing or taking to hire: besides the publicke iudgement of priuat affaires by the lawe Lectoria: and againe, the iudgement of Dolus malus, guile­full dealing; in a word of all wickednesses, which hath been not long since propounded by our friend C. Aquilius, who affirmeth, That such kinde of deceit consisteth in feig­ning one thing and doing another. Thinke wee then that such store of hurtfull seedes came from the gods immortall? for if it be they that haue granted Reason to men, then E haue they in like sort granted malice, since malice is a cunning and deceitfull Reason to doe harme. The selfesame also haue giuen fraud, wickednes, and other like things that neither can be taken in hand nor executed without reason: Therefore the gods should not haue giuen this subtiltie to men, which few of them vse rightly, and these few also are often oppressed by those that abuse it to euill. Now there be innumerable that vse it euill, so that this diuine gift of reason and counsell seeme [...]h to haue been bestowed on men for fraud, and not for goodnes.

AND by that meanes forsaking vertue, he becommeth wicked and cruell.] Plato De Le­gib. 5 Lib. 7. saieth thus: The child that as yet hath not attained to the fountaine of per­fect F prudence, is the most deceitfull and wanton creature that is, and therefore should be kept vnder as it were with a bridle. The same Authour in his sixt booke of the same worke: In all things liuing, the first branches that haue a good beginning according to the propriety of their nature, do easily attaine to their ordained end, as it commeth to passe not only in plants and beasts both wilde and tame, but also in men: for we affirme, that man is a milde and cou [...]teous creature, who obtaining togither with a happy na­ture good bringing vp, vseth to make himselfe of a most diuine and gentle disposition: [Page 20] But if hee haue not sufficient and good education he becommeth the most cruell of all G creatures that are borne vpon the earth. In the 6. booke of his Commonweale: Wee know that the seed of plantes and liuing creatures, which in due time and place recei­ueth not such kinde of nourishment as is meet and conuenient for it, in that it is a thing both noble and vehement in operation, doth loose the greatest part of the powers there­of: for euill is more contrarie to good then that which is not good. So that if a good na­ture meete with such manner of education as is contrary vnto it, then prooueth it in the end to be more vile then that which is cowardly and naughtie. Therefore affirme wee, that if mindes endued with a noble vnderstanding, lacke good bringing vp, they become most wicked. Thinke you that great mischiefes and extreame enormities pro­ceed H rather from a dull and lumpish mind, then from one that is couragious and hardy, marred with euill education: and that a weake nature may now and then be cause of great good or great harme? Therefore if mans nature meete with conuenient instru­ction and education, it must needes by continuall profiting and going forward, attaine to all kind of vertue. But in case it want good bringing vp, it can not choose but fall into all manner of contrary vices, vnlesse some god lay his helping hand thereto. With this brand of beastly crueltie in old time were specially noted Diomedes, who killed his guestes, and made them meate and prouender for his horses. Mezentius, whome Virgill in his 8. Booke of AEneades reporteth to haue coupled dead carkasses with I liuing bodies of men, ioyning hand to hand, and face to face, and so tormenting them to death in that most inhumane and barbarous manner: Nero, who killed his owne naturall mother: Busiris, Phalaris, Atreus, and Thyestes.

6 GIVEN ouer to all manner of lust.] Abusing indifferently all sortes of women con­trary to the law of God and man, and committing that most detestable vice of bugge­rie against nature.

7 AND vnsatiable pleasure of gluttonie.] Seneca writeth thus of the abominable pro­digalitie of the Romane Emperour Caligula, who succeeded Tiberius: It seemeth vnto mee that nature had brought foorth this Prince, to shewe what extreame vices K are able to doe when they fall into a soueraigne fortune; who was so exceedingly de­praued, that hee would needes spend an hundred Sestercies at one banquet: but al­beit that hee vsed the helpe of the spirits, and inuentions of all gluttons and prodigall wretches, yet could hee scarsly finde meanes how to wast and consume the whole tri­bute of three Prouinces vpon one supper. Cicero in the 5. booke of Tusculans Que­stions, maketh recitall of Xerxes King of Persia, how hee wallowing in all kinde of wealth and giftes of fortune, holding himselfe content neither with his innumerable forces, as well of footmen and horsemen and power vpon the sea, nor with the infi­nite treasure of golde which he had in his possession, promised great reward to whom­soeuer L could finde out any kinde of pleasure: and yet when the same was found, hee could not be so content. Anthonie and Cleopatra passed so farre in desired super­fluitie, that they contended who should spend most in making excessiue feastes and banquets, erecting the companie of a ioyfull and merrie band, whereof themselues were chiefe, and tearmed them persons leading such a kinde of life, as neither could be imitated neither was frequented by any other. Apicius consumed in luxurie and gluttonie nine hundred Sestercies, and when hee sawe how his great riches had pas­sed through his paunch, for feare least he should lacke foode ere hee dyed, killed him­selfe with poison, euen as though his purpose was to punish himselfe for the dainty and M deare morsels which he had deuoured. Plinie in his tenth booke calleth him, The prince of all gluttons.

8 BVT iustice is a thing belonging to pollicie.] For as much as the maintenance of States dependeth principally on the obseruation of iustice, there is no doubt but iu­stice is a thing worthy to be had in chiefe regard in a Commonwealth, and to bee esteemed as the sinew and chaine of the whole Cittie or Common-wealth, retaining [Page 21] A the Citizens (who are vnlike in condition) in vnitie and friendship through a due pro­portion which she vseth as well in things as in persons.

SITH the order of ciuill societie is the law.] That iustice is fit for a Common-wealth, 9 and appertaining to the gouernment of a Cittie, it appeareth by that, that law is the order of Ciuill societie; for wee vsually say, that that is lawfully and rightfully done, which is perfourmed fittely according to the order and constitution of pollicie. And when iudgements are exercised by Magistrates, and the will of iustice declared by ex­position of law and right, then is the order of the Citie preserued.

AND iudgement is nothing else but the discussing of that which is iust.] And in his 10 B fift booke of Morall Philosophie hee saith, Iudgement is the deciding of that which is iust and that which is vniust, to wit, that the efficacie of iudgement consisteth in the exposition of right, and discerning of iust from vniust: Iustice therefore is a vertue yeelding to euery man his owne: Iudgement is as it were the iurisdiction that pro­ceedeth according to receiued lawes or customes, and the disposition of the writ­ten lawe.

C CHAP. III. Of a family and the partes thereof, specially of the Master and Seruant.

NOW for as much as it hath beene declared of what partes a D Cittie consisteth of necessitie, wee will first speake of the gouernment of a family: for euery Cittie is composed of families, and the partes of a familie be those whereof it is immediatly compacted. But for that the nature of euery thing is to bee considered in the best partes thereof, and forasmuch as the first and best partes of a familie are the master and seruant, the husband and wife, the father and chil­dren, wee will entreat of these three, what each of them is, and what they ought to be, to wit, of the masterly, husbandly, and fatherly societie. There is yet another part which some men thinke to be Oeconomie, and others take to be the princi­pall E part of a family: concerning the which, wee will also entreate what it is, I meane, that which consisteth in acquiring and getting of goods and possessions both mooueable and im­mooueable. But let vs first of all deale with the master and seruant, that wee may knowe what appertaineth to necessarie vse, and whether wee can attaine to any better knowledge therein then is now in the common opinion of men: for some holde opinion, that the go­uernment of a master is a kinde of science, and that the authoritie of a master and Oeco­nomie, or ordering a familie; and the gouernment of a Cittie or Common-wealth, and the kingly state and gouernment are all one and of the selfe same kinde and nature: as wee haue alreadie touched at the beginning. Others thinke that the authoritie and gouern­ment F of a master and his bondman is against nature, sith it is the force of lawe that ma­keth one a bondman and another a free man, who notwithstanding differ nothing in nature: and therefore conclude they that it is not iust, but a thing maintained by violence. Now for as much as goods and possessions are partes of a familie, doubtlesse the skill to get goods shall be a part of the Oeconomie: forasmuch as it is not possible to liue, much lesse to liue well, without necessarie prouision: for as in Artes definite it is expedient and needefull 1 to haue instruments and tooles fitte and conuenient for the performance of their worke; [Page 22] 2 So must it be in the O [...]conomie of a famile: Now of instruments there be some that haue life, G and others that are without life: as for example, in a shippe the sterne is a liuelesse instrument, and the Mariner that hath charge of the foreship is liuing: because that in artificiall affaires the Maister or seruant supplieth the place of an instrument. In like manner goods are instru­ments seruing to the vse of mans life: and to possesse goods, is nothing els but to possesse a multi­tude of instruments, and a seruant is a liuing possession, and euery Minister an instrument ouer instruments: for if instruments could at their maisters becke and commandement, or by 3 any precedent sence of their owne, performe their worke, as it is reported of the statues of Dedalus, or Treuets of Vulcan, which the Poet affirmeth to haue come of themselues to the battaile of the gods: and so also of the weauers shuttles, and af the quill or bowe of a Violl, H that they woue and played of their owne accord: I say, if it were thus, then cheefe builders 4 should haue no need of seruants, nor lord [...] of slaues. They therefore which are called instru­ments, are operatiue and working instruments, but the possession of goods is an actiue instru­ment: for by a Weauers shittle a certaine thing is made and left besides the vse of it: but of 5 a garment or a bed wee haue nothing but the vse. Moreouer, sith that operation differeth from action in kind, and sith either of them hath need of instruments, it is necessary that these instruments also of either kinde haue the same difference. As therefore life is an action, not an operation; so a seruant is a Minister vnto that which concerneth action: besides a possession is called to bee as it were a part, for a part is not onely the part of another thing, but wholly I and absolutely of another thing, and so likewise is a possession: and therefore a lord or master is the master of a bondslaue or seruant onely, and not in the power of the seruant or bondslaue: but the bondslaue is not onely the bondslaue of his maister, but wholly and entirely in his power. By all which it is easie to bee knowne what is the nature and condition of a bondslaue: for hee that is not his owne by nature, but another mans, and yet a man, the same is by nature a bond­slaue. Now hee is another mans, who so euer being a man is possessed of another, and a thing pos­sessed 6 is nothing els but an actiue and seperate instrument.

BEFORE he wadeth any deeper into the discourse of a Cittie or Common-wealth, K the Philosopher inserteth here a disputation touching Oeconomie and the parts there­of, which continueth to the end of this first booke: the which parts are euidently set downe by him in expresse tearmes, called a Husbandly, Fatherly, and Maisterly socie­tie. This last is expounded and declared from the thirde Chapter to the end of the fourth: where, vpon good occasion, is handeled most learnedly the manner of comman­ding and obeying: and after hauing defined what it is to serue and to bee a bondslaue; hee resolueth vpon this, that some are borne in that estate and condition to serue and obey: shewing that by nature they are properly slaues, which are dull and grosse of vn­derstanding, but puissant and strong of bode, to exercise necessairie workes and la­bours: L and that on the other side they are by nature Maisters and Lords borne to command, which are indued with iudgement and wisedome of mind, but feeble of bo­die, and that the same is profitable to two purposes, both that the wise may com­mand, and the strong obey. Besides these three parts of Oeconomie fore-expressed, a fourth is adioyned, called Acquisitiue, that is to say, a facultie of gett [...]ng and ob­taining goods seruing for the maintenance and entertainement of the family and of the Cittie: the which facultie notwithstanding doth not properly appertaine to Oeco­nomie, the office whereof is rather to vse goods, then to seeke to get them, and there­fore ought to bee placed among the parts of Oeconomie. Of this is spoken at large M in the fift, sixt, and seuenth Chapters: of the fatherly and husbandly societie, is en­treated in the eight and last Chapter. Where againe hee discourseth of commanding and obeying, and of those qualities which are respectiuely requisite in each of them.

1 ARTS defined.] That is, which consist in some certaine thing, and haue their nature as it were defined and determined.

[Page 23] A OF Instruments some haue life, and some are without.] Instruments liuing, as seruants, 2 slaues, Oxen, Horses, and Cammels: Instruments without life, as Chariots, Carts, Forks, Sythes, Sickles, and saddles, &c.

AS it is reported of the statues of Dedalus.] The Greekes call such Instruments [...], 3 that is, which by certaine slye and priuy engines mooue themselues. Plato in his bookes called Menon and Eutiphron, maketh mention of Dedalus and his workes.

THESE therefore which are called instruments are operatiue and working instruments, but 4 the possession of goods is an actiue instrument, [...].] Instruments Operatiue, and Actiue: these are Philosophers tearms little vnderstood, and lesse vsed of B the Vulgar sort. Instruments whereby besides the vse ariseth a certaine worke wrought, are called Operatiue: As from the shittle ariseth the webbe, from the Aule, shooes, from the needle and the scizers, a coat or a shirt: but those whereof nothing redoundeth but the bare vse, are called Actiue, as the Virginals, the Viall, and the Lute, which after they once leaue sounding, there remaineth nothing behind to be seene. This profession of goods is an actiue instrument: because there is nothing required in it but vse onely: as in putting on a gowne or a shirt, or sitting in a chaire, there is nothing left after the vse of them.

MOREOVER sith that operation differeth from action in kind, [...].] 5 C The difference of working and doing consisteth in the end, as the fame Au­thor declareth in the first Booke of his great Morrals: for the end of working is a thing beyond the operation; as the end of building, besides the working, is a house. But of singing with voice, or of playing on an instrument of Musicke, there is no other end of such an action, saue onely the song and the melodie. Besides to worke, appertaineth pro­perly to manuall and mechanicall Arts: but to doe, belongeth to wisedome and other morall vertues. It is very hard & difficult to represent in our English the true difference of these two wordes [...], the which euen in the common ancient phrase of Greece, were not distinguished, saue only in the schooles by the Philosophers, the D better and more properly to expresse the nature of things, which indeed may be better vnderstood by them, then by any forced or constrained tearmes of any other language: but yet they which shall suruey and reade this worke, must thinke, that wee are Transla­tors, and that wee shall doe very much, if in communicating this matter vnto our Na­tion, wee make Aristotle somewhat intelligible without going astray from his owne sence and method.

AN actiue and seperate instrument, [...].] Some instru­ments 6 may be seperated from their possessours, as a hatchet, [...]cizers, plainer: others are inseparable, as the eies wherewith wee see, eares wherewith wee heare, and the tongue E wherewith we speake and tast.

BVT whether there be any bondslaue by nature or no, or whether it bee better and iuster for 1 some to serue or no, or whether all bondage bee against Nature, it is now to bee discussed. Now it will not bee difficult to perceiue the truth of this question, as well by reason as common experi­ence. For to commaund and obay are things not only necessary, but also profitable, yea and some things haue this difference ingrafted in them, that some are borne to obay, others to command [...] and of them that command and obay there are many and diuerse kinds: besides, that comman­ding 2 is alwaies best, which is ouer the best subiects: as it is better to command ouer menne, than F ouer beasts, forasmuch as that worke is euer the better which is performed by the best. Therefore where one commaundeth, and another obayeth, there is a certaine worke done, for in all thinges 3 which are compounded of many, and are reduced to one in common, whether conioyned or seue­red, there is euer one that commands, and another that obaies [...] and this also is to bee seene in all the nature of creatures that haue life: yea also in things void of life, there is a certain Empire and 4 predominance, as we see in Musicall harmonie: but this it may be, doth not belong so fitly to our present purpose.

[Page 24] 1 BVT whether there be any bondslaue by nature or no.] The Philosopher here entreth in­to G a most graue discourse touching authority and obedience: Fetching their first and cheefest cause from the spring-head of nature and the principall parts of euery liuing creature well compounded, to wit, of soule and body: In which composition the soule as the better must command, and the bodie as the worse, be in subiection: which is the most excellent and most profitable Treatise of this first booke.

2 AND of them that command and obey, there are many and diuerse kinds.] Plato de legib. lib. 3. hath this Dialogue. ATHENIEN, Ought there not be authority & obedience in a Citie? CLINIAS, Yea. ATH. And I pray you what reasons and how many are there for H this authority and obedience, as wel in great and smal Cities, as in priuate and particular houses? Is not this the first and true reason of authority, that the father and the mother, and simply those that beget and engender, doe command and rule ouer their children? CLI. Certaine. ATH. And is not this the second, that Noble-men command igno­ble? and the third, that the most ancient command the yoonger? and the fourth, that Masters their bondslaues? CLI. It is most true. ATH. The fift, that the most migh­tie command the weake? CLI. Thou hast hitherto spoken of a superiority most neces­sary. ATH. Yea most common and naturall to all liuing creatures, as reporteth Pin­darus the Theban. But the greatest dignitie is in the sixt, by the which the ignorant are I enioyned to follow and obey, and the wise to lead and command: The which kind of su­perioritie (O wise Pindarus) I would not say that it is contrary to nature, but accor­ding to the nature of Law, and that it is not violent but voluntarie. CLI. Thou saiest well. ATH. Wee will reduce the seuenth kind of superiority vnto a certaine lot, affir­ming it to come to passe by some especiall grace of God, or some principall good hope, in such sort, that hee which shall bee thus chosen by lot, commandeth: and hee that is thus reiected, obeyeth. CLI. It is euen so. And in the fourth Booke hee pro­ceedeth. ATHENIEN, This is one of the iniquities which happeneth in superiority. CLINIAS, Of what iniquities? ATH. Of those which we haue before recited in ex­pounding. K Who they bee that ought, and ouer whome they ought to commaund. Now wee haue said, that fathers ought to command their children, and those that de­scend from their loines, that ancient men ought to command the yoonger sort, No­ble, the ignoble, and other such like formes of dignities, if you remember them which are hinderances and lets to each other. And wee added also the opinion of Pindarus, who esteemed gouernement to bee a thing agreeable to Nature and Iu­stice, and that the most mightie, should command the most weake. CLI. All this is true.

3 FOR in all things which are compounded of many, and are reduced to one in common, whe­ther L conioined or seuered, there is one euer that commaunds, and another that obeyes.] All things consisting of many parts, and combined in one common meane, whether they bee conioined as a liuing creature, consisting of a soule and a body vnited, in one com­mon band by the participation of the soule and the bodie together, or whether they bee deuided as a societie betwixt the male and female, I say in all these thinges there appeareth to bee a commaunder and an obeyer by nature: for in those that enioy life, it is certaine that the minde commaundeth, and the bodie obayeth. In other things which want life, there is neuerthelesse an appearance of an Empire, as among the Elements the fire seemeth to possesse a kinde of superiority, and the earth seemeth M to be subiected to the rest.

4 YEA also in thinges void of life there is a certaine Empire and predominance.] To com­maund and to obey, are thinges so naturall in all thinges, compounded of matter and forme, that euen things void of life, doe carry in them a certaine shewe there­of, as in Musicall harmonye, consisting of voyces or soundes, the treble see­meth to commaund the Base. First of all, wee see that all this inferiour world [Page 25] A obeyeth the superiour, and is gouerned by it, and that a certaine vertuous influence ac­companied with light and heat (called by some the spirit of the world) descending from the celestiall nature, and dispersing it self through the masse of this great body, pierceth, quickeneth, nourisheth and gouerneth all things vnder the Moone, called Sublunar, va­riable and inconstant: and that of this vertue the sunne is the cheefe minister, which we acknowledge as a king among the starres, enlightening the whole world with his rayes [...] We see that the Moone like a Queene doth raigne and rule ouer humidities and moist things, declaring amongst other wonders, her manifest puissance in the miraculous eb­bing and flowing of the waues of the sea: we see that amongst the elements, the fire and B the aire by their first qualities are actiue, and the water and the earth as more materious, passiue: we see that amongst Foules, the Eagle, amongst Beasts the Lion, to haue the cheefeship: and in Waters both fresh and salt, the fishes is of most strength, as the Whale in the sea, and the Pike in the pond: and aboue all creatures, man. And we see in man compounded of a body, a soule, and vnderstanding; that the soule commandeth the body, and the vnderstanding the appetite or will. Then proceeding from a particular man to a family compact of many persons, wee see howe the father as a king naturally hath authority ouer his children, the Maister as a tyrant ruleth his bondslaue with more violence, and the husband commandeth his wife after a ciuill manner. From thence as­cending C to a Citty, we shall find, that euery ciuill and polliticke societie ought necessa­rily to be contained within the bounds of gouernment, consisting in commanding and obaying.

A LIVING Creature first of all is compounded of a bodie and a soule, whereof the one by nature ruleth, the other obeyeth: Now, we must consider the reason of nature, not in things cor­rupted and depraued, but in thinges of the most perfect and entire constitution. Wherefore it is behoof [...]full to consider man being well disposed both in body and soule, in whom this most mani­festly appeareth. And forasmuch as in vicious & naughtie persons, because they are naughtily & D vnnaturally disposed, oftentimes the bodie seemeth to ouerrule the soule. Therefore, first as I said, 1 there appeareth in man both these gouernments, the maisterly, and Polliticke: for the soule ru­leth 2 the body like a maister: and vnderstanding, the will after a King like and polliticke manner. Whereby it is manifest, that by the direction of nature, the body is subiect to the soule: And the part encombred with perturbations, to the vnderstanding or part endued with reason: and that equality and enterchange of gouernment is hurtfull to all, as well men as brute beasts. For tame and mansuet beasts are better by nature, then wild and sauage: and yet it is most expedient for all, both tame and wild to be in subiection to man: sith therein consisteth their safety. Moreouer, if we compare togither the male and the female, we shall find, that by natures law the male as bet­ter E commandeth, and the female as inferiour obeyeth, and is subiect: And the like reason is also necessarily to bee had in all men.

FIRST as I said, there appeareth in man both these gouernements, the maisterly and polli­ticke: 1 for the soule ruleth the body, &c [...]] By the two principall parts of man, it is euident that superiority and obedience, are things natural. For euen as in a man the soule, which is the better part, sits as president and gouernour; and the body as the worser, waiteth and obeyeth as a seruant: so in like manner in euery humane societie or assembly, the wisest ought to sit in the chaire of authority, and the vnaduised to stand and attend at F their beckes: hauing need of the conduct, counsell, and protection of another. The first kinde of gouernement, which is obserued in man, is the Lordly, or maisterly, after which sort the soule commaundeth the body: for the body is constrained to obey the soule, because it quickeneth and moueth it, neither hath any proper or peculiar motion of it owne, without the helpe and assistance of the soule; and therefore must yeelde such obedience vnto it, as a bondslaue yeeldeth vnto his Maister: who is so farre from being his owne man, that he is wholly in the power and iurisdiction of another, no lesse [Page 26] then beasts that are chained are in the power of their leader to follow him, nill they will G they whether hee list: for which cause the Greekes said, that the word [...], which signifieth a maister or a Lord, came from the word [...], which signifieth a binder. From this kind of priuate commanding, sprung vp a most rigorous forme of Publicke gouernment, in the which the Lord hath a most absolute and vncontrouleable authori­tie, hauing full power ouer the life and death of his subiects, as in olde time the authori­tie of the King of Persia was, as witnesseth Plato De Legib. lib. 3. and Isocrates in his Panegerick, and as is at this day the authority of the great Turke, who doth all things at his pleasure without the controulement of Lawe or Counsell, and whose subiects are constrained to obay him like brute beasts, and to doe whatsoeuer hee commandeth. The H Muscouite and Prester Iohn haue also the same forme of Regiment. The other kinde of commanding, is Polliticke and Regall, by the which the vnderstanding part, or mind, ruleth the desiring facultie or appetite, by a certaine law, tending to common profit: and not by violence, constraining it to obey. For foreseeing that which would bee either hurtfull or profitable vnto it, it gouerneth and bridleth it to the especiall defence and safety of the whole body: from which manner of naturall gouernement haue issued all iust and lawfull formes of Empires. Now we must note, whereas hee saith, that the mind exerciseth a Polliticke and Regall gouernement ouer the appetite, that this is to be vn­derstood of the reasonable appetite, for sometimes it happeneth, that the will and rea­sonable I appetite commandeth the mind in matters of faith, and in those thinges which surpasse the common capacity of vnderstanding: and sometimes againe the mind com­mands the will in thinges which it appr [...]hendeth by certaine demonstration: and thus the vnderstanding and the appetite, or will, interchaungeably commaund each other by course, which is nothing els but a Polliticke gouernment: but in things which doe not exceed capacity, the vnderstanding alwaies commandeth the will, either to auoid them as pernicious, or to pursue them as being good: and thus the mind holdeth a Monarchy in the soule, which is nothing els but the Regall gouernement. As for the sensuall appe­tite, it neuer exerciseth authority ouer the vnderstanding: but contrariwise, the vnder­standing K alwaies ought to gouerne and rule it: the which kind of gouernement is not politicall, but rather Maisterly, I meane in those, whose affections are slauish and rebel­lious against reason: but in those that are well borne by nature, and well qualified by education, it vseth a Regall and paternall forme of gouernment. And in those that haue attained almost to the consumate perfection of vertue, in whome there is no sedition in reason, nor discord in sence, it practiseth that which is called Oeconomical [...] but the flesh obeyeth the spirit in such sort, as a good wife obeyeth a good husband: to this end, to procure and procreate a holy generation of good works, which result & redound from vertue, and are commanded by holy Scripture. Galen Therap. lib. 13. calleth this princi­pality L of the soule [...], as also doth Plutarch in his fourth book of Phi­losophicall Decrees. Cicero mentioneth the same in the nature of gods, lib. 2 and De fi [...]ibus. lib. 5. so also Themistius, De Anima, lib. 3. vnderstanding thereby the common sence, which as Iudge and Arbitrator moderateth the other sences, and they as seruants obey it: according to Budeus in his Annotations vpon the Pandects. Plato de Repub. lib. 4. 8. and 9. compareth a Common-wealth to a man, and the parts thereof to the facul­ties and powers of the soule. And first as he placeth in the soule fiue faculties, the Nutri­tiue, Vegetatiue, Motiue, Sensitiue, and Rationatiue: So in like manner in a Common­wealth, hee propoundeth fiue formes of gouernments; Regall, Aristocraticall, Oligar­chicall, M Democraticall, and Tyrannicall. And whereas as well in his book called Timeus, as in the forealledged, he setteth downe three parts of a humane soule, differing in sub­stance, place, and action: Reason in the braine, which is the highest place of the body; to the which he ascribeth the principality and cheefedome: Anger in the heart, as in the middest, to serue for defence and succour; all strength and choler consisting therein: And concupiscence in the Liuer, which procureth the vniuersall nourishment of the whole [Page 27] A body. Hee applieth to these three parts of the soule, three sorts of people, necessary for the establishment of a Common-wealth: To Reason he compareth the gouernours and rulers; to Anger, the souldiours and men of warre; to Concupiscence the Labourers, Artificers and Marchaunts. Also that each of these parts are guided and conducted by their peculiar vertue: Reason by Wisedome, Anger by Fortitude, and Concupiscence by Temperance: and that when these three parts of the soule within vs, and those three sorts of people in Common-wealths, execute their iust duties and offices, according to the prescription of those three aforesaied vertues, without meddling or encroching with one another; then wee may iustly auouch, that that man is well ordered, and that B Common-wealth well gouerned: and contrarily, when those Offices and duties are transgressed.

Vnderstanding.] This is the most diuine & excellent part of the soule, by the which 2 it knoweth and discerneth: called in Greeke [...], and in Latine Mens or Animus, and of vs, either vnderstanding or mind. But euen as the soule doth farre excell the body in dig­nity, so the mind doth excell the soule, and is more noble, and therefore hath authority ouer it. Plato in Timeo saith thus: Almighty God considered, that in things visible, that which was naturally void of vnderstanding, were not at all, nor in any respect so perfect as that which was partaker thereof: and that of the vnderstanding or mind, none could C bee partakers without a soule, therefore gaue he the mind to the soule, and the soule to the body. The same Author De leg. lib. 10. saith, The soule taking hold of the mind, which is alwaies diuine, gouerneth it selfe in all things lawfully and prosperously: but if it bee matched with ignorance, then dooth it cleane contrary. The mind is that in the soule, that the sight is in the body. Ethick. lib. 1. cap. 6. The soule by the mind, seeth God, and the intelligences or Angels, Metaphis. lib. 2. cap. 9. Considereth principles and first cau­ses of the essences, vniuersalities, eternities, and abstract formes of things. Ethiq. Lib. 6. chap. 1. & 6. True it is, that in this humane infirmity our mind cannot well attaine vnto the truth, but demeaneth it selfe in things that bee most euident in Natu [...]e, as the Bats D eyes doe at the day light. Metaphisiq. lib. 2. cap. 1. And often it befalleth to men, who stu­dy too deepely of nature, as it dooth to them which consider the Sunne eclipsed, whose eyes dazell at the sight therof, Plato in Phedon. Now as the sence discerneth things sensi­ble, so doth the mind things intelligible: sensible things are the Accidents & affections of things; things intelligible are their forms and natures. Certain of the which come to the soule by naturall instinct without learning: As for example, that the whole is grea­ter then his part, that two contraries cannot stand togither in one subiect, and diuerse like principles: others of them come by reasonable discourse and demonstratiue know­ledge: As for example, such be the considerations of Logicke, Philosophy, naturall and E supernaturall: others come by diuine inspiration and infusion, as the reuelations of the Prophets, the vnderstanding of the holy Scripture, the knowledge of the Soueraigne prouidence, and of the celestiall spirits: the which vnderstandings come rather by the grace of God and the Holy-ghost, then through any gotten skill or naturall discourse. Auicen in his book of the soule, chap. 8. Aristot. Metaphis. lib. 12. cap. 5. writeth, that eue­ry intellectuall science, or that any wise pertaketh of vnderstanding, is directed toward the causes and beginnings; which bee either most certaine, or most simple. In the 6. booke. chap. 1. 8. In the 11. booke, chap 6. hee layeth foorth three sciences be­longing to speculation, to wit, naturall Philosophy, the Mathematicall Science, F and Diuinitie: wherevnto Ptolomeus agreeth in the beginning of the booke cal­led the Great composition. Aristotle De Annimal. lib. 1. cap. 2. reporteth that Plato thought certaine thinges to bee discerned by the mind, others by knowledge or Sci­ence, some by opinion, and the rest by the sences. Notwithstanding Plato in the first question of Timeus, confoundeth the minde with science or knowledge, and the sence with opinion: declaring howe euerlasting thinges may bee comprehended by the mind with the helpe of reason, and how of them scienc [...]s are ordained, as himselfe affir­meth [Page 28] in Th [...]letus, Parmenides, and Phedon, and how corruptible things are comprehen­ded G by the sence, with the helpe of opinion: whereof the Philosopher is not to haue re­gard, for that hee cannot draw from thence any Science, De Repub. lib. 5.6. & 7. Aristotle Posterior lib. 1. cap. 26. &c. Considering that the truth is drawne from things which are al­waies alike, & receiue no change. Metaph. lib. 11. cap. 5. In this maner is the difference be­tweene the mind and the sence: for the one is corporall or vnited to the body, the other simple without mixture, and may be without the body. Further, the sence is in all liuing creatures, but the mind or vnderstanding onely in those which are indued with reason, and yet not in all them neither, as is affirmed by Anaxagoras and Plato, who in his Ti­meus writeth thus: The vnderstanding and opinion are two seuerall things, forasmuch as H they were made seuerally, & are altogither vnlike: for the one is deriued vnto vs by lear­ning, the other by persuasion: the one is alwaies matched with right reason, the other without reason: the one constant, the other fickle: that all men are partakers of true opi­nion, but the gods only, or at most very few men of vnderstanding. As touching Anaxa­goras, It was hee that first affirmed howe the mind was simple and impassible, and that it was the cause of the world and of all order. Metaphi. lib. 1. cap. 3. Plutarke, of Philosophi­call sentences, Lib. 1. cap. 3. and in the life of Pericles. Galen in the Philosophicall Hysto­ry. Cicero Academ. quest. Lib. 2. and De natura deor. Lib. 1. Aristo. in his Ethicke, lib. 10. cap. 7. recommendeth the mind and contemplation in such maner as ensueth: If felici­ty I be an operation by vertue, it standeth with reason that it be by the most excellent and noble vertue, which pertaineth to that thing which is the best of all: whether that be the mind or some other thing, which by nature seemeth to rule and gouerne, and to haue the knowledge of humane and diuine matters, or whether it be a diuine thing it selfe, or the most Diuine of all thinges that are in vs, the operation thereof will bee by it owne vertue, perfite felicity: that the same is contemplatiue, it hath been already affirmed, and agreeth with the speech aforegoing, and with the truth: for that operation is most per­fect, by reason that the mind is the most excellent thing in vs, and thinges intelligible, whereabout the mind is occupied, are the best of all thinges. Further, it is most perma­nent K and continuall, seeing that we may more easily continue to consider of things, then put them in execution: and we are of opinion, that pleasure is to be mixed with felici­ty: and doubtlesse amongst all vertuous operations, that which commeth from Wise­dome is the pleasauntest: Therefore Wisedome seemeth to enioy woonderfull plea­sures, excellent both in sincerity and stedfastnesse. The same Authour De Animal. lib. 1. cap. 4. prooueth the immorta [...]ity of the soule by the mind. The mind (sayth hee) seemeth to come into man as being some substance diuine, and not subiect to perish or decay: For if it were, that would perish cheefly, through the imbecillity or weakenesse of olde age. Nowe, this imbecillity is onely as it were in the Organ or Instrument: L and therefore if an olde man could recoue [...] such an eye as a yoong man, hee would see as well as hee: in so much, that olde age commeth vpon vs, not that the soule suf­fereth, but onely that wherein it dwelleth, as in drunkennesse and sicknesse: and then it faileth to vnderstand and contemplate when it is within some Organ or member that is corrupted, but the mind it selfe is alwaies impassiple. To reason, to loue, and to hate, bee not passions of the mind, but of him rather which possesseth them so farre foorth as hee possesseth them: Therefore the possessour being dead, it neither can remember, nor loue any longer, sith they belonged not to it, but to the common thing which is now dead. But peraduenture the mind is a more diuine and impassible thing. In the M second booke, chap. 2. He saieth thus: As touching the mind and faculty of contempla­tion, there is nothing as yet fully decided, but it may seeme to bee some other kinde of soule, and that the same onely may bee seperated as an euerlasting thing, from one that is subiect to corruption: in the 3. booke, chap. 4. Thus, that which men call the mind or vnderstanding of the soule, I meane the minde whereby the soule reasoneth [...]nd iudgeth, is nothing actually before it actually vnderstand. Therefore it is not [Page 29] A meete it should be intermixed with the bodie, for so would it assume some quality wax­ing hote or cold; or stand in neede of some instrument, as the sensitiue part doth, which can not be. In the same Chapter: That which is sensible can not be without a bodie, but the mind may be stirred. Metaphis. Lib. 12. That euery soule suruiueth not his bo­die, but the intellectuall mind doth suruiue, and that mindes abstracted are coeternall with God. In the second booke De Generat. Animal. hauing disputed of the other fa­culties of the soule conioyned with the body, he concludeth, that the mind only com­meth from without and alone is diuine, because the bodily action hath nothing com­mon with the action of the mind: For euery vertue and power of the soule seemeth to B haue participation with some other and more diuine body then that which is com­pounded of elements: whereof Cicero maketh mention in his 1. booke of Tusculan Questions. Againe, euery intellectuall mind either is Actiue, Factiue, or Speculatiue. Metaph. Lib [...] 6. Cap. 1. Otherwise thus: Euery intellectuall minde, is either Actiue or Contemplatiue: Actiue, is that which is applyed to Consultation and Action: That which wee call Contemplatiue, is sufficiently knowen by the name, and by that which hath been alreadie spoken touching the same: It is diuided into a Possible or Potentiall power, called by Arist. [...]: & into the Agent or Actuall, called [...]. The Potentiall mind hath nothing as yet of that which it is ordained to vnderstand, be­ing C like an ignorant man, that knoweth neither Art nor Science: in which state we are at our birth and comming into the worlde. The mind Agent or Doing bringeth the same possibilitie or power into acte, and as it were, produceth it from darkenesse into light. The minde Potentiall is afore the Actuall, as flowres before fruite, or bright­nesse before light. For Nature hath put into all things, first a certaine power or possi­bilitie and aptnesse; secondly acte and perfection: and nothing is found perfect at the beginning, but alwaies there precedeth a beginning, and then commeth the perfe­ction. To these two are adioyned [...], the mind Passiue or Suffering, so cal­led, for that it suffereth and dieth when the soule departeth from the body, and for that D the passions of the Soule, as anger, gentlenesse, feare, mercie, confidence, ioy, loue, and hatred, doe belong v [...]o it. Ari [...]o [...]le De Anim. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. As there is in eue­ry nature some one thing seruing for [...]tter to euery kinde, which containeth all by a power or possibilitie: The other Effectiue or Causat [...]e, to doe all the same reason that Art hath in respect of the matter: the like differences are necessarily found in the soule: The one minde is such, that it retaines all: the other such, that it doeth all: which is as it were, a certaine abilitie resembling light, which after a sort bringeth colours from power into acte. The which minde is [...]eparable and not mixt, impatible, beeing by the very substance thereof an acte: for the doer must alwaies be preferred before the suffe­rer, E the beginning before the matter: and when it is seuered, then is it onely that which it is indeede, and onely immortall and perpetuall. Wee remember not then because it is Impassible, and the [...]nder [...]ta [...]ding Pa [...]ble is corruptible: without which, it vnderstandeth nothing. Theoph [...] maintain [...], that Aristotle hereby meant, that this whole compound of the Actuall and Potentiall vnder [...]nding, is separated from the body, and as incorruptible, [...]o vnbego [...]n [...] and that the minde Passiue was not seuered from the body, but is corruptible. Themistius in his Paraphrases vpon the third booke of the Soule, and in the 34. 38. and 39. Chapters. Some, as Theo­phrastus, Themistius, Simplicius, Auicenna, and Ave [...]roes, haue [...]houg [...]t, that the F minde was one and the same in all men, assisting them as the light of the Sunne assi­steth all the world, in lighting and perfecting it. The which minde they supposed to be euerlasting, not beginning with birth, but preexisting from ete [...]nit [...]e; taking holde of all such as are borne, and causing that there beeing visours in the fan [...]asie, they are able to contemplate: euen as the light of the Sunne is not then fir [...] ingendred when man beginneth to see, but beeing before illuminate, first openeth his eyes and affoordeth [Page 30] him meane whereby to see as long as they be open. If the minde (saieth Themistius) G were not one and the same in all men, as common vnto them, from whence should it come to passe, that the conceptions of all men are common and alike? from whence shoulde the notice of the first common principles arise, which are imprinted in our vnderstanding, without both reason and learning by nature? How could wee vnder­stand naturally one another? how could sciences be transferred from masters to their scholle [...]s? Picus of Mirandula seemeth to fauour this opinion in his fourth booke of Theptaple: The minde (saieth hee) which is in vs, is enlightened by a minde which is greater and more diuine, whether it bee God himselfe (as some men thinke) or an Intelligence or Angell neare to man (as almost all the Grecians and Arabians sup­pose, H and euen the most of the Hebrewes consent:) calling this substance, The spi­rit of God. Plotin in his booke De Anima & Idaeis, specially in the sixt Chapter. Ci­cero in his Dialogue De Senectute, & 1. de Legib. Manilius the Poet in the 4. booke of Astronomie: Galen in the 17 [...] booke Of the vse of mans bodie. The vilest part of the worlde is that, which is nearest to the earth, and yet the minde seemeth to des­cend euen so lowe from the superiour bodies, by the sight whereof wee are com­pelled to extoll the beautie of their substance: first and principally of the Sunne, and secondly of the Moone and Starres: and because the substance of their bodies is more pure, it is meete that the minde which dwelleth in them should be better and I more certaine then that which is in earthly bodies: for if in mire, filth, slime, and in pondes, plantes, and rotten fruites, there breede small creatures, hauing a wonder­full shewe of the superiour minde their Maker, what may wee thinke to bee in the superiour bodies [...] themselues? Also wee may behold the intellectuall nature in men, if wee consider Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and diuers other excel­lent men like vnto them. If then the minde which is so noble come into filth and slime (for how can wee better point out that which is composed of flesh, bloode, flegme, and choller, both yellowe and blacke) how great must wee thinke the ex­cellencie thereof to bee in the Sunne, Moone, and other plannets and Starres? K Verely when I thinke of this, it seemeth vnto me that there is no small portion of the minde dispersed through the all-compassing aire: otherwise wee co [...]ld not par­ticipate of the beames or shining of the Sunne, nor of the vertue and power of the brightnesse thereof.

1 THEY therefore in whome the like difference is to be found as there is betweene the soule and the bodie, betweene a man and a beast (as wee see in them all whose worke consisteth in the bare vse of their bodie, and no better thing can be driuen from them) are seruantes by nature, for whome it is best to be gouerned vnder this kinde of gouernment, as it is for the L 2 others of whome wee spake before: for hee is a seruant by nature, which may belong to another 3 man, and therefore is another mans, and which so f [...]rre partaketh of reason, that hee vnder­standeth it, and yet hath it not in himsel [...]e. Verily other creatures vnderstand not reason, but serue their owne af [...]ection; and the vse of seruants and bruit beasts hath but small diuersitie: for we are holpen of each of them by their bodies, (to wit, by seruants and tame beasts) in our necessarie businesse: it is the will and purpose of Nature to put a difference betweene the bodies of free men and bondmen, by making the one sort strong for necessarie vses, and the other straight and vnprofitable for such workes, howbeit fitte and behoouefull for the ciuill life which is 4 deuided into affaires of peace and warre: albeit the contrarie often happeneth, in that some M 5.6 haue only the bodies of free men, and the others are indued with wit and vnderstanding: ne­uertheles, 7 if there could be found any as excellent men in the body onely, as are the images of the gods, all men would confesse that they were worthy to be serued by others which are infe­riour vnto them in beautie. If this bee true in the bodie, with much better reason must it bee so in the soule: but it is nothing so easie to see the beautie of the soule, as the [Page 31] A fairenesse of the bodie. Therefore may wee conclude, that some men are borne to libertie, and 8 other to bondage, to whome it is profitable and iust to serue.

THEY therefore in whome the like difference is to be found, that there is betweene the soule 1 and the bodie.] Those men which excell others as farre as the soule excelleth the bo­die, and man excelleth beasts; to wit, in vnderstanding, reason, and witte [...] are naturally free, and right worthy to beare rule as well priuately as publikely.

WHICH may belong to another man.] Whosoeuer willingly submitteth himselfe to 2 the power and gouernment of another man for his owne good and welfare, that he B may liue by the dexteritie and wit of the other, and not through his owne labour; by reason thereof he belongeth to that other partie, as borne to be in an another mans power.

VNDERSTANDETH reason.] Perceiueth and vnderstandeth what hee is comman­ded 3 to doe by him that is of more wit and discretion then himselfe, which is not so in beastes: howbeit hee wanteth sufficiencie of reason to be able to order and gouerne himselfe conuenien [...]ly.

THE contrary happeneth.] Nature doeth not alwaies bring to passe what she would 4 and pretendeth, hauing impediment in the vna [...]nesse of the matter and other diffi­culties, C as sometimes when she would bring forth a man, it prooueth a monster.

SOME haue the bodies.] Some haue onely a body and not a [...]oule, fit for a freeman, 5 which is neither apt to gouerne, nor yet to serue.

OTHERS are indued with vnderstanding.] Prudence and vnderstanding matched 6 with a deformed bodie.

AS excellent in the bodie onely as are the images of the gods.] Which the painters and 7 Image-makers make the fairest and best proportioned to the vttermost of their cun­ning. Aristotle in the fourth and seuenth bookes of this Worke writeth: That the E­thiopians and Indians were wont when they made election of their Kings and Magi­strates, D to haue regard vnto the beautie and ta [...] of the persons.

THEREFORE may we conclude, that some men are borne to libertie, and others to bon­dage, 8 to whome it is prrfitable and iust to serue.] There be not onely particular men dis­posed to seruitude, by reason of the rudenesse of their wit and small vnderstanding, vnable to doe any seruice but by the strength of their bodies: but also there be whole Nations naturally more seruile then others: as Aristotle in his 3. booke of Gouern­ment, Chap. 10. and Hippocrates in his booke of the Aire, of Waters, and Difference of places, doe report of the people of Asia to be.

E

CHAP. IIII. Of a Bondman, and Bondage, by Nature and by Lawe.

BVt there be some men that speake against this, whose opinion is 1 F not without some reason, as wee will easily giue you to vnderstand. For, to serue, and to be a bond-seruant, is vnderstood two manner of wayes: The one is a bond seruant by force of Law: for the law is a certaine confes­sion or consent, by vertue whereof it is agreed vpon, that those thinges 2 which are taken in the warres, doe belong to the takers. Many accuse 3 this Lawe, as they doe an Oratour that persuadeth vniust decrees: as if it were a thing [Page 32] vnreasonable, that hee which is vanquished by force, should become seruant and subiect G to him, who by force can vanquish him and is more strong: There are diuers opinions of 5 this matter euen among the wisest themselues. The cause of such doubting and varietie is, because that vertue (accompanied with abilitie and meanes) is able very much to con­straine: and also the vanquisher is alwayes in some preheminence of goodnesse, in such sort, that strength seemeth not to be without vertue: So that the question is now only of the equitie. 6 Therefore some account that to be equitie and right, which is wrought by loue: Others, that 7 which hee that is most mightie, commaundeth. Amongst these so different and iarring opini­ons, one containeth nothing that is any thing worth, either for validitie or credite [...] namely, that hee which excelleth in vertue, should not commaund and beare sway. Some againe in H taking equitie (as they thinke good) for lawe (seeing that lawe is a kinde of equitie) suppose 8 that seruitude arising from warre, is iust: albeit generally they doe not confesse it to be iust, because it is not impossible that the beginning of warres was vniust. And also, that no man ought to call him a bondslaue or seruant, that it vnwor [...]hie to serue. Otherwise it would come to passe, that those which seeme most noble, should become bondslaues and sonnes of bondmen, if by chance they were taken captiue and sold in warre: for which cause they would not haue them tearmed bondslaues [...] but barbarous people [...] And yet neuerthelesse in affirming this, they seeke out nothing but a bondslaue by nature, as wee haue touched in the beginning. For neces­sarily wee must say, that some are altogither bondslaues, [...]her [...] not at all. They auouch the same I of Nobilitie, namely, that some are not onely noble amongst them, but wholly and altogither noble: but the Barbarians are onely noble, as if there were a certaine nobilitie and libertie which is absolute and perfect, and another that is not: Euen as Helene in Theodectus saieth of her selfe: I beeing deriued from the gods on both sides, who would call me a bondslaue? In saying this they put no difference betweene a bondman and a freeman, saue onely in regarde of vertue and vice: for they thinke, as a man begetteth a man, and a beast a beast; so good 9 men to beget good children [...] and [...]re it i [...], that Nature [...]ymeth at that, but often times shee 10 misseth the marke. Thus wee see, that there is some reason in this ambiguitie, and that some are naturally bondslaues, other [...] na [...]urally freemen [...] and that it is determined as a thing ex­pedient K and iust for one [...] serue, and for another to commaund: and that it is necessarie that some should obey, and some beare rule, and consequently exercise the authoritie of a master, euen by the lawe of Nature, which hath ordained such kinde of gouernment: and lastly, that an vnlawfull forme of gouernment is vnprofitable to both: for the same thing which is pro­fitable to the part, is also auaileable to the whole; and that which helpeth the bodie helpeth the soule. Now a seruant is a certaine part of his master, as a liuing part of a bodie, and yet se­parated, not conioyned: wherefore there is a kinde of mutuall vtilitie and friendshippe be­tweene that seruant and his master, which are by nature disposed to those places: and the contrarie [...]appeneth in those which are not so by nature, but by lawe and compulsion. L 11 Out of all which it appeareth, that the Masterly gouernment and Politicall, are not all one, neither yet that other gouernments betweene themselues are confounded, as some af­firme: for the one is ouer freemen by nature, the other ouer bondmen; and domesticall gouern­ment is a monarchie: for euery family is gouerned by one, but Politicall gouernment is ouer 12 those that are both free and equall. A master then hath not that denomination by reason of any particular Science or Arte belonging vnto him in his place, but simply because hee is so: and so likewise is to be deemed of the bondman and freeman. Albeit indeed there is a certaine Science appertaining to a Master, and also to a seruant; as that which was taught at Siracusa, where a certaine fellowe for money taught children to serue. But so M wee may finde disciplines and sciences in many other things; as in Cookerie, and such like seruices: whereof some are more honest, some more necessarie, according to the prouerbe: One seruant before another, and one master before another. All such artes then as these, are seruile and slauish: but the masterly science is that which instructeth how to vse ser­uantes aright: for a master is not hee that possesseth seruants, but he which vseth seruants. [Page 33] A The which sure is no great nor glorious matter, for it is sufficient, if he be able to commaund that, which the seruant ought to execute. Therefore many, when they can well ridde their handes of such trouble, they commit that charge vnto their stewarde, whilest they addict themselues meane while, either to the Common-wealth or studie of Philosophie: Now the Ac­quisitiue 13 facultie or Art of getting and prouiding goods, differeth from these forenamed fa­culties: as that which is a certaine lawfull discipline of warre, and hunting. But of a Master and 14 a Seruant it is enough discussed.

To serue, is taken in a double sense; either by nature, or by law. It hath beene alrea­die B declared both who is a seruant by nature, and that this kind of bondage is lawfull. Here he entreateth of the other kinde of seruitude that commeth by lawe, which al­loweth that the captiue in warre serue the Taker, and that the body and goods of the vanquished belong vnto the vanquisher. Which kind of bondage seemeth vniust, by reason that equitie can not proceed from force and violence, (things contrary vnto it) but rather from the voluntarinesse and good will of them, who for their commoditie, securitie, and repose, submit themselues willingly to the power of those that are more excellent in vertue. Neuerthelesse this law is defended by others, auouching that the conquerour doth alwaies excell in some vertue, and that it is agreeable to reason and C nature, that the more vertuous haue rule ouer the lesse vertuous: The which is a weake and feeble reason, because warre may grow and begin from vniust causes, so that the bondage arising from thence, shall be also vniust: and also because the conquerour ex­celling (it may be) in one militarie vertue, which is Fortitude, yet may be surpassed in o­ther better vertues; as by Iustice and Wisdome in men farre more worthy to beare rule then they.

BVT there be some that sp [...]ake against this.] Aristotle here confuteth those that con­tend, 1 that bondage is a thing against nature and vniust; saying, that to be a seruant or to serue, is vnderstood after two manners: that is to say, either by nature, or by lawe. As D touching a seruant by nature, it is no doubt, but that i [...] is both better for him, and more iust in reason to serue his naturall master. The seruant by the Ciuill lawe, that is to say, hee which is ouercome and captiuated in warre, serueth iustly and lawfully, as some thinke, esteeming it to be iust that the mightier raigne ouer the weaker: but vniustly, as others suppose, who thinke that all men are borne free, and that it is against reason that he which is constrained by force, should become bondslaue vnto the constrainer. The Romane Ciuill lawyers make this diuision of Law: There is (say they) the law of Na­ture, and the law of Nations; all men by the former of these are borne free from the be­ginning: and bondage is contrary to nature, brought in by the law of Nations, which E sprung vp after the law of Nature: insinuating thereby a certaine state of bondage, in the which in time of warre the Conquerour retaineth his captiue. But Aristotle here entreateth of the first cause of bondage, deriued from the imbecillitie of vnderstan­ding, hauing need of the conduct and guidance of the counsell of another. And if such as these will not suffer themselues to be gouerned, they ought to be compelled by force, and oppressed by strength, to the end, that the residue of humane kinde may be preserued. Euen as Surgeons vse to cut off those members which are either putrified by a Gangrene, or enflamed with S [...]. Anthonies fire, to the end that the whole bodie may not perish. In this manner they that excell in wisdome and power, may lawfully by F way of constraint keepe in subiection the weaker and vnder sort: Nature her selfe tea­ching vs by the proposed partes of a man, that it is a most iust thing, that the better should alwaies haue preheminence and dominion ouer the worser. Wherefore not without good cause they are reprehended, that through an immoderate desire of liber­tie, doe absolutely condemne that forme of bondage, which is brought in by the lawe of Nations: it being a thing necessarie for the curbing and bridling of wicked ones, to haue a certaine pollicie of estates and forme of bondage.

[Page 34] 2 THAT those things that are taken in the warres, belong to the takers.] Alexander the G Great, after hee had obtained a great victorie against Darius, and taken possession of his campe, he entred into the royall pallace, and after came to the kings bath, saying: Let vs goe and bathe our selues in Darius owne bath: Then one of his Minions re­plyed, Nay rather Alexanders owne bath; for the goods of the conquered apper­taine by good right to the Conquerours, and ought to bee denominated by them. Plutarch in the life of Alexander.

3 MANY accuse this law.] Ordaining that the vanquished in warre, should be bond­slaue to the Conquerour; because it may so fall out, that the warre may be vniustly vndertaken, and so consequently the seruitude proceeding from it, must needs be vn­iust: H or it may be that the Conquerour which excelleth in one vertue, to wit, Forti­tude, may be surmounted in many other more excellent vertues; as iustice, wisdome, and temperance: which indeed are both more befitting Empire and gouernment, and more conuenient for him that should commaund.

4 AS they doe an Oratour that persuadeth vniust decrees.] At that time the Ora­tours throughout all Greece, and specially at Athens, were of great credite and au­thority in the gouernment of the Commonwealth, so farre forth as no statutes nor ordinances were made but by their aduise. Nowe sometimes it fell out that they persuaded decrees that were vnlawfull and repugnant to good manners, and to the I ancient lawes and customes iustly instituted and ordained; for which cause afterwards they were reprooued. Euen so may we accuse that lawe which was first authour, that the conquered and captiue in warrefare, should become bondslaue to the conquerour and taker.

5 EVEN among the wisest themselues.] As Pindarus alledged by Plato in his bookes De Legib. Lib. 3. Cap. 4. vsing these verses: That Empire is agreeable to nature, and that it is iustice, that the most puissant command the weake and feeble. Thrasimachus de Re­pub. Lib. 1. affirming, that that which is most commodious to the most mightie in power, is alwaies iust. And Callicles alledgeth by the same Plato in his booke called K G [...]rgias; where he discourseth on this manner that followeth: It is saide, that it is an vn­iust and filthie thing, by lawe for one to haue more then others; which the common people vulgarly call Iniurie: neuerthelesse, as I suppose, nature declareth that it is both lawfull and iust, that the most mightie and most excellent haue a superioritie in euery thing: the which shee manifesteth diuers wayes, as well in other liuing creatures as in all Citties and Nations of men, where it is helde for equitie, that the most mightie haue not only dominion ouer the weake, but also possesse more goods then they: for by what right did Xerxes wage warre against the Greekes, & his father against the Sci­thians, and innumerable other which would be too long for me to rehearse? Surely in mine opinion, in these actions they followe the nature of equitie, and the example of L Iupiter, who is the law of nature: and yet it may be not according to our written and made lawes, whereby wee restraine and enchaine like Lyons young men of a valiant and noble disposition from their cradle vpwards, and bewitch them as it were, with cer­taine magicall charmes, seruilely to subiect themselues to these lawes, admonishing them to obserue equitie, and how goodly and commendable a thing it is so to doe. But if there should spring vp some one of a more excelling nature, that would de­spise and teare in pieces your writings, charmes, and enchantments, and vtterly abo­lishing all lawes that goe astray from nature, should enterprise to raigne and rule ouer others, then would the lawe of nature shine forth most clearely in this man. Pindarus M in a certaine Ode seemeth to me to be of the same mind, where hee saith: That Lawe is Queene of mortall and immortall things, and that shee ececuteth iustice violently with a strong hand: the which coniecture, hee saieth hee gathered by the exploites of Hercules, who droue away Gerions kine, not hauing either bought or recei­ued them by gift, but taken them away violently by strength of hand. So that by the [Page 35] A lawe of nature, both kine and all other possessions of men belong to him that is most puissant and excellent.

THEREFORE some account that to be equitie and right which is wrought by loue.] When 6 as Kings or other inferiour Magistrates are elected, and men through an opinion of their excellent vertue, which of it self is most amiable, do voluntary submit themselues vnder their obedience: or when as a dullard or a slaue by nature doth subiect himselfe willingly to him that is more wise. This voluntarinesse of menne seemeth to make equitie: because, What is equitie? But that which is acceptable to men and people by a certaine common and generall consent: proceeding often from Nature her B selfe.

OTHERS, that which he that is most mightie, commandeth.] Cyrus in Xenophon, De 7 Institut. Lib. 8. speaking to his Captaines and friendes sayeth thus: You must not thinke that yee doe wrong or iniury to any, or retaine by force other mens goods; for this is a durable and perpetuall Lawe amongst men, That in a Cittie taken or surprised by right of Warre, all the treasures, goods, houses, and persons, belong vnto the Conquerours: so that if you will bee Lords and Owners of all, your possession is not vniust, for it appertaineth vnto you as your owne: and if you leaue them any thing for their necessitie, it is of your courtesie, and not of anie lawfull claime of theirs.

C SVPPOSE that seruitude arising from warre is iust.] They which affirme that bon­dage 8 or seruitude arising from Warre is iust, doe build vpon a certaine ground of equi­tie, and vpon a certaine vertue named Fortitude. Notwithstanding, that equitie is not vniuersally, nor absolutely iust, but must bee reputed iust, onely in regard it is brought in by the lawe of Warre, not being otherwise iust of it selfe, and that for two regards: the one, because it may so fall out, that the Warre it selfe is vn­iust, and so consequently, the bondage arising thereof: the other, because it is against right, that he which is by disposition of nature borne to command, should bee brought vnder subiection by force.

D SO good men to beget good children.] Euen as from a good and well dressed Tree 9 proceede good fruites, so commonly of good Parents, are begotten good children: and Nature alwayes tendeth to this drift, although shee misseth often therein, beeing hindered by the naughtie complexion, and indisposition, or vnfitnesse of Parents, or by superfluitie or defect of matter, and after by the euill education and instructi­on adioyned. Aristotle in his second Booke De Rhethor. sayeth: That wittie and wise men degenerate into madde and furious: and modest and sober, into lasie naugh­tie packes. And in his Problemes, hee propounded this Question: Wherefore it is, that wise and learned men beget commonly dull and blockish children. E Epaminondas the Theb [...]n would not marrie, for feare least he should beget naugh­tie children vnlike himselfe. Augustus Caesar wished hee had li [...]ed wiuelesse, and di­ed childlesse, seeing his daughters and Neeces so dissolute.

Thus we see.] Here hee resolueth and decideth the present contro [...]rsi [...], redu­cing 10 into a breefe Summe the pr [...]cedent reasons alleadged on both sides, and con­cludeth, That to command naughtily, is vnprofitable both for Maister and Seruant: And likewise, to serue naughtily, is also vnprofitable to both, by the Analogie of the whole and the part, or of the soule and the body: for if the soule doe not go­uerne well the bodie, it is hurtfull to the whole person: and so likewise, if the F bodie doe not yeelde good obedience to the soule. That which profiteth the whole, profiteth the part: and that which is profitable to the part, is also profi­table for the whole. Contrariw [...]se, that which is not good for the part, is not good for the whole. Nowe, the Seruaunt or bondslaue, is as it were a certaine part of the bodie of his Lorde and Maister, yet seperated from him: and the Lord is as it were the whole, and as it were the soule. Wherefore to com­maund well, and to obay well, is good for both: and there is a certaine [Page 36] naturall amity betwixt the maister and seruant, which are so by nature, as is betwixt the G soule and the body: but betwixt the lord by lawe and his bondslaue by compulsion and violence, there is no loue, but perpetuall discord and disagreement.

11 OVT of all whic [...] it appeareth, that the maisterly gouernment and politicall, are not all one.] Hee draweth further from the former reasons a difference of gouernements, touched before in the first and third Chapters of this first book, and signally of the Maisterly and Politicall, saying politicall gouernment to bee in regard of them onely which are free and equall by nature, amongst whom there is certaine mutuall entercourse of comman­ding and obaying: but maisterly, to be ouer seruants by nature.

12 A MAISTER then hath not that denomination by reason of any particular science belon­ging H vnto him, but simply because he is so.] A Maister or Lord is not so tearmed by reason of any Science required to the right vse of seruants, as Plato said, but only in regard of vsing them actually: neither in like manner ought hee to bee tearmed a seruaunt, that knowes how to serue, if so bee he doe not withall really and actually serue. Albeit, there be a certaine belonging to maister, and another belonging to a seruaunt: As to prepare victuals for meate, to brush and keepe cleane garments, to trimme Gardens, to ouer­see Labourers, and other like Offices: whereof some are lesse slauish and seruile then others.

13 NOVV the Acquisitiue facultie, [...].] The Art of acquiring and getting goods I both mooueable and immoueable: whereof shall be spoken in the Chapter following. It is necessary, that in handli [...]g and translating such auncient Authours, wee forge and stampe newe wordes, which may bee, as it were tamed and familiarized according to the measure of vnderstanding and vse, as this word Perspectiue, in Geometry.

14 AS that which is a certaine lawfull discipline of warre.] Otherwise, hee that getteth goods and booties by vniust and vnlawfull warre, ought not to be called a warriour, but a Robber.

K

CHAP. V. Of possession, and of the naturall acquisition of goods necessary for life: withall of the variety of liuings and trades of men: and of true riches.

1 IT followes now that we consider generally of euery kind of pos­session, 2 and manner of getting of goods, according to our first entent L 3 and purpose: Seeing that a bondslaue is a part and parcell of this pos­session, First therefore it may be doubted, whether the faculty of getting goods, is the sa [...]e with the disposition of a family, or a part of it only, or at least an attendant vpon it: and if it be attendant; whether, as the art of spinning is to the art of weauing, or as the art of founding to the art of engrauing: which are not vsed after the same maner, but the one ministreth instruments, the other matter. I call that the matter, which is the subiect wherevpon the worke is wrought and absolued; as wooll is to the Weauer, and brasse to the engrauer. That therfore Oeconomie and M the acquisitiue faculty, are not all one, it may hence appeare, because it belongeth to the one to fur­ [...]ish with goods, and the other to vse them: for to what art pertaineth it to vse goods in a fami­ly, but vnto the art of Oeconomie? But it is controuer [...]ed whether it bee a part of it or no, or a seuerall kind from it, for if it appertaine to him that hath that office of prouiding goods, to con­sider and cast from whe [...]ce goods and riches are drawne; and if riches and goods comprehend many parts, we ought first to aduise of Agriculture and land tillage, and generally of all prouision [Page 37] A and preparation of victuals, whether they be portions of this facultie acquisitiue, yea or no: but 4 there are many sorts of victuals and nourishments, and consequently many kinds of diets both in brute beasts and in men: for seeing it is not possible to liue without nourishment, the varieties of victuals make the manners of liuing also diuers. Therefore of brute beasts, some liue togither in flockes and heards, other dispersed vp and downe singly according as is most commodious for them for the purchase of their nourishment and foode, because some feede on liuing creatures, others on fruits: some againe on that which commeth next to hand, wha [...]soeuer it bee: so that nature hath distinguished their manners of liuing according to the commodity and facility of these things. But forasmuch as naturally euery one is not delighted with the same pleasure, but B one with this, and another with that: for the cause and the liuings of brute beasts, both of those that feed vpon liuing things, and of those that eat fruit, differ from each other: as also in like 5 manner doe the liues of men. But of all, those that giue themselues to the trade of grasing of cat­tell, 6 are the most sluggish and stouthfull, for their liuing commeth in vnto them whilest they sleepe and loiter, from these t [...]me beasts, without trauell or sweate. But because it is necessary to change the pasture and feed of their Cattell by translating them from place to place, they are constrained to follow their dro [...]es, exercising as it were a kind of liuing husbandry. Others liue by prey and spoile, but after diuers sorts, as some by robbery, others by fishing: who for that pur­pose 7 dwell neere vnto Lakes, Ponds, Flouds, and the Sea, most fit for that trade: others by fou­ling C and hunting wild beasts: yet the greatest part of mankind liue by the earth, and by dome­sticall fruits: Therefore the kinds of liues wh [...]h dep [...]nd vpon naturall prouision, and doe not get their victuals by exchange or mart, are these: Pastu [...]e, Tillage, Robbery, Fishing, Hun­ting, and Hawking: some by intermingling these or some of [...]se together, liue more at ease, supplying the want of the one by prouision from the other, to the end, they may attaine vnto some sufficiency of life most desired: as some mingle pasturage and robbery; others Tillage, and Hunting or Hawking, and such like, according as necessity compelleth them therevnto. This manner of getting of things seemeth to bee naturally graffed in all liuing creatures, immediate­ly from their first comming into the world, and also when they bee at their perfect growth. For D some kind of creatures, euen from the very beginning of their issue do bring forth so much food withall as sufficeth the thing brought forth, till it be able to prouide for it selfe: as for example, it is so in them which bring forth Wormes and Egges: but such as bring forth liuing off-spring, 8 haue food in themselues, namely, the nature of that which is called milke to feed their yong ones 9 for a certaine time. We must deeme the like of them which are come to their full growth: name­ly, 10 that plants are ordained for liuing creatures, and that all other liuing thinges are ordained 11 for men, in such sort, that tame beasts serue them as well for vse as for foode: and wilde beastes 12 though not all, yet the greatest part of them serue for food, and other necessary vses, as for the making of clothes and such like instruments of life: wherefore if nature either make any thing E vnperfect nor in vaine, it necessarily followeth, that she hath made all things for mens behoofe. Therefore the military discipline shal be in some respect an Art of Acquiring & getting, be­cause 13 hunting is part of the same, which must he practised, not only ag [...]inst be [...]sts, but also against such men as by their natiuity ought to liue in subiection, and yet seek to shake off the yoke of their obedience: for that kind of warre is gounded vpon iust and lawfull cause. Therefore is there one 14 kind of getting according to nature, which is a part of this Oeconomy, which must alwaies ei­ther make competent prouision in store afore [...]and, or prepare it when need requireth, that there may be plenty of all such things as be either, needfull or profitable for the societie both of a Citie or Common-weale, and also of a family; wherein it seemeth that true riches consisteth: for the F sufficiencie of such manner of getting, tending to the attainement of a happy life, is not end­lesse, though Solon Poetizing, affirme, that men haue no certaine measure or end of richesse: 15 Neuerthelesse, it is contained within certaine limits as other sciences are, for there is not any kind of instrument or toole of any art or science whatsoeuer that is infinite or endlesse, either in multitude or greatnesse: and riches is a multitude of instruments pertaining to a family and to a Citie or Common-weale. That therefore there is a certaine naturall faculty of getting goods, [Page 38] that serueth as well for Housekeepers, as for gouernours of Cities and Common-weales, and for G what cause, it is cleare and manifest.

FORASMVCH as neither priuate nor publicke societie can liue without goods and possessours, there is a meane how to get them, seruing to Housekeeping and Gouern­ment, which meane is eit [...]er naturall or artificiall. First of all, here is speech of the na­turall meane, which is ordained by nature, for the preparation of thinges needefull, for foode, clothing, and other vses pertaining to the bodie: and consisteth in breeding of Cattell, Tillage, Fishing, Hunting, Hawking, which trades men vse diuersly, according to the difference and scituations of the Countries wherein they liue: for in some Regi­ons H which are most commodious, they mingle them altogether, as in Fraunce. In other Count [...]ies they vse onely the breedings of Cattell, as in Tartaria, where they liue with flesh and milke. In other places they vse Fishing, as in diuerse coasts of the Sea, and neer vnto Brookes, Ponds, and Riuers, where commonly they liue of fish. Others liue with Venison, as the inhabitants neare, or within Forrests, and in the Mountaines. Also the taking of preyes seemeth to bee agreeable to Nature, so that it bee exercised in lawfull Warres.

1 IT followeth.] After that Aristotle hath [...]eckoned vp the parts of a family, and dispu­ted I first of a Maister and Seruant, wh [...]e as [...]ca [...]on was offered, the manner of Gouer­ning and obeying was intreate [...] at large: Nowe hee reasoneth about the getting of goods, which a [...]e seruicea [...] as well for the family, as for the Citty or Common-weale. Therefore he setteth downe two kinds of getting, the one Naturall, the other Artifici­all. The naturall kinde consisteth in pasturing or feeding of Cattell, in Tillage, in Hun­ting, in Hawking, in Fishing: whereunto he addeth the taking of preyes, which is ho­nest and agreeable to Nature, if it bee exercised in Lawfull Warres. Also thereunto is referred, the sale of goods which growe and come of a mans own ground and soile: to the end, that by the sale of such commodities as we haue plenty of, we may prouide else­where K such other sorts of wares as we want: he calleth that the Marchandise per [...]aining to House-keeping, and recommendeth it as necessary for mans life: which was exerci­sed in time past, by exchange of goods or labour, before money was inuen [...]ed, and is al­so honest and permitted to honour [...]ble and Noble personages, who might not els law­fully vse Trade of Marchaundise. The artificiall kinde lie [...]h in workes and Trades, that ought to be freely communicated. Regrating and forestalling, when men buy vp com­modities to sell againe for gaine, the end whereof is not vse, but profite of money; he blameth, because that which hath beene brought in for necessity, and for mens more commodious liuing, is through craft and subtlety turned to another end, and applied L to gaine only: This kinde of craft is hatefull and preiudiciall to such as buy for their ne­cessary vse. Interest or Vsury consisting in multiplying and encreasing of money from moneth to moneth, or yeare to yeare, is likewise comprehended vnder the artificial get­ting of goods, and reprooued amongst all other meanes of getting, as contrary to the right vse of money, which was onely inuented for the furtherance of Trafficke, and ac­cording to the Nature thereof: and being a thing without life, neither ought nor law­fully may engender other mony, but should be employed to that purpose whereunto it was ordained: Though many men wholly imploy themselues to hoord vp mony with­out end, deeming that therein consisteth the principall and cheefe richesse. M

AND maner of getting houshold goods and possessions, [...].] Pecunia in La­tine, 2 and [...] in Greeke, doe signifie all kinde of goods both mooueable and vnmoue­able. [...] pertaining to houshold goods, that is to say, the industry to get, and the order in spending it conueniently, [...] signifieth getting, and [...] the spen­ding in necessary vse, [...].

[Page 39] A ACCORDING to our first intent and purpose.] As in the first Chapter of this first 3 booke, which he hath also vsed in former bookes, by proceeding from the single to the compound: therefore after he hath treated of the seruant, which is as it were a part, ac­cording to his accustomed manner of teaching, hee speaketh of housekeeping concer­ning getting and spending, because it is like a totall.

NOVV there bee diuers sorts of victuals.] The naturall skill of getting consisting in 4 prouiding of things needfull for meat and drinke and other necessaries for the bodie, is part of housekeeping, as he sheweth by the diuerse manners of other creatures liuings, before hee commeth to speake of mens liues: which doe much differ, according to the B commodity of the countries where they inhabite, and the nourishment which they are acquainted with from their youth vpward.

AND also in like sort doe the liues of men.] At the beginning men were in all thinges 5 very rude and simple, not much differing from beasts. They dwelt in caues of the earth, or vnder cabines, vsing the like meat and drinke that oxen and horse vsed, as Hippocrates writeth in his booke of ancient Phisick. At that time as they were most strong, they did feed of most strong meates, so did they then liue longest: but after waxing weaker, they could not disgest the same, but died quickly; so as they were constrained by little and lit­tle to search out a more tender and conuenient maner of liuing, by making it fit for their C complexions, strength & health, as at this day the most temperate & best ordered coun­tries do vse the same, which bring forth al kind of things needful for mans life, as France, Italy, Greece, and Anatolie. For in the vttermost coasts of the world which exceed in cold and heat, they keep from day to day their first wildnes & rudenesse, eating raw flesh and drinking nothing but milke. Others in the high and long mountains, liue of acornes and maste. Another sort in the sea coastes, eat nothing sauing fish, either fresh or dried, whereof they make meale, & then lay it in water, & so knead and bake it. The cheefe and most conuenient norishment in these quarters, is found to be wheat, barley, millet, pan­nike, rye, and other corne well knowne they haue found out the skil to sow it, to reap it, D to thrash it, to winnow it, to pre [...]erue [...]t, to grind it, to boult it, to lay it in leauen, to knead it, to make it into loaues, & so to bake [...] in ouens. They haue added vnto the same, pease, beanes, & all other kinde of pulse both old & new, for the making of pottage: also salt & hearbs for the giuing of tast & sauor, and butter & oiles: also the fruits of all such trees as are set & planted, as cherries, pruine [...], apples, peares, peaches, raisons, figs, oliue, citrons & Oranges. And not contenting themselues with corn, hearbs, & fruits, they began fi [...]st to eat the flesh of themselues, which after they left off through horror: & then put in vre the eating of the flesh of all other liuing Creatures, both tame and wilde, liuing on the earth, swimming in the water, or flying in the aire, vsing the mean of rosting & [...]eething E them, & then to season the same with sauces & other infinit daintinesse of pastry & coo­kery. Further, forasmuch as it liked them not to drinke water alone, they found out the vse of Wine, Cider, Beere, Ale, Metheglin, and diuers other artificiall drinks. And thus much as touching the maner of liuing vsed heretofore most vsually amongst ciuill men. Let vs see now what he saith of the difference of others.

BVT of all, those that giue themselues to the trade of grasing of cattell, are most sluggish.] M. 6 Varro following Decaearchus affirmeth, that the Pastorall life is most ancient, & to haue ben long before tillage, and that the nations of most antiquity liued in that trade from the beginning, & drew their names from it, as the Hebrews & Italians, which is as much F to say, if we search the signification of the words, as Pastours: now at this day the Tarra­rians towards the North, and the Arabians towards the South, vagabond and wandring Nations, liue after this manner; being wholly ignorant of all Tillage or manuring the ground, of whom mention hath ben made heretofore.

OTHERS liue by prey and spoile, but after diuerse sorts.] Vnder the name of prey & spoile, 7 are comprehended Hunting, Hawking; Fishing & robbing, & pillage by sea & land. Plat. de Leg. li. 7. saith: That this preying (so I translate that which he & Aristotle calleth [...]) [Page 40] which verbally signifieth Hunting, because this woord dooth not expresse the general­nesse G of the tearme, hee sayth: That this preying is a large and ample matter comprised in a short word: It is either vpon fishes or vpon Foules, or vpon land creatures: and not onely brute beastes, but also vpon men: and that not in warfare, but in time of peace, by way of amity; the one commendable, and the other blame-worthy: also the pillage of theeues, and booting of armies. Paul. Venet. lib. 1. cap. 60. writeth of the Medites, that they are a sauage and clownish people, that liue by beasts which they catching by Hun­ting, namely by Harts, whereof their Countrey aboundeth, which they knowe so well how to tame and bring to hand, that they make their flesh serue for meat to eate, and vse their backe to ride on, as other doe on Horses and Asses: They haue neither Corne nor H Wine, wherefore in Summer they take great store of birdes by fouling, whereof they make all their prouision against Winter. And in some Countries of India, they make bisket of dried fishes, and sliced in small peeces, which they beate and pownd in meale, and then soke it in water, and knead it, and make of it loaues of bread, which being ba­ked in the Sunne, serues for their food all they are long.

The diuer­sitie of li­uings ac­cording to the seuerall Countries.Before I oue [...]passe this passage, in my opinion it wil not be impertinent, to collect brie­fly the diuers & different maners of liuings of men, such as I could either by priuate rea­ding or mutuall conference and hearesay come to the knowledge of, to the end, this dis­course may be both more pleasing to the Reader; & also more fit for the vnderstanding of I this present matter. Euery Country hath certain peculiar nourishments & proper fashi­ons of dressing their food, differing in seasonings, sausings, & boylings, from each other: & for euery season of the year nature hath administred sundry & seuerall sorts of meats both by sea and land. The Cannibals euen at this day eat mans flesh rosted: so also other sauage people when they take any of their enemies in warre, they deuour them at their Tables. The Tartarians feed on raw flesh, whether it bee of Dogs, Cats, Horses, Snakes, and such other beastes, they care not: which flesh they onely crush betwixt two stones to wring out the blood, or mortifie it vpon the backe of a horse, a man sitting thereon. They drinke Mares milke, which they so prepar [...], that it resembleth White Wine, nei­ther K is very vnsaury, or of euill tast. The Ala [...]bian [...] eat Cammels and Ostriges, and bread made of Millet and Tu [...]nepseed powned. The Inhabitants of Cathai eat also raw flesh, which they shred first very small, and then soke it in sweete Oyle with good Spices, and being so dressed, it is their food: Their drinke is made of Rice, and diuerse Spices, hauing a tast more excellent and delicious then any Wine, and wherewith, they that drinke o­uermuch are sooner drunke, then with Wine. The inhabitants of Calecut liue by Rice, Fishes, Spices, and Fruits, altogether different from ours. Their drinke is Wine of Palm and Date Trees, mingled with Rice and Sugar. Throughout all the West Indies, they vse bread made of a certaine graine called Mahiz, and of a root called Yuca, which is the common and vsuall food, as well in the Islands, as in the Firme land. They eate their Ma­hiz L in the graine rosted at the fire, and sometimes also vnrosted when as it is tender and yoong [...] Others grind it within certaine hollow stones, vpon the which they hold other round and long stones in their hands, which being rouled about by strength of arme, as Painters grinde their colours and then pouring in water, they intermit by fits their la­bour, not ceasing neuerthelesse still to grind, vntill it be fully finished: Of it thus prepa­red they make a certaine kind of past, whereof taking a little mor [...]ell, they compose of it a roule as broad as ones hand, and two or three fingers thicke, which wrapping in a leaf of the Cane of the said Mahiz, or some other graine, they bake, and beeing well baked, draw ou [...] againe. Otherwhiles they rost this roule by the hote embers, so that it waxeth M hard, and becommeth like white Manchet, crusted on the outside, and tender and soft within. After they disrobe it of the leafe wherein it was wrapped to be baked or rosted, and eat it betwixt hote and cold, as it were luke warme. For when it is cold, it is not of so pleasant a tast, nor so easie to be chewed, because then it is drier and rougher then other­wise. For which cause they neuer store it, being baked or rosted aboue two or three [Page 41] A daies, for if they doe, it presently mouldes and putrifies, and is neither good for meate nor wholsome for teeth: and for this cause, the teeth of this people is commonly more rotten, filthie, and naughtie, then of any Nation in the world besides. This kinde of bread is called Tascalpachon. Besides, of the same past of Mahiz they make also tartes and cakes: and when they saile in the South seas, they carry with them for prouision of vit­taile, the meale of Mahiz rosted, which being mingled with water and stirred well to­gither, serueth them for drinke, being like vnto a [...]leare [...] panade, and for nourishment also; hauing nothing else to satisfie hunger: for it is both bread and water, both meate and drinke, altogither: Yea ouer and aboue, it hath this qualitie, t [...]t if the water bee B corrupt and stinke, it taketh from it the euill odour, so that it tasteth of nothing but of Mahiz. In the prouince of Cueva their wine is made also of Mahiz. The other kinde of bread which they vse, is of the roote Yuca, which is in colou [...] white within, and in bignes as thicke as a Turnep: the which though it be wholesome being well prepared, yet is a deadly and mortall poyson before the iuyce bee crushed out of it: with the graine of this they make great Tartes, which they call Lacabi, [...]and is their ordinarie and vsuall bread, for it keepeth a yeere or more without put [...]saction or moulding, so that it take no wette nor moisture in the meane time: and this ferueth them for foode and prouision vpon the sea througho [...]t all the I [...]lands, and vpon the coasts of the Con­tinent C or Firme land. This is the principallest, the commonest, the best, and most neces­sarie food that they haue in those quarters. They make their drinke of the iuyce of Pineapples, which they call Yayama, which truely is wholesome, but because it is too sweet, is not so pleasant and toothsome as that of this countrey. It would be too long and troublesome to propound h [...]re and to recite in particular the varieties of liuings, re­ceiued of men either by necessitie, or superfluitie and delicious luxurie. Wherefore these that I haue alreadie named shall suffice at this present, as the most strange and me­morable that are to be found amongst vs. Now further besides all these commodities and discommodities of liuings and manners of diet which are incident to mankinde in D their seuerall countries; There be some that abstaine from certaine meates, either tho­rough opinion, as Pythagorians from the Cow and Booues: or through religion, and this either for some certaine time; as from flesh in Lon [...] and fasting daies, among Chri­stians; or continually, as Contrariwise, les Chartreux. the ancient Priestes of Egypt estee­med it a hainous sinne to taste fish, as Herodotus reporteth, Lib. 2. The Egyptians ab­stained from Swines flesh, as also the Iewes and the Mahumetists doe [...] and also from all manner of wine. The Malha [...]bians and Guzeratz eate nothing that hath in it blood, neither kill they any thing which hath life: for which cause they abstaine from greene hearbs and all young fruit, supposing that there is life in them; which to depriue them E of, they account a sinfull act. They adore and worship Oxen, as the ancient Egiptians did, and abhorre swines flesh after the manner of the Iewes. Others lesse scrupulous in opinion, and lesse superstitious in religion, vse indifferently all manner of meats which they can any waies come by, fresh, salt, rosted, boiled, raw, di [...]guised after many deui­ses of Cookerie and pastrie; as flesh, fish, graine, pulse, fruite new and olde, greene and drie, and drinkes of all sortes: nay there is not a part of a beast within or without, which they haue not found out meanes to season and dresse seuerally and with a seuerall sauce, eares, feet, snowtes, tongues, tripes, bowels, so gluttonous and almost insatiable is prooued the belly and appetite of man.

F IN them which bring forth wormes and egges.] [...]. In li­uing 8 creatures ingendred in the forme of wormes and egges. For a worme ingendred groweth vntill it come into the forme of an egge, and as the superiour or vpper part is first formed, so nourishment is ministred vnto it by the inferior & nether part, which af­terward is also articulated and fashioned by the residue of the nourishment. Arist. De Gen. Anim. Lib. 3. Cap. 1. For the chicken hath her beginning of being, from the white of the egge, & is nourished with the yolke by the nauell. Arist. De Hist. Anim. Lib. 6. Cap. 3.

[Page 42] 9 WHICH is called milke.] Plutarch in his booke intituled, De amore Parentum erga G Liberos, that is, The naturall loue of parents towards their children, saith thus: The or­daining and dispensation of milke in the breasts, is sufficient to demonstrate the proui­dence and care of nature, for all which is superfluous blood in women, through the owne heauinesse and the small quantitie of spirit that swimmeth in the top, wandreth vp and downe and aggrauateth the bodie: whereupon it is accustomed monethly at certeine iust reuolutions and periods, to distill downewardes; Nature opening vnto it conduits and pores for issue: By this meanes it not onely refresheth and purgeth the residue of the bodie, but also prouoketh in the matrice a desire of ingendring; euen as we vse to prepare the ground by the plough to receiue seed: The seed being once rea­ped, H the matrice forthwith closeth and foldeth vp it selfe most fast. First the nauell (as saith Democritus) serueth for an ancre to the matrice, to the end it be not too much shaken and disturbed: then the foundation, and as it were, the first branch of this fruit, beginneth to be laid: afterward Nature stoppeth vp the menstruall and purgatiue con­duits: and taking the blood which iss [...]ed by them, conuerteth it into nourishment, and bedeweth therewith the al [...]eadie formed and ingendred infant, vntill such time as the number of daies of the inward growth beeing accomplished, it stand in need of other nourishment and place. Then loe, the blood (more carefull and prouident then any gardiner or waterer) turning and changing it selfe from one purpose to another, hath I certaine vessels made readie like fountaines of running water, wherewith it is recei­ued, not altogither too slowly and without sense, but so, that with a sweete heat of spi­rite and delicate tendernes of the woman, it may bee drawen out and changed into milke: surely the dugge is of this disposition and temperature within: for the milke is not violently thrust out by the conduits or pipes, but di [...]tilling out by drops in a soft and moist flesh, and by little and little through the narrowe and slender pores, leaueth pretily a gratious and amiable tast, yee sparingly, in the mouth of the little infant, where­by it is allured to long after it.

10 THAT plantes are ordained for liuing creatures.] Whereas there are foure Elements; to K wit, the Fire, the Earth, the Water, and the Aire, whereof all things are ingendred: all are of opinion, that the Water and the Earth are most materiall: that is, most full of matter and substance: but that the Fire and the Aire are of greater vertue and efficacie in liuing creatures. Now the bodie which is gouerned by them, receiueth incessantly certaine euacuations, not only apparant, but also secret and hidden from sense, as in­spirations and effluctions: wherefore the body standeth in continuall need of nourish­ment, to fulfill and restore that which is decayed of it substance. Therfore the Almigh­tie to make prouision of this bodily nourishment, hath created plants, hearbs, trees, and seedes, sowen and brought in subiection by Art, which were before sauadge and wilde. L Plat. in Timeo.

11 ORDAIN [...]D for men.] Plants, beasts, and all other inferior creatures, are subiected vn­der mans dominion, and made for his prouision. Cicero De Natur. Deor. Lib. 2. decla­reth this most elegantly.

12 TAME beasts serue as well for vse as for foode.] As oxen and kine to plough the earth, to bring forth calues, to yeeld milke and butter: after, when they be fat, they are killed and eaten, and of their hides tanned, are made shoes and boots, & in like sort of other beasts.

13 THE Science militarie shall be in some respect an Art of getting.] It is certaine, that by the skill of Chiualrie or Militarie discipline, are gotten the chiefest things of this world; as M great kingdomes, Empires, and other states: subiects are retained in due obedience, and strangers driuen backe if they enterprise to doe harme: and the warre is permitted as iust and lawfull, when it is iustly and lawfully vndertaken; as, to the intent to subdue such persons as are borne to obey and be ruled.

14 THEREFORE is there one kinde of getting agreeable to nature, which is a part of the skill of housekeeping.] Here is the resolution of the question before propounded, whether [Page 43] A purchasing be a part of housekeeping, he answereth: that naturall purchasing being the preparing of goods necessary for the maintenance of the family and of the Common­weale, is not properly any part of housekeeping, which vseth only the goods prepared: Notwithstanding, it ought to be carefully procured by the housholder, or some Depu­tie vnder him, to whom hee committeth the charge thereof, and at whose hands hee re­ceaueth things in such measure as his need requireth.

MEN haue no certaine measure or end of riches,] Solon did affirme in his verses, accor­ding 15 to the opinion of the common people, that there was no end of gathering goods vpon goods. Notwithstanding, sith the possessing of goods, is as it were an instrument B of housekeeping, and of gouernment, there is no doubt but it hath some end as well as other instruments, which are each of them appointed and directed to their owne end. Plinie woondring at and much dispraising mens couetousnesse and vnsatiable desire to heape richesse vpon richesse, which neuer findeth end, and by meanes whereof man can neuer enioy blessednesse and felicity, which consisteth in a contented and setled minde: Well (sayth hee) Let vs take a man that hath heaped together so much gold and siluer, as that he may be said to haue innumerable richesse, yet shall he be nothing in comparison of a man that I will tell you of, who was neither any king, nor had any Princedome that might counteruaile a kingdome: It was that Ptolomeus who was at so great charge to C aid Pompey when he subdued Iury, that he entertained vpon his owne wages and costs eight thousand horsemen, and at the same time made a feast, whereat were a thousand men sitting at his table, who had euery one their cuppe of gold, and vpon the seruing of euery messe, hee changed their cuppes of gold into other golden cuppes of a newe fashion. Howbeit (saieth hee) his richesse is but a small portion in comparison of the ri­chesse of Pythius of Bithinia, who gaue to Darius king of Persia a plaine Tree of gold with a Vine of gold, wherof there went so great fame, and is still kept in so great remem­brance. And after the same Pythius through his liberall hospitality and housekeeping, receaued king Xerxes, sonne of the said Darius, at such time as hee made his expedition D against Greece in hostile manner, and ledde his army with him, amounting to the num­ber of seuen hundred thousand men: this Pythius feasted them for one day in a ban­quet. And for that the same Pythius had fiue sonnes, and the king had made proclamati­on, that all men who were able and fit to weare armour, should passe with him into Greece; hee offered the king to pay his army for the space of fiue moneths, and to prouide it Corne during that time, in the name of his children: and in recompence thereof, onely demanded resp it for his eldest sonne to stay at home and not goe into the Warres: to the end, that in the absence of the other foure, he might gouerne his fathers age. And although this Pythius was thus rich, yet for all that, Plinie affirmeth, that hee E was not to bee compared with Cresus king of Lydia, who had an infinite number of golde. Therefore it is want of Wisedome in a man to set his heart so farre vpon coue­tousnesse, the end whereof is nothing els but to possesse great reuenues: and there haue beene diuerse bondmen which haue beene of greater ability in richesse, then the most famous kings. Nowe, amongst all the kings that haue had such great aboun­dance of possessions, there cannot one bee found, that thought hee had hoorded v [...] ynough, as the same Plinie affirmeth. Pallas was the Emperour Neroes slaue, and got so much vnder him after hee was set at libertie, that hee was owner of three thou­sand sexterces, as Cornelius Tacitus affirmeth, which in value amount to seuen milli­ons, F and fiue hundred thousand Crownes. Pliny affirmeth, that the same Pallas was richer then Crassus, though Crassus had in landes and inheritances the value of fiue millions of golde: and though hee was called the rich man of his time, and the richest of all the Romanes next to Silla; neuerthelesse, in the time of Claudius the Em­perour, there were three villaines or bondslaues, namely, Pallas, Callistus, and Narcissus, who were euery one richer then hee. Wee may therefore conclude by [Page 44] the parable of King Salomon, who was the richest and wisest of all men; that the G blessednesse and felicitie of this world, and of this life, consisteth in the getting and possessing of Wisedome. For (as hee sayeth) Wisedome holdeth in her right hand the length of life, and yeares that wee must liue, and in her left hand shee carri­eth wea [...]th and glorie. And whosoeuer can excell others in the getting of this good, and growe famous in that glorie and renowne, which is got by honour, ver­tue, and the goods of the minde, hee is the true owner and possessour of the goods of this worlde, which are proper to him, and are not left by succession to anie heires.

H

CHAP. VI. Of artificiall getting by way of exchange: and of the inuention of money.

I

1 THere is another kind of acquiring and getting, which is exer­cised in the trade of exchaunging [...] by meanes whereof there seemeth to bee no end in richesse and gathering of goodes: which diuerse men deeme to bee the same that vee haue before spoken of [...] by rea­son of their likenesse and affinitie; though indeede it bee not the same, and yet not much discrepant from it. The one is naturall, the other not, but rather artificiall and practised by vse and in­dustrie: K 2 of the which wee are nowe to beginne to speake. Of euery thing that is prepa­red and possessed, there is a twofold vse: both which is of it selfe and simple, but yet not alike: for the one is proper and fitte for the matter, and the other improper and vn­fit. For examples sake, to weare a shooe, and to exchange a shooe, are both vses of a shoe: For hee that exchaungeth his shooe for money or for victuals with him that stan­deth in neede of a shooe, vseth a shooe, as it is a shooe: but yet not properly, for a shooe was made to weare, and not to exchange. The same reason there is of all other thinges, 3 for the vse of exchaunge i [...] insident in all thinges, and it drew the first beginning from that which was agreeable to nature, because men of some thinges had more then they nee­ded, L 4 and some lesse: whereby it appeareth, that that same base kinde of Marchaundise, which they professe and practise, that buy of some that they might sell it dearer to others, called Huxtrie or engrossing vp of commodities, dooth not by nature belong to this Art of domesticall acquisition: because exchange ought onely to bee made in this regard, to 5 helpe and releeue necessitie: and there [...]ore in that first societie of a family, it is cleare, that exchaunge was not needefull, but became necessary a [...]terward in the greater societies: for the coinhabitants of one house had all thinges in common, but after they came to bee scattered and deuided, then they possessed manie goods separately, which they were constrained to ex [...]hange, that by entercourse their necessities might bee releeued. Euen M 6 nowe at this daie many barbarous Nations vse the same, exchanging profites for profites, and no more, as by giuing and receauing Wine for Corne, and such like: the which manner of exchaunge is not contrary to Nature, neither yet any braunch of the Art acquisitiue, but onely seruing for the accomplishing of Natures sufficiencie in matters 7.8 of need: and yet it seemeth agreeable to reason, that that other proceeded from this: [Page 45] A for when men were constrained to relieue and succour one another mutually, not onely neare at hande, but also farre off, as well by the bringing in of those things which they needed; as carrying out of superfluities, necessarily they found out the vse of money, because euery 9 thing necessarie to the vse of life, is not by nature transportable from one place to ano­ther, and therefore they condiscend to giue and take mutually from each other, some one thing in steade of many, which was both profitable for life, and easie to bee transported: 10 as either yron, siluer, or such like, which at the first was simply defined either by quantitie or weight: but at last they set a stampe or a marke vpon it, that the trouble of weight might cease: for the stampe serueth for this purpose to signifie the quantitie. After that money was 11 B thus found out and inuented for exchange, presently another kinde of acquisition intruded: to wit, Huxtrie or Resaile of wares for lucre sake: a base trade, and yet exercised (it may bee) at the first simply without fraude, though in continuance of time it grewe more artificiall and cunning, after men began to enquire from whence and how greater gaine might be gotten by this exchange. Wherefore it seemeth, that this acquisition and trade of getting consisteth prin­cipally in money, and that this is the speciall office thereof, to search and find out the meanes how to gaine and come by most store of money: for which cause it is called the efficient cause of money and riches: for they suppose that riches is nothing els, but heapes and plentie of money: and that both the act of getting and resailing consist in that. Againe on the other side, mon [...] C seemeth to some, to be but a trifle and foolish thing, brought in onely by Lawe and not by Na­ture, because when mens mindes alter and varie which possesse it, then it is nothing worth, not seruing to any necessarie vse of life. And also it may happen that hee which aboundeth and swimmeth in superfluitie of money, yet may want things necessarie for maintenance of his life, and for nourishment for his bodie: and therefore it is to no purpose to haue such richesse, [...]s notwithstanding the which a man may die for hunger: as in the Fables is reported of Mida [...], to whome for his vnsatiable wish, it fell out, that whatsoeuer was set before him to [...], tur [...] into gold. For this cause wise men seeke out some other kinde of richesse and manner of g [...] ­ting 12 money: for there is another manner of getting, and another manner of richesse, which D is agreeable to nature: the one pertaineth to housekeeping, the other to engr [...]ssing and selling againe, which ingendreth money; not euery way, but by exchange, and seemeth to consist in money, in as much as money is the beginning and end of such ch [...]pping and changing; and the 13 riches gotten that way are infinite: for as phisicke tendeth infinitely to health, and euerie Arte 14 desireth the proper end thereof without measure, aspiring thereto as fast as they can, although the meanes appointed to lead to the end, are not infinite: for in all Artes, the ende is the terme and vttermost part: so is there not in this skill of getting any determinate end, by reason it tendeth alwaies to the heaping vp of riches of the s [...]me kind, and gathering of goods tog [...] ­ther: but the skill of housekeeping hath a scope and end, whose office is not alwaies to get m [...]ny. 15 E Therefore it seemeth that there ought to be a measure in all riches, though I see the con­trarie happen: for all they that endeauour to get money, doe infinitely encrease their money. The cause whereof i [...], that these two faculties are like and neare one to the other, and by rea­son their practise consisteth in one kinde of thing, the one is taken for the other: For the 16 getting of goods pertaineth to the sa [...]e vse, howbeit not by the same manner, but the [...] tendeth to a diuers end, the other alwayes a [...]gmenteth. Insomuch, that it seemeth to so [...] men that this is the office of the skill of housekeeping, who pers [...]re in this opinion, that money is infinitely to bee saued or encreased. The cause of this affection is, that they are carried with the care of liuing, but not of well liuing. Therefore whereas such desire is end­l [...]sse, F they endlesse coue [...] such things as it ingendreth. And also, whosoeuer are desirous to liue well, they seeke to e [...] [...]y the pleasures of the bodie, and by reason they thinke the same 17 consists in richesse, therefore vse they all their endeauour about the getting thereof: from whence hath proceeded another kind of getting of mony: for whereas the enioying of pleasure is 18 excessiue, they seeke the meane of enioying the sa [...]e, excessiuely: and if they can not attaine ther­to this may, then attempt they another course, practising other faculties not agreeable to nature. [Page 46] For stoutnesse and valiancie of courage, is not ordained to get goods, but to procure boldnesse; G nor likewise the skill of chiualrie, or phisicke; but the intent of the one is victorie, and of the other health: albeit that all of them be made gainefull, as though gaine were their end, & that all things ought to be referred to lucre. Thus haue we spoken of that manner of getting which is not necessarie, and shewed what it is, and wherefore wee stand in neede of it: and in like sort of necessary getting, which differeth from the other, and of the naturall skill and prouision of housekeeping consisting in the preparation of victuals: which is not endlesse as the other, but hath an end and bound whereat it stayeth.

THE other manner of getting is exercised in Exchanging: first of ware for ware; H as, of wheate for wooll, wine for oyle: which way being plainely vsed for the remedy of mens wantes, is agreeable to nature. Secondly of wares for money, which might al­so be said to be agreeable to nature, in case it were practised for none other purpose, but for the necessarie and plentifull prouision of mans life. But when it is put in vre for the getting of needlesse gaine; as, ingrossing vp of commodities to vtter them againe at high prises, then is it no longer naturall but artificiall: farre distant from the right vse of housekeeping, and from the office and dutie of a housekeeper, which consisteth in the right vse of such commodities as naturally are fit and allowable for the maintenance of life. I

1 THERE is another kind of acquiring and getting.] There be two sorts of getting and preparing of goods: the one altogither naturall, which hath been largely entreated of in the Chapter going before: as Tillage, Hunting, Fishing: The other consisteth in Exchange, and is practised by Aptnes and Experience, and might well be called Na­turall, if it were practised for none other purpose but for needfull and bountifull proui­sion for the maintenance of life. But forasmuch as ordinarily it is referred to the gaine and profit of money, passing beyond the necessarie vse of life; therefore is it not natu­rall but artificiall, and differeth from the skill of housekeeping, which consisteth in the K right vse of such things as are conuenient for the sustenance of life.

2 ALL things possessed haue a double vse.] The trade of Exchanging is practised two manner of waies: either by exchange of ware for ware, as a shoe for bread; or ware for money, as a shooe for money: which two kindes of exchanging appertaine not to the proper vse of a shoe, which is to be worne, and for that purpose is it made, and not to be exchanged, though the shoemaker abuse it to exchange, to the end he may by that meane get what he lacketh with the recompence of his labour.

3 IT drew the beginnings from that which was agreeable to nature.] Of naturall neces­sitie: whereby the trade of exchanging of commodious and profitable things was brought vp. L

4 HVXTRIE and engrossing vp of commodities to sell againe, doth not appertaine to that skill of getting which agreeth with nature.] The trade of Merchandise that is vsed for the getting of money and richesse sake and not for the relieuing of mans neede, or for the furtherance of honest liuing, is to be called artificiall or craftie getting, and not natu­rall, as hee will prooue hereafter.

5 THIS exchange was not needefull in the first assembly.] The husband and wife, master and seruant, parents and children, vse not amongst themselues such exchanging, but when they are multiplied dwelling in hamlets, villages, boroughes, townes, and Cit­ties; then doe they vse it through necessitie, for the getting of such commodities as they M lacke and haue neede of, by deliuering to other men such commodities, as they haue plentie of.

6 AS at this day many barbarous nations doe.] As the Tartarians and Arabians and the wilde people which haue been of late discouered, who are vnskilfull of all manner of occupations, and change ware for ware in their traffiques.

[Page 47] A FROM this proceeded the other, by reason.] After hee hath reasoned about that kinde of 7 exchanging, which is made of ware for ware plainely and naturally for the remedie of mens wants, hee speaketh of that exchange which is made of ware for money, wherein consisteth the Trade of marchandise, and is wholly artificiall: which maner of exchange proceeded from the other.

BY reason.] By industry and dexterity, not through naturall necessitie: for Mar­chandise 8 respecteth gaine onely, and thereabout employeth all manner of dilligence.

OF necessity they inuented the vse of mony.] Here is declared the inuention and right 9 vse of mony: gold, siluer, and mettals were in vse from time out of mind. For as Pliny af­firmeth B in his 33. book, the 3. chapter, king Seruius was the first that stamped and coyned mony of brasse, as Timeus writeth. Notwithstanding, before his time money was in vse at Rome, howbeit not fully come to perfection at that time. The first print or marke of the same, was Pecus, That is the Image of a sheepe or oxe. and therefore all money made and marked with any stampe, was called Pecunia. It is reported that one Phidon in the Island of Egina, first coyned sil­uer money, and that Saturnus after his arriuall in Italy, made brasse money, and stamped it with the Image of the hinder part of a ship. The people of Rome vsed brasse money, till the time of king Pyrrhus, and from thence forward began to make siluer mony: and after the ouercomming of Carthage, made gold monyes. God in the 25 Chapter of C Exodus, commaunded Moyses to take gold and siluer of the children of Israel for the building of the Tabernacle. Ioseph in Egypt commanding his brethrens sackes to be fil­led with corne, caused siluer to be put into euery sackes mouth, and his siluer cup in his yoongest brothers sacke, and afore that time Ioseph had beene sold for thirty pence. At this day in diuerse Countries they vse no kind of money stamped in mettall, As in the kingdomes of Prester Iohn, in the lands of the Mores, and of the Gentiles their neigh­bours, salt goeth for money. Likewise, in the Empire of Cathaia, the money is neither made of siluer nor golde, nor of any other mettall, but of the barke of Mulbery Trees, which they gather and bring together, and then deuide and cut it into diuers small D round peeces, some great, some small, finally they print thereon the [...] of the Em­pire, rating the value of each peece according to the differēce of the [...] smalnes [...] great­nesse: it being not lawfull for any naturall subiect of the Countrey or stranger whatso­euer, vpon paine of death, to make or employ any other money. Paule Ve [...]; and Hayton Armenian. Let vs see what Plato [...] concerning money in his [...] booke of Lawes: We affirme (saieth he) that in a Citie there should bee no gold [...] nor siluer, nor excessiue gaine in handicrafts: in buying and selling, or in vsury [...] or dishonest gaine in Cattell; but rather the profite which Tillage offered and yeeldeth: least gaine should cause the neglecting and dispising of that for which money is required, namely, both E soule and bodie. And in another place: There is not too much gai [...] in this City, where no man should bee tollerated to bestowe his time about dishonest [...]iere, and seeking of vile and infamous gaine, which marreth good manners; wee must not thinke that mo­ney should bee raked together by meane of vile and vnhonest Tra [...]es. Also in the same booke: Forasmuch as money is needfull for the help [...] of that d [...]ily exchange and [...] ­on which is requisite amongst artificers to pay the wages of han [...]crafts men, Ser [...]nts and Labourers, therefore doe we tollerate such money as is of value amongst them, with whome it is currant, and despised of all others. And sith men must often goe a warfare, and trauell long iournies when they be sent for Embassadors and messengers to strange F people, there should of necessitie be alwaies kept in a readinesse of the [...] and furnishing of the Common-weale [...] some common treasure of [...].

SOME profitable thing [...]sie to be tra [...]ed.] As Iron, Gold, Siluer, Brasse and Cop­per, 10 wherewith men make mony diuersly, and in diuers prices according to the d [...]uersi­ty of Countries: which mettals may [...]erue for other purpose [...], [...]pan [...] Swords, Armour, Lookes, Kayes, Ploughshares, Cart-yrons, and [...] Gold and siluer to make Cuppes, Ba [...]is, and other Vtensilles, which in our [...] [Page 48] Countrey of Pe [...]ou hath beene found to haue in vse. G

11 AFTER the inuenting of mony for the necessary exchanging of cōmodities, there came vp another kind of getting of mony.] The first kind of exchanging commodities for mony, is in some respect agreeable to nature, namely, for the obtaining of such things as are necessa­ry for mans life, & vneasie to be transported: which the Philosopher thinketh to stand with reason. From thence issued the other kind of exchange by mony, which Marchants and Brokers vse for gaines sake only, and differeth from the former, as being against Na­ture and endlesse, and therefore blame-worthy.

12 FOR this cause wise men seeke out some other kind of richesse.] The best husbands stay not themselues onely vpon getting of money, but besides that, purchase a safer wealth, H wherewith in time of need they may be releeued, as houses, lands arable, fruit trees, me­dowes, woods, pastures, sheepe, Oxen, Kine, horses, Mules, and other like moueable and vnmoueable goods.

13 IN as much as money is the beginning and the end of such chopping and changing.] At the beginning money was coyned to serue for an instrument in trades of Marchandise; but now it seemeth to be the marke whereat these trades doe shoot: for Marchants aime at no other thing, but only the getting of great store of mony.

14 FOR as Phisicke tendeth infinitely to health.] Phisicke desireth without end to procure health, and is not only content with setting the patient againe in his former health, but I also desireth and endeuoureth to assure his health, and make it last long: and when it can attaine thereto by medicine or diet, it is so satisfied, without searching further meanes. The selfesame and like reason is found in all other sciences.

15 BVT the skill of housekeeping hath a certaine scope and end.] The skill of housekeeping hath certaine meanes of Acquiring and getting, which it dooth not exceed. So hath not the skill of getting money, which continually hoordeth vp without measure.

16 AND by reason their practise consisteth in one kinde of thing, the one is taken for the other. [...], &c.] Whereas there be two faculties concerning money; the one which the housekeeper vseth, the other belonging to the marchant: the office of either of them K consisteth in one kinde of thing, namely in getting money: and for that cause seeme they to bee all one, yet tend they not to one kind of end. For the housekeeper vseth mony for the obtaining of such commodities as are necessary for the maintenaunce of life: but the merchant vseth it for the encreasing of his treasure, and to the end hee may attiane to great and infinite richesse.

17 PLEASVRES of the body.] The inioying whereof is taken with some sence, as tou­ching smelling, seeing, hearing, wherby the body is as much recreated, as the soule is by vnderstanding, learning, and contemplation .2. of Ethickes.

18 FROM whence hath proceeded another kind of getting of mony.] This third kinde of get­ting of mony differeth from the other two afo [...]egoing, as well in regard of the meane of L getting, as in respect of the end & purpose; consisting in the enioying of pleasures, & be­ing the worst of the three, for that it abuseth natu [...]all vertues, and also both sciences and faculties, which it maketh mercenary and ministers to get money: as though such were their end, to wit, bodily pleasure, and the enioyning thereof.

CHAP. VII. That the skill of acquiring and getting is seruant to the skill of house­keeping, called Oeconomie, and to the skill of politicall gouer­ning: M and how it ought to bee vsed.

1 HEreby is resolued the doubt put foorth in the beginning, namely, Whether Art acquisitiue, or the skill of getting money, doe belong to the gouernour of a fami­ly, and to the gouernor of a Commonweale, or not. But this must be first prepared: For [Page 49] A as the skill of politicall gouernement dooth not make men, but taking them from Nature 2 dooth vse them: so must Nature furnish vs with nourishment, either from the Earth, the Sea, or some other thing. But it is the office of the Gouernour of the family to ouer­see 3 the ordering and bestowing of these thinges: For it is not the Weauers Occupation to make wooll, but to vse the same, and to discerne and iudge which is good and meete to make cloth, and which naught and vnprofitable. For a question might bee asked, Where­fore 4 this skill of getting should bee parcell of the Houshold gouernement, and not Phi­sicke: Yet must the health of all the Houshold bee prouided for as well as their victuals and other necessary maintenance. For in some respect it is the office and charge, as well B of the gouernour of a house, as the gouernour of a Common-weale, to prouide for the health of those whome they haue vnder them, and in some respect not, but the Phisi­ons: Euen so the charge and ouersight of the furnishing of money in one respect belon­geth to the Gouernour of the house, and in another respect not, but to the skill and facultie which serueth thereunto. Notwithstanding (as it hath beene alreadie al­leadged) it is most necessarie to haue goods prepared by Nature, whose dutie it is to prouide foode for all thinges that are engendred: For that which resteth and remai­neth of that whereof euery thing is engendred, is the foode vnto it. Therefore the meane of getting of money, as well by fruites, as by liuing Creatures, is in all C thinges agreeable to Nature. And whereas the same is double (as wee haue al­leadged) the one consisting in engrossing and selling againe of commodities, the other pertaining to the defence of the houshold wealth: and this last necessarie and commendable: but the other which engroseth and selleth commodities, worthtly bla­med, beca [...]se it is not agreeable to Nature, but rather to the end one might gaine and encroch vpon another. Aboue all the rest, Vs [...]rie deserueth to bee hated, for 5 that by it menne gaine and profite by money, not for that intent and purpose for which it was ordained, namely, for the exchaunging of commodities; b [...]t for the augmenting of it selfe: which hath procured i [...] the name of [...], to witte, 6 D issue or eng [...]ndring: because thinges engendred, are like the engendrers; and V­surie 7 is naught else but money begotten of money: in so much, that amongst all the meanes of getting, this is most contrarie to Nature. Nowe, forasmuch as wee 8 haue sufficientlie decided what concerneth knowledge of these thinges: nowe let vs come to the practise. All such thinges haue their knowledge and contemplation free, but their practise and experience necessarie. The cheefe and principall point of Ac­quisition 9 of money, is to bee expert and skilfull in knowing where and howe such wares and commodities as are to bee acquired and gotten, are best and most profi­table: as to vnderstand the nature of Horses, of Oxen, of Sheepe, and of all other E Creatures. For it is requisite that a manne haue skill in comparing euery sort and kinde one with another, to knowe which is the best, and to discerne and iudge of them according to the places and soiles where they bee bredde, because the breede of one 10 Countrey is better then another. Next of all, it is behoo [...]efull to haue skill in the manuring of ground, as well vnplanted as planted, in the manner of breeding and hiuing of Bees, and in the nature of other creatures, as well of the Water as of the Aire, which may serue to many vses. These bee the cheefe partes of the skill and meane of true getting of money. As concerning that way and 11 meane which consisteth in exchaunge, the principall part thereof is Marchaun­dise, F whereof there bee three kindes; Nauigation by Sea, Portation by Land, and vtterance of commodities in those places where they growe, called in Greeke [...], and in English it may bee called a standing Mar­chaundise: which differ among themselues, in that some bee safer, and o­thers are more profitable. The seconde part of this Arte Acquisitiue is [Page 50] 12 vsurie: the third part is laborious working for money and wages, which consisteth in han­dicrafts, G and in artificiall Trades which are behoofefull for the bodie onely. The fourth part is a meane betweene this last and the first, for it containeth part of that which is agree­able to Nature, and the Art of that which consisteth in exchanging, and comprehendeth all those commodities which growe in the earth or depend of the same, being fruitlesse, and yet profitable, as the felling of Timber and vnderwoods, and all the industrie and skill that is [...]mployed about mines and minerals, which containe diuerse kindes accor­ding to the varietie of such mettals as are digged and gotten out of the earth: wee haue generally touched these thinges: and for the putting of them in vre and practise, it would auaile to make particuler examination of the same with diligence, but it were too tedious H to stay any longer thereabout. Amongst Occupations, those are most artificiall where for­tune 13 hath least place: those most noisome whereby mens bodies are most defiled and pollu­ted: those most slauish wherein there is most vse of bodily strength: and those most vile wherein the least vertue is required. But forasmuch as diuerse men haue written of these 14 matters, as Charetides the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnean, of the manuring of 15 grounds both vnplanted and planted, and diuerse other Authours haue treated of like matters: whosoeuer listeth to haue further knowledge therein, let him read their bookes. 16 Moreouer, it were verie good to gather further meanes by such reports as goe abroad of men that haue been rich: for such kinde of speeches are behoofefull vnto them that make I 17 account of richesse: as that which Thales the Milesian practised, seruing for an inuenti­on to get money, which is fathered vpon him in respect of his excellent skill, though it may fall out generally: for when this man was reproched and vpbraided with his pouer­tie, as though Philosophie were vnprofitable, it is reported, that before the end of Win­ter, hee foresawe by his skill in Astrologie, that there would bee plentie of Oliues the Summer following, and that hee got a small portion of money, and gaue earnest to the husbandmen, the owners of those places where the Oliues grew, and so procured and bought good cheape all the Oliues that were about Milet and Chio, by reason there was no man at that time that offered more. Nowe, when the time of their gathering was come, K and many men standing in neede thereof, hee solde them quickely for as much as hee listed, and by that meanes got together a great summe of money: shewing that it was an easie matter for Philosophers to waxe rich when they listed, but that it was not their studie nor profession. Thales is reported to haue made this triall of his Wisedome. This manner of getting of money is vniuersall, (as wee haue before alleadged) when any one man dooth obtaine vnto himselfe the Monopolie and wholesale of any kinde of commodi­tie. 18 Therefore diuerse Cities, when they stand in neede of money to bee employed in 19 the affaires of their Common-weales, doe ordaine and appoint this manner of getting of money, by reseruing to themselues alone the libertie to sell certaine commodities. In L Sicilie there was a manne that had certaine money deliuered vnto him to keepe, who with the same bought vp all the yron in the yron Forges: and vpon the arriuall of Marchaunts from other Countries, hee alone solde it without any great enchauncement of the price: Howbet with fiftie Talents, hee gained a hundred Talents. Dionise the Tyrant vnderstanding thereof, gaue him license to carie away his goods, but forbadde him to dwell any longer in Syracusa, because hee had inuented such meanes to get money, as was not behoofefull to his affaires. Thales and this man aymed at one marke, which was to finde out a mane to haue the Monopoly and sole vtterance of commodities. The knowledge of which meanes is also behoofefull for gouernours of Common-weales: be­cause M many Cities and Common-weales haue as great, yea and more neede of goods and reuenues, then any priuate familie: Insomuch, that some persons, that haue pub­licke charges and Offices, are employed onely about the treasurie and ouersight of these matters.

[Page 51] A THE resolution of the whole discourse touching the Art Acquisitiue, of getting & prouiding money and goods is, that it properly doth not belong to the Oeconomicall skill of housekeeping, and to the politicall faculty of Gouernement but ought to pro­ceede and serue vnto each of them, to the end, that victuals and necessary goods want not in houses and Cities, which are there to be distributed by housholders and Gouer­nours: who if by chance they busie themselues about the getting thereof, do it as good husbands. The skill of getting, which is agreeable to nature, is honestly exercised, in Cattell, in Corne, and in the fruits of Trees. The artificiall and crafty meane of getting of money by engrosing vp of commodities, and vttering them againe for gaine, is bla­med. B And amongst all kinds of gaine, vsury is most reproued, which begetteth mony of mony against Nature, and the intent wherefore money at the beginning was ordained: which was of purpose for the exchanging of such commodities, as were hard to bee transported. There is another manner of getting which holdeth a meane between these two, and consisteth in the employment of such naturall commodities as serue not for victuals and clothing, and are ruled and exchaunged for the obtaining of whatsoeuer is needfull for the maintenance of mankind. After the knowledge and contemplation of the science of getting of money, the practise thereof is breefly touched in generall tearmes, as farre as the matter of Gouernement, wherevnto this worke is subordained, C could suffer, by the way. Then occupations are distinguished, and certaine meanes to waxe rich rehearsed, specially by Monopolies, according to the example of Thales.

NAMELY, whether the skill of prouiding mony doe belong to the gouernour of a family or 1 not.] Although this present question had beene decided before, yet neuetthelesse, here the Philosopher maketh a final resolution of the same: cōcluding that this skil is no part of house gouernement and gouerning of a Cittie or Common-weale, but rather a ser­uant or Minister to each of them, as the Spurriours, Smithes, and Sadlers occupations, serue to the vse of horses; melting and casting of mettall, making of gunne powder, and carriage, to artillerie: and that this art of getting must bee in time afore the Art of Go­uerning, D furnishing them with meanes of their maintenance, which they may vse accor­ding as occasion serueth.

THE skill of gouernment doth not make men.] Aristotle in his Politickes, Lib. 7. cap. 4. 2 writeth thus: As Weauers, Carpenters, and other workemen are to haue conuenient stuffe for their worke, and the better the stuffe prepared is, the fairer and better will the workemanship necessarily be: so the gouernour and Law maker is to haue fit stuffe, con­ueniently prepared.

IT is the office of the gouernor of the family to ouersee the orderings and bestowings of these 3 things.] The Purueyour or prouider in a family, prepareth victuals either by sea or by E land, or elsewhere for the housekeeper, who distributeth the same in his family, either in great or small quantity, as hee knoweth to bee needefull; as a Captaine at any place be­sieged, or ready to bee besieged, distributeth Armour and Munition to his Souldi­ours.

FOR a question might be asked: Wherfore the skill to get mony should be parcell of the hou­shold 4 gouernment, and not Phisicke?] Because a family cannot be maintained without vi­ctuals and health, it should seeme, that the skill of getting, and Phisicke, should bee par­cels of housekeeping: Neuerthelesse, each of them doe but onely serue thereto.

ABOE all the rest, vsury deserueth to be hated.] Vsury is reproued in the old and newe 5 F Testament, and by all humane lawes that haue beene made according to wisedome and equity, as Plutarke declareth in his little Treatise touching the shunning of Vsury. Ap­pian in his first booke of the Ciuill warres, the 7. Chapter, sayth: there was an old lawe at Rome that forbad lending vpon vsury, vpon paine, that the offender should forfait as much as the Vsury amounted vnto, for the old Romanes abhorred Vsury, as the Greci­ans did, and accounted this maner of gaine, Lucre; and engrosers of commodities, to be greeuous and intollerable to poore people, and the occasion of much enuy and fallings [Page 52] out. By reason whereof, the Persians accounted lending vpon vsury, to bee a tradefull of G deceit and lying. Aristotle blameth the same, affirming it to be a thing contrary to Na­ture, that mony which was inuented for the furtherance and more conuenient dealing in the trade of Marchandise, should be converted to vsury, to be multiplied by drawing of continuall profite, vpon the vse of the principall stocke from moneth to moneth, or yeare to yeare, by the lone of money, till it bee repaid. Men haue now inuented interest in steed of vsury, which is of diuers sorts, according to diuers places: for they limite in some places fiue for a hundred, in other places tenne or twelue vpon the hundred. The banquers or Marchants set it as high as they can.

6 BVT for the augmentation of it selfe, which hath the name of [...].] [...], to engender: H from which word, [...] is deriued [...] signifying issue: because mony by vsury begetteth other mony, and causeth the encrease thereof.

7 BECAVSE things engendred are like the engendrers.] As Plantes bring foorth like plants, and liuing creatures other liuing creatures, euery one in his kind, commonly like their Parents, as a man, a horse, and a bull doe: so in vsurie, the engendrer, and the thing, is mony: which notwithstanding seemeth contary to nature, that a dead thing, as mony, should engender.

8 FORASMVCH as wee haue sufficiently decided what concerneth the knowledge, now let vs come to the practise.] The reasons hitherto set downe touching the matter of house go­uernment, I doe properly appertaine to the knowledge of the science: the discourse that followeth, concerneth the practise: For in Sciences ordained to be practised and put in vre, as Morall Philosophy, ciuill Gouernement, ordering of families, building, and the Art of Warre, there bee many poin [...]s handled and examined, which appertaine not to the practise and action of life, but to skill onely, and the knowledge of the mind: As in the matter of housekeeping, Whether the art of prouiding goods, be a part of seruant to the science of housekeeping. In the matter of Ciuill Gouernment, which is the per­fect Common-wealth, Whether it be better to be gouerned by the Law than by man: Whether it be expedient to change the laws of a state: how many kinds of gouernment K there bee: and diuerse other like questions discussed by Aristotle in his worke. In the which questions (sayeth hee in the third booke; the fift Chapter,) The truth must bee set out, without hauing regard only to action.

9 THE principall point in this art.) The first naturall richesse dooth consist in the bree­ding and feeding of Cattell, in Corne, and in fruites of Trees. The cheefe point in such matters, is to know what places are best and fittest for them.

10 BECAVSE the breed of one Country is better than another.) Euery Country hath a par­ticular grace and singularity giuen vnto it by Nature, Particular gra­ces and singula­rities of coun­ [...]ries. who regardeth the Common­wealth of the whole world, which cannot continue in perfection, without such varie­tie: L and that to the end, that they hauing need each of other, should entercommune to­gether, and maintaine the society of mankind by mutuall and interchangeable succour and helpe. In one place Corne groweth best, in another Vines are best, and in another Cattell. The aire is so temperate in Calecut, that there is neuer no plague in that coun­try: where also they haue continually both greene hearbes and greene Trees, and newe fruits euery month, wholly differing from ours, howbeit good and wonderful pleasant. The Countrey of Syria, specially about Damascus, aboundeth with all kind of Corne, Flesh, and Fruites, specially with Raysons all the yeare long, and also with Pomgranets, Quinces, Almonds, and most goodly and sweete Roses of diuerse colours: but the Ap­ples, M Peares, and Peaches there, haue an euill tast. In the West Indies, both in the Islands and in the Firme Land, are wilde Vines that beare good Raysons without husbanding, but the kernels of Peaches, Pruines, and Cherries, beeing set in piuerse places in those parts, will take no roote. Oliue Trees planted there, will beare nothing but leaues with­out fruit. Babylon is most fertile in wheat, but vines and fig-trees grow not well there. In Muscouic there is great plentie of Honny and Waxe, L [...]zarnes are certain Wolues somewhat like Harts, hauing a sweet sauour, and faire skins. Gesner. in La­tine called Lupi [...]er [...] [...] in Frēch Loup [...] c [...]r [...]ier [...], and in English L [...]zarnes. Luzarnes, Wildcats, Martens [Page 53] A with vntined hornes, and other like beastes, which yeelde rich and exquisite hides: but there groweth no fruite any thing worth. The Tartarians and Alarbians, haue nothing but Cattell. The Countries of Mouluques, yeeld Pepper, Cloues, Sinamon, and diuers other kindes of Spicery, and yet are in all other respects barren. In other places growe Emeraudes, Rubies, Turkazes, and Pearles: in others Corrall, and Amber. Dioscorides in the preface of his booke, speaking of hearbes and trees: Wee must (saith hee) respect the places where they grow. For those that growe in such places as are pendant or stee­pie, cold, dry, and open to the wind, are better and haue more force in them then others. On the contrary side, those that growe in euen and leuell grounds, and in such places as B are shaddowed or watery, and where the winde hath no power, are the soonest marred, and are not so good, nor haue such strength as the others: and that most specially, when they are not gathered in due time and season, or when through weakenesse of their na­ture, they wither away. We haue also to note, that the soile or weather often furthereth or hindereth the hearbes. Trees are seene to be goodlier, better leafed, and to bear grea­ter plentie of fruit in one place than in another. Also there is no kind of Tree that pros­pereth not better in one soile than in another. Wee see the Trees that prosper in the mountaines, are very great and goodly Trees, as the Cedar Trees, the Firre-trees, Pine­trees, and Beechtrees, and Box-trees. In forrests, euen grounds, Hils, and Hillocks, Okes, C Beeches, Corke-trees, Seruice-trees, Elmes, Maplet [...]ees, Ashes, and Hazels, growe best. The Plane-trees, Elder-trees, Med [...]er-trees, white Po [...]la [...]-trees, Willowes, and Rose-trees, by the riuer sides in watery grounds. The like difference is there in hearbes and shrubbes: for some grow in mar [...]ish grounds, others prosper in standing waters. Others grow by the sea side, and on the bankes of Riuers, and some there bee that are ordina­rily found in moist places, and now and than in drie places. Others come vp best in the plaine fieldes, others speed best amongst the vines. Others in the meddowes, some pros­per better in vallies then in hilly grounds. Some prooue well in all such places as are on high grounds and open to the wind. Some there bee that grow vpon the wals of towns D and villages, and among the old wals and ruinous parts of houses. Theophrastus setteth downe diuers sorts of Wheat, which haue taken their names of the places where they grow, and do all differ in colour, thicknesse, kinde, and property: some die quickly, some slowly, some yeeld much, some little. Plinie esteemeth the Wheate of Italie aboue all other, both for whitenesse and weight, which are the right markes of good Wheate; saying that Nature hath shewed her selfe so friendly to the Italians, that shee hath not onely made them excellent in Lawes, Gouernement, Trade of liuing, and fashions of life: but also hath giuen them both Corne and diuers other singular commodities, in greater plentie than to anie other Regions and E Countries.

AS concerning that way and meane of getting of money which consisteth in exchange.] 11 The second kind of riches consisteth in exchange, and is exercised either by Marchan­dise in giuing goods for goods, or goods for money: or els by vsurie, when profit is got by money from time to time: or by letting or hiring, when men take pai [...]e for wa­ges by the day, or by the yeare, or by taske: wherevnto the saleable workes of diuerse occupations are to bee referred. The fourth kinde is a meane betweene naturall riches, and the riches which ariseth of exchaunge: and is furthered with such naturall commodities as serue neither for victuals nor clothing: as are F Mines, Quarries, Vnderwoods, and great Timber, which are solde or ex­chaunged of purpose to get whatsoeuer is requis [...]te for the maintenance of man­kind.

AMONGST occupations.] Cicero in his first Booke of Offices toward the 12 end, dooth shewe what occupations and gaines ought to bee accounted honest, and what vile and dishonest. First (sayeth hee) those gaines bee reproched and disallowed which are hated of men, as the lu [...]re of tole-gatherers and Vsurers, [Page 54] also all Mercenary Trades, and generally of all them whose labours (not whose G Art and Science) bee bought; for in them, their wages is the reward and obligation of seruitude. They also bee reputed vile, that buy of Marchants that they may sell againe out of hand, for they can get nothing without expressiue lying, and there is nothing viler then vanity and vntruth. Further, all artificers bee of this vile sort, neither can any shope haue any thing in it that becommeth a Gentleman: neither likewise are to bee allowed such Trades as bee ministers of pleasures: as Fishmongers, Butchers, Cookes, Pudding makers, and Fishers, whereto Perfumers, Dauncers, Dicers, and Carders are to bee ioyned. But those Artes wherein there is most Wisedome, or no small profite: as Phisicke, Architecture, and the knowledge of honest thinges, are honest H to such as conueniently exercise them according to their state. Marchandise in case it bee slender and poore is to bee esteemed as vile, but if it bee great and aboundant, conueying manie commodities from all coastes, and communicating them to manie without deceit, it is not greatly to bee blamed, and being satisfied and filled with gaine, or rather contented (as often it befalleth) if then it bee conueyed from the Sea to the Hauen, and from the Hauen into the Countrey, it seemeth then to deserue commendations. But amongst all thinges whereout any gaine is pic­ked, there is nothing better then Husbandrie and Tillage, nothing more plen­tifull, nothing pleasaunter, nor anie thing meeter or worthier for an honest I man.

13 THOSE most noisome, [...].] The Latines cal those vile trades, which the Gre­cians call [...], which word properly dooth signifie those occupations which vse the furnace, as the name noteth. Notwithstanding, vse transferreth and applieth it to all handie occupations: So dooth Lucian vse it in his dreame, and Xenophon in his booke of housekeeping, Who speaking of these Sciences, sayeth: That [...] are vile and foule, and that vpon good cause they are out of estimation, for that they weaken and marre the bodies of the exercisers of the same, by constraining them to sit and remaine close, and to bee alwaies by the fire side: and when the bodies are weakened, the soules K become more lazie and weake: insomuch, that the exercisers of the same occupations, haue no leisure to doe any pleasure to their friends, nor seruice to their Cittie. Where­fore in well ordered Common-weales where Chiualrie is in estimation, the Cittizens are not tollerated to exercise them.

14 CHARETIDES and Apollodorus.] Likewise diuerse haue written in Latine of Til­lage, as Cato, Varro, Palladius, Columella, Plinie in his naturall Hystory, Virgill in his Georgikes, and Mago in the Punike tongue.

15 OF the manuring of grounds both vnplanted and planted.] Of fields that are fit for til­lage, and of planting and graffing of fruit trees, trimming of vines, and making gardens L of good and pleasant hearbes.

16 IT were very good to gather further meanes.] Whosoeuer desireth to get good, must not onely reade bookes set foorth [...]oncerning such matters, but also marke the doings and sayings of good husbands.

17 AS the doing of Thales.] Cicero in his first booke of diuination, rehearseth this no­table prouidence of Thales, to get vnto himselfe the sale of oyle: which Plinie fathe­reth vpon Democritus in the eight and twenty Chapter of the eighteenth booke of his Naturall Hystorie. They were both great Phisitians, and might with their wonderfull skill haue the same deuise. M

18 ONE man doth obtain vnto himselfe the Monopolie and whole sale.] [...], &c. The word Monopolie is vsed & meant in French, when any particular man, or any com­panie, obtaineth a priuiledge or license to haue the only sale of any necessary Marchan­dise, compelling them that haue need thereof, to buy it at his own taxe or price: which is an euill thing, and preiudiciall to the Common-wealth, and not meete to bee permit­ted or put in vre, except it bee by publicke States, and that not at all times, but vpon [Page 55] A vrgent necessitie of warres, or in euident danger of destruction, for their safety and pre­seruation.

THEREFORE diuerse Cities when they stand in publicke neede of money.] There is ex­tant 19 a booke intituled, The publicke Oeconomie or House Gouernement, vnder the name of Aristotle (although it bee none of his) which containeth many inuentions of Princes or Common-weales, for the leuying of Subsidies, and procuring of money: Of which matter there neede no bookes to bee written, for that both in kings Courts, and in the managing of other gouernements, there bee alwaies a sufficient number of such inuentors, yea moe very often then are requisite, to the great damage and oppres­sion B of the subiects, and small profite to the lords and gouernours, who scant grow rich by that meanes, but spend as fast as it commeth in: for the easinesse of getting causeth readines [...]e and forwardnesse in spending.

CHAP. VIII. Of the other parts of house gouernment which belong to the husband C and the father: also of such vertues as are respectiuely requisite for gouernours and obeyers.

NOw forasmuch as wee haue alleadged before, that there bee 1 three parts whereof the gouernment of a familie consisteth; and haue already spoken of the Maisters part: here will wee intreate of those parts which seuerally belong to the father and the husband: For the 2 good man of the house gouerneth his wife and children, each of them D as free folke, howbeit not with the selfe-same manner of gouernment, but his wife ciuilly, and his children regally: for the male by Nature hath more authoritie then the female, vnlesse it befall otherwise in some place contrary to Nature: and the elder and perfecter, then the yoonger and vnperfecter. In the most gouernements of Citties and Common-weales, the ruler and obeyer doe chaunge by turnes, because they will bee equall according to Nature, and not differ in anie respect: Howbeit, when the one gouerneth and the other obeyeth, there is a difference sought both in ap­parrell, in speech, and in honours: as Amasis answered concerning the Basin wherein hee 3 vsed to wash his feete: But the male is alwaies disposed toward the female in this man­ner. E The gouernment ouer children is regall, because the engendrer gouerneth both in respect of friendship, and by the prerogatiue of his age: which is a kinde of kingly gouerne­ment. Therefore dooth Homer rightly tearme Iupiter, Father both of men and gods: who is the King of all. For a King must excell in Nature, and bee of the same kinde, as it be­falleth to the elder compared with the yoonger, and the engendrer with his child: whereby it appeareth, that the houshold gouernement ought to haue greater care and regard of men, than of the possessing of such thinges as haue no life: and of mens vertues, then of the commoditie and force of thinges possessed; which wee call riches: and of free folke, than of bondslaues. But first as concerning these villaines and bondmen, it may bee doubted, Whe­ther F besides that they serue for instruments and ministers, there bee any other vertues in them honourabler then these; as modestie, manhood, iustice, and other such habites: Or whe­ther they bee destitute of all other vertues, sauing those that pertaine to the bodie and sla­uery. For it may bee a doubt on both sides, as if they haue, howe much they differ from free men? And it were altogether absurd to say they haue them not, sith they be men and partakers of reason. In a manner the same doubt may bee mooued touching the woman and the childe, Whether there be any vertues in them: and whether the woman should bee temperate, wo­manly, [Page 56] and iust: and the child intemperate, or temperate, or not. And vniuersally, the like G may bee considered in the obeyer by Nature and the gouernour, Whether there bee in them one selfesame or a diuerse vertue: if each of them participate of one and the selfesame vertue, wher­fore should the one rule, and the other obey continually? They cannot differ according to more or lesse: because obeying and gouerning differ in kind, and not in respect of more or lesse. On the other side, it were a wonder that vertue should bee desired in the one, and not in the other. For except the gouernour bee temperate and iust, h [...]w will hee gouerne well? or if the subiect bee not, howe shall bee well obey? Verily, being intemperate and fearefull, hee will doe no­thing that is comely and meete. Therefore it appeareth, that it is necessary for each of them to participate of vertue, in such difference neuerthelesse as is found in those thinges that are in H subiection by Nature: This is straightway perceaued in the soule where the one part com­mandeth by Nature, and the other obeyeth: The vertue of which partes wee affirme to dif­fer, as the vertue of that part which is indued with reason; and the vnreasonable part. It is certaine that the like is obserued in other thinges, insomuch, that by Nature there bee di­uers sorts of rulers and obeyers: For the free man gouerneth the bondman one way, the male the female another way, and the man the childe after another sort: and in all them are the parts of the soule, howbeit with difference: The bondman is altogether depriued of that part which belongeth to deliberation: The wife hath it, howbeit weake: The childe hath it also, but imperfect. The like is to bee deemed of the morrall vertues. And wee I must suppose, that they ought to haue them: howbeit, not after the same maner and mea­sure, but in such measure as is conuenient for the office and exercise of euery one. There­fore it is expedient for a gouernour to haue perfect morrall vertue: for his office is simply and absolutely to command and giue order for the execution of affaires, and reason beareth the sway in commanding and appointing: But it sufficeth euery of the other persons to haue such portion of the same, as is needfull [...]or their owne exercise. Let vs conclude therefore, that all the persons afore mentioned haue morrall vertue: and that the modestie of the husband and wife are not the selfe same, nor their Fortitude, nor Iustice, as Socrates helde opinion: but the one hath Fortitude apt to gouerne, the other to serue: and likewise in other ver­tues, K as more plainely may appeare by the particular consideration of the same. For they that speake vniuersally, doe deceaue themselues, who affirme that the hauing of the soule well disposed, or well doing, or any other like thing, is vertue: But they which number the vertues (as Gorgias did) say farre better then the others, that thus define it. There­fore it is behoofefull so to deeme of all vertues, as a certaine Poet did of a womans si­lence, saying that silence was an ornament to her, but not to the man in like sort. Sith therefore the childe is vnperfect, doubtlesse his vertue ought not to bee imputed to him­selfe, but to the perfecter, and him that is his gardian and gouernour: and likewise to the Maister, the vertue of the Seruant, who is behoofefull to his Maister in necessarie L affaires; and yet for that purpose hath neede but of small vertue, namely of so much as may s [...]rue his turne, in such sort, that through intemperancie or slouthfulnesse, hee faile not in doing of his dutie. If this that wee haue affirmed bee true, it may bee further doubted, whe­ther artificers should haue vertue, because they often make default in their exercises, by means of intemperancie. But there is a great vnlikelihood betweene these: for the bondman liueth with vs, but the artificer is [...]arther of. Who hath neede of as much vertue as hee hath seruitude: for the vile craftsman dooth serue a certaine kinde of seruitude which is compassed within li­mits and bounds. Moreouer, a seruaunt is one of those thinges that consist by Na­ture, but not the Shooe-maker nor any other crafts-man. Therefore the Maister is M the cause that the seruant hath such vertue, and not euery one that hath a certaine Mai­sterly skill to teach seruile exercises. Therefore are they deceiued that would depriue seruants of reason, alleadging that they should onely execute that which is giuen them in commande­ment: Rather it is conuenient to admonish and instruct them more then children. Wee haue for this peesent sufficiently spoken of these matters. But as concerning the husband and wife, the father and children, and of euery of their vertues and mutuall conseruation: and [Page 57] A by what meanes they follow good and flye euill, wee shall necessarily treat thereof in our discourse of the formes of gouernment. For sith euerie house is parcell of the Cittie, and all the matters aboue spoken of are parts of the house, and the vertue of the part is to bee im­puted to the whole, it is necessary to referre the instruction and ordering of women and chil­dren to such Magistrates as haue the ouersight of the States of Cities; if it bee conuenient for the making of a vertuous Citie to haue vertuous women and children: which is most requisite, for that women are the moytie of free men, and of children do come the partakers and fellowes of the Common-wealth, and of the gouernment of the Cittie: insomuch, that sith wee haue al­readie spoken of these matters, and are to treat of the rest else-where, leauing this disputation as B perfect and brought to an end, wee will begin with another matter, and first examine the opini­ons of other men concerning the establishment of the best sort of gouernement of a Cittie or Common-weale.

THERE were three parties of houshould gouernement propounded: the first of the Maister, the second of the Father, the third of the Husband. Vpon the discussing of the Maisters part with the skill of getting which was added vnto them, nowe those parts which belong to the Father and the Husband are layed foorth. In that part which belongeth to the Father, the children are gouerned by the Father regally, as well C through friendship and prerogatiue of perfect age, as with the good will of the children, who willingly obey their Fathers. In that part which belongeth to the Husband, The Husband hath ciuill gouernement ouer his wife, not in respect of the equalnesse of the man and the wife, and gouerning by turnes, which neither are nor ought to bee in them, but in regard of the courage, strength, authoritie, gra­uitie and wisedome both in wordes and deedes, which commonly Nature affoordeth in greater quantitie to the man than to the woman: and for that as hee is the perfecter and better, so is hee the honourabler. Euen as the ciuill Magistrate, during his Of­fice excelleth all priuate persons in apparrell, in countenance, in manner of speech and D in honours. After are declared those morrall vertues, which bee interchangeably re­quisite in gouernours and obayers, and in what difference they ought to haue them, accordingly as is meete for their Offices and exercises: taking a similitude from the parts of mans soule, where the part endued with reason, as superiour, gouerneth; and the vnreasonable part, his inferiour, obeyeth: hauing difference in their vertues.

NOVV forasmuch as wee haue alleadged, that there bee three parts whereof the 1 gouernement of a familie consisteth.] From the first Chapter to the last of this present E Booke, hee speaketh almost of no kinde of matter but the skill of housekeeping, as farre as it may serue to the gouernement of the Cittie: where at his beginning to reason thereof, hee had propounded three societies of persons, necessarie for the establishment of a perfect familie, namely, that of the Maister and Seruant, called Maisterly or Signiorall, which he hath discussed, and the other two, which are of the Husband and the Wife, and of the Father and the Children, of the which hee speaketh here.

THE good man of the house gouerneth his wife and children, but his wife ciuilly, and 2 F his children regally.] That the likenesses of three gouernements doe appeare in the ordering of a family, Aristotle dooth shewe in his eight booke of Morall Philosophie to Nicomachus. The similitudes (sayeth hee) and as yee would say, the examples of go­uernments, may be taken out of familes: for the assembly of the father & his children is like a kingdome, forasmuch as the father hath a care of his chidrē: Vpon the which occa­sion Homer calleth Iupiter Father, for that the fathers gouernment will be a kingdome. [Page 58] but amongst the Persians the fathers gouernment is Tyrant-like, in that they vse their G children as slaues. The maisters gouernment ouer his slaues is tyrannicall, whereby all things are conueyed to the maisters profite: so that the one gouernement is lawfull, and the other which is after the Persian manner faultie. The gouernement of the man and the woman resembleth the Aristocratie: for the man in respect of his dignity, gouer­neth in such matters as touch him; and the wife dooth the like in whatsoeuer is mee [...]e for her. But the man in taking the whole authority to himselfe, declineth to the Oli­garchie, doing against dignitie, that which is not best. Sometimes, the women that are the richer doe gouerne, but they doe not so in respect of their vertue, but by occasi­on of their wealth and power, as it happeneth in Oligarchies. The brethren dwel­ling H together, are like a Democratie, being equall amongst themselues, sauing in as much as they differ in age. But where the difference of ages is great, there is no more brotherly amitie and fellowship. The Democratie appeareth in such houses as are destitute of a lord and maister, wherein all are equall, and where the weakest ruleth, and euery one is at libertie to liue as he list.

3 AS Amasis answered concerning the basin wherein he vsed to wash his feet.] Amasis as Herodotus writeth in the third booke of his Hystory, hauing ouerthrowne Apries in battaile, made himselfe king of AEgypt: but in the beginning of his raigne the AEgip­tians made small account of him by reason hee had beene but a simple Cittizen, and I issued of a base house. After hee drewe them to like well of him, by the manner en­suing. Amongst other his infinite mooueables, hee had a golden Tubbe wherein him­selfe, and they that resorted to his owne Table, had accustomed from day to day to wash their feete: hee caused this tubbe to be molten, and an Image to bee made of the same, which hee set vp in a fit and conuenient place of the Cittie, where it might best bee seene. The AEgyptians ranne thether straightway, and began to worship the Image with great honour and reuerence. Amasis being aduertised thereof, caused the peo­ple to bee called together, and then declared vnto them howe the Image was made of a Tubbe that was woont to serue to wash feete and to vomite and pisse in, and nowe K was greatly worshipped and reuerenced by them. After hee saied vnto them, matters are so come to passe, that you haue behaued your selues towards mee, as toward the Tubbe: for though heretofore I were but of a meane calling, yet nowe I am your king: And therefore I purpose, that you shall yeeld mee all manner of honour, and haue mee in such respect as shall stand with reason.

CHAP. I. That all the Common-vveales of his time deserued correction: and first of all Platoes, reprouing that communitie of things vvhich Socrates deuised in it.

BECAVSE our intent and purpose is to consider of ciuill 1 societie, which is the best of all, for them specially that 2 are furnished with meanes and commodities to liue according to their owne wish and desire: We must exa­mine 3 the other formes of Common-weales that haue E ben receiued by diuerse Cities, which are deemed to bee ordered and furnished with good lawes: and whether there be any other formes of Common-weales set down by the Sages, that are well described: to the end, that we may see what in them is good and profitable. In the 4 handling whereof, though wee seeke for somewhat be­sides the former, it should not bee imputed vn [...]o vs for curiositie or ostentation, but rather this estimation ought to be had of vs, that we haue taken this labour in hand to discouer the defaults and imper­fections F which remaine in the states and gouernments of this age.

IN this second booke are exam [...]ned the principall Common-weales, that were in that time found either in writing, or in practise: euery one of them deseruing correcti­on. First of all Platoes Common-weale is found fault-worthie, for that it did bring in the communitie of goods, wiues, and children, for the better vniting of the Cittie, and for the better maintenance of naturall loue amongst Cittizens: Which course is [Page 62] not only vnfit and inconuenient, but also vnreasonable, for that it is not possible by the G reasons there laid forth, to attaine to the effect which it pretendeth: But contrariwise, it decaieth the City by vniting it too much: and by the communitie of Wiues, and Chil­dren, the friendship of citizens is rather deminished: and by the communitie of goods, hatred and quarrels engendred.

1 BECAVSE our intent and purpose is to consider.] Aristotle purposing to examine those Common-weales that were in his time, or had beene written off before, being a mat­ter of it selfe odious: for the auoiding of the dislike and euill will of his auditors, dooth modestly excuse himselfe vnto them, affirming that hee doth it not through vnprofita­ble curiositie or vaineglorie, (being vices that a true Philosopher should greatly es­chue) H but rather for the onely discouerie of other mens errours, and thereby to attaine the easilier to the knowledge of some better forme of Common-wealth.

2 WHICH is the best of all for them, specially that are furnished with the meanes and com­modities to liue according to their owne wish and desire.] That forme of Common-weale that is simply and absolutely good, is not good for all Citties, but rather onely for those that haue the meanes to liue at their ease and pleasure. Which meanes diuerse Citties want, insomuch, that they are driuen to take some other manner of gouernement, not as the best, but as the most fit for them. For as Aristotle sheweth in the first Chapter of the fourth booke of this worke, The office of the Law-maker and true Gouernour is, to I consider not onely which is simplie a good forme of Common-wealth, but also which is a good forme for them to whome hee giueth Lawes: which men call good by suppo­sition, that is to say, acording to the nature of the inhabitants, and regard had of their commodities.

3 THE other formes of Common-weales.] As that of the Candeans, Lacedemonians, and Carthaginians, which he accounteth the best in the tenth Chap. of this booke, though hee find not one of them entirely and wholly perfect.

4 THE seeking for somewhat besides the former, should not be imputed vnto vs for curiositie or ostentation.] Lactantius in the eight Chapter of his second booke: God (sayeth he) hath K giuen to all men Wisedome, to the end, that euery of them according to his owne fa­cultie and capacitie may enquire of those things that hee hath not heard, and examine those that hee heareth. And wee must not thinke, that they which haue gone before vs in yeares haue also gone beyond vs in Wisedome: The which forasmuch as it is equally giuen to all men, cannot be forestalled by our predecessors: it is not a thing to be occu­pied or possessed, but is free for all men, as the light and brighnesse of the Sunne: For as the Sunne is the light of the eies, so is Wisedome the light of mens hearts. Sith there­fore Wisedome, namely, the searching out of the truth, is engrafted in all men, they robbe and depriue themselues of it, who without iudgement allow and approoue the L inuentions of the elders, and suffer themselues like sheepe to bee ledde by the others di­rections. But they are deceiued, in that when they heare the name of ancients or elders, they thinke presently that it is not possible either for themselues to knowe more, for that they are called yoong men: or for the others to erre, for that they are called El­ders. What impediment is there then for vs to take example by them: And as they haue left to the posteritie that which they had found false; why should not wee that haue found out the truth, leaue our better things to them that shall come after vs?

CHAP. II. The reproofe of the communitie of wiues and children, brought in by Socrates in Platoes Common-weale.

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BVt now put case it were a very great good thing to vnite a Citie as much as might bee, yet seemeth not that to bee proued by this reason, if all men together say, mine, and not mine: which Socrates supposeth to bee a ma­nifest signe and argument, that a City is perfectly vnited. For why, this word 1 All, hath a double meaning, if it be taken distributiuely for euery one: per­aduenture the thing which hee pretendeth might the sooner bee brought to passe: And then might euery man say of his sonnes and wiues that they bee his, and so of his goods and all other things which belong to men. But nowe, they that should haue their wiues and D children in common, would not say so: but would say All, collectiuely and not distributiuely, as euery one: whereby there manifestly appeareth, that there is a fallacian or deceitfull speech in this word All: because these words All and Both, are euen and odde, in that they haue a double 2 signification: and in disputations do breed fallacious & contentious reasons. Therefore it would not bee amisse, if all men should call the selfesame thing their owne, in one sence of All, that is, distributiuely: But that is not possible, & being vnderstood in the other, to wit, collectiuely; it is in all respects vnfit to breed concord. Further, that discourse of Socrates containeth another in­conuenience: for men smally regard any thing that is common to many, but make good account of that which euery man hath particuler to himselfe. And if some one man bee carefull of that E which is in common, other men therefore will make smaller account and care of it: as it falleth out in houshold affaires, where often many seruants do worse seruice than a fewer number. Wher­as then by that way propounded by Socrates, euery Citizen may haue a thousand sonnes, which shall not be proper to himselfe, but common to euery other man, all men will indifferently neglect them [...] By the same meane also euery Citizen will call any person in the Citie his, that doth well or euill, how many soeuer they be: as for example, This is my sonne, or this is his sonne, and speake in like sort of euery one of a thousand Citizens, or howe many soeuer a City dooth containe: and that doubtfully, because it is not certaine who is the childs father, and for whome it is brought vp. But whether is it better for euery man so to cal (his) any one of two thousand or ten thousand, F or rather as men at this day in Cities, say this is mine, where one selfesame party is called by one man his sonne, by another his brother, by another his nephew, or by some ether name of kindred, or of Parentage, alliance, or affinity, of himselfe first, and next of those that be his: and further, by one fellow or brother of a fraternity, by another companion of the selfe-same Tribe? It is a 3 great deale better to be a right and proper nephew, than the other way a sonne. Neither can this possibly be auoided in that communitie, but that some men will rest doubtfull, who be their owne brethren, children, fathers and mothers: for by the likenesse of children to their parents, they [Page 72] must necessarily make triall one of another, as diuerse Cosmographers doe affirme to bee vsed in G 4.5 certaine countries of the higher Affrica, where women are common, and that children are there discerned by their likenesses and shapes. Also of beasts, there be diuerse females found, as Mares and kine, that bring forth yoeng ones, like their dammes: as for example, the Mare of Phar­salia, 6 which therefore was tearmed iust. Againe, it is not possible for the setters downe of that community to auoid diuerse inconueniences: as for example, affraies and slaughters made sometimes wilfull, and sometime against wil: and also riots, brauling, and quarrelling, the com­mitting whereof against father and mother, and other neere kinsfolke, is worse and more intolle­rable, than if they were done against strangers: which kinds of wickednesse will of necessitie soo­ner 7 happen where kindred is vnknown, then when it is knowne. How [...]eit, amongst them that bee H knowne, if any such offences should happen, they might bee reconciled and purged with accusto­med rites and ceremonies, when parents and kindred be knowne, and els not. Also the pretenders to make children common, do commit a great absurdity, in that they only forbid the mutual com­pany of louers, and prohibite not loue it self: and such other fashions as are most vnseemely to passe betweene father and son, and brother and brother: considering that such manner of loue is of it selfe dishonest, and that it is impertinent and to no purpose to enioine them from that kind of com­pany, for no other reason, then onely for that there is too great pleasure therein: without any re­gard had whether they be father or son, or brethren and sisters among themselues. It seemeth that the communitie of wiues and children is more meet to be established amongst husbandmen, than I keepers and gouernors of Cities & Common-weales: because the community of children & wiues 8 would breed the lesse friendship amongst them: and subiects ought to bee kept in such tearmes, as that they may be holden vnder obedience, and not seeke after nouelties. Doubtlesse, that law of So­crates would worke, not only quite contrary to that which all laws duly ordained, should perform, but also directly against that cause which moued Socrates to hold opinion, that such order should 9 be taken concerning children and wiues: for wee iudge, that amity and friendship is the greatest of all goods and commodities that any City or Common-weale can attaine and come vnto, & the most apt thing to defend them from sedition and vprores. And Socrates dooth highly extoll the vniting of a City, which in his opinion seemeth to be the worke of friendship, as we know how A­ristophanes K 10 in the dialogue or treatise of loue setteth downe, that louers through the feruent loue 11 they beare one to another, do come together, and of two make themselues one, but that is fondnes: for by making one of two, of necessity either both or one of them must perish. Wherfore, that kind of community proposed by Socrates, wil much diminish friendship in a City and Common-weale, and bring to passe, that no son can certainly say this is my father; nor any father, this is my sonne. But admit old men should call the yonger sort sonnes, and yong men should tearme the elder sort 12 fathers, yet would that serue to little purpose: for as a small quantity of sweetnesse mingled with a great deale of water, maketh a strange and insensible mixture, euen after the selfesame sort doth it fall out, in that kindred and familiarity, which springeth from such manner of names and L tearmes: so as in that kind of Common-weale, it is not necessary either for the Father to haue care of his sonnes, or the sonnes of the father, nor for brethren to take care one of another. Soothly, there bee two things which greatly mooue men to care and loue: Namely, that commo­ditie which is euery mans owne and proper to himselfe, and affection or good will, neither of the 13 which can bee amongst men subiect to such kind of gouernement. Againe, the transporting of children from husbandmen and artificers to keepers, and from keepers to husbandmen and craf [...]smen, cannot be without great disorder and confusion, and the maner of the execution ther­of, very hard: besides, it is necessary for the giuers and transporters of them, to know whom, and to what persons they giue them. By which meanes, will the inconueniences afore touched, the soo­ner M happen: namely, murders, vnlawfull louings, and man-slaughters. For neither such persons as are transferred and conueied to other Cittizens, doe any longer call their keepers, brethren and sonnes, fathers and mothers: nor likewise, they that abide with keepers, do vse those names to others to whom they are put ouer, whereby the reuerence or regard of kindred, should restraine them from committing such enormities. Thus much haue we set downe hitherto concerning the communitie of wiues and children.

[Page 73] A ARISTOTLE hauing already declared, that too great vnitie is not good for a Citty: doth goe on with reprouing of those reasons wherewith Socrates supposed to vnite it greatly, and vpholdeth that they are rather the cause of the disuniting of the same: and peremptorily hee condemneth that which concerneth the communitie of wiues and children. Notwithstanding, the opinion of Plato in the fift book of his Common-weale, as appeareth by his reasoning, there at large set downe, and by his repetition of the same Cōmon-weale in the beginning of his Timeus, was not, that women should be absolute­ly cōmon, prostitute to the company of all men without difference, & so by means ther­of B children should be in a maner illegitimate and incestuous bastards, a thing reproued by all laws both of God and men: But for the clear rooting out of the apprehension and conceit of [mine, and not mine] out of mens minds, because they are the occasions of all sutes, partialities, and seditions; hee pretended, that yoong virgines when they were of age to marry, should by certaine Magistrates thereunto authorised, be matched in ma­riage to yoong men of their owne complexion and quality, with certaine ceremonies; lots, and songs, that is to say, good maids to good men, and strong maids to strong men, the more conueniently to bring forth children like themselues: & that when they were with child, they should be retired a part from their husbands, and bee well kept and en­tertained C else-where till the time of their deliueries. And that then the children which came of those marriages should be noursed and brought vp togither in one meet place at the charge of the Common-weale: so that yong folk of like age, hauing ben brought vp after one fashion, should account themselues for the Common-weales children, and for brethren, and acknowledge the eldest sort for their fathers and grandfathers. This he thought was meet to bee obserued in the children of the keepers, and all such as in time to come should bee keepers, that is to say, Magistrates and men of warre. Plato straineth himselfe to shewe howe that fashion is not onely possible, but also very good and be­hoofefull. But Aristotle and all others that came after, haue spoken against it.

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THIS word All hath a double vnderstanding.] This reason with the other that follo­weth, 1 doe smell more of Aristotles cunning and subtlety, than of any politicke grauy­tie. Therefore Alexander the great, now and than smiling at certaine of Aristotles like speeches, said [...]. That is, Ari­stotle is wel seene in So­phistry. Therfore this is a darke word, and is ta­ken and vnderstood sometimes by way of collection, comprising all those that bee of a multitude together: and sometimes by way of distribution, signifying euery one of the multitude seuerally by it selfe. Now Socrates imagined that hee had stablished vnitie in a Cittie, when all men might say of one selfesame woman, child, or house, This is mine, E and that is not mine: Which were well said, taking the word All for euery one, that is to say, by way of distribution, where euery man speaketh of any thing that particularly belongeth to himselfe: but when it is taken by way of collection, it is both impossible and absurd, that all men together speaking of one selfe-same thing that is common, should say, This is mine, and this is not mine: and besides the vnitie intended by Socra­tes could not follow of it.

ALL and Both, are euen and odde, because they haue a double signification.] In Latine, Om­nes, 2 & vtraque, vel ambo, the English cannot so wel expresse them, yet wee will shew the meaning of them as wee may. All and Both are taken two manner of waies, and in the F selfesame meaning: sauing that Ambo or Vtraque is vnderstood only of two, and Omnes signifieth many. Therfore All and Both are sometimes euen and odde in number: as for example, twelue persons deuided into foure threes, are the selfesame euen and odde: for being taken together, and collectiuely, they are euen in number, for that they are twelue: but being taken seuerally by threes, they are all odde. Likewise, sixe taken together, is euen, and seuerally odde. This is alleadged by Aristotle, to shewe that this word All hath a double and doubtfull vnderstanding, and now and then may be drawne [Page 74] to such significations as are directly opposite one against another. G

3 BY one, fellow or brother of a fraternity, by another companion of the same tribe.] The peo­ple of Athens being deuided into sundry parts, the greatest of them were called [...], which in Latine signifieth Tribus: of the which, euery one deuided into three parts, did make [...], called also [...], which signifieth a pit; the which the same neighbours, to wit, they of the selfe-same brotherhood, vsed in common. Har­pocration and Pollux in the eight booke.

4 OF the higher Africa.] Namely, the farthest from the sea, for a Countrey is deemed low because it lieth next to the sea. In the same signification wee say low Almaine, lowe Normandie and Brittanie, lowe Poytou and Languadocke. The sea is contained in the H co [...]caue and hollow superficies of the earth, being lower than the land that is drie and vncouered, as the running downeward of the waters prooueth, which naturally slide downeward, as is affirmed by Aristotle in his second booke of Meteors. So that as the sea is higher than the vnder superficies of the earth, so is it lower than the shoare, and consequently lower than the countries that are farthest from it, the riuers whereof goe downeward by naturall course.

5 AND that children are there discerned by their likenesses and shapes.] There is a great disputation betweene naturall Philosophers and Phisitians, from whence the likenesse of children to their Parents proceedeth. Some hold opinion, that the seed descending I from all parts of the body, and specially from the head and braine, is the cause thereof. Some children are like their Grandfather, some twinnes are, one like the father, and the other like the mother, some alwaies like their father, and others euer like their mother, and diuerse neither like father nor mother.

6 THE Mare of Pharsalia, who therefore was tearmed iust.] Pharsalia is a Towne of Thes­salie, well knowne by reason of the ciuill Warres betweene Caesar and Pompey. The Country adioining vnto it, did breed very good horses, from whence came Bucephale, Alexander the great his horse, and the Mare so much spoken of, whereof Aristotle ma­keth mention in this place, that brought colts like their sires, & peraduenture was there­fore K called iust.

7 HOVVBEIT amongst them that be knowne, if any such offences should happen, they might be reconciled and purged with accustomed rites and ceremonies.] The Gentiles of olde time vsed sacrifices of reconciliation or purgations (whereof wee haue spoken in the second booke of Platoes Common-weale) when any man had iniuried, beaten, or slaine, either his father or mother, or any other of his neere kindred, much like the secret confessi­ons and pennances, which the penitentiaries and other Priestes, were woont to limite and assigne.

8 AND subiects ought to be kept in such tearmes, as that they may be holden vnder obedience, L and not seeke after nouelties.] It were more tollerable, that the wiues and children of sub­iects should bee rather common, than of Lords and Gouernours: because that course would diminish the friendship and affinity that groweth amongst them by reason of marriages, and maketh them the readiar to stirre vp sedition and rebellion. Nowe the meanes to keepe States in safetie, and restraine subiects from sedition, are set downe by Aristotle in his fifth booke of his Pollitickes, cap. 11. in manner ensuing: The first mean is to keepe down and cut short by all possible meanes those personages which are high­est in degree and authority, and to rid away and destroy such as be couragious and high minded. The second is to permit no banquets, assemblies, intelligencies, nor any like M thing. The third, to take heede of all things that haue accustomed to breede these two things, namely, stoutnesse of stomacke, and confidence. The fourth, to forbid schooles and all other idle companies. The fift, to prouide by all means that the subiects knowe not one another, because acquaintance is an occasion whereby they trust one another the better. The sixth, that friendes quarrell and fall at contention and controuersies one with another [...] the meaner sort with the Gentlemen, and the richer sort with themselues. [Page 75] A The seuenth, to impouerish and keepe them occupied from day to day, to the intent, 9 they may want leisure to conspire. The eight, to vndertake Warres to keepe them oc­cupied. The ninth, to attempt to make them faint-heard cowards, and men of small skill. The tenth, to stirre vp distrustfulnesse amongst them, and to bereaue them of all manner of ability and power to rebell.

FOR wee iudge that amity and friendship is the greatest good that any City can attaine vn­to.] 10 Plato in his third booke of Lawes, by many good reasons, and by the example of the Persians and Athenians, sheweth that no state can bee well gouerned, vnlesse it bee free, and both wise, and friendly to it selfe.

B IN the first Dialogue or Treatise of loue.] We haue translated this booke out of Greek 11 into French, and enlightened it with Commentaries lately published.

AND of two make themselues one.] Aristophanes in the fourth Oration of the Trea­tise 12 of Loue, in the fable of Androgines, setteth downe this manner of making one of two by loue. The curious sort may see the place set downe at large.

AS a small quantity of sweetnesse mingled with a great deale of water.] As ye would say, 13 a little Honny or Wine mingled with a great deale of water, is scant tasted at all: euen so the making of parentage and kindred too common, and familiarity and acquaintance in spending, serueth to no good purpose or effect.

C AGAINE the transporting of children from husbandmen and artificers to keepers.] Pla­toes 14 mind was, that if any Gouernours children were found of a rude and vntowardly disposition, they should bee put to Husbandmen and men of Occupation. On the con­trary side, if any Crafts-mens children seemed towardly and fit to serue the Commonweale in publicke and martiall charges and offices, they should bee bestowed amongst the Gouernours children, and trained vp with them all after one sort and manner of e­ducation. Although this kind of alteration and conueying of children from one sort to another, carry a great outward shew, yet dooth not Aristotle like of the same, because it maintaineth disorder in the manner of the proceeding thereof.

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CHAP. III. The reproouing of the communitie of goods and possessions.

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NOw it followeth, that we treat after what maner, goods, and possessions are to be ordered in a good Commonweale, namely, whether they ought to be common or not. This question may seuerally bee consi­dered by it selfe by that which hath beene decided touching children and wiues. I meane as concerning possessions, Whether it were more expedient that they continue in such seueralty and propriety as they remaine in at this day, and that the vse of them should be common, as for example, the lands and grounds to be proper, and the fruits ther­of F to remaine in common, as is vsed amongst diuerse Nations: Or contrariwise, whether the soile and territory should be common, and tillage in common also, b [...]t the croppe and fr [...]its to bee deuided and parted to proper and peculiar vses: which manner of communitie is found amongst certaine strangers and Barbarians: or rather whether both soile and fruites should bee in com­mon. If any other than the Citizens should till the ground, there would bee another and a more 1 easie course: but if the Citizens take paines for themselues, there must needes many difficulties and controuersies grow about possessions: for if they bee not equall, as well in reaping of profite, [Page 76] as in taking of paines, it cannot otherwise fall out, but tha [...] they who reape little and labor much, G will complaine of them that enioy and take a great deale, and yet put themselues but to small la­bour. Doubtlesse, it is a hard matter to liue together and haue all thinges in common, and cheefly amongst those men of whom some take great paines in labouring, and others little or none at all, as is manifestly bewraied by the companies of trauellers, who often fall at variance amongst thē ­selues for matters of little or no value: and wee our selues haue many times controuersies be­tweene those seruants and ouerseers which wee vse ordinarily in our houshold affaires. Therefore these difficulties and diuerse others doe arise by the community of goods and possessions. But that manner and course which is now vsed, being stablished and adorned with good customes and vp­right lawes, will bee more conuenient, for that it hath both the commodities: retaining as well H that benefite which may come by the community of possessions, as that which may growe by the proprietie of them. It is expedient that possessions be inioyed in proprietie, and yet common after a certaine manner. For where they be proper, the labours and cares that are distributed, bee not anie occasion that one man should quarrell with another: nay, rather they doe much good, in that all men doe continually applie themselues seuerally about that which is their owne in seueraltie: Howbeit, for vertues sake they will according to the Prouerbe, make the vse of commodities com­mon amongst friends. That fashion of liuing, to the end it should not be iudged to bee vnpossible, is already represented in diuerse Cities, specially in those that be wel gouerned: some of the which haue receiued this fashion, and the rest may receiue it. For euery man that hath any possession I proper to himselfe, dooth yeeld certaine commodities to the benefite of his friends, and vseth di­uerse other commodities as common, according to the custome of the Lacedemonians, who vse as their owne one anothers Slaues, Horses, Dogges, and victuals, if they stand in need of the same when they trauaile into the country or fields. Therefore it appeareth, that it is best that possessions should remaine perticuler, and yet be made common by the vse and bestowing of them: but howe that may be brought to passe, it is the Lawmakers work and office to prouide in that behalfe. Fur­thermore, the pleasure cannot bee expressed that men conceiue in thinking that they haue some 2 goods proper to themselues. For that friendship which euery man beareth to himselfe, is not vain but naturall. And though selfe-loue be found fault withall, the meaning is not that a man should K not loue himselfe at all, but no more than is expedient: and in like manner concerning the loue of money, sith all men loue such commodities. Also it is a great contentation and pleasure to gra­tifie and helpe friends, strangers, and such as bee of our acquaintance, as they may very well doe, that are owners of any goods or possessions in priuate: which thing can neuer befall to them that vnite a Citie too much, who also besides in so doing, lose all exercise of two vertues: First of Tem­perance and Abstinence from women; for it is a goodly work to abstaine from other mens wiues through the gift of temperatenesse: and next, of Liberality, which consisteth in the employing & bestowing of goods: For no man can be accounted liberall, vnlesse he haue goods of his owne to distribute, as his office requireth. Therefore the constitution of such a law carrieth a good out­ward L shew with it, and seemeth a courteo [...]s and gentle law in outward apparence: insomuch, that the auditor therof would willingly receiue it, deeming that it would breed a wonderful friendship of e [...]ery sort of men towards others, cheef [...]y when any man findeth fault with the abuses and dis­commodities that are now in Common-weales: as happening by reason that goods are not com­mon, I meane, the actions and sutes that one man bringeth against another vpon their bargaines and contracts, and the iudgements growing vpon false witnessing and other flatteries which are vsuall in the behal [...]e of the richer sort. Notwithstanding, those inconueniences doe not happen, for that goods are not commou, but rather through mens leudnesse, considering wee haue experi­ence, that they who possesse any thing in common, and vse community, doe sooner fall at variance M amongst themselues, then they who haue their goods in seueralty: and for the most part it com­meth to passe, that there ariseth more dissension amongst a few that liue in common, then amongst a great many who enioy their possessions particularly and in seueralty. Moreouer, it were good reason to expresse, not onely from what euils the liuers in common should bee deliue­red, but also of what commodities they shall bee depriued: Soothly, that kinde of life see­meth altogether vnpossible. Wee m [...]st deeme, that Socrates conceaued this errour, by [Page 77] A supposing that to bee right and lawfull which is not. For a house and Citie must each of them bee one after a certaine sort, but not wholly: For a Citie may growe so farre into one, that it can bee no longer a Citie: or if it shall drawe to the point of lacking but a little of being no Citie, it will bee worse, like as if a tune were brought to one note, or a verse to one foote. But sithens a Citie is a multitude, it is to bee made common and one, through good manners and stablishing of conuenient lawes, as wee haue afore affir­med: and whosoeuer shall pretend to bring in that manner of institution and ordinance, supposing by meanes thereof to make the Citie vertuous, shall deceiue himselfe, if he thinke to establish it by such meanes, and not as the Law-maker in Lacedemonia and Crete did: B who by good manners, Philosophie, and Lawes, did communicate possessions for the bene­fite of publicke life. Wee must looke well into the long continuance of time, and re­membrance of manie yeares: wherein those meanes tending to establish communitie, had not lyen hidden, if they had beene good and behoofefull. For welneere, all thinges 3 haue beene inuented: Howbeit, some haue not beene rece [...]ued, and other some haue beene reiected and clearely forsaken, after men haue had experience of them. These thinges might bee more euidently perceaued, by putting such a manner of Common­weale in vre: which no man can bring to passe, without deuiding and parting those 4 thinges into publicke assemblies for eating, and into fraternities, or parts of Tribes, C and whole Tribes. Insomuch, that a man shall finde nothing well ordered in that Commonweale: sauing that the Gouernours are not put to the tillage of the ground, as the Lacedemonians doe alreadie begin to practise. Notwithstanding, Socrates hath not specified at all, what forme of Commonweale and gouernement should bee assigned to them that liue in common, neither is it an easie matter to set downe. Though the multitude of a Citie dooth almost consist of diuerse Citizens and Townes-men, yet dooth bee determine nothing for them: to wit, whether Husbandmen ought to haue their possessions in common, or euerie man his owne in particular: nor whether their wiues and children should bee in proprietie or communitie. If Husbandmen in D one like sort shall haue all thinges in common, what difference shall wee haue be­tweene them and the Gouernours? Or what reward shall bee left for the rulers of the Commonweale? Or wherefore should they take Magistrateships and Offices vpon them? 5 Vnlesse they deale as the Candians did, Who permitting all other thinges to their slaues, onely forbad them the vse of publicke exercises and wearing of Armour. And if their af [...]aires shall bee ordered as the affaires of other Commonweales bee, what manner a one shall their community be? Of necessity wee shall then finde two Cities in one, of the which, the one shall bee contrary to the other. For hee ordai [...]eth the rulers, as it were for tuition and defence; and the Husbandmen, Artificers, and the rest, as Citizens: who will E ne [...]er liue without sutes in lawe and iudgements, nor without all those other euils where­with (hee sayeth) Cities are continually vexed. Howbeit, hee affirmeth that there is 6 scant any neede of lawes for their training and directions, as namely, of none such as con­cerne Citie matters, Marchandises, and other like things: because hee onely appointeth and attributeth discipline and the correction of things amisse, to the rulers. Againe, hee suffereth Husbandmen to bee owners of possessions, so that they pay their Tributes: who notwithstanding (as is most likely) will be more tedious, froward, and prouder than those that 7 elsewhere are called [...]l [...]tians, Penestians, and other sorts of villaines. But he dooth not de­termine, 8 whether those thinges which are a little before spoken of, and others thereupon de­pending, F are all after one like sort necessary to Rulers, Husbandmen, Artificers, and other Citizens or not: nor what kind of gouernement, discipline, and lawes i [...] f [...]t for them: which is no [...]asie matter to find out, neither is it a thing of any small importance, how Husband­men, Artificers, and other Citizens should demeane themselues to desend and preser [...]e socie [...]ie and communitie with the rulers. Neither dooth hee declare, if Husbandmens wiues are to bee common, and their possessions proper: or if both common, that the wiues shall haue the care of houshold matters, as their husbands haue of the fields. Besides, forasmuch as br [...]te 9 [Page 78] beastes are not fit for, nor capable for the ordering of houshold affaires, it is impertinent G and against all reason to drawe a comparison from them whereby to appoint both to men 10 and wiues one manner of exercise. Further, Socrates his manner of ordeining and stablishing of Magistrates, is dangerous, in that hee keepeth the selfesame men alwaies in office and authority: which is an occasion, that they who come to no promotion and dignitie, and others who are stout and warlike fellowes, fall vnto mutinies and seditions. Notwith­standing, 11 Socrates by meanes of his owne supposion is constrained so to appoint: For that golde is not mingled by Gods grace, one while in one mind, and another while in ano­ther, but alwaies in the selfesame. Hee sayeth that golde is mingled in some immedi­ately at their birth, siluer to others: and then copper and yron to such as are to bee ar­tificers H 12 and Husbandmen. And bereauing the rulers of all felicitie, hee vpholdeth, that the Lawmaker ought to make the whole Citie happie. Howbeit, it is vnpossible to make all the Citie happie, for euermore many, or all, or some parts thereof shall not enioy hap­pinesse. 13 For it is not all one to bee happie and euen, for a whole number may bee euen, and yet diuerse parts thereof odde: the like whereof befalleth not in happinesse and felicitie. But if the rulers bee not happy, what other persons shall bee? Truly neither artificers nor the meaner sort. Therefore that Commonweale brought in by Socrates, doth containe these difficul­ties, and diuerse others as great as these.

I

PLATO his mind and intent was as himselfe writeth in the third and seuenth bookes of his Common-weale, and at the beginning of his Timeus, that the keepers and rulers of Citties and Common-weales should possesse nothing in propriety: as for exam­ple, neither houses, golde, siluer, nor any other kinde of mooueables: but should haue all those commodities in common, and as seruaunts and Ministers of the Com­monweale receaue their sustenance of other men for their yeerely anuitie and wa­ges. Aristotle hauing alreadie declared those inconueniencies which proceede from the communitie of wiues and children, dooth here shewe by manie ex­cellent reasons, that there is no lesse discommoditie in the communitie of pos­sessions, K whether they bee wholly made common, or the landes onely, and not the croppe and fruites: or contrariwise, whether the soile bee made proper to euerie man, and the fruites common: and that it is a great deale better that they remaine as they doe at this present possessed by euery man, in particular and seueraltie, for the auoiding of many controuersies and debates, and for the ma­king of them in some sort common, by the vse and bestowing of the same, through the honesty and liberality of the owners.

1 IF any other then the Cittizens should till the ground.] As in Fraunce, the L peasants and clownes till the Gentlemens landes, reape their corne, and mowe down their Hey, which they carrie home to their barnes: and these be called Coru [...]s. In Lacedemonia, in Candia, in Thessalie, and in diuerse other places, they had slaues and bondmen appointed to such businesse, of whome mention shall bee made here­after.

2 FOR that friendship which euerie man beareth to himselfe, is not vaine, but naturall.] Plato in his fift booke De Legibus, sayeth: There is a great euill engraffed in di­uerse mens mindes, for the remedie whereof they take no regard, but flatter them­selues: namelie this, (as it is commonly sayed) that euery man is by nature a friend M to himselfe, and that it is good reason hee should so bee. But in truth, m [...]ns too great loue toward himselfe is the occasion of all inconueniences to all persons: for the louer is blind toward the partie loued: therefore whosoeuer loueth himselfe, supposing that hee ought to be more honoured than in truth he deserueth, dooth iudge amisse of that which is vpright, good, and excellent. Nowe hee that mindeth to bee a man of great calling, should not loue himselfe and his owne affaires, but euermore [Page 79] A such matters as are iust: whether they bee perfourmed by himselfe, or by anie other men. This errour is the cause that all men thinke their owne ignorance to bee Wise­dome: insomuch, that though wee haue skill of nothing, yet wee thinke wee knowe all thinges: and whereas wee will not suffer other men to execute that whereof wee are ignorant, but vndertake the doing thereof our selues, wee are constrained to doe amisse. For which cause all men should auoid too much selfe-loue, and follow the better waies without any blushing therefore for shamefastnesse. And in another place he saith: that [...]: Hee that loueth himselfe too much shall haue no friend. Aristotle in his Eihicks, Lib. 9. Cap. 8. declareth what louer of himselfe de­serueth B rebuke, and which is to be commended, and after what manner.

FOR welneare all things haue been inuented, howbeit, some haue not beene receiued, and 3 othersome haue been left off after experience had of them.] Aristotle in his seuenth booke of this Pollitickes, and the tenth Chapter: Peraduenture (sayth he) it is credible, that many other things haue ben long agoe, diuerse times, or rather infinitely found out: and it is likely, that need first taught the vse of necessary thinges, and that afterwards those com­modities which serue to honour and pompe were encreased. Wee must suppose, that the like hath befallen in Common-weales. Therefore it is meete and conuenient to take the vse of those thinges that haue beene well inuented, and to endeuour the C supplying of that which wanteth in that behalfe. And in the twelfth Booke of his Metaphisickes the eight Chapter, hee sayth [...] Philosophie hath beene often lost and forgone, and found out againe. The like affirmeth Plato in Timeus, and in his third and sixt bookes De Legibus, and Plutarke at the beginning of Sertori­us his life.

WITHOVT deuiding and parting those thinges into publicke feastes, and into peeces 4 of Tribes, and whole Tribes.] The Lacedemonians and Candians in old time vsed such manner of assemblies, which in their owne tongues they called Si [...]syties, Phidities, and Andryes, whereof-mention is often made in these bookes of go­uernement. D Also Xenophon in the Lacedemonians Common-weale, and Plu­tarke in Lycurgus his life, speaketh of the same. Forasmuch therefore, as the of­ten meeting together of Cittizens is verie fit for the maintenance of mutuall friendship amongst them: Lycurgus and Minos establishing Common-weales, would and ordained that Cittizens should eate together of one sort of victuals in diuerse companies, expressely forbidding them to eate apart priuately: but they were to meete together by fifteenes, or a fewe moe, or a fewe lesse, in euery hall at set times. Contarine in his second Booke of the Venetian Common-weale witnesseth, That the same old custome was transported to Venice in foure ban­quets E which their Duke dooth yearely make to his Cittizens, at the charges of the Common-weale. Aristotle in his seuenth booke of Pollitickes, and the tenth Chapter writeth: That the fashion of meeting together to eate, was very ancient, and that it hath beene obserued in Candia from the raigne of Mynos, and long afore that brought into Italie by Italus king of that Countrey, who of Sheepeheards, made the Italians Husbandmen, and amongst other Lawes, established that manner of ban­quetting together.

VNLESSE they deale as the Candians did [...] who permitting all other thinges to 5 their slaues, onely forbad them from publicke exercises and the wearing of Armour.] F The Candians in their Language called that manner of people [...], as yee would say, Inhabitants of the Countrey adioyning, who were not properly bond­men, but peasants or men of the Countrey, Vassals, and Tributaries to their Land­lords, and tillers of their grounds, as the peasants of Fraunce doe for their Gentlemen, who commonly take from them their Armour and Weapons, and are an impediment that they shall not exercise them, of purpose to make them the more obedient and tractable.

[Page 80] 6 THAT there is scant any need of lawes for their training and direction.] Plato deemed, G that there should scant neede any Lawes in his Common-weale by reason of the good bringing vp and discipline wherein his Cittizens should bee trained, as he sayth in the fourth booke of his Common-weale, as they that of their owne accords without any lawes, will gouerne themselues as becommeth them.

7 THOSE that elsewhere are called Ilotians, Penestians, and other sorts of villaines.] The Ilotes in Lacedemonia, were men brought into bondage and slauery by right of Warre, who plowed and tilled the ground of the Lacedemonians, and made a yearely reuenue to arise therefrom. These because they oftentimes reuolted against their Mai­sters, are here by Aristotle called prowd, and also for the same cause they were kept as H lowe vnder subiection as might bee, and constrained to labour and trauaile conti­nually.

8 PENESTS, or Penestians.] These as their name notifieth, were poore Husbandmen and Laborers, that serued the Thessalians to till their land. Euen as the Periaeces in Can­die did, of whom it hath already beene spoken. Plato in the sixt booke De Legib. speaketh of this Ilotie and Penestie, shewing how men ought to behaue themselues towards such kind of people.

9 BESIDES, forasmuch as brute beasts are not fit for, nor capable of house gouernement, it is impertinent and against all reason to draw a comparison from them, whereby to appoint both to I men and women one manner of exercise.] Like as Bitches naturally are led to do the same things which dogs do, to safegard the flockes of sheepe from wolues; and other noisome beasts, to defend with equall affection their maisters houses, and to hunt or course the Hare the one as well as the other: so likewise, Plato in the fift booke of his Common­wealth goeth about to proue, that all discipline of gouernment ought to bee common to men and women, and also all exercises both of peace and war, sauing that men ought to be vsed as the stronger, & women as weaker and more tender and delicate. The which reason Aristotle vtterly reiecteth, because brute beasts are not Oeconomical, as men are: Wherupon it commeth to passe, that women as the weaker sexe, abide ordinarily with­in K dores, hauing care of the houshold expences, and of the education of her childrē: the which thing the females among beasts cannot do, but are constrained to liue without in the aire without houses, and to range vp and downe for prey and prouision of victuals, as well as the males. See that which is noted hereof in the first chapter of this first book, and that which Xenophon writeth touching the same in his Oeconomicks, cap. 12. and Aristotle Oeconomicks, cap. 2.

10 SOCRATES his maner of ordaining and establishing of Magistrates is dangerous, in that he keepeth the selfesame men alwaies in office and authority.] He said before, that in a Com­mon-wealth where the Citizens and subiects are equal and free, there ought be a mutu­all L intercourse of commanding and obeying, to the end, that all in their course and turn may haue their part in honours and publicke Offices: Otherwi [...]e it would happen, that men of courage, and exercised in chiualrie, being debarred and excluded, would growe discontented, and so stirre vp rebellions and seditions, which is a most dangerous thing in a state.

11 FOR that gold is not mingled by Gods grace, one while in one mind, and another while in another, but alwaies in the selfe-same.] Plato following the steps of Hesiodus in his booke De operibus & diebus (workes and daies:) saith towards the end of his third booke De Re­pub. in fable wise by comparison of mettals, that men were so created by God, that hee M mingled gold in the generation of them that should be fit to command and rule, which maketh them most honourable: siluer in them which should assist and succour the Ru­lers: and yron and brasse into Labourers and other Artificers: out of which reason Ari­stotle concludeth, that it must needs follow; that alwaies the same men should bear rule, to wit, those that shall haue gold in their birth, seeing that the nature of gold dooth not change nor passe from one to another.

[Page 81] A AND bereauing the rulers of all felicity.] Reducing and bringing them into such an 12 estate and condition, that they cannot by any meanes be happie.

FOR it is not all one to be happie and euen.] An euen number is that which is diui­ded 13 into two equall parts, All a whole number may bee euen, and yet neuer a part thereof but odde, as sixe deuided into two thirds. The which disparity cannot happen in a Cittie betwixt the whole and the parts: for the whole Citty cannot bee happy, ex­cept all the parts into which it is deuided, be happy also.

B

CHAP. IIII. Of the insufficiencie of the second forme of Common-wealth, propounded by Plato in his fift booke De Legibus.

C

NOw for asmuch as the like imperfection is neare band found in the lawes described by him afterward, it shall not be amisse to con­sider a little of that forme of Common-wealth also: For Socrates in 1 his first Common-wealth hath but sleightly touched a fewe thinges, to wit, the community of women and children, howe it ought to bee, and the communitie of goods together with the ordering of a Common-wealth. He deuided the whole multitude of inhabitants into two parts, namely Husbandmen and men of Armes, of which hee compoundeth D a third, which consulteth and exerciseth authority in the City. As touching Husbandmen and Artificers, whether they are to bee receiued into any Office, or whether they may beare Armes, or goe on warfare or no, Socrates hath not a whit determined: but hee esteemed that women ought to goe on warfare, and bee partakers of the same discipline and institu­tion, as men in authority are. As concerning the booke of Lawes, the greatest part 2 thereof is touching Lawes, and little or nothing touching Pollicy or Gouernement: the 3 which also studying to make common to other Citties, by litile and little hee falleth againe into another forme of Common-wealth: For (except onely the communitie of Wiues and goods) hee ascribeth the selfe-same thinges to both kindes, setting foorth the same Disci­pline, E the same exemption from necessarie businesses, and the same manner of eating to­gether, 4 except that here hee addeth the assemblie of women to that same end: and in the one hee would haue a thousand men at Armes, and in the other fiue thousand: Where­fore 5 the whole speech of Socrates carries indeede a shew of brauerie, but is superfluous, am­bitious, 6 vaine-glorious, and full of nouelty and doubtfull questions: and peraduenture it is a hard matter, that all should goe well therein, especially in regard of the multi­tude whereof wee spake of late; which being so great, surely there would want necessaries, as in the land of Babylon, or any other ample and large Countrey, to furnish with victu­als 7 so many idle men as fiue thousand, with a farre greater companie of women and ser­uants: F Let him therefore deuise suppositions in his braine, so that they bee such as are not impossible. Moreouer, hee sayeth: That a Law-giuer when hee maketh Lawes, ought to haue regard to these two thinges, to the place and to the men: to the which, it will not be amisse to adde the regard of neighbour adioyning places, to the end, the Citie may haue a politicke kinde of life: for it is necessarie that it bee prouided of Weapons and Armes that are profitable, not onely for it selfe, but also which may serue for another Countrie. And put the case then, that such a life of the City is not approoued neither [Page 82] in particular nor in publicke: yet notwithstanding the Cittizens ought to bee fearefull to their G enemies, not onely when they i [...]ade their borders, but also when they are retired. Besides, regard ought to bee had to possessions, whether the quantitie of them might not bee bet­ter, that is to say, more plainely and manifestly defined and set downe: for hee affir­meth that there ought to bee so much goods in this Cittie, as might suffice euery one to l [...]e temperately, as if hee would say, to liue well: which is too generall a speech, be­cause that a man may liue temperately, and yet notwithstanding miserably. Wherefore 8 it were better to say, Temperately, and Liberally together: both which seperately taken, a lux­urious life dooth follow the one, and a laborious the other, considering that these vertuous habites doe onely consist in the vse of goods: for wee are not accustomed to say that a man H dooth vse goods gently or valiantly, but moderately and liberally: so that it is necessary, 9 that the vse of them consist in that. Further, it is impertinent and absurd, when as hee bringeth in an equalitie of goods and possessions, to determine nothing concerning the multitude of Cittizens, and to leaue at large the measure of procreation of children: as if it would necessarily come to passe, that howe many soeuer were borne, yet there would bee a sufficient equalitie by reason of the barrennesse of some, as wee see it happen at this present in Citties. But neuerthelesse, that could not bee so exactly obserued then, as now; the reason is, because nowe adaies none are poore, by reason that the goods and possessions are destributed among the multitude: but then they being not distributed, necessarilie I 10 such persons as exceede the rated number, or bee extraordinarie, must haue nothing whe­ther they were more or fewe in number: and therefore it were more needefull rather to limite the generation of children, then the quantitie of possessions: that men might not beget more children then was ordained and prescribed. And in this limitation of chil­dren regard must bee had to the diuerse chaunces of death, and to the barrennesse of men and women: for that being not regarded, as wee see in many places, is the cause that 11 Cittizens become poore, and then pouertie engendreth sedition and wickednesse. Phidon the Corinthian one of the most ancient Law-giuers in memorie of man, was of this minde, that the number of houses and of Cittizens ought alwaies to be equall: albeit, at the first K vnequall proportions had by lot fallen vnto all; but the contrarie is to bee found in these Lawes: of which matter wee will entreate hereafter, and declare what wee thinke is fit­test 12 to bee ordained. Furthermore, hee hath omitted to shewe howe Magistrates and they which are in authoritie, differ from priuate men. For hee sayth, onely as the Warpe is made of another kind of thread then the Wo [...]e, so ought Magistrates to differ from subiects. Againe, whereas hee permitteth the encrease and multiplication of possessions vn­to fiue folde: wherefore dooth hee not allowe the same in lands and territories vnto a certaine limitation? Also the deuision of houses which hee maketh, is not very commodious nor fit for houshold affaires: for hee assigneth to euery man two distinct seuerall houses, but it is a hard L 13 matter for one man to inhabite two houses. Besides all this, all the whole discription of his Common-wealth seemeth neither to bee a popular power, which they call a Democratie, nor the power of a fewe, called an Oligarchie: but a forme of gouernement betwixt both, which they 14 call a Policie, consisting of men that beare Armour. If therefore hee hath propounded this forme of Common-wealth, as the most vsuall in Cities; it may bee hee hath sayed well: but if as the best next vnto the first, hee is out of the way: for so the Lacedemoni­an forme, or some other, where the best men Aristocratically beare rule, is more commen­ded. 15 Some are of opinion, that a good Common-weale ought to bee compounded of all 16 the [...]ormes of gouernement together: and in that respect they commend the Lacedemo­nians, M because it consisteth of an Oligarchie, a Monarchie, and a Democratie, that 17 is, the dominion of the people: Their Kingly State is a Monarchie, their Senate an 18 Oligarchie, and their Ephorie a Democratie: because the Magistrates or Tribunes of 19 the people called Ephori, are taken out of the people. Others thinke, that this Ephorian Office is a plaine Tyrannie, and that Democratie consisteth rather in their common assem­blies, and ioint banquettings, and their other ordinarie manners of life. And more [Page 83] A in these laws of Socrates it is declared, that a good Common-wealth must be compounded of these two formes, a Democratie and a Tyrannie: which are either no formes at all of gouern­ment, or if they bee, yet are they the worst of all. Therefore they that mingle more formes to­gether, are rather to bee followed, because a Common-wealth compact of the most formes 20 of gouernement, is the best. And yet if a man would consider Socrates Common-wealth aduisedly, hee shall finde little or nothing therein that belongs to a Monarchie, but all to an Oligarchie or a Democratie, although it encline naturally most to an Oligarchie, as it may ap­peare by the creation of Magistrates: for to create them being elect by lot, is common to both: but to bee necessarie that the most rich bee assistant and present at their publike consultations, B and the creation of Magistrates, and the execution of other ciuill offices, whereas the rest are exempted therefrom, is proper to an Oligarchie: As this also, to procure that the greatest 21 part of those that beare rule in the Common-wealth bee of the richer sort; and that the grea­test Offices bee put on them that haue greatest riches. Also the election of the Senate is Oligar­chicall: 22 for all chuse necessarily, but the first choice is out of them of the first ranke of men of greatest reuenue, then as many out of the second, and so of the third: except that they of the third & fourth ranke are not necessarily to chuse: as for the fourth, only they of the first & second ranke of reuenue, in all the four are constrained to chuse them. Then he saith after this, that they must cull out of each ranke so many, that they all may be of an equall number: so that they of the C greatest reuenue must exceede in number and goodnesse, for asmuch as there are some of the popu­lacie that chuse not at all, and that because they are not compelled to chuse. Therefore that this Common-wealth cannot consist of a Democratie and a Monarchie, it is cleare by this that hath beene spoken, and will be more cleare by that which we shall speake hereafter, when occasion shall be offered. Also there ariseth a danger in that maner of creation of Magistrates, in chusing some out of them that be chosen: For if certaine should conspire together, though they were but a few, yet would the election be compassed by vndermining, according to their owne desires. And this is that forme of Common-wealth which Plato in his lawes hath described.

D PLATO after his ten bookes of Commonweale matters, wrote twelue of Laws: Of the which twelue, he hath made the foure first in forme of a Proeme, before he enter in­to the principall matter, which he beginneth to treat of in the fift: wherein hee first set­teth downe such Lawes as pertaine to the state in generall, and to the charges of Magi­grates: after that commeth he in order to such lawes as concerne the particular actions of the Cittizens, in the doing whereof, hee hath described such a forme of Common­weale as doth differ from the other. He calleth the one the first, wherein he will haue all things common: the other, the second, being lesse common: against the which Aristo­tle continueth to dispute as he did against the former: alleadging that there is small dif­ference E betweene them, sauing in the community afore specified.

FOR Socrates in his first Common-weale, hath but sleightly touched a fewe matters.] 1 Here is as it were a summe or breefe repetition of the matters contained in Platoes first Common-weale.

As for his booke of lawes.] Although this booke bee enriched with many goodlie 2 and graue discourses of the originall and beginning of Lawes and Citties, of Musicke, of the bringing vp and training of mankind, of Gods prouidence, of the conferring to­gether F of the cheefe Common-weales of his time, namely, the Candian, Lacedemoni­an, and Athenian, and of the Persian monarchie, of the scituation and power of Towns, and of diuerse other like matters: yet notwithstanding, the greatest part of the worke is spent in penning of Lawes, with their Proemes, without any other speech concer­ning the Common-weale, or specifying what maner of forme and qualitie it should bee of.

[Page 84]THE which also endeuouring to make it common to other Citties.] To make it fitter for G the common vse of Citties than the first, so that manie Citties may haue the vse thereof.

4 THE exemption from necessary workes.] As for example, from tillage of the ground, and other meane occupations necessary for mens vse. He vseth this word in the like sig­nification in the third Booke, and third Chapter.

5 AND will haue in the one Common-weale a thousand men at armes, and in the other fiue thousand.] Aristotle hath ouerskipped fortie, for Plato in his fift booke of Lawes, supposeth a great commoditie in the number of 5040, both in Warres and peace, and also in leagues and succours: because it containeth in it diuerse diuisions or distributi­ons H of parts disposed in order.

6 THEREFORE the whole speech of Socrates.] Plato bringing in Socrates in his writings causeth him to dispute in Dialogue-wise, confuting other mens opinions, without de­claring his owne: and vsing diuerse inductions, and other arguments cunningly hand­led, which make the vnderstanding thereof very hard, as hauing in some places appa­rant ambiguities, and in others superfluity: and in some other hee seemeth curious of new and woonderfull matters, as in treating of the Ideas of the community of Wiues, Children, and Goods, and likewise of other strange and vnusuall thinges. Notwithstan­ding, all affection and parciality laid aside, if they be read with iudgement, and that men I do come vnto him prepared aforehand with other Sciences, and some experience with­all, they shall find in him great profite, as well in knowledge of sundry matters, as in elo­quence, whereof he hath shewed himselfe so curious, as that men vsed to say, he pain­ted his writings, that is to say, that hee looked them ouer, and corrected them most curiously.

7 THE Land of Babilon.] A Region neere vnto the great and famous Citty of Baby­lon, verie large and fertile, containing a part of Assyria and Mesopotomia. Ari­stotle maketh mention of Babylon in the third booke of this worke, and the second Chapter. K

8 TEMPERATELY and liberally together.] Forasmuch as the societie of a Citty is not only to liue, but to liue wel, that is to say, happily with sufficiencie: in the second Chap­ter of the first booke, and fift Chapter of the seuenth Booke of this worke, he sayeth: That it should haue the territories and goods sufficient for the temperate and bountiful maintenance thereof, that is to say, moderate and delightfull.

9 ALSO it is impertinent and absurd in that where he bringeth in equality of goods.] Plato in his fift and sixt bookes of lawes dooth not make inheritances so equall, that one shall not possesse more than another: For hee appointeth foure degrees or orders according to the difference of reuenues. Notwithstanding, in his first institution of a Cittie, and L in his diuision of lands and goods, he will haue euen portions deliuered to all his Citti­zens. This Aristotle calleth equalnesse of goods. Then permitteth hee that principall portion to be encreased to a double, treble, and fourefold quantity, so as a man shall pos­sesse no lesse than is comprised in the first stocke, nor any more than is conteined in the fourth.

10 BVT when they remaine vndeuided, of necessitie, such persons as exceed the rated number, or be extraordinary, shall haue nothing, [...].] Socrates would not haue euery mans goods and patrimony deuided amongst all his children: but that the father might dis­pose and leaue it wholly to any one of them whom he liked or loued best. Whereby it M would come to passe, that they which were borne aboue the appointed number of 5040 should haue nothing. For the auoiding of which pouerty, the number of children to bee engendred, should bee prescribed and limited, without staying vpon this, that there die as many of those that bee borne, as that the multitude of Cittizens may alwaies bee reduced to their first egall number: or by the barrennesse of some women to requite the fruitfulnesse of others.

[Page 85] A POVERTIE engendreth sedition.] Plato in his fift booke of Lawes, by the word Po­uertie, 11 doth not so much meane, the want or deminishment of goods and possessions, as the vnsatiable desire of getting and purchasing. And in the fourth booke of his Com­mon-weale, hee no lesse discommendeth and detesteth riches than pouertie, affirming, that delightfulnesse, idlenesse, sedition, and desire of nouelties, doe proceede from the one: and that the other is the cause of vnbountifulnesse and wickednesse, with like de­sire of noueltie. Therefore in a well ordered Cittie that should be free from all parciali­ties, he will haue no excessiue riches or pouertie in any of the Cittizens: as appeareth in the same sixt booke De Legibus.

B AGAINE he hath omitted to set downe how Magistrates shal differ from priuate persons.] 12 Plato in his sixt booke De Legib. discourseth concerning Magistrates [...] what manner of men they ought to be, how and by whom they shall bee chosen, and that euery of them shall yeeld account of his charge and Office: except those, that after the maner of kings appoint the end of all affaires. Nowe fetching a comparison from the Weauer, who maketh not the Woue and the Warpe of like yearne, but putteth the strongest in the Warpe, and the slendrest in the Woue, that it may be the apter for workemanship: hee sayeth that after the like sort, they which shall bee Magistrates, ought to bee discerned from others, that there may be authority on the one side, and obedience on the other, as C appeareth in the fift booke De Legib.

FVRTHER the whole forme of this State seemeth neither a popular gouernement, nor the 13 authority and power of a few, but a meane betweene both, called a Common-weale.] Euery Ci­tie is gouerned by one or many: if by one, it is called a Monarchie: if by many, a Com­mon-weale. Againe, where it is gouerned by one, either that one doth all alone after his owne pleasure, or els vseth good mens counsell and exercise: if he doe all alone, it is ty­rannie: if with others, a kingdome. Further, euery Cittie is gouerned by one, or ma­ny, or a few folke, and that either well or euill: if well by one, it is a kingdome: if euill, a tyrannie: if by a few men well, an Aristocratie: if euill, an Oligarchie: if by many well, D a mixed Common-weale: if euill, a Democratie. Plato at the end of the fourth booke of his Common-weale, setteth downe fiue sorts of Common-weales, the kingly state, an Aristocratie, an Oligarchie, a Democratie, and a Tyrannie. In his Politickes or Trea­tise of reigning, he assigneth three good, and three bad, affirming, that the kingly state is the best. In his fift booke of Lawes he sayth how that is the best Common-weale where all things are common, which he calleth the first: and the second, that which he descri­beth in the said Lawes which is mixed with the Democratie and Oligarchie. Therefore Plato and Aristotle doe differ in this, that Plato mingleth the Oligarchie with the De­mocratie: Aristotle doth seperate them, and maketh one seuerall kind, which he calleth E a Common-weale that is mixed: but they agree in some sort in the mixture of these formes. For tyranny by it selfe is not good, neither an absolute Kingdome, nor a Demo­cratie, not an Oligarchie: but for the attainement of a iust and good Common-weale, they must bee all mingled together, and thereof one compounded forme made and established.

IF then he haue pretended this forme of Common-weale, as that which is most common to 14 Cities.] Which may be conuenient or applied to moe Citties than the first, as not the furthest from mens common custome and manner of liuing.

SOME hold opinion, that a good Common-weale should be mingled of all sorts.] Euery sort 15 F of Common-weale established alone and singly by it selfe, doth quickly goe out of kind into his next vice, except it be guided and holden together by the others. As for exam­ple, the kingly state: though it be the best of all resembling the diuinity, wherein all men acknowledge that one God onely doth rule and gouerne, yet by means of mans vncon­stant mind, being easily marred in so high power and liberty, it quickly chaungeth into Tyrannie. So the Aristocratie, that is to say, the signiorie or state, wherein the wisest and honest personages ought to gouerne, doth conuert into the Oligarchie: When diuerse [Page 86] of the mightiest men conspiring together, do take vpon them the managing of all pub­licke G affaires, and dispose of all matters of state according to their owne pleasures. A­gaine, the Democratie wherein the common people gouerne modestly by the auncient law and custome of the Countrey, doth swell into a disorder of egalnesse and libertie: where euery one pretendeth to haue authoritie to doe and say what he list. Therefore a Common-weale founded to haue long continuance, ought not to be single, nor of one kind alone, but must haue all the vertues and proprieties of the others assembled into it, to the end, that no disproportionablenesse take root and encrease therein, which may cause it to goe out of kind to the next vice to it, and so destroy and ouerthrow it. This did Lycurgus first obserue: who in ordaining and founding H

The Lacedemonian Common-weale, mingled therein these three kinds of States, so aptly that it continued about seuen hundred yeares after one manner, alwaies keeping the integritie and perfection of the first institution thereof: Wherein the kings, the Ephores, and the Senat, had their preheminences and authorities so entermingled and ballanced together, that it could not wel be discerned vnder what kind of gouernment it was stablished.

The Common-weale of Carthage was thus ordained at the beginning: It had kings, and the Aristocratical power of Senators, and the Communaltie, which had also their prerogatiue in matters that concerned them: so that as farre as toucheth the assembling I of the three estates, it was like the Lacedemonian.

The Commonweale of Rome had these three parts so euenly and fitly entermixed that a man cannot tell whether it were all an Aristocratie, or a Democraty, or a Monar­chie: if one consider the power and authority of the Consuls, hee might iudge it for a Monarchie and kingly estate: and hauing an eye to the Senators, he might deeme it for an Aristocratie: or a popular Democratie.

The Venetians establishing their Commonweale, haue so ordered the three estates, that it setteth our the kingly dominion, the gouernement of Aristocratie, and the au­thoritie of the people. Their high or great Counsell hauing the soueraigne authoritie, K whereupon the Senate and the authoritie of all the Magistrates dependeth, doth repre­sent the popular state. The Duke who ruleth during his life, sheweth the royall authori­tie, in that chiefly he retaineth the grauitie and dignitie thereof: as the Senate of tenne men, and the Colledge of the ancients commonly called wise men, resembleth the Ari­stocratie, as appeareth in Contarine his booke of the Venetian Commonweale.

Forasmuch as in the kingdome of Fraunce, the Possessions, Honours, and Offices of the Commonweale are deuided and parted amongst all the Estates proportionablie vnto their degrees, and euery of them kept in his preheminence and calling, there en­sueth of the same such a consent and agreement, as hath beene the occasion of the con­tinuance L and prosperity thereof by so long tract of time amongst all kingdomes, wher­of there is any remembrance or knowledge: for taking it aright, it partaketh of the three States. First it hath a King, who is a Monarke, loued, obeyed, and feared with­all: Who though hee haue full power and authoritie to command and doe what he list, yet is this high and Soueraigne libertie ruled and limitted by good Lawes and Ordinances, and by the great multitude and authoritie of Officers which are so neere about his person, that in sundrie places of the Realme, scant can the king doe anie thing, that should bee either too violent or too preiudiciall to his subiects. The twelue Peeres, the secret and priuie Counsels, the Parliaments and great M Councell, the Chambers of Accounts, the Treasuries and Generalities of char­ges are pertaining to the Aristocratie. The Estates holden euerie yeere in the Prouinces, the Mairalties of Townes, Shrieualties, Consulships, Chapterships, Wardens and keepers of Townes, are Democraticall: as appeareth in Siessel his French Monarchie, and in the preface of Appian of Alexandria, by him translated in­to French.

[Page 87] A AND therefore doe they commend the forme of the Lacedemonians Commonweale, which 16 they say doth consist of the Oligarchie, Monarchie, and Democratie.] The seuenth Chapter of this booke is wholly assigned for the Lacedemonian Commonweale: whereof also there is mention in diuerse places of this worke, as for example, in the third booke and tenth Chapter: and in the fourth booke and ninth Chapter: and in the seuenth booke and foureteenth Chapter: and also in the first, third, and fourth books of Platoes lawes: in the life of Lycurgus written by Plutarke: in the sixt and seuenth bookes of Polybius histories: Xenophon hath written a Treatise thereof: Cicero hath commended it in diuerse places.

B THEIR Kingly state being the Monarchie.] Aristotle in his third booke of Politicks, 17 cap. 10. saieth: The Lacedemonian Commonweale seemeth a very lawfull kingdome [...] yet hath not the king there absolute authoritie, sauing when hee maketh Warres out of the Countrey, at what time he hath soueraine authoritie: also hee gouerneth as cheefe in the sacrifices of the gods.

THE Senate, the Oligarchie, and the Ephori or Tribunes, the Democratie, for that the 18 Magistrates or Tribunes of the people called Ephori, are created by the people.] Aristotle in the fourth booke of his Politickes, cap. 9. hath these words: Many men vphold, that the Commonweale of the Lacedemonians is a Democratie, because their institution hath C many things of the Democratie: as for example, First, the training vp of children, sith the rich mens children are brought vp as the poore mens, and instructed and trained in the selfe-same sort the poore bee. Also in their ages ensuing, and when they come to mans estate, they liue after the same order: For the rich are no more made of there, than the poore: They are serued in publicke feasts with one kind of meate: and the rich weare such apparrell as the poorest sort may come by. Againe, for that the two highest Ma­gistrates are in the handes of the people: whereof they chuse one, and haue part in the other, sith they chuse the Senatours, and haue part in the Ephorie. Others affirme howe it is an Oligarchie, because it hath diuerse thinges of the Oligarchie, as D all the Magistrates by election, and none by lots: and for that a few haue power to con­demne to death, or to bannish, and diuerse other like matters.

OTHERS are of opinion, that the Tribuneship or Ephorian authoritie, is tyrannie.] Plato 19 in his fourth booke De Legibus sayth: When I consider the Lacedemonian Common­weale, I cannot well tell how I should call it: for the power of the Magistrates there cal­led Ephores, is Tyrannicall. Sometimes it seemeth aboue all other Citties, most like the Democratie. Nowe, it were altogether impertinent to denie, that it is no Aristocratie: also that the kingdome which is perpetuall therein, is as well by others, as by our selues deemed the ancientest of all others. Therefore being thus vpon the sodaine asked the E question (as I saied) I cannot presently answere you distinctly, which of these Common­weals the Lacedemonian is. The word [...], signifieth as much as ouerseeing, or cōtro­ling; which was a high Office in Lacedemonia, hauing authoritie euen ouer the kinges themselues, against whome they were set, as the Tribunes were against the Consuls at Rome: as Cicero writeth in his third booke De Legibus. King Theopompus deuised this Magistrate to bridle the libertie of the Kinges, as Aristotle writeth in the fift booke of his Politickes, cap. II. They were two Kings continuing perpetually, and fiue Ephores remaining in Office for a yeare, who were chosen by the people, yea of the meanest and basest sort, and appeales might bee made from the Kinges vnto F them.

THE best Commonweale, which is compact of the most sortes.] Namely, that which 20 is the most entermingled, as hath beene decla [...]ed. Aristotle in the fourth booke of his Politickes, cap. II. supposeth it the best Commonweale which containeth much people of meane calling, who are neither too rich nor too poore: and so dooth Plato in his fift booke of Lawes, and in the fourth booke of his Common­weale.

[Page 88] 21 WHICH is the meane that the greatest part of the rich men do obtaine the Magistrateships, G and that the highest offices are distributed according to the greatnesse of richesse.] Diuerse men haue thought, that they could orderly frame a Commonweale, so that the right and power of gouernement might bee limitted according to the reuenues and plentie of goods and possessions: yet haue they fallen into most great inconueniencies. For it most often falleth out, that men of very base and meane calling attaine to great richesse, insomuch, that for the gathering of richesse, and increasing their substance by the gaine of their meane exercises and vile occupations, they spare not themselues, but beguile their owne nature, as well in victuals, as in taking their rest: to the end, to rake the more wealth together. On the contrarie side, some that be well borne, and haue ben brought H vp Gentlemen-like, fall into pouertie, either by misfortune, as often as it chanceth, or els by meanes they giue themselues to learning and vertue, and take no care for getting of richesse. Therefore those manner of persons who tast of nothing but co­uetousnesse, and are destitute of good learning, by little and little lay hold on the go­uernement. And they that haue been well brought vp, when their riches faile, lose their Cittizenships right, which is an occasion of the breeding of great seditions to trouble the ciuill vnitie. Wherefore, the olde Venetians establishing their Common-weale, for the auoiding of all such perplexities, haue thought it much better to li­mite their gouernement by nobility of blood, then by great reuenues, as appea­reth I in Contarine his first booke of the Venetian Commonweale.

22 ALSO he maketh the election of the Senate and Co [...]nsell answereably to the authority of a few.] Plato (as he writeth in his sixt booke De Legibus) would in his Commonweale haue the Senatours chosen in such manner, that yearely, three hundred and three score should bee elected out of all the Orders, which were foure, by taking foure score and tenne out of euery Order. And that first of all, there should bee chosen foure [...]core and tenne of them out of the first Order, by the voices of all them of the other Orders, with a fine set vpon his head, that should not giue his voice. And next of all, as many out of the second Order in the selfesame manner: consequently, out of K the third, other fourescore and tenne: howbeit, with this caution, that in this third election, they of the last Order were at libertie whether they would giue their voices or not. Last of all, that there should likewise fourescore and tenne bee taken out of the fourth Order, where all they of the first and second Order were bound to giue voices; and of the third and fourth Orders, who listed: afterward these three hundred and threescore after the same manner, were with the voices of euery Order reduced to the one halfe, to wit, to a hundred and fourescore. And at last by lots, to fourescore and tenne Senatours or Counsellours. The Venetians vse lots and elections in the di­stribution of their Magistrateships, taking lots of cloth of golde or siluer, which L they cast into two white earthen pots, according to the order written by Sabellicus in his Treatise of the Magistrates of Venice, and by Contarine in his first booke of the Venetian Commonweale.

CHAP. V. M Of Phaleas his Commonweale: and of the Chalcedo­nian Commonweale. [Page 89] A CHAP. V.

THere haue bene other formes of Commonweales brought in, some by men of no learning, others by Philosophers, and men of experience in Gouern­ment. All the which formes draw neerer than the two former afore spoken of, to those that in time past haue bene established, and to such also as are B in vse and practise in this age. For there hath not any other man inuen­ted the like noueltie concerning the communitie of wiues and children, nor touching the assemblie and meeting of women at meat and meales: But rather they begin with those things that are necessarie, diuers of them holding opinion that the cheefe and principall point lyeth in ordering goods and possessions aright, from whence they say all ciuile discord and dissention ariseth. Vpon which occasion, Phaleas the Calcedonian hath first set foorth this consideration, vpholding that the goods and possessions of Citizens oughte to be equall: supposing it no hard matter to make them equall, if it be foreseene and prouided for at the first stablishing of a Citie: howbeit a hard matter to be brought to passe after a citie is alreadie founded, and yet withall a thing that may be done, so that rich men giue dowries and portions in C mariage with their daughters and receaue none themselues: and that on the contrary side, the poore doe take them and giue none. Plato writing his Lawes, allowed the augmentation of posses­sessions vnto a certaine stint and limitation, howbeit in such sort, that it was not lawfull for any Citizen of what state degree or condition soeuer he were, to possesse aboue fourefold as much as the smallest possession of the meanest sort amounted vnto, as hath bene in this worke already decla­red. Againe, the ordainers of those Lawes ought not to be ignorant of one thing, wherevnto they haue no regard at this day, namely, that when they ordaine and limit the greatnesse of pos­sessions, it were also expedient to prescribe and make a law for the stinting of the number of chil­dren: For if the number and multitude of children surmount the greatnesse of the reuennues D and possessions, the Law must needs be dissolued and abrogated: and besides that abrogation, will rise vp an inconuenience, in that many shall of Rich become poore, whome it will bee hard to 1 k [...]epe from attempting some nouelties and alterations. That therefore the equalnesse of posses­sions is of some effect in a ciuile societie, some men of old time seeme to haue had vnderstan­ding: as for example, Solon made a law in that behalfe, and likewise other lawmakers haue en­acted 2 and ordayned lawes that forbid the possessing of so much land as euery man list. In like 3 fort the lawes forbid the sale of goods and possessions, as there is a statute in Locres restrayning the sale of patrimonies, without euident proofe of some misfortune happened: and commaun­ding the preseruation of auntient inheritaunces. The neglecting of which ordinance in Leu­cades, 4 E made their Commonweale too popular: because, that according to the stint of their reuenues, they came no more to the Magistrateships. But there may bee an equa­litie of possessions, yet will it bee such, as that either they will bee in too great plentie and abundance; and so the cause of lauishnesse and riotous liuing: or else so scarce and so little, that there will bee great want and scarcitie. Therefore a Law-maker dooth not deale sufficiently in making possessions equall, except hee reduce them to a mediocrity: and yet the reducing of them to a mediocrity, will not doe any good, vnlesse the greedy desires of men bee rather made equall and limitted, than possessions: which is vnpossible to bee brought to passe, if the Citizens be not sufficiently trained and ordered by lawes. But it may F bee that Phaleas would answere, that hee pretended to declare, that in Citties there ought to bee equality of these two things: namely of possessions, and of discipline and instruction. Not­withstanding, hee ought to haue told vs what manner of discipline and instruction this should bee: which can doe no good if it bee one and the selfesame. For it may bee one and the same, and yet such as may make men ouer-couetous of money and honour, or of both together. Further, seditions doe happen by reason of the inequality, not onely of [Page 90] goods, but also of honours: howbeit, after a diuerse and contrary manner about both of them. G 5 for the common people doth become malecontent with the vnequalnesse of goods: and men of reputation conceiue displeasure at equality of honours: whence came this saying, Wee are equall 6 in honour both good and bad. Now men are not prouoked to doe euill, onely in regard of thinges needfull when they want them: the remedy wherof he supposeth to come by the equality of goods, to the end, there be no robberies committed through constraint of hunger or cold: but also for the enioying of their pleasures, and satisfying of their couetous desires. For if their greedy de­sires passe their necessity, then will they fall to doing of michiefe for the remedy and helpe there­of: 7 neither will they doe iniury onely for the fulfilling of their pleasures, but also when they desire 8 to enioy pleasures without sorrow. What remedy then for these three? Soothly, that the first sort H haue small wealth, and take paine for their liuing: that the second, vse temperatenesse and mo­deration: the third remedy, if any be minded to attaine to pleasure of themselues, let them seeke it by no other meanes then by Philosophy: for other pleasures cannot be gotten without the helpe of many folke. Now men doe not vse to attempt any great vices or enormities for the remedy and releefe of necessities, but for the satisfaction of their excessiue and immoderate desires: as for ex­ample, some vse tyranny, & oppresse people with vngodly dominion: not for the auoiding of cold, but to the end, they may fulfill their vnruly desires without controulment. Therefore great ho­nours and rewards are decreed and assigned: not to him that killeth a theefe, but to him that bereaueth a Tyrant of his life. Therefore that manner of Commonweale inuented by Phaleas, is I apt only to redresse small iniuries. Againe, hee setteth downe many meanes tending to the good gouernement and behauiours of Citizens and subiects amongst themselues, yet should hee haue had no lesse consideration of neighbours and all strangers. For of necessity this law and order ought to bee in a Commonweale, that it be alwaies ready furnished with warlike and mar­tiall force and furniture: whereof hee hath not spoken so much as one word, nor likewise of goods sufficient to serue the turne, as well in ciuill vses and necessities, as also against for­raine dangers. Which goods ought not to bee so great, that they should bee coueted by neigh­bours and borderers, and by stronger and mightier men: against whose inuasions, the owners should not bee able to make resistance: nor so small, that they could not suffice to maintaine K warre when it should bee made against them, by their equals in number, and euen matches. Hee hath determined nothing herein: yet should it not bee left vnknowne what quantities of goods are sufficient for Cities: whereof perchance that manner of limitation is best, whereby the strongest and mightiest men of power are not prouoked to inuade and make warre, in hope of reaping great profite through the excessiue plenty of richesse, there being: but rather in vn­dertaking of warres, shall consider, how their labour and charges will bee greater then the pro­fite which they may expect by winning the victory: as Eubulus counsailed Antophradates when hee meant to besiege Atarnee: that hee should consider in what time hee might winne the place, and reckon what charge hee should bee at about the same: with which speech hee L brought Antophradates to yeeld to his opinion, and caused him to leaue the siege. Where­fore the equality of goods dooth carry with it some profite, and yet not much. For men of worship and reputation will take great disdaine thereat, as thinking themselues worthy of greater wealth and honour than others, which is the cause that they often rise and stirre vp re­bellion: for the malice and naughtinesse of men is vnsatiable. At the first, they say onely two halfe pence are sufficient: but when they haue once got them, then doe they alwaies couet more and more, being pushed on by the bottomelesse and infinite desire of hauing. For the nature of couetousnesse is endlesse and infinite: toward the satisfaction and fulfilling whereof, most men cheefly apply all their industry and skill. Therefore the fittest remedy herein is not to make equa­litie M of goods, but to procure that good men bee such by nature, as that they will not desire more then they ought, and that bad men shall not bee able to get more then they should, as it will come to passe, if the bad bee least in number, and suffer no wrong. Further, 9 bee hath not taken good order in the equaling of goods, by reason hee onely maketh lands equall. For there is a richesse also of Slaues, and of Cattell, and money, and other mooueables. An equalitie therefore should bee sought for all those commodities, [Page 91] A or some moderate order assigned in them: or els all should bee let alone. Hee seemeth also by the establishment of such lawes to make the City small, if all Craftsmen shall bee publicke seruants, 10 and not comprised within the corporation of the Citie. But if they that doe the publicke workes of Cities ought to be publicke, they should be so after the fashion of Epidamne, and as Diophan­tes 11 sometimes ordeined in Athens. Hereby may yee know, whether Phaleas his Commonweale be rightly ordained or not.

CHALCEDON a sea towne of Bythinia, scituate right ouer against Constantinople, still retaining the same name to this day.

B

MANY shall of rich become poore.] For if one rich father haue many sonnes, and the 1 eldest be preferred to all the inheritance, the rest must needs be poore.

AS for example, Solon made a law in that behalfe.] Solon appointed not possessions to 2 bee equall, but ordained a certaine limitation in reuenues, and that the greatest should not amount to aboue fiue hundred bushels, as shall appeare at the end of this booke, when we come to speake of the Common-weale of Athens.

THAT forbid the possessing of so much land as euery man list.] As for example, at Rome 3 the Agrarian law forbad that no man should possesse aboue fiue hundred Acres of land: C and that children while their fathers were aliue, might haue halfe that quantitie: as is written by Appian in his first booke of the ciuill Warres, and the ninth Chap­ter: and by Titus Liuius in the first Decade, Lib. 2. & 6. This Agrarian lawe was first published in the yeere of the Cittie 267. And was neuer after set forth without great broiles.

THE neglecting of which law in Leucadia.] Forasmuch as in Leucadia, the alienation 4 of possessions was tollerated, by meanes whereof, they were distributed into a great many mens handes: the Lawe that limitteth and stinteth reuenues, whereby the Cittizens might attaine to the honours and Magistrateships of the Commonweale, D was violated and broken, and their Commonweale marred withall, in that it became too popular, by meanes that very poore men were admitted to beare office.

MEN of reputation, [...].] Aristotle often vseth this word, meaning thereby 5 such personages [...] as either for vertue, or skill, or any other laud [...]ble qualitie, do excel and passe others.

FOR things needfull.] Men doe not fall to committing of vnlawfull acts, as to tobbe, 6 steale, fight, and kill, only to saue themselues from cold, hunger, and thirst, but rather to liue lauishly and daintily as tyrants do.

E PLEASVRES without sorrow.] Which come without any greedy desire going afore, 7 which causeth irksomenesse before the enioying of the pleasure: as the pleasure that is receiued by reading, hearing, seeing, and smelling. As for those pleasures that are taken in tasting and touching, hunger and thirst come before them: and vehement loue ac­companied of diuerse anguishes and cares, doth come before fornication.

REMEDIE for these three.] He meaneth by these three, the desires of necessary things, 8 pleasures with sorrow, and pleasures without sorrow.

FVRTHER, he hath not taken good order in the equalities of goods, by reason he onely ma­keth 9 lands equall: for there is a richesse of thrals and [...]la [...]es, and of cattell and mony.] Appian F in the second chapter of his first booke of the ciuill warres, sayth: That by the delibera­tion of the Tribunes, there was an edict and law set forth, that it should not bee lawfull for any man to possesse aboue fiue hundred Acres of land: nor of the greater sort of cattell, aboue a hundred head: and of the lesser sort not aboue fiue hu [...]dred: and so was there a certaine number of freemen appointed to euery man: who were enioyned to in­forme the Senat wherein the ordinance was broken. And at the publishing of the lawe they added an oth, and set a penalty for the better obseruance thereof, hoping that such [Page 92] lands and other goods as should remaine aboue that quantity and measure, would by G those meanes by little and little fall to the share of the poore: but notwithstanding this law and this oth, all was to no effect, which was the occasion of great broiles and murder betweene the poore and the rich: the one side, for that they would not yeeld for anie thing in the world, that the law should stand in force, and the other for the contrary.

10 IF Artificers be publicke.] Namely slaues or thrals of the Commonweale, and not any members of the Communalty of the Citty, nor accounted for Cittizens. This would make the Citty a very small one.

11 Epidamne.] A Towne lying on the right hand as ye come by sea from Candia to Io­nia, and bordering vpon the Talancians a barbarous people of the Country of Ilyria, as H Thucidides saith in the first booke of his history, at the beginning of his declaration of the warre of Peloponesus, which from thence tooke the originall. First, the Corcyrians without the license of the Corinthians their metropolitans and superiours, peopled it with their men. The Romanes hauing conquered it a great while after that, placed ther­in a new colonie of Italians, and named it Dyrachum, for that the former name had an euill sound in the Latine, by reason that Damnum signifieth dammage.

I

CHAP. VI. Of the seuerall Commonweales of Hippodamus, and of the Milesians.

1 HIpppodamus the Milesian, Euriphones sonne, who found out the diuision of Ci­ties, K 2 and seperated Pyre [...]s with a wall from the City of Athens, and in the rest of his life was accounted for an ambitions person: insomuch, that hee 3 was thought to liue too curiously, by reason of his long heire, and of his cost­ly and sumptuous apparrell, which he accustomed to weare, being furred and very hot, not only in winter, but also in summer: and desirous to shewe him­selfe skilfull in euery kind of nature, hee, first of all them that haue not had the administration and managing of Commonweale affaires, vndertooke to set downe somewhat touching a perfect Commonweale. He framed his City of tenne thousand men, diuiding it into three parts, the one of Artificers, another of Land-tillers or Husbandmen, the third of men of warre and such as L weare armour. Also he deuided the Country into three parts, the one sacred, the other publicke, the third priuate: calling that sacred, from whence the solemne sacrifices should bee furnished and made to the gods: that publicke, from whence the men of warre should be sustained: and that priuate which was assigned to the Husbandmen. Further, he supposed there were but onely three sorts of lawes, and likewise three things whereon iudgements were giuen: namely iniury, dam­mage, and death. Besides, hee ordained one soueraine court, whereinto all causes that seemed not rightfully iudged, might bee brought by way of appeale: and stablished it of certaine picked 4 and chosen men of good yeares. He decreed that iudgements should not bee giuen in courts, 5 by little counters in way of lot, but euery Iudge to haue a Tablet, therein to write M the sentence, if hee absolutelye condemned: but if hee absolued, then to leaue it void and unwritten on: or if hee partly condemned and partly absolued, then to declare it in writing: For hee thought that no good order which is nowe in vse and practise, be­cause the parties that Iudge this or that, are driuen to periurie. Hee made a lawe for the honouring of them that inuent anie thing to the benefite of the Common­weale: and for the bringing vp of those children at the charges and cost of the [Page 93] A Commonweale, whose fathers died in the wars, as though the like law had neuer ben made afore. There is at this present a law to that effect in Athens, and in sundry other Cities. And permit­ting 6 the election of all the Magistrates to the people that he hath ordained of the three parts of hi [...] City, hee decreed that the Magistrates elected, should haue the care and charge of thinges common to the whole City, and also of those that concerne strangers and Orphans. These bee the 7 cheefe Articles and points most worthy to be noted and remembred in Hippodamus his plot of a Commonweale.

Hippodamus framed his Cittie and Commonweale in such sort, that it being ordai­ned B of tenne thousand men, was deuided into three parts: the one of artificers, the other of land-tillers, the third of Souldiours. In like sort hee parted the Countrey into three parts: n [...]mely, into the sacred, furnishing thinges needfull for the seruice of God: the publicke, whereof souldiours should be sustained: the priuate, proper to husbandmen. Further, he ordained three sorts of Iudgements, to wit, of iniurie, dammage, and death, and a high and soueraigne court ouer all those for the hearing and determining of ap­peales to bee brought thither. Hee would haue sentences giuen, not by counters and [...]ots, but in Tablets, wherein euery Iudge sho [...]ld write his opinion: and the Iudges to bee chosen by the people: and they so chosen, to haue care of publicke matters, C and of Orphans, and also of strangers: and the children of such as were shine in the Warres, to bee brought vp at the charge of the Commonweale. The most of those Articles are reproued, and fi [...]st of all that which conce [...]neth the deuiding of the multi­tude of the Cittizens. Because Hippodamus making the Artificer and Husbandman parts of the Cittie, tieth them to such a condition, as that they can neuer come to anie Magistrateship or Office: wherein a Cittizen is properly discerned from him that is no Cittizen: as is declared in the third booke of this worke. And this meane being taken from them it cannot bee but they will hate the Commonweale: from whence seditions doe spring. Secondly, his deuision of territories is not good, because the souldiours who D are put to be til [...]ers themselues of the publicke part, differ not from Husbandmen: Or if the Husbandmen be put to till both the priuate part, and also the publicke part withall, then shall they be so charged with sustaining the souldiours and Artificers, that nothing will be left for their owne liuing and maintenance. And if the Husbandmen and the souldiours till not the gro [...]nd, but some other folke differing from them, then shall they adde a fourth part to the Cittie, which part shall be shut out of the corporation of the Commonweale, which euermore turneth to one selfesame inconueniency and danger of sedition. Thirdly, his maner of deuiding of iudgements is blamed, and the common and accustomed forme and course allowed for the best. As concerning the decree that E Hippodamus hath set forth for the rewarding and honouring of them that inuent any thing to the benefit of the Commonweale Aristotle taking occasion thereby, hath here inserted the most notable disputation of all the booke, namely, whether it be expedient or not to al [...]er the old lawes that haue ben receiued and allowed in any state. And after he hath debated e [...]h part of the question with most apt reasons, hee resolueth vpon the alteration of those lawes that are euidently vnbehoofefull and barbarous; and that with­out apparant benefit, no alteration or innouation ought to be made, for feare of losing the authority and obedience of the law, which is not got but by length of time: so that it is bet [...]er to to [...]lerate some imperfections in lawes, and wants in Magistrates, if they be F not too preiudiciall & hurtfull; then by supposing to amend them, to ouerthrow a state.

Hippodamus. He was not only a Lawmaker, but also a builder, and inuented a fashi­on 1 of building surnamed Hippodamie, or Hippodamicall, whereof mention is made in the eleuenth chapte [...] of the seuenth booke of this worke.

SEPERATED Pyreus.] Pyreus was the principall Hauen of the Citty of Athens, 2 well knowne by our Annotations vpon the beginning of Platoes Commonweale. It was about a mile from the Cittie, wherewith it was ioined with a long wall that was [Page 94] of a good heigth and breadth. The commodity of this port was by experience found so G great, as it could not well be iudged whether it were tied to the Citie, or the Citie to it.

3 BY reason of his long heire and of his costly and sumptuous apparrell.] Hee was curious in trimming his head and beard, and full of pompe in his garments. Thucidides in the first booke of his history writeth, that of all the Grecians, the Athenians were the first that began to lead a more ciuill & delicate life then the rest: and telleth how it was not long agoe since the ancients of that Countrey, yea and the honestest sort did weare lin­nen clothes, and trinkets and small things of gold worke, with their haires curled at the ends, and trimmed in-curious manner.

4 HE decreed that iudgements should not be giuen in courts by lots.] The Venetians to the H contrarie, haue an ordinance in all criminall and ciuill iudgements, that the Iudges shal not by word of mouth decla [...]e or openly speake their minds before all men, but deliuer their sentences in lots of fine cloth, which they cast into pots of diuers colours, to the end, they may iudge the more freely, and not bee turned out of the right way of equitie and iustice, either for ambition or for feare of displeasing their friends, or of falling into the euill will of them at whose hands they haue receiued any good turne, or into the ha­tred of the mightier sort: and also to the end, that by the obseruation of this course, eue­ry Iudge may only follow his own opinion, and not depend vpon the authoritie of ano­ther Iudge, which they might easily doe, if the first speaker were accounted the wisest. I In iudgements concerning life and death, they vse three pots, the one, for the condem­nation of the partie accused: another for absolution from all punishment and forfeits: the third, when it yet appeareth not to the Iudges what they ought to ordaine. The first pot for condemnation is white: the second for absolution is greene: the third is redde. In ciuill iudgements, the greene serueth for the disanulling of the sentences of the vn­deriudges: the white one is for the allowance of them: the red, for them that are not yet throughly resolued, but will haue the matter in controuersie delaied, wherein no­thing can be said to be determined, vnlesse aboue one halfe of the Iudges haue allowed or disanulled it. K

5 BVT euerie Iudge to haue a tablet therein to write his sentence.] To the end, the Iudges should not speake when they iudged, but giue their opinion in Tablets of wax, or other st [...]ffe noted with letters, signifying either Absolution, or Condemnation, or Delay. Af­ter that manner did the Areopagites in Athens, and the Romanes in publicke iudge­ments and matters of great importance giue iudgement, writing their opinions in the said Tablets, which they did afterwa [...]ds cast into a pot, so that none of them knewe ano­thers opinion, neither did they all know the opinion of the whole company. The mark or note of condemnation at Rome was this letter C. That of Absolution, this letter A. And the note of delay, were these letters, N.L. which signified Non liquere, that is to say, L the cause is not cleare and ready to be iudged: and three such Tablets were deliuered to euery Iudge, as Asconius affirmeth in his Commentarie or Annotations vpon Cice­roes Oration touching diuination. Which Orator in his Oration for Nilo, obseruing this custome, calleth the one the Tablet of safety, the other of sadnesse, which in Greeke was [...] signifying [...], that [...]s to say, death. As C. in Latine, is for condemnation, as Budeus noteth in his Annotations vpon the Pandects of the ciuill law.

6 THERE is at this present a law to that effect in Athens.] The Athenians did publickely bury those that died in their warres with pompe and funerall Orations, and brought vp the children of them that were slaine, at the charges of the Commonweale. This was M the manner of their funerals: Three daies aforehand they made a great pauilion, where­in they laid the bones of such as were dead, and their kinsfolke and f [...]iendes might lay what they thought good vpon them. Then euery linage or tribe of the Towne had a great Cipresse coffer wherein they la [...]d the bones of the dead of that tribe, which co­fer they carried in a Wagon, and after all those coffers a great faire empty bed was car­ried vpon another Wagon, which signified them that were dead in the Warres, whose [Page 95] A bodies could not bee found. These Wagons were conducted and accompanied by all sorts of people, as well Cittizens as others that would goe, euen to the graue, where the wiues or kindred of the dead were making great mourning, weeping, and lamentation: After, all those coffers were laied into a publicke Tombe made for that purpose in the fairest suberbe of the City. This place was called Ceramicon, wherein the custome was to burie all such as died in the Warres, sauing them that were slaine in Marahone, for whom in remembrance of their singular vertue, they decreed a particular sepulchre in the same place: and immediately vpon the buriall of the corpes, the custome was, that some notable personage of the Cittie being both learned and honourable, according B to the degree of the deceased, made a Sermon or Oration in their commendation be­fore the people: which being ended, euery man went his way. Thucidides writeth all this in the second booke of his Hystorie of the Peloponesian Warres, where the fune­rall Oration of Pericles is inserted. This funerall pompe was afterwards yearely con­tinued, whether they had Warres or not, with many ceremoniall combates a horse­backe, and diuerse exercises and playing vpon Instruments of Musicke, as Plato testi­fieth in his Menexemus, where likewise there is a funerall Oration vnder the name of a learned and eloquent Gentlewoman named Aspasia.

OF Orphans.] Such bee Saint Markes Proctors at Venice, whose Office and dutie 7 C is, to vnde [...]take the wardship and tuition of such Orphans, as in their Minorities haue no Tutors and Gardians a [...]igned vnto them by their fathers last will. The estimation of this Magistrate in time past was so great, not onely among the Venetians themselues, but also with other Nations, that diuerse strangers by their Testaments and last Wils bequeathed vnto them the tuition of their heires, and ouersight of their patrimo­nies.

FIRST of all a man may mooue a doubt as touching the diuision of the multitude of Citti­zens, for that his Commonweale is communicated to Artificers and to Hu [...]bandmen, and to Sol­diours, D and generally to all sorts of folke: namely, to Husbandmen, hauing no Weapons, and to Cr [...]f [...]smen hauing neither Lands nor Weapons, so that they shall bee in a manner bound and thrall to the souldiours. Therefore is it not possible that all sorts of honours should bee communi­cated vnto them: For all the chief [...]tai [...]es and heads of the Warres, and the keepers and defen­ders of the Citizens, and welneere all the principall Magistrates must be chosen out of the men of warre: also if Husbandmen and Craftsmen haue no part in the Commonweale, how can they beare good will vnto it? And yet must the Souldiours needs be mightier and of greater strength than both the other parts [...] but that is no easie matter to be done except they bee a great number: if they be so, to what purpose is it to communicate the Commonweale to others, and to haue power E to create Magistrates? Againe, in what things are Husbandmen behoofefull for a Citie? As for Craftsman they are necessary therein: because euery Citie hath neede of them, and they may get their liuings with their occupations, as they doe in other Cities: But if the Husbandmen fur­nish victuals to the men of Warre, then are they by good reason to bee reckoned for part of the City and Commonweale. Now haue they a priuate part, and till their ground priuately againe, if the publicke part allotted to the sustenance of the Souldiours, were tilled by themselues, then should the Souldiours nothing differ from Husbandmen, as this Law-maker pretendeth: or if there be any other persons employed in that behalfe differing both from Husbandmen and soul­diours, then will those make a fourth part of the Citie, which shall haue no interest in any thing F whatsoeuer, but be as it were forainers in their Commonweale Notwithstanding, whosoeuer shal driue the tillers of the priuate part to manure and till the publicke part, then shall not the multi­tude haue such croppe and fruits as will serue for euery of them to furnish and make pr [...]sion for two houses: and wherefore shall they not straightway out of the selfe-same land, and out of the same allotted territories both take food and sustenance for themselues, and furnish the souldiours thereof? All these things are not free from a great many disorders and troubles. Neither is that his law allowable which concerneth iudgements: and appointeth, that vpon the simple prosecution [Page 96] of a cause, the Iudge shall diuide the sentence, and of a Iudge become an arbitrator. For although G that course might be obserued in arbitrements, where diuerse may conferre amongst themselues of the iudgement which is to be giuen, yet for all that is it not to be allowed in courts and Tribu­nall seates, but rather sundry Law-makers doe expressely forbid the Iudges from all manner of communication betweene themselues about the giuing of sentence. Againe, shall not this bee a troublesome and confused manner of iudging, when the Iudge thinketh there is somewhat due to the plaintife, and yet not so much as the plaintife affirmeth to be owing vnto him? He deman­deth twenty pounds, yet doth the Iudge pronounce ten pounds onely to be due vnto him: or this Iudge more, or that Iudge lesse; another fiue pounds, and another four: and in thus deuiding their sentences, some of the Iudges giue sentence wholly against the plaintife, and others not at all. Af­ter H what manner then shall these voices or opinions bee discerned and reckoned? Againe, no man doth constraine the Iudge to forsweare himselfe, which shall plainely condemne or absolue, if the sute be simply and orderly commenced and prosecuted in law: for he that absolueth the de­fendant, doth not iudge that he oweth nothing, but that twenty pounds are not due. That Iudge is periured, who thinketh that twenty pounds are not due, and yet condemneth the defendant to pay the same.

ARISTOTLE hauing first recited the principall articles contained in Hippodamus the Milesian his Common-weale, doth confute diuerse of them, as the deuiding of the I Cittizens, and partition of lands, and forme of iudging: shewing that they were not wel ordained, and what inconueniences might happen thereby.

1 AS for the rewarding and honouring of them that inuent any thing to the benefite of the Commonweale: it carrieth a faire shew in words, and yet very dangerous to be put in execution, 2 for that it causeth quarrels, and ministreth occasions of some sturre and alteration in the State. 3 For it is a question and doubt whether it be good or euill for Cities, to change their old and anci­ent lawes, if any better be deuised. Therefore is it not easie to consent straight way to the decree touching the honouring of the inuenters of any thing to the publicke profite, if it bee not expe­dient K to change the lawes: For it may so fall out, that some men will persuade either the repea­ling and abrogation of the lawes, or alteration of the forme of gouernement of the Common­weale, 4 as a common good. But forasmuch as we are by the way fallen into this matter, it shall not be amisse to stay a little about it. For it containeth a doubt, as wee haue before alleadged: and in 5 sooth it seemeth that it should be better to change. For in other sciences it hath done good, as in Phisicke, and in the feats which concerne the exercise of bodies, and generally in all Arts and fa­culties, which haue ben amended and bettred by changing their old decrees. Forasmuch there­fore as the skill of ciuill gouernement is to be reckoned amongst these, [...]he like must needes be de­termined in it: as may be proued and confirmed by deeds & euents of the same, because the old & L 7 ancient lawes be very simple and barbarous. For in those daies the Grecians ordinarily went ar­med 8 with swords and weapons, and sold we [...]es one to another: and the other old and ancient or­dinances and constitutions bee very [...]ond and grosse: as for example, there was a lawe at Cumes touching manslaughter, that if the accuser produced witnesses of his owne kindred, the party ac­cused 9 should be condemned to death. Nowe, all men wholly bend themselues to secke, not for those 10 things which haue ben left by their ancestors, but for those which are good. And it is very likely, 11 that those first men, whether they were engendred of the earth, or left behind of some great cor­r [...]ption 12 or destruction, were like the vulgar and ignorant sort, as it commonly accustomed to bee 13 said of them that are borne of the earth. So that it standeth with no reason, that we should satis­fie M 14 and rest our selues vpon their decrees. Againe, it shall bee best, not to leaue the written lawes 15 vnaltered. For in the skill of gouernement (like as in other arts) it is vnpossible to describe all 16 thi [...]ges perfectly. But they must needes bee written vniuersally, and actions consist in particular 17 thinges: whereby it appeareth, that some lawes may bee changed, and that nowe and then they 18 may be altered. On the contrary side, if wee aduise our selues well in that behalfe, it seemeth that 19 we [...]ust tooke throughly into it, and take great heed therein. For where there ariseth small benefit [Page 97] A by alteration of lawes, and the wonting and accustoming of Citizens to change their laws slight­ly, is an euill thing: doubtlesse, it is better to beare with the wants and faults of the Law-makers and Magistrates: for the alteration of them will not doe so much good as har [...]e, by accusto­ming 20 men to disobey. And that example fetched from Arts and Sciences, is deceitful and false, 21 because it is not all one to change an Art, and a Lawe: For a Lawe hath no force to procure 22 obedience to it selfe, sauing custome, which getteth not strength and confirmation, but in 23 great length of time: so that the easie and ready changing of present Lawes into new ones, wea­keneth 24 the vertue and power of the Lawe. Againe, if wee graunt that Lawes are to 25 bee changed, Whether shall all in euery Commonweale or not: and whether is it lawfull 26 B for euery body to change them, or to certaine personages: for there is a great difference in this point. Therefore for this present will wee lay aside this question, as not properly belonging to 27 this place.

AS for the rewarding and honouring of them that inuent any thing to the benefite of the 1 Commonweale.] The men of old time liuing in great rudenesse and want of thinges needfull for life, did so highly esteeme the finders out of profitable inuentions, that di­uerse of them were cannonized for gods after their deceases: as for example, Ceres, Triptolemus, Bacchus, Vulcan, Aesculapius, Lycurgus, and diuerse others, as is witnes­sed by Polydor Virgil in his booke of the inuenters of new thinges. In these daies there C is a custome in Caire among Artificers, that if any of them inuent any skilfull new de­uise of his owne industry touching the Art which hee professeth, they put a cassocke of cloth of gold vpon him, and all the fellowes and brethren of his owne compa [...]y and occupation, lead him from shop to shop with much minstrelsie, in the manner of a tri­umph: and then euery man giueth him a peece of siluer: as Iohn Lion reporteth in his eight booke of th [...] description of Affrica.

IT causeth quarrels, and ministreth occasion of some stirre and alteration in the State.] Al­though 2 nouelty be well liked of by the curious sort, yet is the bringing in thereof of dan­gerous, speciaily in matters of state & religion, which cannot possibly be touched with­out D troubles and dissentions, that often stretch so farre, that they are the causes of the ruine and destruction of Countries and dominions. Therefore all they that haue intru­ded and thrust in themselues to inuent and stablish new [...]wes and fashions, haue seized and laied hold on force and soueraine authority, as knowing that such alteration can­not be achieued and compassed without violence.

FOR it is a question and doubt whether it be good or euill to change the laws of the country.] 3 Plato De Legib. Lib. 7. writeth thus: I say that alteration and change in all things, (sauing those that be leaud) is most dangerous at all times and seasons, as well in the diet of bo­dies, as in the manners and customes of soules, and absolute [...]y in all cases (sauing the bad) E as I said afore. First of all, bodies are somewhat troubled when they vse any newe meats and drinkes and labours: After, when they haue grown in custome therewith, then wax they strong and fat, liking well with such manner of liuing, as already being drawne in­to custome, acquaintance and friendship therewith, and so remaine in good health and plight: But if any occasion driue them to another diet, then are they straightway trou­bled, and fall into diseases vntill they be acquainted with this new manner of liuing. We must deeme the like of mens thoughts, and of the natures of their minds: for all men reuerence and honour Lawes, and feare to innouate and alter those wherein they haue ben trained and brought vp, if the same haue by any diuine fortune long endured, so as it F cannot be remembred or knowne whether euer before there were any other than they. Herodotus in his third booke calleth them fooles and mad folke that despise the Lawes of their Country, for that natually all men doe loue the same, insomuch, that if all men liuing in this transitory world were put to the choice of such fashions of liuing as they should thinke to bee best and honestest, without all doubt, when they had si [...] ­ted all as well as they could, they would chuse the fashions and Lawes of their owne Countries. This may bee tried and examined by manie examples, [Page 98] specially by one that hee rehearseth to this effect. At such time as King Darius reigned, G he demanded of the Grecians that were in the traine of his Court, how much money they would [...]ake to eate the bodies of their fathers that were deceased: They answered, they would not doe it for any wordly good. Then called he for certaine Indians, named Callatians whose custome was to eate their fathers, and asked them in the presence of the Grecians, for how much they would consent to the burning of their fathers in a fire, they cried out and said: Sir, God grant you a long and prosperous life, but wee beseech you to speake of some better matter. Thus doubtlesse are old customes esteemed and set by. And as for my selfe, I am of this opinion, that Pindarus the Poet hath said very well, affirming that custome is like a king reigning ouer all men. Demosthenes in his Oration H against Timocrates, witnesseth: That the Cittizens of Locres were such diligent obser­uers of their olde lawes: that if any man did intrude and put forward himselfe amongst them to make any new law, as he was propounding and persuading the same, hee was driuen to stand with a halter about his necke: and in case the law were liked of, he went his way safe with the halter loosed & taken away: if it were not liked, he was straightway strangled. By occasion of which rigor, there was not in the space of two hundred yeares any law made in that Cittie.

4 FORASMVCH as we are by the way fallen into this matter.] Aristotle taking occasion at that decree of Hippodamus, which appointeth reward to the inuenters of any thing I to the Commonweales benefite, doth put forth a goodly aud graue question, which he debateth with contrary reasons, as well affirmatiuely as negatiuely: namely, whether it be behoofefull or not, to alter the old allowed Lawes of a state: resoluing that those are to bee changed which are apparantly barbarous and good for nothing: but that with­out manifest benefite, there ought no change or innouation to be made therein, for fear of losing the authority and obedience of the law, which is not purchased but by length of time: so that it is more expedient to beare with some imperfections in Lawes, and with some wants in Magistrates, if they bee not too preiudiciall, then in supposing the amendment thereof, to ouerturne a whole state: according to the auncient Prouerbe, K admonishing [...], not to stirre an euill that resteth well: and ano­ther Latine Prouerbe vsurped [...] Titus Liuius, M [...]l [...]m notum, & cui iam assueueris, to­lerabile maximae, that is to say, A knowne euil, and wherein a man is already accustomed, is most tollerable.

5 IN other sciences it hath done good.] First of all hee defendeth one of the parts of the question, to wit, that it is expedient to change Lawes after the example of Artes and Sciences, which through corrections and additions haue in continuance of time ben amended and brought to perfection.

6 FORASMVCH as the skill of ciuil gouernment is to be reckoned amongst these.] Aristotle L Politick. 7. chap. 10. writeth thus: It is credible, that a great many things haue beene in­uented long agoe, diuerse times or rather infinite times: and it is very likely, that neede first taught necessary things, and that afterwards those commodities that serue for ho­nour and pompe were augmented. Therefore are wee to thinke, that the like hath befal­len in formes of gouernement. Let vs therefore vse those things that haue been well in­uented in the matter of gouernement, and assay the supplying of that which wee shall find wanting therein. And in the third Chapter of this booke: We must looke far back­ward, and into the records of many years, wherein such means had not rested vnknown if they had ben found good and profitable. For almost all things haue ben inuented, but M some haue ben receiued, and the rest refused after they haue ben experimented. The be­ginning and progression of Gouernement is shewed by Plato in his third booke De Le­gibus, and how it hath beene often inuented, and lost and forgone againe: and in Poly­bius, Lib. [...].

7 FOR in those daies the Grecians ordinarily went armed with swords and weapons.] Thuci­dides sayth in his first booke: That the custome of going armed, was generall through­out [Page 99] A all the land of Greece, because they had no safetie in their houses, nor yet in the highwaies. Therefore were they constrained for the defence of their persons to goe al­waies armed, as the Barbarians doe. And whereas that manner of liuing is yet obserued in diuerse Countries in Greece at this present day: it may bee presumed, that it was the old generall custome of all the Grecians. Of whome the Athenians were the first that began to relinquish this custome of going armed: and from that manner of life thus forsaken, they betooke themselues to a more ciuill and courteouser kind of life.

THE other old and ancient ordinances be very fond and grosse.] Plato in Minos sayeth: 8 You haue hard what laws we obserued of old time in the buriall and seruice of the dead, B killing the sacrifices before the carkas was carried forth towards the graue, and calling women to weepe: also how the men of old time before them, buried their dead at home in their houses, which fashions we vse not at this day.

NOVV all men do wholly bend themselues to seeke, not for those things which haue ben left by 9 their ancestors, but for those which are good.] Socrates in Euagoras sayeth: That Arts and Sciences came to their perfection, not by staying only vpon the sayings of our prede­cessors, but by correcting and altering what was not aright in them. And in his Pane­gyricall Oration, I thinke (saieth hee) that by this meanes both other Arts, and al­so eloquence would receiue greatest increase, if not they who were the Authours, but C they who were the perfectours of them, might bee honoured and had in reputa­tion.

THE first men.] The Iewes, Christians, and Sarazens, doe beleeue, that accordingly 10 as Moyses setteth downe at the beginning of his booke of Genesis, there was but one man at the first, and that the world was created. But Aristotle in the eight booke of his naturall Philosophie, and in diuerse other places affirmeth, that the world in all kinds of creatures is euerlasting, that they were without beginning, & neuer shal haue end. Pla­to in his third and sixt bookes of lawes, doubteth of the world and of mankind, whether they haue beene euerlasting or not, saying thus: Either the generation of men had ne­uer D beginning, or els it began in vnaccountable length of time before vs. In Timeus he assigneth a beginning vnto it, but sayth it shall neuer haue an end. Diodorus the Sicilian in his first booke telleth vs howe hee hath not seene nor found in any manner of place whatsoeuer, what people or Nation was the first, by what space of time, or howe manie yeares it was before others. Iustine writeth in his second booke, that there was a great strife about antiquity betweene the Scythians and AEgiptians.

AND it is very likely, that those first men were engendred of the earth, or of some corruption.] 11 [...], &c. Plato in his Politicke, or De Regno, sayth thus: [...], &c. that is, It is manifest, O Socrates, that in those times this kind did bring forth nothing by pro­pagation: E and whereas it is saied, that sometimes creatures sprung out of the earth, this was at that time when they returned againe into the earth. These things were deliuered vnto vs by tradition from our first forefathers, who arose presently after the first reuolu­tion of time, and were the witnesses and preachers of these speeches: to whom, notwith­standing, credite was not giuen as it ought to be. The same Plato in his Protagoras saith thus, [...], &c. that is, Time once was when the gods only were, and no kinds of mortall creatures: but when the fatall time of generation came, the gods framed them in the bowels of the earth of fire and earth, and of those thinges that are interposed be­tweene those two. In his Menexemus or funerall Oration thus, The first commendati­on F of their stocke is, in that the originall of their auncestors was not from strange coun­tries, neither left they here their successors, as forrainers or new come inhabitants born of strangers, but in-dwellers and true inhabitants of their owne countries, and nouri­shed not of a stepdame as others, but of their naturall mother country: In the which al­so they that die are laied vp, that is to say, into the bowels of her which brought them forth, nourished and maintained them. Socrates also in his Panegericke to the same [Page 100] effect, [...], &c. that is, We inhabite this land, as not hauing disposses­sed G others, nor finding it empty and void, nor yet being mingled of diuerse Nations, but wee were borne liberally and honestly: for we are home-bred dwellers, that wee should possesse that land continually which brought vs forth, & may call one another by those names that are of most affinity: for to vs onely of all the Grecians, it is permitted to call the same land our nourse, our country, and our mother. The Grecians in their fables re­ported, that Vulcan being in loue with Minerua, spilt his seede one day vpon the land of Attica, whereof sprung the Athenians, who therefore vaunted themselues to be [...], that is to say, Come of the earth; without taking their beginning elsewhere. Pro­clus in his Commentaries vpon Timeus, allegorizing, by the earth vnderstandeth euery H matter or stuffe, and by Vulcan the fire that mooueth the earth and quickeneth it. Wee beleeue with Moises that God created the first man of the slime of the earth, and brea­thed into him the spirit of life. Aristotle De Generat. Animal. lib. 3. towards the end of the booke sheweth: that by the opinion of some persons, men might bee engendred of the earth. Cicero De Legibus, lib. 1. saith thus: When the nature of all things is looked into, then these things are woont to bee so discussed as they are nowe: that by the continuall courses and reuolutions of the heauens, there came at length a certaine maturity of sowing the seed of mankind: which being scattered and sowed on the earth, was increa­sed and inspired with the diuine blessing of soules: and whereas men deriue those other I things whereof they are compact, out of a mortall stocke, they being mortall also and fraile, yet that the soule was engendred by God. Not much vnlike to this is that of Lac­tantius, lib. 2. cap. 12. where he saith thus: They say that by certain conuersions and mo­tions of the starres, there arose a certaine ripe and fit seede-time of men: therefore, that the new earth retaining in it the procreatiue seede, brought forth certaine hollow blad­ders or bags, like bellies in forme: which waxing ripe (nature compelling) burst in sun­der, and so poured forth yong and tender creatures: then that the earth abounding with a certaine humor or moisture like to milke, nourished therewith these new-bred crea­tures. Eusebius in his Treatise of the preparation of the Gospell, maketh mention K thereof: and Diodorus the Sicilian in the first booke of his Library, writing thus: At the beginning of all things (sayth hee) the heauen and earth had one onely being and shape; But afterward vpon the separation of the elements one from another, the world tooke that order, shape, and disposition, wherein wee see it at this present: amongst the which elements, that continuall mouing which the aire hath, fell to his share: and those places which be aboue the aire to the fire by reason of the lightnesse thereof: & after the selfe­same reason those courses which the sunne and starres enioy, fel to them for their shares: And that which was mingled with moisture, staied by reason of the heauinesse thereof, in one masse or lumpe; of the moistest part whereof came the sea, and of the hardest the L earth, being in it selfe soft and miry: which, as soone as it had beene first dried and made tougher with the heat of the sunne, and after by the force of the same heat, swolne and puft vp in the vpper part, there forthwith bred and sprung vp in many and diuerse parts, certaine humours engendring rottennesses and putrifactions, couered and hidden with small thinne skins. Whereas then, the generation is wrought in moist things by putting heat thereto, and that by night the aire spread abroad, yeeldeth moisture to the same, which taketh strength in the day by the vertue and power of the sunne: At last, those rottennesses and putrifactions being guided to their vttermost course, did procreate (like as if the time of their deliuery had ben come) the shapes and formes of all sorts of M creatures and liuing things, after that those small skinnes wherein they were inclosed, were broken: of which liuing things, they that had receiued most store of heate, were made Foules, & flew vp into the higher region: they that had most store of earth, remai­ned serpents and other like beasts: they that held the nature of the water, were carried and put into the element of their owne complexion and called Fishes. And the earth [Page 101] A from thence forward being made drier, as wel with the heat of the sun [...] as by the drought of the winds, left off from bringing forth such great beastes. But those that were alreadie made, engendred other like vnto themselues with continual commixtion & copulation. Men being thus shaped & brought forth, sought their food in the fields, & liued a sauage life without al order & gouernment, to whom the hearbs & trees of thēselues furnished those things which were necessary for their liuing: but the wild beasts became their ene­mies, insomuch, that for the resistance of them, & for their owne commom behoofe and safety they began through fear to conioine themselues in companies, helping one ano­ther, & seeking here & there safe places for their dwelling & abode. Then was the sound B of their voice and speech, such as was disordered and could not be vnderstood: but after­ward by little and little they made diuision and distinction in their speech, and named all things by their names. And forasmuch as they then abode in many parts of the world, they vsed not all one maner of language, whereby it came to passe, that they had also di­uers formes of letters differing one frō another. These first companies were the true be­ginnings of euery people & nation. Notwithstanding, these first men hauing no aid nor succour frō any place, did lead a hard life, by meanes they were naked, & without the vse of houses & fire, seeking their victuals frō day to day, as they that had not the knowledge to keepe their wild fruits for their vse to come, nor to lay them vp against time of need: C wherby it came to passe, that in winter many of thē died either of hunger or cold: but at last whē experience had informed & taught thē, they began to seek trenches or caues to auoid & preuent the sharpnes of cold weather, & to keep their fruits therin to withstand famine: & whē they had got the knowledge of fire & of certain other necessary & profita­ble things, they found out shortly after the other cōmodities for mans life, which in the end, necessity her self, the finder out of al things, maketh particularly known to the vnder­standings of mortal mē; to whō, hands, speech, & excellency of mind, were giuē for helps.

OR left behind of some corruption.] Plato in his Timeus, Critias, Menexemus, & Poli­tick, 13 is of opinion, that through long cōtinuance of time, the vigor & quicknes of minds D & fruitfulnes of bodies decay by little & little, in such sort, that the minds are found as it wer depriued of the diuinity, & the bodies emptied of their wonted fertility. Then God minding to restore mankind to it former dignity, moisteneth or burneth the earth by mingling the heauenly motions (himselfe being their mouer) in such wise, that the hea­uenly destiny doth alway agree and run euen with the prouidence of God: That so the earth being watred with the new and plentiful moisture, and made fruitful with the heat ensuing, therevpon doth bring forth: wherunto shoures descending down more large­ly after an excessiue drowth, and long heats: thereof are engendred or regenerated, not only small creatures, such as there bee now adaies, but also consequently great ones doe E breed out of the earth, as it were, their mother. Of this mind many men haue ben els, as AEgyptians, Grecians, and Arabians, and specially Algazel and Auicenna, with whome Aristotle agreeth in his problemes, where he saith: As in little changings of time small creatures are borne and bred, so are in greater changings greater creatures, and in the greatest changings the greatest creatures of all.

WERE like the vulgar & ignorant sort.] Being rude and wild, & little di [...]fering frō brute 14 beasts: like the men a while since discouered in the new found lands toward the West & South parts of the world by the Spaniards and Portingales; without learning, without schooles, without counsel, without Magistrates, & without religion: as Viues reporteth F in his first book of Christian truth, without arts, without tooles, & without moueables. Plato De Leg. lib. 3. reasoning of the beginning and proceeding of ciuill gouernment or reigning, doth most elegantly set out the state & condition of the world renued, and the needinesse, simplicity, rudenesse, and ignorance of the men of that time. In Timeus, vpon occasion he toucheth the same matters, and in his dialogue of gouernment or of reigne.

SO that it standeth with no reason that we should satisfie our selues with their decrees.] As fond, grosse, blockish, and barbarous, the most part being vniust & vnlawful through the ignorance of the makers.

[Page 102] 15 AGAINE, it is best not to leaue the written lawes vnaltered.] It were a most goodly, a G most behoofefull, and a most commodious thing to vse alwaies one kind of lawes. But sith manners, opinions, customes, and affections are variable, of necessitie men are dri­uen to make incessantly here and there new Lawes, to repeale the old, to amend the eui [...]l; and with dispensations to mitigate those that are too rigorous and seuere. It was neuer otherwise, nor neuer will be, as long as mankind endureth. Plato in his dealogue of po­licie or of reigning, setteth downe a long disputation about this matter, which is both goodly to behold, and profitable to vnderstand.

16 FOR in the skill of gouernement (like as in other Arts) it is impossible to describe all things perfectly.] Plato in his Politickes or Dialogue of reigning: The vnlikenesse (sayth he) of H men, and of doings, and the vnstable condition of wordly things, are the causes that no single Art can ordaine any thing vniuersally for all affaires, and that will be auaileable at all times. For it is impossible to set downe any certain order plaine and simple in things that alwaies varie and change, and neuer continue in one state. Yet in Minos, hee resol­ueth, that the right and true law (if any such could be found out) should bee euerlasting and vnchangeable, and alwaies one, of the selfesame things toward all thinges. And in the fourth booke of his Commonweale, he sharply rebuketh those Law-makers, that through ambition doe nothing but make and vnmake laws, supposing to remedy those frauds that are committed in wordly trafficke and other doings, not knowing that in I truth they cut off the head of that serpent Hydra, that is to say, in steed of remedying or redressing mischeefes, they augment and multiplie the same. Plato affirming that such alteration and changing proceeded through mens euill bringing vp and nurture, for which few Lawmakers haue had care to prouide: and that the multitude of Laws is vn­profitable for two causes; the one, because they are not necessary in a good Common­weale, and vnbehoofefull in one that is naught [...] the other, for that euery man by instinct of nature doth easily perceiue what is iust and vniust.

17 BVT they must needs be written vniuersally, and doings consist in particular things.] Plato in his Dialogue of reigning writeth thus: They thinke it not possible to ordaine what is K conuenient for euery man particularly and seuerally: Therefore suppose they, how that ought to be ordained which they thinke most common, & very fit for most. So the Law­maker gouerning his societies, and ministring right concerning iust actions, and mutu­all bargaines, cannot when he prouideth for al togither, regard the commodity & right of euery particular person, but ordaineth that which may profit many, & that very gret­ly: and propoundeth such lawes both written and vnwritten, as hee bringeth into the country: for how can he all his life time ouerview euery seueral man, & diligently help and prouide for his priuat commodity? Aristotle in the third booke of this work, cap. 11. reasoning whether it be more expedient to be gouerned by one good mā, than by good L lawes: They (saith he) that prefer the kingly gouernment, suppose that those laws which speake only in generall termes, doe not prouide for particular cases: so that it is fondnes in any art whatsoeuer to cōmand according to the prescript rules. And in the 12 chap­ter of the same book, he saith: that in many places there be Magistrates which haue full authority to determine, as Iudges, those cases wherein the law cannot prouide redresse. And a little after: for that certaine things are comprised within the lawes, & others can­not be comprehended therein, it maketh a doubt and question whether it be most con­uenient, that a good law or a good man should command and gouerne. Therfore foras­much as the whole cannot be comprised within the law, it is needfull to cōmit it to the M arbitrement of man, and to establish some one as keeper and ministrer of the lawes, who by the tenour and disposition of them, shall gouerne the Commonweale.

18 WHEREBY it appeareth, that some lawes are to bee changed, and that nowe and then they may be altered.] This is not the finall conclusion, but of one part of the question only, af­firming that lawes may be altered. Those laws that wholly repugne the iudgement and sence of nature, or that corrupt nature, & containe manifest iniquity, ought to be chan­ged or rather abrogated.

[Page 103] A ON the contrary side, if we doe aduise our selues well in that behalfe, it seemeth that we ought 19 to looke well vnto it.] Here is the other part of the question, that those lawes which haue ben allowed, and by custome established, should not vpon light cause be altered, though they containe in them some discommoditie or imperfection. Aristotle, Ethicks, lib. 5: sheweth how the faults of lawes ought to be dissembled and winked at.

FOR the alteration of them will not doe so much good.] Vlpian a Roman Lawyer saith: 20 that there ought to be apparant benefite in the ordeining of new Lawes.

AS harme, by accustoming men to disobey.] There doth nothing more debase & wea­ken 21 the authority of lawes, than the too often making of them, without hauing suffici­ent B care of their obseruation and maintenance. Vpon which occasion, it is written in the second law of the beginning of right, in the old digests, That it is to small purpose to haue Lawes in a Cittie, except there bee some bodie authorised to put them in ex­ecution. To such effect in old time were ordained the Nomophilaces in Grecia, and the Censors at Rome.

THE example fetched from Arts, is false.] He hath the same saying in the third book 22 of this worke and cap. 12. These examples of Arts are set downe by Plato in his Dia­logue of reigning, and in Minos.

FOR the law hath no force to procure obedience to it selfe, sauing custome.] The cheefe au­thority 23 C of lawes dependeth of antiquity. True it is also, that the power of the Law-ma­kers doth helpe much to cause men to yeeld their obedience thereunto. Wherfore Mi­nos, Lycurgus, Solon, and welneere all other Law-makers tooke and seized into their hands the absolute force and power of the Countries wherein they gaue lawes. Others that medled therein without force and power, haue lost their time in vaine, or beene re­compenced with death or hanishment for their labours.

WEAKENETH the vertue and power of the law.] Often changing of lawes decayeth 24 their authority, and taketh away the respect and reuerence that men beare vnto them. And when those two things are gone, there is no further obedience to law.

D WHETHER lawes are to bee changed, and whether all in euery Commonweale, or not.] It 25 were too great violence and tyrannie to change them all at once, yea though it were by strangers conquering new countries: but the discreeter sort doe it in time, by little and little. And yet is it not possible to make any such great alteration, but there must alwaies remaine diuerse prints of the former lawes and customes.

AND whether is it lawfull for euery body to change them, or to certaine personages.] They 26 ought to bee changed by the Magistrates called to that Office, to the end, that the busi­nesse may be executed with the lesse stirre and tumult: or else if euery man bee allowed to haue an oare therein, and that such ceremonies as are needefull for the making and E publishing of lawes, be not obserued in the same, it would be nothing but confusion & disorder, with the continuall toile and paine of euermore beginning againe, through misliking, ambition, or curiositie and desire of nouelties, which of custome reigneth in the most part of men. Plato in his first booke De Legibus, forbiddeth all persons vnder the age of fortie yeares, to enquire whether the lawes be well or euill ordained.

THEREFORE for this present wee will lay aside this question, as not properly belonging to 27 this place.] Aristotles drift and meaning in this second brooke, is to examine the Com­monweales of his owne time, as well those that were vsed in Countries and Citties, as those that were written by any Philosophers or Lawgiuers: and not to deale with lawes, F but incidently and by occasion, as he hath done in this place, putting ouer that question to another more conuenient place.

G

CHAP. VII. Of the Commonweale of the Lacedemonians.

IN the Lacedemonians Commonweale, and also in the Cretane, and almost in all others, two things are to be considered: the one, whether there be any thing well or ill ordained, according to the right forme and description of a Commonweale: the H other, whether there bee any thing contrary to that supposition and forme of policie 1 which they propounded to themselues. Now it is fully resolued and concluded amongst all, that in a well gouerned state, the principals and cheefe rulers ought not to giue themselues to necessary workes: but yet how this ought to bee done, is not easie to bee comprehended. For oftentimes the 2 bondslaues of Thessaly, (called the Penestie) haue rebelled against the Thessalonians: and the I­lotians conspired against the Lacedemonians: watching and spying out ordinarily the time of their aduersities: the which thing hath not hither to happened vnto the Cretans: the cause wher­of peraduenture may be this, in that it is not expedient nor profitable [...]or the neighbour Citties, (albeit they make warre vpon each other) to assist such rebels against their maisters, least they I should be likewise dealt withall by their neighbours. But all the borderers of the Lacedemonians, as the Argiues, the Messenians, and Arcadians, were deadly enemies vnto them: And then did the Penestians of Thessalie begin first to reuolt, whilest the Thessalians made warre with their neighbours the Athenians, Perraebians, and Magnesians. Now suppose there were no other thing but this, yet it seemeth to be a matter of great care and trouble, how to conuerse with such kind of people: for if one giue them too much liberty, they growe proud and insolent, and equall them­selues with their maisters: and if on the contrary, they be roughly and sharpely handled, they re­bell and conspire. Seeing therefore that they are so disturbed with this Ilotie, it is certain, that they haue not found a good forme of gouernement.

K

There were in Greece three notable Commonweales, the Cretane, the Lacedemo­nian, and the Athenian; ordained by three notable Lawgiuers, Minos, Lycurgus, & So­lon: of which three he beginneth to intreat, and first of the Lacedemonian, which surpas­sed the rest, as wel in regard of the firme establishment thereof (the like whereof was ne­uer seen) for it continued about seuen hundred years, as also in regard of the glory of the martial deeds thereof, hauing a great while possessed the Empire of Greece. Aristotle, a seuere and strict examiner of all things, findeth fault with certain notable articles in the same, to wit, the conuersation and demeanure of the Ilotians, the liberty of women, and L election of Magistrates for terme of life, the authority of the Ephores or Tribunes, the ordering of taxes and treasure, & the end and marke whereat it shot, which was to haue dominion. Which points it is not possible to vnderstand, without taking a view of the maner & forme of gouernment, in such state as Lycurgus deliuered it: & as we could ga­ther out of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarke, Polybius, Strabo, and other good Authours. Ly­curgus therefore, the eleuenth, descending in the right line frō Hercules, being the yon­ger brother of Polydecte king of the Lacedemonians, gouerned the kingdome after the decease of this Polydecte, first as king, and after (when there was a man child born of the wife of the same Polydecte, whō at his decease he had left great with child) as protector M of the orphan being born after his fathers decease. And forasmuch as, if the yong prince should die, the succession of the kingdome appertained to Lycurgus, as vncle & next of kin vnto him: fearing least if it should so fal out, the fault therof would be laid vpon him, as some of his enemies had already reproched him: and fearing that suspition, he with­drew himselfe fro Lacedemonia, & went into Crete: where falling in acquaintance with Thales the Musitian & Lawmaker, he learned of him the lawes of the country, and how [Page 105] A Radamanthus & Minos had receiued them from Iupiter, and deliuered them vnto men. From thence he passed into AEgipt, where he learnt the laws of that nation. Then came he into Chio, where hee had conference with Homer. Thence returning into his owne country, he found his nephew Charilaus reigning: & meaning to apply himselfe about the making of lawes, he asked counsel of the god Apollo in Delphos. Then began he to publish them, being for the most part like to those of Minos, but fathered vpon Apollo, as the other were vpon Iupiter. By such manner of proceeding, Lycurgus brought to light such a forme & patterne of gouernment, as no man before him had inuented, and as none other after him could imitate, and hath presented to the sight of thē that thinke B the definition of a perfect wise man to bee a matter onely imagined in the aire, and that none such can be really and effectually in this world, one whole Citie liuing and gouer­ning it [...]elfe philosophically, that is to say, according to the precepts and rules of perfect wisdome. By means whereof, he hath in glory rightfully surmounted all them that euer tooke vpon them to write or stablish the gouernment of any ciuil or politick state [...] And thereupon (saith Aristotle) after his death they yeelded him lesse honor in Lacedemonia then hee had deserued, though they yeelded vnto him as much as was possible: for they erected a temple vnto him, and ordained an yearely solemne sacrifice for him, as it had ben a god. After this maner vndertook Lycurgus to alter the gouernment of the Com­monweale, C and wholly to change all the forme of the state: supposing that the only ma­king of certain particular lawes & ordinances would not serue to any purpose, no more than to a body all marred and full of all sorts of diseases, the appointing of some sleight medson; except hee would first giue order for the purging, losing, and consuming of all euill humours, to the end, to appoint vnto it afterwards a newe forme and rule of life. When he had taken this resolution in his mind, he went (before any putting in vre ther­of) vnto the City of Delphos, where, after he had sacrificed vnto Apollo, he asked coun­sell of him touching his affaires, and receiued that so greatly renowmed Oracle, wherby the Prophetesse Pythia, called him, Beloued of the gods, and rather a god then a man. D And as touching his request for grace to establish good lawes in his countrey, shee an­swered that Apollo did grant it vnto him, and that hee should ordaine the best and per­fectest forme of Commonweale that euer was in the world. This answere encouraged him more then before: so that he began to reueale his secret purpose to certaine of the principall persons of the towne, praying and exhorting them secretly to yeeld their fur­therance and assistance therein: trying them first whom he knew for his friends, and by little & little euermore winning some others to his side that ioined with him in his en­terprise. After this, when oportunity serued, on a certaine morning he caused an assem­bly in the market place of thirty of the cheefe men of the Towne in armour, to fray and E restraine those that should withstand that which they had determined to doe. Wherby it appeareth, that Lycurgus shewed in effect, that it was a hard matter to alter the go­uernment of a Commonweale without open force and apparant fear. And thus almost all founders or reformers of Commonweales and kingdomes haue accustomed to doe: who had not ben els heard, obeied, nor followed, as witnesseth this, that Lycurgus him­selfe had one of his eies plucked out by setting vp the equality of possessions. Nowe in this change and alteration of the state by Lycurgus, there were many nouelties brought in: but the cheefest and greatest of all, was the founding and institution of the Senate, which being mingled with the power of the kings, and made equall to them, as tou­ching F the authority of matters of importance, was as Plato sayeth, a counterpoise or ballance of welfare to the whole bodie of the Commonweale, which aforetime was euermore wauering, inclining one while to tyrannie when the kings had too much power, and another while to confusion and disorder of the people, when the common people tooke too much authoritie vpon them. And Lycurgus did place betweene them both this Councell of Senatours, which was, as it were, a strong barre, keeping the two extremities in euen ballance, and giuing stedfast and sure [Page 106] footing to the state of the Commonweale, by reason the eight and twenty Senatours, G of whom the body of the Senate consisted, sometimes tooke part with the kings, as far as was needfull for the resistance of the malapertnesse and rashnesse of the people: and contrariwise, nowe and then strengthened the part of the people against the kings, to keepe them from vsurping any tyrannical power. He made choise of this number of Se­natours, to the end, that the entire body of the Counsell should consist of thirty per­sons in the whole, by putting the two kings vnto them: Which stablishment was au­thorised by the very Oracle of the god Apollo, called Retra: which is as much to say; as decree or sentence. The tenour whereof was thus: ‘After thou shalt haue builded a Temple to Iupiter Syllanvan, and to Minerua Syllanyan, and deuided the people into H Tribe [...], thou shalt establish a Senate of thirty Counsellers, comprehending therein the two kings: and shalt assemble the people together, according to the occasion of times, in the place that is scituate betweene the bridge and the riuer of Gracyon: where the Senatours shall propound matters, and breake off the assemblies, and it shall not be law­full for the people to make any Oration there.’ Afterwards the kings Polydore and The­opompe added thereunto, that where the people would in any wise alter the aduise pro­pounded to the Counsell by the Senate, it should be lawfull for the kings and the Sena­ [...]ours to breake of the Councell, and disanull the decree thereof: as hauing altered, dis­guised, and changed to worse, the sentences and propositions set foorth by the Senate: I and persuading the people, that this addition, as well as the principall, came from the Oracle of Apollo. Then Lycurgus hauing thus temperated the forme of gouernment, it seemed neuerthelesse to them that came after him, that this small number of thirtie persons who made vp the Senate, was yet too mighty, and had too much authority. By meanes whereof, for the bridling of them, they gaue them (as Plato sayth) a bit, which was the power and authority of the Ephores, that is to say, controulers, who were crea­ted about one hundred and thirty yeares after the death of Lycurgus. The second no­uelty that Lycurgus made, and was the hardiest ente [...]prise of all, consisted in causing a new diuision of lands. For whereas there was in the Countrey of Lacedemonia most K great oddes and inequality between the inhabitants, because some, and the greatest part were so poore, that they had not so much as an inch of land, and others, and that a very small number so rich, that they possessed all: hee considered, that for the banishing and hunting out of his Citty, ouerlustinesse, enuie, couetousnesse and delights; and also ri­chesse and pouerty, which are also great pestilences in Citties and Commonweales: there was no readier way then to persuade his Citizens to set againe in common all the lands, possessions, and heritages of their Country, and to deuide them new again equal­ly between themselues, to the intent, to liue altogether from thence forward as brethrē: so that one should not haue more in possessions then another, and that they should not L seeke one to excell another in any other thing than vertue onely: deeming that there ought to bee no other oddes or inequality betweene the inhabitants of one selfesame Cittie, sauing that which proceedeth from the blame of dishonestie, and the commen­dation of vertue and honestie. According to this imagination, hee effectually executed the diuision of lands. For he diuided all the rest of the Countrey of Laconie wholly in­to thirtie thousand equall parts, which hee distributed to the inhabitants about Sparta: and of the lands neerer to the very City of Sparta it selfe, he made nine thousand other parts, which he diuided amongst [...]he naturall burgesses of Sparta, who be they that pro­perly are called S [...]artans. Euery one of these portions was such, that yearely it yeelded M to the owner, seuentie bushels of barley for a man, and twelue for a woman: and of wine and other liquid commodities in like proportion, esteeming this quantity to be suffici­ent to maintaine and preserue a mans body sound, nimble, and lustie, and that nothing els was needfull and requisite. He went about also to bring into one, all their moueables, and then to diuide them equally, to the end, that all manner of inequality might bee ta­ken away. But when hee perceiued, that the people tooke it impatiently to haue their [Page 107] A goods thus openly taken from them: he proceeded therein closely and vnderhand, and so deluded craftily their auarice and couetousnesse, for first of all he disclaimed all kinde of money made of gold or siluer, and ordained that yron money should onely bee vsed, wherof also a great and heauie masse was valued at a small rate, in such sort, that a peece of a hundred crownes, would trouble and hinder a whole roome in a house, and aske a yoke of Oxen to draw it vp and downe. Now by this meanes gold and siluer being thus banished out of Laconia, it was necessarie that many vices and enormities went out with them: for who would be willing to rob, steale, receiue or retaine a thing which he could no waies hide and conceale, and which he had no great reason to desire, nor pro­fit B to possesse, the case being so that he coulde not translate it to any other vse: because that when the yron which they purposed to coine, was fire hote, they quenched it with vinegre, and so extinguished the strength and hardnesse thereof, in such sort as it lost all fitnesse for other seruices and workes euer after, being become so sharpe and so brittle, that it could not abide the hammer or the fire any more. Next after this, he banished all superfluous and vnprofitable trades, and albeit he had not banished them by expresse e­dict, yet had they all, or at least the most part, of themselues togither with the vse of mo­nie, when they had not found any more meanes of gaine, and riddance of their workes to others: by reason that their yron coyne was not currant in other Cities of Greece, C but rather mocked and laughed at in all places: And by this means, the Lacedemonians could not buy any strange merchandises, neither did there any shippe of trafficke haunt their ports; no affecting Rhetorician came into their countrie to teach the art of sub­tile pleading; no Southsaier to forecalculate good fortunes; no Bawde to maintaine stewes and houses of brodelrie; no Goldsmith or Ieweller to make or sell trinkets of gold or siluer to adorne ladies: because all these things tend onely to this end, to gayne and hoord vp money, whereof there was no vse in that place: and so delights being de­stituted of those things which nourish and maintain them, began to wither and vanish by little and little, and at last to fall of themselues, when as the rich could haue no more D than the poore, and riches and wealth could haue no means of ostentation and publicke shew, but remayned idle within dores, without being able to serue their maisters in any stead. But further he being desirous to persecute yet more the superfluitie and delici­ous pleasures of his Citizens, to the end to exterminat and roote out on all sides this greedie desire of hauing and enriching: Hee made another third ordinance, newe and most excellent, which was, that concerning bankets: by the which he willed and ordai­ned that they should eat together by companies, and that al of the same meats, & those none but such as were namely specified by his decree: by the which also it was expresly forbidden to eat apart priuatly vpon rich tables and sumptuous beds, abusing thus the E labours of excellent workemen, and daintie Cookes, to fat and feede themselues in se­cret, and in the darke as it were, as men vse to fatte rauenous and greedie beasts: which thing spoileth and corrupteth not onely the conditions of the mind, but also the com­plexions of the body, when the bridle of libertie is thus let loose to all sensualitie and luxurious gluttonie: whereupon it followeth, that much sleepe must afterward be had, to boile and digest that ouerplus of meat which is ingested: and also the helpe of hote bathes, long rest, and sett diet must needs bee vsed, like as if he were sicke of some gree­uous disease. It was not lawful for them to eat priuatly in their houses, before they came into the common halles, and so preuent by secret farcing themselues, the publicke ban­quet F in the place appointed: for euery man had his eye readie to note expresly those which did not eat and drinke with a good appetite in the assemblie: and not onely so, but also his tongue readie to blame and reprooue them as gluttons, or at least as men disdaining in a certaine daintinesse, to eat in publicke with the rest. The Cretans called these publike banquets Andria, and the Lacedemonians Phiditia: and this last, eyther because these were such places wherein a man might learne to liue soberly and thriftily (for thrift or sparing, in the Greeke tongue is called Phido) or because in those places [Page 108] mutuall amities and friendships were engendred, as if they would haue called them G Philitia ( i.) places or feasts of loue, putting a d for an l. It might also bee, that the first letter was ouer-added as superfluous, and then it should bee Editia: because men as­sembled together in these places to eate and take their repast. Thus they assembled to­gither by fifteenes or thereabouts in euery hall, and euery one of them brought at the beginning of each moneth, a bushell of meale, eight gallons of Wine, fiue pound of cheese, and two pound and a halfe of figges: and ouer and aboue, a little peece of their money to buy their meat. But besides all this, when any of them sacrificed in his house, hee sent the first fruits of his sacrifice into the publicke hall. Likewise, if any had taken any Venison in Hunting, hee sent one peece thereof thither: for in these two cases one­ly H it was lawfull for them to eate priuately, to wit, when they had sacrificed beastes to their gods, and when they returned late home from hunting: otherwise, they were con­strained to bee continually present in the hals at the common meetings, if they would eate. Which custome they obserued a long while most strictly. Their children also fre­quented these meate-assemblies no lesse than schooles of honour and temperance, where they heard manie good and graue sentences and deuises touching the gouerne­ment of the Commonwealth vnder maisters that were not mercenary: and where they learnt also to play vpon one another in speeches, and to quippe and mocke each other pleasantly, and yet without all sharpe girding, or dishonest iesting, and being thus moc­ked, I not to bee angrie or discontented. It was an ordinary custome, that when they ente­red into the common hall, the eldest among them pointing to the dore, saied: Let no speech here spoken, go out of these dores or ouer this threshold. Also whosoeuer would be receiued into any of those meat-assemblies, must be first approued and allowed of by all the residue. The most exquisite and daintie meate which they had, was that which they called blacke broth: so that when that was serued in, the olde men would eate no flesh, but left it to the younger, and they by themselues fed vpon the broth onely. After they had thus soberly eat and drunke togither, they returned without light euery one to his home: for it was not permitted to walke either thither or elsewhere with a Can­dle, K to the end, they might accustome themselues to march boldly euery where by night and in the darke as wel as in the light. This was the order and forme of their Phiditia, or meate assemblies, or loue feasts, as we may fitly tearme them. As concerning other light matters, touching contracts and bargaines betwixt man and man, being thinges which often change & alter, sometimes on this, sometimes on that fashion, as necessity requi­reth; he thought best not to tie or reduce them vnder any written edicts or constraints, nor yet to establish in them any setled custome not to bee changed: but rather to leaue them to the discretion & arbitrement of men which had ben well instructed & brought vp, to the end, to take from or adde vnto them, according as the occurrence and occasion L of time required. Supposing (to be breefe) that the cheefe scope and drift of a good esta­blisher or reformer of a Commonweale ought to bee this, to cause that men might bee wel instructed & brought vp in vertue. Lycurgus as hath been said, called these his ordi­nances Retres, which is as much to say, as graue sentences, or Oracles giuen by the god Apollo: neither would he euer suffer that any of these should be put in writing: but it is expressely mentioned in one place, that his meaning was not that any of his decrees should be committed to writing. For as touching that which is of principall power and force to make a City happy & vertuous, he thought that it ought to be imprinted in the hearts by education, and in the maners of men by custome, that it might there remaine M vnchangeable. Good willingnesse of mind is the strongest bond which can bee knit and made to constrain men to liue wel: & the bent which they get by good instruction from their first infancy, is it which maketh euery man to serue in stead of a law vnto himselfe. Plutarke esteemed this to be one of the most happy & excellentest things which Lycur­gus brought into his Cōmonweale, namely, the great leisure & idlenes which he besto­wed vpon his Citizens, when as he suffered thē not to employ themselues to any base or [Page 109] A mechanical trade: & that it was not needful to trauel & toile for the heaping vp of riches in such a place, where wealth and opulency was neither profitable, nor esteemed. There were amongst thē nothing but dauncing, feasts, sports, banquets, pastimes in hunting, or exercises of their bodies, and such like, all the while that they were not busied in War. Solon on the other side ordained great punishments for idlenesse, and would that eue­ry one should giue an account of his life and exercise. And at this day in the lawe of Mahomet euery one is bound to be skilfull in some trade, euen from the highest Bassa and his children, who all learne some Art or other, to the lowest and basest drudge. But it is time to returne to Aristotle, and to the exposition of our text, hauing forealleadged B this discourse, to the end, to haue the better vnderstanding thereof.

NOVV it is fully resolued and concluded amongst all [...] that in a well gouerned state [...] the prin­cipals 1 and cheefe rulers ought not to giue themselues to necessary works.] Plato & Aristotle are both of this opinion, that the cheefe men of a countrey ought not to exercise any vile or base Trade, nor any craft of hands, as mercenary hirelings. And so Lycurgus also or­dained in Sparta or Lacedemonia. Of which matter Plutarch in the life of Solon wri­teth thus: Lycurgus (saith hee) who inhabited a Cittie, wherein there was no resort nor ariuall of anie strangers, and which had so large territories that might sufficiently fur­nish C twise as many people as there were resident, and which besides was enuironned on all sides with a great multitude of Ilotians: whom it was very much expedient to keep from idlenesse, and alwaies to hold them in low subiection, constraining them continu­ally to trauel and labor both for themselues & others: this was a most wise decree, wher­by to keepe his Cittizens alwaies occupied in the exercise of armes, without the lear­ning or practise of any other trade of life, discharging them from all other paineful oc­cupations and handicrafts.

THE Ilotians conspired against the Lacedemonians.] These Ilotians were men enthral­led 2 by the law of armes, who tilled the grounds of the Lacedemonians, and yeelded vn­to D them thereout a certain rent and reuenue euery yeare. And by reason that they often rebelled against their lords, Plutarch reporteth, that there was in Lacedemonia a cer­taine secret decree, that the gouernors which had the ouersight of the youth, at certain periodes of times, should select out some whom they iudged best aduised, and send them into the country here and there, carrying with them dags only, and that which was ne­cessarie for their liuing and sustenance. Now these yoong men dispersed vp and downe in the countrey, hid themselues in the day time in some couert and secret places, where they rested and refreshed themselues: but in the night beset and lay in wait in the high waies, and there slew euerie Ilote that they could find: and sometimes also in the broad E day they ranged through the fields, killing and slaying the mightiest and strongest that they could come by (as Thucidides in his history of the Peloponesian warre recordeth: where he saith further, that certaine Ilotes, a good number at a certaine time were by a publicke decree of the Spartanes crowned, as being enfranchised and made free, and so led through all the Temples of the gods, in reward of their good seruices which they had exploited most valiantly for the Commonwealth:) and thus in short time it could not be perceiued what was become of them, although the number of them amounted to two thousand: in such sort, that neuer any man heard it spoken, neither then nor af­ter, after what maner they died or were made away. And Aristotle besides that which al F others affirme, saieth: That the Ephories or Tribunes as soone as they were installed in their offices, denounced warre against the Ilotes to that purpose, that it might bee law­full to kill them howsoeuer. Well, it is most certaine, that amongst other thinges they handled them most roughly; for sometimes they compelled them to drinke Wine vn­mixt with water, in such quantitie, till they were starke drunke therewith: after they led them thus drunke into the common hals of their meat assemblies, to shewe vnto their children what a villanie and ouglie thing it was to bee drunke: and then caused them to [Page 110] daunce filthie daunces, vnbeseeming honest persons, & ful of derision and mockery, for­bid [...]ing G them expressely those which were comely and honest. Plutarke thinketh, that the Lacedemonians begun to vse this notable cruelty and roughnesse, long after the death of Lycurgus, and namely after that great earthquake which happened in Sparta: at what time the Ilotes rebelling against them, took part with the Messenians, and com­mitted many outrages in their Countrey, and put their Cittie into the greatest danger that it euer was in. Plato De Legibus, lib. 6. speaking of bondslaues, mentioneth these Ilotes, Penests, and Periaeces of the Cretans.

MOREOVER, the libertie which was giuen vnto women, is hurtfull and incommodious, H both for the purpose of their Commonweale, and also for the happie estate thereof. For euen as the man and woman are parts and members of a familie, so likewise a Citie may be deuided into 1 two equal parts, one consisting of men and the other of women: so that in any Citie where the or­dering & discipline of women is not good, there the one halfe or moyetie of the Citie is thought to 2 be out of order, as it is in that: for the Law-giuer desiring to make all the Citie temperate and able to sustaine labours, hath attained his purpose in regard of men, but not of women, who are permitted to liue in all licentiousnesse and dissolute intemperancie: in such sort, that necessarily 3 riches are honoured and esteemed in such a Commonwealth, especially where men are in subie­ction 4 to women, as for the most part it is amongst warlike and military Natione, except the Celts I 5 or some other which openly approue the vnnaturall fellowship with their owne sexe. And there­fore it seemeth that he which first deuised fables, did not without cause couple Mars and Venus togither: for all such kind of people are giuen either to Sodomie against nature, or to the hunting 6 of harlots and strumpets. The which mischiefe was amongst the Lacedemonians, where the most part of their affaires were ordered by the direction of women. For what difference is there, whe­ther women command in their owne persons, or that the commanders be commanded by women, doth it not all come to one passe? Further, whereas audacitie and boldnesse is nothing auaileable in ordinary businesses, except only in matters of warre: the women of Lacedemonia were in this 7 respect most hurtfull to their Commonweale, as they euidently made proofe of at the inuasion of K the Thebanes, for they were so farre from being profitable, as women of other Cities were, that 8 they rather raised vp more trouble and tumult in the Citie, then the enemies themselues. But it seemeth that such libertie was permitted to the Lacedemonian women not without iust cause: for the men were often abroad from their homes, by reason of the continual warre which they waged; first with the Argiues, after with the Arcadians and Messenians. And when they enioyed any peace, they yeelded themselues to their Law-giuers discretion to be prepared and made fit against 9 warre: in which kind of life, all most excellent vertues were to bee found. Some say that Lycur­gus attempted to bring women in subiection to his lawes: but when hee saw that they made head against him to withstand them, hee surceassed from his enterprise: and this was the cause which L threw them into those inconueniences, and consequently into this errour. But our purpose is not to inquire what deserueth excuse, and what not, but what is wel or ill ordained: for if the discipline of women be not well ordered, it seemeth (as it hath beene said before) not onely to cause an vnde­cencie and indecorum in the Commonweale, but also to engender auarice and couetousnesse.

The Lacedemonians haue euer affied and ascribed very much vnto their women, suf­fering them to looke into and to meddle more with the affaires of the Commonweale, then they themselues did with the affaires of the house. Plutarch in the life of Agis [...]nd Cleomene. And because the greatest part of their riches was vnder the hands and custo­die M of women, therefore they gaue them much honour, and withall much power and authoritie.

1 SO that in any Citie where the ordering and discipline of women is not good.] Aristotle in his first booke of Rhethoricke affirmeth, that in all Citties where the estate and affaires of women is not well ordered and gouerned, as among the Lacedemonians, the one [Page 111] A halfe of their felicitie and happinesse seemeth to be wanting.

FOR the Lawgiuer desiring to make all the Citie temperate and able to sustaine labour, hath 2 attained his purpose in regard of men, but not of women.] Of the education and nurture of men hath beene spoken before, that of women was such as followeth: First, the Law­giuer willed and commanded, that the yong women should harden and inure their bo­dies to labour, by exercising running, wrastling, throwing the barre, and whirling the dart: to the end, that both the fruit of their wombes which they should conceiue, ta­king deepe root in a lustie and strong body, might burnish and grow the better: and also that they themselues being enabled & made strong by such exercises, might with more B courage and ease endure the trauailes of childbed. And that he might depriue them of all delicacie and effeminate tendernesse, hee accustomed the young maids as well as the young men to labour and to dance naked at certaine feasts and solemne sacrifices, and to sing in the presence of yong gallants, to whome oftentimes they would giue bitter cuts, touching them to the quicke, which had forgotten their duty in any respect. And sometimes also they rehearsed in their songs the praises and commendations of them which deserued the same: whereby they engraued in the hearts of yong men an excee­ding great emulation and contention of honour. For hee that had been commended by them for his valour and prowesse, was presently lifted vp in courage to attempt greater C matters afterward: and the bitings and quippes which they gaue vnto others, were no lesse stinging and sharpe, then the most seuere admonitions & chastisements that could come vnto them, considering that it was done in the presence of the kings, Senators, and whole people, who came alwaies together to see and hear their contention. But as tou­ching that, that the maids shewed themselues naked in publicke; Plutarch striueth to ex­cuse it, saying that thereupon arose amongst them no naughtinesse nor vncleannesse at all: but that their strife and contention was accompanied with al honestie and modesty, and void of immodestie and lecherie: yea rather on the contrary, that it carried with it an accustoming and inuring them to the discipline of their countrey, and an emulation D amongst themselues, who should haue the strongest and lustiest bodie. And which is more, it lifted vp in some sort their heart with courage, and made them more valiant and magnanimious, by making knowne that it was no lesse seemely for them to exercise and professe prowesse, and to contend among themselues who should haue the prize, than for men. Whence it proceeded, that the Lacedemonian women had the heart to speake and thinke of themselues, that which Gorgon the wife of king Leonidas one day an­swered a strange lady deuising with her, and saying: That there were no women in the world saue the Lacedemonian, that ouer-ruled and commanded men. No more (replied she) are there any women in the world that bring forth men, saue they. Moreouer, this E was a bait to allure yong men to marry them, I mean these sports, daunces, and conten­tions which yong maids practised in the presence of young men. And yet besides these allurements, he appointed a note of infamie and discredite against those which refused to marrie: and they that would marry also, must first rauish by force those maids whom they would espouse, who after had their haire shauen off vnto their bare skin, and then were attired with mens garments, and breeches of the same, and placed in beds alone vpon certaine pallets, where the new married came to lie with them. Plato De Repub­lib. 5. alloweth in his Commonweale such publicke exercise of yong maids naked with young men, attributing the same workes to both of them, willing also that the old men F and women should exercise themselues togither after the same manner.

ESPECIALLY where men are in subiection to women, as for the most part amongst 3 warlike and military nations.] Great warriours are ordinarily great whorehunters, and Nations most warlike, are commonly most giuen ouer to most licentious luxuriousnes, whence arose that fable, which fained that the god Mars lay with the goddesse Venus, & that they were enwrapped and entangled in a chain by Vulcan her husband, as is recor­ded by Homer and Ouid.

[Page 112] 4 EXCEPT the Cel [...]es, [...].] Budeus in his first Annotations vpon the G Pand [...]cts hath translated this vltra Celtas, that is to say, beyond the Celtes. Philip Me­l [...]ncthon in his Chronicles, li. 2. is of opinion, that in ancient Greece the Galatians and these Celtians were the people that inhabited on each side of the riuer Rhine. Other suppose, that the name of the Celtians contained all the westerne people, as at this day the Asians, Affricans, Moores, Turkes, Sarasins, Abissines, Agiamesquians, and Indi­ans, call vs Westerne people by the name of France: because that the first that euer visi­ted them with armies, and ouercame them, were the free French men, who alwaies haue made the greatest expeditions towards the easterne countries. Therfore, from the cheef captaines which were French, they haue translated the name to all other Christians of H Europe, on this side the Mediteranian sea, the name remaining as a monument of the ancient vertue and renowne of the French Nations. The hardinesse and furiousnesse of this people hath alwaies beene feared and held in awe, especially in the affaires of chiualrie.

5 OR some other which openly approue the vnnaturall fellowship with their owne sexe.] The Celtians in olde time were noted of the horrible sinne of buggerie, wherewith at this day they are not infected. Amongst the Turkes and the Mores, and euen among the Per­sians also, this detestable and horrible vice is not punished by the fire, as with vs it is, but is permitted and tollerated to the great scandale of mankind, and reproch to their law. I Howbeit Plato De Legib. 8. seuerely forbiddeth men to abuse males in steed of females, calling to witnesse the nature of brute beasts, amongst whome the males doe not com­mit such filthinesse with each other, because it is a thing contrary to nature. Hee dete­steth also this same vice in his booke of the same worke, alleadging the fabulous storie of Ganimedes, deuised by the wicked Cretans, to the end, to cloke the villany wherevn­to they were then (and with them all ancient Greece) enclined.

6 AMONGST the Lacedemonians, where the most part of their affaires were ordered by the direction of women.] For which cause they were named in Greek [...], that is, Men gouerned by women, like as Plinie also in his sixt booke calleth certaine peo­ple, K which being neighbours to the Amazones, were vanquished by them in Warre, and yeelded obedience to their conqueresses, to the end, to beget children of them. There are also to bee found many husbands so besotted and addicted to their wiues, that they wholly yeeld and submit themselues vnto them, in such sort, as being despoy­led of all authoritie in their priuate house, yet they thinke themselues worthy to com­mand others in publicke, & to beare the greatest Offices in a Cittie, a thing very strange and vndecent.

7 AS they euidently made proofe off at the inuasion of the Thebanes.] At the battaile of Leuctres, wherein the Lacedemonians were conquered by Epaminondas, and lost L their king Cleombrotus, with the valiantest of their men. After which battaile, Epami­nondas entred enemie-like with a puissant armie into the Countrey of Lacedemonia, and marched euen to the wals of their Cittie, wherein abode Agesilaus one of their kings who defended it valiantly against the enemie. During this siege, the olde men and the women were amazed with wonderfull feare, and did nothing but runne vp and downe crying and lamenting which thing was as great a trouble and vexation to Age­silaus, as were the threats and reproches of his enemies, wherewith notwithstanding he was sore troubled.

8 IT seemeth that such liberty was permitted to the Lacedemonian women not without iust M cause.] The Lacedemonians abode tenne yeares obstinately at the siege of Messenia, hauing sworne a solemne oath, neuer to depart from thence vntill such time as they had taken the Cittie. Wherefore in this their absence, they chose out a certaine number of yong men, which came into the army after the oth, and sent them backe to dwel with their wiues, and to repeople the Cittie, permitting them (as reporteth Iustine) indiffe­rently to enioy the company of them all. Which deed, though done vpon necessity, yet [Page 113] A caused them to be whores euer after.

SOME say, that Lycurgus attempted to bring women in subiection to his lawes: but when 9 he saw that they made head against him to withstand them, he surceassed from his enterprise.] Plutarch in the life of Lycurgus: As touching that (sayth he) which Aristotle reporteth that Lycurgns went about to reforme women, and surceassed presently, when hee per­ceiued that he could not attaine his purpose, because of the too great libertie, which in the absence of their husbands they had vsurped: who were constrained often to bee at the warres: during which time, they were left as mistresses and rulers at home: and their husbands also when they were at home, honoured and pampe [...]ed them aboue mea­sure, B calling them Ladies and mistresses. Plutarke affirmeth all this to be false.

BESIDES the matters already alleaged, a man may reprehend the inequalitie of possessions also: for it commeth to passe, that some possesse great store of goods, and others againe very little, so that the whole countrey of Sparta is growne into fewe mens hands: which thing was not well prouided and looked vnto by their lawes: For albeit, the Law-giuer ordained it to be a dishonest part, and that well, to buy or sell a mans patrimony: Neuerthelesse, hee hath giuen liberty to giue it away, or to be bequeath it by Testament, although it m [...]st needs be, that the same discommodi­ty will arise by this meanes, as well as by that. Now, the whole country being distributed into fiue parts, two of them fiue are come into womens hands, by the meanes of the great inheritances C which fall vnto some, and of the great dowries which are bestowed vpon others: but it were bet­ter that either there were no dowries at all, or that they were limitted with small and meane bounds. Now it is lawfull for any to bequeath that which is their owne, by testament, to whom they list: and albeit a father die intestate without appointing an heire to succeed him, yet may he bequeath his owne to whom hee list. Whence it commeth to passe, that that countrey which could 1 nourish a thousand and fiue hundred horsemen, & thirty thousand footmen, can scarse now nou­rish a thousand. And so by experience, it is clearely perceiued, that this was not well prouided in their law: For their City reduced to so smal a number of men, hath not sustained one blowe of misfort [...]ne alone, but euen hath ben vtterly ruinated for want of men. They say, that in the time 2 D of their first kings, they receiued many strangers into their City, to the end, to redresse this i [...] ­conuenience, in such sort, that in their long war which they made, they neuer wanted men, but could haue ministred & set forth ten thousand men at any need: but whether this be true or no, it skilleth not. It were far better to haue their City replenished with men by the e [...]en proportion and equality of goods. Nowe that law which concerneth the procreation of children, bindereth the a­mendment of this default: for the Lawgiuer desiro [...]s to encrease & multiply the Lacedemonia [...]s, inuited and entised them to beget many children by exempting him from keeping watch which had begottē three children, & him that had four, frō al other puplike charges. And yet it is mani­fest, that where many be born, there must needs be many poor, whē their ossessions are so diuided.

E Aristotle declareth, that the great inequality of possessions which was amongst the Athenians so noisome & hurtful to their state, grew through the default of the Law-gi­uer, who hauing interdicted the sale of patrimonies, yet neue [...]thelesse granted thē leaue to giue away & to bequeath them by testament to whom they would: whence sprung vp the same inconueniences, as if they had ben permitted to make sale of them. The which vnequality and vneuennesse is so much the more blame-worthy, in that neere hand the one halfe of goods is grown into womens hands, as wel by the means of successions, as excessiue dowries, which ought to be either none at all, or very small, or at most but rea­sonable. For by this disorder the Lacedemonians were brought into pouerty & want of F men. To remedy the which mischeefe, the way is not to beget many children, for that hurteth more then helpeth, because the more children there are, the more the number of the poore is encreased. The Oracles of the gods being demanded, made this answere in old time to the Lacedemonians, that they should carefully beware of couetousnes & auarice, which one day would proue the plague & ruine of their estate [...] which by expe­rience proued most true: for after that a greedy desire of heaping and hording vp gold and siluer, was shed abroad in the Citty of Sparta, and that the possession of richess [...] [Page 114] was accompanied with couetousnesse and niggardise, and the vse with pleasures and de­lights, G presently Sparta was destitute and depriued of many great and honourable pre­heminenc [...]s. Which corruption began to take hold of the Lacedemonians, after their great victorie ouer the Athenians, when they glutted themselues with gold and siluer by the spoile. But yet the number of the parts and portions of inheritances ordained by Lycurgus, remaining still firme, and fathers alwaies leauing to their sons their goods by succession, I say this order & equality being in some sort maintained, preserued their Commonweale from many faults and errours a long time, vntill that there arose vp one Epitadeus, a man of office and authority, by nature peruerse, sturdie and proud, who being one of the Ephories or Tribunes, was at controuersie and debate with his owne H son [...]e, and that so eagerly, that in hate of him, hee put forth and caused to bee enacted a law and ordinance, whereby it was made lawful for a man to bestow his patrimony and other goods by Will and Testament either in his life time, or after his death, to whome [...]e would. This man propounded this law to satisfie his owne particular anger, & others accepted of it to furnish and satisfie their couetousnesse, which was the cause of the a­brogating and abolishing of a most excellent ordinance, for riches then began to bee hunted after by all meanes, and on all sides, and true heires to bee thrust out of their pa­trimonies by head and shoulders. And by this meanes all the wealth being in short time [...]ongested into few mens clouches, there ensued forthwith an extreame pouerty in the I Citty of Sparta, which caused all honest and liberall exercises to bee laied aside, and in [...]ead of them mechanicall and base occupations to come in request, together with en­uie and hatred towards them which possessed the goods, in such sort, that there remai­ned in all not aboue seuen hundred naturall Spartanes in the Cittie, and of them not aboue one hundred that possessed lands and patrimonies. All the rest was nothing but a rude Chaos of needie beggerly people, which kept in the Citty without hauing any degree of honour: who in time of warre, were most cowardly and aukward, not willing to go into fight: and in time of peace factious and seditious, not desiring any thing, but occasion of change and alteration. K

1 WHENCE it commeth to passe, that that countrey which could nourish a thousand and fiue hundred horsemen, and thirty thousand footmen, can scarce now nourish a thousand.] Strabo in his Geographie, lib. 8. speaking of the Lacedemonians, sayth thus: Wee shall bee to prolixe in the description of this Country, if wee pursue many things that are mentio­ned in hystories, and leaue others, the Countrey being long agoe desolate and vnpeo­pled in comparison of that ancient estate wherein it flourished of old time with a great multitude of noble people: for besides Sparta, there remaine now no more then thirty villages, whereas in ancient time by commanding ouer a hundred Citties, it was called [...], from whence euery yeare were sent a hundred Beeues to that great solemn L sacrifice, called [...]. Plutarke in his booke of the ceasing of Oracles, complaineth, that the Romane puissance preuailing so much euery where, at his time all Greece was not able to make three thousand men at armes. Xenophon in his book touching the af­faires of Greece, lib. 6. describeth the vertue and magnanimity of the Lacedemonians: Seneca in his S [...]asories, 2. writeth thus: Euery thing hath his ornament: Athens was re­nowmed for eloquence, Thebes for sacrifices, Sparta for armes, because the riuer Euro­tas runneth fast by it, which hardeneth and emboldeneth youth to the exercise of fu­ture warfare.

2 RECEIVED many strangers into the City.] Contrary to the first institution of Lycur­gus, M who was so carefull of the integrity of his discipline, that hee would not suffer any strangers to be admitted or receiued in his Citty, but onely vpon certaine prefixt daies, calling this rigor against strangers [...], as reco [...]deth Pausanias in his tract of the Lacedemonian affaires, and is obserued also by Coel. Rhodiginus de lect. Antiq. lib. 10. cap. 5. Neither only that, but more, hee allowed not his Cittizens to frequent the company of [...]angers abroad. He permitteth not (saith Plutarch) euery one that list to go out of their [Page 115] A country, and range vp and downe through the world, for feare least they which should thus wander at their pleasures, should bring home with them strange manners and con­ditions, and patternes of a wicked and corrupt life, which by little and little would bring in an alteration and change of their state. And that which is yet more, hee banished out of Sparta all strangers, except those which had there some necessary businesse to dis­charge, or which were arriued for some good and profitable purpos [...]: not that he feared that they should learne any thing there, which might procure them to loue vertue (as saith Thucidides) nor that they should bee stirred vp to imitate the forme of his policie, but rather for feare least they should teach and infect his Cittizens with some naughtie B and vicious quality: for it is necessary, that when strangers enter into a City, there enter also togither with them new and strange languages, and these newe languages must be­get new conceits, and new conceits new affections: which oftentimes are as iar [...]ing and repugnant to the lawes and forme of gouernement already established, as discords to a a well tuned harmony of musicke. For which cause, hee reputed it a thing as necessary to preserue his Citty pure and clean from strange maners and fashions, as from persons in­fected with contagious diseases. Moises giuing the law to the Iewes, by the commande­ment of God, saith all as much: There shall bee (saith he) betweene thee and the stranger that liueth with thee but one law and one maner of life. Wherfore they abho [...]red stran­gers, C not daring to conuerse nor contract any affinities with them, as they themselues also were mocked and reiected of strangers. Solon on the other side set open the gate of Athens to all commers [...] so that strangers there were as wel entertained as the natural & original inhabitants.

MOREOVER, the office of the Ephorie or the Tribuneship, is not well ordained: for albeit 1 that these Ephories haue a sup [...]rindance o [...]er the cheefest affaires of the Commonweale, yet are they alwaies elected out of the people, in such sort, that o [...]tentimes men that are exceeding poore, are promoted to that office, who by reason of their pouerty and need become vendible and easie to be bought and sold, as it hath often beene seene beretofore, and is yet euidently to be perceiued in D their meat assemblies, called Andries: for some of these Ephores being corrupted with bri [...]e [...], haue as much as in them lay ruinated and subuerted the City. And by reason that their authority was 2 very great, euen equal with a tiranny, the kings themselues were constrained to s [...]eke their fauour and countenance, in such sort, that thereby [...]e Commonweale sustained great detriment, being changed from an Aristocratie into a Democratie. It is true indeed, that their Commonweale is 3 maintained & vpholden by this office, the people being content and quiet, in that they are parta­kers of the soueraigne Magistrateship, which, whether it was brought in by the prouidence of the 4 lawgiuer, or by fortune, is most behoofefull for their affaires: for to cause a Commonweale to en­d [...]re long safe & sound, it is requisit that all the parts of the City doe desire to preserue the whole, E & do perseuere in the same estate. Here therfore the kings content themsel [...]es with their [...]onour: good men with their Senatoriall dignity, for that is the stipend & wages o [...] their vertue: and the common people with t [...]eir Ephoreship or Tribuneship, which is taken ou [...] from amongst them all [...] 5 which Magistrate in very deed ought to bee chosen out from amongst the people, as hee is, but yet 6 not after that maner which they vse, for it is too childish. Moreouer, although they bee m [...]n of no reputation and worth, yet are the soueraigne iudgements committed vnto th [...]m: and ther [...]ore it 7 were more expedient, that they should not define and iudge according to their owne wiss, bu [...] ra­ther by the prescript of the written law and rule of equity. Also the manner of liuing of the Ephe­ries 8 doth not agree with the intention of the City, being very dissolute & vnbridled, howbeit, a­gainst F others they be so rigorous and cruel, that they are almost intollerable, & yet s [...]cretly them­selues transgressing the laws, giue euer their minds to all sensuall and corporall delights.

MOREOVER, the office of the Ephorie.] Ephorie [...]ignifies as much as controling, taken 1 from the Greek verbe [...], which signifieth to ouerlooke or ouersee. This was in La­cedemonia an annual Magistrateship of great authority made by election, & opposed to the kingly power, to cōtroule & bridle the same: as the Tribunes in Rome were opposed to the Consuls, as hath ben said. There were but [...] of these Ephories euery year, who had [Page 116] a peculiar precinct and place of audience, where they were enformed of the cheefest G affaires of the Commonwealth, yea euen had authority to call the kings before them. By succession of time, they grewe in this their soueraigntie so insupportable, that at the last they were slaine, and their office suppressed. Wee read, that King Agis king of Lace­demonia, when hee perceaued that the auncient vertue of the Lacedemonians was de­cayed, and consequently the strength of their gouernment greatly empaired, began to bethinke himselfe what remedie was fittest for their reformation, and for bringing them to the first orders of Lycurgus, from the which they were farre gone astray. Whereat the Ephores being discontent, murthered him at the preparation of this enterprise, say­ing that he aimed at no other end, but to bring in tyrannie into their Cittie. After him H Cleomenes succeeded, who had no lesse desire to bring it to passe, then his predecessor had: he found out the records of Agis, whereby hee vnderstoode his plot and pretence, and perceiued that his misse and errour was, in that he vndertooke such an enterprise of weight, before that hee was in full and quiet possession of all the Lacedemonian power. Therefore he went another way to worke, he slew the Ephores, and all other that might any wise withstand him: and so by this meanes restored easily the auncient laws of Ly­curgus. Whereby he won vnto himselfe great renowme, yea as great, or more, then Ly­curgus himselfe: and sure he had reuiued halfe-dead Lacedemonia, but for the vnhappy comming of the Macedonians, whose furious onset he could not possibly resist, his own I force alone being too weake, and the rest of the Grecians refusing to succour him, ther­fore he was ouercome, and all his excellent purposes and designes annihilated and bro­ken. Polybius. Lib. 4. writeth: That Cleomones being dead, the Lacedemonians chose two kings, the one, Agesipolus, the other called Licurgus [...] extract from a linage whence there was neuer hope that euer king should proceed. This man made men beleeue, that he was of the race of Hercules, and caused himselfe to be created king, by giuing to eue­ry one of the officers sixe hundred crownes.

2 THEIR authoritie was very great and euen equall to a tyrannie.] Plato hath the like say­ing in his fourth booke De Legibus, discoursing of the Lacedemonian Common­weale. K

3 BEING changed from an Aristocratie to a Democratie.] If the Ephores had demeaned themselues according to their duties, the Lacedemonian forme of gouernment was an Aristocratie, directed by the counsell of the kings, and the Senate. Such was the gouern­ment of Rome, before the erection of the Tribuneship, which made the power of the people greater then the power of the Senate: as Cicero writeth in his third booke of Lawes, and Salust in his histories.

4 THE which whether it were brought in by the prouidence of the Lawgiuer or by fortune.] Here Aristotle seemeth to doubt, whether the Ephores were ordained by the Lawe of L Lycurgus, or by chaunce: yet in the fift booke of this worke, and the tenth chapter, hee affirmeth, that they were added to the kings by Theopompus, to cut their power shor­ter. Howbeit, Herodotus in his booke intituled Clio, sayeth: That they were ordained by Lycurgus. Xenophon in his Treatise of the Lacedemonian Commonweale, sayeth it is very likely, that they were brought in by the cheefe of the Cittie, yet hee affirmeth no­thing. Cleomenes, who ouerthrew them, in his information which hee gaue to the Lacedemonians touching their affaires, rehearseth another originall of the Ephores, as Plutarke writeth in his life, namely, that when the kinges were long occupied in the warres of Messena, they did chuse certaine of their friends to minister law and iustice in M their absence to the Lacedemonians, which were called Ephores.

5 EPHORIE being taken out from amongst them all.] The Ephories were chosen out of all the Orders or Estates of the Cittie, namely, out of the Senatours, Gentlemen, and Commoners. When Cleomenes had slaine the Ephories, and throwne downe their seats and chaires, he for the proclaiming of the suppression of their state and office, cau­sed an assembly to bee made of the people, to sh [...]we a reason of his doing, saying: [Page 117] A Lycurgus did rightly entermingle the Senatours with the kings, and that the Citie had beene so gouerned a long time without neede of any other Magistrate, but that after­ward when the warres against the Messenians had long continued, and that they could not themselues haue leisure to hear and determine matters and controuersies between partie and partie, they made choice of certaine of their friends, whome they left in the Towne to heare and iudge matters in their steed: who were called Ephores, and conti­nued a great while in being onely the kings Ministers. Howbeit by little and little they attributed the soueraigne power, and vsurped a seuerall iurisdiction to themselues, and if they would haue demeaned themselues gently and moderately, hee could peraduen­ture B haue the better borne with them: But to purpose, through an vsurped libertie, to suppresse the Magistrates lawfully ordeined of old time, euen to the banishment of some of the kings, and putting others of them to death, without any forme of Lawe or order of iustice, and to threaten them which yet desire to see againe in Sparta the most goodly and sacred gouernement which was woont to bee there in old time; This (sayeth hee) is a matter that ought not to bee borne withall. If it had beene possible to haue rooted out of Sparta without murder, these pestilences of the Commonweale which haue beene brought thither from other places, I meane delights, superfluities, abundance of wealth, debts, vsurie, and also others more auncient, as pouertie and ri­chesse: C hee would haue thought himselfe the happiest king that euer had raigned, as a Phisitian, that without causing any sorrow had healed the diseases of his Countrey: but if hee had beene constrained to set his hand to bloud, hee had followed the example of Lycurgus, who ought to excuse him: for hee being neither king nor other Magi­strate, but onely a priuate Cittizen, taking kingly authoritie vpon him, was so hardy and bold as to come into the market place in atmour, so that the king for feare, fled vnto the franchises and liberties of the Temples, and of the gods. But forasmuch as hee loued the welfare and honour of his Countrey, hee quickly ioined himselfe to Lycurgus his side, helping him in the execution of his enterprise, and allowed of the exchange of the D gouernment of the Commonweale.

BVT yet not after the same manner that is vsed now adaies.] Like the election of the Se­natours, 6 whereof shall be spoken hereafter.

IT were better they should not iudge after their owne wils, but according to the tenour of 7 written ordinances and prescript lawes.] The Courts of Parliament in France, doe iudge almost as the Ephores did, after their owne wils, without tying themselues to the Lawe written, or to any ordinances: but there is some difference betweene them: For the Ephores were men of no skill, but the counsellers and Presidents haue studied, and are well seene in the Lawes.

E THE manner of liuing of the Ephores doth not agree with the intention of the Citie.] The 8 Ephores during the time of their Magistrateships, liued very pompeously, contrary to the sobrietie prescribed by Lycurgus, which was so strict, that skant could it bee obser­ued by other Cittizens, toward whome, those Ephores vsed seuere rigour, to cause the same to bee performed and kept, so that if any were disposed to make good cheare, and to be merry, they were driuen to hide themselues.

IN like sort the estate of their Senate is not rightlie ordained. For admit, they were 1 well conditioned and sufficiently inclined to vertue, and that therefore it should seeme to F bee for the benefite of the Cittie to commit the high iudgements to them: yet it is doubt­full 2 whether it were good to yeelde vnto them such continuall power for tearme of life: Sith there is an oldnesse, as well of the minde, as of the bodie. But sith they bee trai­ned 3 in no such sort, as the Law-giuer himselfe dooth distrust their vprightnesse and honestie, sure it is no sure thing. Nowe, of them that are promoted to this degree, some yeelde to bee corrupted with bribes, and prodigally mispend the common Trea­sure: Therefore it were better they should not bee exempted from correction as nowe they bee, 4 [Page 118] 5 but that they should yeeld an account of their doings. The Eph [...]rian Magistrate seemeth to bee G a corrector of all others, which is on the other side too great a prerogatiue to the Ephorie. Neither 6 are we of this mind, that accounts ought to bee giuen in that manner. Also the election of the Senatours which they make by suffrages and voices, is very child [...]sh: neither is it good, that hee which is to be called to the Magistrateship, should as capable thereof, demand it himselfe at their hands: For he that deserueth the Magistrateship, will he, will he, ought to be Magistrate. N [...]w the Lawgiuer seemeth to deale herein, as hee hath done in the rest of the Commonweale, hauing set downe this manner of chusing the Senatours, to the end, to make the Cittizens ambitious, sith no man would euer demand a Magistrateship, except he were ambitious. And the most part of offences and crimes which men do willingly commit, spring from ambition or couetousnesse. H

BESIDES the former points, Aristotle in the Commonweale of the Lacedemoni­ans doth find fault with the ordaining of their Senatours, who had too great perpetu­all power, hearing and determining matters of life and death, and of infamie, as Plu­tarke reciteth, without being subiect to yeeld account of their doings. And therefore the election which they made of them, was childish and ambitious.

1 Senate, [...].] The Senate was welneere the very same thing at Rome, that [...] was in Sparta, so tearmed of the ancients called in Greeke [...]. Of which I matter Cicero writeth thus in his Dialogue of old age: If counsell, reason, and aduise, were not in old men, our ancestours would neuer haue called their soueraigne coun­sell, a Senate. Of the Lacedemonians, they that exercise the amplest Magistrateship are rightly called ancients, as in truth such they bee.

2 To yeeld vnto them such perpetuall power, and for tearme of life.] It is a question that in all ages hath beene debated amongst wise men, whether the principall Magistrates ought to remaine in office during a certaine prefixed time, or for tearme of their liues. And there is an inconuenience either way: For if they be for a time prefixed, they are not so much respected: and it falleth out, that they goe out of office before they haue K learned their charge. On the other side, if they abide perpetuall, and for tearme of life, they waxe proud, and often wicked, when they perceiue that they cannot bee deposed, nor any man dare accuse them.

3 SITH there is an oldnesse, as well of the mind as of the bodie. [...], &c.] In very olde age, not onely the force of the body, but also the quicknesse of the vnderstanding and ripenesse and integritie of iudgement do decay; and when a man is come to his doting daies, he is no more fit to exercise any Magistracy.

4 IT were better they should not be exempted from correction as now they be, [...].] Not subiect to yeeld a reason of their doings. It is allowed by the customes of Fraunce, con­trarie L to Aristotles authority, that the Iudges of the soueraigne courts are perpetuall, and not subiect to giue account of their charges, as well in generall as in particular, as Budeus affirmeth in his first Annotations vpon the Pandects.

5 THE Magistrates of the Ephores seemeth to be a correcter of all others.] Such manner of correction is made two manner of waies, to wit, either by appeale when a higher court, or the prince, or people dooth amend the sentences of the vnderiudges, or else when a reckoning is required of him that is gone out of office: and after that maner, it seemeth that Aristotle would haue Iudges corrected. In old time they vsed this manner at Rome, as they doe still at this day in diuerse places of Italy, toward diuerse vnderlegates and M potestates.

6 ALSO the election of the Senators which they make by suffrages and voices, is childish.] Lycurgus at the first, established the Senate of those personages that were adherents to him in his enterprise: But hee ordained, that when anie of their roomes should fall void from time to time afterwards, he should be preferred thereinto that was found to be the honestest man, & of best report in all the Towne; so that he were aboue three­score [Page 119] A yeares old. It was doubtlesse, the most honourablest strife that could bee among men, where hee carried away the best game, not that was most iust amongst them that be iust, nor the strongest amongst them that be strong, but the most vertuous and hone­stest, of the vertuous and honest sort: hauing for the reward of his vertue full power (as ye would say) and soueraigne authoritie in the gouernment of the Commonweale, and holding the life and goods of all his Cittizens at his direction. The election was thus made: The people first assembled & met together in the market place, where there were certaine Deputies shut vp into a house, out of which they could neither see nor be seen of them that were there assembled, but onely did heare their noise. For the people by B their clamour declared him whom they accepted or refused, of the pretenders: As also in other cases they declared their minds after the same manner. The pretenders were not brought in nor presented altogether, but one after another in order, which was by drawing of lots. That partie to whom the lot fell, passed ouerthwart the assembly of the people, without speaking one word: and the Deputies that were shut in the house, had little tables, wherein they noted the greatn [...]sse of the noise, and of the clamour of the people: so as euery of the pursuers passed by vnknowne to them who it was, noting on­ly that it was the first, the second, the third, or the thirtieth; which was found in the or­der of them that were presented: & he, at whose passage the clamour of the people was C greatest, was by them declared and elected Senatour. Who therevpon wearing a gar­land of flowers vpon his head, went vnto all the Temples of the gods, to giue thankes vnto them, being waited on by a great number of young men, who went highly com­mending and magnifying his vertue, and also with a great company of women, who went singing songs to his praise, blessing him for that he had so honestly liued: then eue­ry one of his kinsfolke prepared a banquet for him at his house, and as hee entered into the house, one said: The Citie honoreth thee with this banquet. This done, he returned to the appointed place of his feast: where hee did in all other things according to cu­stome, sauing that at the table there was serued & set before him a double portion, wher­of D he kept one: and after supper all his kinswomen stood at the entery of the hall of the feast where he had supped: and he called vnto him her that he thought best of, to whom he gaue the second portion, and said to her: This hath been giuen to me in testimonie, that this day I haue borne away the prise of vertue, and I giue it vnto thee. Then was sh [...] brought home to her owne house by all the other Gentlewomen, in the very same sort that the men conducted him home to his mansion place.

How Lysander attempted by all meanes to procure the abolishing of the priuiledge of Hercules his stocke: which was that none might be chosen king, except hee were of E the race of them that descended from Hercules, Diod Sicilian in the foureteenth book, cap. 4.

As touching the kingly state, whether it be best or not for Cities to be gouerned by kings, we wil speake thereof in another place: but soothly, it were better to iudge the worthinesse of euery king [...] by his life and vertuous and honest actions, then as they doe in these daies, by their races. Also that the lawgiuer himselfe hath not thought that he could make them perfect in bounty & good­nesse, it appeareth in that hee distrusted them as not being good inough. Therefore they vsed to send such Embassadors together with the king, which bore euill will one to another, and thought F that the discord of the kings serued for the preseruation of the Commonweale.

THE kingly state in Lacedemon, was Hereditarie, in the race of them that descended from Hercules, seruing for the ordering of the warres, and hauing the preheminence in the sacrifices. Two kings raigned and gouerned there together, not after their own wils, but according to the Lawes of the Country: sauing that in the Warres they had abso­lute power. Aristotle, Polit. lib. 3. cap. 10. saith thus: The kingdome in the Lacedemonian [Page 120] Commonweale seemeth to be most iust: yet hath not the king absolute power there in G all matters, but when he warreth abroad, then hath hee soueraigne authoritie. And in the eleuenth Chapter of the fift booke, hee writeth: That this state continued a great while, because it was at the beginning deuided into two parts, and that afterward king Theopompus did moderate it, as well in other thinges, as by adding vnto it the Magi­strateship of the Ephores. In time of peace, they not much honor them aboue others, of purpose to restraine them from conceiuing a tyrannicall pride, or from giuing oc­casion to others to affect the royall Maiestie: but after their deceasses, they honoured them not as men, but as heroicall personages. The kings and the Ephores, did monthly take an enterchangeable oath one to another, the kings in their owne names, and the H Ephores in the name of the Cittie. The kinges did sweare to raigne according to the Lawes of the Cittie, The Ephores sware, that if the kings inuiolably kept their oaths, then would they maintaine and keepe the kingdome stable vnto them: as Xenophon writeth in his treatise of the Lacedemonian Commonweale, it seemeth that the two Consuls at Rome were created in imitation of these two kings, with whom they had as many things common: as also are in the Cantons of the Swissers, and in diuers free Cit­ties of high Germany, the borough-maisters and the Auoyez of Berne. The difference betweene them is, that the kings of Lacedemon were perpetuall, and could not bee but of a certaine race: The Consuls of Rome were annuall, and chosen by election. The A­uoyez I are perpetuall and eligible.

MOREOVER, their assemblies at meales, which they call Phidities, haue not beene well or­dained at the beginning: for it had beene better to haue assembled at the publicke charges, as they doe in Candia: but amongst the Lacedemonians, euery man is bound to bring his portion to the feast: notwithstanding, that there bee some so poore, that they are not able to furnish this charge, insomuch, that the contrary to that which the Law-giuer entended, resulteth and happe­neth vnto him, who would haue the institution of such feasts Democraticall: howbeit, as it is or­dained, it is in no wise Democraticall, because it is not easie for very poore folke to bee there. Also K there is an ancient law which admitteth no man into the Commonweale, that is not able to beare this contribution.

THIS manner of assembling at meat, hath beene already declared, Euery man furni­shed a certain quantitie of victuals in these assemblies consisting of fifteenes. And who­soeuer could not furnish his rate, was excluded from the honours and Offices of the Commonweale. This course Aristotle blameth, affirming it better to haue made those feasts at the charge of the Commonweale.

SOME men also haue iustly blamed the law touching their admirals, as a law that is the cause L of sedition: for by adding to the kings, who are the heads in the warres, the perpetuall authoritie and power of the sea, it is in a manner the ordeining of another kingdome.

FORASMVCH as they haue sought in this Commonweale to abase the kingly state, and to moderate it by diuerse meanes, they forgot themselues when they added vnto it the perpetuall authority of the sea, which was in a manner, to double the authority and power by sea and by land.

YET further, the Law-makers inuention may be blamed, as also Plato hath found fault with M it in his lawes. For the institution of all his Lawes tendeth to one vertue, namely, warlike forti­tude, 1 which serueth for victory. Therefore they preserued themselues by warring, and after they had conquered and gotten to themselues the Empire, then were they presently vndone, for that 2 they could not liue at rest, nor doe any better exercise then the exercises of warre: Neither is the errour any lesse, in that they thinke the goods for which they fight, ought rather to bee gotten by [Page 121] A vertue then by vice: Fer though it bee well said, yet erre they in esteeming them worthier then vertue.

PLATO in his first booke De Legibus, Aristotle in the seuenth booke of his Politicks, chap. 2. 3. and 14. and Polybye of his history, lib. 6. doe blame the Commonweale of Ly­curgus, as too warlike, saying, that all his Lawes were well ordained to make men vali­ant, but not to make them iust nor vpright. Notwithstanding, Plutarke answering them, sayth: That Lycurgus shot at no such marke, as to leaue his City commanding ouer ma­ny, but rather deeming, that the felicity as well of a Cittie as of a particular man, dooth B cheefly consist in the exercise of vertue, and in the vnity and concord of the inhabitants: he hath composed and framed his forme of gouernement, to the end, that his Cittizens should waxe free hearted, content with their owne, and temperate in all their deeds, for the most long maintenance and conseruation of their state. That the selfesame intention also Plato, Diogenes, and Zenon, haue had in writing their books, wherein they haue reasoned of the gouernment of Commonweales: and likewise all other great and skil­full personages that haue vndertaken to write of the same matter: but that they haue left nothing behind them but writing and bare words only. Xenophon, who matched learning with chiualrie, and was a great Captaine in his time, in his Treatise of the La­cedemonian C Commonweale, dooth wonderfullly commend this institution of Lycur­gus: And hee being a martiall man, and returning from that so famous expedition of A­sia, withdrew himselfe into the iurisdiction of the Lacedemonians, where hee liued a great while, being banished out of the Cittie of Athens, whereof hee was a naturall subiect.

THEREFORE they preserued themselues by warring, and after they had conquered and got­ten 1 to themselues the Empire, thē were they presently vndone, for that they could not liue at rest.] Aristotle, Polit. lib. 7. cap. 14. writeth thus: That the Law-giuer ought rather to bend his D wit to referre the affaires of Warre, and all other Lawes, to rest and peace, the euents agreeing with the reasons, doe sufficiently witnesse: Sith diuerse such Citties by making warres, haue beene preserued, and after they haue conquered and gotten the Empire, doe perish and decay, for they rust in time of peace like yron: whereof their Law-giuer is the cause, who hath not taught them how to liue in peace as well as in war. Sith there­fore in these daies the Lacedemonians haue no more dominion, it is certaine they are no more happy, nor their Lawmaker good. For it is a mockery, that persisting still in his Lawes, & hauing no hinderance in the vse thereof, they haue lost notwithstanding their happie life. So from the time that the Lacedemonians began to take their ease, they not E only diminished, but also by little and little, destroyed their noble and famous Com­monweale. The like whereof, vpon the selfesame occasion, afterwards befe [...] to the Ro­manes, as also some of the cheefe Senatours foresaw it would come to passe. Amongst whome, Scipio Nasica was one, Scipio Nasica. who was of opinion, that Carthage (albeit it was enui­ous of the renowme and name of Rome, and a perpetuall enemie thereto) should not bee rased and destroied, to the end, they might alwaies haue an enemie against whome to fight and shew themselues in arms. For all enemies and enuious persons being whol­ly ouerthrowne and destroyed, it were a danger that the Commonweale of Rome being instructed and furnished for the Warres, and the Romane youth brought vp in martiall F affaires, would turne their weapons against themselues, and worke their owne decay. Which counsell although it was refused by the Senate, yet the disposition of matters that fell out after, shewed well that it was wise and discreet counsell. For after the destru­ction of Carthage, the ciuill warres began welneere presently to be kindled, wherby the most flourishing and most mighty Commonweale that euer was, was in the end ouer­throwne, and that Cittie which was the richest of all others, and the lady and mistresse of the world, became a prey to the barbarous nations.

[Page 122]N [...]ITHER is the errour lesse.] The Lacedemonians erre also, in that they esteeme not G vertue but for victories sake, wherevnto they referre all their doings, as to a last and cheefe end: saying concerning other matters, except victorie, for the getting whereof paines ought to bee taken, that they should be sought for rather by vertue, then by craft or leudnesse.

AGAINE, the publicke treasures and taxes are not well ordered in Sparta, where they are constrained to maintaine great warres, without hauing a common stocke, and doe also contribute with euill wils: For whereas the most part of the Countrey doth appertaine to the Lacedemoni­ans, they doe not exact subsidies one of another with care and diligence. By meanes whereof, the H Law-giuer hath not attained to that commoditie which he pretended: but cleane contrary, hath 1 made the Cittie p [...]ore, and particular persons couetous. Thus wee haue spoken sufficiently of the Commonweale of the Lacedemonians, sith the principall points that could bee blamed therein, haue ben touched by vs.

THE Commonweale of Lacedemon as Polybius writeth in his sixt booke, was wel ordained, to retaine the Cittizens in concord and modestie, and to preserue their liber­tie a long time, insomuch, that they that publickely aime at that marke, cannot possiblie find a better order. For the equalities of possessions and their plaine and common man­ner I of liuing, made their conuersation modest priuately, and the Commonweale peace­able. Also their continuall exercise in trauaile, and custome to indure great labour from their infancie, made them hardie and courageous, and suffered no leudnesse to breede amongst them, or to bee drawne thither from other places: but for the making of them maisters ouer their neighbours, and for the vndertaking of warres out of their country it was altogether vnsufficient. While they warred with their neighbours for the domi­on of Morea, they could furnish the fame, by reason they had their necessary prouisions ready at a becke, and quicke returne: But afterward, when they aspired to the Empire of Greece, and began to spread their armies vpon the sea, and to make voyages out of Mo­rea K with armies by land, they put their liberty forthwith in danger. For their yron mo­nies, and exchange of yearely fruits, could not suffice their necessities, obseruing the or­dinance of Lycurgus. For such manner of enterprises required currant money, and vic­tuals out of forraine countries. Therefore were they forced to haue recourse to the Per­sians, to set tributes vpon the Iland [...]rs, and leuie money vpon all the Grecians, knowing now that it was vnpossible by obseruation of the lawes of Lycurgus to mainetaine and keep, not only the principality ouer the Grecians, but much lesse their own Common­weale.

1 HATH made the City poore and particular persons couetous. [...], &c.] Although L it was the intent of Lycurgus, to keepe the Lacedemonians as farre as hee could from ambition and couetousnesse: yet notwithstanding did they in continuance of time wex so couetous and ambitious, that through a vaine hope of getting the dominion ouer all other of the Grecians, they submitted themselues to the yoke of the Persians, whom they had before ouercome, by yeelding into their hands certain Citties of Greece, from whence they had driuen them, to the end, to get money and aid at their hands, to streng­then themselues against the other Grecians. At which time, the stablishment of their Lawes began first to decay, as Polybius writeth in the sixt booke of his history. M

A

CHAP. VIII. Of the Commonweale of Crete ordai­ned by Minos.

B THe Commonweale of Crete is somewhat like the former, and hath certaine things that are no worse ordained, and in diuerse others againe, it is lesse adorned and polished: for the Lacedemonian Common­weale (as it seemeth, and is reported) hath in many points imitated the Commonweale of Crete. Also the most part of old ancient thinges, are lesse corrected, then those that be new. For the report goeth, that Lycur­gus 1 yeelding vp the Protectorship of king Charilas, departed out of his country; and abode a long time in Crete, by occasion of kindred: For the Lictrans did issue and 2 come from the Lacedemonians. And they that came in this Colonie from Lac [...]demon, had re­ceiued C those lawes which the auncient inhabitants of the Countrey of Crete did vse: the which 3 lawes the Perioecians doe still vse to this day in the very same order that Minos first deliuered 4 the same vnto them. Now this Island doth seeme to haue such a scituation as is naturall and fit to 5 rule all Greece. For it abutteth to the sea euery way, and they be welneere all Grecians that dwell ouer the sea coasts: and at one part it is not farre srom Peloponese, and in another part is neere to Asia, shooting toward Triope and Rhodes. By reason wherof, Minos obtained the Empire of the sea, and brought certaine Ilands vnder his obedience, and made other apt to be inhabited. At last he died in an enterprise in Sicily, neer vnto Camica. Therfore the discription & ordaining of the 6 Commonweale of Crete, is in a certaine proportion answerable to the Lacedemonian: For as the D Ilotians till the ground for the Lacedemonians, so doe the Perioecians for the Cretans. And both the Lacedemonians and Cretans, haue assemblies ordeined for their diet, which the Lacedemo­nians in ancient time did not call Phidities, but Andries, as the Cretans did: insomuch, that the custome seemeth to haue come from thence. So they agree in the order of the Commonweale: for the Ephores haue the selfesame power, which they that are called Cosmi, haue in Crete; sauing that there be fiue Ephores, and tenne Cosmi. In like sort, the Senatours are equall to the Senators, whom they call the Counsell. The Cretans aforetime had a kingdome, which they did afterwards rid away: and the Cosmi haue ouerfight and authoritie in all matters concerning the Warres. All men are admitted into the publicke assemblies, where nothing is done, sauing the ratifying E of the decrees of the Senators and of the Cosmi. Further, the feasts amongst the Cretans, are bet­ter ordeined then amongst the Lacedemonians: For in Lacedemon, euery man contributeth by head his rated share, for default of performance whereof, the lawe disfranchiseth him of his de­gree and freedome in the Commonweale, as hath ben before declared. The fashion of the Cretans is more sociable, for of all their publicke fruits and breed of cattell, and of the customes and rents yeelded by the Perioecians, one part is appointed for the seruice of the gods, and for the common charges, and the other part for the banquets: so that all men, women, and children haue their food of the common charge and prouision: so the Lawgiuer hath deuised many things wisely & cunningly concerning sobrietie, as a thing very behoofefull: and touching diuorces, to the end, F there should not be too many children, and allowing buggerie: wherein, whether hee hath done well or euill, we will dispute that in another place. That therefore the feastes and meate assemblies are better ordained in Crete then in Lacedemon, it is manifest and cleare: but the stablishment of the Cosmi, is worse then that of the Ephores. For the euill that is sound in the Ephores, is also in them, being either of them created alike out of the common people. But that commodity which is found in the one Commonweale, wanteth in the other. For [...]n Lacedemon, the people hauing part in the soueraigne Magistrateship, by the election of the Ephores, who are taken out of all [Page 124] sorts of men, doth desire the conseruation of the state: but here in Crete they chuse not the Cosmi G out of all degrees, but out of certain families and stockes, and the Senators out of them that haue ben Cosmies: of whom the same may bee saied which is spoken of them of Lacedemon, to wit, that the immunity a [...]d freedome from yeelding account, and to bee in the office of Magistrates for tearme of life, is a greater preheminence then they are worthy of: and it is a dangerous venter, least they exercise their office, not according to the written law, but according to their owne wils and discretions. Though the people being dispoiled of this prerogatiue of hauing any part in the soueraigne Magistrateship, doe keepe themselues quiet, yet is that no token that the Law in that be­halfe is good, for the Cosmi haue no such meanes to gaine as the Ephores: but by reason they dwel in an Island, are farre from such aduersaries, as might suborne them with bribes. Also the reme­dy H 7 that they apply to this inconuenience is absurd, and not ciuil, but rather sauouring of the power or authority of one or of a few, which is called a Dinastie or Potentateship. For the Cosmi are of­ten driuen away by their companions and fellowes in office, or some perticular persons rebelling. Also they are at liberty to giue ouer their offices before the expiration of their tearmes. All these 8 things might be better done according to Law then after mens wils, which is no sure rule. But the greatest mischeefe therin, is the disorder often committed by the mightiest, when they wil not sub­mit themselues to the order & correction of iustice. Whereby it may be vnderstood, that this dis­order hath I know not what of a Commonweale, and yet is not a Commonweale, but rather a Di­nastie or Potentateship. They haue accustomed when they see the people in an vprore, and friendes I diuided to commit the authority to one alone, and so to stirre sedition and fight one with another: Which is nothing els, but in time to bring to passe, that such a City shall bee no City, and that the ciuile society shall bee dissolued and taken cleane away. During which tumults, the whole estate is 9 in danger, if there were any that could or would inuade the same. But it is preserued (as wee haue said) by the scituation of the place, which defendeth strangers from approching thereunto. Ther­fore 10 the Perioecians are obedient, and contrariwise the Ilotians often reuolt. For the Cretans doe not command and rule out of the Isle: and of fresh remembrance forraine warre hath entered in there, which hath plainely bewraied the weakenesse of their Laws. Thus much shall suffice for this Commonweale. K

Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and diuers other Greek Authors in conferring the Commonweale of Crete with the Lacedemonian, haue written, that they were welneere both alike. Which Polybius refuteth in the sixt booke of his histo­ry, shewing their difference. First, in that amongst the Lacedemonians it was not lawful for one to bee a greater landed man then another, but euery one was to haue an equall portion of lands of the signorie. Contrary thereto, in Crete, euery man was allowed by the law to possesse as much of the Country as hee could come by, without any man­ner of limitation. For by the amplenesse of possessions, excellency was esteemed and L discerned amongst them. So that the greatest and amplest possession, howsoeuer it was gotten, was in great estimation: and they deemed no manner of getting whatsoeuer, to be blame-worthy. Secondly, in Lacedemon, the kings enioyed their state for euer, and they whom they called elders, were for terme of life, by whom and with whome all the affaires of the Commonweale were managed. In Crete, their manner of gouernement was annuall and Democraticall. Thirdly, as there be two meanes needfull for the conser­uation of euery Commonweale, namely, power and force against the enemies, and mu­tuall agreement betweene Citties and Countrimen: Lycurgus in Lacedemon had pro­uided for both together, by ridding away couetousnesse, that causeth all ciuill discord M and sedition. But there were no people in all the whole world that liued in greater mu­tinies, murders, and ciuill warres, then the Cretans, by reason of their naturall coue­tousnesse. Further, there is no such craftie liuing priuately to bee found, nor so many for so many, more vniust enterprises, as among the Cretans: wherefore Polybius conclu­deth, That their Commonweale was not like the Lacedemonian Commonweale, nor worthy to be compared with it, or imitated of others: For (sayth he) it may be easily iud­ged [Page 125] A when a Commonweale is wholly out of order and depraued, as wel by the lawes, as by the maners of liuing, and by seeing the inhabitants and subiects of the same, giuen without measure to couetousnesse, and their publicke actions vniust.

FOR the report goeth, that Lycurgus.] It hath been already recited, how Lycurgus be­fore 1 he gaue laws to the Lacedemonians, dwelt a great while in Crete, where he learned that manner of gouernement in the Island which was ordained by Minos, whence hee borrowed many articles, vsing correction in some, and moderation in other some, by which meanes he made his Commonweale perfecter then that of Minos. Strabo in the B tenth booke of his Geographie hath the like speech.

THE Lictians.] Licte was a town of Crete, & the Lictians inhabitants of the same, who 2 had ben sent thither by the Lacedemonians to dwel there as a colony, as the old custome was, which Lyctians in cōtinuance of time became Cretans, and tooke lawes of Minos.

Perioecians, [...].] A word affected in the country of Crete, signifying husbādmen that tilled the lands, as the Ilotians did to the Lacedemonians: notwithstanding, the Pe­rioecians were not thrals & slaues as the Ilotians, but farmers or tribute payers: the word according to the Greeke propriety signifieth as much as dwellers about, or neighbours adioyning.

C Minos.] Plato reasoning of the nature and definition of the lawe, hath intituled that 3 Dialogue by the name of Minos, where he reciteth certaine places of Homer in his cō ­mendation, wherein he is called the son and familiar of Iupiter, as hauing learned & re­ceiued his lawes of him. In this Dialogue and in the first of his lawes, Plato affirmeth, that Minos and Radamanthus were the eldest Lawgiuers of the Grecians, and right pa­stours of mankind. Thucidides in the first booke of his history writeth of Minos, that he was the most ancient of the Greek lawgiuers that had ben heard spokē of, and that he as­sembled a great number of ships, wherewith he possessed & kept a great part of the sea, called the Greeke sea, and was the first that occupied the Cycladian Islands, which hee D peopled with his own subiects, after he had driuen the Carians out of the same, and that after his death he left thē to his childrē: and also that he droue Pirates out of those quar­ters to the vttermost of his power, to the end, to leuie the reuenues thereof the better.

THIS Island hath such a scituation as is naturall and fit to rule.] The scituation of the 4 Island of Crete was very fit to command all Greece, as the scituation of Italy is to pos­sesse the Empire of the world, being enuironed with the vpper & nether sea, with many other commodities recited by Pliny in the 6. chapter of his 3. book, & by Virgil in the 2. booke of his Georgikes. Also the scituation of Constantinople, is most apt to rule Asia and Europe, as being builded in the vttermost coasts of both of them, and vpon the sea E shore with a very good hauen, & in a fruitfull and temperate country for the sustaining of valient & wise men. Hippocrates doth treat of the scituation of countries in his book of the aire, of waters, & of places. Galen saith, That the manners of the soule doe imitate the temperature of the body, according to that which had ben before set downe in that behalfe by Plato in his Timeus: in his 5. book of laws: and in the Epinomide [...]: & by Ari­stotle in his 7. book of Politicks, cap. 7. Likewise Cicero hath spoken therof in his 2. book of the nature of gods, & in his treatise of destiny: and also Varro in his first book of hus­bandry according to Eratosthenes [...] Philip de Comines in his history of king Lewis the eleuenth, doth shewe the aptnesse and commodity of the scituation of France, and the F nature of Frenchmen in the 71 chapter. How the French king ought to demeane him­selfe toward strange nations that are round about him, it appeareth in the booke of the French monarchie, the 1. chapter written by Seissell.

THE description and ordaining of the Commonweale of Crete.] Here are declared cer­taine 5 like points of the Cretan and Lacedemonian Commonweales, as of the Perioeci­ans and Ilotians, of the feasts, of the Cosmi, of the Ephores, & of the Senators: howbeit, without omitting the differences that might be in the same, as it is a hard matter for ci­uill [Page 126] affaires & Magistrateships, to answere directly in all points one to another in diuers G places, and at diuers seasons. Strabo in his tenth booke of the description of the earth, imitating Ephorus the Hystoriographer, who had written of the Commonweales of Europe, reciteth some principall points of the Commonweale of Crete: The first, that liberty is a great welfare and commodity to Citties, & that they ought to be wholly im­ployed about the maintenance therof, because it onely maketh goods proper to the ow­ners and possessors, & that the goods of the thrals and bondmen doe not belong to the obeiers, but to the commanders. That for the keeping of this liberty, concord was need­ful, which is contrary to sedition, that springeth from delicious liuing and couetousnes: and therefore, that if all the Citizens liue modestly and soberly; enuy, reproch, & hatred H should not hurt them. For this cause were children incontinently sent to the assemblies of their equals, called bands or troupes, marching day by day, band against band, with Flute and with Harpe, and fighting according to the patterne of very warres: The eldest went to the feasts, where the rich were entreated like the poore, and all serued with one kind of meat. That for the keeping of them from faintheartednesse in trauel, and in feats of armes, they were accustomed from their youth to exercises & battels made for plea­sure, that they might learne to care little for heat and cold, for sharpnesse & hardnesse of life, and for blows and wounds. They doe exercise shooting and leaping in armour, after the Perichian fashion, wearing a coat of armor, and shoes vsed in the wars, with measu­red I pacing, melody, & tuning, insomuch, that their plaies & pastimes brought a certaine martial cōmodity. Strabo who was a Cretan, & liued vnder Augustus Caesar, wrote that a few of these things continued in his time, wherin all was gouerned by the statutes and edicts of the Romans, as it is at this day by the ordinance of the Venetians.

7 SAVORING of his Dynastie.] That is to say, extreame & wicked Oligarchie, so called of the verbe [...], which signifieth to be able, and therefore [...] is as much to say, as Potentateship: but Potentate in Italian is taken in good part, & [...] in Greek in euill part. Whereof there is mention in the fift chapter of the fourth of these bookes.

8 MIGHT be better done according to law, then after mens wils, which is no sure rule.] Ari­stotle K disputeth very grauely in the eleuenth and twelfth Chapters of the third of these bookes, Whether it bee more expedient for Citties to bee gouerned by good written lawes, then according to the will of honest men: Concluding thus, Whosoeuer will haue the law command and rule, hee will haue God and the lawes to command toge­ther: but whosoeuer wisheth a man to rule, he also addeth a beast vnto him. For such is the lust and wrath of the Magistrate, that turneth the best men out of the right way: But the law is an vnderstanding without affection and lust. And in the booke of the World directed to Alexander vnder the name of Aristotle, the Authour affirmeth, that he had found nothing whereto he could liken God, sauing to the old law of a Citty wel gouer­ned, L as who would say: That God in this vniuersity of causes, was nothing els but that which the ancient law in a ciuill society is: whereby wee may learne, that it is good and behoofefull, that some thing more diuine then man, doe beare a stroke in the ordering and moderation of the assemblies and companies of men. For when this charge is com­mitted to man, the businesse goeth forward with very great daunger, because there are few men to be found which are adorned with wisdome, goodnesse and valour, who very often through force and violence of affections, doe erre in giuing iudgement, and swarue a great deale from reason. It is better therefore to commit such authority to the Lawes, then to men. But forasmuch as Lawes are generally written, and cannot M prouide for all perticular cases, it is needfull to haue recourse to men, and to establish some of them as keepers and ministers of the Lawes. This is the resolution which hath been made in this graue matter by many wise personages that haue beene instructed by the experience of many things, and by the inuention of others, and haue conferred di­uerse copies and patternes together.

[Page 127] A BVT is preserued by the scituation of the place, which defendeth strangers from approching 9 thereunto.] In all countries compassed about with the sea, as Crete or Candie is, the ac­cesse and entrance is vncertaine and dangerous, which hindereth strangers from com­ming thither with their armies, and therefore doth serue for safety & defence. We may say that by the like reason Venice hath ben preserued to this day aboue the space of ele­uen hundred yeares since it was first founded, without falling into the hands of stran­gers, or changing the fo [...]me of their Commonweale, or religion. The like whereof wee do not read to haue happened to any other cities: notwithstanding, that she abounding in all wealth, & being full of gold and siluer & all other kinds of riches, might haue pro­uoked B the farthest barbarous nations of the world to come to the sacking & s [...]oil of her. The scituation of Venice is described by Contarine lib. 1. of the Venetian Cōmonweal.

THEREFORE the Perioecians obey.] The Paizants or countrimen in Crete being in­closed 10 with the sea, were more peaceable then they of Lacedemon, who dwelling in the maine land, did often rebell, being fauored and aided by those neighbors and borderers that were enemies to the Lacedemonians.

CHAP. IX. C Of the Commonweale of Carthage.

THe Carthaginians seeme also to haue a good forme of Commonweale, and to excell others in many things, and in diuerse points to come neer the La­cedemonians: for these three Commonweales d [...] resemble one another, and are far better then the rest, to wit, the Cretan, the Lacedemonian, and the third which is of the Carthaginians, wherin there be many things wel or­dained. That this Commonweale is duly and rightly instituted, it appea­reth by the continuall perseuerance of the people in their order and forme D of gouernmēt, without the accesse of any notable sedition or tyranny there: it answere [...] to the La­cedemonian Commonweale in these things, namely, in b [...]nquets, and in the authority of the hun­dred and foure, and in the Ephores, sauing that it is better directed: For the Ephores amongst them are taken out of the common sort, & these are chos [...] of them that excel in vertue and wor­thinesse. Their kings & S [...]nat do agree with the Kings and Senators of Lacedemon: But they doe better in this also, in no [...] chusing the kings alwaies of o [...] [...]ace as they do, or in differently out of [...]vocations, but out of the best sort, & therin they regard vertue more thē age. For when they ha [...] great authority, & be of no wisdome nor valour, they do great h [...], & haue already greatly en­domaged the City of Carthage. The greatest part of error [...] & fault [...] deseruing blame and repre­hension E for declining from a right Commonweale are common to all the Commonweales whereof we haue made mention. But as for those Commonweales that carry [...] outward shew of [...] Aristo­cratie or of a Commonweale as it is properly termed, the one sort of them doth more incline to the power of the people, called a Democrati [...], & the other sort to the dominion or power of a few, called an Oligarchie: for it lieth in the power of the kings & Senators to refer or n [...] refer to the people, those matters wherof they haue consulted & agreed vpon. The which [...]atter a [...] [...] & [...] ­creed, if the kings & Senators be all of one mind and opinion: but if they disagree in anything, then is it referred to the people, who haue power & authority, not only to hear what is referred [...] thē, but also to determine the same, so as it is lawful for euery man [...] to speake agai [...] the [...]atter so F referred. This is too great a prerogatiue for the people, and not allowed in other Commonweales [...] Now, wheras the fiue Magistrates of the Quinquevirateship, who haue p [...]wer & au [...]ho [...]it [...] [...] ma­ny matters of great importance, are chosen by themselues, and haue the electi [...] of the [...]nd [...]d Magistrates of the Centumvirateship, being a Magistracie of most ample a [...]thoritie, in their hands; and whereas they gouerne l [...]ger than the other, to wit, before they enter into that offic [...] and after they are gone out of it: This [...]asteth of an Oligarchie. And whereas they [...] Magistrateships without [...]ees, and are not created by casting of lots or any other lik [...] de [...]i [...]e, and [Page 128] all causes are iudged by all the Magistrates, and not certaine causes by certaine M [...]gistrates, and G other causes by others, as in Lacedemonia. This is a part of the Aristocraticall gouernment. Fur­ther, the state of Carth [...]ge doth cheefly decline from an Aristocratie to an Oligarchie, by follo­wing one opinion which many men hold, that Magistrates should not be chosen, only in respect of their vertue, but also according to their richesse; as a matter vnpossible, that a needy man should be a good Magistrate, and apply the businesse of his office. If then the election that is made accor­ding to richesse, pertaine to the Oligarchie, and that which is made in respect of vertue, belong to the Aristocratie: this should be a third kind or forme of gouernement which the Carthaginians vse in their Commonweale. For with these two respects doe they chuse their Magistrates, yea the highest that they haue, as their kings and the generals of their armies. Which breach or trans­gression H of the Aristocratie or gouernment by the best sort, is to be laid to their lawgiuers charge, who at the first ought to haue prouided and taken order for this, as a most necessary point, that good men might liue in peace, without committing any vndecent thing in the state, as wel of Ma­gistrateship, as of a priuate life. For though a care must be had of riches for rest and quietnes sake, yet is it a bad thing, that the greatest offices, as the kingly state, and the authority of the warres, should be saleable and bought for mony: For this law procureth richesse to be more esteemed then vertue, & maketh the whole City couetous, by reason that whatsoeuer is in estimation of the cheefe personages of a countrey, the same is necessarily followed by others: Then where vertue is not cheefly honoured, there can be no assurednesse of the gouernment of the best sort. It is probable, I that the buyers of offices doe accustome to make a gaine of them, sith they come to them with [...]harge: so is it not credible, that a poore and honest man would seeke after gaine, and a dishonest and worse man that had disbursed money for his office, would not gaine it again with aduantage. Therefore should they onely desire Magistrateships that can exercise them with vertue and vp­rightness [...]. And though the Lawgiuer despised the pouertie of good men, yet notwithstanding hee ought to haue prouided for the quietnes of the Magistrates. Againe, that one man should exercise many offices, it seemeth a disordered and vnconuenient thing, and yet is accounted honorable & glorious amongst the Carthaginians. For one worke is best done by one man: wherein the Lawgi­uer should haue set an order, and prohibited that one man should be both a minstrell and a shoma­ker. K Therfore where the City is not small, it is more Citie-like and Commonweale like, and more agreeable to the people to communicate the Magistrateships to many. This is more political, as we haue affirmed, and euery worke is this may the better and sooner brought to perfection, as appea­reth in warlike affaires and seamatters. In which two charges almost all persons doe obserue one t [...]rne and course of commanding and obeying. Furthermore, whereas the forme of their Com­monweale doth resemble the Oligarchie, yet notwithstanding they do very aptly auoid this incon­uenience; when euermore some part of the people is enriched whilst they send others to inhabite their smaller Townes. By which meane they redresse this euil, & establish the state of their Com­monweale: which notwithstanding is the worke of fortune, but the occasions of sedition ought to L be preuented and rid away by the prouidence and foresight of the Lawgiuer. Now, if through any euil misfortune or aduersity, the subiects reuolt, there is no remedy in their lawes to retaine them in peace & tranquility. Therfore, as concerning the Commonweales of the Lacedemonians, Cre­tans, and Carthaginians, which deseruedly are liked and do flourish in the good estimation of all men the case th [...]s standeth with them.

Forasmuch as Carthage hath ben one of the most triumphant Citties that euer was, as wel in respect of the commodious scituation of the place & fair buildings therein, as in regard of the large Empire & good gouernment, we will set down these excellencies as breefly as we can. Therfore one part of the City of Carthage stood in a great gulfe of M the sea, for the most part being enuironed & compa [...]ed about with water, almost like an Island: the neck & point wherof that entred into the maine land, as it ascended & went vpward contained in breadth about fiue and twenty furlongs. From this point issued a peece of land which was long and narrow, shooting toward the West, of the breadth of halfe a furlong or aboue. The sea lay on the one side of this peece, and a great pond of standing seawater called Mare mort [...]m on the other side. And the same was inclosed [Page 129] A with a single wall which was scited and ioined by many rockes, stretching from one to another. On the other side, in the main land shooting toward the South, higher then the point, stood the castle called Byrsa, & the greatest part of the towne enclosed with three wals, containing euery of them thirty cubites in height, not comprising therein the tur­rets and galleries that were in the top. These wals stood about two acres one from ano­ther, within euery of which spaces, there were foure streetes a peece, and the same wals went thirty foot deepe into the ground. The first loft wherof, was at the bottome within the ground, and contained roumth for three hundred Elephants, besides garners for the stoage of necessaries for their keeping. Ouer them were the horsestables, containing B roumth for foure thousand horses, & garners to keep their prouision in besides: & fur­ther, there were chambers for the lodging of twenty thousand footmen, & foure thou­sand horsmen. All this prouision in time of wat was bestowed in that place between the three wals: The Arsenal of Carthage. But at the end of the said long & narrow peece of land whereof we haue spo­ken that lieth between the sea and the pond, there was for want of a wal a point that tur­ned toward the hauen which was very low & weake, by reason there had ben no account made of it at the beginning. Nowe the ponds on the land side were nauigable from one to another, & had the entry of the sea about threescore and ten footes broad, which was shut vp with chaines of yron. The Merchants ships lay cheefly in this place, & therefore C there were a great number of cables & great ropes kept there to tie their ships. Within these ponds there was a very great hall, that was seuered from the ponds, & builded vp­on certain rocks, standing high among their ponds, betweene the which there were ma­ny harbours & places of receit for ships, like an Arsenall, that sufficed to hold & hide a­boue two hundred ships, & ouer the same were garners & lofts to lay the ships muniti­on & furniture in: the whole being like a porch or hall standing vpon pillers of marble stone, to wit, euery seuerall harbor or place of receit for the ships vpon foure pillers, so that the water was vnderneath like a pond, & building ouer, all of one height in form of an Arsenal: & also more forward in the top of all the building was the captains lodging, D which had at the dore a cabine, out of which he might see the whole Arsenal on al sides, and to the sea, & might from thence command all the mariners, as seemed good to him­self: & yet they that were on the sea could not see what was done within the Arsenal, how quickesighted soeuer they were, nor the Marchants that arriued in the hauen, for it was inclosed with two wals of such height, as that they hid it al, and there were certain gates which led all incommers, from the end of the hauen into the City, & not toward the Ar­senall. This City was builded & founded in Lybia by the Phoenicians, fifty years before the destruction of Troy, and Chorus and Carchedon did lay the foundation of it, or else queene Dido, as the Romanes & Carthaginians themselues affirme. This Dido (after the E tyrant Pigmaleon who reigned in the Citty of Tire, had by treason murdered her hus­band Sichee) departed from thence, being admonished thereto by certaine visions in dreames, togither with many burgesses of the Citty who could not indure Pigmaleons tyranny, and carried with her as much gold and siluer as she could gather togither, and so ariued in Libia, in the place where Carthage was after builded, & perceiuing that the people of the country would driue her away, she entreated thē to giue her as much land to dwell in as an oxe hide would compasse, whereat the men of the countrey tooke vp a laughter at the first, by reason of the smalnes of the thing which she required. Notwith­standing, being curious to learn by what subtilty the Tyrians meant to build a city with­in F so small a peece of ground, they granted her request. Then these Tyrians did cut an ox hide into so many small thongs, as that it compassed about that place wherein the castle of Carthage after stood, The beginning and encrease of the Empire of Carthage. which by reason thereof was called Byrsa. Afterwards in conti­nuance of time these Tyrians hauing exercised thēselues in trade of marchandise euery where, being more painful and diligent then their neighbors, did prepare many ships, & by that mean builded the city: & hauing subdued the country of Lybia, held a great part of the sea in their subiection, and then warring with their neighbours, one after another, [Page 130] conquered Scicily, Sardinia, with al the other Islands in that sea, & sent part of their peo­ple G to inhabite in Spaine: By which meanes, of a small beginning, there grewe an Em­pire & Princedome, that for power might be compared to the Empire of the Grecians, and for riches to that of the Persians. They had kings, and the Aristocraticall power of Senatours, and gaue to the Communalty their preheminences in matters to them per­taininge wherein their Commonweale resembled the Lacedemonian state. Their exer­cise was cheefly in sea matters, wherefore they cared for no footmen, but gaue some or­der for horsemen, because they were serued with strangers and hirelings. Nowe, when they had liued in this sort about seuen hundred yeares, the Romanes warred vpon them, and tooke from them in the first punicall warres, the Islands of Scicily and Sardinia, H and after in the second, all Spaigne. By reason whereof, the Carthaginians assembled a great army vnder the conduct of Hanniball their Captaine generall, and occupied and spoiled the greatest part of Italie by the space of sixteene yeares. On the other side, the Romanes vnder the conduct of Cornelius Scipio the first, spoiled and occupied all the Country of Libia euen to the Cittie of Carthage, tooke their shippes and elephants, and brought them to such extremity, as that they were constrained to pay them a yeare­ly tribute. Whereupon they made truce the second time, which continued about fiftie yeares, vntill such time as it was broken: at what time the third warres began, wherein vnder the conduct of Scipio the younger, Carthage was wholly destroyed by the Ro­manes. I It is reported of this Scipio, that beholding this Citie, which for the space of se­uen hundred yeares from the building thereof, had so flourished and excelled in all things, and had the dominion of so many seas, lands, and Islands: which in ships, riches, and armour, was comparable to any other, and in boldnesse and hardinesse passed all o­thers, and had so valiantly defended her libertie by the space of three yeares after shee had yeelded vp all her weapons and defences, and was at the last through famine and warres come to this extreame necessitie, he wept and shed teares for very pitty: where­by he gaue sufficient notice, that hee well knewe how all Citties, Countries, and King­domes, were subiect to change of fortune, euen as euery particular man is. So the Cit­tie K of Troy which sometime was so great and mightie, came to ruine: and likewi [...]e the kingdomes of the Assyrians, of the Medes, and Persians, after they were risen vp to t [...]e highest pitch of felicitie. The like play of fortune is yet more clearly shewed in the Em­pire of the Macedonians. Therefore when Scipio had weighed these things, hee vttered that verse of Homer, which is thus in effect, The time shall come, that great T [...]oy shall fall, and king Priamus with all his power and valiant familie: Mean [...]ng Rome, whereof he greatly doubted least she were subiect to humane casualtie. Polibius endeuoureth to shewe some reasons of so strange a ruine: For though the Commonweales of Carthage and Rome had some likenesse in their seueral institutions and ordinances, yet Carthage L when she began to make wars against Rome, was in her decaying daies [...] and Rome then in her growing vigour and force. For all Commonweales haue a certaine naturall aug­mentation and quickening, and consequently a decay and diminishing. For then did Rome flourish in the forme of her Commonweale. The people in Carthage had vsur­ped too great authority in their counsels. At Rome the Senate had the direction of the most part of matters of state, which prospered the better, for that they were gouerned by the wisest sort: and by that direction, at last they ouercame the Carthaginians. Adde also, that the Italians were indued with a more excellent nature then the Lybians, as wel in force of body, as in hardinesse of courage; And that the Romanes serue their turnes M with their owne Nation, whom they traine and bring vp in warlike skill, in the best sort that is vsed in all the whole world: The Carthaginians vsed none but strangers and hire­lings, in whome they reposed all their confidence. Whereof they were euill apaid in the end: And at their first warres with the Romanes, they ruled ouer the people of Af­frica with too great tyrannie and couetousnesse, because they thought they had good cause so to doe, insomuch, that they yearly leauied the one halfe of their fruits. Further, [Page 131] A they doubled their tribute, and shewed no mercie to them that had offended through ignorance. They bestowed the Magistrateships, not vpon them that were gentle and mercifull persons, but vpon them that augmented the publicke treasures, though they played the Tyrants with the people. Which crueltie and rigour was the cause that in their ciuill warres with Matho and Speudons, not onely the men, but also the women of euery Cittie did conspire, who had afore seene their children and husbands led into thraldome, because they had not payed the tribute; which women were content to sell their iewels to furnish the paiment of the souldiours.

B

CHAP. X. Of the Commonweale of Athens, ordei­ned by Solon.

C OF them that haue entreated of Commonweales, some neuer had the managing and guiding of publicke affaires, but euermore did lead a priuate life: and wee haue spoken almost of as many of them as haue set downe any thing worthy the remembring. Others haue ben Lawgiuers, some in their owne Cities, others in strange Cities. Of these, some haue ben only Authours of lawes, others founders of Commonweales: as for example, Lycurgus and Solon, who stablished both laws and Common­weales. The Commonweale of the Lacedemonians hath been spoken of. As for Solon, some think hee was a vertuous Law-giuer, and abrogated the Oligarchie (being then very immoderate and vnreasonable) and deliuered the people from thraldome, and established the Democratie or popu­lar D state according to the old manner, by temperating and ordering the Commonweale aright. For the counsell in the Areopage pertaineth to the Oligarchie; and the election of the Magi­strates 1 to the Aristocratie: and the forme of the iudgements is popular. Now it seemeth that So­lon did not take away these two things which were afore time, to wit, the counsell and the election of the Magistrates, but made the people lord by creating them Iudges of all things. Therefore some men find fault with him for that he ouerthrew the other part of the Commonweale by com­mitting the authority of all things to Iudges, which were made by casting of lots. For since that course was taken, they that carried fauour with the people as a Tyrant, haue brought the state in­to such a Democratie, as it remaineth in at this present. Ephialties and Pericles brake the lims of 2 E the counsell of Areopage. The same Pericles also ordained fees for the iudges: so euery one that sought fauour and credite at the peoples hands, haue augmented the authority of the people so far, that they haue brought the Commonweale into that forme of Democratie, or gouernmnt by the 3 multitude, wherein it nowe remaineth. Notwithstanding, that seemeth not to haue beene Solons meaning, but rather to haue happened by chance and accident. For when the people had been the occasion of the sea victorie in the warres against the Medes, they wexed haughtie-minded, and tooke to themselues leud Oratours in steed of good gouernours. For Solon had giuen authoritie to the people to create, correct, and reforme the Magistrates, as a most necessary thing: which au­thority being taken out of their hands, they must needs become thrals, and enemies to the state. F He ordained, that none should beare office, but such noble and rich men, as could leuie yearely fiue 4 hundred bushels out of their lands and reuenues, and of the Zeugites, and of them of the third order called knights. The Citizens of the fourth order, were the hirelings and workmen, & they might not be admitted to any Magistrateship.

THE Cittie of Athens was long vexed with ciuill dissention about the gouernment [Page 132] of the Commonweale, and diuided into as many factions and pa [...]tialities, as there were G sundry sorts of lands within the Country of Attica For there were the mountain folke, the inhabitants in the plaine countrey, and the sea men. They of the mountaine ledde a popular life: Contrariwise, they of the plaine, wished that a small number of the grea­test burgesses should haue all the authority in matters of state: and the sea-faring men wishing a meane and mixt gouernement of both, were an impediment, that none of the contrary sides could ouercrow the other. Againe, at the same time the controuersie be­tweene the poore and the rich proceeding from vnequality, was at the hottest point. By which meanes, the Cittie was in most eminent danger, insomuch, that there was no likelihood howe these controuersies could bee compounded and pacified, vnlesse some H Tyrant rose vp, tooke possession of the Monarchie, and made himselfe soueraigne lord. For all the common people were so farre in debt to the richer sort, that either they til­led their lands, and payed them a sixt part of the profites, or borrowed money of them for vsurie vpon the pawne of their proper persons, and when they wanted ability to pay, were adiudged and condemned to their creditors, who possessed and vsed them as thrals and slaues in their houses, or els sold them into strange Countries. There were many that through pouertie were constrained to sell their owne children, hauing no lawe to the contrary, or els to forsake both Cittie and Countrey by reason of the hardnesse and crueltie of the creditors that were vsurers: till at the last diuerse of the actiuest & stron­gest I persons ioyned themselues together, and encouraged one another to suffer this no longer, but rather to chuse some Captaine among them, being an vpright and faithfull man, not onely to deliuer them from captiuitie that were condemned to thraldome and slauerie for want of payment of their debts at the daies appointed, but also to diuide all the [...]erritory new againe, and to alter the wholest [...]te of gouernement. Then the wisest sort of the Cittie considering that only Solon was blamelesse, as hee that tooke no part with the iniquitie and violence of the rich, nor with the neede of the poore, entreated him to vndertake the dealing in the affaires of the Commonweale, for the appeasing and ending of all these partialities. Hee at the first was verie doubtfull to take the K matter vpon him, fearing the couetousnesse of the one sort, and the pride and arrogan­cie of the other. Notwithstanding, at last hee was chosen Prouost, and withall, media­tour and reformer of the Lawes, and of the whole state of the Commonweale, by the good liking and consent of both parties: for the rich liked him well because hee was not needie, and the poore allowed of him because hee was honest and vpright. In which matters hee after guided and behaued himselfe so constantly, that hee neither yeelded for feare of the mightier, nor framed his Lawes to the liking and will of them that had chosen him reformer. Also hee did not cut off the wound at the quicke, nor altered the state in such sort as had beene most expedient. Fearing least if hee had at­tempted L to haue altered and turned the whole gouernement of the Citty vpside down, hee should after haue lacked sufficient power to settle and stablish it in the best forme. Therefore did hee onely alter what hee hoped either by reason to persuade, or by force to make the Cittizens to accept, by matching force and iustice together: yet when they elected him generall reformer of the whole state of the Commonweale, they had not limitted his power and authoritie, but indifferently committed all thinges to his discretion, as the Magistrateships, the publicke assemblies in coun­sell, the voices and suffrages in election of Officers: the iudgements, the body of the Senate, with authoritie and power to determine and limite what possessions euery M of them ought to haue, what number they should bee, and howe long they should stay in office, and to retaine, confirme, or cancell what hee thought good in the old lawes and customes which were in vse and practise. After the establishing of his Lawes, hee authorised them to stand in force for the space of a hundred yeares, and wrote them in rols of wood, which turned within certaine Tables [...], more long then broad, wherein they were kept. Then did hee cause the whole bodie of the [Page 133] A counsell to take a corporall oath, that they should obserue and cause to bee obserued all his lawes from point to point: but particularly also hee caused euery of the Thesmo­thetes (who were certaine Officers of the body of the counsell, that had the keeping of the lawes in speciall charge) to take a solemne oath in the great market place, neere the stone where the publike proclamations are vsually made, with a promise and vow, that if any of them should transgresse one note of the same lawes, he should forfeit and pay to the Temple of Apollo in the Cittie of Delphos, and Image of massie gold, weying as much as himselfe.

B THE counsell in the Areopage, perteineth to the Oligarchie.] The most part of Authors 1 hold opinion, that Solon stablished the court of the Areopages, whereof there seemeth a great testimony, in that Draco in his lawes maketh no mention of the Areopages in any place, but alwaies where he speaketh of murders and death of men, he directeth his speech to the Ephetes, who were criminall Iudges. Notwithstanding, the eight lawe of Solons thirteenth table, saith thus in these proper tearmes: ‘They that were banished or noted of infamie before Solon established his lawes, shall bee restored to their goods and good name, except those that were condemned by sentence of the court of Areo­page, or by the Ephetes, or by the kings, in the place of audience of the pallace, and in C the towne-house, for murder and death of men, or for aspiring to vsurpe tyrannie.’ These words seeme to proue, that the court of Areopage was erected before Solon was cho­sen reformer of the Lawes. For how could any offenders haue been condemned by sen­tence of the court of Areopage before Solons time, if Solon were the first that gaue it authoritie to iudge of matters? Except they will say, that the letter of the law which is darke must be holpen, and somewhat supplied therein that wanteth, by giuing such in­terpretation as followeth vnto it, to wit, They that shall bee attainted and conuict of any matter whereof the court of Areopage, the Ephetes, or gouernours of the Cit­tie haue the hearing and determination, vpon the publishing of this lawe, shall remaine D condemned, and all others shall bee released and restored. This Court and Counsell of Areopage was composed of them that are yeerely chosen Prouosts of the Cittie: Of the which number, Solon himselfe was. But when hee perceiued how the people were fierce and bold, by reason they felt themselues discharged of their debts, he erected ano­ther second counsell for matters of state, chusing a hundred men of euery tribe, foure of the which had the charge to consult and debate of matters, before they were deliue­red to the people, to the end, that vpon the assemblie of the great counsel, there should no matter be put forth that had not been first well debated and considered in this coun­sell of foure hundred. Further, he ordained that the soueraine court should haue an eye E and ouersight in all thinges, specially concerning the maintenance, obseruation, and keeping of the lawes: [...]eeming that the Commonweale being stayed with these two courts, as it were with two strong ancres, should bee lesse beaten vpon and lesse tor­mented, and that the common people would thereby, bee the more peaceable and quiet.

EPHIALTES and Perycles brake the lims of the counsell of Areopage.] When Pery­cles 2 had in short space woon the good will of the common people, with distributing vnto them the money of the Commonweale, as well to haue place to see the playes, as for salary to assist in iudgements: and by other like corruptions, hee afterwards serued F his turne with them against the court of Areopage, of the body whereof he was neuer any member: because the lot had fallen at no time vnto him, to bee neither yeerely Pro­uost nor Guardant of the Lawes, nor King of the sacrifices, nor maister of the Warres: which were Officers, that of olde time were created by lots, and they [...]o whom the lot fell, and which behaued themselues vprightly in the execution of their Offices, were preferred by course to be of the bodie of the Areopages. Then Pericles hauing by this means purchased great credite and authoritie with the common people, so encombred [Page 134] this court of Areopage, that hee caused the hearing and determination of many mat­ters G to be taken from them, and through the helpe and entermedling of Ephialtes, pro­cured the banishment of Cymon, as fauouring the Lacedemonians, and contrarying the welfare and authoritie of the people, although hee were one of the richest and no­blest men of all the Cittie, and had gotten many glorious victories, and filled the Citty of Athens with the spoile of their enemies. Plutarke in the life of Pericles, who writeth in that same place of Ephialtes as ensueth: The Orator Ephialtes being feared and stood in awe of by that side which tooke part with the Nobilitie, because hee pardoned none that in any matter whatsoeuer had offended the authority of the people, but pursued & persecuted them to the vttermost with all rigour, his enemies lay in wait for him by the H helpe and setting on of Aristodice the Tanagrian, and slew him by treason.

3 SO farre, that they haue brought the Commonweale into that forme of Democratie wherin it now remaineth.] Plutarke in the life of Cymon writeth, That as long as he was in the Cittie, he alwaies bridled and kept vnder the ouerlustinesse of the people, that inuaded the authoritie of the honest and vpright men, and drew into their hands the souerainty of power and rule: But as soon as he was gone into the warres, the common sort hauing no body to gainesay their doings, ouerturned the whole gouernement of the Towne, and confounded all the auncient Lawes and customes which they had vsed at all times, and that by the prouocation and practise of Ephialtes. For they tooke the hearing and I determination welneere of all causes away from the court of Areopage: and by com­mitting all the authority of the iudgements into the hands of the people, brought the state of the Cittie into a very Democratie, when Perycles was growne into great cre­ [...]ite who fauoured the communalties side.

4 HE ordeined, that none should beare office, but such noble and rich men as could leuie yearely fiue hundred bushels.] Solon determining that Offices and Magistrateships should re­maine in the [...]ands of rich Cittizens, as they were, and to mingle the authority of go­uernement in such sort, that the common people should be interessed to a part therein, which prerogatiue they had not aforetime, he made a generall valuation of the possessi­ons K of euery particular Cittizen, and of them that were found to haue yeerely reuenue to the value of fiue hundred bushels and aboue, as wel in corne, as liquid fruits, he made the first order or degree: and them that had to the value of three hundred bushels yeer­ly, and were able to find and maintaine a horse of seruice, he placed in the second ranke or degree, and called them knights: and they that had but the value of two hundred bushels yeerely, were placed in the third order, and called Zeugites. All the rest that were vnder these rates, were called Thetes, as a man would say, hirelings or handicrafts men, liuing of the sweat of their browes, who were not admitted to haue or exercise a­ny publicke office, nor to enioy the right of burges [...]ie or freedome, sauing in hauing L voyces in elections and assemblies of the Towne, and in iudgements, wherein the peo­ple had the soueraigne iudgements. This at the first seemed nothing, but after it was found by experience to bee a great matter, for that the most part of sutes and contro­uersies betweene particular parties came in the end before the people: For in all mat­ters the hearing and determination whereof appertained to the Officers, hee allowed all men that found themselues greeued with their iudgements, to make their appeales before the people. And that more is, for that his Lawes were darkely written, so as they might bee wrested to diuerse fences, it greatlie augmented the authoritie and power of the iudgements, and of them that were to giue sentence: because M that when their controuersies could not bee ended and accorded by the expresse deciding of the Lawe, recourse must needs bee had to the Iudges, before whome welneere all questions were debated: so that the Iudges by those meanes came to bee after a [...]ort aboue the Lawes, by reason they vsed such interpretation in them as they pleased.

[Page 135] A SO Zaleucus to the Locrians and Epizephyriens, and Charondas of Catania to his Citizens 1.2 and other Townes of Chalcis, which are in Italy and Scicily, were Lawgiuers. Some men affirme, that Onomacritus was the first that had skill to make lawes, and that hee being of Locres, and dwelling in Crete, exercised himselfe in this faculty, at what time hee professed southsaying: Tha­les had been his scholler, Lycurgus and Zaleucus were hearers of Thales: and Charondas, of Za­leucus. But the affirmers hereof make no right computation of the times. Likewise, Philolas the Corinthian was Lawgiuer to the Thebans. This Philolas was of the race of the Bacchians, 3 and fell in loue with Diocles, that woon the best game at the playes of Olimpus. And forasmuch B as this Diocles, abhorring and detesting the loue of Alcione his owne mother, had [...]orsaken his owne Towne, he followed him to Thebes, where they both died. At this day their sepulchres are to bee shewed in the view one of another: Howbeit, in such sort, that the one may be seen of Corinth, and the other not. And they report, that this buriall was thus foreappointed by them, to wit, by Diocles, because he would not be seene of Corinth, in despite of his misfortune, and by Philolas to the contrary, for that hee would bee seene. Well, they dwelt vpon this occasion amongst the The­banes, to whome Philolas gaue lawes in diuerse things, and specially concerning the generation of children. Which lawes they called positiue lawes, and prouided specially, that the number of inhe­ritances 4.5 should bee maintained. Charondas hath limitted nothing specially, but iudgements a­gainst C false witnesses, and was the first that made a law in that behalfe. Further, he is more dili­gent and more exquisit in his laws, then the lawgiuers of this age. Philolas hath proper to himself the inequality of possessions: Plato to himselfe the community of women, children, and goods, and the meetings of women at meat and meales: And further, the lawe touching drunkennesse, and that maisters of feasts should be sober: Also martiall exercises, and the practise to doe good with both hands, as if it were an vnseemely thing, that one hand should bee profitable, and the other vnprofitable. Moreouer, there bee certaine lawes of Draco found, that hee made for the Com­monweale 6 after it was stablished: and hath nothing proper to himselfe that is greatly worth the remembring, sauing rigour in the greatnesse of punishment. Pyttacus was a Law-maker, but no 7 D founder of a Commonweale: and there is one law proper vnto him, That if drunkards fight, they shall bee condemned to greater punishment then if they were sober: For sith they offend more when they bee drunke then when they bee sober, hee hath not so much regarded the giuing of pardon to the drunkard, as the doing of good. Further, Androdamas of Rhegium gaue lawes 8.9 to the people of Chalcis in Thrace touching manslaughter, and Damosels that were Orphans 10 and heires to their parents: But nothing can bee alleadged as proper to him. It shall therefore suffice to haue thus discoursed of the cheefe Commonweales, and those that haue beene put in wri­ting by diuerse men.

E Caele Rodigin, de Antiq. lectionibus, lib. 10. cap. 19. maketh mention of many olde Law­giuers.

Zaleucus.] Hee was so seuere a Lawgiuer, that when his owne sonne had offended a 1 law that hee had made concerning adultery, of such effect, that whosoeuer should bee conuict thereof, should lose both his eyes: for the maintenance of the authoritie of the Lawe, caused one of his owne eyes, and another of his sonnes to bee plucked out.

CHARONDE or Charondas.] Valerius the great in his 6. booke and 5. chapter, and 2 F Diodorus the Sicilian, in the 12. book of his library, make mention of Zaleucus & Cha­rondas, and Cicero in his 2. booke of lawes, affirming that they haue not written lawes for pleasure as Plato did, but for the Commonweales sake. Stobeus the Greeke gathe­rer of common places, rehearseth certaine proemes of the lawes of Zaleucus.

OF the race of the Bacchians.] It was a most noble race in Corinthe, fetching their 3 pedigree from Bacchus, whereof it had the name, as the Heraclyans of Her­cules,

[Page 136] 4 WHICH lawes, they called positiue lawes, [...].] As being the principall grounds of G the Commonweale. For [...] sometime signifieth a foundation. The Lawyers call a po­sitiue law, the ciuil law, which is altered and changed according to countries: contrary to the law of nature, which euermore continueth the selfesame; and the Lawes positiue, which vary according to circumstances.

5 THAT the number of inheritances should be maintained.] That they should not bee di­uided amongst Coheres, but remaine wholly to the eldest, or best liked or dutifullest of the children, for that the number of the said inheritances doth not increase by the diuiding of the same.

6 Draco.] This man, a great while after the establishing of the Commonweale of A­thens, H gaue to the Athenians most rigorous Lawes, punishing all offences, yea euen the least with death, so that an Oratour of Athens named Demadas, saied: That Draco had written his lawes with bloud, and not with inke. Vpon which occasion of seueritie and sharpenesse, Solon repealed and abolished them all, sauing those that concerne murders.

7 Pyttacus.] Was of Methelin in the Isle of Lesbos, reckoned for one of the seuen wise men of Greece. Who after hee had possessed the dominion of his Cittie by the space of tenne yeares (his Cittizens offering and yeelding it into his hands) and had gi­uen them lawes, gaue it vp of his owne accord and good will, contenting himselfe with I a little, saying that, Halfe was more then the whole: as is alleadged by Diogenes Laerti­us in his booke of the liues of Philosophers.

8 AS the doing of good.] To terrifie other persons from drunkennesse, through the sharpenesse of the punishment.

9 OF Rhegium.] Rhegium a Cittie of Italy, scituate in the straits of Scicilie, ouer a­gainst Messana. It is a verie auncient Towne, retayning her olde name at this day.

10 CHALCIS in Thrace.] Chalcis a Cittie builded vpon the hill of Athos in Thrace, according to the old extent of the Countrey. For by others it is attributed to Macedo­nia. K Pomponius Mela appointeth Thrace to stretch from the sea of Pontus, euen to Ily­ria or Sclauonia.

E

CHAP. I. Of a Citie, and of a Citizen.

WHo so vndertaketh to treat of a Commonweale, and to shew what euery Commonweale is, and of what quality and sort; ought first to haue con­sideration of a Citie, to the end, it may be vnderstood what a Citie is: F for in these daies there riseth a doubt thereabouts. When diuerse men say the Citie hath done some act, and others say, not the citie, but the Oligarchie, or the Tyrant hath done it. Nowe wee see that the whole charge and businesse of a politicke man, or of a Lawgiuer, doth consist in a citie, and that the forme of gouernment of a citie, is the order of the inhabitants of the same. Sith therefore a citie is a thing compounded, and consisting of di­uerse parts, as any other whole thing; we will first speake of a Citizen. For whereas a citie is a [Page 138] multitude of Citizens, it is expedient to learne, who ought to bee called a Citizen, and who is a G right Citizen, for as much as often that matter commeth into question, by reason all men doe not vnderstand it after one sort. For many times hee that is a Citizen in the Democrati [...], or po­pular state, is not a Citizen in the Oligarchie. Wherefore for bearing to speake of them that other­wise purchase this name, of which number are those that be made Denisons, or obtaine their ad­mission by way of redēption: The Citizen is not called a Citizen in respect of habitation, which is common to strangers, and bondslaues: neither ought they to be taken for Citizens, which haue liberty to plead their causes, so as they may sue, and bee sued, as all they may that bargaine and trafficke with Citizens: yet in some places, that liberty is not wholly graunted to strangers, but they are driuen to retaine a patrone or assistant. Where therefore that kind of libertie is not per­fectly H graunted vnto them, they ought not to bee called Citizens absolutely, but after a certaine 1 sort: as children, who by reason of their age are not yet enrolled, and olde men exempted from publicke charges and offices, whome wee call not Citizens simply, but with some addition, tear­ [...]ing the one sort vnperfect, and the other passed their time, or dismissed, or els doe giue vnto thē some such other tearme. It is not materiall how, so it be vnderstood what wee say: For wee seeke for the right and true Citizen, that may not bee reiected or put off by meanes of any such excep­tion, because it is an easie matter to make the like obiections and reputations, touching infamous and banished persons. But the true and right Citizen, cannot bee defined more properly than by hauing interest and participating in the publicke power and authoritie of iudging, and of bea­ring I the office of Magistrateship in his City. Of Magistrateships, some bee limitted and de­fined by time, insomuch, that it is not lawfull for one man to obtaine them twice, at least, ex­cept there bee some space limitted and passed betweene both times. The others bee without limitation, as the Iudge and Counseller: Peraduenture it will be obiected, that they are no Ma­gistrates, though it bee ridiculous, and contrary to reason to say they haue no interest in the Ma­gistrateship, who bee of most authority. But let vs not stand on this, sith the question is but about the bare name. For the charge which is common to the Iudge and Counsellor hath no name, nei­ther is there any word fit [...]or them both. Therefore for distinctions sake, wee will call it the indefi­nite Magistrateship. Herevpon wee ordaine and limit them for Citizens that haue this interest K and participation: wherefore that definition of a Citizen, which may most fitly bee applied to all them that are called Citizens, is almost of this sort: notwithstanding, we should not bee ignorant, that in those things wherein subiects differ in part or degree, and the one is first, the other second, another after, there is little or no community or fellowship at all amongst them, as they be of that kind & sort. As for Commonweales, they also differ in kind from each other [...] for some be later, & othersome former: because those that be corrupted and marred, and haue transgressed and tur­ned out of the right way, ought necessarily to be later then those that doe remaine in their perfe­ction, and haue not transgressed: wee will declare hereafter what wee meane by them that haue transgressed. Forasmuch therefore as the Citizen differeth according to euery Commonweale, L it followeth that the Citizen aforelimitted is cheefly in the Democratie, or popular state: yet may hee bee also in other Commonweales, but that is not of necessitie: for in some of them, the people hath no such authority, neither is there any vse of publicke assemblies: but the Senatours serue the turne, and decide causes seuerally. As in Lacedemon, the Ephores or controullers doe heare and determine contracts and bargaines, and other Magistrates other matters: the Senatours manslaughters, and peraduenture euery Magistrate some seuerall matter. The like order is in Carthage, where certaine Magistrates decide all causes. But the definition of a Citi­zen dooth receiue correction, because in other Commonweales the authoritie of the iudge and Counsellor, is not indefinite and without limitation, but definite and limitted according to the M Magistrateship. For it is graunted to all or some of them, to deliberate, to counsell, and to iudge, either of all, or certaine affaires. It appeareth now by the premisses, who is a Citizen: For who so hath meane to come to the authoritie of counselling and iudging: him say wee to bee al­readie a Citizen of this Citie: and a Citie, to speake simply; I call such a multitude of those Citizens, as is sufficient to liue of it selfe. Some men hauing an eye to custome, doe define him for a Citizen that is borne of father and mother, that be Citizens; and not of one Citizen alone, [Page 139] A as of the father, or of the mother, othersome seeke higher, as to two or three Grandfathers, or mo degrees. Vpon the deciding of these things in this manner politickly and brie [...]ely, some men doubt of this third and fourth kinde, how they shall be called a Citizen. Gorgias the Leontine, partly doubting and partly scoffing, said, that like as morters be made by their workemen, so the Laryssyans were made by their ingendrers, and that there were some makers of Laryssyans. But this is too fond and grossely spoken, for if they communicated of the commonweale in the manner a [...]orementioned, they should be Citizens. But they being borne of a father that is a Citi­zen, or of a mother, cannot be applied to the first inhabitants or founders of a Citie: but the greatest doubt is about them that haue bene admitted by reason of any alteration and change B that hath happened in a Cittie: as Clisthenes did at Athens, after he had driuen out the tyrans. 2 For he receiued many strangers and bondmen into the tribes, of whome it may be doub [...]ed, not which of them is a citizen, but whether they be made citizens vniustly. Wherein it may also be doubted, whether who so is not iustly a citizen, be not a citizen, as if vniust and false were all one. But forasmuch as we see some personages behaue themselues vniustly in Magistrateships, whome neuertheles we call Magistrates, and yet not iustly: and for that a Citizen is defined in regard of some Magistrateship (sith he to whome the Magistrateship may be imparted, is called a citi­zen as hath bene declared) doubtles these men also ought to be called citizens, whether it be iustly or vniustly, that is to be referred to the former question, where it is demaunded whether a Citie C hath done or not done any thing, as when it is changed from an Oligarchie or tyranny into a De­mocra [...]ye: for then will not some men keepe the former couenants, as though they were not made by the Citie, but by a Tyrant, nor obserue diuers other matters, as though some commonweales consisted rather by force and violence, than by the publique benefit and commoditie. If then some men do thus demeane themselues in the popular state, it must needes be said that the acts of such a Citie are no otherwise publique, than if they were of an oligarchie and a tyrannye.

Heere is the very entrance and beginning of the discourse touching the matter of gouernment. For the attaining whereof, it is needefull to know aforehand, what a po­licie D or commonweale is: And sith that is the order and very life of a Citie, we must also learne what a Citie is. And sith a Citie is a multitude of Citizens, and it is m [...]eter to speake of the parts rather than the whole, he first of all intreateth of a Citizen, who though he differ according to the diuersities of commonweales, yet taking him pro­perly, it is he that hath right to iudge in his Citie, and a voyce in deliberations in the generall or common counsell of the same. Aristotle calleth each charge an indefinite Citie magist [...]ateship: and a Citie, the multitude of men, to whome the commonweale is thus communicated, hauing plentie of all things as well necessarye as commodious. Which definition of a citizen cannot well be applied to all the citizens of all cities, but E to those that haue a popular gouernement, wherein they being equall, are gouerned by assemblies, where euery of them hath libertie to say his opinion. Two other defini­tions of a citizen are reiected: the one, that a citizen is who so is borne both of father and mother that be citizens: the other that a citizen is who so is engendred of father and mother being citizens, whose grandfather, great grandfather, and other aunce­stors haue bene citizens. Also two doubts are resolued, the one touching them that are newly admitted and made citizens at any alteration in a state, whether they be iustly or vniustly created. The other whether who so is vniustly made a citizen, ought to be accoumpted a citizen. The whole conclusion is, that who soeuer in any maner F of gouernement whatsoeuer may beare office & exercise any Magistrateship, is accoun­ted a Citizen, as the naturall Frenchmen be in the realme of France, of whome there is none so mean, of how base degree soeuer he be, but he may be aduanced to worship and honor for his valliancy, or be preferred to the cheefest ecclesiasticall dignities, or to the highest offices of iustice or of the princes reuenues by his skilfulnesse & vncorrupt be­hauiour, as hath ben declared in the first booke. In truth the [...]e be no citizens at Venice, but the lords or signiours, who onely enioy the Magistrateships of the Cōmonweale, [Page 140] and a [...]e admitted into the high counsell at the age of fiue and twenty yeares, the com­mon G people being not admitted to any matter concerning the gouernment, sauing Se­cretariships, and Chauncellorships, as appeareth in Contarines first booke of the Ve­netian Commonweale. As Rome was not alwaies gouerned after one sort, so was not the name of a Cittizen alwayes taken in one sence: For while the first kings had the do­minion, the common people were clearely shut out from all honours and Magistrate­ships; but after the kingly State was once changed into a Commonweale, the people were admitted to the Magistrateships, and ordering of publicke affaires, and to bee as­sistant in the publicke assemblies that were made in the field of Mars, and in Tribes, Courts, Orders, and Censuries, for the deliberating and consulting of the affaires of H the Commonweale by voices and suffrages, for the creating of Magistrates, and for the ordaining of new Lawes; where hee was accounted for a right Cittizen that was free, hauing a family and tribe, with power to attaine to any degree of worship and honour, and enioying many priueledges and prerogatiues. But after the dominion was once vsurped by the Emperours, those publicke assemblies were onely continued vnder Iu­lius Caesar, and Octauius Augustus, and after abrogated by Tyberias, who tooke from the people the authoritie of intermedling in publicke affaires, and transferred it to the Senate, and to the absolute power of the Prince, as appeareth in Sigonius his booke of the auncient law of the Cittizens of Rome, and in Gruchius his booke of the publicke I assemblies of the Romanes.

1 AS children, who by reason of their age, are not yet enroulled.] This was the order at Rome, that euery one of the Cittizens children within three daies after their births and namings, were carried to the Temple of Saturne, where the treasure and receit of the reuenues of the Commonweale was kept: At which place the childrens names were registred in the records of the maisters and disposers of the treasure, by which meanes, euery childs age, and the number of children was knowne, and this was called the pro­fession of children. No child was accounted for a man, vntill hee came to the age of se­uenteene K yeares, that he left wearing a childs gowne, and tooke on him mans garment. At Venice all the young men descending from the order of the Senatours and Noble­men, and being aboue the age of twenty yeares, vse to resort to the Magistrates called the Aduocators, to whome the guardiance and defence of the lawes is cheefly commit­ted: before which Magistrates, they must come with their father or mother: if the fa­ther be dead, then with the next of their kin: if the father and mother be deceased, then with two witnesses of good credite, and proue that they are borne of lawfull marriage, and of a mother both godly and honest. The witnesses take an oath, that they know it to be so by the testimony of many folke, whom they knowe. This being done, the father or L mother, or next of kin (if the young man haue neither father nor mother) declare vpon their oaths, that the yong man is aboue the age of twenty yeares. All this being written in a common booke by the secretary of the Magistrate, they stay for the fourth day of December, at which day the names of all these young men that through the benefite of the lot haue not obtained the right of a Citizen, nor exceed the age of 25 years, are cast into an earthen pot, or some other like thing, and so brought before the prince & coun­sellers, where the same pot is set by another pot, wherin there be as many lots, as names written in little bils in the other: The fift part of the lots are guilded, & all the rest of sil­uer. The Prince taketh a bill out of the first pot, and straightwaies a lot out of the other: M wherby if it be one of the gilt lots, the yong man, whose name is come out, straightway hath the right of publick authority, & thence forward is receiued into the high counsel. But if it happen to be a siluer lot, he loseth his right for that time, & must tarry another year, except in the mean space he exceed his age of 25 years. For all they that descend of the order of the Senators & noblemen (whom according to the vulgar Italian tongue, wee may call Patricians) as soone as they attaine to that age, haue a Cittizens right, [Page 141] A and are partakers of the publicke power, as appeareth in Contarines first booke of the Venetian Commonweale.

AS Clisthenes did at Athens, after he had driuen out the Tyrans.] After the Atheni­ans 2 were ouercome by the Lacedemonians, in a great batai [...]e, they could by no meanes obtaine peace at their hands, but by receiuing into their Cittie thirty gouernours, who should after beare the name of Athenians: to the end, the Commonweale should of a popular state, become an Oligarchie, as the Lacedemonians endeuoured to bring to passe in all places. Those thirtie gouernours, after they had possession of the state, played the Tyrans, and for that cause were driuen away and banished by Thrasibulus, who in B their steads appointed tenne gouernours of the Commonweale, which tenne, for that they followed the Tyrans steps in crueltie, were in like sort banished. Forasmuch there­fore as by reason of the former warres and rigour of the Tyranor, the Athenians were brought to a small number, they by the counsell and persuasion of Clisthenes, recea­ued many strangers and bondmen into the franchises and liberties of their Citty, who were distributed into Tribes, to the intent, to replenish their Citty with new Cittizens, in stead of them that were wanting.

C

CHAP. II. When anie alteration happeneth in a Cittie, in what case the Cittie shall bee said to remaine: the same that it was before, or otherwise.

D

IT seemeth also a matter pertaining to this question, to consider in wha [...] case a Citie is to be called, the same, or not the same, but another: that is, whether he may be chāged or no. The cheef resolutiō of this doubt consisteth in the place, and in the men. For the place may be seuered, and the men also, & some may dwell in one place, & others in another, which is but a sleight doubt: for in as much as a City is taken and vnderstoode 1 diuerse waies, this question is easie. Likewise, where as men doe inhabite one place, how long and how far a City is to be deemed the same: which is not to bee measured by E the wals, for a wall might be made round, about all Pelops Isle. Such peraduenture is Babilon, and 2 euery other City that is liker a Nation then a towne. For when Babilon was taken by the enemies, it is reported, that one part thereof knewe nothing of the taking till the third day after. Wee will reason hereof in another place more conueniently. For who so is apt to gouerne a City, ought not to be ignorant concerning the greatnesse of the City, both how great it should bee, and whether it be expedient to haue one Nation or moe therein: and whether while the same inhabitants dwell in one place, it is to bee called the same as long as the same kind of gouernement shall last, though one sort incessantly die, and another continually succeed: as we haue accustomed to call floods and riuers the same, and fountaines and springs the same, notwithstanding that euermore one water F commeth and another goeth: or whether shall we call the men the same for such cause, and the towne diuers: for if a City bee a certaine society, and this society is made of Citizens: when the Commonweale falleth into another forme or shape, and becommeth of another stampe, it should seeme necessary, that the city were no more to bee called the same, as wee say, that the quier 3 or Chorus being one while comicall, and another while tragicall, are diuers, though it often con­sist of the selfesame persons, and so of euery other fellowship and composition: as wee say, a har­mony of the same voice is another, when sometimes it goeth after the Dorian manner, [Page 142] and nowe and then after the Phrygyan fashion. If it bee thus, it appeareth that a Citie is to be cal­led G the same, in respect of the Commonweale, and that it may bee called by another name, or the same, whilest the same inhabitants remain in it, or altogether others that are diuerse from them: but whether it bee lawfull and meet or no, when the forme of a City is wholly changed, to pay or not to pay our debts, it belongeth to another place to discusse of.

Aristotle taking occasion vpon the propounded question, (to wit, whether the forme of gouernment being changed, a man is bound to obserue the bargaines and couenants which were contracted before) discourseth howe a Citty when any change or altera­tion happeneth vnto it ought to be esteemed, one and the same, or another and diuerse: H for if the change be made onely of the place and scituation, the Towne indeed becom­meth diuerse, but the Citty remaineth the same. As Pompey at the beginning of the ci­uill warre, being retired out of Italy, saied that there was Rome, where the Senate was, and not where the wals were. And during the time that Camillus dwelt at Veyes, it was generally said, that Rome was there also; as if there had not been any change, but of the place onely and habitation, which is changed oftentimes for many and sundrie causes: as wee see how Rome and Lions are nowe built by the riuers sides, which in olde time stood vpon high places, and Ierusalem stands in another place nowe, then it was woont to doe. If the change bee made of men alone, who all in a hundred yeares space die and I passe away: neuerthelesse, seeing that some thus dying, others still are borne to succeed in their places, the Towne retayning the same forme of gouernement, the Citty also re­maineth one and the same: as the kingdome of Fraunce, and signory of Venice haue continued already eleuen hundred yeares in the same state of policy, albeit the French and Venetian Cittizens haue in this long space ben infinitely changed: after the simili­tude of riuers, which are alwaies the same riuers, although the water is neuer the same, but one runneth away, and other succeedeth in the roome. But when the forme of poli­cie and gouernment of a Commonweale is changed, then becommeth the Citty ano­ther then it was, as not long agoe the signorie of Florence is chaunged into a Duchie, K the kingdome of Rome into a Commonweale, properly called, and this againe into an Empire. And thus a Cittie may continue one, and the same, though the Towne bee re­moued, ruined, or subuerted: as the Empire of Rome was the same Empire still, euen then when the seat of it was translated from Rome to Constantinople, or when the Ci­tie of houses and wals was destroyed by the Gothes and Vandales. On the contrary, a Towne may be called by the same name, and be the same indeed, though the Cittizens be changed, and the forme of gouernment quite altered: as may bee said of Constanti­nople, out of which the Grecians were driuen and banished by the Turkes, who also haue changed the forme of the Empire. Censorius the Romane Consull declaring to L the Carthaginians the decree of the Romane Senat concerning the pulling downe and euerting their Citty, and that they should build and erect another in some place eighty furlongs from the sea, said vnto them: That hee did not thinke that the place where the Citty stood was Carthage, but the people: as reporteth Appian Alexander in his book intituled Libic. cap. 9.

1 FOR in as much as a Citie is taken and vnderstood diuerse waies, [...].] This word [...] in Greeke signifieth sometimes the place, wals, and buil­dings of a Cittie, sometimes a Cittie it selfe, that is to say, A companie of men associa­ted M and gathered together by right and equitie. Plutarke in his Treatise of the three formes of gouernement: from whence is deriued [...], that is, a policie or Com­monweale. Cicero de Deuinat. lib. 1. Looke what Socrates saith in the Politicke of Plato, [...], that is, Politicke, or belonging to a Cittie. Cicero De finibus, lib. 5. sayth thus: As a man hath engrafted in him by nature, I know not what seed of ciuility and populari­ty, which the Greekes call Politicall. In his book De Oratore, lib. 3. thus: In time past Phi­losophers [Page 143] A for their excellent knowledge in great matters, were called by the Greekes Politicians, comprehending vniuersally in that word, all manner of Commonweales In his familiar Epistles thus: Your bookes touching policie, are in all mens hands. And At­ticus thus: Would I were able to make some politicke worke in this calamity of the Commonweale, [...], that is, to be conuersant & occupied in Commonweales, or to gouerne Citties. Demosthenes in his Oration De corona, or of the Crowne, vseth it so, [...]. And Aristotle in his Pol. lib. 7. [...]. And in the fourth Chapter of this third booke. [...]. B This word Policy is deriued from those Greeke words, which in French is most vsually taken for feasting of victuals, & ordering of trades & occupations by the Iudges or Sherifs of the citty, confounding in one the name of policie and publicke dispensation. In like manner, the Latine word ciuitas, is not onely taken for a Towne or Cittie, wherein some Arch-bishop or Bishop keepe their seat, as Ecclesiasticall persons vsurpe the same, but for signorie or publik go­uernment, or for an assemblie of men, subiect to the same lawes and Magistrates. Cice­ro De somnio Scipiones, or Scipioes dreame, hath this saying: Nihil est illi principi deo, &c. That is, Nothing that is done vpon earth, is more acceptable and pleasant to the chee­fest C God, then companies and societies of men coupled together by law, which are cal­led Cities. And in his Oration for P. Sestius: Quis ignorat ita naturam rerum tulisse, vt quodam tempore, &c. Who doth not knowe (sayeth hee) that such was sometimes the ne­cessitie of nature, that men in former times did wander vp and downe scattered and dis­persed in the fieldes, no naturall nor ciuill lawe being as then described: and that they possessed no more as their owne, but that which they could take away and keepe by strength and violence, or by slaughter and wounds? They therefore which first excelled in any eminent wisedome and vertue, perceiuing the docility and capacitie of mans na­ture, gathered togither these scattered people, and from that inciuilitie and sauagenesse, D translated to a kind of iustice, and ciuill courtesie. Then hauing found out both the di­uine and humane lawes, did they first enuiron with wals both those things which con­tained any common commodity, and also the conuenticles of men, and houses that were ioyned togither. All which they called by the name of Cities. Caesar in his French Commentaries, lib. 1. sayeth thus: Euery Cittie of the Heluetians is deuided into foure boroughes. Also in the beginning of the fourth booke hee sayeth: That the Nations of the Swissers had a hundred boroughes or Townes. Also in the seuenth, That there was one Cittie of the Hedurans which prolonged and hindered the certaine victory of all Fraunce, and that by the authority of it the other Citties were vpholden in authority, E being deriued vnto them, there would remaine no footing for the Romanes in Fraunce. Also in his booke of ciuil warres, Lib. 1. Principes vero, &c. Cn Pompey, and Iulius Cae­sar were the cheefest Captaines of those factions, being both patrones of the Citty, one of whom had publickely graunted vnto it the possessions of the Volcans, Atrecomians, and Iluans: the other had bestowed on it the French Nation, being conquered: and aug­mented their tributes. Titus Liuius Lib. 10. Decad. 3. Nulla magna, &c. No great Cittie can endure long in quiet and tranquility: if it haue no enemy abroad, it shall find some at home.

Babilon.] This beautifull Citty was in olde time reckoned amongst the seuen mira­cles 2 F and wonders of the world, the beauty, bignesse, and mightinesse whereof, is descri­bed by Herodotus, lib. 1. Diodor. Sicil. lib. 2. Iustine lib. 2. Quintus Curtius. lib. 5. Plinius, lib. 6. cap. 26. Strabor, lib. 6. Paul. Orosius, lib. 2. and is much renowmed in many places of the old Testament.

AS we say, that the quier or chorus, being one while comicall, and another while tragicall.] 3 The word Chorus, which we translate quier, signifieth a company of many persons tal­king, singing, or dauncing together, which the ancient Poets vsed whē they represented [Page 144] to the people comedies or tragedies at euery pause and change of persons, and hereof G remained a certaine similitude in temples, wherevpon the place where men vse to sing and also the company of singing men, is called in Latine Chorus, and in English a quier. Now euen as a tragedie and a comedie did differ, the one being more stately, and the o­ther more light: so also did tragicall and comical quiers, which might notwithstanding be sung by one and the same persons: the form notwithstanding which giueth perfecti­on vnto things, being diuerse and different.

H

CHAP. III. Whether the vertue that belongeth to a good man, be the same with that which belon­geth to a good Citizen.

I

AFter the things before mentioned, it followeth consequently that we consider, whether the vertue of a good man and a good Citizen bee one, and the same or no: that is, whether to be a good man is to bee a good Citizen: for the vnderstanding whereof, it is meet first to consider summarily what is the vertue that belongeth to a Citizen. Therefore as a Mariner is one of the fellowship and societie of nauigatours, so a Citi­zen is one of the fellowship and society of ciuill gouernment. Now, albeit that Mariners haue vnlike offices and charges, one drawing at the oare, another holding the K sterne, and another gouerning the foredecke, or doing some such like work: yet it is manifest, that the perfect definition of euery of them, is to be proper and peculier to his own vertue: and in like manner, there must bee a common definition fitting to them all: for the safety and suretie of say­ling, is that which belongeth to them all: For this euery Mariner aimeth at, as the cheefe end. In like manner, though the offices of Citizens be vnlike and diuerse, yet the preseruation of ciuill community, belongeth to all. And this community is a Commonweale: wherefore the vertue of a Citizen must needs be referred to the Commonweale. If therefore there bee many kinds of Com­monweales, then surely there cannot be one perfect vertue of a good Citizen, but a good man is he that is endued with perfect vertue, whence it appeareth euidently, that there may be a good Citi­zen, L in whom is not found that vertue which is required in a good man. Notwithstanding, a man may in doubting manner, otherwise apply this reason, taken from a perfect Commonweale. For if it be impossible that a City should consist of all good men, and if euery one ought to doe his duty in his place vertuously, (for that is vertue to doe ones duty) and againe, if all Citizens cannot bee alike; then it followeth, that the vertue of a good Citizen and of a good man cannot be all one: for the vertue of a good Citizen must be in euery one, for so the reason of a good and perfect City requireth: but the vertue of a good man cannot bee in euery one, except it bee necessary, that all the Citizens of a city be good, which can no wise bee. Moreouer, seeing that a city consisteth of vnlike persons: for example, as a liuing creature, of a body and a soule; and the soule, of reason M and appetite: and as a family consisteth of a man and a woman, and possession of a maister and a seruant, after the same manner a City is compounded both of all these, and also of many other vn­like kinds: it is impossible that the same vertue should appertaine to all Citizens, no more then in dauncing, the same vertue belongeth to him that leadeth the daunce, and him that followeth. Therefore simply that the same vertue is not of euery good Citizen and good man, it is euident by this: but whether it may be in some perticular Citizen and man, let vs now consider. We vse [Page 145] A to say in common speech, that a good ruler and commander is a good and wise man: and some hold that the institution of a prince and ruler [...] ought to differ from that of priuate men, as it is to bee seene in kings children, which are brought vp and exercised in the art of horse-manship & war­fare: and Euripides saieth: Giue not to mee these glorious things, but those which the City hath need of: as if there were a peculier discipline for the Prince. But if there the vertue of a good Prince or Magistrate, and of a good man bee the same; and hee which is a subiect, is a Citizen also as well as they, it shall not simply be the same of euery one, but of some onely, because the vertue of a Magistrate and a Citizen do differ. And therfore it may be, Iason said that he was vexed when [...]e reigned not, as if he knew not how to lead a priuate life: and yet neuerthelesse it is commenda­ble B to bee able both to rule and to obey well, and it is a vertue in a good Citizen also: If therefore we consider the vertue of a good commander alone, and the vertue of him that knoweth both to cōmand & obey together, surely both these cannot deserue equal commendation. But because some­times it seemeth that both these ought to bee, namely, that the commander and obeyer ought not to learne both the same ver [...]ues, and that the Citizen ought to know both howe to command and obey, & to enioy them in common, we shall vnderstand concerning this, by that which followeth, what is requisite: for there is a signoriall or maisterly gouernment, and it is not needfull for him which holdeth the same, to know howe to doe things which are called necessary, but rather how to vse them. Another thing also belongeth to the bondslaues, namely to performe seruile workes, & C to be a minister of base trades. Now we say that there are many sorts of slaues, as there are many kinds of seruile workes: in which ranke, all handicraft men are reckoned, that is to say, such as labour with their hands to get their liuing as their name importeth, and with these all base and illiberall artificers. Wherefore in auncient times these kind of people were not pertakers of bea­ring any publicke office, before that licentious Democratie and sway of the people began to pre­uaile. Therefore a good man or a good Citizen ought not to learne nor meddle with such kinde of trades of people so much in subiection, except for their owne particuler vse and practise: for if they should, then there would be no difference betweene the maister and the slaue. Againe, there 1 is another kind of gouernment, by the which, he that is in authority commandeth ouer his like in D nature, and ouer free men: which gouernment we call Politicall, which a man ought to learne by obeying: Euen as a souldior learneth to lead a troupe of horsemen, by seruing vnder a gen [...]rall of horsemen, and to be a Centurion or a Corporall, by seruing a captaine of footmen. For which cause it is well said, that he can neuer command well, which hath not first learnt to obey well: but the vertue belonging to both these, is diuerse, and a good Citizen must know and bee able both to obey and to command: and it is the vertue of a Citizen to knowe well to demeane himselfe in both: consequently also both these belong vnto a good man, although I confesse the iustice and temperance of him that commandeth, is of another stampe then the iustice and temperance of him [...]hat obeyeth: for the vertue of a subiect being free, cannot be the same with the vertue of a E good man, as iustice for example, but must needs be of two sorts, one of commanding, the other of obeying. Euen as the temperance and fortitude of a man and women doe differ: for a man would be accounted a coward, if he were but so valiant, as the valiantest woman is, and a woman would be accounted a pratler, if shee were but so modest, as an honest and the modestest man may be. Considerng also that the husbandry and [...]uswifery of man and woman are not all one, for it is his office to get and bring in, and hers to keepe and lay vp. So also wisdome is a vertue proper to the commander, all other vertues are common both to commaunders and obeyers: but wisdome belongeth not to an obeyer, but only a true opinion: for he that is in subiectiō, is like vnto a maker of pipes, and he that is in authority, like vnto him that playeth on the pipes. By this which hath F ben deliuered, it is easy to know whether the vertue of a good Citizen be all one and the same: & also how they agree & how they differ: but concerning a Citizen, there remaineth one scruple to be discussed, that is, whether in truth he only be to be reputed a Citizen, which is capable of pub­lick office and Magistracy, or whither artificers and mercenarie tradesmen be Citizens also: for if we call them Citizens which are not capable of any office, it cannot be, that the vertue of com­manding should belong to all Citizens: but if none of them be Citizens, in what number or ranke are they to bee placed: not in the number of strangers conuersing with vs, nor of enemies fighting [Page 146] against vs, or it may be no absurdity will arise hereof, seeing that bondslaues, & enfranchised per­sons, G are not counted amongst them which I mentioned: for this is true, that all those are not to be reckoned in the account of Citizens, without which a City cannot consist, for euē children are not Citizens after the same maner as men, for these are simply so, those conditionally & by supposition: Citizens indeed they are, but yet imperfect ones. Therfore also in time past in some places, the mer­cenary artificers & strangers were accounted bondmen, & therefore now many of the cōmon peo­ple are so also, howbeit, a good City wil neuer admit a mercenary & base artificer into the fre [...]dom of it: but if so he be nūbred amongst Citizens, sure the vertue which we spake off before, cannot be­long to all, nor to a free man only, but to thē that abstaine frō necessary workes: nowe of these, they that minister to one in priuate, are seruants, but they that minister to al in publick [...] are mercenary H artificers: but as concerning these things, we shal plainly perceiue how they are, by that which fol­loweth, & it is also manifest by that which hath ben spokē already: for seeing that there are many kinds of Cōmonweales, there must needs be also many kinds of Citizens, especially of obeying Citi­zens, so that necessarily the mechanical artificer & mercenary tradesman must be accounted citi­zens in some Cōmonweale, & yet no Citizens in others: as for example, in an Aristocratie if there be any such, or in that kind wherin honors & offices are distributed according to vertue & digni­ty: for it is impossible for him to exercise the works of vertue, that occupieth a mechanical & mer­cenary trade. In Oligarchies also a mercenary cannot be a citizen, because men are there admitted to Magistracies in regard of their great and large reuenues, albeit that the mechanicall artificer I may attain thereunto, by reason that many such grow very rich. There was a law in Thebes, that no man might be receiued into any office of honor, who had not forsaken the traffick of merchan­dise for the space of 10 yeares. In some Cōmonweales the law admitteth & allureth strangers into the society of citizens: for in some cities where the people bear rule, he that is born of a mother ci­tixen, is accounted a citizen, & the same reason is of bastards in many places, but this is for want of legitimated citizens, that they make such as these are, for the scarcity of men was the occasion of all such laws. But as soon as the city is abundantly peopled, they by & by driue out & cut off by little & little: first, those that are born of both parents seruants, next those that haue their fathers slaues but their mothers citizens, and at last admit none into that society, but those that are free­men K by both parents. We may therfore hereby perceiue, both that there are many sorts of citizens [...] & also that he principally is to be reputed a citizen, that is capable of publick honors and offices: as Homer brings in a certain stranger despised of Achilles, as a man not pertaker of publick honors. Now if such a thing as this be in any respect hidden and concealed, it is to this end, to delude the inhabitants. Whether therefore the same vertue belongeth to a good man & a good citizen, it is plain by this which is said, as also that in some city it is all one, in others not: & that not in euery citizen, but in a politick citizen, who can alone or together with other gouerne the Cōmonweale.

Here a question is propounded whether the vertue of a good cittizen & a good man be one & the same or no: & it is answered that it cannot be the same. First, because there L being many formes of Cōmonweales, it is necessary to fit the vertue of a Citizen to the kind of Commonweale wherein he liueth: so that there cannot be one & the same ver­tue of all citizens in all Cōmonweales. Secondly as a city cannot consist of all good mē, and yet all good citizens must be indued with the ciuil vertue, it seemeth in this respect, that the vertue of a good man & of a good citizen cannot be the same. Further, seeing that a city consisteth of vnlike persons, euen as the vertues of those that are thus vnlike must needs be diuers, so it followeth, that the vertue of all cannot be al alike, notwithstā ­ding, in a good Cōmonweale only, the vertue of thē is but one: for albeit there be a dou­ble vertue required in this also, one to teach men to obey wel, the other to cōmand wel, M which latter is greater & more perfect thē the former, for to obey well, are required for­titude & temperance, euen so the same are necessary to cōmand wel, but yet these diffe­ring frō the other in kind & nature, though the same in name [...] neuerthelesse, a good citi­zen & a good man ought to haue the both, although ech of thē is called properly good, because of that vertue which is most perfect: but amongst all vertues, wisdome is most fit for a cōmander, which is not necessary in an obeyer. This question being thus decided, he returneth to consider of a citizen: & declareth that there are many sorts & kinds ther­of, where he affirmeth that in well gouerned cities, mechanicall Artsmen & mercenary [Page 147] A persons, being vnfit to exercise the workes of vertue, ought not to bee placed and recei­ued into the ranke and order of true citizens: but that only they are to bee so esteemed which are free and honestly brought vp, capable of offices and publicke honours. Con­tarin de Repub. Ve [...]et. lib. 1. Salust in his second Oration to Iulius Caesar, touching the ru­ling and reformation of the Romane commonwealth, Haec igitur multitudo primum ma­lis moribus, &c. that is, Therefore this rude multitude first infected with corrupt man­ners and conditions, and after dispersed into diuers arts and trades of life, and in no re­spect agreeable and at vnitie together, doth not seeme vnto me any thing fit for the rule of the Commonwealth. Herod. lib. 2. affirmeth that the Thracians, Scythians, Persians, B and Lydians, and almost all barbarous nations doe hold Artificers for the vilest and ba­sest sort of people in the world, yea and also their children and whole race: and doe re­pute them most noble and generous, which are farthest from all Mechanicall arts, and especially those which make profession of Arms. All the Graecians are of the same mind and aboue all the Lacedemonians, also the Corinthians make small account of Artifi­cers. In Fraunce Gentlemen are in most account and estimation, who by the ancient ordinance of the countrie are forbidden all commerce of merchandise, and of euery o­ther gainfull Art, vnder paine of being depriued of their gentilitie, and of paying taxe and custome like a common clowne or Carter. Plato also in his 2 & 8 book de Repub [...] and C in the beginning of Timeus, writeth that Gentlemen and Soldiors abstaine from Hus­bandrie and mechanicall trades, and such other gainfull occupations. In old time landes and reuenues were designed and set out in AEgypt for the maintainance of soldiours, to the end that they might wholy addict themselues to the exercise of Arms, without pra­ctising any base Art or Trade. The Alarbians greatly detest Mechanicall arts.

Againe, there is another kind of gouernment by the which he that is in authoritie comman­deth 1 ouer his like in nature, and ouer free men: which gouernment we call Politicall.] Aristotle in the first and fourth chapters of the first booke of this worke sayth, that Politicall go­uernment is amongst free men and equals: amongst whome euery one that is capable D and fit to gouerne, is by lot or election called to the publick honors and Magistratships of his Cōmonweale, for longer or lesser continuance, according to the qualitie of the offices, gouerning and obeying in his place, and by turnes, as the ancient manner was at Athens and at Rome, and now is at Venice, Raguse, Genes, Luke, the free cities of Ger­many, the Cantons of Swisserland, the Grisian league, and at Geneua. In like sort also is the Shrieuewicke of Paris, with the Prouostship of the Merchants. The which officers or administrations are changed frō 2 years to 2 years by election amongst such as be Pa­risiens born by father & mother that be Parisiens also. In the vniuersity amongst the stu­dents, the Rector or gouernor, who is changed 4. times a year, & the 4. Proctors of nati­ons, E & other like eligible officers, retaine some form of the gouernment of a Common­weale. The same author in the last chap. lib. 1. Amongst very many gouernments of Cō ­monweales, the gouernor and obeier are changed by turnes, because they wil be equall according to nature, & differ in nothing. Albeit, that whē the one gouernes & the other obeies, there is a difference sought, in apparrel, words, & honors. In the 1. chap. of the 2. book, Those things wherof an vnion is made, must differ in kind, in sort, that the recom­pence which is equally made, may preserue the Cities & Cōmonweales, as it hath been before declared in the books of maners: the which recōpensing of necessity must be kept amongst such as be free and equall, for that they cannot all gouern together, but rather F they must gouern by yeares, or some other order of time. By which course it falleth out, that all gouern, like as if the tailors and carpenters did change, and were not alwaies the selfesame. But because in the Cōmonweale gouernement, it is best that things continue as they are, it would be most expedient, that the selfesame men should alwaies gouerne. Notwithstanding, where that cannot bee, because all are equall by nature, it standeth with reason, that all should haue part in gouerning, be it good or bad: following there­in an enterchangeable course by turnes, that such as bee equall, may yeeld place one to another, as those that went afore, gaue place vnto them. Thus some gouern, & some are [Page 148] subiect still enterchangeably, as if they were of a diuerse nature and quality, the [...]e being G euer diuerse commanders and Magistrates. In the fourth chap. of this booke hee sayth: That when ciuill offices are distributed according to the equality and parity of the Citi­zens, then they looke to manage them by turn: First, as nature requireth, euery one wil­ling in his turn to gouerne and looke vnto the profit of another, as another being in au­thority, is careful ouer the good and profite of him. And in the twelf [...]h chap. of the same book, he saith: That it seemeth to some to be a thing contrary to nature, that one should hold the principality ouer all, where the body of the Citty standeth of equals. For it is necessary, that those which are alike by nature, haue the same honor and dignity accor­ding to nature. If then it be pernicious and hurtfull to the bodie, that men of vnlike dis­position H vse the selfesame kind of nourishment and attire, so is it in honors, for vnequall honours are not to be giuen to those that are equall. Wherefore none ought more to command then to obey, but there must be an intercourse of both: which truly is lawe, seeing that order is law. At the end of the same chapter, he saith thus: it may bee well ynough vnderstood by that which hath been spoken, that it is neither commodious nor iust, that amongst equals one should haue rule and authority ouer all: neither if there be no laws, but he himselfe stand for the law, neither if there be, neither for a good man ouer them that are good, neither for an euill man ouer men of his condition, except in some respect only. In the 7. book and 14. chap. thus: Seeing that euery society consisteth I of commanders and obeyers, let vs see whether they ought to change, or alwaies to re­maine in one state. If therefore they did so excell one another as we suppose the gods & Heroes to excel men, and that they do declare this their excellency first by their bodies next by their minds, so that it might be euident and apparant: surely it would be better, that the same men should euer command, and the same alwayes obey: But seeing this is hard to find, it is necessary for many causes, that the right of commanding and autho­ritie be indifferently communicated to all. For amongst men of like condition, there should be the like equality. K

CHAP. IIII. What is a Commonweale, and hovv many kinds thereof there be.

THese things being thus declared, it followeth that we consider L whether there ought to be but one forme of pollicy, or more: & if more, what they are and how many, and how they differ one from another. Po­licy therefore is the order and description, as of other offices in a city, so of that which hath the greatest and most soueraine authority for the rule and administration of a Commonweale, hath euermore power and authority ioined with it: which administration is called policie in Greeke, and in English a Commonweale: for example sake, as in a Democratie the authority is in the hands of the people, in an Oligarchie in the hands of a few. Now we call a policy a state di­uerse from both these, and also from all other formes of gouernment. First, we must suppose where­fore M a City was ordained, and how many kinds of gouernments there bee amongst men, and in the society of life: wee haue somewhat touched this point already in the forefront of this worke, where we entreated of Oeconomie and maisterly authority, How a man by nature was a ciuil and politicall creature, whence it ariseth, that albeit they should not stand in need of mutuall succour and helpe, yet they would neuerthelesse desire to liue together in ciuill society: yet notwithstanding common profite and vtily gathereth them together, in as much as it is behoofefull for each partie [Page 149] A to liue wel. This therfore is the principal end, propounded to al in general, & to euery one in perti­culer, to li [...]e wel: & yet men assemble & come togither also to this end to li [...]e only (for euen in that perchance appeareth some sparkle of honesty) & do maintain ciuil society, in that respect only that they may liue, except excessiue & most bitter miseries ouerpester their life. We see how much euill, & what great calamity many men indure, for this cause only that they might liue; as if there con­sisted in that a certain natural pleasure & delight. Now it is no difficult matter to discern & di­stinguish the formes of gouernment aforenamed, for we haue elsewhere in other of our books most clearly & plainely defined & determined thereof. For the maisterly & signiorall gouer [...]ment, al­though indeed it be profitable both to the natural seruant & master, yet neuertheles it aimeth di­rectly B at the profit of the master & not of the seruant, but by accident: for it cannot be, that the seruant perishing & sailing, but that the authority of the master do fail also. The regiment of wife & children, & of a family, which we call Oeconomy, tendeth either to the good of thē that are in obedience, or of both together. Simply & in it self it respecteth the good of the obeyers, as we see in all other Arts, as Phisicke, & the art of exercising the body: by accident it respecteth the good of the commanders also, for nothing hinders the master of the Art of exercise, but that hee himselfe may be one of thē that do excercise, euē as a Pilot in a ship is alwaies one of the mariners. Therfore the mast [...]r of exercise & the Pilot regard the good of thē that are vnder their authority: but whē they thēselues become one of that number, they are pertakers accidentally, the one of the safetie of C the ship, as he is a mariner, the other of the exercise of the body, as he is an exerciser. Therfore whē ciuil offices are determined & distributed according to the equality of men, they desire to manage thē by turns: first (as Nature directeth) euery one desiring to gouern in his course, & to prouide in his turn for the good of others, as others in their course of gouernmēt prouide for him. Now in re­gard of the cōmodity which grows from the Commonweale & gouernment, they would alwaies be Magistrates, as if it should come to passe, that those that are sick & diseased, by bearing rule & au­thority, should alwaies be sound, after which maner Magistratships & offices, would peraduenture be sought for and hunted after. Therfore it is manifest, that all Commonweales which tend to the common good, are simply right and iust, and that those which regard only the profite of superiors, D are all corrupt and transgressions of the right formes.

Policy is the order & disposition of the city in regard of Magistrats, & specially in re­gard of him that hath the souerain authority ouer al, in whose gouernmēt the whole cō ­monweale consisteth. The which gouernmēt, if it be in the hands of the people, is called popular, as in the Cantons of the Swissers, in the Grisian leagues, & in many of the free cities of Almaine, & was in old time at Athens: If it be in the hands of certain persons, as at this day it is amongst the gentlemen in Venice, & in certaine families in Genes, then is it called a signorie: if it depend wholly vpon one mans authority, it is called a monar­chy, as in France, Spaine, Portugal, &c. Now the cause that moueth men to assemble to­gither E in cities, is not only to help one another in their mutual needs, but also to the end to liue togither, because that by nature they be companiable & ciuill. And nature hath put a great pleasantnes in life, which makes it to be greatly desired, vnles folk be brought into extream misery of sicknes, pouerty, or furiousnes, which driue them into dispair, & cause thē to wish for death by means of their aduersities & discontentments. The diuer­sity of gouernments of cities depends vpon their ends: for if they tend to a good end, thē are they good gouernments, if to an euil end; thē are they euill gouernments: as for exā ­ple, those Cōmonweales that tend to the cōmon profit, are good & iust, & those that re­spect only the perticular profit of the gouernors are bad & vniust: as it fals out in the go­uernmēt F of families, where the father gouern the childrē, & also the wife, respecting the welfare of the obeiers, & the cōmō profit of both the cōmāders & obeiers, & therfore is good. But the gouernmēt of the master ouer the seruāt, regarding the masters cōmodity, & not the seruāts, is nought, & that is most cōmōly imitated in al disordered cōmōweals.

CHAP. V. Of the diuision & definition of Cōmonweals, & of their transgressions.

[Page 150] VPon the determining of these matters, next of all we are to examine how G many Commonweales there be in number, and which be they. First of all we will speake of those that be right and perfect Commonweales, because their transgres­sions and contraries will be known by them. Now sith the Commonweale and the politick or ciuil gouernment is but all one, & the ciuile gouernment is it that hath the souerain authority in cities: either one man seuerally by himself [...], or a fewe men, or els manie, must needs haue this a [...]thority. Therfore, when one, or a fewe, or many, in time of his or their go­ [...]rnment, tend to the profite of the Commonweale; necessarily, these Commonweales are indiffe­rent and right Commonweales: and those Commonweales which seek the particuler profite, either of one, or of a fewe, or of a multitude, are transgressions and contrarieties of the same: for those H that be copartners of the Commonweale, either ought not to bee called Citizens, or els should haue part in the cōmon profit. We are accustomed to cal that Commonweale a kingdome, where one go­uerneth, with respect of the cōmon profite: & that an Aristocratie where a few men, and yet aboue one, haue the gouernmēt; either for that good & honest men are in authority, or for that they pro­ [...]ide for the welfare of the city, or of those that be pertakers therof: and when the multitude gouer­neth, tending to the cōmon profit, it is calld a Commonweale, by the common name of all Cōmon­weales. The which commeth to passe, not without good reason, for a fewe men may excell in ver­tue, but it is a hard matter for many to be exactly perfect in euery vertue, except it bee in the war­like valiantnesse which is exercised by the multitude. Therefore the principall part of this Com­monweale I consisteth in men of warre, & those that possesse the munition & Armes, are members thereof Now these be the transgressions aboue specified, that is to say, Tyranny is the transgression of the kingdome: The Oligarchie is the transgression of the Aristocratie: and the Democratie or popular state, is the transgression of the Commonweale: for tyranny is a monarchie or sole reigne, hauing respect only to the profit of the monarch or party that raigneth: The Oligarchy regardeth the profite of the rich only: and the Democratie or popular state [...]endeth to the commodity of the poor only: nay there is not any of all these that prouideth for the benefit of the Commonweale. It is behoofefull to declare a little more at large what euery Commonweale is, because there remaine some doubts touching the same. For he that reasoneth as a Philosopher in euery methode, & hath K not an eye to action only, but also to contemplation, ought not to neglect or admit any thing, but is to declare the truth in euery point. Nowe then tyranny is a Monarchie, or gouerning by one alone (as hath been aboue declared) that vsurpeth masterlike and lordlike authority and gouernement ouer th [...] ciuil society. The Oligarchie, is when rich men haue the soueraigne gouernment in their hands. Contrariwise, the Democratie or popular state, is when the poore haue the gouernement in their power, and not those which haue great riches. The first doubt is in the former definition or distinction: for if many rich men gouerne the City, and the Democratie or popular state is whē the multitude is cheefe gouernor: In like sort, if it happened that there were fewer poor then rich, & yet those poor the stronger party & masters of the gouernement: sith that is called an Oligar­chie L where the lesser number hath the dominion, those Commonweales should not seeme to bee rightly defined and distinguished. But if paucity be added to riches, and multitude to pouerty, and that the Oligarchie wherin the rich being few in number do gouern, and the Democratie wherin the poor being a great multitude rule & command, should be called Commonweales, there would yet remain another hard point: for what should those Commonweales afore mentioned be, to wit, that where many rich men haue the gouernement, & that where fewer poore men haue the soue­raine authority, if there be none other Commonweale besides those whereof we haue made menti­on? It seemeth by this reason, that the paucity or multiplicity of gouernours is an accident, the one of the Oligarchie, & the other of the Democratie; Forasmuch as in all places there are few rich, M and many poor. Therfore these causes make no difference, but the Democratie and Oligarchie do differ in pouerty & riches: and there must needs be an Oligarchie wheresoeuer the gouernment is limitted by riches, whether there be few or many in number: & wheresoeuer the poor haue the so­ [...]erain [...] authority in thē, there must needs be a Democratie. Howbeit, it falleth out as we haue al­leadged before, that the one consisteth often of a smal number, & the other of a great multitude: for the rich are but f [...]w in number, & the free men a great many. By which occasion they both fal together at variance for the cheef gouernment of the Cōmonweale.

[Page 151] A There are three good and indifferent Commonweales, and three bad ones. The good be those where the gouernors and superiors haue respect to the common profit of eue­ry one. The bad are those where the gouernors and superiours regard their owne perti­culer profit: for the gouernment alwaies consisteth in the superiors of the state, as hath ben alledged, and of them taketh the appellation. The gouernment of one, is called a monarchie: and if it be applied to the profite of the Commonweale, it is termed a king­dome: if it tend to the perticular profite of one alone that gouerneth, it is called a Ty­ranny. The gouernment of a certain number of Lords or Gentlemen prouiding for the welfare of the state is called an Aristocratie: And if any of thē seeke their own ambition B and couetousnesse, and by conspiracie dispose of all affaires of the Cōmonweale accor­ding to their owne pleasure, it is called an Oligarchie. The gouernement of many where the communalty is directed by the laws, is tearmed & that rightly, a Commonweale, ac­cording to Aristotles opinion: and on the contrary side, a Democraty or popular state is that where there is nothing but liberty and disorder in the people. Such as Plato in his 3 booke of lawes, and Zenophon haue described to haue ben the Democratie of Athens, when the people exceeded and ouerflowed in all liberty without feare of Magistrates or obseruance of lawes, whereof Demosthenes complaineth in certain of his Orations. Now euery one of these Commonweales haue certaine vnder-kinds and sub-diuisions, C as shall hereafter appeare by the laying forth of this matter. The Oligarchies are pro­perly where the rich gouerne, and are only admitted to Magistrateships and Offices, ac­cording to the quantity of their wealth, and stint of their yearely reuenues. The Demo­craties are where poore and free men rule without any respect had of riches, nobility, or vertue, to the attaining of publicke Offices, but rather of liberty onely, and it makes no matter what number there be of either of them: Albeit, the Oligarchie is so tearmed, for that there are commonly in it a few rich men, and many poor men. Also Aristotle trea­teth of the number of Commonweales, of their formes, ends, and customes: In the first booke of his Rhetoricke, the eight chapter, and in the eight of his bookes of Ethicks and D tenth chap. he entreateth of three forms of Cōmonweales & of their transgressions, to­gither with that likenes & similitude of Cōmōweales, which is found in priuat families.

CHAP. VI. Of the right and law of the Democratie and Oligarchie.

LEt vs first see what end and bounds they appoint and limit to the Oligarchie, E and to the Democratie, and what is iust and rightfull in them both, for all speake of a kind of right and equity, but they reach not to that which is per­fect: as for example, That which is equall, seemeth rightfull and iust, and is so indeed, howbeit not to all persons, but to those onely that bee equall: and that which is vnequall, seemeth to bee rightf [...]ll and iust, and is so indeede, howbeit, not to all persons, but to those that be vnequall: some men take away this point, to wit, to whom e­quality belongeth, and so iudge amisse: the cause whereof is, for that the iudgement concerneth thēselues: for most cōmonly men are euil Iudges in their owne affaires. Wherefore sith that which is iust, is iust to some persons, & all one diuision and distinction is to be vsed, as well in matters, as F in persons, as we haue before declared in our Ethikes: they agree in the equality of things, and not in the equality of persons, most specially for that cause which we rehearsed euen now, namely, that they are not indifferent iudges in matters concerning thēselues. Further, wheras both parties ac­knowledge 1 in some sort a kind of right, they suppose that they speake of right absolutely & simply, for if the one party be vnequal in any kind of thing, as in richesse, then thinke they thēselues alto­gither vnequal: & if the other party be equal in any other thing, as in liberty, thē think they thē ­selues altogether equall: but neither party reacheth that which is the very perfect and principall [Page 152] right indeed: for if they haue begun their society, & assembled thēselues togither into one place for G possessions & wealth sake, euery of thē should haue as great part & interest in the city & Comon­weale, as he should possesse of wealth. Therfore the reason of those that fauour the Oligarchie or go­uernmēt of a [...]ew, may seeme to be effectual, wherby they vphold that it is no indifferent & right­ful equality, that any party which to the furnishing & making vp of a stock of a 100 pounds, had disbursed & laid down but one pound, should reap as great a share & portion as he that disbursed & finished all the rest, as wel in the principal stock, as in al supplies, profits, & increase therof. But the cause of mens assembling & drawing togither into corporations & cities, is not only to liue, but rather to liue wel: for if the cause of their assembly and ioining in society, were to liue only, the city should consist of slaues, & of other creatures: but now it is not so, because they are neither partakers H of felicity, nor liue according to their own choise & wil: neither do they assemble in cities for war­like confederacies sake, to the intent, to defend thē that are comprehended in the league from out­rage & iniury at other mens hands, nor for traffick or increase of merchandise, for so should the Tuscans & the Carthaginians, and al others that vse mutual entercourse & traffick one with a­nother, be as Citizens of one city, for they make couenants between thēselues for safe intercourse & trafficking togither, & set down contracts and articles of agreement in writing, touching the not iniur [...]ing nor hurting one of another, as they passe and repasse about their assaires, and yet for all that they vse not in these dealings common Magistrates, but differing according to those places where each party dwelleth and is subiect, neither care they one for another what maner of persons I they ought to be, or whether thē that be cōprehended in the society, be vnhonest or vniust, or spot­ted with any other kind of vice, but respect this only that they be assured from iniurying and hur­ting one another. But if those that intend to stablish good lawes, haue a principall care of the ver­tue and of the vice of the citizens, it is without all doubt, that the city which is a true & right ci­ty in very deed, and not in name only, ought before all other things to haue a special care of vertue & vprightnes: for lay this care aside, and thē the society of citizens waxeth a confederacy of war­fare, differing in place only from others with whom they be in league, though they remain one far from another. Now the law is a couenant & warrant amongst thē (as Lycophon the Sophister said) to hold & keep them togither within the compasse of mutuall duty & vprightnes one toward ano­ther, K but cannot make the citizens good & iust: that so it is, it is a clear case, for if places far distant and remote, were assembled in one, in such sort, that the cities of the Megarians & of the Corinthi­ans should touch one another, yet for al that would they not be one city, nor if they should contract mariages one with another, though this be one of the most fit & proper alliances & communica­tings that are amongst citizens. Likewise if any did dwell asunder, & yet not so farre asunder, but that they might communicat togither, & enioy laws for the not iniurying one of another in their trades, as for exāple, if one were a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shomaker, & ano­ther some other artificers, & were in this sort to the number of 2000, and yet had community of nothing but only of traffick and of warlike confederacy, for al that it should not be a city, and why L not? Not for that there wanteth vicinity and neighbourhood of society: for though those that so communicate, did assemble themselues togither, and should euery one vse his owne house after the fashion of a city, and helpe one another as confederates only against those that offer them any iniu­ry, yet should it seem no city to them that precisely consider the matter, vnlesse they should vse ano­ther maner of communicating in their assemblies then they do when they remaine thus asunder. Wherfore a city is not a community of place, neither was it ordeined to the end that they should be safeguarded from iniury, nor yet [...]or traffickes sake, but those things must be prouided for before it be a city, and though they be already prouided, yet shal it not be a city: but a city is a society ordai­ned to liue wel in houses and families; and to this end, to lead a perfect and sufficient life: which in­deed M cannot be vnlesse they inhabite one place, and haue the vse of mariages: wherfore there haue ben brought in into Cities, both affinities, cobrotherhoods, sacrifices, and other manners and cu­stomes of liuing togither, which is the work of friendship, for friendship is nothing but an election of liuing orderly together, therfore the purpose and end of cities is to liue wel, and a city is a society of families and boroughes in a perfect and sufficient life, which is, as we haue already affirmed, to liue in al felicity and wealth. Now then a city is ordained for honest actions, and not for liuing to­gither onely. Wherefore they that further most in that society, haue a greater interest in the Citie [Page 153] A then those that are equall in liberty or in race, or those that are the mightiest, but vnequal in the ciuil vertue, or they that exceed in richesse, and are excelled in vertue by others. That thero [...]ore all those that contend about Commonweales, doe speake of some part of that which is perfect, iust, and right, it appeareth by the reasons here set downe.

It is alledged that there is a certaine right in the Oligarchie and Democratie, being corrupted Commonweales, and in some respects contrary one to another. Vpon which right, they first ground themselues, that fauour and maintaine the Oligarchies, who for that they are the superiors, and cheefe both in riches & nobility, do account themselues B for the superiours absolutely in all respects, and challenge as proper to themselues the greatest part of the gouernement, as reasonable in their opinions, that vnequall prefer­ment should bee giuen to vnequall persons, and the people as equall in liberty with the rich & noblemen do vphold that the gouernment of the Cōmonweale should be equal­ly communicated to thē, affirming that equal rewards belong to equal folke, but neither of thē are to be allo [...]ed: for the superiors in riches or nobility, are not absolutely supe­riors, nor the equal in liberty are not perfectly equal, but those only are to be accounted superiors, who are superiours in vertue, and those which are perfectly equall in vertue, ought to be accounted equal. And forasmuch as men do not assemble together in cities C to the intent to liue only, but also to liue wel & orderly, whervnto they are great furthe­rers that be good & vertuous men: therfore to them ought the greatest part of the go­uernment to be imparted. Amongst these matters is inserted a braue discourse, shewing what a city properly is. Wherin is declared, that for the constitution of a city, it suffiseth not that many men gather together in one place, or be allied by mariages, do aid one a­nother against those which offer them iniury, and that they possesse goods and trafficke togither, vnlesse all these things be ordained, to the end, to liue well & happily, which is nothing els but the exercise of morrall and intellectuall vertues, to the which end, those cities can neuer attain, which haue for their ends & scopes the right of the Oligarchies D and Democraties, and not the true and absolute right, consisting cheefly in iustice distri­butiue, which yeeldeth to euery man according to his deserts, and hath respect as wel to persons as to things, as hath ben declared at large in the fift booke of Ethicks.

FVRTHER, wheras both parties acknowledge in some sort a kinde of right, they suppose that 1 they speake of right absolutely & simply.] Right & equity is not well vnderstood in Demo­craties and Oligarchies: for in Democraties the populacy being all free alike, think that they may equally haue part in the gouernment, without any regard at al either of riches or nobility, only in regard of freedome: & contrariwise in Oligarchies, they regard no­thing but riches and nobility, the lords and great men supposing, that all the commodi­ties, E offices, & dignities appertain to thē alone, without any respect had to the common people, what sufficiency soeuer there be in any of thē. The which di [...]ference and contra­riety between the populacy & nobility, happeneth not only in these two kinds of policy, but also in euery other form, & that for want of vnderstanding of the true politick right and equity, whence haue sprung vp in time past, & doe spring vp from day to day at this present, & wil also hereafter, many seditions and ciuill wars, threatning strange alterati­ons & changes, & often the very destructions of Commonweales. The peasant or coun­trimen of Swessia going about to establish their Democratie, partly droue out, & partly slue the nobility of that country. It is not long since in Germany they made head & re­belled F against the nobility there, vnder the pretext & colour of the liberty of the gospel, but indeed to be freed frō greeuous taxes & impositions which were laid vpon them. At Florence since the first foūdation of the city, vntil it was reduced into a dukedome, trou­bles & cōtētions neuer ceased between the people & the nobility for the preheminence of the coūsel, & the distribution of offices. No lesse was the discord at Genes, betwixt the people & the nobility, which was deuided into four principal families: of which four, two namely, the Spinulians & Aurians were Gibelines, & the other two, to wit, the Flisquians [Page 154] and Grimaldians were Guelphes. The Athenian people was so disordered and let loose G to all vnbridled libertie, that they were almost past all shame and obedience to their lawes or Magistrates and consequently depriued of all mutuall amitie and familiaritie, which men liuing vnder one state should haue. In Carthage, at that time when it was destroyed by Scipio in the third Punicke warre, the people had the greatest power and preheminence. In Lacedemonia when as the Nobles roughly handled their Plow-men called Ilotians, they constrained them to rebell often against them, and to conspire with their enemies, whereupon many euils arose, euen to the bringing of the Citty into the greatest daunger that euer it was in. The like inconuenience almost befell all Italie by the bondslaues, and Spartacus the fencer their captaine, who raised vp a most dange­rous H and wretched warre, called the Seruile warre. The common and baser sort of people among the auncient Gaules, were reputed for slaues, not possessing any thiug of their owne, nor being called to any consultation or management of affaires, but many of them either being iniured by the mighty ones, or burdened with debts, or eaten vp with exactions, yeelded themselues to the nobles, and by this means bec [...]me their bondmen. French men better instructed, doe altogether reiect all manner of slauish seruitude, yea and bondslaues comming out of other Countries into France, are presently enfranchi­sed and set free as soone as they inter into that kingdome, their patrones not hauing power to sell them any more. At Venice, the signiours which haue all the authority in I their hands, deuide amongst them [...]elues all the offices, benefices, and publicke charges, wherein either honour or profite consisteth, except the Secretariships, without parti­cipating the people with any of them, whom by all meanes they debase and keep vnder, least they should mutinie and rebell against them. In England the populacy is stronger then the nobility, and easier to bee stirred vp, being armed by a publicke decree. The Turkes that inhabite Anatolia and Greece, and other regions, haue either rooted out, and banished all the nobility, or at least wise left them naked of their goods. The Musco­uites left the Lords and Barons no castles nor fortresses at all to bee vnder their obey­sance. At Rome there neuer ceased con [...]inuall strife betweene the nobility and the peo­ple K for their rights and priuiledges, whence also the ciui [...]l wars tooke their beginnings: by the which all military discipline was corrupted, all obedience to the Senate annihila­ted, and finally the whole state chaunged, w [...]th a great m [...]ssacre of the cheefest of both factions. Howbeit, in France the nobility and the people are so well gouerned, that they haue no occasion either to be discontented with their king, or yet to contend with each other. The nobility enioy many great prerogatiues and priuiledges, because they de­f [...]nd the Count [...]ies and dwelling places of the people, with the dange [...] of their liues: They are exempt f [...]om all tributes, to [...]es, taxes, customes, impositions, & subsidies: they possesse the cheefest dignities of the kingdome, as Constableships, Marshalships, g [...]eat L Masterships, Admiralties, gouernments of Prouinces, Bailywickes, Stewardships, Cap­taineships of Citties and castles, and such like. T [...]e principall of these, are the Princes, as well of the blood royall, as others in high reuerence and honour, which are Collate­rall in kin vnto the king, hauing vnder their obedience and execution of iustice, whole countries and prouinces, depending notwithstanding on the king, and rendring an ac­count of their proceedings in the highest iurisdiction to his souerain courts. Amongst these, there are some which are called Peeres, who in regard of their places, assist as first and cheefest in the ceremonies and consecrations of kings, attired after the old fashion. These haue thei [...] causes committed at the first instance of the parliament of Paris, wher­of M they themselues are members. In that which concerneth their Peereships, neither can they be iudged or censured, but by the Peeres their brethren. All which priuiledges the Princes of the blood royall enioy, and many more, being borne counsellors to the ro [...]all Maiestie. Next after the Princes of blood and the Peeres, succeede in honour, the Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Barons, and others in order, endued with fees, lordships, offi­ces, and cha [...]ges, as well in actions of warre, which is their principall exercises, as also [Page 155] A in actions of peace and pollicy: on whom the Kings lay so much trust and affiance, that all of them seeme to be as it were their domesticall friends, it being lawfull for them to haue accesse vnto them without all suspition, yea and to weare their weapons in their priuy chamber, which is not permitted vnto others. Further, the Princes of the blood, and other great Lords, haue pensions of the King, and many Gentlemen which wait vpon diuers offices, by quarters receiue wages of him also. And besides all this, there is an ordinary army of souldiers greater and better payed and mayntayned then in any other kingdome whatsoeuer: Which order was brought in as well for the defence of the countrie, that there might alwayes be in readines a sufficient number of men of B warre, well mounted, furnished, and practised in feates of armes; as also to mayntayne Gentlemen, amongst whome the offices are so distributed, that many of them may en­tertaine their calling with honestie and credit, albeit there be no warre: some hauing companies of Launces either greater or lesser, according to their qualities: others being Lieutenants, Ancients, Standerd-bearers, men of Armes, and Archers: the yonger ones are brought vp as Pages vnder the rest: also great Lords and those that are richest, en­tertaine the lesser, euery one according to their faculty: and this is the condition of the Nobility as honorable and fauourable as may possibly be. As for the common people they haue occasion to content thems [...]lues with their estate, exercising freely all things C meete and agreeable to their conditions: they till the ground, tra [...]fick in Merchandise, and exercise many Mechanicall trades: they possesse Farmes, which is not lawfull for the Nobility: are partakers of many honours and common commodities with the Gentlemen, as benefices of all quantities, great, smal, and meane; offices of iudgements, treasures, accounts, Secretariships, which is very aduantageous to them as well in re­gard of the authority which they beare, as the profit which they reape: for in as much as they apply themselues more commonly to the study of Learning then the Nobility, they become more fit to discharge such places: yea and also they may by fauour and especiall priuiledge, in performing some notable peece of seruice for the common­wealth, D attaine vnto the estate of Nobility, to the which they aspire continually, as be­ing the most worthy. And thus they haue no occasion to be discontented in their estates, or to practise any thing against the Nobility, knowing that by good and lawfull meanes they may attayne vnto the same degree of honour. The estates of the Nobility and of the popularity being thus managed and directed, and each of them enioying their seuerall rights and liberties, it is hard either for one to oppresse the other, or for both together to conspire against their head and monarch. If the Nobility, with whom is the possession of Armes, goe about to outrage the people, the sword of iustice defen­deth them, and chastiseth the other, which hath authority (so that the King giue leaue) E to lay hands vpon the rebellious by force, so that be he neuer so great, whether Prince or other, he is compelled to obay thereunto: and this iustice is so respected, that when any of what quality or condition soeuer they be, are condemned, they indure the stroke of execution, will they, nill they. In like manner if the populacy which is in number farre greater, go about to rebell, or be tumultuous, the Nobility is so strong together with iustice, and the common people so weake in deedes of armes, that they may very easily be repulsed, and brought in subiection, by meanes whereof they thinke of no­thing but how to liue in good ciuill, pollicy and vnity together, and aboue all in loyall obedience to their King, whome they hold in exceeding loue and singular reuerence, F the Nobles being alwayes ready to put on armour when it is requisite, and the people to contribute to taxes and necessary subsidies: so that in all matters the King is serued and obeyed with good will, and without contradiction, better and more readily then any Prince in the world. Now our predecessours considering the ambition and inso­lency of the Nobility, which seemed to them to stand in neede of a bridle to curbe and refraine it: and perceiuing on the other side the hatred of the common people against the nobles, proceeding from a naturall feare which they haue of them: which feare they [Page 156] desiring to deliuer and discharge the communaltie of, and yet not to lay the trouble vp­on G the king, to the end, to exempt him from the euil wil which the Nobles would beare him, if he should seeme to vphold the populacy, and also which the people would beare him if hee should seeme to fauour the Nobles, they aduised to establish a third iudge­ment betwixt both, deuided into many parliaments, and placed in diuerse Prouinces of the realme, representing all of them in seuerall iurisdictions, as it were the Maiesty of a Senate, yeelding succour and refuge to those that are good, and being fearefull to the wicked, and taking knowledge of all ciuill and criminall causes, without appeale to any higher court: In these Parliaments are a great number of learned and notable persons, who without either charge or reproofe of their king, refraine the mighty ones by their H authority, and keepe vnder the common sort in obedience. There could not bee deuised by any meanes a better and more commodious way, for the rest of the king and tranqui­lity of the realme. And thus, to the end that none might violate this league and agree­ment, the king doth most charily preserue and maintaine his souerainty ouer all his sub­iects, of what degree or condition soeuer, not losing an inch of it, nor suffering any to vsurpe or encroch vpon it, to the end that all might acknowledge him as their naturall lord and soueraigne, in all reasonable and accustomable matters, vsing notwithstanding all manner of courtesie, and humanity, and familiarity towards them in their seueral de­serts. Also hee doth carefully prouide, that one estate doe not aboue measure surmount I the other, to wit, that the nobility doe not deuour the Comminaltie, nor the Commi­naltie by their merchandise, iudgements, and treasuries, encroch vpon the lands and goods of the nobility, who being impouerished by long sutes, great expences in warre, and other braueries and sumptuous superfluieties cannot serue the king: Also the peo­ple being eaten vp with exactions, and trampled v [...]der foot by souldiors could not bee able to pay their taxes and subsidies, both inconue [...]iences of each side to be shunned, as very preiudiciall to the quiet & good of a Commonweale.

K

CHAP. VII. Who ought to beare rule in a Citie.

IT is doubted of some, who it is that ought to beare rule and do­minion in a City, whether the multitude, or the richest sort, or the best men, or him that is best among the best, or a Tyrant. And euery one of L these seemeth to carry some doubt and scruple with it: for what if the poor being more in number, do deuide amongst them the goods and possessions of the rich, Is it not vniust? Albeit, it be accounted iust by the populacy [...] hauing the cheefe authority and rule in the City. By what name or title then shall we call extreame iniustice, If this be not? Againe, if the greater number vsurpe the goods of the fewer, is it not certaine that they destroy and spoile the Commonweale? And yet ver­tue is not pernicious and hurtfull to him that hath it, nor right euer the cause of ruine in the ci­ty: wherefore it appeareth, that this law cannot be iust. Moreouer, if this were so, then necessari­ly all the acts of a Tyrant should be iust and lawfull, for being in authority he of [...]ereth violence to M the Commonweale, no lesse then the multitude to the rich. Whether therefore is it lawfull that a fewe and those the richer sort doe bear rule, or no? If they commit the like acts, robbing and de­spoiling the multitude of their goods, can we thinke their dominion iust? Sure, if the one be iust, the other is also: but without all question, they are both vnlawfull and wicked. But what if good men gouerne, and haue the authority ouer all things? Why then all other remaine without ho­nour, and are noted with discredite, in that they are not adorned with ciuill offices: for wee call [Page 157] A Magistrateships and offices, honors. Now if the same persons be alwaie [...] in authority, it followeth necessarily, that all the rest be depriued of honor. But what if one which excelleth in vertue, haue the gouernment, is not that better? This sauoureth more of an Oligarchie then the former, for here are more that are depriued of honors, then were before. But it may be some man will say, that it is not meet at all for a man that is subiect to affections and perturbations of the mind, to beare rule in a Commonweale, but that the law should haue the preheminence. But for answere, if it bee a law appertaining to an Oligarchie or a Democraty, what dooth it concerne these doubtes which are propounded? For the same inconueniences will still arise from hence, as did be [...]ore. As con­cerning other doubts, more shal be spoken elsewhere. But that the multitude ought to haue the go­uernment B and rule in their hands rather then a fewe good men, it may seeme to bee plainely resol­ued, and yet to haue some doubt in it, & peraduenture the truth also. For it is possible, that a great multitude, whereof euery one seuerally is not good, yet being assembled together may be better thē the other [...]ewe, being not compared one to one, but all to all: as a supper or banquet made by many mens prouision and charge, is better and more costly then that which is prepared at one mans ex­pence: For when they are many, euery one hath his portion of vertue and wisedome, and being vnited togither, the multitude becommeth as it were one man, indued with many feete, manie hands, many sences, and many maners & vnderstandings. Wherfore many iudge better then few, both of Musick and Po [...]sie, for one marketh one part; and another, another part; and all, all parts. C Howbeit, I confesse that good men doe farre differ from the common sort, when one is compared with one; as we say, that faire doth differ from foule, and artificiall pictures from true substances: because those excellencies which were diuided before, are collected and combined into one. For if the members of euery man bee compared with the parts of the picture, the eie of the one will ap­pear more beautiful then the eie of the other, and so of any other part. Neuerthelesse, whither this difference between many, & few good men, be to be admitted concerning euery multitude of peo­ple, it is vncertaine: yea rather it seemeth impossible in some, for it would then as well agree vnto brute beasts. For do we not see that many men do nothing at al in a maner differ frō brute beasts? And yet all this letteth not, but that in some multitude of people, that which I haue said may bee D prooued true, wherfore a man might resolue by this that hath been spoken, both the former prece­dent doubt, & also the subsequent which followes, that is, what things ought to be cōmitted to the discretion & gouernment of freemen & the cōmon people, that is, such as neither haue any abun­dance of riches, nor reputation of vertue: for it is not a safe course to cōmit vnto thē great charges & dignities, by reason that by their vniustice & vnskilfulnes, they would do much iniury, & cō ­mit many errors: on the other side to exclude thē altogither frō bearing offices, is also dangerous: for where there are so many debarred from honors, & such a multitude of poor, there the city must needs be stuffed full of enemies. It remaineth therefore that they be admitted to the participation of iudgements and consultations: for which cause Solon, and some other Lawgiuers, make them E to bee ouerseers of the election of Magistrates, and giue them power to call to account and to correct those that haue beene in the Magistracie, but for them alone to beare rule and office, and to gouerne, they no waies allow of: for all being assembled together, haue sufficient vnderstan­ding, & being mingled with the better sort, are profitable & commodious to the Cōmonweale; as vnpure & grosse food mingled with pure & fine, is more profitable for the nourishment of the bo­dy, being much togither, thē a little alone: for euery one apart is vnperfect & vnfit to iudge, wher­as all togither are most fit & perfect. Neuertheles, in this form of gouernmēt, there arise 2. doubts: the first is, that it seemeth to appertaine to him that can cure a sicknesse, & rid a man frō a present disease, to censure of another, whether he hath done the part of a Phisition or no: & this not only in Phisick & a Phisition, but also in all other arts and faculties. As therefore a Phisition ought to F giue an account of his practise to other Phisitions, and be by them reprehended if need be, so ought other artificers to do also. Now a Phisition is both he which practiseth by anothers direction, & he which directeth others, & also a third, which by bare experience attaineth vnto the art: for these thre are almost to be foūd in al arts: so we ascribe the authority of iudging no lesse to those that haue gottē that skil by experience, thē to those that haue it by knowledge: & so also cōcerning election for to chuse wel is the office of thē that haue knowledge: as for exāple, none can chuse a good Geometri­cian but those that haue knowledge in Geometry, none a good Pilote but those that haue knowledge [Page 158] in Nauigation: For albeit, that many ideots and vnskilfull persons doe intrude themselues, and G presume to giue iudgement of workes and Arts, yet they doe it not better then those that haue knowledge. So that by this reason it seemeth, that neither the election nor correction of Magi­strates ought to be committed vnto the common people. But per aduenture all these arguments are not rightly alledged, especially for that reason which was before declared, namely, except the peo­ple be too seruile. For euery one a part, must needs be a worse iudge then they that haue skil, but all together, cannot chuse but be either better, or as good: and also because in some things the worke­man doth neither iudge alone, nor better of his owne worke then others that know the work, and yet haue no skil in the Art; as it doth not belong only to an architect to know and iudge of a house, but he that vseth the house, which is the maister of it, doth both know and iudge of it better then H the builder: also a Pilote is better able to iudge of the sterne of a ship then a Carpenter: and of a banquet those that eat it, better than the cooke that dressed it. And thus this first doubt, though difficult and intricate, may be resolued. The second doubt dependeth vpon the first, for it seemeth very absurd, that the authority and guidance of greater matters, should rather bee in the power of naughty and wicked persons, then of those that are good and vertuous. Nowe the election and correction of Magistrates, are matters of greatest moment, the which in some places (as hath been said) are committed to the people, the popular assembly hauing soueraigne authority ouer all such things: for to assemble together popularly, to deliberate and to iudge, is allowed to men of small reuenue, and of all ages: but the Treasurorships and Captainships, and all other principall I charges, are giuen to them only that are of great reuenues and possessions. This doubt might bee resolued by the like reason, for per aduenture this institution is not to be found fault withall: for neither a Iudge, nor a Counsellour, nor hee that deliberateth in an assemblie, hath any rule or go­uernment, but the iudgement it selfe: the Senate and the people, are those that gouerne and beare rule, these (to wit, the Counsellor, the Deliberatour, and the Iudge) being but particles a [...]d porti­ons of the other: wherefore not without great reason the greatest matters are committed to the multitude, the people, the counsell, and the Senate, consisting of many, whose reuenue all together, is farre greater then the reuenue either of one, or a fewe which manage great offices and estates. And let this suffice to haue beene spoken, concerning these matters. But as concerning the first K doubt, this especially resulteth thereof, that nothing ought to gouerne so much, or haue such power in a City, as iust and wholesome lawes: and that where and when the lawes cannot exactly deter­mine of a cause, but are dumbe, because it is not easie to comprehend all accidentall cases in so ge­nerall tearmes; then that the gouernor or gouernors, be they one or more, haue power and authori­ty to determine and decide. Albeit it be not yet declared in what manner good and profitable laws are to be esteemed, and so still the former doubt remaineth vndiscussed: Notwitstanding, it must needs be, that the lawes be alwaies like vnto the Commonweale whereunto they are annexed, that is to say, either good or bad, iust or vniust: for it is euident, that they must be fitted and applied to the Commonweale. And if this be true, it appeareth that in good Commonweales, the lawes must L n [...]cessarily be good and iust, and in corrupt and bad Commonweales, corrupt and vniust.

It hauing been declared, that the difference and varietie of gouernements dooth ac­crew from that part which is of greatest soueraignty and power in a Citty, and which commandeth the rest: also how all Citties are necessarily gouerned, either by one sole man, or by a few together, or by the multitude, whence arise sixe kinds of policies, three good and three bad: Here in this chapter hee discourseth after what manner estates are best ordered: for there are many difficulties, whether the gouernment bee in the hands of some few, or in the power of the communalty: for if it bee saied, that it ought to bee M committed to good men, then the rest being debarred from Offices and honours, will stirre vp seditions through discontent: or if it be pretended, that the law which is with­out affection should absolutely command, he answereth that this also is not to bee fully admitted, because the law is alwaies fitted and applied to the estate wherein it is, as be­ing made at the will and for the commodity of the most mightie; so that for this cause, there is no lesse discommodity in the law, then in a man: also whether it be better to be [Page 159] A gouerned by many, of which there is not one good and prudent man, or by a few good men. Whereunto it may bee answered, that if these many bee all naughtie, vnwise, and seruile persons, then it is better to be gouerned by a few good ones: but if they bee in a mediocrity that is reasonable good, the administration seemeth to bee farre more com­modious in their hands, then in a few good mens. And therfore that it is conuenient to commit vnto good men offices of greatest weight and moment, which are executed ei­ther by perticular persons or by a few: but those offices that are administred by many to­gether, ought to be committed to the multitude, as namely to elect and correct Magi­strates, and to take an account of their charges. Finally it behoueth, that as much as is B possible, the lawes doe beare sway in Citties without giuing any other libertie to the rulers, sauing in particular cases, which cannot be comprehended nor expressed by the generall lawes.

CHAP. VIII. Of the end of a Policie, which is the publicke good, and C ciuile iustice, and that it is the noblest end of all other faculties.

NOw forasmuch as in all Arts and Sciences, the end whereun­to they tend, is a certaine good: therefore the greatest and principallest good, is the end of the greatest and principallest Art, which is the facul­ty of Policie: Now, this politicall good is right and equity, consisting in the common profite of all. Now, all men thinke, that this right is a cer­taine D equality: and therein in some sort they agree with the Philoso­phicall reasons alledged in our Ethicks: for they say that there ought to bee a certaine right, and that amongst some men, and that it ought to bee also equall amongst equals. Wherefore it is behoofefull to consider in what things equality and inequality consisteth, because this is not void of doubt, nor beside the purpose and intent of ci­uill Philosophie: for it may bee some man will say, that Offices and Magistracies ought equally to be distributed, according to the excellencie of all goodnesse: albeit, the men differ not in other matters, but are alike: and that to them that differ from each other, there must be a diuers equi­ty, which ariseth vnto them of their diuerse dignity and worth. Notwithstanding, if this bee E true, then must more politicall right bee attributed to them that excell most in regard of their beauty, or of their t [...]lne [...]se of stature, and such like good things: the which is apparantly false, as we may see in other faculties and sciences. For among Musitions, in regard of that Art, to them that are cunning and expert alike, wee must not giue more or better instruments, because they are more noble, for that would not make them play any whit the better: but it is meete to giue the best instruments to those that are most excellent in the Art. If this bee not yet plaine inough, it shall be made more plain by that which followeth: for if any excell in the Art of Musick, and yet is farre inferiour in nobility and beauty, though both these bee farre greater goods then the other, and excell them in proportion, yet the best instruments must be giuen to the former: for it is meet F to giue the preheminence to the worke, without hauing regard either to riches, nobility, or any thing els, which helpe nothing in that respect. Againe, by the same reason euery good might bee compared with euery good: for if that excell which excelleth in quantity certainely greatnesse of quantity shall deserue wholly to bee compared with riches and liberty: wherefore if this man ex­cell more in bignesse, then that man in vertue, and if greatnesse be a [...]ge [...]her more excellent then vertue, then may all thinges bee compared with all thinges: For if such a quantity is greater then such a quantity, surely such shal be the equality [...] But seeing tha [...] [...]his is impossible, there is no [Page 160] cause to contend in ciuill affaires, about equality in honours and Magistracies, as because some G are heauie and others light, therfore more is not to be giuen to one and lesse to the other. I confesse indeed, that in the exercises of the body, some honour is due to such things: but in thinges belon­ging to a Citie, it is doubtfull and in contro [...]ersie. Wherefore those that are noble, free, and rich, haue good reason to assume vnto themselues this honour: for it is necessary, that Citizens be free, and rich, able to support publicke charge, and pay tributes: for a City cannot possibly stand of all poore men and seruants. Nowe if a City stand in neede of such thinges as these, it must also necessarily stand in neede of iustice and warlike vertue, which are full as necessary, except that a Citie cannot bee, nor consist without the former, but it cannot well bee, nor consist without the latter: It should seeme therefore, that all these thinges, or some of them doe contend with e­quity H in the establishing of a City: and that discipline and vertue contend in the leading of a happie life, as it hath beene declared before. But forasmuch as those that are equall in one thing onely, ought not to ascribe vnto themselues equality in all: nor those that are vnequall in one, inequality in all, therefore it is necessary, that all such formes of Commonweales bee faultie, and farre from the right. It hath alreadie beene declared, that all doe contend iustly after a sort, and yet not all simply iustly [...] rich men, because they haue more lands and territories, which lands are common: besides, in contracts and bargaines, more credite is giuen vnto them. Free men and Nobles, as neighbours, seeing that those which haue more Nobility, haue more right in a City then the ignoble. And euery one esteemeth Nobilitie in his countrey, as a thing very honora­ble, I seeing it is likely, that the best Parents should beget the best children: for Nobility is nothing els but the vertue of the stocke and race. In like manner, wee may say that vertue dooth con­tend rightfully: for wee call iustice a sociable and ciuile vertue, which draweth on with it all other vertues necessarily: yea and many contend also with fewe, and that not without cause: for they are euen more mighty, richer, and better, if many be compared with fewe. There­fore if all these were in one City, I meane good men, rich men, and Nobles, and withall another ciuill multitude, whether would there bee any contention betweene these or no, Which of them should administer the Commonweale? Therefore in euery one of these Commonweales before spe­cified, that iudgement is vndoubtfull and without controuersie, who ought to commaund and K beare rule therein. For the difference of States ariseth by the difference of those that beare rule and authoritie in the states, as one in that state which is gouerned by the rich, another in that which is gouerned by good men, and so of the rest in like manner. Neuerthelesse, let vs consider if these things should happen at one and the same time, howe they are to bee determined. If the vertuous bee a very small number, howe should we then proceed? Must wee haue regard to the worke, if by reason of their paucity they cannot gouerne the City? Or if their number bee great ynough, so that a City may consist of them, yet is there a question and doubt concerning all those that striue for ciuill honours: for they that seeke to gouerne for their wealth sake, or for the No­bility of their stocke, doe seeme to alledge no lawfull cause: because if any one should bee the ri­chest L amongst all, by this reason, that one man should command and gouerne all: in like manner also, if any one should excell all others in Nobility, the same also should excell in authority those, which being free men, contend about the gouernment. The same inconuenience will happen in an Aristocratie, in regard of vertue: for if any one were better then the rest which haue any thing to doe with the publicke gouernement, the same one ought to bee superiour in authority to the rest by that reason. Also if the multitude ought therefore to gouerne, because many are stronger then few; then it followes if one, or some more number then one, but yet fewer then the multi­tude, were stronger the [...] the rest of the multitude, that that o [...]e or they few, should rather com­maund and beare rule then the multitude: All which speeches giue vs to knowe, that none of M these are iust causes, why some should affect the gouernement and desire that others should bee subiect vnto them: for the common people might oppose a certaine right against those which would gouerne by cause of vertue, or by riches: For nothing letteth, but that a muititude may bee better and richer the [...] [...] so [...]e, not respecting them seuerally a part, but as it were all together: wherefore that doubt which is obiected by some, may bee resolued after this man­ner: for some make a question whether a Lawgiuer going about to e [...]act good Lawes, ought to [Page 161] A respect the profite and commoditie of the best, rather then of the most, when as that which wee haue mentioned d [...]th happen. Peraduenture also hee ought to follow that which is right, without any other respect, for that ought to bee esteemed right which is auaileable for the profite of the whole Citie, and the common good of the Citizens. And hee is called a Citizen commonly, that participateth of the office of commanding, and the duty of obeying: and yet this is not all one in euery Commonweale, but in a good Commonweale, hee is a Citizen which can and will obey and command according to a vertuous life.

Forasmuch as the end of ciuill policie is Iustice, respecting that which concerneth B publicke commodity, and also that equity is nothing els but a certaine equality and ex­cellency: wee must consider such an equality and excellencie, not that consisteth in all thngs, but onely in those which appertaine to the worke, and to the politicke end, and so to distribute the offices and honours of the Commonweale. In which regard men are often deceiued in euery estate, in supposing that if they excell in riches and nobili­ty, or some such like thing, therfore the cheefe dignities belong vnto them. Now if such a prerogatiue should take place, or be of force, it were as meet also to consider the excel­lencie of the complexion, of beauty, or of strength, of them that should beare rule, as they vsed to doe in old time in Asia and India: which is a thing most impertinent & ab­surd. C Wherefore it is not conuenient in the communion of the Commonweale, and in the bestowing of offices and dignities, to haue regard to the equality or excellency of al things, but onely of those which concerne the common good. Forasmuch therefore, as the end of a good Commonweale is to liue well according to vertue, the equalitie and excellencie in vertue ought principally therein to bee obserued. For which cause in the state of Venice, the signiors which are true citizens, to the end to preuent all such com­petitorie quarrels and contentions, haue this institution amongst them, to distribute their publicke offices in such sort, that as farre as may possibly bee, all the families may be partakers of those common dignities: And yet with such aduisement and considera­tion, D that onely those that are renowmed for wisedome, bounty, and vertue, do gouerne and manage their affaires: mingling thus together the Democratie and Aristocraticall Oligarchie, when they vse partly casting of lots, which is Democraticall, as in the crea­tion of electours: and partly election which is Aristocraticall in the distribution of ho­nours, committing the same to the estimate and censure of the Cittizens. For to chuse Magistrates by lot, is proper to a Democratie, and they which proceed so, doe measure and ballance equity by an Arithmeticall equality, which would haue all men to enioy the like priuiledge of right and profite, and the like ability to obtaine Magistracies, be­cause they are all Cittizens and freemen, and therefore equall priuiledges are due to e­quall E persons. But in an Oligarchie they proceede after another sort, for it would haue the greatest and highest dignities to bee conferred vpon those that are in greatest and highest esteeme in regard of riches and Nobilitie, because that vnequall priuiledges doe appertaine to vnequal persons. But these two opinions doe erre in this, that the for­mer measureth equality onely by number, that is, in that they are all Cittizens; and the latter esteemeth equality only by riches and nobility: for seeing that the body politicke was first ordained to this end, that men might liue well and happily, onely vertue ought to make this difference: of which matter, more shall bee spoken hereafter in the first Chapter of the fift booke of this worke.

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CHAP. IX. When a man doth greatly excell in vertue, how they ought to be­haue themselues: and of Ostracisme.

IF any one, or more then one, and yet not so many as may bee able to make a full complement of a city, doe excell others so much, according to the excellency of vertue, that the vertue of all other, nor their ciuill power, be equally comparable with theirs, if they be many; if they be one, with one: yet these are not to be numbred to the parts of a City: for they H should bee preiudiced which are so vnequall, according to vertue and ci­uil power, if they shall not bee thought worthie to obtaine things equall. 1 Therfore it is likely such a man to be as a god amongst men: from whence it appeareth, both the 2 constitution of lawes to be necessary amongst equals; both in kind and power: but according to such there is no law, for they themselues are a law vnto themselues: and he were ridiculous which should go about to decree lawes against thē. They would alledge perchance that which Antisthenes said the Lions to haue spoken when as Hares did conferre in an assembly, and euery one requested 3 that they might haue al things equal. Therfore the popular cities do constitute an Ostracisme for such a cause, for they seem to prosecute equality aboue al things: so that they did Ostracise, & vntil I some definit times remoue them from the citie who did seeme to excel in power of riches, of mani­fold friendship, or any other political force. It is reported the Argonauts to haue relinquished Her­cules for this cause, they would not therfore bring him to Argo with others, as excelling much the Mariners: therfore they are not thought simply to reprehend aright, those that do dispraise the ty­ranny, 4 & that counsel of Periander to Thrasibulus. They say Periander to haue answered nothing to him that sent a Legat for counsel, but to haue made euen the corn, in taking away the most emi­nent eares of corne: whence the Legat not knowing the cause of the thing done, declaring the ac­cident, Thrasibulus conceiued that it was behoofefull to take away the most excellent men: for this dooth not onely agree with tirants, neither doe tirants onely these things, but it is thus like­wise K in Oligarchies & Democraties: but Ostracisme hath the same power af [...]er a maner, to cut off the most excellent, & to repul [...]e thē: the same do the Potentates in Cities & nations: as the Athe­nians did amongst the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; after they had more mightily cō ­firmed to thēselues their Empire, they humbled thē against their couenants. The king of the Per­sians did oftentimes cut short & abase those Medes & Babilonians, & other insolent men, which had borne the gouernmēt. This probleme generally doth concerne all Cōmonweales, & those that are good: for these disordered Cōmonweales which are only respectiue of their priuat good, do this, & not they alone, but those which entend the cōmon good, are like affected: this is manifest by o­ther arts and sciences. The painter will not permit any liuing creature pictured, to haue a greater L foot thē is proportionable, not although it doth excell in beauty; nor a shipwright the hinder part of the ship, or any other part to be larger then it should be: neither the master of a quire wil admit 5 him to sing in the quire which hath a louder or a better voice thē the whole quire. Wherefore, for this cause nothing doth hinder the Monarchs, that they should not cōsent vnto the cities in this, if they respect their priuat security, & the profit of their subiects. Thus according to the cōfessed ex­cellencies, the treatise cōcerning Ostracisme, hath something that is iust and politick: but it is bet­ter certainly, that the lawmaker should compasse his Commonweale at the beginning, that it may not need this medicine. The second meane is, if it so happen, to endeuor with some such discipline to correct it; which was not done in the cities: for they did not looke to the profit of a priuat Com­mōweale, M but they vsed these Ostracismes mutinously. In troublesome & disordered Cōmonweals, that it is priuatly commodious & iust, it is manifest; perchance not that it is simply iust. But in the best gouerned cōmonweals it hath some doubt, not according to the excellency of some good things, as power, riches, & much friendship; But if any man excell in vertue: what is meet to bee done then? For they ought not to banish such a man, nor so much as ouerrule him. This hath a resem­blance with those which deuiding kingdomes amongst themselues, doe seeke to gouerne Iupiter [Page 163] A himselfe. It remaineth therfore (which seemeth a thing naturall) that all obey such a one dutiful­ly, so that kings should be such as may be perpetuall in cities.

If either one or a few persons doe so much excell in vertue in cities, that none other are to be compared with them, it is iust and requisite that they doe alwaies commaund ouer the rest; but the like is not to be vsed amongst them that excell in riches, nobility, or plurality of friends: for where regard is had to such goods in the distribution of ho­nours, there the state of Commonweale is corrupted and depraued. But yet in euery Commonweale, bee it good or bad, it is best that there bee not amongst the Citti­zens B too great inequalitie, and it is meete to preuent this by Lawes and constitu­tions.

THEREFORE it is likely, such a one to bee as a god amongst men.] The Prophetesse Py­thia 1 being inspired with the fury of her god, called Lycurgus the Spartane Lawgiuer, a man beloued of the gods, and a god rather then a man: And whereas he required grace to be able to establish good lawes in his countrey, shee tolde him that Apollo graunted him his desire, and that hee should erect and ordaine such a forme of Commonweale, as should bee esteemed the best and perfectest that euer was in the world. Plutarch in C the life of Licurgus. There is nothing here below more acceptable vnto God, nor more approching to his diuinitie, then to raigne well in iustice and equity. Wherefore euery good King and Monarch ought rather to seeke for praise and reputation from good­nesse and vertue, then that which proceedeth from might and puissance: for as the di­uine essence, to the which kings so much desire to conforme and equalize themselues, doth excell all other essences and natures, in three things principally, to wit, in immor­talitie, power, and bountie, certainely of the three, bounty and vertue is most venerable, and that wherein most of the diuinity appeareth: for, as for incorruptibility & immor­tality, the foure elements and the void place, are so as well as God, as the naturall Philo­sophers D hold: and as for force and power, the earthquakes, the thunders, the violent tempests of winds, the streames and innundations of waters, haue that also; but as tou­ching iustice, vprightnesse, and equity, there is nothing in the worlde that can pertake thereof, except it bee a diuine thing, by the meanes of reason and vnderstanding. And therefore albeit that men ordinarily carry three different affections towards the gods; one, in that they esteeme them happie, another wherwith they feare them, and the third whereby they honour them: it seemeth that they account them happie, because of the eternitie and immortality of their essence; that they fear them and stand in awe of them, because of their soueraigntie and almightinesse; and that they loue, honour, and wor­ship E them because of their iustice: and yet notwithstanding, of these three qualities, those which men most desire, are immortalitie, whereof humane nature is not capa­ble: and power, the greatest part whereof dependeth vpon fortune: and in the meane while, they leaue vertue behind, which is the only good thing of the goods, and where­of wee may bee pertakers: wherein they deceiue and abuse themselues greatly, because vertue and iustice doth make their life, who are placed in high hegree of fortune, full of power and of diuine and heauenly authoritie, and iniustice maketh it brutish & sauage [...] Plutarch in the life of Aristides.

BVT according to such, there is no lawe.] Xenophon in the eight booke of his Paedia 2 F reporteth of Cirus, that hee accounted a good Prince to bee a liuing and seeing lawe, who might command and punish, as the laws, those which doe not their duty. And that in regard of his life, hee vsed such temperance and modestie, that hee gaue example vn­to others to liue after his patterne, iudging that the common people would endeuour themselues so much the more to lead a temperate life, if they did behold abstinencie in him, who had more power and libertie to doe euill. And in very truth, there is no lawe more conuenient for the good ordering of a Commonweale, then the example of the [Page 164] king, shewing first in himselfe the way that hee would haue others to walke in, and re­presenting G in his owne person, that which hee giueth in charge vnto others, in com­mending some things, and blaming others, and alwaies disgracing those which are diso­bedient: for such as are the rulers and Princes, such is the estate for the most part, the subiects conforming themselues naturally after the manners of their superiours, and imitating that which they see to bee acceptable and pleasing to them. Plato De Legibus, lib. 4. Cicero, lib. 2. Plutarch in his worke intituled, That learning is requisite in a Prince.

3 THEREFORE the popular Cities doe constitute an Ostracisme for such a cause, for they seem to prosecute equalitie aboue all things.] Plutarch in the life of Themistocles, sayeth thus: H At last the Athenians banished and expelled him out of their Citty for the space of fiue yeares, with an intention to rebate and weaken his too great authority and credite, as they were accustomed to doe to all those, whose power seemed to them excessiue and vnmeasurable, because of that equalitie which ought to bee amongst Cittizens in a popular state: for this kind of banishment for a season, which was called an Ostracisme, was not the punishment of any offence, but rather was as it were a restraint and alle­ [...]ation of the enuie of the common people, which delighted to abate and humble those persons which seemed to exceed in too much greatnesse, and by this meanes did let out and giue vent, as it were, to the venome of their malice, by this diminution of honour. I The same Authour in the life of Aristides sayeth: That at the first the sirname of Iust, gained to Aristides great loue and fauour of the people, but afterwards it stirred vp and engendred enuie vnto him, and that by the deuises of Themistocles: who went about reporting euerie where, that Aristides had abolished and disanulled all the iudge­ments, forasmuch as by the good liking and consent of parties, hee was alwayes cho­sen an Arbitrator, to take knowledge and giue iudgement of all controuersies, and that by this meanes hee went about secretly to acquire vnto himselfe a soueraigne puissance of a Monarch, without hauing neede either of guards or attendants meete for such a place. Moreouer, the people being growne mightie since the victorie at Marathon, K and being desirous that all thinges should whollie and entirelie depend vpon them and their authoritie, tooke it ill, and was displeased when any one in priuate surpas­sed the rest in good renowme and reputation. By meanes whereof, they flocked to­gither from all quarters of the Countrey of Attica into the Citty, and banished Ari­stides with the banishment called Ostracisme, disguising and cloaking the enuy which they bore vnto his glorie, vnder the name of feare of tyrannie: for this kinde of ba­nishment called Ostracisme, or Exostracisme, was not a punishment ordained for anie crime or offence, but as some say, to giue vnto it an honest vizard, it was inuented onely for an abating and weakening of too great authority, and power too excessiue L for a popular state: but in verie deede, it was no other thing but a deuise to con­tent and asswage gentlie and fauourablie the enuy which the people conceiued against some particular person: which enuie did not disgorge it selfe in anie vnrecouerable euill against him whose greatnesse displeased them, but onely in this, that it banished and constrained him to absent himselfe for tenne yeares. But after that by practises and deuises they began to punish after this sort base fellowes, and some­times wicked persons, as Hiperbolus who was the last that was banished, the A­thenians desisted altogether from the vse thereof. It will not bee amisse to declare in this place how and for what cause this Hiperbolus was banished. Alcibiades and M Nicias were the cheefest men of authoritie of their time in Athens, who hauing stung and wrenched one another, as it ordinarily happeneth betwixt equals, and perceiuing that the people in a certaine assemblie were about to proceed to this iudgement of O­stracisme, they doubted much that it was to this end to banish one of them two, where­vpon they conferred togither, and agreed themselues & their adherents and followers, and so coupled them all in one league, in such sort, that when they came to collect the [Page 165] A voices of the people, to see by the plurality of suffr [...]ges who should be [...] banished, and who not, it came to passe that it was neither of them, but one Hiperbolus, with whom the people we [...]e so discontented. They therefore seeing that order of Ostracisme so em­based and dishonoured, would neuer more vse it, but vtterly abolished the vse thereof. But to make it knowne summarily what this was, and how it was vsed: It is to bee obser­ued, that vpon a certaine set and prefixed day, euery Cittizen brought a shell, whereon he wrote the name of him whom hee would haue to be banished, and brought it into a certaine sure place enclosed with a wall of wood, which was there made for that pur­pose: after, when euery one had brought thither his shell, the Magistrates and Officers B of the City came to recken all the shels togither: for if the number of Cittizens, that brought shels thus written, was lesse then six thousand, then the Ostracisme was imper­fect. This being done, they diuided and put apart all the shels that had the same names writtē in them, and he that was found written in the most shels, was by the sound of the trumpet proclaimed banished for ten years, during the which, he enioied neuerthelesse all his goods. Therfore as euery man thus wrote vpon his shel his name whom he would haue banished, it is reported that there was a certaine peasant so blockish and ignorant, that hee could neither write nor read, who came to Aristides, meeting him first, & gaue to him his shel, desiring him that he would write thereon the name of Aristides, wherat C Aristides wondering, asked him whither Aristides had done him any displeasure or no: no answered the peasant, and that which is more, I doe not know the man, but it displea­seth me to heare him so called euery where by the name of iust. Aristides hauing heard this answere, replied not a word, but wrote himselfe his owne name vpon the shell, and so gaue it him againe.

AND that counsel of Periander to Thrasibulus.] Aristotle in this work, lip. 5. ca. 10. saith: 4 That tiranny draweth this euil from a Democratie, to make war vpon the nobles, and to destroy them either coue [...]tly or openly, and to banish them as enemies to the state, see­ing that from thence spring vp conspiracies & treasons, when as some desire to gouern, D and others are not willing to obey: Wherfore Periander aduised Thrasibulus, that hee should lop off the most eminent eares of corne, as if he should alwaies cut off the most apparant & renowmed Citizens. Herodotus in his first booke intituled Terpsichore, wri­teth that Thrasibulus gaue this counsel to Periander, and not Periander to Thrasibulus, as Aristotle here reporteth in these two places. But howsoeuer it was, the story is stil of the same substance. After (saith Herodotus) that Periander trafficked by embassage with Thrasibulus a potentate of Militum, hee beeame more cruell and bloody then euer was his father Cypselus, he sent to the same Thrasibulus to knowe by what meanes after hee had confirmed his estate, hee might best gouerne his Cittie. Thrasibulus led his Emba­ssadour E out of Miletum into a large corne field, and there began to walke, questioning with the Embassadour about his iourney, and of the accidents which had befallen him since his comming from Corinth, in the meane while striking downe the eares of corn which were higher then the rest, and casting them to the ground, thus spoiling a whole field of goodly thicke corne. When he had thus walked sufficiently, without giuing any other answere to the Embassadour, he sent him away: who returning to Corinth, Peri­ander was very desirous to heare some newes of his Embassage, but hee tolde him, that Thrasibulus had nothing at all aduised him touching his demand, & that he maruelled why he had sent him to such a foolish and sencelesse fellow, which spoiled his own good; F & thervpon recounted all that which Thrasibulus had done: but Periander vnderstood right well that Thrasibulus meaning was, that he should put to death all the cheefest mē of Corinth, & therupon practised all the cruelty in the world towards his subiects, fini­shing the murders of his fathers Cypselus, by putting to death all that were left by him.

Wherfore for this cause nothing dooth hinder the Monarches, that they should not consent 5 vnto cities in this, if they respect their pri [...]te security, & the profit of their subiects.] Aristotle [Page 166] Polit. lib. 7. cap. 3. sayth: That the changes of Commonweales doe happen by an vnpro­portionable G growth: For euen as the body is composed of parts & members, and ought to growe by proportion, to the end, that there may bee a commensuration in all parts, otherwise it perisheth, when the foot is foure cubites long, and the rest of the body but two handbreadths, yea and oftentimes it might bee transformed into the shape of ano­ther beast, if it should not onely in quantity, but also in quality encrease aboue iust pro­portion: so a Citty is constituted of many parts, amongst the which, oftentimes some one groweth more largely then the rest. In the same booke, cap. 8. This is a common rule in a Democratie, Oligarchie, Monarchie, and euery kind of policy, not to make any too great aboue measure; but rather to distribute small Offices, and of long continuance, H then great, and short: for men are quickly depraued, and it is not in euery one to support the prosperity of fortune: or at least when much power is giuen to any, not to take it from them againe all at once, but by little and little: and especially to prouide by lawes, that no man doe aduance himselfe too much in friends and riches; but that if there bee any such, they be commanded to absent themselues out of the City: and if any member of the Citty becommeth through prosperity too insolent and haughtie, there ought re­gard to be had thereunto by the same meanes. In the same booke cap. 9. As a nose passing the iust proportion, is notwithstanding faire and well fauoured, but if it bee stretched out excessiuely, then first the member is depriued of mediocritie, and at last it commeth I to that passe, that it hath not any more the shape of a nose, by reason of the excesse or defect of contraries: and the same is to be thought of the rest of the members. The like happeneth in Commonweales, for an Oligarchie or a Democratie might be tollerable, albeit they were somewhat declining from their right institution: but if either the one or the other be extended too farre, then first the Commonweale is but hurt and made worse, but at last it becommeth no Cōmonweale at all. In the same booke, cap. 11. More­ouer, there is a generall Caueat for the safety and preseruation of euery Monarchie, not to suffer any one to growe too mightie, or if it must be so, then to make more then one, because they will obserue and haue an eie to each other: or if by chance it be necessarie K to aduance some one, not to take such a one as is of stout and proud conditions, for such are in all actions great vndertakers and enterprisers. And againe, if it seemeth meete to abase and put downe the credite and authority of any great man, it behooueth that it be done by little and little, and not at one clap. This aduertisement hath ben ill vnderstood, and worse practised by many Kings, Emperors, and Monarchs, who hauing exalted too high some of their friends and seruitours, haue beene afterwards either themselues or their children ruinated and destroyed by them: or sometimes when they haue smelt out their faults, haue ben constrained to put them to death, as Tiberius serued Seianus, into whose hands he had before committed the whole gouernment of the Romane Empire. L Sultan Solyman put to death in like manner Hibrahim Bassa, whom he had almost made equall to himselfe a little before in authority, in such sort, that they called him king of the Gardiners, and the Bassa the king of the souldiours: And notwithstanding, vpon a certaine night hauing inuited him to supper, and forced him to lie in the pallace, hee caused him to be slaine, and his body to be cast into the sea, and the next morrow all his goods to be seized and transported as things confiscate, no man euer knowing the true cause of his death, saue that he was growne too great, and consequently suspected of his Lord, and hated of others. Paulus Iouius discourseth hereof at large at the end of the 32. booke of his Hystories: Who also in the 14. booke sayeth, That the Turkish Empire is M principally gouerned by the counsell & prowesse of slaues, who can easily without dan­ger to the prince be aduanced to great honours and offices, and without tumult and en­uy of the people, bee abased, thrust downe, and murthered. The Crowne of France was translated from the race of Clouis vnto the stocke of Charles Martel, by giuing too much authority to the Maires of the pallace, and the Constables of France: and by the same meanes was again transplanted from this linage to another. Paulus AEmilius, lib. 1. [Page 167] A & 2. & 3. of the French history: who also writing of Dagobert speaketh thus, The kings at that time did enioy onely the name of kings, but the authority of kings, and absolute gouernment of the kingdome, was in the Constables hands: for they were so slo [...]thfull and so much addicted to their pleasure, that no account was made of them. And thus the gallant house of Clouis degenerated, and came to nothing. And as much as their predecessors made it their cheefest glory to encrease their kingdomes and signories: So much these their successours placed all their felicity and happinesse in idlenesse and vo­luptuous pleasure: They shewed themselues onely abroad in publicke, the first day of May, when they receiued those presents which were giuē them, not entermedling with B any other affaires of the Commonweale. On the other side, the Constables receiued the Embassages of forraine Kings and Emperours, and gaue them their answeres, making at their discretions, leagues and truces, warre and peace, ordinances & laws for the whole kingdome: and by howe much the more the kings did reiect and cast off all such care, as being a thing too painefull, by so much the more did the Constables augment and en­crease their power and authoritie. See howe the mind of man is neuer content with the fauours of fortune, and neuer satiate. The Constables which came vp of so lowe a de­gree, being at the first called but Maires of the pallace, grewe so in short time, that they quickly attained to that high and great authority, that they made no reckoning not of C the kings themselues, being so idle and slouthful: who if they had gone about to refrain and bridle this boldnesse, seeing that they could doe nothing of themselues, could hard­ly haue vndone that which they had done and suffered so long, because it was thought that these Constables had had this great power from all conti [...]uance of time, and that the absolute command and rule of the kingdome was due vnto them. Therefore those that are elected to any kingdome, ought diligently to haue care to ouerturne and pre­uent the too great boldnesse of their subiects, at the very birth and beginning of it: for after that it is once engrafted and hath taken roote, it is impossible to pull it out againe, without the full destruction of the parties, and often also with their dammage and de­struction, D that seeke to quench the same. This therefore may serue in steed of an exam­ple for Kings, Emperors, and other Princes, for the history should be written to no end and purpose, if they should not learne thereby to raigne well, and vertuously to gouern the Commonweale. In regard of this, almost all Commonweales both auncient and moderne, haue ben by succession of times filthily beguiled, except the Venetian onely: which besides that the Nobles and Lords who haue the rule and managing thereof, are not ambitious, hath by certaine constitutions moderated the authority of Magistrates, depriuing them in the greatest affaires, of soueraigne power; and creating them almost all of short continuance, together with this prouiso, that three of one linage may neuer E bee lawfull Senatours, or other Magistrates at one time, to the end, that one part of the Communaltie should not become stronger then the other, but that all should be parta­kers of the publicke power and authority. Moreouer, tenne men were appointed whose charge and office was principally to foresee and prouide that no sedition or ciuill quar­rell might rise amongst the Citizens, whence any faction might grow, and that no trea­son or surprise might be attempted against the Citty by any wicked Citizen desirous of raigne, or ouerladen with debts or crimes: and that if perchauncc any such mischeefe should secretly happen, they had soueraine power in their hands to punish and correct them, and to procure that the weale publick sustaine no detriment. Also to the end, that F no Citizen might make himselfe too mighty in deeds of armes, and attendance of men, & so get means to attempt ought against the signory; they vse in their land wars strange souldiours, euen to the Generall of the armie, who ordinarily is some Prince or Lord of Italy wel experimented and reported of in feats of warre, to whom they giue good and honorable entertainment, who neuerthelesse dareth not decern or determine any thing without the counsel of them which are conioined with him in commission by the signo­ry. Contarin, lib. 3. & 5. of the Commonweale.

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CHAP. X. Of a kingdome, and the seuerall kinds thereof.

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THese thus manifested, it is expedient peraduenture to discourse otherwise, and to consider of a kingdome: for this forme of gouernment wee say is to bee reckoned in the number of those that bee good. But wee are to consider whether it bee expedient for a Citie and Country where­in men are to liue well and happily, that men obey the rule of a king, or follow some other course or gouernement: or whether it bee conuenient to some to bee subiect to the regall Empire, and to some others, not so conducible. But first wee are to diuide and distinguish of gouernements, and to see whether the I 1 gouernement of one or of many bee best. And this is easie to bee knowne, that there be ma­ny kindes of gouernements, and that the order of gouernement is not alike in all men. For the forme of the Commonweale amongst the Lacedemonians seemeth to bee the most per­fect Commonweale of all approoued Commonweales, and yet one King enioyeth not soue­raigntie: but when hee is out of the Lacedemonian bounds, hee is but captaine and prin­cipall of warlike affaires. Further, all diuine matters concerning the seruice of the gods are committed vnto them. This kingdome therefore is like to a walike Empire, which captaines in warre [...]btaine in their cheefe and perpetuall gouernement: For hee hath not authoritie to put to death, but in a certaine kingdome onely, and in warlike affaires, as it is amongst K the auncient, by a certaine Lawe which consisteth in blowes and armes. The which Homer declareth: For Agamemnon heard patiently reuiling speeches and taunts in publicke as­semblies, but out of an assemblie had free and entire power of putting to death, for so hee sayeth: Whome I shall see to depart from the battaile to the Nauie, let not him thinke that hee hath so escaped the foules and the dogges: and in another place, I haue sentence and cheefe power of death in my handes. This therefore is one kingdome, the Empire of warre in the whole course of life. And of these kinde of kingdomes, some are Heredita­rie, and appertaining to a linage, othersome by election, and the choice and suffrages of the people. There is another kinde of Monarchie besides this, as are kingdomes amongst L certaine Barbarians. All these haue force and power like vnto a Tyrannicall Empire, notwithstanding, they are agreeable to the lawe, and Hereditarie: For, because that the Barbarians are of more seruile manners then the Grecians, and Asians, and Euro­pians, they beare a Maisterlike sway, neither doe they this anie way against their wils: These kingdomes are therefore tyrannous for this cause, notwithstanding sure and stedfast, both because they are so ordered by the countries, as also because they are so by discent of auncestrie, and also legitimate. And the custodie is regall, not tyrannicall, for the same cause; for Kings are beset and guarded with the weapons of Citizens, but tyrants with for­raine power: for these rule by Lawe, and men obey them willingly: but those against M lawe raigne ouer men in despight of them. So these haue the custodie of Citizens offered them, these other haue it gotten by strength. These are two kinde of Monarchies there­fore. There is another furthermore, that flourished amongst the auncient Grecians, which 2 they call AEsynnetas: And this kinde of Monarchie is altogether affected of Tyrants, whether it bee by voice or consent of the people offered, which differeth from a barbarous tyrannie, not in that it is not agreeable to the lawe, but in that they descend not by auncestrie [Page 169] A nor kindred. And this kinde of Empire, some obtained all their life, some others vntill someset times, and to doe some certaine thinges: for example sake, the Mitylenaei deliuered and ga­thered in times past one Pyttacus against certaine exiles, whose leaders were Antimeni­des and Alceus the Poet. And Alceus the Poet declareth in a certaine rayling verse, that Pyttacus the Tyrant was taken of the Mitylanians: for hee findeth fault with them, that they created Pyttacus (a man borne in a base and miserable country) Tyrant ouer a meane and an vnfortunate Citie: and being gathered together, extolled him to heauen with prai­ses. These Monarchies therefore both are and were (because they were tyrannous) mai­sterlike and proper to lords: but in that they were electiue and offered by consent of the peo­ple, B and also in that they are vsed ouer voluntaries, they are regall. Nowe the fourth kinde of regall Monarchie comprehendeth the same which flourished in those heroicall times, in the which the people obeyed of their owne accord; and those which were by succession and le­gitimate. For because that the first men deserued well of the multitude, either by inuen­ting 3 the Arts; or making warres, or because they gathered together the dispersed, or be­cause they affoorded them ground and lande, they were not onely created Kinges of the voluntaries themselues, but also they yeelded vp their kingdome obtained, to their children and posteritie: And they had in their power the disposition of the warlike Empire, and those sacrifices, which belonged not to the Priests, and besides they decided controuersies. And C this did diuers of them, being sworne, and diuers others vnsworne: And this oath was made by the taking vp of the scepter. Kings therefore which were in auncient times, did alwaies moderate and gouerne ciuill and rurall affaires, and those thinges which stret­ched themselues beyond the bounds of the Empire. And lastly, Kings dismissing partlie of their owne accord these thinges, and the people partlie detracting in other Cities, sa­crifices were left onely for kinges: but in those parts which worthily merited the name of a kingdome, they onely helde the principality of martiall discipline out of the limits of the kingdome.

D AFTER hee hath intreated of Policie in generall, hee nowe commeth par­ticularly to handle the [...]euerall kindes thereof. And first the kingdome or regall power, which is the best forme and most absolute, whereof there are found foure kinds: the first practised of olde in Lacedemonia, and nowe in Arragon, according as Sepulueda testifieth. The second like vnto the Barbarian kingdomes, which al­beit they are legitimate, and Hereditarie, yet notwithstanding they obserue a signi­orall and maisterly gouernement: as is the state of the Turke, of the Muscouite, and of Prester Iohn. Such was in time past the kingdome of Persia, according as Plato De Legibus, lib. 5. And Socrates in his Panegericke beare witnesse. The third is ele­ctiue, E not Hereditarie [...] in some places for tearme of life, as the Empire of Germany, the kingdome of Polonia, and of Bo [...]emia, of Denmarke, and Hungarie: in other place for tearme of time, as was the Dictatorship in Rome. The fourth proper to the heroicke times, which was not at the beginning vsurped by violence and force, but collated voluntarily by the people, and after lawfully deriued to their successours who had in time of warre soueraine power, and were cheefe ouer the most solemne ce­remonies belonging to the gods.

AND this is easie to bee knowne, that there bee manie kindes of gouernements, and 1 F that the order of gouernement is not alike in all kingdomes.] Some kingdomes are He­reditary, and others electiue. Hereditary kingdomes are either by succession from male to male onely, as the kingdome of Fraunce, which the French men wisely ordained at the first by the Salicke law, their kingdome continuing by that prouidence in the same forme of gouernement these twelue hundred yeares, the Crowne neuer departing out of their Nation, and the royall linage being neuer chaunged but thrice in so long continuance: The like whereof hath neuer happened in any other Monarchie, [Page 170] signory, or popularity, that is in mind of man, where the issue male failing, females haue G succeeded: as in Spaigne, England, and Scotland. Further, in Hereditary kingdomes where the males onely succeede, in some places that honour is onely kept for the first borne, honest portions being alotted to the younger brethren, as in France: or els with­out regard had to the birthright, hee is preferred of the sonnes, which is found most fit and able to gouerne, or he that is most warlike disposed, and most fauoured of the soul­diours, as in Turkie, Selimus the first, being the third and last sonne of Baiazeth the se­cond, vsurped by the helpe of the Ianissaries, the Empire from his father himself, whom hee caused to bee poysoned, and his two elder brethren, Achmat and Corcuth to bee slaine, with all their nephewes and linage of Ottoman: saying that nothing was more H sweet then to raigne without the feare of kindred. In other places they doe not put to death their brethen and kindred, but pinne them vp close in some sure guard, as they do in AEthiopia, where hee onely remaineth, that must reigne, the rest are all sent into a high and strong Mountaine, called the Mountain of the Israelites: whence it is not law­full for any male euer to issue, except it fal out, that Prester Iohn die without heire of his bodie to succeede in the Crowne: for then one is taken out who is neerest in blood, or thought most worthy in reputation. By this meanes a kingdome so great, hath continu­ed a long while without the disturbance of ciuill warres and murthers, the stalke of the royall race remaining thus vnspoiled, and the braunches thereof hauing not stained I their hands in each others blood. A wonderfull happinesse, and such as seemeth rather to betide by some diuine power, then by any humane prudence: the like order not ha­uing beene obserued in any other Realme, auncient or moderne. In Calecuth when the king dieth, although hee haue sonnes of his owne, and nephewes by his brothers side, yet neither the one nor the other succeedeth in the kingdome, but onely his sisters son: and when hee wants, the next vnto him of the blood royall commeth to the Crowne: The which so strange and vnused custome is only obserued in this state, the reason ther­of being founded vpon a certain foolish superstition which they haue, namely, because the young Queene is defloured first by some young Priest called a Bramin, and that whē K the king goeth abroad, the Bramins haue the continuall guard and ouersight ouer her. Therefore they suppo [...]e, that the children borne of such a dame, smell more of the Bra­min, then of the king. Other kingdomes are electiue, as the Empire of Germanie, the [...]ingdome of Polonia, of Bohemia, and lately of Hungarie, before the vsurpation of the Turke: which states are not ordinarily so assured and so durable, as Hereditaries are. In electiue kingdomes, the election is either made out of such persons as please the ele­ctors to propound, as in Germany, where the Emperours are chosen, not onely out of the families of the Germane Princes, but also sometimes out of strange Nations, as Alphon [...]us king of Spaigne, and Richard king of England: or els the election is out of L some certaine persons, or some inferiour states, as the Pope out of the Cardinals: and not long since the Souldan of Cai [...]e out of the Mamelucs, into the which order, none could be admitted, except hee had beene a slaue first, and one that denied the Christian faith. In all ages and memory of man, there was neuer found such an estate wherein bondslaues which are subiect in all places, doe command so prowdly and couetously, as they do in AEgypt & Siria. Peter Martyr of Millan in his embassage to Babilon or Caire. The which state hauing continued about three hundred yeares, was vtterly ruined to­gether with the order of the Mamelucs, in the yeare of our Lord 1517. and the last soul­dan taken and drawne backwards on an asse along the City Caire, and after hanged at M one of the gates of the said Cittie. The great maister of Malta is elected out of the prin­cipall Priors of his religion: as also was he of Pru [...]sia, before the agreement made with the king of Polonia, by which accord his state was conuerted into a Dukedome subiect vnto the Crowne of Polonia: and made of electiue, Hereditary. Furthermore, as kings doe differ in succession and election, so doe they also in authority: for some commaund more absolutely, of whom we wil entreat afterward: others haue their souerain power [Page 171] A ruled and moderated, as the king of Fraunce: who in the first place commandeth no­thing that commeth to effect, which is not signed by his Secretaries, and sealed with his great seale, that is to say, seene and allowed by the Chauncellour, a most seuere control­ler of all dispatches. And it is necessary, that all the royall rescripts or answeres bee ap­prooued by the Iudges, to whome they are directed, who examine them not onely con­cerning things gotten by false suggestions, and by secret and cunning deuises, but also touching the ciuilitie & inciuilitie of them. Also in criminall matters, the restorements to office [...], or things lost or forfeited, the repeals of outlawries and banishment, pardons and remissions, are debated by them with such seuerity, that the procurers thereof are B constrained to present themselues bare headed on their knees, and to yeelde themselues prisoners, of what estate soeuer they be: yea and some of them also are condemned and executed oftentimes togither with their fauours. As touching gifts and expenses, whe­ther ordinary or extraordinary, the chamber of accou [...]ts dooth examine them curiou­sly, and oftentimes doth cut off those which haue no good ground nor foundation: the Officers of that chamber being sworne not to suffer any thing to passe to the detriment of the Realme, whatsoeuer letters of commandement they haue. Amongst other things the king cannot alienate any of his Crowne reuenue, before the cause be heard and al­lowed by the same chamber of counts, and by the Parliaments. And that which is yet C more, no publicke treaties with neighbour states, no edicts nor ordinances, haue anie authority, except they be published openly in the soueraigne courts. By the which mo­deration, his power is nothing lessened and abated, but made more assured and constant. The king of Spaine hauing reduced vnder the obedience of one Crown, the kingdomes of Castile, Aragon, Granada, Leon, Toledo, Galicia, Catalognia, and others, dooth go­uern them according to the auncient customes of the countries, it being not lawfull for him to augment the tributes, or to impose new exactions, without the consent of the e­states. The king or Emperor of Germany, cannot by his owne authority leuie subsidies, nor muster soldiers, without the aduise and accord of the Princes and estates of the Em­pire: D which maketh him both to be so ill obeied of his owne subiects, and so weake to re­sist the Turke & Muscouite his neighbour puissant enemies. And more, if he do not ma­nage the Empire wel, or if he shew himselfe vnworthy of that honour, he may be depo­sed by the Princes electors, as it hath oftentimes come to passe. Munster lib. 3. Iul Pflug. de Repub. German. The Duke of Venice possesseth the honour, dignity, and representation of a king, but yet he can do nothing alone, and being ioined with other Magistrats, hath no more power then one of them: who also are of so small authority, albeit they bee so great, that they can decerne nothing which is of any moment, but by the sentence of the counsell. Contarin. lib. 2. de Repub. Venet. In some Realmes there are nobles & gen­tlemen E that haue vnder their iurisdiction subiects peculier vnto thēselues, as in France, Spaine, Germany, Naples, and Persia. In others the Prince holdeth in his owne handes all the fees, as it was wont to be in France, before the time of Hugh Capet: and is now in Turky, where the great Turke distributeth them to his men of warre, with this charge, to maintained therewith a number of armed men and horses, answerable to the reuenue: and when it pleaseth him, he reuoketh them againe to himselfe. Neither is there in all his dominions, any which possesseth Cities, Castles, or Townes, after the maner of the Persians: or that dwel in strange houses, or that dare build aboue one story, or higher thē a doue house. In England the nobility doth not possesse houses entrenched or fortified, F neither hath any iurisdiction ouer men, it being all in the hands of the king, whether it be high, lowe, or betwixt both. The dignities, as Dukedomes, Marqueships, and Earle­ships, are only titles bestowed at the pleasure of the king: for they that enioy thē, do not for the most part possesse any thing in those places whereof they beare the names, but a certain annual pension is paid thē out of the Kings treasures. There is yet another kinde of kingdome confounded & mingled with the Priestdome, as was in Egipt, where it was [Page 172] not lawfull (as Plato sayeth in his Politicke) for a king to rule being not cheefe Priest al­so. G The royaltie in a Lacedemonia was a superintendancie in war, and a preheminence in sacrifices. Politicke, 5. cap. 10. Also the first kings of Rome were the high priests, and afterwards the Emperours called themselues by the name of Pontifices Maximi, cheefe Priests: and the Emperours of Constantinople were consecrated, as are the kings of France after their imitation. In like maner the Caliphes of the Sarasins were both kings and high Priests in their religion, one of them in Bagadet, another in Caire. Paulus AE­milius De historia Gal. lib. 4. & 5. The King of Calecuth is cheefe in his religion, and for that cause excelleth in dignity all the other kings of India, & is called SAMORY, that is, a god on earth. The Pope commandeth and ruleth the temporality of the church, cal­led H Saint Peters patrimony, as a king: and is reuerenced of the rest of Latine Christen­dome, as the head of religion, I meane in those places where hee is so acknowledged. The Princes of England intitle themselues of late times both kings of the Common­weale, and cheefe heads of the Church. Virgil auoucheth the like of one Hele­nus.

THOSE which are called AEsymnetes.] Aristotle vseth this word in the Chapter following, and in the tenth Chapter of the fourth booke, which some expound King. Dionysius Halycarnasseus translateth it, Dictator: it signifieth also [...], I" that is, An instructor or orderer of an army, or an arbitrator in feates of chi­ualrie.

3 FOR seeing that the former deserued well of the multitude.] Aristotle, Politicke, lib. 5. cap. 10. sayeth: For all those that either haue beene, or may bee benefactors to Citties or Countries, attained to this regall honour: some by procuring that the Cittie might not fall into seruitude and slauery, as Codrus: others deliuering it out of serui­tude into libertie, as Cyrus: others for edifying some Cittie, or enlarging the con­fines of the Countrie, as the kings of Lacedemonia, Macedonia, and Molosse.

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CHAP. XI. Of the fift kind of gouernment, whether it be more expedient for a Cittie to be gouerned by a good man, or by good lawes.

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1 THese are the kinds of gouernements, foure in number, the first which flou­rished in the heroicke times, ouer such as voluntarily subiected themselues in certaine definite matters, for the king himselfe was both generall of the warre, iudge, and high Priest: the second, barbarous successiue by linage, wherein the subiects were gouerned according to the lawes of seruaunts: the third, which they call AEsymnetia, that is, tiranny by election of voi­ces: the fourth Laconicall, that is to say in one word, a perpetuall milita­ry intendencie by tribe: these kingdomes differ thus among themselues. The fift kind of admini­stration, M when one is sole lord of all: as euery Nation and euery Citie hath power ouer common things, and followeth the example of the Oeconomie, for as the Oeconomie is a kinde of houshold gouernment, so is the gouernement of a Citie, and the Oeconomie of one or more Nations. Nowe there are almost two kindes of gouernement, whereof wee are to speake, this, and the Laconicall. The others, or the greater part of them, are a mean betwixt these two. For either the Kings haue [Page 173] A lesse authoritie then in an absolute Commonweale, or more then in the Laconicall: wherefore the whole matter consisteth in two points: the one is, whether it bee profitable to the Citie to haue in it a continual Gouernour and Generall of the warres, and that hee bee created by succession in stocke and linage, or whether hee bee elected by suffrages according to the vertue and dignitie of the person, or whether this bee not so profitable: the other is, whether it bee profitable to haue the Kingdome gouerned by one solely, although the consideration of such a Captaine pertaineth rather to the Lawes, then to the Common-weale, as a thing that cannot hap­pen in euery Commonweale. Leauing therefore the first manner of gouernement, let vs come to the other, which is the forme of a Commonweale, and let vs breefely resolue the doubts B therein.

The beginning of this question is; Whether it bee more expedient for a Commonweale 2 to bee administred by a good man, or by a good Lawes? They which thinke it more expe­dient for Cities to bee gouerned by a King; doe suppose, that the Lawes doe speake onely in generall tearmes, and not to prouide for particular cases, and therefore that it would be absurd and foolish to commaund in anie Art, according to the prescript rules and Lawes of the same. And in AEgypt the Phisitions are not permitted to meddle with any disease before the fourth day being past: and if they doe minister before that time, it is at their pe­rill and hazard. Wherefore it is apparent, that that is not the best forme of regiment, C which followeth the letters of the Lawe. And yet it is necessarie, that this vniuersall reason bee in all Gouernours: For that must needes bee better which is voide of passion and perturbation of the minde, then that which naturally is affected therewith. Nowe, the Lawe is without all passion, but the minde of man is necessarily subiect vnto pertur­bations.

But peraduenture some may obiect, that a good man will recompence the hauing of affections, by being able to iudge in particular cases, which the Lawe cannot doe, and therefore that it is necessarie that hee bee the Lawe-disposer: and also that there bee Lawes written, yet not fullie confirmed and vnuiolable, in regard that they maie D differ and varie from the truth, namely in those thinges which are not within the com­passe of the Lawes, (albeit in other thinges they must bee ratified) as in this question, Whether one good man solely, or manie togither ought to gouerne? For nowe adaies ma­nie assembled togither, doe discusse, consult, and iudge of matters; and all these iudge­ments are of particular cases: Therefore one, whatsoeuer hee bee, compared to manie, is farre inferiour (for a Cittie consisteth of manie) euen as a banquet prepared and furni­shed by manie, is more exquisite then a simple Table: And therefore a multitude iud­geth better then anie one is able to doe. Further, a multitude is lesse subiect to corrup­tion then one, like as water, the more plentifull it is, the lesse it putrifieth. But when E as one Iudge is ouercome with choller, or anie other passion, then must the iudgement needes bee depraued: Whereas in a multitude, all of them cannot bee chollericke or de­ceaued. But let vs suppose a multitude, which doe nothing contrarie to the Lawe, but that which they needes must: or if that bee hard to bee found amongst manie, yet at least, if they were manie good men and good Cittizens, the question is, whether these manie good, bee more or lesse subiect to corruption then one? if it bee replied that they will bee seditio [...]s, which one cannot bee: I answere, that being good and vertuous in minde, they are indeede but as one, though manie. If therefore wee determine the gouerne­ment of manie good men to bee an Aristocratie; and of one, a Regalitie or Monarchie [...] F sure an Aristocratie will bee more welcome to Citties; then a Monarchie, whether the estate bee ioyned with authoritie, or without: For as much as there are to bee found manie of like qualitie. And therefore in times past they suffered themselues to bee gouerned by Kinges, because manie excellent and worthie persons were not then ex­tant, especiallie when as they inhabited small Citties. Furthermore, Kinges were cre­ated onely for their bountifulnesse, which bountifulnesse is the proper office of good [Page 174] men: but when as plentie of these vertuous and good men began to abound, then they G could not anie longer endure the dominion of one, but sought for a c [...]rtaine communitie, and so ordained a Commonweale. Afterwards when these began againe to decline and wax worse, enriching themselues by the common good, it is likely, that from thence arose Oli­garchies, where riches are helde in so high honour and account. Againe, from these they grewe first to Tyrannies, and then from tyrannies to Democrati [...]s: for when through a greedie desire of gaine, they contracted the gouernement to fewer and fewer, by this meanes they fortified the multitude, in such sort, that they inuading and spoiling the Ty­rant of his power, set vp a Democraticall gouernement. And then Cities growing great, it was not easie to chaunge by bringing in anie other. Moreouer, if it were more ex­pedient H for Cities to bee gouerned by Kings, what should become of their children? must they also raigne in their fathers steades? But what if they degenerate from their fathers vertues, would not their regiment bee dangerous? But some will say, that the father hauing all in his owne power, will not bequeath the kingdome to his children? I but this is not credible, and besides it is a vertue that humane Nature is not capable of: Besides, there is a diffic [...]lt question concerning the power of the King, whether hee ought to bee guarded with anie power continually about him, whereby to constraine to subiection the disobedient: or by what other meanes hee should deale in keeping them in obedience. For albeit that hee bee a legitimate and absolute Lorde, not attempting anie I thing contrarie to the lawe, yet it is necessarie for him to haue a power, whereby to pre­serue and mainetaine the sacred Lawes. But it may bee it is no hard matter to decide this doubt in regard of such a King: for hee must needes haue a power alwayes in readi­nesse, but such a power that may bee stronger then euery one in perticular, or many to­gether, and yet weaker then the whole multitude. Such guards did the auncients giue to him whome they created their AEsymnete, as they tearmed him, that is to say, their Tyrant. And Dionysius demaunding of the Syracusians a guard for his defence, a certaine man counselled them to appoint him one of that quantity.

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To the foure former kindes of Kingdomes is adioyned a fift, which is proper­lie called a Kingdome, where the weale publicke is administred at the Princes will, with regard had to the generall profite and commoditie of the subiects. Which kinde of Kingdome is like vnto an Oeconomie: for albeit that a gouer­nour of a familie ordereth his house at his owne will and pleasure, yet neuerthe­lesse hee hath respect to the commoditie of the whole familie. Nowe, all these sortes of kingdomes are reduced to two extreames, to wit, the Lacedemonian, and the absolute. After, vpon the occasion of the Lacedemonian royaltie, which was nothing els but a commission, or militarie superintendance ouer the armies, L hee taketh occasion to dispute whether it bee behoofefull or no for Cities to haue a perpetuall Captaine. Also whether it bee better to chuse him for his vertues, or to take him alwayes out of the same stocke and linage by the right of succes­sion. But relinquishing such a forme of kingdome which may bee in euery state, the Philosopher resteth himselfe principallie vpon the perfect and absolute royal­tie, disputing whether it is better to bee gouerned by good Lawes, or by a good man. They which preferre a good man before good lawes, doe lay the cause vpon this, because it is impossible to ordaine by lawes that which is principally iust, but onely that which is vsually so, the affaires and common dealing of men being so incon­stant M and so changeable, that it cannot bee otherwise: albeit that the vniuersall reason of the law ought to be well vnderstood of the gouernours of a Commonweale. They againe which preferre good Lawes before a good man, say that the Lawe is with­out affections, wherewith the minde of man is sore disturbed; as anger, feare, ambition, auarice, hatred, and such like, which peruerte men placed in seate [Page 175] A of iustice and authority, yea euen the best of them. Therefore hee that would haue the law to comm [...]nd, would haue God to command, and an intelligence without affection: but he that would haue a man, admitteth therewithal a beast, for so is mans nature ouer­swaied with affections: for this cause it seemeth more expedient to bee gouerned by lawes. But because both of these parts bee true, hee proceedeth to dispute, whether it be better to be gouerned by one good man, or by a multitude? Which question is interde­bated, pro & contra, affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as well in this Chapter, as in the next, where it is resolued and discussed. Herodotus in his third booke, called Tha­lia, handeleth the same controuersie: and so also dooth Dionysius Halicarnasseus in B the twelfth booke of the Roman antiquities. And Socrates in his Oration to Sy­machus.

THE first which flourished in the Heroicke times ouer such as voluntarily subiected them­selues 1 in certaine definite matters.] Such were the kings of AEgypt at the beginning, who liued not disordinately, as others that exercised Lordship and dominion, whose onely will serued them instead of a lawe, but followed the constitutions of the lawes, both in collecting their duties and tributes, and also in the manner and frame of their li­uing. And they which serued and ministred vnto them, were not slaues, or of a ser­uile C condition, whether they were borne and brought vp in the house, or brought from elsewhere: but onely the sonnes of Nobles and Princes, of the age of twentie yeares, instructed in all Sciences of learning, were deputed for the seruice of the kings, to the end that the king being stirred [...] by the view of those that were about him, might keepe himselfe from committing any thing worthie of reproch: And surely it happe­neth not sildome, that great Lords become wicked and corrupt, especially when they haue seruants and ministers to flatter and applaud, and set forward their sensuall desires and affections. There were certaine appointed and set houres both by night and day, wherein the king was bound to doe that which the lawe permitted. The king ri­sing D in the morning, the first thing that hee was to doe, was to receiue all the let­ters and petitions which were presented vnto him, to the end, that by giuing an­swere to necessarie matters, all his affaires might bee marshalled in good order, and by discretion. This done, after that hee had washed his bodie before the Princes of his kingdome, attiring himselfe with rich and costly robes, hee went to the Temple, to offer sacrifice to the gods. And there this was the custome of the Arch-prelate or cheefe Priest, that after the oblations and sacrifices offered vpon the Altar, the king being present, to pray with a lowd voice in the hea­ring of the people, for the health, prosperitie, and good fortune of the said king, E who obserued and executed iustice amongst his subiects. And then the Arch-priest recounted seuerally the vertues of their king, both howe hee vsed obseruaunce, and religion in the seruice of the gods, and gentlenesse and courtesie towards men: and further that hee was a continent, iust, magnanimious, true, and liberall Prince, refraining his lustes, punishing malefactors with a more easie and remisse punishment then the greatnesse of their offence and misdeeds required, and recom­pencing his subiects with greater rewards and fauours, then their vertues meri­ted. And then after all this thus spoken, he pronounced a bitter curse and male­diction against all wicked ones, excusing and purging the king from all blame, F and laying the fault if there were anie, vpon his seruaunts, that counselled and persuaded him to such vnreasonable thinges. This done, the saied Arch-prelate exhorted the king to a happie life, conformable to the gods, and likewise to ver­tue and good conditions, and to practise not that which wicked men counselled him, but that which appertained to honour and vertue. And finally, the king hauing sacrificed a Bull to the gods, the Priest did reade out of a certaine holie booke, certaine noble exploits and enterprises of great and excellent personages, [Page 176] to the end, that after their example, the king by imitation might learne to vse his G authoritie and domination iustly and vertuously. Neither was the time onely pre­scribed by the auncient Lawes, wherein the King should exercise himselfe about the matters of his owne treasures and reuenue, and the controuersies of his sub­iects, but also the time to walke and to bath, to lye with his wife, and of all other exercises. These kings liued vpon a verie simple diet, as of Veale, and Geese, for all their messes. As touching Wine, there was a certaine measure expressely appoin­ted them, which they might not passe, to glut and make themselues drunke withall: yea and the whole order and course of their diet was so limitted and moderated, that it seemed rather to haue beene ordained by some expert Phisitian, then by any wise H Law-giuer. And sure this is a thing deseruing admiration, that the kinges of AEgypt liued not at their pleasures like other Kings, but onely according to the ordinance of the lawe: but this is more straunge and admirable, that they had no power nor authoritie to iudge, to collect subsidies, or to punish any man through anger or anie other vniust occasion, but were altogither like priuate persons, sub­iect to the Lawes: and yet they endured it patientlie, esteeming it the cheefest happinesse that could betide, to bee obedient to such ordinances and constitutions: for those that did otherwise, and liued at their owne pleasure, they thought them miserable, by being subiect to so much daunger and hurt, as vsually accompanieth I such actions. And in truth, they which often offend willingly, are ouercome ei­ther with friendship, or euill will, or some other passion of the mind, or doe stray of set purpose out of the right path: but othe [...] that order and guide their liues by counsell and good aduise, doe offend in fewe thinges. Therefore the kings of AEgypt exercising such bountie and lenitie towards their subiects, gained so much their loue and obedience, that not onely the AEgyptian Priests, but also the whole multitude of common people, had more care and regard of the safetie and per­son of the king, then of their owne wiues and children, yea then of all the rest of the Princes of the land. And certainely the most part of their kings, hauing fol­lowed K the common ordinances and customes of their Countrey [...] died after they had raigned a happie raigne, whilest this obseruance of the Lawes continued a­mongst them: and besides, haue brought vnder their subiection many strange na­tions, and thereby heaped vp great treasures, by the meanes whereof, the Coun­trey hath beene enriched with manie excellent buildings, and sumptuous workes, and the Citties beautified and endued with manie gifts and largesses. Also those costlie buildings which the AEgyptian people erected to their Kinges after their deaths, are ample witnesses of the good will and loue which they bore vnto them; insomuch, that they honoured them not onely whilest they liued, but also when L they were dead: for whensoeuer anie of their kinges came to the point of death, all the people with one eye and voice wayled and lamented exceedinglie, they tore their garments, and the Temples being shut, they neither frequented the mar­kets, nor anie publicke places, nor celebrated anie feastes or solemnities, but be­smearing their heads with durt for the space of threescore and twelue dayes, be­ing girded about, both men and women with sheetes, of whome, to the num­ber of two or three hundred, enuironned the kinges corpes twise a day, reitera­ting their greefe, and recounting his vertues in Epitaphes and songes. They ab­stained also all that while from eating anie liuing thing, from whote meates, from M Wine, from all costly apparrell, from seruice at the Table, from washings, oyn­tings, and gorgeous beds, and all other matters of pleasure and delight, and only gaue themselues to weeping and lamenting, as if their owne children had beene dead. And after that in this time of mourning, all thinges requisite for the obse­quies and funerals were prepared: the last day they put the dead bodie into a [Page 177] A cofer close shut, at the entrie of the sepulchre, and there recited summarily after their accustomed manner, all the worthie deedes which the king acheeued whilest hee liued: Also hee that would, was allowed to accuse death. The Priests being present, com­mended with a lowd voice the kings good deeds, and the people which stood about the obsequies, reioiced at the true commendations, & contradicted the false, with a tumul­tuous noise. Whereupon it hath come to passe, that many kings of AEgypt (by reason of the resistance of the multitude) haue beene depriued of the honor and magnificence due vnto their funerals, the feare whereof hath compelled these kings to liue iustly, least after their death they should incurre the euerlasting indignation & hatred of their B subiects. This was the auncient manner of liuing of the kings of AEgypt, Diod [...] Sicilian Biblioth, lib. 1. cap. 8.

THE beginning of the question is, Whether it bee more expedient for a Commonweale to 2 bee administred by a good man, or by good lawes.] Many are of this mind, that the go­uernement of men ought not to bee committed to one alone, but that it is necessa­rie to search out a more diuine thing, to take charge of men, as is easie to coniecture by the example of many sorts of brute beastes. For amongst sheepe, one sheepe dooth not gouerne the whole flocke; and amongst Horses and Oxen, one Horse or Oxe doe not gouerne the whole Heard: but man is hee, that excelling and being more Noble C then all other creatures, hath the conduct and guidance of brute beastes: whose worth, how much it surpasseth all other vnreasonable creatures, is notoriously knowne. By the like reason (if wee desire to haue matters succeede according to our wils) it is meete that some thing more excellent then man doe gouerne the societies of men. But because in all the world there is not a gouernour to bee found, more noble or better then man, and that also man is a creature of great variety, composed of diuerse parts, forasmuch as by the inferiour faculties of the mind, hee hath a certaine commu­nion with brute beastes, and by the superiour powers approcheth in some sort vnto the immortall gods: That part therfore of man which is diuine and immortall, ought D to hold the raynes of gouernement amongst men, which according to the iudgement and opinion of all, is the vnderstanding, which is nothing els but a certaine beame of the heauenly light infused into the natures of mens mindes. Therefore it can­not bee that a Commonweale should bee well prouided for, if the gouernement thereof bee committed to a man, who by the brutall faculties of his minde, is of­ten disturbed and diuerted out of the right way of reason: but it must bee commit­ted to this pure vnderstanding, which is free from all disquietnesse and perturbati­ons of the minde. The which (when as by other meanes it could not bee done) seemeth to bee attained vnto through the prouidence of God, by the inuention of E good Lawes: which is nothing else but to haue the charge of gouernment layed vpon the vnderstanding and reason, which are not subiect to the tempests of pertur­bations. To the which benefite and gift of the gods, I knowe not whither (if wee weigh the commodities and profite of them) any other bee equal, or any waies compa­rable: for first many wise men hauing conferred togither the examples of auncient times, concluded and determined after long consideration, that which seemed best in their iudgement for the enacting of lawes, without all feare of being diuerted from the truth, either by euill will, by friendship, or anie other perturbation of minde: seeing that in the constitution and making of Lawes, they doe not F handle the particular cause of anie one, as it often happeneth in the deciding of controuersies, but of all in generall. Then the Lawes being thus enacted if any man bee found to offend, and constrained to indure the punishment or penaltie of his offence, hee cannot beare any grudge against the Lawgiuer, because hee knoweth he aimed not at him, but at all: and thus consequently, there is no cause to feare any sedition or rancour, which is the most perrillous staine and blot of a Commonweale that can be. As also on the contrarie side, it commeth to passe, [Page 178] when any is punished without the disposition of the law, many greeuous iarres and dis­sentions G doe arise: for it is almost impossible but that wee should beare euill will vnto those, by whom we haue receiued hurt and dammage. Wherefore I knowe not whether Nature, the mother of all, hath bestowed a greater benefite vpon mankind, then the in­uention of the lawes, which from all antiquity hath alwaies ben ascribed and consecra­ted to the immortall gods. To this purpose Aristotle before alledged, sayth in his booke of the World, dedicated to Alexander, That hee could find nothing in the world to the which hee might resemble God more fitly then to an ancient law in a well ordered Cit­tie. By the which sentence it appeareth, that in this vniuersality of causes, God is no­thing els, but that which is an auncient law in a ciuill society. Hee sayeth further in the H same booke and next Chapter, that Law is a shining and bright intelligence, not infec­ted with any spots of affection: whereby we may easily perceiue that to be true & com­modious which wee said before, that is, that some thing more diuine then man, sitteth at the sterne of humane societies to guide & direct thē in the right course. But if we prefer man before the lawes, to this charge of gouernement, then the case standes in far grea­ter danger, because it is hard to find many adorned and enabled with wisedome, boun­tie, and honestie, fit for so great a place, but for the most part they all erre in iudgement, and goe astray from the truth, through the violent outrage of affections. And if it were possible to find out a man so wise, good, and constant, that hee would by no blast of per­turbation I bee turned aside from his dutie, yet notwithstanding (for this excellencie) it would not bee conuenient to preferre the rule of a man before the principality of the lawes, considering that in regard of his fraile and mortal nature, he could not long per­seuere in his duty without offence: whereas on the other side, the only lawes are able to ioine him to eternity. By this which hath beene spoken, it seemeth that the souerainty of gouernement ought to be recommended rather to the determination of the lawes, then to the discretion of man. But forasmuch as euery thing cannot be comprehen­ded within the lawes, it is necessary to commit some cases to the arbitrement of man, and to establish some one as a guardant, vicar and executioner of the lawes, who by the K disposition and direction of them, may take vpon him the gouernement of the Com­monweale. But seeing that all cannot bee comprised by the lawes, and that it is needfull to haue a supreame Iudge for such causes as come in question: the same doubt ariseth againe, which seemed to haue beene resolued by the establishment of the lawes, to wit, Whether it be better to haue one alone, or a few, or rather the Communaltie to be pre­ferred to the tuition of the lawes, and to giue iudgement in cases which are without the compasse of the lawes. Albeit that by many mens iudgements, the royall and regall go­uernement is esteemed the most excellent of all others, and the cheefedome of one a­lone, of greatest account for worth: Notwithstanding, because of the vnconstant mind L of man, & pronenesse to encline to that side which is either not good, or the worse, and because of the breuity of his life, some suppose that the good estate of all ought not to bee reposed vpon such a gouernement, but rather that the cheefe rule should apper­taine to the Communaltie, because there hath beene scarce any regall gouernement, which hath not beene soone transformed into a tyrannie. On the contrary, wee reade that many Commonweales or popular gouernements, haue continued a long time in a flourishing and triumphing estate both in peace and warre. But yet sure the multitude of it owne nature is very vnfit for gouernement, wherefore ciuill society maintained by concord and vnitie, will be quite defaced and broken, except it bee by some deuise redu­ced M into an vniforme estate: wherupon it commeth to passe, that the wisest which haue learnedly written of ciuill institutions, determine that a Commonweale ought to bee tempered and mixed as it were of a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, and a Democratie, to the end, that by this mixture the discommodities of simple gouernements may bee a­uoided, as it hath beene manifested by reasons and examples in the Annotations vpon the second booke of this worke, and fourth Chapter. Also that question is touched in [Page 179] A the eight Chapter of the same booke, Whether the Law, or the will of man, be the best rule for policies.

CHAP. XII. Of an absolute king, and howe people are more disposed B to be gouerned by one sort of gouernment, then by another.

NOw, whereas we haue discoursed of such a king as gouerneth all thinges at his owne becke and pleasure, we are to consider further of this matter. For he which is called to be a king lawfully, hee dooth not as we say, make a shew of a kingdome. For in all cities it may come to passe, that the Empire of warre may be perpetuall as it is in Demo­cratie C or popular estate, and in Aristocratie, that is in the power of the Nobles, and many deferre to one the power of administring and mo­derating the Commonweale: for such an Empire is that of the Dyr­rachij, and is in some part more strict then that of Opus. But wee are to speake of that kingdome, 1 which in all respects is absolute and entire in it selfe. But it seemeth to be a thing against Nature that one should beare the whole sway of the Citizens, where the City consisteth of all equals. For they which bee like of Nature, it is necessary naturally that they should haue the same law & dig­nity: wherefore as to giue meate and equall apparrell to vnequall men, hurteth the bodies: so is it to be reputed of honours. In like sort, it is dangerous to distribute vnequall honours to men of D equalitie. Wherefore it is no lesse iust, that these men rule then that they bee subiect to rule. And againe, it is iust that these men rule and obey alike. But this thing is the law: for the law is the de­scription of order. It is therefore more to bee wished, that the lawe beare the whole sway then any perticuler Citizen. Furthermore, by this sel [...]esame reason, when some rule, these that rule, are only the keepers and executioners of the lawes: for it is necessary that there should be some Magistrates; but one man to rule, they denie to be iust, especially where all are equal. And now whatsoeuer it see­meth the law cannot determine, that also falleth not into the knowledge of man: but after that the lawe hath accurately and diligently instructed men in, it deliuereth and committeth the rest to Magistrats to be iudged and decided by a most iust sentence and conscience. But furthermore E whatsoeuer seemeth better to men that haue made triall, then that which the lawes written con­taine, it is permitted to amend. He therfore that would haue conscience or the mind to bee cheefe and beare rule, he seemeth to will that God and the lawes beare sway: but hee that would haue a man, addeth also a wilde beast. For the cupidity & desire of man is brutish, and anger corrupteth Magistrates, yea euery man of the best sort. Wherfore the lawe is an intelligence deuoid of affec­tion. Further, that example taken from the Arts, seemeth to be false, to wit, to cure such men by precepts and bookes which are written of the Art of Phisicke, they helpe nothing, nor hurt anie thing. But on the contrary side, it is more fit to vse those that are artificers and learned men, and to vse their counsell and helpe: for these doe nothing that abhorreth from reason for friendship F sake, but hauing made men whole, receiue their reward: But those which are aduaunced to ciuill Magistracies, are wont to do many things vpon spight, and also vpon fauor, for if so be, the Phi­sitions should be suspected that they were brought in by enemies, not to heale, but to kill for lucre sake, then had they rather bee cured by precepts of Art and bookes, then at the Phisitions plea­sure. And Phisitions themselues when they are sicke, send for and vse other Phisitions: and the maisters of childrens exercises, when they are exercised themselues, vse other maisters of exerci­ses: as though they could not iudge and examine the truth, as also because they cannot iudge of [Page 180] their owne matter: and because they being troubled, should come to iudge. Therefore it is mani­fest, G that they that seeke the law, seeke the meane betwixt both: for the law is the meane. Further, they haue greater authoritie, and the lawes consisting in manners, are of greater moment, then written laws. Wherfore a man which gouerneth a Commonweale, lesse faileth, and is lesse decea­ued, then laws written: but not so as lawes gotten and confirmed by customes. And now truly it is not easie for one to see many things. It shall be therfore behoofeful to appoint many Magistrates. Wherefore what skilleth it whether this thing bee done straightway from the beginning, or whe­ther one may place many after this sort ouer gouernment: furthermore, if a good man, as it is said before, because he is better then others, is worthy to rule, then shall two good men be better to rule then one good man. For this is it that Diomedes sayth in Homer: For when two go togither one H way. And that which Agamemnon wisheth in the same Authour: O if I had twice fiue such counsellors. And there are nowe Magistrates, who haue the arbitrement and authority of iud­ging, as hath the Iudge of those things which the law cannot comprehend and define, because the law cannot command and iudge after the best sort. For in regard of those things which the lawe cannot determine, no man doubteth of them, but his authority ought to preuaile very much. But because some thinges may bee comprised within the lawes, and other things cannot: these thinges make it doubtfull and questionable, whether it bee better that the best lawe or the best man beare sway: for of those things that men consult, there can be no law made. No man therfore pleadeth a cause, but that it is necessary that there bee a man which is to iudge of causes: but they will not I haue one alone but many, for euery Magistrate iudgeth well which is instructed in the lawe. But it may seeme per aduenture absurd, that any should see more accutely with two eyes, and hear more attentiuely with two eares him that iudgeth, and deale better, endeuouring with two feet and two hands, then many with many hands and feete. For now those Princes which rule alone, which the 2 Grecians call Monarchs, labour to haue many eyes about them, many eares, many hands, & ma­ny feet: for they that fauour their dominion and them, these they make their fellowes in the king­dome. If therefore they be not friends, their actions shall not bee approoued by the counsell of the Monarch. If they bee friends to him, then are they friends also to his Empire. And a friend is one that is equall and alike. Wherefore, if he thinketh them meete to rule, then bee thinketh that K Peeres and equals equally ought to reigne. Those things therefore, which certaine dissenting from others dispute against a kingdome are in a maner these. But these things perhaps are true in some cases, though not so in other: for there is a certaine kind of men, apt by Nature to beare maister­like authority, another to royall authority, another to ciuill society, and to euery one of these, one thing is a law, another thing profitable. But the tyrannicall gouernement is against Nature, and so is euery other forme of gouerning a Commonweale, which swarueth from the right: for these things are done against Nature. But by those things which are spoken, it is manifest, that it is nei­ther expedient nor iust, that amongst men of like condition and equals, one should haue the go­uernment of all the rest: and if there be not lawes, that he should be as a law; neither yet if there L be lawes. Neither that one good man should sway ouer many good men, nor one bad man ouer many bad men: neither if hee excell in vertue, but after a certaine manner. But what manner this is, must be expounded, although we haue in a manner discoursed of the same hereto [...]ore. But first we are to define what it is to be fit for a royall Empire, what for Aristocraticall, and what for ciuill. Such a multitude therefore is fit to vndergoe a royal Empire, which is so framed of nature, that it can brooke a stocke excelling in vertue, to beare ciuill principality. A multitude therefore is Aristocraticall, that is, fit to beare sway ouer free men: such as may be gouerned by free power of them that excell in vertue: referring their counsels to ciuil authority: & that is a ciuil mul­titude, in the which there is wont to be by nature one militarie multitude and warlike, which can M obey and rule according to law, for dignity and deserts de [...]erring to rich men Empires and offi­ces. 3.4 When therefore it shall happen, that either a whole kindred or any one person shal arise, so ex­ceeding the rest in vertue, that his vertue excelleth the vertue of all others, thē is it iust, that this be the royall linage, and that this person haue power ouer all, and bee an absolute king. For as it is said before, the matter is not only so by the course of law, the which they propound which instruct 5 Commonweales, both Aristocraticall, Oligarchicall, and Democraticall: for all doe iudge, that [Page 181] A according to the rate of excellencie, honours and offices should bee deferred: (but all esteeme not excellencie to be one and the same, but some preferre this, and some that) and by that lawe which is before spoken of. For; forsooth it is not meet to desire the death of such a man, or his exilement, or his absence tenne yeares out of the Citie, nor that hee bee subiect to authoritie: for Na­ture will not haue it that the part should excell the whole. But to him whose excellencie is so great, this happeneth. Wherefore it remaineth onely, that such a Citizen to whome the rest are to yeelde obeysance, haue the iudgement and gouernement of all thinges, not for his owne part, or by course, but simplie. Of a kingdome therefore, howe manie differencies there are, and whether it bee expedient for Cities or no, and to what Cities it is expedient, and after B what sort, let it be thus defined and declared by vs. And because wee say there are three formes of gouerning a Commonweale, of these it is necessarie that this is the best, which is gouerned by the best men: and that is such a one wherein it happeneth that some one excelleth all, or a whole kin­dred or [...]ltitude excelleth in vertue: of which multitude, some are to obey, some to command; in this respect [...] that they may liue well. And in the former bookes it is shewed of vs, that the same vertue ought necessarily to be in a good man, that is in a good Citizen in a good Citie, it is manifest after the same order, and by the same Arts, that there may be a good man and a citie ap­pointed, whether it be of a few Noblemen and famous for vertue gouerned, or whether it bee go­uerned by the Empire of one king. Wherefore there shall bee the same institution, and the same C conditions which shall make a good man and a politicke man, and one fit to reigne. These things thus defined and declared, wee are to endeuour to speake of the best forme of administring a Commonweale, and after what manner the nature thereof may arise, and be by a certaine means ordained: for it is necessary to comment and dispute thereof conueniently, and as the matter requireth.

All sorts of kingdomes, where the king doth not absolutely cōmand, are not properly kingdomes, neither in very truth is any a kingdome, but that wherein the king hath ab­solute authority: concerning the which, it is here disputed whether it be iust and lawfull D or no, and after many reasons alleadged on both sides, concluded, that considering the nature of people, whereof some are naturally enclined to bee gouerned after this man­ner of gouernement, rather then another, where the subiects are fit for a royall gouern­ment, there it may iustly and lawfully bee exercised: in like manner, when there is any man fit for gouernement, who decideth this authority amongst certaine chosen friends, making them partakers of the publicke charges, being men vertuous, (and yet his ver­tue doth surmount all theirs) that then it is reason that all should obey him, and hee be­ing thus qualified, hee should beare sway ouer all, not by course, but absolutely: other­wise, that it is not onely vnlawfull, but also vnprofitable for an equall to raigne amongst E equals, and for one to bee a lord ouer all. In like manner Darius in Herodotus, and Amulius in Dyonisius Halicarnasseus, the forealledged bookes, conclude, touching a King and a Monarch, as also doe Socrates in his Oration to Symachus, and Plato in his Politicke, all of them dignifying Royalty, as a thing ordained of God, who go­uerneth the whole world as a king: and appointed also by nature, which hath en­grafted the first [...]imilitude of a regall gouernement, not onely in euery reasonable per­son (where the vnderstanding, the purest and diuinest part of the soule, commaundeth like a king ouer the appetite and desire; representing in this microcosme or little world, a little interiour kingdome) but also in the companies of many brute beasts, as of Bees, F which a [...]knowledge a king amongst themselues: receiued from all antiquitie by the pri­mitiue and most auncient Nations, practised at this day amongst the most renowmed and warlike people, in the greatest part of the habitable earth. Wherein the Frenchmen ought to be so much the more carefull & prouident, in that they haue ben from all time commended singularly for the loue, obedience, and fidelity, which they beare vnto their king, as vnto the first, the noblest and most auncient not only of Christendome, but also of all the rest of the world.

[Page 182] 1 BVT let vs speak of that kingdome which is called absolute, where the king doth euery thing G at his pleasure.] [...], That is, an absolute kingdome, where the kings pleasure ser­ueth in stead of law, his word in stead of iudgement, and his life an exemplar discipline of doing well or euill. After this manner haue many of the Romane Emperours com­manded, vsurping full authority ouer the life and death, goods and honors of their sub­iects Such is at this day the rule of the great Knes, or Duke of Muscouie, who surpasseth in the seuerity and rigour of commanding, all the Monarchs of the world; hauing ob­tained such authority ouer his subiects ecclesiasticall and [...]ecular, that hee can dispose both of their liues and goods at his pleasure, no man daring to contradict him. They H confesse openly that the kings will is Gods will, and that all which he doth, he doth it by the will and direction of God. Prester Iohn createth and aduaunceth to kingdomes and lordships, such persons as pleaseth him, installing them when he wil, and degrading thē againe when and as often as it liketh him, hauing neither regard to right nor wrong, and they that are thus dealt withall, not daring to shew any signe of sadnesse, nor in a maner to take knowledge of it: this opinion being generally ingrafted in their hearts, that all that succeedeth well or ill with them, commeth to passe by the vnchangeable decree of God. The ancient estate of Persia became like to these vnder Cambises, Xerxes, & other kings, euen vntill the last Darius, who reduced it into extreame bondage and slauery, I more neer to a tyranny thē a kingdome, depriuing it of that mutual amity which ought to be amongst Princes and subiects, and that politicke communion which is requisit to the preseruation of euery Commonweale: in such sort, that though hee bore rule ouer an infinite multitude of men, yet he could put no confidence in them, hauing made thē vnfit for warfare, but was constrained in time of warre to vse the helpe of mercenary souldiors and strangers. Plato De Legibus, lib. 3. Aristotle Politicke, lib. 5. For as Socrates in his Panegericke speaking of the Persians, saieth: That it cannot bee, they being so brought vp, and so gouerning their affaires, that they should either be endued with any vert [...]e, or triumph ouer their enemies: for how can there be amongst them of such con­ditions, K either a good Emperor or a valiant souldior? When the greatest number of thē are a confused multitude, and ignorant of warfare, and as dissolute in war, so more prone to bondage then our seruants. And as for the most honorable and famous of them, they neuer liued a ciuill, popular, or politicke life, but euer so behaued themselues, that they insulted ouer some like lords, and serued others as bondmen, being men of most cor­rupt dispositions: their bodies they decke and adorne for riches sake, but in their minds they tremble by reason of authoritie, for euen they waite at the pallace gate of the Prince, and lye downe and humble themselues most basely at his feet, &c. This cor­rupt discipline and manner of the Persians, is found fault withall by Xenophon in the L end of his Paedia, and noted by Q. Curtius, and Plutarch, and Herodotus, in diuerse pla­ces. And it is most certaine, that the king of Persia, who for a time was the greatest po­tentate in the world, by vsurping a more absolute authority, then was meete, spoiled his estate, by tyrannizing too much ouer his subiects, whom hee esteemed no better then bondslaues, as Plutarch reporteth: and at last vtterly ruinated it, euen then when he sup­posed that he had aspired to the top of worldly prosperity, the spring of pride and arro­gance. Such is the estate of Turkie at this day, resembling much in many thinges the kingdomes of Persia and Parthia, and the Empire of Rome: ouer which the great Turke raigneth as sole Lord, vsing his subiects rigorously, as wel the Musulmans, as Christians M or Iewes, and seruing himselfe in his principal affaires both of war and peace, & matters of gouernment, of abiured slaues that had renounced their faith, whom (as it hath been said before in the ninth chapter) hee placeth or displaceth, chaungeth, or deposeth, as it pleaseth him, without all danger or enuie, yea he causeth them to be strangled vpon the least suspition or discontentment that can arise, not sparing his owne children and kin­dred of blood, if they anger him. But the king of France is set in the midst of an ancient [Page 183] A nobility and companie of Princes, Earles, and Barons, and other Lords, who seruing him, and yet hauing vnder them subiects also proper vnto themselues that respect and reuerence them, cannot be depriued of their preheminences, without manifest feare of sedition and tumult.

CONSIDERING that Monarchs make vnto themselues many eyes, eares, hands, and feet.] 2 Xenophon in his eight booke of his Paedia sayth: That Cyrus neuer got vnto himselfe the true eies and eares of a king, but by his great liberality: for by rewarding diuerslie those that had brought him tidings of any thing that was profitable, he brought to passe within a short space, that euery one stroue to see and heare out many things, the report B wherof might benefit the king. From thence it arose, that men attribute vnto kings ma­ny eyes and eares, which are the two necessarie parts of defence for a man. And hee is greatly deceiued, that requireth in a king but one eye and one eare, for one can heare and see but few things. And if a king should commit the charge of all his affaires to one alone, others would become carelesse and negligent thereof, and all the world would looke at him onely which was reputed to bee the Princes eye. But it behoueth a king to listen to the reports of all such which say they haue seene or heard any thing worthy to be obserued. For this cause it is thought that kings haue many eies and eares, because in all places euery one feareth to do or say any thing against the king, as if hee continually C stood by to heare and see them. By meanes whereof, there was neuer any heard of, that spake euill of Cyrus, but all were so affected to speake wel of him, as if his eies and eares had been present in all places. And hereof I can render no better a reason, but that for small seruices he rendred alwaies great benefites.

WHEN therefore it shall happen, that either a whole kindred, or any one person shall arise 3 so, exceeding the rest in vertue, that hee surpasseth all others, then is it iust, that this bee the royall linage, and that this person haue power ouer all, and be an absolute king.] Aristotle Politicke lib. 7. cap. 3. saith thus: Peraduenture men esteeme it an excellent thing to beare rule ouer all, forasmuch as by this meanes a man may be able to performe many honest & iust ex­ploits: D so that he that is able to gouerne, ought not to lay the burthen of gouernement vpon anothers shoulders, but rather take it from another, without regard had on the fa­thers part of his children, or on the childrens part of their father, or of one friend to ano­ther: for that which is good, is most desirable, and to doe well is good. Nowe they that speake thus, possibly say true, if that which is most desirable, could happen to spoilers & destroyers of Countries, which cannot indeed happen vnto them, and therefore they presuppose a false ground: for such a one cannot performe vertuous and honest acts, if so bee hee doe not so farre excell all others, as a man doth a woman, or a father his chil­dren. Wherefore an offender cannot succeed so well in well doing, because hee is alrea­die E farre from vertue. For there is an intercourse of honestie and iustice betwixt equals in bearing rule by turnes, for this is inequality; but an inequality amongst equals, and a dissimilitude amongst those that are like, is contrary to nature: and that which is con­trary to nature cannot bee honest. If therefore any other bee found excelling the rest in vertue, and ability to performe good deeds, it is an honest thing to yeeld vnto him, and a iust thing to obey him, for he ought to haue not onely vertue to work, but also power wherewith to worke. Therefore such persons that so much excell others in generositie, vigour of mind and bodie, as the soule dooth the body, or a man dooth the brute beastes, are by reason of their excellencie worthie to command as kings, and to haue F absolute dominion ouer all. Such were Cyrus, Alexander, Iulius Caesar, Octauian, Charlemaigne, and others like vnto them, who farre surpassed the vertue, felicitie, and common reputation of other Princes, whome wee must not thinke to haue beene sent by chaunce into this world, but by the will of God, who adorned them with so many rare and excellent vertues, and exalted them to so high a pitch of honour and authori­ty, to the end, to giue order to humane affaires, to correct the abuses of men, to found Monarchies and Empires, and to bring in good ordinances and lawes, to promote Arts [Page 184] and learning, and to cause the name of God to bee feared and reuerenced, whose births G and deaths were long before foreseene and foretold by Oracle, Prophesies, and signes, in heauen and earth.

5 FOR all doe iudge, that according to the rate of excellency, honours and offices should bee deferred.] The Medes laied the sway of gouernement vpon one Deioces, because of his sufficiencie in giuing iudgement, and of that good iustice which hee practised a­mongst them, according to the report of Herodotus in his first booke, which I thought good to transcribe into this place, as very fit for this present matter touching a king and a kingdome. The Medes (sayeth he) inhabiting townes and villages, amongst them there was found one Deioces, a man highly reputed of in his territorie, and who applying H his heart to iustice, executed the same most carefully: And albeit, that throughout all the countrey of Medea, the bridle was let loose to all licentiousnesse and libertie, yet hee well knowing that iustice was an enemie vnto vice, behaued himselfe so notwith­standing: which the inhabitants of his Town vnderstanding, chose him for their iudge. In which estate (as one that longed after dominion) hee demeaned himselfe so iustly and vprightly, and gained to himselfe so great reputation, that the other Townes began to vnderstand howe that Deioces was the onely man in the Countrey, that gaue iudge­ment according to right and equitie. Wherefore they flocked vnto him to haue iustice on all sides, because of the vniust sentences and wrongs which they had before sustai­ned: I and at last it came to that passe, that they came to none but him, yea that euery day a great multitude flocked to him in regard of his vpright dealing. But when hee per­ceiued that all the Countrey relied vpon him, then hee would no longer keepe Court in his accustomed place, nor exercise the office of a Iudge, alleadging that by imploy­ing himselfe to distribute iustice vnto others [...] hee neglected his owne affaires, and so endammaged himselfe. Then againe, robberies, ryots, and insolencies rebudded amongst the Medes more then before. To preuent the which mischeefes, they assem­bled togither, and disputed of the prouision of offices: at what time, in mine opinion the friendes of Deioces spake most brauely. For, maisters (saied they) if wee will al­wayes K liue in that kinde of life which wee nowe lead, it is impossible for vs to remaine any longer in this Countrey: Wherefore wee aduise to establish a king amongst vs, which is the onely meanes to prouide, that our Countrey may bee iustly and vprightly gouerned, and to returne vs backe to the discharge of our charges: and so it will come to passe, that wee shall not bee any more destroyed and ruined by our peruerse conditi­ons. With these speeches, they stirred vp this persuasion, that a king was needefull. This dore being opened, presently euery one bethought them of Deioces, and extol­led him so greatly, vntill by one consent hee was chosen and established for their king. This done, hee commaunded them that they should helpe to build him a house fit for a L king, and designe him a guard for his safetie. The Medes presently layed to their indu­struous hands, and erected for him a great and strong castle in the place which hee had marked out, and suffered him to chuse whome hee would to bee of his guard. Hee perceiuing himselfe thus confirmed king, constrained the Medes moreouer to build him a Cittie, and to furnish it royally with all thinges necessary. They obey, and builded at his direction high and strong wals, enclosed within each other, which at this day are called Ecbatanes. The description of the building is on this manner, one of the wals is not higher then the other, except in the prospects or Turrets: The scituation of the place helpeth much, being found vpon a little hill: but that which most sheweth M their industrie is this, that there are seuen inclosures of wals, enuironned one within another. Within the last and least of them is the kings pallace, where all the treasures are preserued, the widest of them is as large as the whole Citie of Athens. The Turrets of the first enclosure, are enamelled with white, of the second with blacke, of the third with carnation, of the fourth with azure, of the fift with Orange tawney, of the sixt and seuenth, the one with siluer, and the other with golde. Deioces (all thinges being [Page 185] A thus performed) commanded the people to lodge round about the Citie: & afterwards hee was the first that ordained, that none should date to present himselfe before the King, but by his huishers and messengers, also that none should bee so bold, as to looke the King on the face, and that it should bee accounted a base and dishonest part, either to laugh or spit before the King. The Medes doe most willingly obserue all these Lawes, to the end, that those which are of the same age with the King, and haue beene brought vp with him as men of worth, in looking vpon him, should not bee discontented, and so conspire against him. These decrees thus decerned by Deioces, thinking that nowe his state was most sure and setled, hee began to be ve­rie B rigorous in iustice, and commaunded, that from that time forward, they should send him their sutes in writing, to giue iudgement vpon them so, and then re­turne them to the parties againe, and so he administred iustice. To conclude, he ordained, that if any should enterprise anie thing against his Maiestie, hee should bee called before him, to receiue punishment answerable to the qualitie of his offence: and to the end hee might bee still aduertised of such dealings, hee had his spies and intelligencers in euery corner of his kingdome, to giue him no­tice thereof. After this manner, Deioces brought vnder subiec­tion the Nation of the Medes, and made himselfe C their King and Lord.

CHAP. I. What a Politician or a Lawgiuer ought to consider in the esta­blishing of a Commonweale.

IN all Arts and Sciences which are not handled in part, but are in some one kind perfect and accomplished, it is the same mans part to con­sider M what is fit for euery kind: as for example, what exercise is most meet for euery body, and which is the best (for it is requisit that the best should be applied to him that is by nature best informed and furnished with the best qualities) and which to all for the most part is alike: For this is the office of the Art of exercising the bodies. Moreouer, if any doe not desire a right habite or seat in the highest degree of perfection, neither doth couet a perfect [Page 187] A knowledge of those thinges which doe appertaine to the labour of exercise: Notwithstan­ding, it is the part of him that hath gouernment ouer the exercise of children, and of him which doo [...] professe to teach the Art of the exercise of the bodie, to bee able to deliuer euen this same facultie. And this likewise, both in the Art of healing, and in the Art of building shippes, and in that Art which pertaineth to apparrell, and in euery other Art also, we see to fall out. Wherefore it is manifest, that it is belonging to the same science, both to consider which is the best forme of gouerning a Commonweale, and which and what man­ner were most to bee wished, and according to our mind, no outward thing hindering the same, and which were fit and conuenient for all: For manie to attaine the best, is perad­uenture B hurtfull. Wher [...]fore a Law-giuer, and hee which is very cunning in the ruling of a Cittie, and as the Grecians [...]earme him, a Politician, ought not to bee ignorant in that which is simply the most excellent, neither in that, which for the subiect thereof, is the best of all: finally, hee ought not to bee ignorant of that which consisteth of condition, or as I may so tearme it, of supposition, that is, which is agreeable to anie end proposed: For he ought al­so to bee able to see that which by chance is offered: both howe from the beginning it was or­dained, and howe being once ordained, it might bee longest conserued. But for example sake I say, if it happen to any Citie that it neither vse the best forme of gouernement, nei­ther bee furnished with thinges necessary, neither yet doe yeeld such administration of a C Commonweale as the nature of thinges which are present dooth require, but some farre worse: As for example sake, aboue all these thinges, hee ought to knowe which is most fit for all Citties: for many of those which haue set forth and written somewhat of the admi­nistration of a Cittie, albeit they speake manie thinges excellently, yet doe they erre from the vtilitie thereof: for wee must not weigh the best onely, but euen that same which may bee the best, and that also which is the more easie and more common to all. But nowe [...] some onely seeke the forme of gouernement of the Common-weale placed in the highest degree of dignitie and excellencie, and wanting much furniture and prouision, and great expence: others rather remembring some vulgar Common-weale, disallowing and condemning all D other formes of gouernement of a Commonweale which are vsually receaued, doe allowe and commend the Laconike, or some other. But that description and ordination of the gouern­ment of a Commonweale is to bee commended and persuaded vnto men, which they may ea­sily, despising and reiecting their present lawes, both approoue and transferre to the com­mon vse and practise in the exercise of a ciuile life. For it is no lesse labour and businesse to change the forme of the gouernement of a Commonweale, then to institute any new from the beginning: As it is harder to forget what is learned, then to learne at the beginning. Wherefore, besides this which is already saied, as politicke man ought to heale and assist those formes of the gouernment of a Commonweale which were vsually receiued, as is afore­said: E But hee cannot excell herein, that is ignorant how many kinds of gouerning a Com­monweale there are. But nowe, some thinke there is one Democratie, and one Oligar­chie, but it is not so: wherefore hee ought not to bee ignorant, howe manie differences of formes of the gouernement of a Commonweale there bee, and by howe many meanes they are coupled and combined: with this same wisdome also the best lawes and formes of the gouern­ment of a Common-weale which are agreeable, must bee knowne and consider [...]d: For the Lawes are to bee made for the gouernement of the Commonweale, and so a [...] [...] of all; and not the Commonweale for the lawes. For the Common-weale is a description of order in Citties pertaining to Magistracies and Empires, howe they are diuided, and what it F is, that in the Commonweale should beare the cheefest sway and authoritie [...] and finally, what is the end of euery society. But the Lawes, by which they should restraine the Ma­gistrates, and those which offend against the Lawes, are separated from those which declare the forme of gouernement of the Commonweale. Wherefore it is euident, th [...] i [...] [...] requi­site in setting foorth of Lawes, to obserue both the differencies and number of the forme of the gouernement of the Commonweale: for it is impossible that the same lawe [...] should bee fit for all Oligarchies and Democraties, if there bee many kindes of each of them, and [...] [Page 188] onely Democratie, and one onely Oligarchie. G

Because Aristotle in the former booke diuided policies into three goo [...] and three bad: hee declareth by the example of other Arts and Sciences, as of the Art of exer­cise, of Phisicke, of Building shippes, and making apparrell, that it is necessarie for the perfection and vnderstanding of a good Politician to declare, not only which is the best and most to bee desired forme of gouernement, but also which is a good one, not simply, but in regard of the commodities thereof, such as they bee: and thirdly, that also which is supposed to bee good, although it bee not. And then euerie forme of policie being propounded, to knowe howe it was first established: H and next, how and by what Lawes it is gouerned: also to bee able to iudge what forme is most common and vsuall, that is to say, fit for most Citties: and lastly, howe manie parts and braunches euery policie hath, and what Lawes are most agreeable to euerie kind.

CHAP. II. I Hee resumeth the diuision of Common-weales, propoun­ded in the former booke: and declareth how bad ones are opposed vnto the good.

SInce wee haue declared in handling of the formes of Common­weales, that there are three right formes, to wit, the Kingdome, the Ari­stocratie, K and that which wee properly call a Commonweale: and three transgressions answerable vnto them, to wit, a Tyrannie to a Kingdome, the Oligarchie to the Aristocratie, and the Democratie to the Common­weale. And that wee haue alreadie entreated of the Aristocratie and the Kingdome (f [...]r to speake of the best forme of Commonweale, is nothing else but to dis­pute about those names, because both of them must bee framed according to vertue, and furnished with necessarie and commodious thinges) and also since wee haue expounded how an Aristocratie and a Kingdome doe differ, and howe a Kingdome is to bee esteemed, it remaineth that we now began to speake of a Commonweale, rightly taken, and of other formes L of gouernement, namely the Oligarchie, Democratie, and Tyranny. For it is necessarie that that which declineth from the cheefest and most diuine, bee the very worst. But a Kingdome of necessitie either hath the name of a Kingdome onely, when it is indeed no King­dome: or for the great excellencie of him which beareth rule, it is manifest. Wherefore a Tyranny, which is the worst, is farthest differing from this forme of gouernement of a Commonweale. In the second place of badnesse is an Oligarchie, from which the Aristocra­tie 1 farre dif [...]ereth: but the Democratie is the most moderate and tollerable. Moreouer, a certaine one of those which haue written before vs, hath beene of the same opinion, and yet not regarding the same which we doe: For hee supposed, of all the formes of Common­weales M which are good, of which sort is the right and laudable Oligarchie or Aristocra­tie, and such others; that a Democratie is the worst amongst them, and the best amongst the bad [...] f [...]r wee doe call those onely depraued and estranged from the right, and that it is neither meete, nor right to say that our Oligarchie is better then another, but lesse euill, but of such opinion, let vse spare at this present to speake. First of all, wee must di­stinguish howe many differences of formes of Commonweales there bee, Whether there are [Page 189] A manie kindes both of Democratie and Oligarchie: then, which is most common and most to bee wished and desired, next after the best: And whether any other gouernement of a Common-weale bee Aristocraticall, and from the beginning well instituted, and apt for verie manie Cities, as it is: then, which of the other it is, and by what men it ought to be desired. For peradu [...]nture to some the Democratie seemeth more necessarie than the Oligar­chie, and to others the contrarie. Moreouer, by what meanes it were requisite for him that would vndertake this, to ordaine these formes of Commonweales, namely, euery kind of De­mocratie, and likewise of Oligarchie. Lastly, when wee haue breefely entreated of all these, so as the matter requireth, wee must endeuour to pursue, both what thinges are hurtfull B and pestiferous to these formes of gouernements, and which are wholesome, both common­lie and separatelie to each, and for which causes cheefly they are woont to decay, or bee con­serued by Nature.

Hauing repeated those thinges which were handled in the former booke, the Philo­sopher propoundeth breefly those whereof hee intendeth to speake in this fourth and fift bookes, affirming, that of all naughty formes of Commonweales, a Tyrannie is the worst, being a transgression of a Kingdome: which of good formes, is the best. Next to a Tyrannie, that an Oligarchie is most vicious, as being contrarie to an Aristocratie: & C that a Democratie amongst them that are bad, is least bad, and most tollerable, see­ing it is opposed to a Commonweale properly taken, which holdeth the last place amongst those that are good.

MOREOVER, a certain one of those which haue written before vs, hath ben of the same opi­nion, 1 and yet not regarding the same which we doe.] This certaine one is Plato, who in his Dialogue iutituled the Politician, or, De Regno, writeh thus of a Democratie, [...], &c.

D

CHAP. III. Why there are diuers formes of gouernements.

THat therefore there are many kindes of Common-weales, the E cause is, in that there are manie parts of euery Cittie. First, wee see all Citties to consist of faculties, and then in this multitude, it is necessarie that some bee poore, and some rich, and some betwixt both: and againe, amongst rich and poore men, that some be ad­dicted to armes, others to peace: and of the people, that some bee Husbandmen, others Marchaunts, and others Artificers. There is also a difference among the Nobles, both in regard of their riches, and largenesse of their possessions, [...] to keepe stables of horses, which cannot bee done without riches. Where­fore in such Citties which in time past had their force consisting in Horsemanship, Oligar­chies F were in vse. They vsed horses against their neighbour enemies, as the Etrerians, Chalci­dians, and Magnesians, dwelling neare to Meander, and many other people of Asia. Besides the difference of riches, there is another in regard of race, and another in regard of vertue, and what other thing els of like sort, which wee haue made a part of a Citty, when as we entreated of an Aristocratie, where wee declared howe many parts were necessarie in a Cittie. Sometimes all these parts are in a Commonweale: sometimes more of them, sometimes fe [...]er. Whence i [...] is manifest, that necessarily there are manie Common-weales differing from each other i [...] [Page 190] kind: forasmuch as the parts of them differ after the same manner. For a Commonweale is the G order and disposition of Magistrates which are distributed, either according to the power of them who are partakers of it, or according to some other common equality belonging to poore and rich, or some other thing cōmon to both. It is therfore necessarie that there be so many Cōmonweales, as there are orders, according to the excellencies and differences of parts. But it seemeth, that prin­cipally there are but two, as we say of the winds, that some are Northerne, & some Southerne, & the rest the excesses of these: so in Commonweales there are but two cheefe kinds, the Democratie and the Oligarchie: for they make the Aristocratie a branch of Oligarchie, as if it were a kinde of Oligarchie; and that other which is properly a Commonweale, to bee a braunch of the Demo­cratie, as in the windes they referre the Southwest and Southeast, all to the South. The like is to H be obserued in harmonies of Musicke, as some say, wherof they make two kinds, the Dorian, and the Phrigian, and call all other consorts, compounds of these two. So they are woont to esteeme of Commonweales, but it is both truer and better, as we haue said, that there being two right forms, or one, that all the other be transgressions, as in Musick of good harmonie, so here of a good Com­monweale: and that those be Oligarchicall, which are more seuere and lordly: and those Demo­craticall, which are more gentle and remisse.

The cause why there are many formes of Common-weales, and many braunches of euery forme, is, because in euery Cittie there are many parts, by the diuersity whereof, I the gouernments also are made diuerse, so that they are sometimes held by one part, & sometimes by another, it being not possible through humane inconstancie, that they should remaine alwaies in one stay: for some are rich, others poore, a third sort in a meane estate: againe, some are armed, others disarmed, others tillers of the ground, Artificers and Merchants. In like manner, Noblemen are distinguished according to the diuersity of Countries, by stocke, wealth, vertue, and learning. Notwithstanding, all these parts whereof the totall is composed, do not make this diuersity, but only those parts which belong to the forme and essence of the state: as Artificers, and other such base persons doe not properly diuersifie the gouernment, but those which appertaine K to the forme and essence thereof, as poore and rich, noble and vertuous, a [...]d such like. Seeing therefore that a Commonweale is the order of Magistrateships, and that such parts doe communicate the estate in greater or lesser number: necessarily, there must needs be so many kinds and sorts of Commonweales, as there are differences in that or­der. All which kinds may be reduced into two, to wit, an Oligarchie, and a Democratie, as all the winds are reduced to two cheefe, Boreas and Auster, called now adaies by ma­riners, the North and the South; and all the harmonies of musick are reduced to the Do­rian & the Phrigian: so that as all other tunes are transgressions of these two, so all other Cōmonweales do seem to be transgressions of a Kingdome & an Aristocratie, the most L seuere & lordly, resembling Oligarchies, & the most licentious and mild, Democraties.

CHAP. IIII. That a Democratie and an Oligarchie are not simple formes: and that there are many sorts and kinds of Democraties.

M

NOw we must not frame our Democratie so simple as some haue accustomed to doe, to be onely where the multitude commandeth: forasmuch as in Oligarchies, and euery where, the greatest part beareth rule: nor an Oligarchie to bee where a fewe gouerne. For if all were a thousand and thr [...]e hundred, and amongst them there were a thousand rich men, and these did not communicate the gouernment to the three hundred poore and free men equall to them in other thinges, their estate should neuer bee [Page 191] A iudged to be Demo [...]raticall. In like manner, if the poore were few, and could doe more then ma­ny rich; this should not bee called an Oligarchie: nor if there were any other kind where the ho­nours were not conferred vpon rich men. Therefore then the estate is rather to be [...]armed Popu­lar, when free men gouerne: and then Oligarchicall, when rich men gouerne. But it happeneth, that the number of the one is small, and of the other great, there being many fre [...], and few rich: for if offices should be bestowed according to the greatnesse of stature, as some say was woont to bee done in AEthiopia, or according to beauty, it would bee an Oligarchie: forasmuch as there are but few faire and great: Notwithstanding, it is not sufficient to limit Common-weales by such things, but seeing there are many kinds of people and Oligarchies, wee must set downe this, B that it is not a Popular estate, if a fewe free men command ouer many that are not free, as in Auellone vpon the Ionicke sea, and in There: because that in these two Cities the honours and offices were in the hands of the most noble, and the first inhabitants, which were but a handfull among many. Neither should it bee a Popular estate, if the rich should surmount in multitude, as it was in time past at Colophon: where the elders of the City possessed great inhe­ritances before that warre which they waged with the Lydians. But this is a Democratie, when free men being poore, and of a greater number, are lords of the estate: and this is an Oligarchie when the rich and Nobles being few in number, haue the rule. Therefore that there are diuerse sorts of Commonweales, and why, it hath beene thus declared. Now it followeth, that wee vnfold C why there are more kindes yet then haue ben named, and what they are, returning to our former beginning: for wee confesse, that euery City hath not one onely part but many: as if wee would set downe the sorts of liuing creatures, wee should diuide first all that which necessarie belon­geth to a liuing creature in generall, as the sensitiue Organs, and the pla [...]es of digesting and re­ceiuing nourishment, I meane the mouth and the belly; and withal, the parts whereby euery li­uing thing is mooued. If therefore there bee so many kinds of necessarie members onely, and they all differing from each other, as for example, many kinds of mouths and bellies, and moouing members: the number of their coniunction must needs make diuerse kinds of li [...]ing creatures: For it is not possible, that the same liuing creature should haue many differences of mouths, and D likewise of eares: so that taking the coniunctions of these parts which may bee taken, wee shall make as many kinds of liuing creatures, as there are coniunctions of necessary parts. The like to this is found in the forenamed Commonweales: for Cities doe not consist of one part, but of ma­ny, as it hath often been saied. Therefore one part is that multitude which is busied in prouiding vittailes, which are called Husbandmen: A second is a multitude of Artificers, exercising their trades, without whom a city cannot be inhabited: A third, of those that frequent mar­kets, occupying themselues in buying and selling, and trafficking, and retailing: A fourth, of mercinarie hirelings: A [...]if [...], of men of warre and souldiours, which kind is no whit lesse neces­sarie then the others, if they would not be slaues vnto their enemie. For peraduenture it cannot E bee, that a city that serueth naturally, should deserue the name of a citie, seeing that a city is suffi­cient of it selfe: and if it serue it cannot haue that sufficiencie. The which is elegantly disputed by 1 Plato in his Common-weale, though not sufficiently: For Socrates saith, that a Cittie is compounded of foure necessarie kindes of people, which are the Weauer, the Husbandman, the Tailor and the Builder. Afterwards, as if these were not sufficient, hee addeth thereunto the Smith, and the feeders of all necessarie cattel: after, the Merchant, and engrosser or retailer: all which things doe per [...]it and accomplish t [...]e first Citie, as if a citie was ordained for necessity sake only, and not rather for a happy and perfect life, and that it standeth in as much neede of Tay­lors, as of Husbandmen. As touching men of warre, he doth not attribute their part vnto the ci­ty, F before that the territories thereof being enlarged, & already extended vnto their neighbors, they vndertake warre. Neuerthelesse, it behoueth that in all these four parts, and all others, there bee alwaies some one to deuide the law, and decide controuersies. If therefore the soule ought ra­ther to bee esteemed a part of the creature, then the body; sure such as these are rather to bee reckoned parts of a citie, then those that belong to necessary vse, I meane the military and iud­ging part, and those of the counsell, which is a worke of ciuile wisedome: neither maketh it any matter in regard of this speech, whether these be separately in some mē, or iointly in the same: [Page 192] for oftentimes it falleth out, that the same men are Souldiors and Plowmen. Wherefore if both G these and those are parts of a City, it is no doubt, but that Souldiours are necessary parts thereof. The seuenth part is of those who helpe and sustaine the Commonweale with their wealth, called rich men. The eight, of those that manage the publike charges, and exercise the offices, forasmuch as a Citty cannot bee without Magistrates. Therefore it is requisite that there be foure which are capable of gouernement, to discharge this office in the City, either continually, or by course: and also such as we spake of but lately, to wit, Counsellors and Iudges. If therefore these things are re­quired in cities well and iustly administred, there must needs also bee required some that are per­takers of vertue, concerning matters of state. Nowe, some are of opinion, that diuerse faculties may be in the same persons, as the same men to be Souldiors, Plowmen, and Artificers, yea and H also Counsellors and Iudges. All these doe ascribe vertue vnto themselues, and thinke themselues worthy to beare many offices, but it is impossible that the same persons should bee both rich and poore: Wherefore the poore and rich seeme to be principally the parts of a Citie. Moreouer, be­cause that commonly the one of these are few in number, the other many, they seeme to bee parts that are contrary to the parts of a citie, so that they doe frame and erect Common-weales accor­ding to their excesse; and so seeme to be double, a Democratie and an Oligarchie. That therefore there are many Commonweales, and for what causes there are so, it hath beene already declared. Let vs now also make manifest, that there are many sorts of Democraties & Oligarchies, which neuerthelesse is manifest already by that which went before, for there are many sorts of people, & I many kinds of Nobles. The Husbandmen make one sort of people, Artificers another, Merchaunts that occupie buying and selling, a third; those that frequent the seas, a fourth; of whome some also follow the war, others seeke for lucre, some are posts and carriers, others fishers: for in many pla­ces there is a great multitude of such people, as in Tarentum and Bizance of fishers, in Athens of gally slaues, in AEginum and Chio of Merchants, in Tenedos of Carriers: also Handicraftsmen, and those that possesse so little goods, that they are not allowed to bee idle, the fift: and lastly, those which are not free men by both sides, and any other such like multitude of people. That kinds of no­blemen are distinguished by riches, linage, vertue, learning, and other such like things of the same 2 difference. Therefore the first Democratie is that which consisteth principally in equality, for the K law of such a Democratie noteth equality, forbidding that the rich, and that neither the one nor the other exercise any lordship, but that the condition of both be alike: for if liberty and equa­lity be principally in a Democratie, as some thinke, it shall bee then especially, when as all partake of the Commonweale alike. But because the people is superiour in number, and that that which pleaseth the most, is alwaies ratified, it must needs be, that this must be a popular estate: this then is one kind of Democratie. Another, is where Magistracies are conferred according to riches, al­though they be but small, so that it may be lawfull to the possessor of riches to accept of them, and not to him that shal be without them. Another kind of Democratie is, whē as euery citizen with­out reproch may pertake of the gouernment, the law notwithstanding bearing cheefe authority. L Another is, when as euery one may become a Magistrat, so that he be a citizen, and that the lawe haue the cheefe preheminence. Another is, where all other things abiding in the same stay, the multitude ruleth, and not the law [...] which is done when the decrees of the multitude preuaile, and not the law, by means of the guiders of the people: for in Democraties which are gouerned by law, there is no cheefe guider and conducter of the people, but the best Citizens hold there the cheefest place; but where the laws do not bear rule, there they make vnto themselues guiders and captains. For when one is set vp out of many, then the people becōmeth a monarch, because many are lords, not as it were separately, but rather altogither as one. Whē as Homer saith, that it is not good that many should gouern: whether he means this gouernmēt, or some other, where many gouern a part M euery one by himselfe, it is vncertain. Therfore such a people, as if it were a Monarch, seeks to bear rule alone, refusing to be subiect to the law, and so becometh a lordly forme of gouernment, in such sort, that flatterers are there in great estimation, & such a people is in gouernmēt most like a Ty­rant, because in both, there raign the like cōditions, & both cōmand their betters: & the popular decrees are like vnto the Tirants cōmandemēts, & the ringleader of the people, & flatterer & fa­ [...]rer of a Tirant, are of the same nature, & in the same credit, the one towards tirants, the other [Page 193] A towards the people. They are causers & procurers, that decrees are preferred before laws: reducing by this means al vnto the wil of the people, & so exalting thēselues, by reason that the people being cheef lord [...], they haue their wils at their directions, they being obedient vnto them. Further, reie­cting all lawful Magistrats, they affirm, that only the people ought to sit in iudgement, who listen to their exhortation, so that all the offices are quite peruerted. Hee therefore, that tearmeth this estate a Democratie, and not a Commonweale, seemeth to reproue it most worthily: for where the law beareth no sway, there is no Commonweale: seeing that the lawe o [...]ght to rule in all generall causes, and the Magistrate and Commonweale decide particular cases. Wherefore, if a Demo­cratie is one forme of Commonweale, without doubt such a constitution where all is gouerned by B decrees and not by lawes, is not properly a Democratie, forasmuch as no decree can be vniuersall. And thus much concerning the kinds of a Democratie.

A Democratie is a forme of Commonweale, where free men and those that are poore, being more in number, are Lords of the estate: An Oligarchie, where rich and noble men being few in number, haue the gouernment. Now, as diuerse kinds of liuing creatures are distinguished by the coniunction of diuerse parts, as of mouths, throates, bils, bellies, feet, pawes, tallons, winges, hands, eyes, eares, noses. So by the assembling togither of diuerse parties in Citties, arise diuerse formes of Common-weales. Nowe, C the parts of Citties are eight, to wit, Husbandmen, Artificers, Marchaunts, Hirelings, Sou [...]diors, Counsellors, Iudges, and Magistrates. But the rich and poore doe seeme to be the principall members o [...] a Cittie, of whom the said Oligarchies and Democraties are constituted. Againe, the Populacie is distributed into many parts, as into Husband­men, Artificers, Merchants, Marriners, Souldiours, Porters, Carriers, Fishers, Handi­craftsmen, and such like: and the Nobilitie into foure, distinguished by riches, linage, vertue, and knowledge. Therefore of these diuerse different parts assembled togither, are made diuerse different Commonweales, in such fort, that in a Democratie, there are fiue seuerall distinct kinds. The first, where the Commonweale is equally communica­ted D to all: the second, where regard is had to goods, though they be but smal: the third, where the law bearing sway, all the Cittizens partake of the gouernement: the fourth, where euery one may aspire to the Magist [...]acies, so that hee bee a Cittizen, and that the law beare rule: the fift, where other things abiding the same, the multitude commaun­deth, and not the law: that is to say, where the people onely gouerneth after their own fancie, by dec [...]ees and statutes daily enacted by them: which kind indeed ought not to bee accounted a Common-weale, be [...]ause that is not a Commonweale, wh [...]rein the law doth not sway and rule, but rather as a Tyrannie, not worthie to be reckoned in that ranke.

E

THE which is elegantly disputed by Plato in his Commonweale, though not sufficiently: for Socrates sayth: That a Citie is compounded of fo [...]re necessary kinds of people, which are the Weauer, the Husbandmā, the Tailor, & the Builder, afterwards as if these were not sufficient, he addeth therunto, &c. SOCRATES. Go to thē, let vs frame a citie in our speech, beginning from the first cradle thereof, and let vs grant, that want was the first cause therof. ADIM. Be it so. SOC. The first and cheefest want is the prepara [...]ion of no [...]rishment; to the end, we may both be and liue. ADIM. Without doubt. SOC. The second of habitation, the third of apparrell, and such like things. ADIM. It is so. SOC. How shall a Citty be a­ble F to furnish this preparation? Must there not be one a Husbandman, another an Ar­chitect, another a weauer? And what if wee adde vnto these a Taylor, or any other that prepareth things fit for the body? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore a Cittie may consist of foure or fiue men. ADIM. So I thinke. SOC. What, and is it necessary that each of these doe comm [...]nicate his labours vnto the rest? As the Husbandman being but one, must he prepare foode for foure, and spend his time in tillage and fourefold labour, and com­municate it to others? Or rather neglecting them, prouide only for himselfe the fourth [Page 194] part of his no [...]rishment in the fourth part of his time, and employ the other three parts, G one in building, the second in apparrelling, the third in making shoes, without curi­ous communicating their [...]bours to each other? ADIM. It may be it would be easier, if thus then otherwise. SOC. No by Iupiter it would be impertinent: for in your speech I obserued first, howe wee are not borne very like to each other, but differing by nature, eueryone being fit for his owne worke: are not you of that mind? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Could one practise all occupations togither, better then if one should professe but one? ADIM. When one professeth but one. SOC. In like manner it is manifest, that in ouerslipping the opportunitie of any worke, the work it selfe decayeth. ADIM It is ma­nifest. SOC. For the worke that is in doing, will not tarry vpon the leisure of the worke­man, H but it is needfull that the workeman follow his worke, and obserue alwaies the op­portunity of working. ADIM. It is needfull. SOC. It followeth then that one may dis­charge better, with greater ease, and in greater quantity, a peece of worke [...] when accor­ding to Nature, and the opportunity of time, hee exerciseth but one trade, lea [...]ing the rest. ADIM. Most true. SOC. Therefore there is neede of more then foure Cittizens to prouide these necessaries whereof wee haue spoken: for in my iudgement a Husband­man cannot make for himselfe a Cart, fit for his vse, or a Spade, or other instruments needful for tillage: nor an Architect, who also hath need of many tooles: nor the Wea­uer nor Turner. ADIM. True. SOC. Wherefore Carpenters and Smiths, and many I other Artificers receiued into the Citty, do make it more peopled. ADIM. It is so. SOC. And yet it will not be great ynough, except there be adioyned Heardmen, Shepheards, and other keepers of Cattell, to the end, the Husbandman may haue oxen to till with­all; Builders, horses to carry their stuffe; Weauers their wooll, Tanners, Curriers, and Tawyers their skins. ADIM. It would be no small Citty where all these are to be found. SOC. Besides, it is almost impossible to build a Citty in such a place, where there would be no need of Carriers. ADIM. Impossible. SOC. Therefore it must needs stand in neede of others, that may conuey from other Citties, things necessary. ADIM. Yea. SOC. That seruant, should [...]ee not bee vnprofitable, that bringeth no necessary thing to the place, K whence [...]e fetcheth that which setteth his Cittizens aworke, for he should return emp­ty? ADIM. I thinke so. SOC. Now it is meet to prouide, not only sufficient for the Citty, but also for the inhabitants, such things whereof they stand in need. ADIM. It is meete. SOC. They stand in need of many Husbandmen and Artificers. ADIM. True. SOC. And of many that export and report, which are called Marchaunts, is it not so? ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore we must also stand in need of Merchants. ADIM. I confesse. SOC. And if this trafficke is to bee made by sea, there is need also of many that are expert in naui­gation. ADIM. Sure it must needs be so. SOC. And howe shall they partake in the Citty the labours of each other, for which cause wee haue called togither this assembly, and L erected our Citty? ADIM. Sure in buying and selling. SOC. So that there must be also a market, and there must be needs money coyned to serue for traffick. ADIM. That is true also. SOC. If the Husbandman bringing to the market his fruits, or any other Artificer his worke, doe not come at the same houre when others are ready and willing to mart, shall hee remaine idle there? ADIM. No, but some when they see their wares, will offer themselues to bargaine: for in well pollicied Citties, there are many feeble of body, and vnfit for other vses, deputed to this purpose, to bide in the market, and to pay money to those that are desirous to sell, or deliuer to others which are desirous to buy wares for money. SOC. This necessity hath ben the cause of bri [...]ging into Citties, engrossers, and M retailers: doe wee not so call them which remaine ordinarily in the market to buy and sell, or trafficke? and others that goe and come into Citties, Marchaunts? ADIM. Euen so. SOC. There are also other kind of seruants, which helpe little with their mind in this assembly, but haue strong bodies for trauell and labour. These selling this strength of their bodies, and calling the price thereof their hire, are named Mercinaries. ADIM. Yea. SOC. Therefore these also serue to the accomplishment of a Citty. ADIM. It see­meth [Page 195] A so. SOC. &c. Aristotle in the seuenth of his Politickes, chap. eight, writeth thus of the true parts of a Citty: First (sayeth hee) a Citty must haue victuals, next arts, and trades, because our life standeth in need of many instruments: thirdly weapons, things necessary for Cittizens, as well to preserue their estate, and chastice rebels, as to resist strangers, if they enterprise ought against them: Then a certaine competent quantity of money, to furnish both ciuile and warlike affaires: the fift and most principall thing is the obseruance of religion, which is called the Cleargie, or Priesthood: the sixt in number and most necessary of all, is the decision and iudgement of controuersies in rights and titles. These are the workes which are requisite in all Citties: for a Cittie is a B multitude, and yet not euery multitude, but such a multitude as is of it selfe sufficient for the maintainance of life: and if any of these things be wanting, such a company cannot haue this sufficiency. Seeing then that a City is grounded vpon these trades, there must needes bee a multitude of Husbandmen to furnish it with victuals, and of Artificers, Souldiours, rich men, Priests, and Iudges to descerne of ne [...]essary and profitable mat­ters, and betwixt right and wrong.

THEREFORE the first Democratie is that which is said principally to consist i [...] equalitie.] 2 The beginning, forme, and imperfection of a Democratie, is set downe by Plato in the eight booke of his Commonweale, as it followeth. SOCRATES. Consequently it is [...] C to entreat of a Democratie, how it is framed, and what men it hath: to the end, that kno­wing the quality thereof, wee may represent it in iudgement. GLAV [...]VS. So wee shall continue in our old course. SOC. Therefore the gouernement of a Citty is after a [...]ort changed from an Oligarchie into a Democratie, where the lords are neuer glu [...]te [...] with goods, but propound this as their cheefest happinesse, to be rich. GLA [...]. How. SOC. Because that the Gouernours ruling therein by their great wealth, will not prohib [...] by law the younger vnruly sort from lauishing and spending prodigally their goods, to the end, they may vsurpe ouer them by contracts and vsuries, and so encrease their own wealth and honour. GLAVC. Aboue all. SOC. It is impossible in one and the same Ci [...]y D to honour riches, and to possesse temperance withall; but either the one or the other must be neglected. GLAVC. Without doubt. SOC. Therefore when the education and gouernment of youth is neglected in Oligarchies, and the reines of intempera [...]ce let loose, then men of a generous & gentle disposition sometimes become poore. G [...]AVC. It is so. SOC. In my opinion, these men thus wronged & pricked, must [...]e [...]ds sit discon­tented in the Citty, some being endebted, others dishonoured, and some againe oppres­sed with both, so that hating and seeking to hurt the with-holders of their goods and o­thers, alwaies gape after nouelties and alterations. GLAVC. It is most [...]ue. SOC. Yet the couetous in the meane while greedy vpon gaine, and seeming not to see their miseries, E but still lending mony to others, so that euery one is readie to yeeld vnto them, & thus heaping vp great vsuries, they replenish the Citty with many drones and begge [...]s. GLAVC. Sure with very many. SOC. Neither goe they about to quench this euill alrea­dy kindled, but suffer euery man to dispose of his owne goods at his pleasure: such cu­stomes and practises not being interdicted by any other law. GLAVC. By what law [...] SOC. I meane that law which is the second, and enioyneth Cittizens to haue care of vertue: for if there were propounded greater danger in these voluntary tra [...] ki [...]gs, they would not enrich themselues so impudently in the Citty, neither would there be such a multi­tude of such enormities, as we lately spake of. GLAVC. It is true. SOC. Now, Lords vse to F dispose of their subiects in Citties, after all these meanes: yea and make both them and their youth such wantons and idle drones, that they are not able to sustaine any labour either of body or mind, but ready to yeeld and to be ouercome of plea [...]res and greefs. G [...]AVC. I confesse. SOC. Not regarding anything but gaine and p [...]ofi [...]e, n [...] resp [...]ng vertue more then the poorest and base [...] persons. GLAVC. Sure. SOC. Therefore being [...] qualified [...] when the Lords and the subiects [...] as­ [...]mblies, or at publicke spec [...]les, or [...], [...]ith [...] by land [...] or in any other [Page 196] dangers, then the poore are not anie whit despised of the rich, for oftentimes a poore G man, leane, and weather beaten, opposed against a rich man, that is brought vp in the shaddow, and loaden with superfluous fat, short breathed, and full of care, hee will then thinke that such men get their riches by wicked meanes, so that one talking priuately with another, will not sticke to say, that their Lords riches are of no value. GLAVC. I know that they are accustomed thus to doe. SOCR. As therefore a weake and sickly bo­dy with any little outward alteration falleth soone into sicknesse, and sometimes with­out any outward cause, is at discord in it selfe: so an euill disposed Citty, vpon euery light occasion falleth sicke, and is at variance in it selfe, when as the people of a city that is ruled by an Oligarchie, or by a Democratie, seeke for helpe abroad from others: yea H also sometimes without forraine aid it entreth into sedition. GLAVC. Most certaine. SOCR. I thinke that the Democratie or popular state hath his beginning when the poo­rer sort preuailing, kill or expulse one part of the rich, and doe equally communicate with the rest the honours and charges of the weale publicke, and the offices are there commonly disposed of by lot. GLAVC. Such is the beginning of a Democratie, whe­ther it be through force of Armes, or feare, the other giuing place. SOCR. Howe then shall those Cittizens liue, and of what manner shall their gouernment be? Certes, such a man will shewe himselfe Democraticall. GLAVC. Hee will doubtlesse. SOCR. First they will all bee free, and their Citty full of libertie and boldnesse, so as they may I without controulment doe what they li [...]t. GLAVC. Men say so. SOCR. But where this absolute libertie is, euery one leads such a life as likes him best. GLAVC. That is mani­fest. SOCR. There are in such a Commonweale all sorts of people. GLAVC. Why not? SOCR. It seemeth likewise to bee the best and goodliest Commonweale of all: Fo [...] as a garment decked with choice of floures, makes a very faire shewe, so dooth such a State, hauing in it variety of all kinds of manners and dispositions. GLAVC. Yea. SOCR. And peraduenture, as children and women take delight to see such peeces of worke as are full of diuersitie, so many men will deeme this an excellent Common-weale, sith it is fraught with such varietie. GLAVC. For that cause principally. SOCR. Nowe it is easie K to find in this City a forme of gouernment. GLAVC. Why so? SOCR. Because that by reason of such absolute libertie, there are contained therein three kindes of gouerne­ments, and it seemeth necessarie for him that vndertaketh the constituting and or­dering of a State, as wee not long since did, to repaire vnto some Cittie, the gouerne­ment whereof is Democraticall or Popular, there to make choice of such a forme as best shall please him, as if hee were come to a faire of Commonweales: and after choise so made, to order and establish it. GLAVC. Perhaps there will bee no want of people there. SOCR. Tell me, will not such a life seeme at the first blush diuine and sweete, when you are not enforced either to gouerne, though you bee thereto fit and sufficient; or to L obey, vnlesse it please you [...] or to serue in the warres when others are in armes; or to liue in peace when others embrace quietnesse, vnlesse your selfe affect peace; or if any lawe barre you from the authoritie of gouerning or iudging, yet both to gouerne and iudge neuer a whit the lesse, when you thinke good? GLAVC. It will perhaps seeme so at the first. SOCR. Tell mee againe, thinke you not clemencie towards some condemned per­sons to bee a goodly thing? Haue not you seene in such a Cittie certaine men condem­ned to death or banished, who haue notwithstanding remained there stil, shewed them­selues abroad, and oftentimes, as if no man had any thought or care therof, walked vp & downe the Cittie like demi-gods? GLAVC. I haue seene many such. SOCR. The cause M hereof is the too much sufferance therein vsed, with the want of all regard, and the neglect of those things which we recounted in constituting and ordering a Cittie, viz. that if any bee endued with an excellent naturall conceit, he will neuer prooue a good man, vnlesse euen presently from his infancie, hee be accustomed and enured to honest recreations, and continue such exercises, wholly supplanting all the rest. Now by reason of this former neglect, it commeth to passe, that in such a Cittie none doth consider by [Page 197] A what meanes men attaine to places of authoritie in the Commonweale, but respecteth those onely who are most in fauour with the people. GLAVC. You propound vnto vs a very excellent forme. SOCR. The Democratie will haue these and other like thinges, and shall be as it appeareth, a plausible gouernement, full of disorder and diuersitie, di­stributing some equalitie as well to those that are equall as vnequall in estate. GLAVC. This that yon [...]ay, is very cleare. SOCR. Aduise you next what manner of man the De­mocraticall or Popular person is in priuate, or if you will, let vs fi [...]st consider, as we did when we discoursed o [...] gouernement, by what meanes he becommeth so. GLAVC. That will bee a very good order. SOCR. Doth it not so come to passe, that the sonne of a co­uetous B father, and one that affecteth the Oligarchie, is trained vp by him in such man­ners? GLAVC. What els. SOCR. And he forcibly restraineth his pleasures, that prouoke him to spend, and not to get, which are called vnnecessary pleasures. GLAVC. It is eui­dent. SOCR. Will it not (thinke you) be good for the auoiding of obscuritie, that we doe first distinguish the necessary desires from the vnnessary? GLAVC. I like it well. SOCR. Those desires are called necessarie, which we cannot remoue or take away, and which being vsed, doe helpe and profite vs, for our nature doth of necessitie require these two. GLAVC. Yea. SOCR. We may by very good right call these necessary. GLAVC. By verie good right indeed. SOCR. And those vnnecessary, which may bee remoued, if men bee C so accustomed from their youth, and which being vsed, doe vs no good, but oft great hurt [...] GLAVC. You say verie well. SOCR. Let vs take an example out of them both, that wee may the more euidently see and knowe them. GLAVC. Let vs doe so. SOCR. The desire of eating meate and dyet for the preseruing of our health and good dispo­sition of bodie, is it not necessarie? GLAVC. I thinke yes. SOCR. Doubtlesse the vse of meate is good for two respects, both because it is profitable, and because without it our life cannot continue. GLAVC. It is certaine. SOCR. So is also the vse of diet neces­sary, in that it furthers the good disposition of the body. GLAVC. It is so. SOCR. But if the excessiue desire of these feedings and other like, being hurtfull both to the bodie D and mind, may bee restrained in vs from our youth, and wholly, as it were, quenched by discipline, for our better attaining of Prudence and Temperance, may it bee iustly cal­led necessarie? GLAVC. In no sort. SOCR. Wee will then call the one sumptuous, the other profitable, becaus [...] they help vs in our life and actions. GLAVC. What els? SOCR. Wee will say as much of venereall and other pleasures. GLAVC. Altogether as much. SOCR. Nowe hee whome wee erewhile called a drone, was full (wee said) of these plea­sures and desires, and subiect to the vnnecessary, sparing, and Oligarchical. GLAVC. Yea without doubt. SOCR. Let vs likewise shewe after what manner hee doth of an Oligar­chicall person become Democraticall, or Popular: And it seemeth to mee, that hee be­comes E so in this manner. GLAVC. In what manner I pray you. SOCR. After that the young man, whome wee said erewhile to bee poorely and hardly brought vp, tasteth the honey of these drones, and approcheth to those burning and fierce beastes which can afford him many and sundry pleasures, resolue your selfe, that from thence proceedeth the chaunge which is made in him of the Oligarchicall into a Democraticall dispositi­on. GLAVC. It must necessarily bee so. SOCR. As then the state of the Cittie was chan­ged when any forraine succour gaue aide to one of the parts, the like vnto his like; so also is the young man changed when any kinde of strange desire being of the same na­ture, doth further and set forward that which is in him. GLAVC It is wholly so. SOCR. F And if on the other side anie furtherance bee giuen to the Oligarchicall disposition be­ing in him, either by his father, or by others of the house, who warne or chide him, there is there bred in him against himselfe, a sedition, contradiction, & combat. GLAVC. What els? SOCR. Sometimes also the Democraticall disposition giueth place to the Oligarchicall, and some desires or passions faile or fade, when any shame surpriseth the youthful mind, wherby it is reclaimed. GLAVC. This thing doth happen SOCR. Other­times in stead of the desires which are departed, there come other like, & as vehement, [Page 198] and that through the vnfit education vsed by the father. GLAVC. That dooth also oft G times happen. SOCR. Which new desires breed customes, and do largely grow in great number. GLAVC. It is euen so. SOCR. Lastly, they doe possesse the high fortresse of his youthfull mind, finding it voide of honest disciplines and institutions, and of true rea­son, which doe notably defend and guard the minds of men that are religious. GLAVC. Notably indeede. SOCR. Then false, euill, and proud conceits, succeeding in s [...]eade of the other, possesse the same place in such a kind of man. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. Nowe when hee goeth againe towards those Lotophagi, will hee not manifestly dwell there? And if any furtherance bee giuen by his friends to the sparing or moderate in­clination of his mind, these euill conceits shu [...] the gates of the royall [...]l that is ther­in, H and receiue no such succours, nor admit the admonitions of pri [...]ate olde men, who are as it were sent Embassadours thither: But rather, comming to the combat, they pre­uaile against them, and calling shamefastnesse folly, doe in vile sort banish it: Tempe­rance they tearme cowardlinesse, & reproching it, driue it thence: making him beleeue that Mediocritie and moderation in expences is a clownish and miserly thing, they ga­ther more force by drawing to them many other vnprofitable desires. GLAVC. It is true. SOCR. Hauing thus emptied and purged his minde, pos [...]essed by them, and long accu­stomed to great and wastfull spending, they bring in wantonnesse, prodigalitie, and im­pudence, all braue and crowned, in great number, praising and making much of them, I calling wantonnesse, honorable education; licentiousnesse, liberty; prodigality, magnifi­cence; and impudence, valiantnesse: Will not then this young man change himselfe by this meanes from the education, which he hath had in pleasures that are necessary, and fall to a dissolute and licentious life, following vnnecessarie and vnprofitable pleasures? GLAVC. He will doubtlesse SOCR. Such a kind of person doth liue afterwards as it see­meth to me, not so much for necessary, as vnnecessary pleasures, employing thereon his goods, labours, and exercises. But if hee bee so happy, as not to abandon himselfe too much, and that growing more in yeares when these pleasures doe in great number pre­sent themselues vnto him, he take a part therof, & mean while leaue the rest, and though K he wholly addict himselfe to those that he hath taken, yet liue in such sort, that hee doth equally vse them all, euer submitting himselfe to the first that shall subdue him, vntill he bee therewith glutted; then to take another, not setting light by any, but cherishing all alike. GLAVC. It may so happen. SOCR He doth not admit nor receiue true reason into his fort [...]sse, when any doth shew him that there are some pleasures of honest and good desires, and some of bad desires, and that hee must exercise and honour the one, mode­rate and bridle the other: but hee agreeth to all those points, affirming that these plea­sures are all alike, and equally to bee honoured. GLAVC. The man that is thus addicted, doth so. SOCR. Thus liues hee secure, gratifying and embracing the first desire that pre­senteth L it selfe, sometimes being drunke, & playing on musicall instruments, other times he drinking water, and vsing abstinence, sometimes exercising himselfe inactiuitie, hee is also often idle: and regardeth nothing: now he will play the Philosopher, then deale in the Commonweale, and going out of his house, doth speak & doe that which he doth by chance first light on; if he meet with souldiours, he will arrange himselfe with them, if with Merchants, he will doe the like; to bee short, there is neither order nor necessitie in his life: But hee calling and accounting such a kind of life, pleasaunt, honourable, and happy, doth continually vse it. GLAVC. You haue declared the life of a popular man full of equalitie. SOCR. I suppose that such a kind of man hath sundry and different con­ditions, M and that he is gallant, and full of diuersities, like to the Citie which many think is happily gouerned, because it hath in it selfe many examples of gouernement and manners. GLAVC It is so. SOCR. Such a manner of man then is like to the Democratie, and may iustly be called Democraticall.

A

CHAP. V. Of the kinds of Oligarchie.

AMong the kinds of Oligarchie, one is, wherein publicke offices B are disposed according to a certaine quantitie of goods [...] but such a quan­titie, a [...] that the poore who are more in number, are not thereto admit­ted: and that hee which hath attained to such a determinate proportion of riches, be able to go [...]erne the Commonweale. The second kind is, wher­in the Magistrates are created by the smalnesse of their reuenues, and take others in the place of such as faile: which if they were taken or chosen by all: this State should seeme Aristocratical: if by some certaine and appointed men, Oligarchi­call. The third kind is, when the sonne succeedeth the father. The fourth, when that commeth to passe which hath now beene spoken off, and the lawe ruleth not, but the Magistrates [...] which kind C is the same amongst the Oligarchies, as the Tyrannicall State amongst the Mon [...]chies: and a [...] the last kind of Democraties, and it is called a Dynastie or Potentacie. Such are the kindes of Oligarchie and Democratie. But we must know that it chaunceth in many places, that the Com­monweale is not popular in respect of the lawes, but that it is ruled like a popul [...]r [...], by reason of the manners and gouernement. Contrariwise, in other places in respect of the laws, [...] [...]clines more to the popular, and by reason of the gouernment and manners to the Oligarchicall. Which thing doth happen cheefly a [...]ter the changes of Commonweales: for [...]en are not presently chan­ged, but are content at the beginning, to exceed the rest a little, so the former Lawes remaine in force, but the stronger doe change the Commonweale.

D

The right of gouerning the Common-weale, is limitted in Oligarchies, by the valuation of euery particular Cittizens wealth. And as in auncient times were vsed foure kinds of valuations of goods, so are there also foure kindes of Oligarchies, as the wealth doth by degrees encrease. The first is, where publicke offices are giuen to rich men, enioying such a proportion of wealth, that they may exclud [...] the poore from go­uernement, and because they are many in number, the Lawe beares rule amongst them. In the second kind there are fewer rich men, but such as possesse greater wealth, and be­ing in office, may of themselues chuse successours, or place new officers in the roomes E of those that die, or otherwise faile. But if the rich doe farther decrease in number, and encrease in wealth, then ariseth the third kind of Oligarchie, wherein the children suc­ceed their fathers in publicke offices. Lastly, when the rich doe mightily encrease in wealth and friendships, then beginneth the fourth kind of Oligarchie, the gouernment whereof is not according to the Lawes, but all is there ordered by the will and pleasure of those that are wealthiest. And this fourth kinde is called a Dynastie, resembling the Tyrannicall State, and the last kinde of Democratie. This order of foure hundred hath beene obserued by Plato in his sixt booke of Lawes in the election of Counsel­lours or Senators, and by Solon in the establishing of the Athenian Commonweale, as F Plutarch writeth in his life: and by the Romanes in disposing the honours of their state, though not in the same order as Aristotle doth here set it downe, but it hath beene di­uersly vsed by all these, according to the Lawes and ordinances of their Countrey. Pli­nie saith in the Preface of his 14 booke. Posteris laxitas mundi & rerum amplitudo d [...]no fuit, post quā Senator censu legs coeptus, index fieri censu, Magistratū ducem (que) nil magis ex [...]re quā census. Seneca in the 10 booke of the Declamations saith, The taxe & proportion of wealth, aduanceth the Senators order: it discernes the knight frō the Plebeian: in armies [Page 200] it giueth promotion, Iudges are thereby chosen: The taxe of a Romane Gentleman, G or Knight, amounted to foure hundred thousand Sestertians, and if they were worth so much, they might sit to behold the sports in foureteene degrees. The Senatours reue­nue did first amount to eight hundred thousand Sestertians, which was afterward ray­sed by Augustus to twelue hundred thousand, to the end, that they might with more honour maintaine their estates. And as none might bee chosen Knights or Senatours, if they had not that proportion of yearely reuenues which was required, so also if they lost it, they were no longer reputed for Knights and Senatours: which institution or or­dinance was Oligarchicall. At this day euery Cardinall must haue twelue hundred Crownes of yearely reuenue at the least, and if he faile of that proportion, the Pope al­loweth H him so much pencion.

CHAP. VI. For vvhat cause there are many sorts of Democratie and Oligarchie.

IT is then manifest by the discourse going before, that there are so many sorts of Democratie and Oligarchie: for it must needs bee that either all I the aforesaid parts of the people participate in the Commonweale, or that some doe, and some doe not. When as then the Artificers, and others, that are meanely rich, gouerne the Commonweale, the gouernement thereof is according to the laws: For they must liue by their labour, and cannot bee idle; so that the lawe being made, they assemble not but for necessarie cau­ses: and it is lawfull for others to bee admitted into the Commonweale, if they enioy so large a reuenue, as is prefixed and appointed by the lawes, whereas otherwise, if this were not lawfull, this sort Democratie should be Oligarchicall: this is for such respects one sort of popular gouernment, and it is impossible to liue idly without reuenues. The other is by the election of Magistrates, K for it may be, that all are admitted into the Commonweale, if they bee not excluded by reason of their birth, and that notwithstanding, they onely participate in the publicke offices which haue sufficient maintenance for their estate without labour, and therefore the lawes beare rule in such a kind of Democratie. The third sort, is when all that are free, may bee admitted into the Com­monweale, who neuerthelesse haue no authoritie of gouernment for the cause aforesaid: so as it is necessary that the law doe bear rule there also. The fourth sort of Democratie is that which hath lately ben inuented in cities. For by reason that cities are waxed greater then they were at the beginning, and for that there is in the same plenty of reuenues, all men are partakers of the com­monweale, by occasion that the multitude excelleth, who communicate and gouerne, because the L poore wil be idle, when they receiue wages or [...]ipend. The which multitude is indeed very idle, for the care of their priuate affaires dooth let them neuer a whit, which so greatly turneth the rich aside, that often they come not into the assemblies nor seats of iudgement. By this means the com­monweale is brought vnder the gouernement of the poore, and not in the power of the lawes. So many and such be the kinds of the Popular state through these causes. As for the Oligarchie, when many men haue goods, howbeit in smaller quantity, and not very great, it is a kinde of the first Oligarchie, for they giue leaue to the possessor to be a gouernour there. And for that there is a multitude of those that participate in the gouernment, the law and not the men must rule. For sith they be farthest from the Monarchie or rule of one man alone, and haue not such ability, as M that they can liue idly without care, nor so smal substance, that they must haue releefe of the com­monweale, they will rather haue the lawe to gouerne then themselues. But if there bee fewer that posses [...] wealth the [...] they before mentioned, and yet haue greater abundance thereof, it is the kind of the second Oligarchie: for when they haue the more power, they will beare the more authori­tie, and therefore take other companions to helpe them in the gouernement. And as yet not s [...]rong y [...]gh to gouerne without lawe, they constitute such law. If they come to this point, that [Page 201] [...] [Page 202] [...] [Page 203] [...] [Page 204] [...] [Page 205] A assisteth. ADIMAN. You say wel. SOCR. Such a Timocratical yong man resembleth that kind of Cittie. GLAVC. Yea certes. SOCR. And hee doth sometimes become so in this manner: When any body is son to a rich father, (dwelling in a Citie not wel gouer­ned) who shunneth Honours, Offices, Iudgements, and all such troublesomenesse and dooth willingly submit himselfe to others, that hee may so bee ridde from businesse. GLAVC. Howe then becommeth hee so? SOCR. When this boy I say, heareth his mo­ther complaine, that her husband is no Magistrate, and that therfore she is not accoun­ted off among other women; and when hee sees her offended with his father, because hee is little giuen to the getting of wealth, vsing no dealings either in priuate or pub­licke, B whereby to enrich himselfe, but neglecting all such courses, and following onely his owne humour, without making anie great account of his wife, yet not despising her; who conceiuing thereat great indignation, tels the boy that his father is not wor­thie to haue the name of a man, but that hee is too lazie and cowardly, with other such tales as women are wont to tattle. ADIMAN. Without question such women are wont to babble so. SOCR. You know also, that the seruants and they of the house, such I mean as are more affectionate to the Mistresse part, doe priuily buzze such tales into chil­drens eares: And if they see that any one hath wronged the father, who for quietnesse sake seekes not to redresse it by lawe, they counsell the boy to reuenge himselfe of such C persons, when hee shall growe more in yeares, and to shewe himselfe more like a man then his father. Besides, hee going abroad, heares other like speeches, and sees that they who trouble not themselues in the Cittie with ought els saue their owne priuate busi­nesse, are called sots, and had in no account, whereas those of contrarie humours are prais [...]d and honoured. Then the boy hauing heard and seene all this, and on the other side, hearkening to the instructions giuen him by his father; and noting his exercises in comparison of others, hee is drawne by both: on the one side, the reasonable part of his soule being exercised and augmented, and on the other side, the concupiscible and irascible, that is, mouing desire and anger, whereby, although hee haue no euill inclina­tion, D yet by reason that he vseth bad company, and is drawne hereby into the same opi­nions, he yeeldeth himselfe to some meane power prone to contention and anger, and becommeth a magnanimious and ambitious man. GLAVC. You seeme to haue suffici­ently declared the manner of his growing into such an humour.

CHAP. VIII. E Of the Gouernement generally called a Commonweale.

IT remaineth that wee speake of the Commonweale, so called generally, and of the Tyrannicall state. Now we haue thus ordained it, though it bee no trans­gressiō, nor yet the Aristocraties lately mentioned. Neuertheles in very deed, they doe all swarue from the right forme of a Common-weale: afterward they are reckoned amongst those which are their corruptions and blemishes, F as was saied in the beginning. But wee haue with good reason referred our intended discourse of the Tyrannicall State, to the last place, because that of all the rest, it is least a Commonweale [...] And sith wee purpose to treat of the Commonweale [...] wee haue therefore obserued such an order. Nowe then it is meete to treat thereof, and wee ma [...] the more easili [...] knowe the force of it, after wee haue declared such things as concerne the Oligarchie and De­mocratie. For a Commonweale, to speake simply, is a mixture of the Oligarchi [...] and Demo­cratie. Those States that enc [...]e more to the Democratie, are [...] called [...], and [Page 206] those that hold more of the Oligarchie, are rather called Aristocraties, because discipline and no­bilitie G doe for the most part accompany the rich. Besides, the rich seeme to haue that whereby men are inuited or allured to commit euill, and in this respect they are called vertuous and no­ble. Sith then the Aristocratie will impart superioritie to good Citizens, and sith it is saied that Oligarchies doe for the most part consist of good and honest men, it seemeth impossible, that a citie ruled by good, and not by e [...]ill men, should not be gouerned by good lawes, as also that being gouerned by good lawes, it should not bee gouerned by good men. Likewise the administration of lawes is not good, though they bee well ordained, vnlesse they be obeyed. Wherfore this is one good point in the ordinance of lawes, that men obey them, being ordained: Another is, that the Lawes bee well ordained and obeyed, because men may obey those lawes also that are not well ordai­ned: H which commeth to passe in two manners, either when they are conditionally good, or simplie good. Now that seemeth cheefely to be an Aristocratie, wherein honours are bestowed for vertue, sith the end of the Aristocratie is vertue; of the Oligarchie, riches, and of the Democratie, li­bertie: and this is common to them all, that the greater number of opinions preuaileth. For in the Oligarchie and Aristocratie and Democratie, that which seemeth best to the most part of those that gouerne [...] is ratified. For which cause, in many Cities this manner of gouernement is called a kind of Commonweale. For the mixture of rich and poore men, hath regard onely to riches and libertie, sith for the most part men seeme to haue the place and reputation of vertuous men. Now as there are three things in the Commonweale which contend for equalitie, to wit, li­bertie, I riches, and vertue (for the fourth which is called Nobilitie, followeth or dependeth on the two last, because Nobilitie, is auncient riches and vertue) it is certaine, that the mixture of these two, that is, of rich and poore men, is to bee called a Commonweale; and the mixture of three, an Aristocratie, I meane that kind of Aristocratie which followeth the true and first kind. Thus it hath beene shewed by vs, that there are other sorts of Commonweales besides the Monarchie, the Democratie and Oligarchie. We haue likewise declared what sorts they are, and how the Ari­stocraties differ among themselues, as also those formes of gouernement which encline or bend to an Aristocratie, and that they are not much vnlike.

K

The Commonweale so tearmed by the generall name, is a gouernement compoun­ded of the Oligarchie and the Democratie: which composition, when it enclineth to the Democratie, is called a Commonweale: and when it bendeth more towards the Oli­garchie, it is called an Aristocratie: because vertue and riches doe commonly accom­pany Nobility, which is defined to be ancient riches and vertue. There are three things (saith he) which contend for equality in Cōmonweales; liberty, riches, & vertue: but the mixture of rich and poore men, is called a Commonweale, and that mixture of three an Aristocratie, not the true and first sort, but the second.

L

CHAP. IX. How the Commonweale so called generally, is made of the Democratie and Oligarchie.

WE will now declare, howe that forme of gouernement which is generally called a M Commonweale, is made of the Democratie & Oligarchie. And it will also plainly appeare, how the Democratie and Oligarchie are defined. For when wee haue di­stinguished them, we will then forme this kind of Commonweale, by taking from either of both some part, as it were a rule. There are three ends of this composition [...] The one, in taking the ordinances of both, as in iudgements, because that in [Page 207] A Oligarchies there is a penaltie set downe and appointed for the rich, if they iudge not, and for the poore no see. In Democraties there is a fee for the poore, and no penaltie for the rich. The common and meane of these, which therefore belongeth to this forme of Commonweale is [...] that both [...]ee therein obserued, sith it [...] [...]m [...]ered or composed of both kinds. Thi [...] i [...] one ma­ner of conioyning them. The other is, by taking the meane of those thinges that are com­maunded by both: as to bee present at publicke assemblies, the one hauing no yearely reue­nues, or very s [...]all [...] the other, a great deale; neither the one nor the other is common, but the meane betweene both proportions of reue [...]es. The third is compounded of two ordinaunces, the one Oligarchicall, the other Democraticall. As it seemeth to bee De­mocraticall, B that the Magistrates bee created by lot: and Oligarchicall, that they bee chosen: it seemeth againe to be Democraticall, that they bee not taken by their riches, or thereto preferred for their yearely reuenues: and Oligarchicall, that they bee therefore ta­ken and preferred. It shall therefore bee Aristocraticall, and fi [...] for such a Common­weale to borrowe somewhat of both: of the Oligarchie, the election of Magistrates: of the Democratie, not taking them by and for their yearely reuenues. This is the way to entermixe them: and the end of well per [...]ourming this mixture is, that the same Com­monweale may bee called both a Democratie, and an Oligarchie. And there is no doubt that it is so called, because it well tempered or composed: which thing also happeneth to the 1 C meane, for both the extreames doe appeare therein. As may bee seene in the Lacedemo­nian Commonweale: For manie holde opinion, that it is a Democratie, sith there are manie thinges in their ordinaunces, proper to the Democratie. As first the education of children: For rich mens children, are brought vp in the same manner as the childre [...] of poore men, and in like sort as they are taught, so may the other bee. Likewise, being pa [...] their childhood, and when they are growne men, they liue after the same order, for the rich make no greater a shewe then the poore: they are serued with the same meats at pub­licke feastes, and the rich weare no costlier apparrell, then the poore also may bee able to buy. Besides, because the two greatest offices are in the peoples handes, whereof they chuse the one, D and administer the other: for they elect the Senatours, and participate in the state or of­fice of the Ephori. Others thinke that it is an Oligarchie; because it hath manie thinges proper to the Oligarchicall manner of gouernement, as this, that all offices are disposed by election, and not by lot: and that a fewe haue power to condemne to death, or to banish: and sundry other such things. Now it is requisite, that in a Commonweale well composed, there bee both these, yet neither of them seeming to bee there, and that of it selfe it doe maintaine and vp­hold it selfe, not outwardly of it selfe, not by hauing many outwardly, who wish it well (for that may happen also to a corrupt Commonweale) but by hauing no part wholly in the Citie which desireth another forme of Commonweale. Wee haue declared after what manner a Common­weale E should bee established, as also those formes of gouernement, that are called Ari­stocraties.

That forme of gouernment called by the generall name of Commonweale, is made of the Democratie and Oligarchie in three sorts. First, in taking the Lawes and ordi­nances of both: then taking the meane of those things that are commaunded in both: thirdly, in following or obseruing the institutions, partly of the one, and partly of the other. And then the mixture or temperature shall bee good, when the same Common­weale shall seeme both a Democratie and an Oligarchie.

F

AS may be seen in the Lacedemonian Commonweale, which many hold to be a Democratie, 1 others an Oligarchie.] Aristotle in the 2. booke of his Politickes, chap. 4. Some holde opi­nion, that a good Commonweale should bee a mixture of all the formes of goue [...]e­ment, and therefore they praise the Lacedemonian Common-weale, which they say, consisteth of the Oligarchie, the Monarchie, and the Democratie: their royal estate to bee a Monarchie; the Senate, an Oligarchie; and the State of the Ephori, Popular. [Page 208] Plato in the foureteenth of his Lawes, When I consider the Lacedemonian Common­weale, G I cannot well tell howe it should bee called [...] For the power which the Ephori haue there, is verie tyrannicall: Sometimes it seemeth aboue all other Citties to bee verie like to a Democratie, and it should bee very absurd to denie that it is Aristocra­ticall. Also the Kingdome, which is there perpetuall, is accounted the auncien­test State of all. Let him that would knowe more herein, [...]de tha [...] which is noted touching this point in the fourth Chapter of the sec [...]nd booke, and the seuenth, which treateth altogether of the Lacedemonian Commonweale.

H

CHAP. X. Of the Tyrannicall State, and the kinds thereof.

WE will speake nowe of the Tyrannie, not for that it deserueth a long discourse, but that it may haue a place in this treatise, sith wee haue set it in the number of Commonweales. Wee haue in the former booke spoken of a Kingdome, where wee discoursed touching that State I which is chee [...]ely called so, to wit, whether it bee vnprofitable or profi­table for Citties, as also when, whereof, and howe it should bee establi­shed. In which place wee propounded two kinds of Tyrannie, because their power and the Kingdome are in some sort taken one for another, sith they are both lawfull: for some Barbarians chuse Monarchs with absolute power: and in times past there were among the auncient Grecians certaine Monarchs called AEsymnetae. These estates haue some differences among themselues, and they were royall and resembling the state of a Kingdome, both because they were lawfull, and because they signiorized ouer volunta­rie subiects: and Tyrannicall, because they exercised their Kingly authoritie at their owne plea­sure K 1 without controule. The third kind of Tyrannie which seemeth to bee principally a Tyran­nie, and is opposed to the State of a Kingdome, must necessarily bee a Monarchie, and dooth absolutely commaund and raigne ouer such as are equall, and all that are better; respecting his owne, and not the subiects profit, and therefore is not voluntarie: for no person that is free, dooth willingly endure such a state. There are then so many and such kinds of Tyrannie, for the causes aforesaid.

Although the Tyrannicall State should not bee called a Common-weale, as it was said before, because the Lawes haue therein no authoritie, but all thinges are ordered at L the will and pleasure of the Tyran: neuerthelesse, it hath beene accustomed to be num­bred among the corrupt Commonweales. Nowe there is not one onely kind of Tyran­nie, but there are many sorts thereof. For although the Kingdomes of the Barbarians, and the AEsymnetae of the Greeks, signorize ouer voluntary subiects, and lawfully; ther­in imitating the state of a kingdome: yet they are Tirannies, because they exercise lord­ly rule ouer good men, or better then themselues. Notwithstanding, that is properly a Tyrannie wich doth forcibly raigne ouerfree men.

1 THE third kind of Tyrannie, which seemeth to bee principally a Tyrannie, and is opposed M to the state of a Kingdome.] Aristotle in the fift of his Politickes, chap. 10. Almost the same accidents doe grow in kingdomes and Tirannies, as we said, did chaunce in Com­monweales: For the kingly state doth imitate the Aristocratie, and the Tyranny is made of the extreamest sort of the Oligarchie, and of the Democratie, and is therefore verie hurtfull to the subiects, for it is compounded of two corrupt Commonweales, retay­ning the transgressions and blemishes of them both. Moreouer, it will easily appeare, [Page 209] A that the beginning of Monarchies hath proceeded of contraries, for the Kingly State was first ordained for the defence of good men against the multitude: and the King was created out of the number of good men, according to the excellence of his ver­tue, or vertuous deedes, or of the stocke from whence hee came. The Tyran was created by the multitude, against the Noblemen, to the end, that they should not op­presse them, as is manifest by the euents and issues of things. For almost all Tyrans haue become so, through being Captaines and leaders of the people, hauing gotten credite by forging accusations against the Nobilitie. Then one sort of Tyrannies hath sprung vp in this manner, the Citties being already growne great. Others, of those B that hauing beene Kinges before, haue violated the auncient customes of the Coun­trey, desiring to commaund more absolutely. Others, of such as haue beene cho­sen to the cheefest Offices: for in auncient times the people allowed long time to Magistracies and publicke charges. And others of Oligarchies, where they had cho­sen and preferred some one to great Offices, for to hold them in manner of soueraigne­tie: for in all these manners they might easily vsurpe a Tyrannie, if they were but wil­ling thereunto, because some had alreadie the power of a Kingly estate, and others the honour, as Phidon in Argos, and others which made themselues Tyrans, hauing before kingly authoritie, and those of Ionia and Phalaris, the honour. Panecius among C the Leontines, and Cypselus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens, and Dyonisius at Syracusa, and others in the same sort, of Captaines of the people haue become Tyrans. So the Kingly State dooth resemble the Aristocratie, in that it is giuen accor­ding to the persons dignitie, or through his vertue, or birth, or honourable deedes, or through all these thinges together, and through power. For all those that haue well de­serued, or might well deserue of Citties and Countries, haue attained to this honour; some in defending them from bondage, as Codrus; others in setting them at libertie, as Cyrus; some for building a Cittie, or conquering a Countrey, as the Kings of the La­cedemonians and Molossians. The office of a King, is to see that the rich bee no way D iniuried, nor the multitude outraged. The Tyrannicall State (as hath beene often said) hath no respect to the publicke commoditie, vnlesse it bee for his owne peculiar profite: and the onely end or ayme of a Tyran, is pleasure; of a king, honestie. Wherefore the desire to exceede in money, is Tyrannicall; and to excell in honour, more kingly. The kings guard is of Cittizens, the Tyrans of strangers. That the Ty­rannie hath the vices and corruptions of the Democratie and Oligarchie, it is mani­fest: of the Oligarchie, in that it chuseth riches for the onely end whereat it ay­meth: otherwise the guard and magnificence thereto requisite, could not be main­tained: likewise, in that it doth in no sort trust the multitude, and therefore takes their E weapons from them. Item, the oppression of the people, the driuing them out of the Citadell, and forcing them to disperse themselues, is common to them both, as well to the Oligarchie, as to the Tyrannie. It taketh likewise of the Democratie, the ma­king of warre against the Nobles, the destroying of them by couert, or open meanes, and banishing them as aduersaries and enemies to that state, because they are the Au­thours of conspiracies: when some will seeke to rule themselues, others refuse to en­dure subiection. For which cause, [...]eriander counselled Thrasibulus to loppe off the highest eares of corne; as if it were necessarie alwaies to make away the cheefest Cit­tizens.

F

CHAP. XI. That the best Commonweale, and of longest continuance, is that wherein there are many men of meane sub­stance, neither too rich, nor too poore.

E

THey doe not measure the best Commonweale and best state of life for many Cities and many men, by excellent vertue, nor by knowledge, both which haue need of Nature and Fortune, nor by that kinde of Commonweale which they would wish, but according to that state of life which is common to the greatest part of men, and that forme of gouernment, whereof many Cities are capable. For the Aristocraties whereof we spake [...]e [...] now, are either not fit for many cities, or resemble much the Commonweale, so gene­rally called [...] so that we shall speake of both, as of one. The deciding of these questions, dependeth F on the same principles. For if it were wel said in the Ethickes, that the happie life is according to vertue, not empeached, and that vertue is Mediocritie; then it must bee, that the meane is the best of that Mediocritie, which most men attaine. We must determine in like sort of a Cities ver­tue, vice, and Commonweale, sith the Commonweale is the life of the City. There are in all cities three sorts of inhabitants: the one very rich, the other very poore, the third in a mean betweene both. Sith then it is graunted, that the meane is the best, it followes that meane wealth is likewise the best of all, as that which easily obeyeth reason. But excessi [...] beautie, or strength, or nobilitie, [Page 220] or riches, and their contraries, pouertie, or weakenesse; or ignorance, do with great difficultie obey G reason: for the one become contumelious and offending openly in great matters; the other decea­uers, and too malicious in small matters. Now iniuries are sometimes o [...]ered by contumely, other times by cousenage. Moreouer, these men are vnfit for publicke offices and counsell, the want whereof is very hurtfull to Cities. Likewise they that are too happy, or strong, or rich, or greatly fauoured, and such like, wil not or cannot obey, with which euill they are infected from their in­fancie, disdaining euen in the very schoole to obey their Maisters or teachers, through their cockering and licentious education. The other through want of these things, are too abiectly min­ded and base. So that the one cannot beare rule, but doe seruilely obey: the others cannot obey, but in lordly manner beare rule. Wherefore the City consisteth of slaues and lords, not of free men: H and of these the one part is enuious, and the other disdaineful, which things are much repugnant to amitie & ciuile conuersation, that proceedeth frō societie & good will: For we will not so much as walk with our enemies. A citie therfore must be principally of men, whose estates are equal & alike, as are they whose substance is meane. For which cause it is necessarie, that that City be well gouerned, which consisteth of those things whereof we say the naturall constitution of a Citie is, and that those Citizens enioy more safety then any other, for they desire not other mens goods, as the poore doe, neither are their goods desired by others, as the poor do co [...]et the rich mens wealth: and sith by reason hereof they seeke not to hurt each other, they therefore liue without daunger. For this cause Ph [...]cilides praied well, that much good might befall men of meane calling, him­selfe I desiring to be a meane man in the City. Thus we see that of all ciuile societies, that is the best which consisteth of men whose estate is meane; and that those Cities are well gouerned, wherein there are many such inhabitants, which may haue more power then the other two parts, or at the least then either of them alone. For being adioined, they cause the city to encline; and preuent con­trary excesses. It is then great good hap, that they who gouerne the Commonweale, haue meane and sufficient substance: For where the one are too rich, and the others haue nothing, there fol­loweth an extreame Democratie, or an intollerable Oligarchie, or a Tyrannie, through both excesses: for of too hautie a Democratie and an Oligarchie, is made a Tyrannie [...] which thing chaunceth farre more seldome amongst men of meane and equall estate: the cause K whereof wee will shewe afterwards in discoursing of the changes of Commonweales. Then the meane forme of gouernment is the best, because that onely is without sedition: for where there is great Mediocritie, there arise no seditions nor diuisions of Commonweales: and for this reason great Cities are lesse seditious, because they haue many inhabitants of meane estate. As for smal Cities, they may easily be deuided into two parts, so that there is no meane: for almost althere, are poore or rich. Likewise, the Democraties are surer, and of longer continuance then Oligarchies, by reason of the inhabitants of meane estate which are there in greater number, and haue more part in the honours of the Commonweale, then in Oligarchies: for when the poore doe without them grow to great power and multitude, the state of the City becommeth miserable, & is forth­with L ruinated. That this is so, there is a manifest signe, viz. that the best Law-giuers haue beene meane Citizens, for so was Solon, as it appeareth by his verses; and Lyc [...]rgus, who was no King; and Charonda [...], and almost all the rest. We may hereby knowe the cause why the greater part of Commonweales are Democraticall or Oligarchicall: For by reason that oft times there is small Mediocritie in them, whensoeuer the one or the other exceed, viz. the rich men, or the people, and transgresse the meane, they drawe the Commonweale vnto them, whereon followes a Demo­cratie or an Oligarchie. Moreouer, when there happen seditions and fightings betweene the peo­ple and the rich men, they which preuaile, do not establish the Commonweale in common, or equal sort, but esteeme it the guerdon of their victorie to excel or bear most sway in the Commonweale: M and so the one make a Democratie, the other an Oligarchie. Besides, they who haue obtained the principality of Greece, each regarding the forme of their owne Commonweales, haue established in Cities, some of them Democraties, others. Oligarchies, not considering the profite of those cities but their own priuat commodity. For these causes there is neuer or seldome, and amongst few mē, a meane Commonweale: for of all the Princes of former times one onely would haue established such a manner of Commonweale. But the custome of reiecting equalitie, and seeking to bear sway, [Page 221] A is long since growne old in Cities, wherein if the attempters be foiled, they obey. Hereby it appea­reth which is the best Commonweale, and for what cause. As for the other Commonweales, wher­as we say that there are many Democraties, and many Oligarchies, the perfect Commonweal be­ing set downe, it shall be no hard matter to know which is to be accounted the first, which the se­cond, and so of the rest; because one is worse, and another better: For that is of necessitie the bet­ter which is neerest, and that the worst which is farthest from the mean: vnlesse we iudge by sup­position, I meane by supposition, because oft times though one forme of Commonweale be more a­greeable to mens desires, yet there is no let to the contrary [...] but that another may bee more profita­ble and meet [...]or some.

B

That is the best Commonweale which consisteth of Citizens possessing meane sub­stance for neither they which are too rich, nor they that are extreamly poore, be fit for the mainte [...]ance of ciuile society, the one being too proud, the other too base and ab­iectly minded; the one contumelious and insolent, the other enuious and deceitfull; the one commanding as lords, the other obeying as slaues. But a city should consist of those who are equall and like, as they bee whose estates are meane. Wherefore, that is the best Cittie which consisteth of such, and being as it were exempted from seditions, doth thereby long vphold it selfe, but where many are exceedingly rich and poor, there C doth easily growe an intollerable Oligarchie or Tyrannie, if the rich preuaile; or an ex­treame Democratie, if the multitude of poore men get the vpper hand. Plato in the fourth booke of his Commonw [...]ale, and in the ninth of his Laws, maketh an excellent discourse touching riches and pouertie, which Aristotle seemes to haue followed, for the conformitie of the matter. There must great heed bee taken (saith Plato) that riches and pouertie enter not into the Cittie, for the one engendreth effeminate daintinesse, sloth, seditions, curious after nouelties; the other, basenesse and malicious practises, to­gether with desire of innouation. Also that man who couets to bee happy, must not get riches, but by iust dealing and temperance.

D

CHAP. XII. Of that which doth generally concerne the preseruation of Cities, and what manner of multitude is fit for a Democratie or an Oligarchie.

E WE will consequently shew for what sorts of men what kinds of Commonweales are fit or behoofull, but first we will set down that which generally concerneth all. For that part of the Citie which desireth the safetie and preseruation thereof, must haue more power then the other which desireth it not. Now euery Cittie consisteth of qualitie and quantitie: by quality I meane libertie, riches, knowledge, nobilitie; by quantitie, the excessiue multitude of the people. It may so come to passe, that in one of the parts whereof a Citie consisteth, there is qualitie, and in the other, quantitie: As to haue more vn [...]o­ble Citizens then noble, more poore then rich, but in such sort, that they exceede not so much in quantitie, as they faile in qualitie: for which cause they should bee compared together. Then F where the multitude of poore men dooth exceed the aforesaid proportion, there springeth a De­mocratie, and so euery kind of Democratie, according to the excessiue number of euery sort of people [...] as if the multitude of Husbandmen preuaile, the first kind of Democratie [...] if of mecha­nicall and mercenarie men, the last: and in like manner the other sorts which are in the meane betweene these two. But where the rich and Noblemen exceed more in qualitie then they faile in quantitie, there springs an Oligarchie, and euery kinde of Oligarchie after the same manner, [Page 222] according to the excesse of the Oligarchicall multitude. There [...]ore hee that maketh lawes in the G Commonweale, must alwaies haue regard to those men which are of meane calling, whether hee make Oligarchicall or Democr [...]ticall lawes, and euer respect them. When the number of meane men is greater then both the extreames, or than either of thē alone, then the Commonweale may be firme and stable; for none needs to feare, that the rich men will at any time agree and confede­rate with the poore against these men, because the one will neuer endure to serue the other. And if they seeke a more common forme, they shal not find it; for they will neuer serue by turnes by reason of their mutuall diffidence. But an Vmpire is euery where to be trusted, and the Vmpire is the meane, and by how much the more the Commonweale is thus tempered, so much the more firme­nesse and stability it hath. Many men erre, who suppose that they can establish Aristocraticall Cō ­monweales, H not only by attributing too much to the rich, but by excluding the people out of them, for of things which haue a false appearance or shewe of good, there doth in [...]ime, and that not sel­dome, of necessity spring true hurt and euill. For the Commonweale is sooner destroied and ouer­throwne by the superiori [...]y of the rich, then of the poore.

IT is necessary for the preseruation of euery Commonweale, that that part of the Cittie which desires the safety thereof, bee of more power then the other which doth not desire it. And there are two things to bee considered in the parts of a Cittie, to wit, Quality and Quantity: Quality, as Richesse, Liberty, Learning, Vertue, Nobility: by I Quantity is vnderstood the number of Cittizens, of whom the parts of a Citty consist. By the collation and mixture of which things, there growe many kindes of Common­weales: for where the poore doe exceed in quantity, and are exceeded in quality, there springeth a Democratie: contrariwise, an Oligarchie, where the rich exceed in quality [...] and are exceeded in quantity. Wherfore a Law-giue [...] or Politician must haue great re­gard to men of meane estate, and euer respect them, whether hee make Oligarchicall or Democraticall lawes, to the end, hee may auoid the euill of the one or other extremity. For where the meane Cittizens haue more power then both the rich and poore toge­ther, or then the rich alone, or the poore by themselues, it is easie to ordaine there a firm K and stable Commonweale: but to giue more preheminence to the whole degree of rich men, then to all the multitude of the poore, it is dangerous; because the rich are more prone to offer iniuries then the poore, and the Commonweale is sooner destroyed by the superiority of them, then of the poore.

1 FOR that part of the City which desireth the safety and preseruation thereof ought to haue more power.] Aristotle in the Chapter following [...] it is very profitable to ordaine the va­luation of Citizens goods after such a rate or proportion, that they who participate in the Commonweale, be more in number then they who do not participate: for the poor L and such as haue no part in the publicke honours, seeke to liue in quiet if they be not outraged, nor their goods taken from them. In the fift booke and ninth chapter: The principall foundation is that which wee haue touched sundry times before. viz. to see that that part which is content with the present state, haue more power then the other which is not therewith content. And in the eleuenth chapter of the same booke: Sith Cities doe consist of two parts, to wit, of poore men and rich men, it must bee so prouided that both of them thinke that their safety and preseruation dependeth of the state, and it must be carefully looked vnto, that they wrong not each other in anything, that he haue the stronger on his side, to the end, that when need requireth, he be not in­forced M to set slaues a [...] liberty, or to take the Cittizens weapons from them, because ei­ther of the parties being adioined to his strength, will bee sufficient to resist the other part that might assaile him.

A

CHAP. XIII. Of the sleights and subtile deuises by the rich against the poore, and by the poor against the rich, to purchase to themselues the gouernment of B the state, and how the Lawgiuer should take order for it.

THere are fiue sorts of sleights and subtile deuises vsed and practised to cir­cumuent the people: The Assembly, the Magistracies, Iudgements, Armes, and Exercises. The Assembly, that it bee lawf [...]ll for all to bee present and assistant therein, and that there be a fine set on the rich mens heads, if they bee not assistant there, either onely, or in greater number. The Magistracies, that they which haue yearly reuenue, may not refuse C them, but that the poore may. The Iudgeme [...]s, that there be a fine set on the rich mens heads if they iudge not, and on the poore none; or a great fine on the one, and little on the other, as in Charondas his laws. In some places all they that are enrolled, must be assistant at assemblies and iudgements, and if they be not assistant, they are subiect to great penalties, to the end, that for feare of the penaltie, they cause themselues not to be enrouled, and that being not enrouled, they assist not at iudgemēts, nor at assemblies. There is the same ordinance touching Armes and Exercises, for the poore are per [...]itted to haue no armes, and there is a penaltie set downe for the rich, if they haue none: and if they doe not exercise themselues, the one are p [...] ­nished, and the other are not: so the one doe exercise themselues for feare of the penaltie, and the D other do not, because they feare nothing. These are the Oligarchicall deuises, vsed by Lawgiuers. As for the Democraties, they vse these counter sleights and deuises, setting downe a fee for poore men which are assistant at assemblies and iudgements, and imposing no penaltie on the rich. Then whosoeuer will iustly temper these, hee must entermixe the ordinances of both, setting downe a [...]ee for the one, and a penalty for the other: for by this meanes the Commonweale shall be communicable to all, which should els remaine in the hands of one part alone. Now such a kinde of Commonweale ought to consist of those only who beare armes. The quantity of the valuation or reuenue cannot be simply defined and determined, but the quality being considered, it is verie profitable to ordaine it after such a rate or proportion, that they who participate in the Common­weale, E [...]e more in number then they who doe not participate: for the poore, and such as haue no part in publike honours, seeke to liue in quiet, if they be not outraged, nor their goods taken from them. But this is not easie, because the Gouernours of the states are not alwaies modest and cour­teous, and the poore, if there arise any warre, will not [...]erue therein, vnlesse they bee maintai [...]ed by the common charges o [...] the State, but being so maintained, they serue willingly. In some places the Commonweale consisteth, not only of those which do beare armes, but of those also which haue b [...]rne them. Such was the Commonweale of the Mallians, which created their Magistrates out of the number of those who were in the war. The first Commonweale among the Grecians after the kingdomes, did consist of warriors, and first of horsemen, because the force & excellence of the F warre consisted in thē, sith the footmen without order were vnprofitable: For the ancient Greci­ans had as thē no discipline or order in these things, so that the horsemen had all the power, but whē cities grew great, & the footmē became stronger, the Cōmonweale was communicable to all [...] Therfore those states which we do now cal Cōmōweals, were in former times called Democraties: & the gouernmēts were by good reason Oligarchical & roial, because in regard of the s [...]l [...] of mēthe [...]e were not many of mean estate, so that being few in nūber, & failing in order, they [...]l [...] the more endure to be gouerned. We haue shewed for what cause there are many Commonweales, [Page 224] and why there are others besides those whereof we spake before, (for there is not one kind of De­mocratie G nor of the other formes in like sort) moreouer, what differences there are, and wherfore it happens. Also which is commonly the best Commonweale: and for what sorts of people, which among the other Commonweales is fit or behoofefull.

Sixe Democraticall, and as many Oligarchicall lawes, subtilly and maliciously deui­sed to vphold, and cause the one estate to preuaile against the other in fiue things: which are, the publick Assemblie, Magistracies, Iudgements, Arms, & Exercises, which things may be iustly or equally moderated, in being well entermixed.

H

CHAP. XIIII. That there are three parts of all Common-weales, the Counsell, the Magistrates, and Iudgements: and first of the authori­ty of the Counsell, and the manners thereof. I

WE will speake againe of all Commonweales in general, and of euery one seuerally in the discourse following, beginning where it is requisit. Then there are three parts in all Commonweales, wherein an aduised Law­giuer must diligently consider and regard what is fit or behoofefull for euery one. For where such parts are duly ordained, the Commonweales doe of necessitie prosper wel, and differ only according to the difference which is in euery one of them. One of these three parts consisteth in pub­licke Counsell: the second in the Magistrates, what power they haue, & K 1 how they ought to be created: The third in the Iudges. It belonging to the Counsell to haue the directing and ordering of the affaires both of peace and warre, to make leagues, or to breake thē, to ordaine Lawes, and to abrogate them, to condemne, to banish, to confiscate, and to call the Ma­gistrates to account. The consultations of all such matters ought to be committed to all the Ci­tizens, or all the same to certaine, as to some Magistrate, or to many; or diuers of the same con­sultations to some, or some to all, or certaine of them to certaine: when all doe consult, and of all thinges, that is Popular, for the people seeke for such equalitie. All the Citizens may consult many waies, as one way by turnes, and not altogether; as in the Commonweale of Tele [...]les the L Milesian. In other Commonweales the Magistrates assemble together, and consult; but all men as their turnes fall, attaine and come vnto the publicke offices, and are taken out of the Tribes and smallest par [...]s of the Citie, vntill all the Citizens by turnes, haue exercised the same offices: Assembling themselues together only to make lawes, or to prouide for the Commonweale, and to heare what the Magistrates would signifie. Another way is, when all the citizens doe consult to­gether, assembling onely about the creation of Magistrates, and the stablishing of lawes, & when there is any question about matters of peace, or of warre, or of the calling of the Magistrates to account. The other matters doe remaine in the deliberation of the Magistrates, being euery one appointed to his charge, and created out of all the Citizens, and either by election or by lots. Another way is, whē the citizens do assemble together about the creation of Magistrats, & calling M thē to account: & when deliberation is to be had of the wars, or of the making of any martial asso­ciation: the other affaires being administred by the Magistrates which are elegible, as those are, which ought of necessity to be exercised by men of skill. The fourth way is, when all the citizens asse [...]ble together, & consult of all matters: and when the Magistrats decide nothing, but pro­po [...]d matters only, and ask aduise. After which manner the last Democratie is now gouerned, [Page 225] A which we haue affirmed to be correspondent to that Oligarchie which is called a Dinastie, or Po­tentatie, and to the Tyrans Monarchie: All these wayes are Popular. But where a certaine number doe consult of all affaires, it is an Oligarchie, wherein there bee also many differencies. For when they bee created in respect of small substance, and are the greater number, by meanes of the meanenesse of their goods, and enterprise not against the Lawe, but obey it: And when it is lawfull for whosoeuer hath that proportion of goods limitted by the Lawe, to at­taine to the Gouernement; that kind of gouernement is an Oligarchie: [...]owbeit ciuile and tollerable in respect of the Mediocritie that raigneth in it. But where all Citizens are not ad­mitted to deliberate, but those onely that are elected doe gouerne according to lawe, as afore, B that pertaines to the Oligarchie. Also when those that haue authoritie to deliberate, doe chuse themselues, and the sonne succeedeth in the roome of his father, and are Maisters of the Lawes; of necessity this order is Oligarchicall. When the offices are deuided, as for example, if the deliberating of peace and warres; and the calling of Magistrates to account, bee per­mitted to all the Citizens, and the other affaires to those Magistrates that are created by ele­ction, or by lots, it is an Aristocratie, or a Commonweale. If Magistrates bee chosen by voi­ces for any speciall cause, and created by lots for other causes, either absolutely out of all them that afore haue beene elected, or are taken by election and by lot, it is partly an Aristo­cratie, and partly a Commonweale. Thus the Counsell is deuided, according to the nature of C Commonweales; and euery Commonweale is administred according to such determination and meanes as wee haue here set downe. But it is behoofefull for that kinde of Democratie; which at this day seemeth to bee cheefly a Democratie, to wit, where the people is maister of the Lawes, for better and more fit order in consultations, to doe in assemblies as is practised in Oli­garchies, where they set fines vpon their heads that will not bee Iudges, to the end, that by this meane they may bee constrained to iudge. But in Democraties, they appoint a [...]e to the needie, the which should seeme a good course in the assemblies, wherein all should determine better in common, to wit, the common people with the Nobilitie, and the Nobilitie with the multitude. Moreouer, it auaileth, that the consulters bee taken by election, or by lot, equally out of all parts D of the citie. Also, it is behoofefull that the vulgar people should be more in number then the men apt to gouerne, or not to giue fees to all, but to so manie as shall bee correspond [...]t to the num­ber of the Noblemen, or to exclude the greatest part of them by lots. As touching the Oligarchies, it is behoofefull for them either to chuse certaine of the multitude, or to ordaine such Magi­strates as are in some Commonweales, whom they call forecounsellours, or foreseers, or keepers of the lawes, and then to consult of those matters whereabout they had before deliberated. So shall the people be present and assistant at the consultations, and will not enterprise to alter any thing in the Commonweale: & wil decree the very selfesame things, or nothing contrary to that which shal be referred vnto them. Or els that all the Citizens should be receiued to the counsell, howbeit E in such sort, as that the Magistrates onely shall haue authority to consult. And it is expedient to doe quite contrary to that which is practised in Commonweales, that the authority and sentence of the people may take place in absoluing & discharging, and not in condemning, but rather that their sentences of condemnation be referred to the Magistrates. For the contrary is practised in those Commonweales where the authority and sentence of a [...]ew when they discharge or acquite any man, is firm and obserued: And if they condemn, then is their i [...]dgement not firm & stable, but is alwaies referred to many. Thus much haue we se [...] down concerning the Counsellor and Go­uernour of the Commonweale.

There are three parts in all Commonweales, the Counsell, the Magistrates, and the F Iudgements, and accordingly as they be ordained the Commonweales go wel or euil, receiuing differēces according to the differēce which is seen in euery of the same parts. The soueraigne Counsell is ordained to determine and consider of the affaires both of peace & war, of leagues & treaties [...] to make new laws, or to abrogate the old, to cōdemn to banish, to confiscate, & to correct the Magistrats. The deliberation of which things may be cōmitted al to al men, or al of thē to a certain nūber, or some of thē to some men, or some to al men. If al determine of al things, it is Popular, & is done in many [...]: if a [Page 226] certain number do determine of al things, it is Oligarchical: but if the determinations G & iudgements be deuided, they pertaine to the Aristocratie, & to the Commonweale.

I IT belongeth to the Counsell to deale in the affaires of peace and of warre, to make leagues, or to breake them, to ordaine Lawes, and to abrogate them, to condemne, to banish, to confiscate, and to call the Magistrates to account.] Here Aristotle speaketh of the first and soueraigne Counsell of a state, whereon dependeth all the rest of the gouernement, and by means whereof many and diuerse necessarie parts for the establishment of a Commonweale, are tied togither and vnited, euen as in the round world, many vnlike mouings are held togither by one heauenly and durable mouing, and all causes by the first cause of al. H In euery liuing creature many and diuerse members differing in office, are comprehen­ded and drawne into vnitie and accord by the soule and the heart. From this Counsell proceedeth the directing and ordering of matters of Religion, of Iustice, of Armes, of Treasure, of Lawes, of Magistrates, and of Manners. Plato in the twelfth booke of his Lawes, calleth it the Anker of the whole Cittie, whereby it is set sure, and staied as the shippe is in the water. Moreouer, in the same booke hee sayth, That this Coun­sell hath such place in the Cittie, as the soule and the head haue in liuing creatures: for the vnderstanding is infused into the soule; and in the head, the sight and hearing are placed, insomuch, that the mind being ioined to two goodly sences, and reduced into I one, doth preserue euerything. This Counsell therefore whereof wee speake, is di­uersly ordained, according to the diuersitie of gouernements. In Fraunce, first of all the King hath all power and authority in all causes touching peace and warre, hee calleth together and holdeth the Estates of the Kingdome, according to the auncient obser­uation and custome of the same, whensoeuer he seeth any need requireth: hee proui­deth for all offices and benefices that are electiue, and for Captaineships: he disposeth of the monies, and employeth them where the publicke affaires doe require it: he alone maketh Lawes himselfe, and expoundeth them: sendeth Embassadours into straunge Countries to be there ordinarily resident, or to discusse some controuersie, to treat of K peace or truce, to shew his right and claime, and to summon any Citty or Countrey to yeeld vnto him, whereof hee deliuereth instructions signed with his owne hand, and the hand of one of his Secretaries of Estate: to mone for the death of a Prince, and to congratulate the new comming of another to the kingdome, as is accustomed amongst friends: He ordaineth that which is necessary to be done to strange Embassadours, an­swereth them from his owne mouth, and giueth them their dispatch. Besides this, as euery state is maintained by rewarding of well doing, and punishing of euill, the one being fauourable, the other odious: he himselfe distributeth the Honours, graunteth the recompences, and punisheth by Iustice, which is a great aduantage and furtherance L vnto him to be loued, obeyed, and honoured. The first Counsell about the King, is the secret Counsell, which is called the counsell of affaires, and is commonly holden in the morning after his vprising, whereto he calleth a certaine small number of those whom he accounteth the wisest, and of greatest experience, and most faithfull vnto him, with whom hee secretly communicateth his principall affaires, as they happen and fall out. There the letters which come from Embassadours, from Gouernours and Captains of the Frontiers, are red, dispatches are resolued vpon, and comm̄anded to the Secretaries being there present, euery one according to his Office: gifts and benefites are there agreed vpon; and the rols of the same, and all the principall matters there determined, M are signed by the kings hand. The number is greater in the priuy Counsell, whereinto men are called in respect of the Nobilitie of their blood, and by the highnesse of their house, or dignity, Wisedome, Knowledge, and Experience. The King himselfe is present therein now and then when any great matter is deba [...]ed: In his absence the first Prince of the blood is President. The Constable and Chauncellour being two cheefe officers of the Crowne, are of great authority: the one is cheefe for matters of warre, [Page 227] A and the other for Iustice; and being placed on seuerall sides in equall degree, doe alwaies sit one right against the other. This Counsell is held either for the kings treasures, and other matters concerning the affaires of the state of the Realme, and then there enter none saue only the Secretarie of Estate, and the Treasurer, De [...]espargne (as they cal him) ouerseers of the treasures, whose charge it is to vnderstand how they are leuied and im­ploied; and the Secretaries appointed for the said treasures: or els this Counsel is assem­bled for the parties, that is, for matters of iustice depending on the soueraignty or royall prerogatiue; then there enter the Maisters of the requests, waiting by quarters, who report requests, informations, appeales, and other affaires of consequence wherof B the king hath reserued to himselfe the knowledge, or which cannot be decided in anie other place. Sometimes also the parties themselues haue audience, or speake by aduo­cates. This Counsell being ordained for the complaints of priuate men in such affaires as concerne the state, and for the reports of Citties and Prouinces, doth iudge the ap­peales of Parliaments, lookes to the Mercurials touching their order & discipline how it is kept, aduiseth on the treaties of graine and wines, & on the Marchandises brought into the Realme, or carried out, and the imposts set therin: It taketh order for the course and value of money, and hath care of the demeins of the Crowne, of taxes, subsidies, and other reuenues of the king: and of the principall farmes, in prolonging the time, it C makes abatements to farmers, or dischargeth them with knowledge of the cause and in­formations going before, ioyned to the aduise of the Treasurers and Generals of the charges. Furthermore, whatsoeuer is agreed on and ordained to take effect, must be sig­ned by one Secretarie at the least, and sometimes by one Secretarie and Maister of the Requests, or by some person that is qualified, according to the nature of the cause, be­fore it be sealed by the Chauncellour, who is a seuere examiner, and as it were, a Con­trouler of all things, which maketh his Office very great, and sometimes hatefull. Be­sides, all publicke treaties, edicts and ordinances must be certified in soueraigne courts, and all the kings rescripts allowed by the Iudges, to whom they are directed. In Turkie D the Grand Signior doth neuer or very seldome giue audience to any priuate man, but onely admitteth into his presence the Embassadors of strange Princes sent to him with presents, and after hee hath giuen them his hand to kisse, and vnderstood the cause of their comming, not dealing farther with them, hee referreth them to his Bassas, which hold a Counsell called Diuan, wherein is open audience foure daies in the weeke, Sa­turday, Sunday, Munday, Tuesday, in that place where the Prince doth soiourne; if in time of peace, at Constantinople, or some other Citty in his Serrail; if in warre, in his pauilion. The Bassas are called to this honour by degrees from lower estates, rising al­waies, and giuing good example and opinion of themselues. Being assembled in coun­sell, E they consult touching the affaires of the said Embassadors, and the answeres which must be giuen them, touching matters of estate and soueraignty, touching meanes to be prouided for the strengthening of Prouinces which begin to decay, touching mur­thers and condemnations. The suppliant, plaintife, or defendant, doth speak there with­out an aduocate, and then is constrained to make full satisfaction to his aduersary, if he [...] be present, or to proue his owne allegation by witnesses: Whereupon there is forth­with made a definitiue & irreuocable decree. Whē the Counsel hath held seuē or eight houres, the Bassa-visir goes to acquaint the Prince with all that hath been treated of, ac­cording to the truth of euery thing; for in this case the lie is presēt death: For the Prince F doth oft times hearken at a window called the Dangerous window, which is right ouer the Diuan, made in such sort, that he may heare & see not being perceaued, & although he neuer be there, yet they thinke alwaies that he is there. When hee hath heard the re­port and aduise of the Counsell, he doth seldome gainesay it, but doth confirme or mo­derate it. The things that are thus ordered and determined as edicts, sentences, [...], priuiledges, safeconducts, and other like dispaches, are set downe in writing by the Tes­queregibassa, who is as a Secretarie of Estate or of the Commandements, and by th [...] [Page 228] Zazgilars, who doe record and register it. Touching the treasures, the Bassas meddle G not with them, but there are two called Defterderler, who are ouerseers thereof, as it were Treasurers generall, the one of Romania, the other of Natolia. The Cadile­squers are Presidents in ciuile causes, and sit in the Diuan with the Bassas. The Muphtie is cheefe for r [...]ligion, and hath charge of matters of conscience. At Rome, while the Commonweale lasted, the Consuls being present, had the gouernement of all publike affaires, with as great authoritie almost as Kings, whom all the other Magistrates obey­ed, the Tribunes of the people excepted, who were opposed against them, to the end, to bridle their authoritie, and controule their doings. They assembled the elections to create their Consuls, or Pretours, or Censors, and to establish newe Lawes: they H tooke order for warlike preparations, and all matters for the campe. In gouerning their Prouinces, they commaunded ouer their confederates as seemed good vnto them: they made Captaines of thousands, leauied Souldiors, and chose the fittest: they might punish all their subiects wheresoeuer they dwelt, and employ the publicke treasure as they would, being for this purpose followed by the Questor, who forthwith obeyed their commandement. The Senate disposed the reuenue of the Empire & the common charges; it was not lawfull for the Questors to bestow one penny without their order, vnlesse it were for the Consuls: to thē belonged the punishing of all offences through Italie, which merited open punishment, as treason, conspiracie, poysoning, mur­thers, I &c. If any priuate person, or any Cittie had neede of fauours, or reproofe, or of aid and defence, the Senate had the whole charge thereof. If Embassadours were to bee sent to any Prince or State out of Italie to reconcile, or intimate, to commaund ought, to possesse, or to denounce warre, the Senate tooke order for it. If any strange Embassadours came to Rome, it belonged to the Senate likewise to take order for their entertainement, and for the answeres that should bee made them. The people alone had the authority of rewarding and punishment, wherein consisteth all gouernement, and the whole life of man: they alone condemned to death, bestowed Magistracies, honours, and publicke charges, and ratified the Lawes: Peace and Warre was at their K choice and appointment: they determined of sending succour, of vnion and agree­ments with their allies, they confirmed and approued these things, or disanulled them. At Venice, the generall assembly of the Lords, which is helde euery eight day, is called the great Counsell, hauing the soueraigne power of the State, whereon dependeth the Senate, and the authority of the Magistrates, and doth represent in this Commonweale the Popular State. The Duke hath royall authoritie and power, cheefly in that hee re­taines such grauitie and dignitie. For all the Cittizens doe honour him as a king, and in his name all the decrees, ordinances, and publicke Letters are written. The Coun­sell of the tenne men called Sign [...]ri Cai, and the Colledge of the Auncients, or of the L Counsellours, called Sa [...]ij, represent the Aristocratie, who foresee and consult between themselues touching the affaires about which the Senate is to be assembled. They con­tin [...]e but sixe months, and are distinguished into three degrees or orders. In the first there are sixe, which surpasse the rest in experience and good reputation, who haue the principall charge of gouerning the Common-weale, and other affaires of importance; touching which, they giue aduise to the Senate, that there may be order taken for thē. In the second degree are fiue inferiour to the other in account, which haue charge of the Souldiers that are in the pay of the Signorie, following armes vnder the leading of th [...]ir Captaine generall. In the third degree are fiue others, who haue charge of M the Se [...] affaires, not being bound to referre to the Senate any thing whatsoeuer. At Raguse th [...]y create [...] President from Moneth to Moneth, who dwelleth in the pallace and hath twelue Cou [...]sellors, whose assembly is named the little Counsell. Then there is another Counsell, called of the Pregadi, whereinto an hundreth of the most ancient Cittizen [...] may enter: After these there is the great Counsell, wherein all those of No­ [...]le [...] families, past the age of twenty years, are assistant. At Genoa the whole Common­weale [Page 229] A is gouerned by them that are borne of the eight and twenty families, and none is called to any charge whatsoeuer if he be not of this number, which they call an aggre­gation. Thence are taken the foure hundreth, of whome the great Counsell consisteth, hauing the whole power and authoritie of the State, and they are chosen from yeare to yeare, out of whom is made another Counsell, which is likewise annuall, called the lit­tle Counsel; & this is assembled more often than the great Counsell, and therein the af­faires are commonly treated of. For the great Counsell is neuer held, but for the creati­on of the Duke and the eight Gouernours of the Commonweale, which are renued euery two yeares, or to consult of peace and war [...]e, and other matters of great conse­quence. B All the Magistrates there, what authority soeuer they haue, are Syndiquez so soone as their charge is expired, that is, they may be accused and called to account. In Switzerland euery Canton hath a double Counsell, the little and the great. But vpon any weigthy cause that concerneth all the Cantons, they hold their generall Counsell called a Iourney or Diet, the most times at Baden: as in like case the Ionians and AEtoli­ans did in ancient times, calling such assemblies [...] and [...], whereof He­rodotus maketh mention in the first booke of his Hystorie, and Titus Liuius in the first booke of the warre of Macedon. There was besides in Greece a publicke counsell of all the States, called the Amphictionicall counsell, because it was first ordained and in­stituted C by Amphiction the sonne of Deucalion: Plinie in his 35. booke, calleth it Publicum Graeciae Concilium. Those people that from the beginning sent thether their Agents called Pylagorae, and had voices therein, where the Ionians, Dorians, Perhae­beans, Beotians, Magnesians, Achaians, Pthiotes, Melians, Dolopians, AEnians, Del­phians, and Phocians: afterward there came many others also. Strabo in his ninth book of Cosmographie writeth, That this Counsell was kept at Delphos in the Temple of Apollo, by reason of the commodious scituation of the place, which is as it were in the middest of Greece, as well of that part within Isthmus, as that without: and he calleth it [...], the nauill of the earth. This Counsell of the Amphictions was D held twice a yeare, in the Spring, and in Autumne: That the authority thereof was great, it appeareth by Diodorus Siculus in his sixteenth booke De Bibliotheca Historica, cap. 8. where he saith, that the Thebans not contented with the battel of Leuctra, wher­in they had ouerthrowne the Lacedemonians, did besides frame a complaint against them in the assembly of the States of Greece, which is called the Counsell of the Am­phictions, and did prosecute it in such sort, that the Lacedemonians were there cōdem­ned in a great summe of money, because they had taken by stealth in time of peace the Castle of Thebes, which was called Cadmaea. In like manner the Phocians also ha­uing prophaned and tilled a great part of the ground consecrated to the gods, called E Cyrrhaea, were therefore condemned also by the Amphictions in a great summe of mo­ney, which because they refused to pay, the said counsell of the Amphictions declared, If the Phocians did not pay the fine wherein they were condemned for offence to the gods, that then their countrey should bee confiscate and consecrated to the gods. And they farther decreed, at what times all the others which had beene condemned, should be enforced likewise to pay their fines, of which number the Lacedemonians were, and if any of them refused to obey the decrees of the Counsell, that they should be reputed excommunicate, and [...]et vpon by all the other Greekes as wicked men: which sentence was authorised and confirmed by all the other Grecians. And in the seuenteenth Chap­ter F he writeth, That Philip king of Macedon hauing waged and finished this holy war, resolued and agreed with the Boeotians and Thessalians, that the Parliament of the Am­phictions should be assembled, and the whole ordering of those affaires altogether re­ferred to them. Whereupon the Agents or Deputies were sent from al parts, and being assembled, they decreed, that from thenceforth King Philip and his successours [...]hould haue a place in the counsell of the Amphictions, and the two voices that the Phocian [...] had before, who were lately vanquished by him: that the three Citties of the Phocians [Page 230] should pull down their wals: that they might in no sort come to the Temple of Apollo G in Delphos, nor enter, or haue a voice in the Counsell of the Amphictions: that they might haue no horses nor weapons, vntil they had made restitution of all the gold and siluer which they had taken away. Furthermore, that all they who had in anie sort beene accessary to this sacriledge, or which had fled out of the Countrey, should bee held for excommunicated persons, and that it should bee lawfull to lay hands on them, and lead them away wheresoeuer they might be found: that all the good townes of the Countrey of Phocis should be pulled downe, and made small villages, so as none of them might containe more then fifty houses, yet that the lands should bee left vnto them, paying yearely sixtie Talents, which amount to six and thirtie thousand Crowns, H for tribute to Apollo, vntill they had fully repaied all the gold and siluer that they had taken out of the Temple of Apollo. That Philip and his successours should frō thence­forth haue the gouernment and iurisdiction of the Pythian games, together with the Boeotians and Thessalians, because the Corinthians had beene accessary to the sacri­ledge committed by the Phocians against the gods: That the Amphictions, and King Philip should burne and breake to peeces the armours of the Phocians and of the strangers which had beene waged by them, and that afterwards they should burne the remainder of them, and that their horses should bee sold. The Amphictions did like­wise make a decree for the defence of the Oracle, and for all other things concerning I religion and reuerence towards the gods, as also for peace and vnion betweene the Greekes. Budeus is of opinion, that the summoning and generall assembly of the three Estates of Fraunce may bee called by a Greeke name [...], as the other were cal­led [...], and [...]. The auncient Kings of Fraunce were woont to hold E­states very often, which was an assembly of all their subiects, or of some deputed for them. And the holding of Estates is nothing els then when the King acquainteth his subiects with his greatest affaires, and taketh their aduise and counsell: likewise hee hea­reth their complaints and greeuances, and giueth order touching them, as reason re­quireth. This was aunciently called the holding of a Parliament, which name it hath K yet retained in England and Scotland. But because that by this meanes the Kings had knowledge, as well of generall complaints which concerne the whole Estate, as of pri­uate, which concerne particular causes: the name of Parliament hath remained in pri­uate, and touching particulars, which are held by a certaine number of Iudges appoin­ted by the King, which are called a Parliament. The publicke and generall audiences which the King hath reserued to himselfe, haue taken the name of Estates. The Estates were assembled for diuerse causes, and according to the occurences and occasi­ons, either to demand aide of men and money, or to take order for ciuile causes & mat­ters of warre, or for the portions or allowances of the kings yonger sonnes, as it chan­ced L in the time of Lewis the eleuenth, or to determine touching the gouernement of the realme, or other causes. In which assemblies the Kings did sit, and were President, saue onely ouer the Estates, wherein was handled the noblest cause that euer was, to wit, to whom the Kingdome of Fraunce should belong, after the deceasse of Charles the faire, whether to Philip de Valoys his cousin, or to Edward King of England his brother in Lawe. Philip was not President there, for hee was not as then king, and besides, was a partie therein. It is doubtlesse, that the people receaue great furtherance by the saied Estates, for they haue thereby the good hap to come neere the person of their King, to make their complaints vnto him, present M their petitions, and receaue the necessary remedies and redresses. Messire Michel de l' Hospitall Chauncellour of Fraunce, in the first Oration hee made to the Estates held at Orleance, Anno, 1559. Wherein hee doth at large confute those which say that the king doth in some sort diminish his soueraigne power, by ta­king aduise and counsell of his subiects, sith hee is not bound thereunto, and that hee maketh himselfe too familiar with them, which engendereth a contempt and [Page 231] A abasing of the kingly dignity. Touching the Parliament of England, Polydor Virgil doth thus write thereof in the life and acts of king Henry the third: The kings of En­gland (sayeth hee) were not woont to assemble their subiects for to consult with them touching the affaires of the Realme, or if they did, it was verie sildome; so that we may by good right ascribe the order and manner thereof to this king Henry, which hath taken such roote, that since his time no matter of importance hath euer beene done, concerning the Gouernement of the kingdome and safetie there­of, vnlesse it hath beene first referred to this Counsell: and whatsoeuer things are decreed and done by the commaundement of the king and people, vnlesse they bee B ratified by the authoritie of this Counsell, they are accounted of no force. But least there should any impeachment go through the iudgement of the ignorant multitude, such of the Cleargie and people as shal be present and assistant there, haue by a certaine lawe beene noted and declared from the beginning. It is called a Parliament af­ter the manner of Fraunce, and euerie king dooth vsually call or summon it at his comming to the Crowne, to chaunge or abrogate old Lawes, and to make newe if neede require, by the aduise of the Counsell, after which time hee may so oft as hee will call the saied Court of Parliament, according to the exigence of pre­sent occasions: the manner which they obserue in consultation, is this, The C Counsell being assembled for the good of the Prince and people, to the end that euery one there assistant, may freely speake in his degree and turne, they are separated the one from the other, for the Ki [...]g, Prelates, Princes, and other Lords are withdrawne into one place, and the Deputies of the people, whom they cal Burgesses, into another, where they conferre together touching publicke affaires, and chuse out of their owne assembly some one man of account, whom they call their Speaker, who propoundeth those matters whereon they are to deliberate, and demandeth each mans opinion, then makes report vnto the king, and there is nothing enacted, vnlesse it passe by the ad [...]se of the greatest part, both of the vpper and lower house, and be confirmed by the King, D who signifies his pleasure last of all, being demanded by the Chancellor of the Realme, who is the speaker and as it were the mouth of the rest, to the Kings. The Prelates on their part obserue like order: and when their speaker hath aduertised them of the grea­test number of opinions, the Archbishop there present giues assent thereto, and ioines with the rest in the establishing of Lawes. The proper Lawe of England dependeth on the decrees of the Prince and people, approoued and ratified by the authoritie of this high Court; and they call it the cheefest Lawe of all: neither dooth that Countrey receaue or admit any other ciuile Lawe. In Almaigne, the Emperour can decree no­thing touching the weale publicke of Germany, or the authority, or safetie of the E Empire, without the aduise and consent of all the Estates, especially the seuen Electors; neither can hee alone at his owne pleasure vndertake warre, impose taxes, leuie Soul­diours of the same Countrey, or ent [...]rtaine strangers. This Counsell and assem­bly of the Estates is called a Diet, or Iourney. Melancthon in the first booke of his Chronicles dooth much extoll the authoritie of the Electors, calling it the soue­raigne Senate on earth, and the synowes of the Empire: Hee compareth their power to that of the Ephori in Lacedemonia, and of the seuen Princes in Persia. Iulius Pflug in his treatise of the Commonweale of Germany, complaineth, That the Em­perours authority is much abased, and that euery one of the Electours hath more F power in his owne Prouince, then the Emperour hath throughout all Germanie: For besides other prerogatiues, it is lawfull for the Electo [...]s, when vrgent necessi­ty requireth it, to assemble themselues apart, and consult touching the weale publicke, neither may the Emperour in anie wise prohibite or disturbe them, as Sleidan maketh mention in the first booke of his Hystorie. When the Em­perour dooth summon the Estates, hee is President, and dooth by his Chan­cellour propound those matters whereof hee will haue them to deliberate. [Page 232] If he chance to die, then the Archbishop of Magunce assignes the other electours to G meet at Franquefort, there to proceed to the election of a new Emperor, in such maner as is described by the said Sleidan in the same booke, and by Omphrius Veronensis in the discourse which he hath written touching the state of the Empire. The Counsell established at Spires, which is called the Chamber of the Empire, is as it were a Parlia­ment of Almaigns for the administring of iustice among them. Frixius Polonius in his second booke of Laws, chap. 16. wisheth, that there were in Polonia such a Counsell as that of Spire for Germany, and that of Paris for France, and as the Counsel of the Am­phictions was for Greece, and of the Areopage for Athens, in which Counsell there might bee assistant, honest, learned, and wise men, chosen out of all the Estates, which H might iudge by the Lawes without further appeale the causes brought thither by ap­peales of inferiour Magistrates, from all the Prouinces of the whole realme of Polo­nia all the yeare long, hauing the same power and authority ouer all the subiects of the Crowne. Neque vero illorum tantum munus iudicandi esset, sed & reconciliando discordes, & tumultuantes compescendi, & litium causas praecidendi: ac nisi res aliter componi possint, tum vero pro tribunals sedendo, causas cognoscendi, ac vnicui (que) ius suū reddendi. Hac ratione & que­relis de iudiciorū prorogatione obuiā iretur, & causidicorum artibus munimū, loci relinqueretur. Haec ille. The assemblies of the states is held in Polonia euery year, & that cheefly for two causes, the one for administring of iustice in souerainty, for there are appeales made thi­ther I from all the Iudges of the Countrey in great number, which breedeth confusion: The other cause is to take order for defence of the countrey against the bordering ene­mies, as the Tartars which make many inrodes.

CHAP. XV. K Of the ordinance and authoritie of Magistracies, and of their distinction.

WE will nowe come to the distinction of Magistracies, for this part also of the Commonweale hath many differences. For it must bee considered how many Magistracies there ought to be, and what authority they are to haue, & how long euery one is to continue, because some allow them halfe a year, others lesse [...] L some againe a whole yeare, and others longer time. It must likewise bee consi­dered whether the Magistracies ought to be perpetual, or of long continuance, or neither, but that the same persons may often execute them: or whether it bee better that one man doe not beare office twice, but once onely. Moreouer, touching the ordinance of Magistra­cies, it must be considered out of what estate or quality of men, and by whom, and in what man­ner they ought to be created. For it must be knowne in how many sorts these things may be done, and for what Commonweales what kinds of Magistrates are fit. Neither is it an easie thing to determine which may properly bee called Magistracies, sith ciuile society hath need of many Pre­sidents or Gouernours. Wherefore it is not meete to call all those Magistrates who are created by M election, or taken by lot, as first the Priests, whose function differs from the charge of ciuile Magi­strates, then the ouerseers and orderers of publicke feastes, the Heralds and Embassadour [...] are chosen. Of publicke offices and charges some are ciuile, either of all the Citizens for one acti­on, as the Generall of the armie; or of one part of the Citizens, as the ouerseers of women and children, or Oeconomicall, as many times there are some chosen to measure and distribute corne, or inferiour and seruile, whereto if rich men bee chosen, they substitute their slaues. But to speake [Page 233] A simply, they are cheefly to be called Magistrats which haue authority to deliberate, iudge, cōmand; & that especially, for it is more imperious. But touching the vse, it skils not how they are called, sith there is as yet no controuersie touching the name, but a certaine speculatiue consideration. It may farther be doubted what Magistracies, and how many are necessary for the gouernement of a city, & which not necessary, yet profitable for good gouernmēt, aswel in euery Commonweale, as cheefly in smal cities: for in great cities one Magistrat may & ought to be appointed to one of­fice, because that by reason of the great number of citizens, many may attaine to offices, so as they be chosen again to some after long time, & beare others but once in their life. Now euery thing is better done, when men attend and follow one thing only, then when they are distracted with the B charge of many things: but in smal cities necessity inforceth to bestow many offices on few persons, for by reason of the smal quantity of inhabitants many cannot haue charge, for who should after succeed thē? sometimes also smal cities haue need of the same kinds of Magistracies, and the same lawes that the great cities haue, but the difference is this, that the one haue often need of the same, & the other after long time. Wherfore nothing hinders, but that many offices may be committed together to one man, because they doe not hinder each other, it being necessary by reason of the smal number of citizens to create Magistrates, as instruments seruing to diuerse vses. Then if we can declare how many Magistrates are necessary for euery city, and how many not necessary, yet meet; this point being explaned, we may easily know what Magistracies may be conueniently be­stowed C in one. It will likewise be expedient not to be ignorant to what kinds of Magistrates, many offices may be committed by the lawes, & of what offices a Magistrate may euery where haue the executing and authority: as the discipline of modesty, if in the market place it pertaineth to the AEdile, & in another place to some other officer, or euery where to the same: as also whether the di­stinction is to be made in respect of the affairs, or of the persons; I mean, as if one had charge of the discipline of modesty, to know whether such a charge ought to be committed to one man ouer chil­dren, & to another ouer women. Likewise in Commonweales to know whether the kinds of Ma­gistracies do differ in e [...]ry one or not: as in the Democratie, Oligarchie, Aristocraty, & Mo­narchy, whether there be the same cheefe Magistrats, yet not chosen out of those who are equal & D like, but being diuerse in diuerse formes of Commonweales, as in Aristocraties, of learned men; in Oligarchies [...] of rich men; in Democraties, of free men; or whether there bee some according to the differences of the Magistracies; in some places the same & alike, in others diuerse: for it is ne­cessary that the same be in some places great, & in others smal. Neuerthelesse, there are some offi­ces proper, as is theirs who are called Preconsulters, which is no popular office, although the Coun­sel be popular: for there must be certain persons to consult & deliberate before the people, least they should hinder their priuat busines, which Preconsulters if they be few in nūber, it is Oligarchical. Now it is necessary that they be few, therfore their office is Oligarchical. But where both these of­fices are, the Preconsulters are ordained against the publicke counsellors: for to consult is popular, E & to preconsult Oligarchichal: but the authority of coūsel is lost in Democraties, where the people assembling, doth determine of al things; as it vsually commeth to passe, where there is great profit or fees appointed for those that are assistant in assemblies: for being idle, they do oft assemble, and meddle in al matters thēselues. As for the ouerseer of women & children, or if there be any other officer hauing such charge, it is Aristocratical, not Democratical. For how should they bar poore mens wiues from going out of their houses? Neither is this Oligarchical, sith the wiues of Oligar­chical persons liue deliciously. But we haue for this time spoken ynough of these things. Let vs re­turne thē to the ordaining of Magistracies, & finish that discourse. The differences cōsist in three points which comprise al the other sorts [...] the first, who they are that create Magistrats; the second, F out of what estate of men; the third, in what manner. Each of these three hath three differences: for either the Magistrates are created by all the citizens, or by some of thē, or out of all, or out of some certain & appointed persons, as for their reuenues, birth, vertue, or other like respect: as in Megara they created their Magistrats out of the number of those that conspired and made war togither against the people, & the [...]by election or by lot. Againe, these things are coupled, so that some Magistrats are created by some, others by all, others out of all, others out of some o [...]e [...] by ele­ction or by lot. So euery difference is of foure sorts: for either all are created out of all by election, or all out of all by lot: again, either out of all being gathered togither, or out of all a [...] by tribes, [...] [Page 234] out of certaine companies & fellowships vntil they haue passed ouer al the citizens, or alwaies out G of all, & sometimes in one manner, sometimes in another. Likewise they are created either some out of all by election, or out of all by lot: or out of some by election, or out of some by lot: or some after one manner, some after another. I say some out of all by lot, some by election: so that beside the two couplings there are twelue sorts, of which ordinances two are popular, viz. that the Ma­gistrats be created by all out of all by election or by lot: or both these two together, partly by ele­ction, partly by lot: but not to ordaine them by all together, but out of all: or out of some by lot or by election, or in both sorts: or some out of all, some out of certaine, in both sorts, yet partly by lot, partly by election, this is Commonweale like: but whē as all are created out of all, some by election, others by lot, or in both sorts, partly by lot, partly by election, it is Oligarchicall: & yet more Oli­garchical, H when it is in both sorts. But when as some are created out of all, or some out of some, partly by election, partly by lot, it is Aristocratical; & when some out of some, it is Oligarchical. Likewise by some out of some not in like sort, or by some out of some in both sorts; but as by some out of all, it is not Oligarchical: but of some by al by way of election, it is Aristocratical. There are so many sorts or maners of ordaining Magistracies, which are diuided according to the forms of cō ­monweales: but for which of thē which are fit and behoofeful, and how the Magistracies should be ordained with power & authority, and what they are, it may easily be vnderstood, by the power & authority of the Magistracy, I mean an ouerseeing of the taxes & subsidies, or of the prison. There is another kind of power, as of the Generall in war, & of him that hath charge of ciuile contracts I and sutes.

The second part of Commonweales consisteth in Magistrates, which are properly those that haue power to deliberate, iudge, and commaund, but cheefly to command. Some Magistracies are necessary in euery City, others not necessary, yet profitable; which great and rich Cities vse: for smal Cities hauing few sufficient men, are constrai­ned to commit many offices to one man. Then all kinds of Magistracies are not fit or behoofefull for all Commonweales, but some are profitable for some Commonweales, and other for others: neither are all created in the same manner, but some by lot, others K by election, wherein there are three points to bee considered. The first, to knowe who they are which create Magistrates: the second, out of what estate of men: the third, in what sort: as whether all ought to be chosen out of all, or some out of all, or some out of some; by election or by lot, according to the diuer [...]ity of Commonweales. Aristotle doth againe treat of Magistracies in the 6. booke of this worke, chap. 8. and Plato doth the like in his 6. booke of Lawes. Aristotle in the 5. booke of this worke, chap. 5. sa [...]th, That there ought to be three things in them that exercise the cheefe Magistracies. First a loue to the present state; Secondly, ability to execute the functions and charges requi­red in the Office; Thirdly, vertue and iustice fit for euery Commonweale. And in the L 8. chapter of the same booke he affirmeth, that there is no greater rule to bee obserued in euery Commonweale, then to prouide by the lawes that the publicke [...]ffices bee not gainefull. In the second book, chap. 7. he doth not like that the power of the Senators was perpetuall and during life; and that they were exempted from controulment, not being bound to giue account of their dealings. Plat. De Legibus, lib. 12. sheweth the necessity and importance of the sute De repetundis, called in Greeke [...], where­of the Nomophylaces in Greece, and the C [...]nsors in Rome, had commonly the charge: but sometimes the people being assembled, was iudge thereof. Budeus in his former Annotations on the Pandects, complaines that the Syndicate (which is an accusing or M calling to account of those that haue ben Magistrats or officers) hath no force ouer the Magistracies of France, especially ouer the Parliamēts: & that the said Magistracies are perpetual. For although the king takes order for al, & in his letters to that effect, causeth to be set down so much as pleaseth him, yet none of thē are wont to be suspended or de­posed, if it be not by forfeiture & order of law. The same Budeus in his Annotatiōs makes an excellent discourse of the Magistracies of France, & to what persons they should be cōmitted [...] & in what [...]ort they should be executed. Vincent de la Lo [...]pe hath gathered the [Page 235] A Magistracies of France in three books, Fenestella & Pomponius Laetus haue written of the Romane Magistracies: Perion of the Greeke and Romane: Postell of the Athenian & Turkish: Contarin [...] of the Venetian.

CHAP. XVI. Of Iudgements, and of the kinds and manners thereof.

IT remaineth that we speak of the third part, which is of Iudgemēts: wherof we wil by 1 B the same way shew the seueral maners. The difference then of iudgements consisteth in three points, viz. out of whō, whereupon, & in what maner. I say, out of whō, that is, whether out of al or out of some: wherupon, that is, how many kinds of iudgemēts there are: in what manner they ought to be created, whether by lot, or by election. We will first di­stinguish how many kinds of iudgements there are: they are eight in nūber; One for calling of the Magistrats to accoūt: the other against those that publickely offend: the third belongeth to the Cō ­monweale: the fourth is of differences rising between the Magistrates & priuat men, concerning fines & penalties: the fift is of particular contracts or bargaines of importance, and of criminall causes, & strange matters, [the kinds of criminal causes are either amōg the same iudges, or amōg C others, whether done of purpose or by constraint; & whē the case is confessed, yet some doubt whe­ther it hath ben iustly done:] The sixt is, whē they who are accused of homicide, be in prison vnder the earth, as in Athens that which they call the iudgement of a Well; but few such crimes are euer cōmitted, euen in great cities. Touching the iudgement of strangers, it is of two sorts, the one is of strangers between thēselues, the other of strangers with citizens. Moreouer, there is another kind of iudgemēt for smal causes, as from one Drachma to fiue & a little more; For iustice must also be done in these cases, which neue [...]thelesse is not by many iudges. But lea [...]ing the iudgements of criminall causes & strangers matters, let vs speake of ciuile causes, which if they be not wel ad­ministred, 2 there ensue seditions, and changes of Commonweales. Now it is necessary either that al D do iudge of all the aforesaid matters by lot, or by election: or that all do [...] iudge of all partly by lot, partly by election: or of the same matters, the one by election, the others by lot. These are the foure maners of creating or ordaining iudges, & there are a [...] many other in part: for sometimes some Iudges are created by election, who iudge o [...] all causes: others by lot, who iudge likewise of all cau­ses: or part by lot, or part by election: or there are certain iudgemēts on the same causes, consisting of iudges created by lot, or by election: wherefore these manners of iudging are the same that the other are which were before: & they wil also be the same, if they be counted so, that some be out of all, others out of some, & others again out of two: as if in the same auditory some were chosen out of all, and some out of some, by lot or by election, or in both forts. We haue declared of how many E sorts the iudgemēts do consist, wherof the first are popular, which are out of al, or ouer al; the second Oligarchicall, which are out of some, ouer all; the third Aristocraticall and ciuile, which are partly out of all, and partly out of some.

The third part of Commonweales consists in iudgements, which part hath three dif­ferences in like sort, as the Magistracies haue; the first is, of what Citizens Iudges are to be chosen: the second, of what causes they are to iudge: the third, how they are to be created or ordained by voices or by lot. And there are eight sorts of iudgements accor­ding to the diuer [...]ity of causes, which may bee easily vnderstood by the reading of the text. Plato speaketh of Iudges in the sixt and twelfth of his Laws. Aristotle also treating F of Iustice in the fift of the Ethicks, discourseth of Law and Iudgements.

IT remaineth that we speake of the third part, which is of Iudgement.] Plot. De Leg. lib. 6. 1 saith, No city may be truly called a city, if it haue not the iudgemēts wel ordained. Some iudgemēts are priuat, others publick; & some criminal, others ciuile. Priuat iudgements are of seruitudes, prescriptions, guardianships, bargaines, testamēts, successions, marria­ges; wherof the said Plato hath treated in his 6. & 8. booke of lawes. Publick iudgements [Page 236] are of treasons, sacrileges, extortions, falshood, thefts, murders, whether wilfull or G enforced, whereof Plato speaketh in the 9. booke of his said lawes. Then he treateth of publick & priuat iudgements togither, & of such things as are necessary for both, in the 12. book: how Iudges are to be ordained in the 6. book: what they ought to know & do, in the said 12. book, & what manner of men they ought to be, in the 3. of his Common­weale. Among the ancient Greekes and Romanes the office of iudging was imposed by necessity on those that iudged, yeelding thē honor with small profit, & of great hurt, to those that would wel acquite thēselues of their charge: as it appeareth by the 3. Oration of Demosthenes in fauor of the Olynthians, & by that Oration of Cicero, Pro Praetura vrbana. Vos inquit, quod ad vestram famam, existimationem, salutemque communem pertinet, H Iudices, prospicite at (que) consulite. Splendor vester facit, vt peccare sine sūmo reipublicae detrimēto ac periculo non possitis. Non enim potest sperare populus Romanus, alios esse in Senatu qui rectè possint indicare. Vos si non potueritis, necesse est cū de toto ordine desperarit, aliud genus hominū, at (que) aliā rationē iudiciorū requira [...]. Hoc si vobis ideo leuius videtur, quod putatis onus, esse graue & incōmodum, indicare: intelligere debetis primū interesse, vtrum id on [...]s vosmetipsi reieceritis: an quod probare populo Romano fidē vestram & religionem non potueritis, ideo vobis iudicandi potestas excepta sit. &c. At this cay in Switzerland the taking of any thing for iudgement either directly or indirectly, is forbidden on pain of death. In England likewise the Iud­ges place is little profitable vnto thē, for after that they are chosen to the number of 12. I in what cause soeuer it be, ciuile or criminall, and that they haue taken a solemne oth to iudge vprightly according to the lawes, they are shut without victuals into a place, out of which they cannot come forth, vntill they haue agreed on the iudgement of that cause for which they were chosen: as Polidor Virgil writeth in the 9. of the English Hi­story. But to return to the maner of the Romane iudgements, although they were ap­pointed to three degrees or estates of Senators, Knights, and officers of the treasury, cal­led Tribuni aerarij, yet the same persons did not iudge alwaies, but the Pretors being an­nuall Iudges, were therin President, and chose by lot out of the aforesaid 3. estates, a cer­tain number of Iudges, but if they whom they had chosen, were refused by either of the K parties, thē they proceeded againe to the choice of others, tooke their oths, & distribu­ted thē by tens. The Senators were for a time the only Iudges of all causes, but Tiberius and Caius Gracchi, who were altogether popular, to diminish the Senates authority & increase the peoples, added 300 Roman knights, being as many as there were Senators, & they caused the iudgemēts of al causes to be cōmitted to these 600. But Silla, to dimi­nish the authority of the knights & people, took frō thē this power of iudging & know­ing, as wel criminal as ciuile causes, & restored it wholly to the Senate. Afterward Pom­pey in his second Consulship, gaue it to the order of knights, and then the authority of iudgements was equally cōmunicated to the 3. estates: but Caesar being Dictator, redu­ced L it to two only, viz. to Senators & Knights, as Suetonius & Dion write. Paulus Ma­nutius in his book of Laws, doth diligently treat of the manners which was obserued in the election of Iudges. Budeus in his former & latter annotations on the Pandects, hath obserued many notable points touching the maner of the Romane iudgements, which they that are desirous to know farther thereof, may read. As also that which Gruchius hath gathered in the first book of the Roman elections, declaring principally what were the kinds of the Roman iudgements in the time of Cicero. And Sigonius in his second booke of the ancient law of the Romane Citizens, chap. 18: who following the custome of the Romanes, puts such difference betweene the Magistrates and the iudges, that the Magistrates appointed the iudges, or interposed an edict: the Iudges hauing vnderstood M the cause, gaue iudgement: the one assembled the Iudges, the other came to sit in iudge­ment at their appointment. The Magistrates were created by the voices of the people, the Iudges by lot, the one taken out of all the people, the other commonly out of a certaine degree [...] Men obserued what euery Magistrate propounded, and regarded what many Iudges decided: finally, the Iudges gaue sentence, and the Magistrates pronoun­ced it. To be short, all the Magistracies at Rome were giuen by the voices of the people, [Page 237] A the degrees established by the Censors choice: the iudgements committed or referred to the religion, or to the Praetors lot. Plato in his 6. book of lawes, speaking of Iudges, doth not cal thē Magistrats, but as it were Magistrats.

WHICH if they be not wel administred, there insue seditions & changes of Commonweals.] 2 In ancient times Iudgements were so well ordered & administred in France, that stran­gers also came to submit thēselues thereto, but at this present they are brought to such a delaying length, & so wrapped & entangled with formalities, that it is great pity to see the noble realm thus infected therewith, as with a general cōtagious sicknesse: for there liue innumerable people on the miserable exercise of pleading, which they cal Practise [...] B Plato in the 3. book of his Cōmonweale, affirmes it to be an euident signe of a corrupt estate, whē we see therein many Iudges & Phisitians, because the multitude of Iudges is maintained by mens falshood & cōtention; & the nūber of Phisitians by their idlenesse, leudnes & gluttony. Paulus AEmilius in his 8. book of the history of France, writeth, that the Frenchmē were at the first gouerned more simply in the course of iudgements, con­tenting thēselues with the sentences giuē by the Bailifes & Seneschals (who had almost the whole authority in administration of iustice) & thinking it vnseemely to seek law, & sue for their right a far off, by releefes of appeale. But when scandalous vexations were sprung vp amongst thē, & sutes of law multiplied, then the soueraign administration of C iustice began to be exercised once a yeare, & on few daies; then twice, in remouing still the places. At the last it was thought best to keep the courts for iudgements, in one cer­tain place, & to build an hal for that purpose at Paris, being the cheefe city of the realm, wherevpon in the time of Philip the faire, or of Lewis Hurin (as Gaguin thinketh) the pallace was founded by Enguerran de Marigny Earle of Longueuille, high Treasurer of France, in that greatnes & stately magnificence as we see it now with hals & chambers, wherin the iudges of ciuile & criminal causes without further appeale, were disposed & distributed by certain cōpanies. In the great chāber & first appeale of pleas, the causes of Peeres, & such as concern the crown; & ordinarily the verbal appeales on the aduocats D pleas are iudged at the first propounding: where if they cannot be speedily & readily de­cided, they are referred to the counsel, for which there is a chamber appointed. Behind, there are three chambers of inquests, wherin the sutes are decided & examined by wri­ting. Moreouer, there is the court called la Tournelle, wherin criminal causes are iudged: and the Exchequer chamber for such causes as concerne the domains of the crown. The court of requests, where are iudged at the first propounding, the causes of those that are of the kings traine, or others who are priuiledged. The auditory of the maisters of re­quests of the houshold, who iudge of the titles of offices. The chābers of the generals of the taxes, & the Chancery. On the other side is the chāber of accoūts, & another of the E generals of the monies. The Coūsellors are some married, some clergy mē, being dispo­sed or distributed in the chambers in greater or lesse number, according as the Court is furnished. In the great chamber there are most commonly four Presidents, to whom by reason of the necessity of the time two other haue been adioyned, who are during plea­sure: in the other chābers there are two Presidēts only. There is besides, the kings Attor­ney & two aduocats, who look to the rights of the crown, & to al that is done there: two registrers, to gather, record & deliuer the acts, the ciuile & the criminal: with four nota­ries & secretaries to ease thē; & a great nūber of clarkes. Budeus a mā of great knowledge, and a diligent searcher of all antiquity, hath obserued in his former annotations on the F Pandects, that in the raigne of Philip the Long, there were three sorts of Iudges in the first seat, which is properly called the Parliament, viz. the Prelates, of whom it took the name; and the Barons; who were assisted by certaine Lawyers, or men that were other­wise learned, called clearkes and lay men. That 3. Prelates and 3. Barons were president there, who did not so much confirme Iudgements by the greater number of opinions, as by the sufficiencie of those which gaue their opinions. And that the lay Counsellors were chosen out of Gentlemē & others, who were enioined to be graduats in the law: [Page 238] but it sufficed if they were meanely seene in other learning, as we see some of the short G robe. They studied not then, as they haue done since, the Romane laws; hauing now ere­cted in the best Citties, schooles of law: from whence many suppose, that the multitude of sutes hath sprung, sith men haue thereby learned the facultie of pleading, as Mes­sire Michel de l' Hospitall declared in his second Oration which he made to the Estates at Orleance. Besides, they had in those daies few statutes and edicts, for they thought that the true lawes were good and honest manners; and natural reason assisted by an vpright conscience, ioined with due experience, the true r [...]le of right iudgement: But when men became thus skilfull in points of law, and the offices concerning iudgement, ha­uing had before a time limitted and small profite, vvere now become perpetuall, gaine­full, H and exempted from the Syndicate, (which is as before I noted, an accusing or cal­ling to account of those that haue been Magistrates or Officers) when they had gleande great summes of mony, leauing the ancient honesty of friendship, and found it no smal profit to cleare causes, and to decide sutes by Commissioners: When Presidents and Counsellors tooke delight to be followed, solicited, and flattered by those that pleaded, against the custome of the Areopagites, who sat in iudgement by night & in the dark, [...], that is, that they might not looke on them which spake, but respect that which was spoken; & against the opinion of Ca­to, Qui dictitabat, iudicem nec de obtinendo iure orari oportere, nec de iniuria exorari: After I that the Aduocates did sleightly rid away their causes, taking small aduise on them, nor hauing the patience to attend the finishing of one, for the hast they made to runne to another: After that they were accustomed to write by rols sixe lines in one side of a leafe, and to disguise matters by bils of greefes, and answeres, by contradictions, excep­tions and aduertisements: After that the Proctors, who had before no fee, and were but in certaine causes only, became mercenary and perpetuall: Finally after that there haue been suffered to creepe in amongst them solicitors, as it were scummers of sutes, to de­uour the substance of poore men, as drones doe sucke vp the honey from the Bees: And after that the Chancerie permitted all sorts of dispatches, and would teach the Iudges: K By these meanes wee are fallen into this vnhappy trouble of tedious length in sutes of law, which is very profitable for crafty and ill minded fugitiues, but most preiudiciall and hurtfull for good and wel meaning men, who had rather lose their right, then vndo themselues by suing so long for iustice; for they see that oft times a right is wrested by appeales or remouings of causes at their pleasures that haue most fauour, besides infi­nite other sleights; and somtimes they see many decrees made in one cause, yet nothing executed; or if there be any definitiue sentence, that it is presently suspended by the least obiection that may be, or brought a gaine into controuersie by a ciuile request (as they tearme it) a writ of error. It had ben great good hap for vs to haue continued in our L ancient and natural simplicity, rather then to enwrap and entangle our selues in so ma­ny kinds of sutes and captious subtleties, which have corrupted and almost extingui­shed the light of iustice, imprinted in the hearts and vnderstandings of all men that are wel borne. Thus we see, that sutes being heaped one vpon another, are become immor­tall, nothing so certaine, which proues not vncertaine; no difference so cleare, which may not be darkened; and no bargaine so sure, which may not be cancelled; no sentence or decree made with such aduise, which may not be frustrated; all mens actions exposed to scandalous vexations, subtleties, malicious dealing, fines, & extortions of these pra­ctioners, the maiesty and integrity of the ancient law cleane lost, and in mens conuersa­tions M now adaies no more appearance of true iustice found, but onely a shadow therof remaining. It is not possible, but that this euill being come to so high a pitch and extre­mity, is neere to destruction, according to the course of earthly thinges, or that it doe shortly receiue some notable change.

A

CHAP. I. Of the changes happening in publicke Estates.

B WE wil consider here which and how many, and what are the causes of these changes which happen in cōmon­weales: and what are the destructions of euery one, out of what formes into what formes they are changed, and therewithall what their remedies are, both in generall, and in particular, and by what meanes they may bee cheefly preserued.

The Philosophers purpose is to treat in this booke of the changes of Estates, and to shew the C causes thereof: and by what meanes euery forme of Cōmonweale is preserued & destroied. Which changes he will afterward diuide into foure sorts, or thereabout. Plato assayeth to doe the like in the eight and ninth booke of his Com­monweale.

Our beginning herein shall be, that many formes of Commonweales, haue beene established, 1 in which all men confesse, that there should be a certaine right and equality, according to propor­tion, 2 wherein neuerthelesse they erre, as in the Democratie, where all the Citizens being in some 3.4 D sort equall, doe thinke themselues absolutely equall: and because they haue all like libertie, they 5 thinke themselues altogether like. In the Oligarchie, when they who are vnequall in some things, 6 will be vnequall in all things; as if because they are vnequall in riches, they thinke themselues al­together vnequall. Whereby it happeneth, that some as being equall, repute themselues worthy to 7 haue all things in equall manner; others, as being vnequall. 8.9

The most seditions doe happen, because that (as all men confesse) in the distribu­ting of honours, equality must bee proportionally obserued in euery Commonweale; yet some being equall in one thing only, as the poore men in Democraties are equally E free, will be absolutely equall in all things. Others being vnequall in one thing, will bee vnequall in all things, as the rich men and Noblemen in the Oligarchie feeke to be ab­solutely preferred before those whom they exceed in riches or Nobility, although they bee inferiour to them in vertue. Wherefore both these sorts of Citizens, hauing that part in gouernment which they thinke doth by right belong vn [...]o them, raise seditions, whereby Estates are chaunged from one forme into another cleane different [...] as from a Democratie into an Oligarchie: or els the same being still kept, are gouerned by other Lords, or made more or lesse Democraticall, Oligarchicall, and Regall: or altered in some part, as in the ordaining or suppressing of some principall Offices touching the F Counsell, the reuenues of the State, of Religion, and Warre. For the auoiding of which inconueniences and preuenting of the grudges and discontents of such persons, it is re­quisit to entermixe the Arithmeticall and Geometricall equality: the Arithmetical be­ing of it selfe euill, distributing by Lot the publick honors & commodities to all alike; and the Geometrical impossible to be obserued, though it be good of it selfe, hauing re­spect alwaies to euery mans desert and worth. Wherefore the Venetians who seeme to haue ordained and established the forme of their Commonweale with great wisdome, [Page 242] doe vse both lot and election. They vse lot in the creation of the Electors, or chusers G of Magistrates, and herein all the Citizens, euen they that are vicious persons, may par­ticipate with the better sort, without any hurt to the Commonweale. But in the attai­ning of honours, all consisteth in the iudgement, and estimation of the Citizens, as it hath ben already noted in the eight chapter of the third book, according to that which Conta [...]ine hath written thereof in his first booke of the Venetian Commonweale. Ari­stotle both here and in his third and sixt bookes, [...]deth most on the Democraties and Oligarchies, because in his time all Greece was full of these troubles and discords, by reason that there were few other forms of gouernments than Oligarchicall and Demo­craticall, which are commonly vnquiet, and subiect to enuies, discontents and enmities. H

1 MANY formes of Commonweales haue ben ordained.] As well principall as subalternal; third booke, chap. 5. & fourth booke, chap. 2. 3.

2 WHEREIN all men confesse, that there should bee a certaine right and equalitie.] The end of gouernment is ciuile iustice; and Right is the publlcke good, or common vtility, 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. Likewise right or iustice is called in the first booke, chap. 2. The order or rule of ciuile society: because that is said to be done by right, which is done conueniently according to the order and institution of ciuile society, and according to the forme of euery Commonweale, as the Democraticall, Oligarchicall, and Aristocra­ticall I right, which is measured according to their particular ends: 3. of the Politickes, chap. 6. and 6. booke [...] chap. 2. All men confesse (saith he) in the fift of the Ethicks, chap. 3. That in distributing to euery man that which belongs vnto him, Right or iustice must be obserued, according to a certain dignity, which is not accounted the same by al men [...] for the Democraticall persons doe place it in liberty, the Oligarchicall in riches or in Nobilitie, and the Aristocraticall in vertue. Then all men doe affirme that right is equa­litie. 3. booke, chap. 8. and that in the distributing thereof, it is requisit to keep a propor­tion [...] not onely in goods and honours, but also in persons, chap. 6. For looke what pro­portion there is betweene the dignities and deserts of persons, to whom distribution is K made, the same proportion ought to bee betweene the thinges that are distributed, al­though men doe not agree therein, by reason of the diuersity of gouernements, and of their vnbridled desires, as Plato doth very well discourse in the eight and ninth bookes of his Commonweale.

3 ACCORDING to proportion.] Wee will afterward shew what this proportion and proportionalitie is [...] and how many the kinds thereof be Right (saith Aristotle in the fift of his Ethickes, chap. 3.) consisteth in proportion; and proportion is not onely of the number numerant, or that doth number, but also of the number numberable, or that may be numbred. For proportion is the equalitie of reason, and consisteth in four terms L at the least, not onely the diuided proportion, but also the continued, repeating one twice: In like sort Right consisteth in foure tearmes at the least, and there is the same rea­son And in the same place he saith, Right must consist in foure tearmes at the least, for those in whom right is are two, and the thinges wherein it consisteth, are likewise two. And there must bee the [...]ame equality of the persons, as there is of the things, wherein right consisteth; which things are so proportioned one towards another, as they are be­tweene whom the right is; who shall not haue equall things, if themselues be not equal: whence debates and quar [...]els doe spring, when they that are equal, do not receiue equal things; or they that are not equall, vnequall things. M

4 WHEREIN neuerthelesse they erre.] In taking that which is in some sort iust, for that which is properly and simply iust: and they iudge ill, because they iudge of them­selues, and of their owne affaires, 3. of the Politickes, chap. 6. agreeing in the equalitie of things, and not of persons. They erre in speaking of equality, because they adioine not them to the number of equal persons, nor account them equal, who are so in very deed. We haue already touched this point in the said sixt chapter of the third booke.

[Page 243] A As in the Democratie, where all the Citizens being in some sort equall, and because they 5 haue all like libertie, they thinke themselues altogether like.] Hee yeeldeth an example of his saying in two corrupt Common-weales somewhat contrarie, viz. in the Democra­tie and the Oligarchie, wherein Right is euill vnderstood. First in the Democratie, where the Democraticall persons, hauing all like freedome, thinke that they shou [...]d all equally participate in the gouernement, without any respect to bee had to [...]ches or nobility; so that in such an estate the poore are superiour in all thinges, a [...] attribute to themselues the publicke commodities and honours, which they distri­bute B equally among themselues: for the end of the Democratie is libertie, and the Democraticall right is that euery one may haue equality according to the number, and not to the dignity, as it hath ben shewed in the third booke, chap. 6. 8. and we will speake thereof againe in the 6. booke, chap. 2. and [...] 3. Plato in the eight of his Common­weale, and the third of his lawes.

IN the Oligarchie, when they who are vnequall in some thinges, will bee vnequall in all 6 things, as if because they are vnequall in riches, they thinke themselues altogether vnequall.] The other example of right, ill vnderstoode, is taken from the Oligarchie, whose C end is riches, and wherein publicke commodities and honours are distributed, ac­cording to the valuation of mens wealth, without hauing respect to the poore, al­though they bee more vertuous or more learned, and therefore more capable of offi­ces: so that in such an Estate, rich men and riches, onely are esteemed. Plato in the eight of his Commonweale. Aristotle in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. And 4. booke, chap. 4.5. & 6. And 6. booke, chap. 6.

WHEREBY it happeneth, that some as being equall, repute themselues worthie 7 to haue all thinges in equall manner.] Poore men hauing equall freedome in the De­mocratie, D will be absolutely equall in all things.

OTHERS as being vnequall, seeke to haue more.] In the Oligarchie, the rich & No­blemen 8 will bee absolutely preferred by reason of their riches, although they be infe­riour in vertue to those whom they exceede in wealth.

WHICH is vnequall.] As more honour is greater reward: for inequality consisteth 9 in more or lesse. Aristotle in his booke of the Predicaments.

E Then all these Estates haue in themselues a certaine right, wherein neuerthelesse they doe 1 simply erre. Hereupon, when either of them haue not such a part in the gouernement of the 2 Common-weale, as they thinke that they ought to haue, they raise sedition. But such as excell in vertue, might haue iuster cause to mutinie, as those which should by reason hee ab­solutely 3 and onely vnequall, and preferred before others; although they doe it not. There are some of higher birth, and in regard of this inequality will bee preferred and aduanced 4 aboue the rest: because men doe account those noble who flourish through the vertue and ri­ches 5 of their auncestors.

F THEN all these Estates haue in themselues a certaine right, wherein [...]erthelesse 1 they doe erre.] The Democratie and Oligarchie are grounded on some part of right, or rather some shewe of right. Aristotle in the third of his Politickes, chapter eight. Because they who are equall in some one certaine thing, must not attri­bute to themselues an equall part of all thinges; nor they a greater part, who doe exceede in one thing. For they that are superiour in richesse, or in Nobilitie, [Page 244] are not simply superior, neither they that haue like libertie, are absolutely alike: because G no man is absolutely superiour, and to be preferred, saue onely the vertuous; nor anie simply equall, saue only they that are equal in vertue. The reason is, because men assem­ble themselues into a Citie, not to liue only, but rather to liue well. Whereto, sith the good and vertuous men doe yeeld greatest furtherance, it is meet, that the greatest part of gouernement in the City bee assigned to vertue: the third of the Politickes, Chap. 6.

2 HEREVPON, when either of them haue not such a part in the gouernment of the Commonweale, as they thinke that they ought to haue.] As at Rome the Senate and Nobles in or­daining the popular Estate and gouernment, after the expulsion of the Kings, assumed H to themselues so much authority, and allowed so little to the common people, that they mutinied and separated themselues from them with great dissention. Whereupon to appease them, the said Senate and Nobles were enforced to graunt them greater au­thority, then in reason they should haue had: from whence sprang all their discords and ciuile dissentions that happened afterwards. At Venice the Gentlemen who are Lords, haue the whole rule, and diuide among themselues all the offices and charges wherein there is any honour and profite: whereat the other Citizens, among whome there are many both wise, rich, and of great courage, doe meruellously repine, and are mightily discontented. Likewise in the Cities and territories subiect vnto them, those that are I Noblemen and of power, are very much kept downe, by reason of the feare which that Signorie hath alwaies had, least by giuing credite and authority to the people, they should raise any mutinie.

3 BVT such as excell in vertue, might haue iuster cause to mutine, as those which by reason should bee absolutely and onely vnequall.] The vertuous being lesse esteemed, or ill vsed, might haue greater occasion to mutinie: as Cato, being repulsed when he sued for the Praetorship, or rather (as most Authours write) the Consulship: Aristides the iust when he was banished from Athens: Scipio, Rutilius, and Cicero, from Rome. Neuerthelesse, they raise no commotion, because they haue more regard of the publicke good, then K of their owne peculiar commodity.

4 THERE are some of higher birth, & in regard of this inequality will be preferred and ad­uanced aboue the rest.] As the Princes of the blood in France, and the Lords at Venice, and the Gentlemen of the best houses through all Christian realmes, and in Persia and in India, and wheresoeuer Nobility is respected.

5 BECAVSE men doe account those noble, who flourish through the vertue and riches of their ancestours.] Aristotle in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 8. Euery mans Nobility (saith he) is honoured in his Countrey, because it is a probable thing, that of the better Parents the better children are borne: for Nobility is vertue by descent. And in the fourth book, L chap. 4. Riches, credite of birth, vertue and learning, & other like, do by the same diffe­rence constitute the kinds of Noblemen. And in the eight chapter of the same booke, There are three things which striue for equality in the Commonweale, to wit, libertie, riches, and vertue, for the fourth which is called Nobility, followes the two latter, sith Nobility is auncient riches and vertue. Osorius a Portugall hath lately written a booke of Nobility, which is translated into the French tongue. Nowe adaies they are called Gentlemen who liue on their landes without taking any paines, or vsing any Trade, whereby to get their liuing: They haue Castles and fortresses, and a certaine num­ber of subiects and vassals which yeeld them fealtie and homage, as in France, Spaine, Germany, in the kingdome of Naples, and in Lumbardie. At Venice the Gentlemen M haue not much lands and possessions, but their substance consisteth in moueables and Merchandise, neither haue they any Castle or iurisdiction: so that such manner of Nobility is accounted but a title of preheminence to distinguish them from the peo­ple, and those of base estate.

[Page 245] A These are, as I may say, the beginnings and fountaines of seditions, which cause the changes 1.2 of Estates in two sorts: Sometimes from the present forme into another diuerse, as from a Demo­cratie 3.4 into an Oligarchie; or from an Oligarchie into a Democratie, or into a Commonweale; and from any of those formes into an Aristocratie, or from these formes into those. Sometimes, they 5 seeke not to change the present forme of gouernment, but maintaining still the same Estate, they will haue it gouerned by themselues, as the Oligarchie or Monarchie being still continued. 6 Moreouer, they contend for the respect of more or lesse, as to augment or diminish the autho­rity 7 of the Oligarchie or the Democratie, and in like sort of other Commonweales, to the end, to B enlarge or restraine them. Besides, in changing some part of the Commonweale, as if they 8.9 should ord [...]ine or put downe some Magistracie, as it is saied that Lysander, attemp [...]ed to haue 10 changed the Kingly state at Lacedemon; and king Pausanias, to haue abolished the state of the 11 Ephori. And at Epidamnus the Commonweale was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a 12 Senate in stead of the Prou [...]sts of the Tribes: and in the Court of Athens called Heliae [...], when 13 they proceed to the election of any one to bee receiued thereinto, they must take him euen out of those that haue authority or imployment in the Commonweale, and that heare other offices. And 14 an Archon or President that hath supreme authority in this Commonweale, is a remnant of the old Oligarchie.

C

THESE are the beginnings and fountaines of seditions.) Ciuile commotions are rai­sed 1 in these two sorts of Commonweales, and commonly in all, through the vnequall vsage of men, viz. when such as are equall, are not equally vsed among their equals, and some of them more aduanced; or when such as are vnequall, are vnequally vsed among them who are likewise vnequall; but the superiours are equall to their inferiours, or else lesse set by and despised.

WHICH cause the changes of Estates in two sorts.) Hee doth first set downe two sorts 2 or manners of chaunging Estates, whereto hee will afterward adde two other, which D make foure. Estates are changed by seditions, and there is neuer any immutation in the principall parts of a Common-weale without violence and force, as in ci­uile Gouernement, and in Religion: sith Plato saith, That euen in persuading, there is some violence.

SOMETIMES from the present forme into another diuerse.) The first manner of chan­ging 3 Estates, is when they are altered from one forme of Gouernement into another cleane different, as at Rome there was a change from the Monarchy of Kings to the go­uernment of ten men, called Decemuiri; and afterward to a popular Estate, wherein the Romanes were long time gouerned by the Consuls and Senate, vnder the authoritie of E the people; then againe to a Monarchie. Not long since the Commonweale of Flo­rence was changed into a Duchie. And the Switzers, who had at the first beene vnder the Kings of Fraunce, and after that, vnder the Empire of Germanie, by reason of the insolence, crueltie, and auarice of the Gouernours which were set ouer them, re­belled and confederated themselues cheefely against the Dukes of Austria who annoi­ed them, and they established this Democratie wherein they liue nowe, diuided by Cantons. Machiauel in the second of his discourses, chap. 9. writeth so of them and of the free Citties of Germany.

When the Romane Empire declined, and the title thereof was reduced into Germa­ny, F the cheefe Citties of that Countrey did one after another [...]edeeme themselues of the Emperors, according to their stubbornesse and necessity, and so became free, allow­ing to the saied Emperours some yearely tribute. Thus by little and little all the Citties which were immeadiately subiect to the Emperours, acknowledging no dutie to any inferiour Prince, haue in like sort redeemed themselues. It chaun­ced at the same time that certaine Communalties who were subiect to the Dukes of Austria rebelled against them, amongst whom were they of Friburg, the Switzers, [Page 246] and others, which prospering from the beginning, did by little and little growe to such G strength, that they haue not onely not returned vnder the yoke of Austria, but doe al­so keepe all their neighbours in awe; and are they whom wee call by the generall name of Switzers.

4 As from a Democratie into ân Oligarchie, or from an Oligarchie into a Democra [...]e, and from those formes into an Aristocratie, or from these into those.] The natural conuersions of Commonweales are very exactly considered and discussed by Plato in the eight booke of his Commonweale, and no lesse diligently set forth by Polibius in the sixt of his Hystorie, which placeth the Monarchie as the first gouernement of all, springing H naturally amongst men without any industrie, whereof the Kingly state is bred, which being turned into a Tyrannie, hee saith that by the suppressiion thereof, the Aristocra­tie riseth, which chaunging likewise into an Oligarchie, and afterward into a Demo­cratie, doth in processe of time become an Ochlocratie, that is, a troublesome, and vncertaine Gouernement of an ignorant multitude. Aristotle treateth of the chan­ges of Commonweales, in the eight of his Ethickes, chapter 10: and fourth of his Politiques.

5 SOMETIMES they seeke not to change the present forme of gouernment, but main­taining still the same Estate, they will haue it gouerned by themselues.] The second man­ner I of changing is rather in the Estate, then of the Estate: to wit, when the forme of Gouernement being nothing altered, there is onely a chaunge of Lords. As in England the houses of Lancaster and Yorke, surnamed the white rose, and the red, fought together not to destroy the Kingdome, but to trie whether of them should rule it. Likewise, the controuersie which was betweene Philip de Valoys, and Edward the third King of England, which of them had most right vnto the Crowne of France.

6 As the Oligarchie and Monarchie being still continued.] With their Lawes, or the same forme of Gouernement remaining. For the Oligarchie, wee will cite K that commotion or ciuile tumult which was at Florence in the time of Pope Six­tus betweene the houses of Medici and Paci, who sought not to alter the forme of their Commonweale, which chaunged euery three months, but either of them to obtaine for themselues the cheefe authoritie in the Cittie, or rather to suppresse the power of the Medici. Touching the Monarchie, it doth oft remaine, chaun­ging onely from one linage to another, or from one Cittie or Prouince to ano­ther; and that by marriage, adoption, conquest, force, and vsurpation, wher [...] onely the manner which is vsed in obtaining the Estate, is chaunged. Wee haue examples hereof, first of the chaunge from one linage to another, the two chaun­ges L that happened in Fraunce, the Kingdome still remaining, to wit, from the line of Pharamond, which possessed the saied kingdome three hundred and thirtie yeares, to the line of Pipine, which bare rule two hundred thirtie and three yeares: and from that to the line of Hugh Capet, which hath helde the Crowne since the yeare 984. vntill this present. From one Cittie to another, as the Em­pire from Rome to Constantinople, the seate of the Turkish Empire, from Bur­sia to Andrinople and Constantinople: From one Prouince to another, the Kingdome of Assyria into Media, and from Media into Persia. The Romane Empire out of Italie, first into Greece, where it continued vntill the yeare 1453: M Then into Fraunce, when the Eagle began to haue two heads; and into Ger­manie, where of Hereditarie, it is bacome Electiue: the Electours, who are seuen, must all bee Germanes, and of certaine families, and cheefe Ecclesia­sticall Estates, in whome onelie this priuiledge resteth. By marriage, as the Dutchie of Burgoine, and Kingdome of Spaine into Austria. By adoption, Augustus adopted Tiberius; and Adrian, Antonius Pius. The kingdomes [Page] A of Norway, Sweathland, and Denmarke, came from Queene Margaret to the D [...] Pomerania, whō she adopted. And the kingdome of England was conquered by [...]liam Duke of Normandy, surnamed in the English Chronicles, the Conqueror, [...] progenie doth yet continue.

MOREOVER, they contend for the respect of more or lesse, as to augment or [...] the authority of the Oligarchie, or of the Democratie, and in like sort of other Common [...] to the end, to enlarge or restraine them.] The third manner of changing Estates, is [...] the formes are not altered, but doe somewhat varie in regard of more or lesse, as [...] Oligarchie becomming more Oligarchicall, and the Democratie more Democrat [...] B as it hath beene shewed in the 4. of the Politickes: or the Kingly State more absolu [...] as they say of King Lewis the eleuenth, that hee set the Kings of Fraunce out of th [...] page; thereby meaning that hee made their authoritie more absolute then it had beene before. And Theopompus diminished the authoritie of the Lacedemonian Kings, as shall afterward bee shewed, [...]when as we do come to speake of Monar­chies.

BESIDES, in changing some part of the Commonweale.) The fourth maner is, when 8 the Estate is not wholly changed, but in one part, as in the cheefe Magistracies, or in the maner of Counsell, ordering of the Treasure, Religion, and military Discipline. In an­cient C time, the holding of a Parliament in Fraunce was nothing els then the assembling of the Estates of the Realme, wherein the King did communicate and conferre with his subiects, or some amongst them deputed for the rest, touching his greatest affaires; taking their aduise and counsell, hearing likewise their complaints and greeuances, and redressing them: the name whereof doth yet continue in England and Scotland. But be­cause that by this meanes the Kings had knowledge, as well of generall complaints which concerned the whole Estate, as of priuate causes concerning particular persons, the name of Parliament remaineth still in priuate courts or audiences, which are held by a certain number of Presidents & Counsellors, ordained by the king, at Paris, Roan, D Tolouse, and other places. The publicke audiences reserued by the King, haue taken the name of Estates, which haue beene left for the space of eightie yeares, or therea­bouts. And the Parliament which had beene held once euery yeare, became ordinary; and from being ordinary, to bee held euery halfe yeare; and from that became ordinary again. But the ordaining of the Presidents hath diminished it. In like sort, the charge & ordering of the monies hath had many changes of sundry Offices therein from time to time. In Military discipline the regimēt of the men of armes, instituted by king Charles the seuenth, and the Legions by king Francis the first.

As if they should ordaine or put downe some Magistracie.) The Dictatorship at Rome 9 E was ordained with absolute power for a time to take order for the weightie and vrgent affaires of the State. And it was afterward abolished, because first of all Silla had held it aboue the prefixed time, and after him Iulius Caesar had made it perpetuall. Silla did not wholly put downe the Tribuneship, but diminished the authoritie thereof, for­bidding any appeales to bee made to the Tribunes, or that they should make newe Lawes, and graunting them power onely to oppose themselues, and to assemble the Senate. But Pompey did wholly rest [...]re this their authoritie. Cice­ro in the third of his Lawes. And finally, Augustus Caesar abolished it ret [...] ­ning the name onely, that by right thereof, hee might when hee would, assemble F the Senate. The Mayor of the palace hath beene altogether suppressed. And in the time of Lewis the eleuenth, the Cons [...]able had in his ordinarie re [...]ue [...] hun­dred men of Armes, wherof himselfe was Commissary, which number is now brought to an hundreth.

As it is said that Lysander attempted to haue changed the Kingly st [...] a [...] L [...]ced [...].) 10 There were two kings at Lacedemon [...] who were ouer-awed and bridled by 17. Senators and fiue Ephori, and could not bee of any other stocke then of the Heraclid [...]e, as Plato [Page 248] writeth in the fourth of his Lawes, and in Alcibiades the first. But Lysander (as Plutarch G writeth in his life) attempted to bring it so to passe, that the Kingdome should not goe by succession, but that being void, it should bee giuen to the most valiant and vertu­ous persons.

11 AND King Pausanias to haue abolished the State of the Ephori.] The two principall degrees at Lacedemon, were the Kingdome and the State of the Ephori, opposed each against other, as the Tribuneship and Consulship at Rome. Cicero in his 2. booke of Lawes. Then as Lysander attempted to change the Kingdome, so did Pausanias to abo­lish the State of the Ephori, because their authority was too Tyrannicall, as Plato wri­teth in the 4. of his Lawes, and Aristotle in the 2. of his Politickes, chap. 7: and it was H very odious, especially to the Kings, of whome they were controulers. [...] signifi­eth as it were an ouerseeing or superintendence, and it was a yearely Office, whereto was committed the vnderstanding and ordering of all their principall affaires, and the correction of all other Magistrates, yea euen of the Kings themselues, from whom men might appeale to the said Ephori, who were fiue onely in number.

12 AND in Epidamnus the Cōmonweale was changed in one part, by the ordaining of a Senat instead of the Prouosts of the Tribes.] Epidamnus, otherwise called Dyrrhachiū, Thucidi­des maketh mention thereof in the first booke of his Hystorie. The Romanes changed the name of it in processe of time. It is scituated in Illyricum, or Sclauonie. At the I first they chose there from time to time a certaine number of Prouosts by the tribes or linages, for the ordering of all affaires, which was afterward changed into a Senate or ordinarie Counsell.

13 AND in the Court of Athens called Heliaea, when they proceed to the election of any one to be receiued thereinto, they must take him euen out of those that haue authority or employment in the Commonweale, or that beare other offices.] The Philosopher speaking of the change which is made in one part of the Cittie, doth beside the former example, alleadge one out of the Estate of Athens, which being chaunged from an Oligarchie into a Demo­cratie, retained still many Oligarchicall customes: as the election of the Heliastae, K who were not indifferently taken out of all kindes of men by lot, as was ordinari­lie done in Democraties, but out of the worshipfullest sort, especially out of them that had alreadie other Magistracies: which was an Oligarchicall fashion. Heli [...]a was in Athens a soueraigne Court, consisting of a thousand Iudges, who were called Heliastae, and were kept at the charges of the Commonweale.

14 AND an Archon or President that hath supreme authoritie in this Commonweale, is a remnant of the old Oligarchie.] The dignitie of the Archon in Athens, was likewise Oligarchicall, and giuen at the first for tearme of life, after for tenne yeares, and at last was yearely. This Archon was called Hegemon, and Prytanis, L and his name was entered in the publicke decrees, as at this day the Dukes name is at Venice.

1 THEREFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequalitie, when 2 that is not giuen to them that bee equall, which is due vnto them by proportion, so that the Kingly state it selfe being perpetuall, is found vnequall, if it bee ouer equall persons. 3.4 For men, by seeking wholly for eq [...]lity, doe enter into sedition. Surely equality is dou­ble, 5.6 the one in number, the other in dignitie: I meane in number, that which is all one and [...]quall by multitude or greatnesse: and in dignitie, by proportion. As three exceed two [...] in like number, as two exceede one. By proport [...]on foure, two; and two, one: for M two are an eqall part of foure, and one of two, [...]ith each of them is a moitie. And 7 whereas men confesse that to bee absolutely right, which is equall according to dignity, they 8 fall into dissention, as hath ben before affirmed: The one sort, for that they being in some 9 respect equall, account themselues equall in all respe [...]ts [...] The other sort, for that they being vn­equall 10 in somethings, will be vn [...]quall and superior in all things. From whence proceede two [Page 249] A chiefe formes of Commonweales; namely; the Democratie, and the Oligarchie, considering that 11 vertue and noblenesse are in few men; but these other qualities are [...]ound in many men: for there 12 are not in any place scene a hundred men together that be noble and good; but there be many poore 13 men euery where. 14

THERFORE sedition happeneth in all places, because of inequalitie, when that is not giuen to 1 them that be equall, which is due vnto them by proportion.] As Equalitie, when it is well kept in all things and persons, breedeth friendship: so vnequalitie causeth euill will and dissention, chiefly when a due proportion is not kept amongst vnequall persons, by gi­uing B vnto euery one that which pertaineth vnto him, according to his calling and de­gree. The vnequall persons which be seene commonly in countries, are Princes, gentle­men, villains, poore, rich, learned, vnlearned, merchants, soldiors, husbandmen, and ar­tificers: who in a well ordered State, should and ought to be intreated and handled ac­cording to their callings, without giuing that to the one which pertaineth to the other. But aboue al things rewards must be yeelded-according to vertue, and punishments ac­cording to offences: Els cannot publique vnitie and concord be maintained, nor the Commonweale preserued. For as the world is not composed of semblant and like ele­ments, but of those that are differing one from another, and yet agreeing by proportion C(as Galen sayth in his booke of Mixtures, and Hippocrates in his booke of Mans nature, and Plato in the same Timeus and in his Phoedon, the not naturall excesse and want whereof and changing from one place into another that is not agreeable, breedeth in­ward sedition and sicknesse) so the citie is not constituted of men equall alike, but diffe­ring in kind, as is set downe in the second booke of the Politikes the first chapter: and the third booke, the first chapter: who are vnited by proportionall handling, and disuni­ted by vnequalitie. Wherefore Aristotle saith very wel in his great Morals, that propor­tion holdeth the Citie together, for that all persons are knit together therein by pro­portion, which is the cause of mutual concord and good wil amongst them. The breach D of proportion filleth a State with hatreds, dissentions, mislikings, and grudges, whereof seditions and ciuile wars doe grow. In the time of king Lewis the eleuēth, many French princes and lords conspired against him, as malcontent for that he called them not ney­ther vsed their counsaile in the directing of the great affaires and important matters of the kingdome, but was counselled and gouerned by meane men: and they rose vp in armes together, vnder colour that they would take order in matters concerning the Commonweale: as Philip de Comines reporteth in the first booke of his remembrances.

SO that the kingly state itself being perpetual, is found vnequall, if it be ouer equal persons.] 2 Although the kingly state be good and lawful of it selfe, as appeareth in the third booke E of the Politiques, the first chapt. yet for all that if it come to passe that one would make himselfe king amongst his equals, and such as bee as free and noble as himselfe, and take such perpetuall authoritie as Iulius Caesar enterprised at Rome; he should make it vne­quall, and therefore odious and vnsupportable. For when they are all equall and free by nature, they ought all to haue part in the gouernment, whether it be good or bad, and to gouerne one after another as their turns fall, and for a certaine time, as is set downe in the second booke of Politiques the first chapter: as they doe at Venice, a few States excepted: and Genoa, Noremberg, Ausburgh, Strasburgh, Lubec, and commonly in al Signories & cōmunalties. He meaneth by this word Kingly estate, the whole soueraign F authoritie of one alone, which amongst equals is more tollerable to be yearely, as the Aduowership of Berne, and the Consulship of Rome, diuided betweene two: and the Archon of Athens: or from two months to two months, as the Confalonnier of Lucca: or from 2 years to 2 years, as the duke of Genoa: or during great affairs, as the Dictator. The reason is, because the other Citisens in time may attaine therevnto: And in Magi­stracies of short continuance lesse may be enterprised: as appeareth in the second and third bookes of the Politiques.

[Page 250] 3 FOR men by seeking wholly for equality, doe enter into sedition.] When some intrude G themselues to take too much vpon them, others that seeke to maintaine equality, doe conspire to pull them downe, and reduce them to equality; which agreeth with mens nature, and nourisheth peace amongst them, entertaining friends with friends, Townes with Townes, Kingdomes with Kingdomes, and confederats with confederates, as Eu­ripides saith. If therefore some enterprise to take it away, it is no maruell, if for the with­standing of their purpose, men make war against them.

4 SVRELY equality is double.] Because men are often deceiued in the vnderstanding of equality, He sheweth that it is double, to the end men should not be deceiued by ta­king one for another, and by confounding them, and that they should know the way to H vse the same well, in publicke and priuate affaires, as well in ordering of men, as of their contracts and bargaines.

5 THE one in number.] Arithmeticke, as 321, when there is equalitie in multitude, or greatnesse in quantity, that standeth of seuered parts, or of contuued and ioined parts, as might be said amongst so many hundred crownes, or acres of land.

6 THE other in dignity.] By proportion, as 421, wherein double proportion is found. For as much as the knowledge of this matter is most profitable and necessarie, and not vnderstood by all men, we will stand a little vpon it, and rehearse it more amply for the better interpretation of this place, and the fift booke of manners. First we will presup­pose I (as is written in the Predicaments, and the sixt chapter of the second booke of Mo­rall Philosophie) that equalitie or vnequality is the property of quantity, in as much as all thinges comparable in equalnesse, or vnequalnesse, are comprised vnder the ioi­ned or seuered quantity, and haue betweene them proportion of numbers, or of greatnesse. Therefore Proportion, as Iordane affirmeth in his second booke, is a certaine referrence or comparison of two things, all of one kind betweene themselues: or as saith Euclide in his fift booke, a certaine habitude or comparison of quantities, all of one kind, which in Greeke hee calleth [...]. Boetius in his first booke of Arith­meticke, the seuenteenth and eighteenth chapter, nameth the proportion of numbers, K Arithmetical proportion; for that the Arithmetritians consider onely the kind of quan­tity which consisteth of seuered parts, and the proportion of number, which is from equall to equall, as from two to two; or from a bigger to a lesser number, as 4. to 2. or from a lesser to a greater, as from 2. to 4. and extending infinitely, retaineth alwaies the selfesame difference of excesse, as 1.2.3,4.5.6.7.8. where alwaies the next number ex­ceedeth it, which is next vnto it by an vnity, or 3.6.9.12.15. by three. But the Geometri­cian doth further consider the habitude or comparison of all bignesses, and therefore the proportion of bignesses, is properly called Geometricall, as hee compareth line to line, outside to outside, and body to body. Nowe, as one number may bee compared to L another, being equall, bigger, or lesser: Such comparison of proportions, is called by Euclide in his fift booke [...]: By Boetius in his second booke of Arithmeticke, and by Iordane in his tenth booke, proportionality and proportion of proportions: yet the Geometrician applieth it particularly to equall or semblant proportions, that is to say, such as haue semblant and like denomination, which is named sole, or only propor­tionality, to wit, similitude or likenesse of proportions, and equality, and mediety. The one of them is called Arithmeticall, and the other Geometricall. Arithmetical propor­tionality is an habitude or comparison of quantities, surmoūting one another by equal exceedings, as 10,6.8,4. For as tenne exceedeth sixe by foure, so eight exceedeth foure by foure, and so is it of all other numbers, disposed by naturall order; which when they M be infinitely extended, doe alwaies keepe all one, and the selfesame difference. Geome­tricall proportionality is a comparison of quantities that haue semblant and like Geo­metricall proportion, as 8,4.6,3. bee: For there is a double proportion of the first to the second, and of the third to the fourth, & as 8. be to 4. so are 6. to 3. And the other way, as 3. are to 6. so be 4. to 8. which is subdouble proportion. Euery of those proportionalties, [Page 251] A may be of ioined and fastened parts, or of seuered and vncoupled parts. They call it ioi­ned or fastened, where there is such proportion of the first tearme or bounder to the se­cond, as there is of the second to the third, and of the third to the fourth, as 8,4.2,1. do declare it in Geometricall proportion, and 8,6,4,2. in Arithmeticall proportion. The which ioined or fastened mediety may be made in foure or moe tearmes, and if there be but three, the middle serueth to both. The seuered or vncoupled mediety, is set and con­stituted amongst tearmes that haue some interruption or breaking off from their pro­portion, as 10,5,4,2. and 12,8,6, 2. And it must haue foure tearmes or bounders at the least. Therefore Iordane saith very well, that the meanes of seuered proportionality are B vnioined, and the meanes of fastened proportionality ioined together. Aristotle in the fift booke of his Morall Philosophy, the fourth and fift Chapters, requireth the forme of Arithmeticall equality, in iustice that pertaineth to the communicating and exchaun­ging of things; wherein the equalnesse of things, and not of persons is necessary: and where one thing must be giuen for another, as price for Merchandise, and recompence for dammage, without any respect of persons. Otherwise, if men take alwaies on the one side, and giue nothing on the other: as out of a Marchaunts shop without paying or exchanging any thing at all, the shop at last will be empty, and the trade of exchaun­ging will [...]ease. Therefore this Arithmeticall equality is required in contracts, as well C voluntary as constrained: To the end, that the communicating of things, may last for euer in the societies of men. It is also vsed in Communalities of people, in the bestow­ing and distributing of Offices, where euery one will be as high a maister as another, for the keeping of equality amongst them. In the fift booke of his Ethickes hee applieth the Geometricall mediety to the degrees of vocations, and of men, that there may bee equality, not of thinges, but of proportions; and that the degrees may bee kept. As, al­though the Diuine, the Lawyer, the Captaine, the Senator, and the Treasurer doe dif­fer, yet for all that they ought to haue necessary correspondence, and to be made equal, not in their vocation, but by semblance and likenesse of proportions, in such sort, that D euery one shall exercise his Office without letting the others. Wherefore Plato affirms the publicke state to bee good, if it be instituted according [...]o the Geometrical propor­tion, and that all the welfare thereof dependeth vpon the same. The King giueth the Office of Chancellorship to a wise and learned man, that loueth vprightnesse and pub­licke peace: and the Office of the Constableship to a good Captaine, well experienced in matters of state: The gouernement of the Church to a Diuine, that is skilfull in the Ecclesiasticall gouernement: the Office of a Iudge to a Lawyer: the Treas [...]rorship to one that hath skill in the ordering of the monies. Then euery one keepeth his place, & exerciseth his Office, without incrochment and hinderance one of another, to the end E that the publicke concord bee not troubled. This order causeth equality amongst such as be vnlike and dissemblant. Plato in the sixt booke of his Lawes sayth: The old saying is true and very wel vsed, that equality breedeth friendship: But for as much as the equa­lity that can worke this, is scarcesly knowne, it troubleth vs. For whereas there bee two equalities, called by all one and the selfesame name, but in effect almost contrary in ma­ny things, euery City and euery Law giuer may vse the one by lots in the distributing of honours, to wit, the equality in number, weight, and measure. But it is not easie for all men to know the true and good equality, for it is the iudgement of God, and happe­neth sildome amongst men. But as farre as it happeneth to Cities and to perticuler per­sons, F it causeth all welfare, it giueth more to men of great calling, and lesse to them that are of lowe degree, ordering all thinges according to their nature. Truly it giueth the most excellent men in vertue, the greatest honours; and to the vnderlings in vertue and skilfulnesse, the lesser preferments: distributing to the one and the other that which by reason appertaineth vnto them. Which is the very politicall right that wee ought to desire, and we should obserue such equality in establishing and ordering this new City, as also whosoeuer buildeth another, ought to doe and frame his Lawes according to [Page 252] the same, not respecting some small number of Tyrants, or one, or the power of the G people, but alwaies hauing regard to right, which wee lately affirmed to distribute al­waies that which is equall by nature amongst them that bee vnequall. And in Gorgias hee saith: You are not ignorant that the Geometricall equality is of much effect, both amongst the gods and men: And thinke that the most ought to be had in all things, be­cause you dispise Geometry. Geometricall proportion is particularly vsed in Oligar­chies and Aristocraties, in distributing the publicke honours and offices onely to the rich, according to their riches, and to the good according to vertue.

7 AND whereas men confesse that to be absolutely right, which is equall according to dig­nity, they fall into dissention.] Although all men confesse, that the manner of distributing H honours and offices according to desert and worth, is simply iust (the fift of the Ethicks, chap. 3.) yet commonly they fal to strife and debate, because some men measure worth after one sort, and some after another.

8 THE one sort, for that they being in some respect equall, account themselues equall in all respects.] The poore sort in Democraties haue equall freedome, and because they are equall in libertie onely, they will bee absolutely equall in all things, thinking it to bee against reason, that any one should haue greater priuiledge, or bee preferred for riches or for Nobility, but wil that all doe alike participate in their degrees and turnes, in pub­licke honors, the 4. of the Politickes, chap. 4. and 6. booke, chap. 2. I

9 THE other sort, for that they being vnequall in some things, will be vn [...]quall and superior in all things.] The richer and nobler sort in Oligarchies, thinke that the whole gouern­ment of the State should belong to them by reason of their richesse or Nobilitie, and they diuide among themselues all the publicke offices, not admitting the poore to any part thereof, though many of them be both wise and vertuous.

10 FROM whence proceed two cheefe formes of Commonweale, namely, the Democratie and Oligarchie.] Pouerty and Riches are the differences whereby the Democratie and Oli­garchie are distinguished. That State wherein publicke Offices are distributed to the rich by reason of their wealth, is of necessity an Oligarchie: and that wherein the poore K doe gouerne, a Democratie: 3. booke of the Politickes, cha. 5. and 6: and 4. booke, cha. 5. Sedition then ariseth in these two Commonweales, namely in the Democratie, when the poore who beare sway, doe assume all vnto themselues; and the rich being despised or outraged, doe conspire: and in the Oligarchie, when the poore, because there is no account made of them. 3. booke of the Politickes, chap. 7. And Plato in the 8. of his Commonvveale.

11 CONSIDERING that vertue and noblenesse are in few men.] Hee sheweth a rea­son why there are more Democraties and Oligarchies then Aristocraties; wherein all is referred to the goodnesse and vertue of them that beare rule, and to the publick good L of the State. And because that fewe men being both noble and vertuous together, are found in any place, therefore there are few Aristocraties, for as hee writeth in the 3. of the Politickes, chap. 5. One onely, or very few men can excell in vertue, but it is impos­sible that many can perfectly excell in all vertue.

12 BVT these other qualities are found in many men.] Namely, Pouertie, Liberty, and Riches, which are the differences of the Democratie and Oligarchie.

13 FOR there are not in any place seene an hundred together that be noble and good.] At the least, which may be in sufficient number, and sufficiently qualified for the establishing of an Aristocratie.

14 BVT there be many poore men euery where.] Who if they beare the greatest sway, M they grow insolent, and oppresse the rich, whence spring the seditions in Democraties: or if they bee wholly depriued of all authoritie in the Commonweale, they rebell a­gainst the rich in Oligarchies, and by such disorders, cause the changes of Estates.

[Page 253] A AND to ordaine a Commonweale simply in all respects, according to the one or the other, 1 equality it is not good, as appeareth by the issue thereof, sith no such Commonweale can be of con­tinuance. 2 The reason is, because it is impossible, that from an error committed at the first, & from 3 a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end. Wherefore it behooueth to vse partly the equality 4 of number, and partly that equality, which is according to dignity. Yet the Democratie is surer & 5 lesse subiect to mutinie, then the Oligarchie: for in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, 6 namely between the gouernors, and with the people. But in Democraties they are with the Oligar­chie 7 only, and not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made. 8 B Moreouer, the Commonweale which consisteth of meane men, being the surest or safest of all such 9 Commonweales, doth approch neerer to the Democratie then to the Oligarchie. 10

AND to ordaine a Commonweale simply in all respects, according to the one, or the other 1 equality, it is not good.] The Arithmeticall equality is of it selfe bad, and the Geometri­call alone cannot be altogether obserued without mutinies, but they must be mixed for the preuenting of mens discontents. Socrates in his Areopagiticall Oration, This (saith he) did much helpe and profite them in the gouernment of the City, that whereas there are two sorts of equality, of which the one giueth alike to all; the other, that only which C is meet; they were not ignorant whether of the two was most profitable. For they left that equality which giueth alike both to the good and bad, and obserued in their afore­said gouernement that other equality which distributeth honours and punishments ac­cording to deserts, not chusing Magistrates indifferently out of the people, but out of the better sort. He doth wholly mislike the Arithmeticall equality, which is sought only by Democraticall persons, & commendeth the Geometricall. Which notwithstanding must not bee obserued alone, euen in those Common-weales that are thereby ordered, viz. in Oligarchies and Aristocraties: For Riches of it selfe, or Nobility, can giue no ab­solute right or authority to gouerne, in such sort, that none may beare rule saue they D who are rich or Noble: neither can vertue alone doe it, if the good and vertuous man be not in many Estates noble or rich. Likewise in a well ordered Commonweale, all Of­fices are not to be giuen to good men, but the principall: wherein consisteth the autho­ritie of the State, which are administred by sole persons, or in small number, to the end, that the rest who are not honoured but excluded from gouernement in the Common­weale, grow not discontented, or vse practises tending to innouation.

SITH no such Commonweale can be of continuance.] No Democratie which doth 2 simply in all points obserue the right before mentioned, according to the Arithmetical equality, is of continuance, by reason of the seditions that spring therein; nor any Oli­garchie E which hath respect only to the Geometricall equality.

THE reason is, because it is impossible that from an errour committed at the first, and from 3 a bad beginning, there proceed not a bad end.] The beginning is of such force in all things, that things well begun, are accounted halfe done; but things ill begunne, haue sildome good euent. Wherefore it is no meruell, if these two formes of Commonweales do not prosper, but soone decay, sith that from their beginning they are not grounded on the true and equall right, but on an outward apparence only.

WHEREFORE it behoueth to vse partly the equality of number, and partly that equa­lity 4 which is according to dignity.) For the well establishing of a Commonweale, and pre­seruing F it from seditions, it is requisite to mixe and temper these two equalities toge­ther. Plato in the sixt of his Lawes: It is necessary for euery Citty which would be alto­gether exempted from sedition, to vse these two equalities, hauing like denomination. For this commendable equity, and equall discerning of that which is perfect and abso­lute, is violated, if it be not done with right iudgement. Wherefore it is expedient to vse the equality of Lots, thereby to auoid the giuing of offence to many. And in this behalf God and good Fortune are to bee praied vnto, that the lot may bee directed to fall on [Page 254] the best and iustest. So then both these sorts of equality must bee vsed of necessity, but G that sort the lesse, which hath need of Fortune. For this cause therefore this order must bee thus obserued by that Cittie which desireth continuance & safety. And in another place of the same booke: Amongst the Magistrates which are chosen by the proporti­on of their wealth or reueuues, the one halfe should bee created by lot, and bee Sena­tours for a yeare; which kind of creation will bee a middle forme betweene the Mo­narchicall and Democraticall: of which two formes the Commonweale ought alwaies to keepe the meane. For otherwise the lords and slaues will neuer agree, nor the good and bad Cittizens, if they doe not equally participate in publicke honors. For amongst men that are vnequall, equall things doe become vnequall, if they receaue not a pre­scribed H measure. It doth therefore hereby appeare, and Experience the Mistresse & tea­cher of things, doth sufficiently shewe, that these two sorts of equalitie must be mixed in a well ordered Commonweale. For wee see that all humane society, both in priuate and publicke, consisteth in the due communication or commutation of things, and in the order or degrees of persons. The communication of things is made by contracts or bargaines, wherein great equalitie must bee obserued by Arithmeticall proportion, which doth simply retaine an equall difference among many numbers. For this cause the penaltie of like for like called P [...]ena talionis was in auncient times ordained for the restoring of that equalitie which was before. Touching persons and Offices, they I are ordered and appointed by degrees in Citties and in priuate families. In Cities there are cheefe, meane, and inferiour Magistracies: in families there are diuerse degrees, as of Parents, Children, Brethren and Sisters, Lords and Slaues: which order of persons must bee established by Geometricall proportion, retaining the equalitie of propor­tions, to wit, in giuing euery man his place, and vsing him according to his quality and desert.

5 YET the Democratie is surer and lesse subiect to mutiny then the Oligarchie.] Although both bee corrupt, yet there is lesse euill and danger in the Democratie then in the Oli­garchie, and it is lesse troubled with sedition, because it approcheth neerer to the K meane.

6 FOR in Oligarchies there arise two kinds of seditions, namely betweene the Gouernors, & with the people.] The Oligarchicall persons, who are the richest or the noblest, doe not agree well together, but oft times destroy or expulse each other. And because they af­ford no part or authority of gouernement to the poorer sort, which are many in num­ber, or doe besides oppresse them, it is necessary that they become enemies vnto them, (the 3. book of the Politickes. chap. 7) and conspire against them, as shall afterward bee shewed. Plato in the eight of his Common-weale, the fourth of his Lawes, and in the Gouernour. L

7 BVT in Democraties they are with the Oligarchie only, not of the people with the people; at the least, whereof any reckoning is to be made.] In the Democratie sedition is raised by the poor only against the rich. But the poor doe neuer or very seldome cōtend amongst themselues, for there is nothing thereby to bee gotten, or if they doe at any time, it is some small sedition, and of no consequence.

8 MOREOVER, the Commonweale which consisteth of mean men.] That is to say, hauing meane substance, who are neither very rich nor very poore.

9 BEING the surest of all such Commonweales.] The fourth booke of the Politickes chap. 11: to wit, of corrupt commonweales, and which haue already swarued from the perfection of a Commonweale. M

10 DOTH approch neerer to the Democratie, then to the Oligarchie.] The meane forme of Commonweale hath more affinity with the Democratie, then with the Oligarchie: for which cause the Democratie is surer or safer, and lesse corrupt. Likewise in the 8. of his Ethickes, chap. 10. he saieth, That the Democratie is not bad, because it doth but little transgresse or exceed the right forme of Commonweale: and in the 4. of the Politicks [Page 255] A chap. 11. hee saith that Democraties are surer, and of longer continuance, by reason of those of meane estate who are there in greater number, and haue more interest in pub­licke honours. There are commonly in all Cities three sorts of people, of whom some are very rich, as in Oligarchies: some very poore, as in Democraties: the third sort are meane betweene both, neither very poore, nor very rich. And where manie such haue authoritie of gouernment, without doubt the state of that Cittie is more assured and lesse troubled with sedition. For those Cittizens who are very rich, or very poore, are not fit for the maintaining of humane society. The rich are prowd, disdainefull, and prone to offer iniuries: the poore malicious and enuious, and they cannot long B remaine together without tumults and factions. So that they which are the stronger falling to quarrels, and hauing the aduantage on their enemies, doe alwaies cause the state of the Commonweale to encline on their side. If they bee poore, they establish a Democratie: if they be rich, an Oligarchie. And because the most part of men are such, and there are few of meane estate, this is the reason why we see more Democraties and Oligarchies then other formes of Commonweales. But the meane sort of Cittizens doe neither desire other mens goods as the poore doe, neither are they insolent, as the rich are: and by this meanes they mainetaine publicke amitie, and eschewe seditions. Wherefore that Commonweale which is gouerned by men of meane substance, is the C best and of longest continuance. Neither can there happen any greater good to all Estates for their safetie, then to haue those for their Gouernours, who are meanly rich, otherwise they fall presently into Monarchicall or Popular Tyrannies, or (which is worse) are vtterly destroied.

D

CHAP. II. From vvhence seditions spring, and of their causes.

SIth we are come to consider from whence seditions and chaunges in Com­monweales doe spring, we will first touch in generall the beginnings and cau­ses 1 thereof, which are about three in number, and wee will breefly discourse them each seuerally by it selfe. First of all we must know howe men are dispo­sed E or made prone to sedition: next, wherefore they raise it: Thirdly, wh [...]t are the beginnings of ciuile troubles, and of the mutinies or tumults which arise amongst them. The cause by which they are disposed to the desire of a change, is that in generall, whereof we haue lately spoken, viz. that some in seeking equality doe mutine, if they thinke that they haue lesse, being themselues equall to those that haue more. Others seeking ine­qualitie and preheminence doe likewise mutine, if being vnequall, they persuade themselues that they haue not more, but alike or lesse. Nowe, these things may sometimes bee iustly desired, and sometimes vniustly. The reason is, because being inferiour, they contend for equality; and be­ing equall, for superioritie. Hereby it appeareth, how they are disposed to sedition, and desire of F innouation. The thinges for which they contend, are profite, and honour, and their contraries. For in seeking to shunne dishonour, or daunger, either of themselues, or of their friendes, they trouble Cities and Estates with sedition. The causes and beginnings of the motiues which dispose them in the aforesaid manner, and for the thinges by vs men­tioned, may bee seuen in number, and somewhat more; two whereof are the same that the former are, but not in the same manner. For profite and honour doe prouoke them to quarrell, and contend together, not thereby to purchase them for themselues, [Page 256] as we said before, but because they see others more aduanced, some iustly and some vniustly. They G are likewise prouoked by reason of iniuries, feare, prepotence, contempt, excessiue encrease, and 2 otherwise of shame, negligence, pusillanimity, and vnlikenesse.

In euery sedition there are three points to be considered. The first, how men are dis­posed or made prone to the raising of it: The second, to what end they mutine: The third, what the motiue cause thereof is. Equality or inequality in Democraties or Oli­garchies, doe dispose and incline men to discord. The ends or finall causes thereof are profite and honour; and their contraries, dammage and dishonour. The motiues which prouoke them to sedition, are set downe to the number of seuen, namely, honor H and profit, enioyed by some aboue their deserts, for which cause the rest repine at them: iniuries, feare, prepotence, contempt, excessiue and disproportionall encrease of some part of the Cittie, or of some per [...]on: to which motiues there are added foure other, viz. shame, negligence, pusillanimity, and vnlikenesse.

1 WE will first touch in generall the beginnings and causes thereof.] There are foure kinds of causes set downe by Philosophers, the efficient, materiall, formall, and finall cause. The efficient cause of seditions is double, the one a neere, the other, a remote cause. The neere cause are the Authours thereof, by whose counsell, direction, and aide I they are raised and performed. By the remote cause we vnderstand those things, for, and through which they are prouoked thereunto: and these are set downe by Aristotle to the number of eleuen. The Authors of seditions are either Magistrats, as were at Rome Tiberius, and Caius Gracchus brethren, Sylla, Marius, Apuleius, Caesar, Antonius, Le­pidus: or priuate men, as Catiline and Manlius. In the Romane Hystories we may find, that certaine slaues haue ben the Authours of seditions, as Herdonius Sabinus, which raised the warre called Bellum seruile; and one named Eunus a Syrian, who gathered a power of more then forty thousand slaues in Sicile, and hauing put on Kingly attire, ranged through the Island, wasting and spoiling it. There was also another borne in Ci­licia, K who did as much mischeefe. Spartacus a sword-player rising against the State of Rome, fought many times with the Romane Consuls, whom he discomfited in battaile, but afterward was vanquished by L. Crassus. The materiall cause of seditions are they against whome they are raised, of whome some are superiours, as Princes and Magi­strates; and some inferiours, who are subiect vnto them. The end or finall cause of sediti­ons, is that thing for which they are raised. Aristotle setteth downe foure ends thereof, namely, profite, and honour; and their contraries, dammage and dishonour: for men are commonly stirred thereunto through hope of profite and honour, or through feare of dammage and infamy, as well of themselues as of their friends, desiring the one, and L shunning the other. To profite, we referre riches: to honour, Magistracies, Offices, and publicke charges: to dammage, pouertie: to dishonour, continuall iniuries, contempt, and such like, which although they are numbred among the motiue and efficient cau­ses of seditions, because they prouoke men, yet they may likewise bee the ends thereof, because that for the obtaining or shunning of them, men doe conspire. The forme or manner of a sedition, is a commotion of the people, noise, cries, beatings, murthers, ci­uile warre, surprizing of Townes, burnings, banishments. If it bee of subiects toward their superiours and lords, it is called rebellion: if betweene subiects or men of equall estate, faction. Titus Liuius in the second booke of his first Decade doth elegantly de­scribe M the forme of a sedition which happened at Rome for debts, in this manner: ‘Mag­no natu quidam cum omnium maiorum suorum insignibus se in forum proiecit, obsita erat squa­lore vestis, foedior corporus habitus pallore ac macie perempti: adhoc promissa barba & capilli es­fer [...]erant speciem oris: noscitabatur tamen in tanta deformitate, & ordines duxisse aiebant, aliáque mititiae decora vulgo miserantes eum, iactabant: ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pug­n [...]rum cicatrices aduersopectore [...]stentabat. Sciscitantibus vnde esset ille habitus, vnde defor­mitas, [Page 257] A quum circunsusa turba esset propè in concionis modum: Sabino bello ait se mili­tantem, quta propter populationes agri non fructu modò car [...]erit, sed villa incensa fuerit, dirrepta omnia, pecora abacta, tributum iniquo suo tempore imperatum, aes alienum se­cisse: id cum [...]latum vsuris, primò se agro paterno auitòque exuisse, deinde fortunis alijs, postremò velut tabem peruenisse ad corpus: ductum se ab creditore non in seruitium, sed in ergastulum & carnificinam esse: inde ostentare tergum foedum recentibus ves [...]igijs ver­berum. Ad haec visa auditàque clamor ingens oritur: non iam foro se tumultus con­tinet, sed passim totam vrbem peruadit: nexu vincti, solutíque, se vndique in publi­cum proripiunt, implorant Quiritium fidem: nullo loco deest seditionis volontarius comes: B multis passim agminibus per omnes viat cum clamore in forum curritur. Magno cum periculo suo, qui fortè patrum in foro erant, in eam turbam inciderunt: nec tempera­tum manibus foret, ni properè Coss. P. Seruilius & Appius Claudius ad comprimen­dam seditionem interuenissent. At in eos multitudo versa, ostentare vincula sua, de­formitatémque aliam: haec se meritos dicere, exprobrantes suam quisque alius alibi mi­litiam, postulare minaciter magis quàm suppliciter vt Senatum vocarent, curi [...]mque ipsi futuri arbitri moderatorésque publici consilij circumsistunt.’

There is also another description not much vnlike to this, made by the same C Authour in the third booke of the same Decade, of a sedition raised in this manner, for the outrage committed by Appius on the daughter of Virgi­nius: ‘Repraesentatur mactaturus iam pater filiam abrepto ab lanio cultro: Hoc te vno quo possum (ait) modofilia inlibertatem vendico. Pectus deinde puellae transfigit, respectánsque ad tribunal: Te (inquit) Appi, tuúmque caput sanguine hoc consecro. Clamore ad tam atrox facinus orto, ex­citus Appius, comprehendi Virginium iubet: ille ferro quacunque ibat, viam face­re, donec multitudine etiam prosequentium iuuenum ruente ad portam perrexit. Icilius Numitoriúsque exangue corpus sublatum ostentant populo, scelus Appij, puellae infeli­cem D fortunam, necessitatem patris deplorant. Sequentes clamitant matronae, eám ne procreandorum liberorum conditionem? ea pudicitiae praemia esse? Concitatur multitudo, clamatur ad arma.’

Cicero in his Oration pro T.A. Milone compareth the people being in­censed, to a tempest: Et quidem, inquit, caeteras tempestates & procellas in illis dun­taxat fluctibus concionum & seditionum. The same Authour in his first booke De Oratore: Hoc tempus post consulatum obiecimus his fluctibus, qui per nos à communi pest [...] depulsi, in nosmetipsos redundarunt.

E So dooth Virgil likewise in the first booke of the AEneide:

[Page 258] 2 Vnlikenesse.] Plato in the eight of his Commonweale sayeth, That wheresoeuer G there is vnlikenesse, and discordant inequalitie, there men are alwaies troubled with seditions. Hee did well to adde discordant inequalitie, because all vnlikenesse is not to bee reprooued, but that only which hath in it selfe a discordant inequalitie, and thereby may cause sedition. For the preuenting of which euill this inequali­tie must bee (so much as is possible) reduced to an equality. So wee see that the world being compounded of contrarie Elements, namely, Earth, Water, Aire, and Fire is maintained and preserued by this Analogie and proportion which they haue together, and that the bodies of creatures consisting of heat, colde, drinesse, H and moisture, are by the same meanes and manner preserued. In the maine bo­die of Nature, there is matter, forme, priuation, simplicitie, mixture, substance, quantitie, qualitie, action, passion: In mans bodie the head, hands, feete, eyes, nose, and eares: In the Oeconomicall bodie, the Husband, Wife, Children, Lords, Slaues, Seruaunts: In the Politicall or ciuile bodie, Magistrates, Noble­men, and Plebeians, Husbandmen; Artificers, Merchaunts. Then to preuent the seditions which proceede from vnlikenesse, wee must not remooue the vnlike­nesses themselues, without which no Commonweale can stand, but rather the disorder growing betweene vnlike persons, and reduce them to a due agreement, I such as the seuerall parts haue, which are seene in the constitution of the world, and of man. That vnlikenesse which breedeth sedition, whereof Aristotle spea­keth, consisteth in diuersitie of beginning, of place, of birth, offices, professi­ons, trades, and religions. They are vnlike in beginning and place, who are borne and brought vp in diuerse places, as an Almaigne, a Spaniard, an English­man, a Frenchman, and an Italian. Philip de Comines writing of the enter­view which Lewys the eleuenth King of Fraunce, and Henrie King of Castile made, being the neerest allied Princes in Christendome, (for they were aunci­entlie confederate, not onely King with King, but Realme with Realme, and K bound vpon great and deepe curses to obserue their league) saith that the French­men and Spaniards by reason of the diuersitie of attire and manners, both in their Princes and themselues, ceased not during the time that they were toge­ther to mocke, quarrell, and in the end to beate each other throughly, little re­garding their solemne league. The Noblemen and Plebeians are vnlike in birth: in Offices, they which haue diuerse charges; as Iudges, Treasurors, Souldiours, Priestes, of which point wee haue spoken in the former Chapter. In professions; as a Lawyer, a Phisitian, a Diuine, a Philosopher, and their followers being againe of diuerse sorts, as were amongst the Greeke Philosophers, the Acade­miques, L the Perepatetiques, the Stoiques, and the Epicureans. In Schoole [...]di­uinitie the Thomists and Scotists. Among the Iewes, the Pharisees, Saduces, and Esseys. Lucian dooth in sundrie places facetiouslie shewe the differences and controuersies of the Greeke Philosophers, but cheefely in the banquet of the Ia­pites. Among Artificers which vse diuerse Trades; as Bakers, Butchers, Shooe­makers, Painters, Smiths, Carpenters. In religion; as Iewes, Christians, Mahumetists, Caphars, Lutherans, Zuinglians, Caluinists, Anabaptists, Armenians, Greekes, La­tines, Iacobites, Abissines.

M

BESIDES the causes here alleadged which dispose men to sedition, wee may adde some other, as the nature of the places wherein men are borne: so Ammianus Marcellinus in his eleuenth booke sayeth, That Alexandria in AE­gypt was fatallie subiect to sedition. And Socrates in his Tripartite Hystorie writeth: That the people of Alexandria were much more enclined to sedition then [Page 259] A all the other Nations of the world. Many holde opinion, that Rome hath beene seditious euen from the first foundation, this pronenesse to dissention beginning in the quarrell of R [...]mulus and Rem [...]s, and descending to their posteritie, where­of Horace in the seuenth Ode of his Epode complaineth, the people and noble­men being at perpetuall discord. Machiauel in the first booke of his discourses, chap. 4. 5. and 6. doth assay to prooue that the contrarietie of the Senate and peo­ple hath caused the libertie and greatnesse of Rome. Wee may say that Genoa and Florence haue had like nature, as it appeareth by the Hystories which haue been written of both those States. Moreouer, men are disposed or made prone to se­dition B through abundance of wealth, and too much ease. Sallustius in Bello Iugur­thin [...]: Caeterum mos partium popularium & Senatus factionum, ac deinde omnium ma­larum artium, paucis antè annis Romae ortus est, otio atque abundantia earum rerum quae prima mortales ducunt. Likewise extreame pouertie doth much incite men to this euill. Horace in the foure and twentith Ode of his third booke.

C Plato in his fift booke of Lawes sayeth thus: There must bee neither extreme pouertie, nor excessiue riches among the Citizens of that Cittie which would be exempted from the greeuous disease called dissention, or sedition. Salust in the con­spiracie of Catiline, speaketh thus of the poore men. Nam semper in ciuitate qui­bus opes nullae sunt, bonis inuident, males extollunt, vetera odere, noua exoptant: odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur, quoniam egestas facile sine damno habetur. Manie Countries haue beene much troubled with sedition, because they could not indure the excessiue multitude of inhabitants, and D thereon haue growne many transmigrations or remouings of people out of one re­gion into another. Likewise an Estate is enclined to sedition when it hath no enemie: as Hanniball told the Carthaginians, speaking thus in the tenth booke of the third De­cade of Liuie. Nulla magna ciuitas quiescere potest: si foris hostem non habet, domi in­uenit: vt praeualida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus one­rantur. That is, No great Citty can remaine quiet; if it haue no enemie abroad, it findeth one at home: euen as great bodies, which seeme to bee safe and assured against all outward dangers, yet are surcharged and ouerladen with their owne force. For this cause Scipio Nasica was of opinion, after the victorie which the Romanes E had of the Carthaginians, that Carthage should not bee raced, least the Ro­manes hauing no enemies, should turne their weapons against themselues, and so destroy each other; as soone after it happened: Salust in the conspiracie of Catiline. After that through labour and iustice the Commonweale was growne flourishing, great Kings subdued by warre, fierce Nations and mightie people vanquished by force, Carthage the emulous riual of the Roman Empire destroied from the verie ground, all Seas and Countries opened: then Fortune began to shewe her crueltie, and to trouble all: Ease, and Riches, which should bee wi­shed to others, haue beene a trouble and miserie to those who before did easilie F endure paine, danger, doubtfull and sharpe chaunces. Wherefore God in the booke of Iudges, the third chapter, ordained that the Philistines, Canaanites, Si­donians and Hiuites should bee left and opposed against the Israelites to trie them, saying: Therefore will I no more cast out before them any of the Nations which Iosua left when hee died. That through them I may prooue Israell, whether they will keepe the way of the Lord to walke therein as their Fathers kept it, or not. Likewise the imposing of newe subsidies dooth mooue men to sedition, [Page 260] as it hath often happened in France, and late time yet fresh in memorie, in the begin­ning G of King Henry the seconds raigne, all the Country of Gu [...]en rose by reason of the excessiue taxes. Likewise, the changing of Princes, Lawes, and Coynes, breede great troubles in Commonweales. Omnes rerum mutationes (saith Salust in his preface on the warre of Iugurth) caedem, [...]ugam aliaque hostilia portendunt. Presently vpon Augustus Caesars death, the Romane legions which were in Pannonia and in Germanie, raised strange seditions: described by Cornelius Tacitus in his first booke of the Historie of the Caesars. Immediately after the deceasse of Salomon, the Iewes rebelling against Roboam by reason of the taxes which hee would not moderate, diuided themselues in­to two Realmes, namely, of Iuda and Israell: the first book of the Kings, chapter twelue. H All Spaine being gouerned by Flemmings, reuolted against them by reason of the ex­actions that they vsed: which commotion is described by Paulus Iouius in the life of Pope Adrian the fixt. Whensoeuer any king of Fraunce hath beene in his minoritie, there haue sprung vp seditions in the Realme, as hath beene saied. The diuision of lands propounded at Rome in the law called Lex agraria, was the beginning of the seditions among the Romanes, and caused the death of the two Gracchi, brethren, who were the Authors thereof. Besides, the changing of coines being not vsed in due time, and vpon iust cause and vrgent necessitie, is wonderfully dangerous, causing great discontent and occasion of mutinie. So also doth the bad administration of iustice, and impunity pro­posed 1 to offenders, which emboldeneth them to plot and attempt innouations.

CHAP. III. A declaration of the causes of seditions.

1 AMongst which causes we may clearely see what sorce iniurie and profit K haue, and what euils they breed. For if the Gouernours bee iniurious and couetous, they prou [...]ke the Citizens not onely to growe disconten­ted, but also to rebell against those Estates, wherein such licence is 2 granted them. Auarice is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men, and sometimes in robbing the publicke Trea­sure.

The beginnings and motiue causes of seditions, which were simply set downe be­fore, L are nowe declared, with examples answering to each seuerall cause, that the euils which thereby happen, may bee the better knowne, and the remedies fit for them.

1 AMONGST which causes.] The first cause of sedition is the auarice of the Ma­gistrates and Gouernours of a Commonweale, which thing is very pernicious, and greatly to be shunned. For if Commonweales were therefore ordained at the first, that vnder the protection and gouernement of good Magistrates men might quietly pos­sesse their owne, then doubtlesse they which rule Estates ought cheefly to haue care, M that not onely the publicke treasure be disposed and employed according to the neces­sity and profit of the Commonweale, but also that particular men may quietly enioy their goods.

2 AVARICE is committed sometimes in extorting the goods of particular men, & some­times in robbing the publicke Treasure.] Auarice is the iniurious coueting of that which is anothers: and it is committed publickely or priuately. The publicke Treasure is the [Page 261] A reuenue of Signories, Kingdomes and Empires; demeines, taxes, confiscations, appropriations of deceassed straungers goods, impositions, subsidies inuented and vsed for publicke necessitie. A [...] Auarice is herein committed, when the money thereby leuied, is conuerted by those that haue the charge thereof, rather to their owne priuate, then to the publicke vse: which crime was by the Romanes called Peculatus, and the iudgement vsed thereon, De repetundis: when such goods are ei­ther vnprofitably, or wastfully spent, Princes and Magistrates vse immoderate and vnaccustomed exactions on their subiects. Auarice is priuately committed, when the poorer and weaker sort are spoiled of their goods by those that haue power, which B is a very detestable crime, especially in Magistrates and Gouernors of Commonweals: For as continence and abstinence doth purchase them the praise of all men, so auarice doth make them generally hated.

It is likewise manifest, what force Honour hath, and in what sort it is the cause of sedi­tion. For men which are not honoured, seeing others honoured, doe mutine; which thinges are vniustly deuided, when any are honoured aboue their desert and dignitie: and iustly, when eue­ry one is honoured, according to his dignity.

C In the distributing of honours it is requisite that especiall ragard bee had to the qualitie and sufficience of the persons, to the end, that publicke charges be com­mitted to those who are worthie thereof. Next, i [...] is expedient that men arise by degrees from small Offices [...]o greater, euen as their experience en [...]reaseth: and that they bee displaced who are vncapable, as bad and infamous persons, and such as are not lawfully borne. Moreouer, that men attaine thereto by vertue and in­dustrie, not by money and fauours. Else when vnworthie men are aduaunced, or insufficient persons preferred before those that are sufficient; or they who haue done no seruice to the Commonweale, obtaine the reward due to those that haue done D good seruice; or when vicious persons are honoured, then men of worth iud­ging this to bee done in contempt of them, doe sometimes raise sedition, thereby to auenge themselues.

SEDITION ariseth by reason of Praep [...]t [...]nce, when one or manie haue more power then the state of the Commonweale can support or endure: whereof dooth ordina­rily proceede the Monarchie, or Potentacie. Wherefore there is a custome in some pla­ces to banish such persons for a time; which kinde of banishment is called an Ostracism [...], as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to take order at the first, that they growe E not so great, then to seeke remedies afterward, when they haue suffered them to mount so high.

Excessiue authoritie and power through riches and friendes, is daungerous in euery kind of gouernement: it must therefore bee hindered from the beginning, or abridged and diminished with all possible speede, because that through too much Praepotence in such thinges, Commonweales are changed into Monarchies, and Kingdomes and Empires vsurped by newe Lordes. This matter hath beene discoursed at large in the third booke, and the ninth Chapter, and the manner of F the Ostracisme expounded according to Plutarch. When any men burning with de­sire of glory and praise, seeke to beare ouer-great sway in an Estate, and others doe resist this their attempt, then spring there seditions betweene them, and oft ciuile warres.

By reason of Feare mutinies are raised, as well by those that haue committed some offences, for which they feare to bee punished, as by those that desire to preuent the iniuries that [Page 262] are intended against them; [...] at Rhodes the Noblemen conspired against the people, for feare of G the iudgements which they prepared against them.

Feare is a perturbation of the mind for some imminent or future daunger. That also which is done by force or violence, seemeth to bee done by feare. They raise seditions for feare, who dread imminent and future perils, and seeke to auoid them. So Catiline knowing himselfe to bee culpable and guilty of many acts, did for feare of iudgement conspire against his Countrey, being assisted by Lentulus, Antonius, Cethegus, with many sacrilegious persons, murtherers, adulterers, ruffians, men that were farre indeb­ted, and others which by reason of their vile offences, stood in feare of punishment: He H was likewise assisted by all those whom either the hand or tongue maintained by periu­ry, or effusion of Cittizens blood; and other like persons who were oppressed with for­feits, want, or crimes. Salust in the conspiracie of Catiline, and Cicero in his Orations against Catiline.

By reason of contempt likewise seditions are [...]aised, and conspiracies made, namely in Oligar­chies, when they who are excluded from authority of gouernement, are more in number, and doe therefore assure themselues that they are the stronger: and in Democraties, when the rich men doe conte [...]ne the disorder and negligence of the gouernors, as at Thebes after the battell fought I at Oenophytes, because they gouerned ill, the Democratic was destroied. As also it was at Me­gar [...], when through their disorder and want of gouernement, they were ouerthrowne. And at Syracusa before the Tyranny of Cel [...]n: and at Rhodes the authority of the people decaied before the insurrection of the Noblemen.

Commonly those men are contemned, who haue neither vertue, courage, nor po­wer, being therefore vnable to helpe themselues or others, and who haue no industrie nor care. Where contempt is, there can bee no obedience, the sonne disobeyeth his fa­ther, whom he contemneth, the wife her husband, the scholler his teacher, the seruaunt K his Maister. Euen beastes haue some feeling of the quality of those whome they must serue, as wee may reade of the horses of Alexander the great, and Iulius Caesar, who would not suffer any other to sit on them. Wherefore it is no maruell; that amongst men the opinion of Prudence, Iustice, Constancie, Knowledge, Bounty, Modestie, and other vertues doth nourish and mainetaine obedience towards them, and the contrarie vices prouoke subiects to rebell against their Lords. Then as States doe prosper, being gouerned by wise, iust, constant, valiant, and temperate persons, so they are troubled with seditions through the imprudence, cowardise, and intemperance of their rulers: or when they are too familiar with inferiour persons, or are come from base estate, and L sodainly aduanced, or seeme too young, old, poore, vnfortunate, all which things breed contempt. Cicero doth elegantly and excellently teach in his second booke of Offices howe the honour and dignity of those that gouerne Commonweales, and the obedi­ence of their subiects, towards them, may be maintained. But sedition doth not spring in Commonweales then onely when inferiours contemne their superiours, but also when one degree contemneth another: as in the Oligarchie, the poore making no ac­count of the rich, because themselues are more in number, and stronger then they, doe conspire against them. Likewise in the Democratic, the rich contemning the disorder of the poore which gouerne, doe easily attempt to suppresse and put them M downe.

The changes of Commonweales doe happen also by reason of excessiue increase. For as the body consisteth of parts, and must grow by proportion, to the end, that the due measure may still remaine: whereas otherwise it perishe [...]h, if the foot be foure [...]ubit [...]s long, and the rest of the bo­dy but two spannes: and it might likewise bee chaunged into the shape of some other liuing crea­ture, [Page 263] A if it should grow beyond doe proportion, not onely in quantity, but in qualitie also. Euen so a City consisteth of parts, amongst which oft times some one doth priuily growe vp, as the multi­tude of poore men in Democraties and Commonweales. Sometimes also this dooth happen by chaunce, as at Tarentum the greater part of the Nobility being vanquished and destroied by the Iapigians not long after the warre of the Medes, that State did of a Commonweale become a Democratie. And at Argos after the slaughter of their people at He [...]doma by Cleomenes of La­cedemon, they were constrained to receiue some of the bordering strangers, & make them mem­bers of their Citie. And at Athens when they had sought vnhappily in the battaile by land against the Lacedemonians, their Noblemen decreased, because they sent them to this warre, ac­cording B to the catalogue of the city. The like doth happen in Democraties also but more seldome [...] For many men growing rich there, or their wealth being encreased, they are chaunged into Oli­garchies or Potentacies.

Euery Commonweale is composed of degrees or Estates, as it were parts, which Estates must bee kept and held in concord by a due proportion of each to other, euen as the harmony in Musicke consisteth of vnequall voices or sounds, which are equally accorded. For when any of those Estates doth rise too much aboue the other, there doth forwith insue dissention in the City, like a discord in a song, when one tune is too low, C another too high. The Romane Commonweale was composed of three degrees or or­ders, namely, the Patricians, Knights, and Plebeians; and while these Estates were kept within proportion, all thinges went well, but when one of then rose against the other through enuy, ambition, & auarice, then began diuisions and dangerous factions. The ij. Gracchi to abridge the Senatours authority, tooke from that order the exercise of Iudgements, and gaue it to the Knights, whose power thereby was so encreased, V [...]fata fortunásque patrum vitásque principum in manu haberent, qui & interceptis vectigalibus iure suo rempublicam peculati sun [...]. For when both the Romanes, Italians, and Senators them­selues were of necessity to appeare in iudgement before the Knights, touching what D cause soeuer they had in controuersie, were it for money, honour, or offences; the knights were by this meanes exalted aboue the mas their Princes, and the Senatours made subiect and bound to them; so that they assisting the Tribunes at the creation of Officers, and taking whome themselues listed (by a conspiracie made betweene them) had put the Senate in great feare; and there wanted not much more to change the go­uernement of the Commonweale, sith the Senate had onely the name, and the knights all the authoritie and power: Appian in his first booke of the ciuile warres, chap. foure. Neither is a Commonweale disturbed by the excessiue encrease onely, of degrees or Estates, but also by the weakening & impouerishing of them. For there can be no pro­portion E where the stronger haue all, and the weaker little or none; nor any concord, where some are depriued not onely of the common and publicke commodities, but al­so spoiled of their owne priuate goods, as were the people at Rome: for whom Tiberi­us Grac [...]hus spake thus, That the sauage beasts in Italy had at the least their holes, caues and dennes, wherein to shrowd themselues; where as men who fought and died for the defence thereof, enioyed nothing saue onely aire and light, but were constrained to wander vp and downe with their wiues and children, hauing no place nor house wher­into to put their heads so that (quoth he) the Captaines do commonly lie, when to en­courage their souldiours, they require and admonish them to fight valiantly for the F graues, the temples, and the altars of themselues, and of their auncestors: For among so many poore Romane Cittizens, there is not any that can shewe one domesticke al­tar or graue of his auncestours, but the silly wretches fight and die for the effeminate pleasures, richesse and superfluity of others; yet are they falsely called Lords and com­manders of all the habitable world, whereas they haue not one foot of ground that is their owne. Plutarch in the life of the ij. Gracchi. In Fraunce, the two principall degrees or orders, are the Nobilitie and people: whereto that of the Church, although [Page 264] it participate of both, was adioined as a third, for the reuerence of religion, and by rea­son G of the great reuenues of the Cleargie in lands, houses, fees, & other exceeding pro­fites, amounting yearely to foure millions of pounds; whereto adde the authority that it hath long time had in iudgement both in the Parliaments, and neere the Kings, in Counsell. There is no doubt, that the agreement of these Estates hath caused the Realme to continue and prosper so long amongst all other auncient and moderne king­domes; the publicke commodities, honours, and charges being ordinarily deuided ac­cording to the condition of euery Estate, without abridging their rights and prehe­minences, especially in taking diligent heed, that neither of them doe aboue measure exceede the other, viz. that the Nobility doe not too much oppresse the people, and H thereby driue them to despaire, (the ommitting of which diligent heed, hath oft cau­sed the people to rise, wherof hath ensued great mischeefe) or that the people by means of Merchandise, iudgements, and disposing of the publicke reuenues, together with the gainefull priuiledges by them possessed, should not ouer-greatly enrich themselues to the preiudice of the Nobilitie, and purchase the Noblemens lands, who being im­pouerished, could not be able to sustaine the charges of the warre, nor serue the King in his armies, whereto it is most necessary to haue alwaies speciall regard for the saf [...]ty and quiet of the French dominions.

I

Commonweales are likewise changed by reason of shame, as it happened at Heraea, where the Magistrates which before were chosen by election, were afterwards created by lot, because that while the manner of election was obserued, they bestowed the publick offices on men of no worth.

Heraea was a Citty of Arcadia, whose gouernement was popular, wherein men of no worth were chosen Magistrates by such as were like themselues; for which the He­raeans being derided, changed their custome of election into the vse of lots, thereby to shunne like derision. There was not long since in the counsell of Fraunce an excessiue number of maisters of requests, extraordinarie; and Secretaries for the Office of the K Treasurie, which were afterward for very shame caused to withdraw themselues, it be­ing vnseemely and vnmeet to treat of high and weightie affaires, which should be kept secret, in such a multitude.

And by reason of negligence, when they suffer those to attaine to soueraigne Offices, who are not friends to the Commonweale, as at Oreum, the Oligarchie was destroyed by Heracleodorus, who being become a Magistrate, changed the said Oligarchie into a Commonweale, and a Democratie.

L

There is herein double negligence, first of those which doe call, elect, and admit in­to any great Office vnworthy persons, & such as take no pleasure in the executing ther­of: or which suffer those men to attaine to soueraigne Magistracies, who dislike the pre­sent manner of Gouernment. As if the Lords of Berne should chuse an Auoyer, or the Venetians a Duke, whose disposition and desire were contrary to the forme of their Commonweale: or the Cardinals a Pope, who were not of their religion [...] or if the king of France should create a Constable or Chauncellour, who affected not the royall and Monarchicall Estate. The second negligence is of those, who being called to any dig­nitie or office, shewe themselues slacke and carelesse in the administration and exercise M thereof, as we see that the most part of the Bishops and Prelates, regard not the dutie of their Ecclesiasticall charges, that they may more freely follow secular affaires, and for this cause they are contemned: From which disorder there haue risen great scandales and meruellous troubles, which may more easily be lamented then remoued or refor­med, because abuses haue through long time taken deepe root.

[Page 265] A FVRTHERMORE, the changes of Estates do grow by little and little: I say, by little & little, because many times there happeneth a great change both of manners and lawes, without being perceiued, through the neglecting of some small thing: as in Ambracia where they aduan­ced to offices men of small reuenues, and in the end they admitted those that had none at all: as if nothing and little were neere in nature, or not any whit different.

Changes, vnlesse they be very violent, doe sildome happē all at once, but are ordina­rily bred by little and little, euen as the seasons of the yeare doe by degrees passe from B excessiue heat to excessiue cold, and from Winters sharpenesse to Summers extremity. Wherefore it is farre more difficult to remedy or preuent them, because commonly men take no heed to euils and dangers, vntill they be growne great: as Aristotle sayeth in the 6. booke of the Politickes, chap. 4. Whosoeuer will consider the change that hath happened in Fraunce within these thirtie yeares, shall find it to be very great, as well in religion, as in manners and Lawes; yet hath it not chanced all at one time, but by little and little, as it grew on by continuance.

Likewise, when the inhabitants of one place are not all natiue there, this breedeth sedition C among them, vntill they grow to a generall accord. For as a City is not composed of euery mul­titude, so also it is not constituted in euery time. Wherefore, all they that haue hetherto receiued strangers into their cities to dwell therein with them, haue for the most part beene troubled with seditions. As the Achaians dwelt with the Troezenians in the City of Sybaris, and afterward be­ing grown stronger then they, draue them out: which thing caused great euill to the Sybarites, who did the like among the Thurians to those that dwelt with them: for seeking to appropriate to themselues the greater part of that territory, as if it had beene their owne, they were discomfi­ted and exp [...]lsed. The Byzantines, when the practise and intended enterprise of the strangers against them was discouered, draue them by force of armes out of their Citie. And the Antissae­ans D hauing receiued the banished Chians, did afterward expulse them likewise by plain force. The Zanchaeans also hauing receiued the Samians, were ouercome by them and driuen out of their Ci­ty. The Apollonian [...] which dwell neere the sea of Pontus, by receiuing strangers, were troubled with seditions. And when the Syracusans being freed from their Tyrans, had made many stran­gers and hired souldiers, fellow Citizens with them; they were so troubled likewise with seditions, that in the end they fell to fighting. And the Amphipolites by taking into their city the Chal­cidians were almost all driuen out by them.

It is commonly seene, that the naturall inhabitants of a Citty do seldome agree with E strangers dwelling amongst them: and of such differences there doe oft spring sediti­ons, as it appeareth by the examples which Aristotle alledgeth, for confirmation wher­of, we may adde that of Geneua, whether many strangers repairing, as well Frenchmen as others, for religion, they were alwaies maligned and repined at by the naturall Citi­zens, although they had done great good vnto their Citty, which by reason of their re­paire thether grew rich and populous, whereas before it was poore and small: & there haue beene many conspiracies made against them, to expulse or kill them, especially that which Perin plotted in the yeare 1556. which was begun to bee effected and exe­cuted when Caluine thrust himselfe betweene the naked swords to appease the tumult: F as Beza reporteth in his life. But touching this receiuing of strangers, great regard is to bee had to their number, whether it be small or great: for if being fewe, they quarrell with the naturall inhabitants, there is lesse danger; but if they exceede them in number and power, then through confidence in their owne strength, they will soone raise sedi­tions. Likewise men that are of different manners, doe hardly agree at the beginning, but when they haue long remained and dwelt together, they doe in kind and quiet sort conuerse each with other. Salust speaking of the Troians and Aborigines; that is, the [Page 266] auncient inhabitants who had not descended from any strange people) writeth thus: G Hi postquam in vna moenia conuenere, dispari genere, aissimili lingua, alius alio more viuen­tes, incredibile memoratu est quam facile coal [...]erint. At the first the Gaules and Frenchmen being of a diuerse Nation, Language, and Religion, could not well agree, but after that the Frenchmen were baptised, and had together with the religion accustomed them­selues vnto the manners and language of the Gaules, these two people were forthwith reduced into one body, and did meruellously prosper. The Lacedemonians permitted no straungers to dwell amongst them. At this day in China and Cathay all accesse and entrance is denied them, for the Merchants remaining in the Hauens, make shewe of those wares that they will sell, and haue such commodities as they aske for brought vn­to H them, which being done, the inhabitants do presently withdraw themselues without any conference or farther trafficke. But the Romanes were herein more courteous, who did not only receiue strangers into their Citie, graunting them the right and freedome thereof, but did also aduance them to publicke honours and Offices, to which purpose there is an excellent Oration made by the Emperour Claudius to the Senate, recorded by Cornelius Tacitus in the eleuenth booke of his history of the Caesars: Nam cùm (in­quit Tacitus) de supplendo Senatu ageretur, ac primores Galliae qui foedera & ciuitatem Roma­nam pridem assecuti [...] ius adipiscendorum honorum in vrbe expetissent, ac multus super ea reva­riúsque rumor, & studijs diuersis apud principem certaretur: asseuerantium non ita aegram Ita­liam, I vt Senatum vrbi suae suppeditare nequiret, suffecisse olim indigenas consanguineis populis, nec poenitere veteris Reipublicae: Princeps contrà disseruit, & vocato Senatu ita exorsus est. Ma­iores mei, quorum antiquissimus Clausus origine Sabina, simul in ciuitatem Romanam & in fa­miliam patritioram ascitus est, hortantur vti paribus consilijs Rempublicam capessam, transfe­rendo huc quod vsquam egregium fuerit. Neque enim ignoro Iulios Alba, Coruncanos Came­rio, Porcios Tusculo: & ne vetera scrutemur, Etruria Lucaniáque & omni Italia in Senatum accitos. Postremo ipsam ad Alpes promotam, vt non modò singuli viritim, sed terrae gentésque in nomen nostrū coalescerent. Tunc solida domi quies, & aduersus externa floruimus: cùm Trans­padani in ciuitatem recepti, cúm specie deductarum per orbem terrae legionum, additis prouinci­alium K validissimis fesso imperio subuentum est. Num poenitet Balbos ex Hispania, nec minus in­signes viros è Gallia Narbonensi transiuisse? manent posteri eorum, nec amore in hanc patriam nobis concedunt. Quid aliud exitio Lacedemonijs & Atheniensibus fuit, quanquam armis pol­lerent, nisi quòd victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditur nostri Romulus tantum sapientiae valuit, vt plerosque populus eodem die hostes, dein ciues habuerit. Aduenae in nos regnauerunt: libertinorum filijs magistratus mandati: non vt plerique falluntur, recens, sed priori populo fa­ctum est. At cum Senonibus pugnauimus: scilicet Volsci & AEqui: nunquam aduersam nobis aci­em instruxere? Capti à Gallis sumus, sed & Tuscis obsides dedimus, & Samnitum iugum sub­iuimus: attamen si cuncta bella recenseas, nullum breuiore spacio quàm aduersus Gallos conse­ctum: L continua inde ac fida pax. I am moribus, artibus, affinitatibus nostris mixti, aurum & opes suas inferant potius, quàm separati habeant. Omnia P.C. quae nunc vetustissima creduntur, noua fuere. Plebeij magistratus post patritios. Latini post plebeios, caeterarum Italiae gentium, post Latinos. Inueterascet hoc quoque: & quod hodie exemplis tuenur, inter exempla erit. Haec Claudius princeps. Quam sententiam secuto Senatu, mox Heduis Senatorum ius in vrbe da­tum est.

In Oligarchies many men doe raise sedition, as if they were iniured, because being equall, as we said before, they haue not an equall part in gouernement: and in Democraties the Noblemen M grow discontented, when they haue but an equall part, although they bee not equall, but su­periour.

These quarrels springing from inequality in Democraties and Oligarchies between the Noblemen and the people, haue been at large discoursed of in the third booke, and in the beginning of this fift booke. In euery Estate, they that are not esteemed and vsed [Page 267] A according to their desert and quality, repute themselues iniuried, and oft times they seeke redresse by raising mutinies.

Sometimes Cities are troubled with seditions, by reason of the places wherein they are scitua­ted, when the nature of the Countrey is not fit for the constituting of a city: as at Clazomene they that dwelt in Chitrum, bore grudge and hatred against those of the Island; and the Colophonians against the Notians. And at Athens they are not all enclined alike: but they of Piceum are more popular then those of the City. For as in warres the passing of trenches, although they bee small, doth breake the souldiors array, and disorber the battailes, in like sort, euery difference in a B City doth seeme to breed dissension.

The separations which are in Citties, doe oft breede quarrels amongst them that in­habite diuerse parts thereof: as at Paris during the factions of Orleance and Burgoine, they that dwelt in the Cittie, especially towards the Hals, held stiffely together against those of the Vniuersitie: as Enguerrant of Monstrellet writeth in his first book. At ano­ther time they were constrained to build in the Citty the Fortresse de petit Po [...]t, that is, of the little bridge, against the tumults which the schollers made: as Gaguin writeth in his ninth booke. Philip de Comines likewise in his fifth booke, the fifteenth Chapter, C sayth, That in Arras there were wals and trenches betweene the Towne and the Citty, and gates to shut against the saied Cittie while the Burgonians were maisters thereof, but afterward when the Frenchmen held it, the Cittie was shut against the Towne, be­cause the Cittie tooke part with France, and the Towne with Burgoine. One part of the Cittie of Trent speaketh Italian, and liueth after the Italian manner, the other part spea­keth the Germane tongue, and liueth after the manner of that Countrey. At Athens they that dwelt in the Hauen Piraeum, which was ioined to the Cittie by a long & thick wall (as we haue noted in the beginning of Platoes Commonweale) did more affect the Democratie. Moreouer, Plutarch in the life of Solon writeth (as wee haue already she­wed D in the last chapter of the second booke) that in the Countrey of Attica there were as many factions as there were diuerse sorts of the territorie: for the Mountainers were Democraticall; those of the champion countrey, Oligarchical; and they that dwelt neer the sea, desired a middle kind of gouernement, consisting of both formes, whereby wee may know, that Plato in the beginning of Timeus, and in the end of his fift booke of Lawes, hath written most truly, that there is great difference of places for the disposing and fashioning of mens manners, which point is grauely handled by Hippocrates in that little treatise that hee wrote of the aire, of waters, and of places; as also by Galen, shewing that the affections of the mind follow the temperature of the body. We haue E also noted in the former chapter that some places are naturally, and as it were by some destiny, seditious. Likewise, when a place is vnfit for habitation by reason of barren­nesse or any other like cause, the Citty therein scituated, is prone to sedition.

Peraduenture the greatest dissention is betweene vertue and vice, and next to that, betweene richesse and pouerty; and so of the rest, one more then another.

Sith vice and vertue are contrary, there must needs be dissention betweene them, yet they who excell in vertue (as Aristotle sayth in the beginning of this booke) doe neuer vse to raise sedition when they are repulsed, or others of little or no worth preferred be­fore F them, as at Rome it happened to Cato: although they haue iust occasion of anger, because that by reason they ought to bee absolutely and onely vnequall, and preferred before all others. Touching the Noble and rich men, this is their common fault, that they are almost all prowd and disdainers of the poore and vulgar sort, so that it is a very difficult matter to keepe these two degrees of people in quiet, in whatsoeuer forme of gouernment they liue: as we haue shewed at large by reasons and examples, as well an­cient as moderne, in the sixt chapter of the third booke.

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CHAP. IIII. The issue of the occasions whereby Commonweales are changed.

1 SEditions then are not raised for small matters, but from small they grow to H 2 great. And being small, they take exceeding force when they arise betweene the cheefe and principall persons of a Countrey. As in ancient times it hap­pened at Syracusa by the meanes of two young men, who being Magistrats, sell to dissention about a loue matter: For while one of them was absent, the other who was his companion, enticed a young boy whom he loued, wher­at hee conceiuing great despight and indignation, at his returne found meanes to haue his pleasure of the others wife: and herevpon each seeking to win on his side the other Gouernors, 3 they set the whole City at dissention. Wherefore such euils must bee looked vnto when they begin, 4 and the discords that grow betweene the principall lords, presently apyeased; sith this fault is in I 5 the beginning, and sith also men say that the beginning is the halfe of all; so that a small ouer­sight 6 chauncing then, doth answer by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed. 7 Bree [...]ely, the discords of Noblemen diuide the whole City into factions, as it chaunced at Estiae [...] after the warre of the Medes by reason of the controuersie betweene two brethren for their por­tions: for hee that was the poorer, complaining that the other did not shewe him all the goods in the house, and bid from him the treasure which their father had found, drew all the vulgar sort to his side: the other being wealthier, wan the rich men to take part with him. And at Delphos a certaine quarrell being raised about a marriage, was the beginning of all the seditions that rose afterward in that Citie: For the spouse hauing had some signe of ill lucke, at his return to hir K vnto whom hee was betrothed, refused to marry her; Wherupon the maids friends, as being here­in dispised and wronged, conueyed on him while he was sacrificing, some of the consecrated things of the Temple, and afterward caused him to be slaine, as one guiltie of sacriledge. And at Miti­lene a certaine controuersie arising about the inheritance of two maidens that were Orphanes, was the occasion of much hurt, and of the warre betweene the Mitilenians and the Athenians, wherein Paches tooke their City. For Timophanes a wealthy man deceasing, left behind him two daughters coheires: Doxander who had demanded them in mariage for his sonnes, being deni­ed, raised sedition, and incited the Athenians (who comming to Mitilene, were alwaies lodged at his hous [...]) to make warre on the Citie. Amongst the Phocians likewise there grew dissention about L an inheritance betweene Mnaseas the father of Mneson, and Euthycrates the father of Onomar­chus, from which dissention the holy warre arose. At Epidamnus also the Estate was changed, by reason of a marriage: For when one who had betrothed his daughter to a young man, was con­demned in a summe of money by the same young mans father, being then in office, hee to auenge himselfe for this disgrace and iniury, caused al those to rebel that were without the City.

Aristotle hauing rehearsed and declared the causes of seditions, setteth downe the euils and changes that grow thereby. First hee saith that seditions arising betweene the cheefe men of a countrey, are dangerous, and must bee appeased with al possible speed, M without suffering them to take root and to encrease in any wise.

1 SEDITIONS are not raised for small matters.] Seditions doe spring from small beginnings, but if they bee not speedily quenched, they will sodainely grow infinitely, and not onely infect houses, townes, and citties, but also whole prouinces and great estates. They must therefore be looked vnto at the beginning, or rather if it be possible, [Page 269] A hindered from growing at all, and by cutting off their causes through politicke foresight and wisedome. As in Phisicke, besides the Therapeuticall part, which was inuented for the healing of sicke persons, there is also the Prophylacticall, which doth by exercise and diet, preuent diseases; or by purging, remoue the causes thereof.

AND being small, they take exceeding force, when they arise betweene the cheefe and 2 principall persons of a Countrey.] As were those factions and partakings in Fraunce in the raigne of Charles the sixt, betweene the Dukes of Orleance and Burgoine: or B in England in the raigne of Henry the sixt, betweene the houses of Yo [...]ke and Lanca­ster: which by reason of their discords, filled both thofe Realmes with dangerous dis­sensions, and had thereby almost vtterly ruinated them. The quarrell betweene Pom­pey and Caesar, troubled not Rome and Italy only, but Greece, Asia, AEgipt and Spaine; nor those Countries alone which were subiect to the Romane Empire, but also the bordering Prouinces, and confederate Estates, which followed the one or other part.

WHEREFORE such euils must bee looked vnto when they begin.] Wise Prin­ces 3 or Gouernours of Commonweales haue regard not onely to the present state of C things, but also to that which followeth, prouiding and taking order euen then by wise and good direction for future accidents, because daungers which are a farre o [...]f foreseene, may bee easily remedied: but by tarrying till they draw neere, the medicines that are then applied, bee out of season, the disease being growne in­curable. And herein it commeth to passe, euen as Phisitions haue obserued it in the feuer called Febris hectica, which at the first comming thereof, is easilie cu­red, and hardlie knowne; but if it bee not knowne nor cured at the beginning, it groweth easie to bee knowne, and impossible to bee holpen. Euen so it hap­peneth in Commonweales and Estates, for the euils and inconueniences which D doe dailie growe, being long foreseene, may bee easilie remedied; but when through want of being knowne, in time they are suffered to growe on till eue­rie one may clearelie see them, there is not then anie hope of remedie. Plu­tarch writeth, That Cato alone, as being therein the wiser man and of de [...] ­per iudgement then anie other in Rome, foresawe and prophesied the destruc­tion of the Commonweale, which should bee wrought by the practises of Iuli­us Caesar; and hee did thereof sundrie times aduertise the people, the Senate, and Pompey himselfe apart: but at the first hee was accounted a troublesome and im­portunate man, vntill the end being such as hee had foretold, prooued him to be E more wise then happie in the counsels. For (as the same Plutarch writeth) Cae­sar abused and deceaued the whole world, except Cato, in the reconciling of Pompey and Crassus, who were for power the cheefest persons of the Citty; and before, vtter enemies. Nowe, when Caesar had made them friends, and by this meanes gotten to himselfe the whole power of them both, men had not so deepe an insight into his dealings, as to thinke that vnder an act, hauing the goodliest shewe and the most honest pretext that might bee, hee had turned vpside downe, and laid a plot for the vtter ouerthrowe of all the Romane Commonwe [...]le: for it was not the dissention of Pompey and Caesar which raised the ciuile Warre, as men doe F commonly suppose, but rather their agreement and vnion, [...]ecause they did al­lie and ioine themselues together, first to ouerthrowe the authoritie of the Se­nate and the Nobilitie, and afterw [...]d falling to mortall en [...]ie, they [...]ought to destroy each other. And in another place the same Authour sayeth, That Cato greatly suspecting this alliance of Caesar and Pompey, as not being made for anie good intent, saied that hee feared not so much this distribution of lands, as hee did the recompence which they would therefore demaund, who by such cunning [Page 270] deuises allured and fed the common people. And in another place hee sayth, Cato G stepping forth did with a lowd voice before all the assembly foretell (as if hee had beene inspired by some diuine propheticall spirit) all that which would happen through these practises to the Commonweale: a little after hee saith thus; When the edict was pro­pounded touching the Prouinces and armies which Caesar required, Cato adressed not himselfe vnto the people for the hindering thereof, but to Pompey, denouncing & pro­testing vnto him that he did put on his owne necke Caesars yoke, which as then hee per­ceiued not, but that soone after hee would feele the weight thereof, and find himselfe therewith surcharged and taken, and that then when hee could no longer endure it, nor find any meanes to shake it off, he would cast both himself and his burthen on the Com­monweale, H and too late remember Catoes warnings, which were no lesse profitable to him in particular, then iust and reasonable in themselues. Cato did sundrie times vse like speeches vnto him, but Pompey made no account thereof, for hee could not beleeue that Caesar would change, and besides, hee trusted too much in his owne pros­peritie, and in the greatnesse of his power. Thus hauing strengthened and aduaunced Caesar against himselfe and the Commonweale, hee did deseruedly feele the smart of his follie therein committed. Caesar on the other side hauing from the beginning ai­med at Pompeys ouerthrowe, and to make himselfe greater; like a skilfull wrastler, whose onely studie is how to trip and foile his aduersary, got himselfe farre from Rome, I and to exercise himselfe in the warres of Gaule, where hee trained his armie, and did so much augment his own glory by his admirable deeds of armes, that he did equal Pom­peys explots, so that there rested nothing els for executing & effecting of his purpose, saue onely some coloured occasions, which partly Pompey, and partly the time did afford and offer him: and all this grewe through the bad gouernement which was then in the Commonweale of Rome. Plutarch in the liues of Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, and Cato.

4 SITH this fault is in the beginning.] Aristotle in this same book, chapter eight, Espe­ciall regard and heed must be had to the euill when it begins, how little soeuer it be, for K men marke not corruption when it groweth by little and little, no more then they doe small charges, which being oft vsed, consume a mans whole substance. This chaunge is [...]t noted, because it happeneth not all together, and the conceit is therein deceaued: as in Sophistrie by inferring, that if each seuerall part bee little, then the whole is little, which is somewhat true, and yet is not so, for the whole and all are not smal, but do con­sist of small things. And in the seuenth Chapter hee saieth, When men haue neglected some point belonging to gouernment, they doe more lightly and easily change ano­ther that is somewhat greater, vntill they haue finally corrupted both order and orna­ment. And in the 6. booke, chap. 4. A small euill is not perceaued, but growing on, it is L better knowne.

5 AND sith also men say that the beginning is the halfe of all.] Hesiodus [...]. Plato in the second of his Commonweale, [...].

6 So that a small ouersight chauncing then, dooth answere by proportion to all the faults that are afterward committed.] A small fault at the beginning, breedeth a meane euill in the other parts, and a greater fault doth by proportion breed a greater euill; so that the proportion of the euill doth alwaies depend on the occasion and beginning of the fault which breedeth it. M

7 BR [...]EFELY, the discords of Noblemen [...] the whole City into factions.] Ari­stotle in this same booke, the eight chapter: Great care and endeuour is to bee vsed for the ordaining of such Lawes, whereby the growing of contentions and sedsediti­ons betweene great persons, may be hindered, and the oth [...]rs preuented, who haue not yet taken part with either side, before they enter into anie [...]action: because euerie [Page 271] A man cannot know an euill when it begins, but onely the good, which is vnderstood in matters of gouernment.

Moreouer, there doe happen changes both in the Oligarchie and in the Democratie, and in the Commonweale, when any Magistrate or part of the city gets reputation or encreaseth in po­wer: as the counsell of Areopagus, hauing wonne great estimation in the warre of the Medes, 1 seemed to reduce the Commonweale to a more seuere forme of gouernment. Againe, the Mari­ners 2 and those that had fought in the gallies, by whome the victorie was obtained as Salamis, by reason of the soueraignty and power by sea which the City had hereby gotten, did strenghthen B more the Democratie. And at Argos the Noblemen hauing wonne great honour in the batta [...]le of Mantinea against the Lacedemonians, did thereupon attempt to ouerthrow the Popular estate. At Siracusa also the people being cause of the victory which they had in the warre against 3 the Athenians, chaunged the Commonweale into a Democratie. And at Chalcis after that the people had expulsed the Tyran and the Nobility, they did forthwith vndertake to rule the Com­monweale themselues. Likewise, at Ambracia, hauing driuen out the Tyran Periander, and those of his faction, they tooke on themselues the gouernment of the state. To bee short, we must not bee ignorant, that all they by whose meanes the power of any state hath ben augmented, whether they be priuate men or Magistrates, or some tribe and linage, or some parts of the City, or whatsoeuer C multitude, do raise sedition: For either they who enuy their honor, do mutine, or els themselues by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equall to the rest.

Changes doe sometimes happen in Commonweales through the discords between the cheefe men of a Countrey: sometimes also when any priuate men, or Magistrates, or some tribe and linage, or some other part of the City, or whatsoeuer multitude is the occasion of augmenting the Cities strength; and thereby encreaseth in reputation: be­cause then either they who enuy their honour, doe begin sedition, or els themselues by reason of the power which they haue gotten, will not be content with an estate equall D to the rest, and thereby change the forme of gouernment.

AS the counsell of Areopagus, hauing wonne great estimation in the warre of the Medes.] 1 When Xerxes King of Persia inuaded Greece with an incredible army, bending his power cheefly against the Citty of Athens, with full purpose to destroy it vtterly; The­mistocles counselled the Athenians to leaue their Citty, and commit the fortune of their defence vnto their sea forces: But because the Athenians had not any publicke treasurie, the Senate of the Areopagites allowed to euery souldier eight Drachmae, and was hereby the cheefe cause that the gallies were armed and furnished, whereon follo­wed E that famous victory which the Grecians won on the Barbarians. The Areopagites by reason of the credit that they had gotten through this liberality, tooke on thē grea­ter authoritie in gouernement then they had done before, and sought to reduce it to a more seuere forme. Plutarch in the life of Themistocles. Aristotle doth here confound the name of Medes and Persians, vsing one for another, as also in another place spea­king of this warre, he calleth it the Median warre. Herodotus also doth sometimes vse it in like sence, namely in the seuenth booke, where he saith, that a great part of the Gre­cians would not feed on the warre, but was ready to follow the Medes.

AGAINE, the Mariners and those that [...]ad fought in the gallies, by whom the victory was 2 F obtained at Salamis, did strengthen more the Democratie.] The battell was wonne at Sala­mis, cheefly by the Me [...]elotes, Galio [...]es, Pilotes, & others who dwelt neere the sea coast, was the cause that encreased the peoples power against the Nobleman, and made the inferiour multitude more audatious.

AND at Sirucusa.] The warre which the Athenians made against the City of Sira­cusa 3 where they were finally discomfited and destroyed, is described by Thucidides in the sixt, seuenth, and eight bookes of his Hystorie.

[Page 272] Furthermore, Commonweales are changed, when the parts of the City which seeme contra­ry, G are made equal; as the rich men, and the inferiour multitude; and when the middle or meane part is little or none at all. For if one of the parts doe much exceede, the other part will hazard nothing against that which is manifestly the stronger. Wherefore they who excell in vertue, doe sildome raise sedition, because they are few in number in respect of the rest. Then the beginnings and causes of seditions and chaunges doe happen generally in all sorts of Commonweales, after this manner.

Thirdly, changes doe happen in Commonweales, when the parts of the Citty that seeme contrary, are made equall, and the middle or meane part is little or none at all; as H are the rich and the poore, the Noblemen and the people, of which point wee haue oft spoken in the former discourses, and will handle it againe in the chapters following: wherein Aristotles especiall purpose is to treat of the changes of Democraties & Oli­garchies.

Besides, they are changed by force, and by subtletie. By force, in constraining the Citizens to such a change, either presently vpon the beginning, or afterward. The subtlety likewise which may be herein vsed, is double: For sometimes they doe craftily induce them to a voluntary change of the Commonweale, and doe afterward continue it by violence, as at Athens in the time of the I foure hundred, they deceiued the people, promising them that the king of Persia would aid them in their war against the Lacedemonians, and by meanes of this lie they attempted to vsurpe the gouernment of the Commonweale. Sometimes they deceiue them at the first with faire words, & keepe them afterward with their owne good wils, in such obedience and subiection as they wil thē ­selues. Then to speake generally, the changes of all Commonweales doe spring from the aforesaid causes.

Fourthly, Commonweales are changed by force, or subtlety. By force, as the Romane Commonweale oppressed by Caesar, was changed into a Monarchy: the realm of Egipt K into a Prouince by Augustus: and not long since, that of Hungary by the Turke: and the States of Florence and Si [...]a [...]nt [...] a Duchy. By subtletie, as that change which hap­pened at Athens through Alcibiades meanes, mentioned in the text, whereof Iustine in his fift booke writeth thus: While the Athenians and Lacedemonians warred toge­ther, Alcibiades being banished from Athens, came to Tisfaphernes the King of Persia his lieutenant, who fauoured the Lacedemonians, to whom Alcibiades shewed that it were no good policie to minister ouergreat aid to the Lacedemonians (for their victorie would be nothing to his profite) but only to furnish them so far, that they might not for want of mony be enforced to giue ouer the war: For causing it by this meanes to con­tinue, L the king of Persia should haue in his choice both peace and warre, and subdue the Grecians with their owne forces, whom hee could neuer vanquish with all his po­wer. Whereas if the war should bee finished, they who had the victory, would forthwith set on him. That therefore it was necessary that Greece should bee weakened by ciuile dissentions, thereby to keep it from making war abroad; and that hee should so consider the power of both parts, as to aide alwaies the weaker side: for without doubt the Lace­demonians, if they got the victory, would not rest so, reputing themselues the preferuers & protectors of the liberty of Greece. These speeches did greatly please Tissaphernes, who began to furnish the Lacedemonians very coldly with victuals and other necessa­ries, M & sent them not all the kings ships, because he would not giue them an absolute vi­ctory, but keepe them still in warre. Meanewhile Alcibiades aduertised the Athenians what he did for them. Whereupon they sent vnto him their embassadors, to whom hee promised that he would make the King of Persia their friend, if they would take away the authority from the people, and giue it to the Senate and Counsell: thinking that by this meanes, either the Cittie if it grewe to a generall agreement, would chuse [Page 273] A him captaine, or if it were diuided by sedition, that one of the parts would call him to their aid. But the Athenians seeing the danger whereinto this warre had broght them, had more care of their safety then of their honour, and gaue the whole authoritie of the people to the Senate and the publick Officers, who by reason of their natural pride, began to oppresse the rest: for euery one of thē would vsurpe Tyrannicall power ouer the people, as if he were their Lord. For which cause, the souldiers sent for Alcibiades recalling him from exile, and making him their cheefe commaunder by sea, who went forthwith towards Athens, and being landed, sent to the Gouernours and Senate, wil­ling them to restore the peoples authority, which if they refused to doe, he threatened B to come vpon them with his souldiours, and enforce them thereunto. The Gouernours were herewith so terrified and astonished, that they resolued to betray the Citty to the Lacedemonians, but failing of their purpose, they went into voluntary banishment.

CHAP. V. C Of the changes that happen in Democraties.

WE will now seuerally and particulerly consider these things in euery kind of Com­monweale. Democraties then are for the most part changed through the per [...]idi­ousnesse 1 of those that are the guides and leaders of the people, or (as wee may call 2 thē) their fauourits, who by forging false accusations against the rich, enforce thē to conspire together; for a common feare doth reconcile the greatest enemies: or els by incensing the people openly against them, as we see it hath come to passe in many places. In the D Isle of Cos, the Democratie was chaunged through their bad dealing which guided and led the people, at such time as the Nobility conspired. And at Rhodes, because they kept to themselues the mony appointed for the souldiors paiment [...] and would not permit that it should be deliuered to the Captaines of the Gallies to whom it was due: Whereupon the Captains being likewise further vr­ged, and fearing iudgement, were enforced to conspire against the popular estate, which they de­stroied. At Heraclea likewi [...]e the Democratie was for the same cause ouerthrowne, for some that had great credit and authority with the people, droue out the Noblemen by the intollerable iniu­ries which they offered them: but they conspiring and assembling themselues together, returned into the City, and ouercame the people. At Megara also the popular estate was in like sort destroy­ed; E for these guides and leaders of the people, banished many Noblemen, to the end, that by confis­cating their goods, they might fill their owne purses: but these banished Noblemen who were ma­ny in number, ioining together, ouercame the people, and established an Oligarchie. The like hap­pened at Cumae touching their Democratie, which was destroied by Thrasimachus. And who­soeuer doth well consider it, shall find, that the changes of Commonweales doe happen in other places almost in the same manner, when those persons to please the people, do vex and oppresse the 3 rich men; as by the diuision of lands and goods, thereby to equall the Citizens wealth: or by pay­ing the Magistrates pensions out of the publicke reuenues [...] or in forging false accusations against them, to the end, they may confiscate their goods: so that by such courses they enforce them to con­spire. F In ancient times when the same person that guided and led the people, was also generall of 4 the army, then the Democraties were changed into Tirannies. And ce [...]t [...] the greater part of an­cient Tyrans haue by this meanes become so. But the reason why this dooth not happen now so much as it hath done is, because in those times men were not so expert and skilfull in the Art of fine speech. At this day that Rhetoricke is mounted to the top of perfection. The eloquent men 5 gouerne the people, but because they are not skilfull in warre, they dare not enterprise against the 6 sta [...]e, or if they doe attempt ought in [...] part, their enterprise hath beene to small purpose: [Page 274] Li [...]wise, Tyrannicall States haue risen more ofter in times past then nowe: because they gaue to G 7 some citizens offices of great authority, as was at Miletum, the Pritany or Pretorship, which hath the ordering and gouernement of great matters: and besides, because then cities were not great, and the people dwelt in the country, busied in following their Husbandry, if the Gouernors were warriors, they vsurped a Tyranny. Their cheefe meanes to attaine therevnto, was the trust which the people reposed in them, proceeding from the hatred they bare to the rich: as at Athens 8 Pisistratus taking a quarrell against the Pediaci, and Theagenes at Megara hauing killed all 9 the rich mens beasts, as he found them feeding neere the riuer; and Dionisius, by accusing Daph­neus and the rich men, obtained the Tyranny for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to bear against them, and for that he was accounted one that held on the peoples side. Likewise, the De­mocratie H is changed from the auncient and accustomed into the last forme: For where the Ma­gistrates are chosen by the people without respect had to their reuenues, then these guides and fa­uorites, of whō we spake euen now, desirous to beare rule, bring the State to such a point, that they submit the lawes to the peoples will. The remedy against this thing, either that it happen not all, or not so much as [...]ls it would, is that the Magistrates be elected by the tribes or linages, and not by all the people. Then all the changes of Democraties doe happen for these causes.

The Philosopher hauing spoken of the publicke charges in generall, doth now par­ticularly consider them in euery kind of Commonweale, beginning with the Demo­cratie, I which he saith is for the most part destroyed or changed in two maners, through the bad dealing of those that are the guiders and leaders of the people. The one is, when they vexe and oppresse the rich men, by equalling the Cittizens wealth, or paying the Magistrates pensions out of the publicke remedies, or by forging false accusations against the nobler and better sort, to the end, to confiscate their goods, so that hereby they incense and inforce them to conspire, by which meanes the Democratie is oft changed into an Oligarchie, or a Tyrannie. The second maner is, when the Magistrats are chosen by the people, without respect had to their wealth. For then these guides & fauourites; desirous to beare rule, reduce the Democratie from a meane or middle form K wherein the Lawes haue greatest force, into an extreame kind, wherein all is done ac­cording to the peoples pleasure, and by popular decrees, without any respect or regard of the Lawes.

1 THROVGH the bad dealing of those that are the guides & leaders of the people.] [...]. Aristotle treating in these two chapters of Democraties and Oli­garchies, doth oft make mention of these [...], whom we following the Etimolo­gie of the Greeke word, translate guides and leaders of the people. These men in such formes of gouernments did alwaies both doe and say to please the people, all that they L could for a time, thereby to get their fauour, and to encrease their owne authority and wealth. The Democraties and Oligarchies of Greece were commonly ful of such gal­lants, who did with the people what they listed, and committed infinite euils: as al [...]o Rome was much giuen to this folly, especially after that it had receiued eloquence, and the custome of making Orations in publicke assemblies after the manner of the Greci­ans: the two Gracchi were such. Likewise Marius and Caesar shewed themselues very popular, and hereby got great fauour: in like sort as sundry others, who of guides and leaders of the people, as Aristotle saieth, haue made themselues Tyrans, if they were warriors. M

2 WHO by forging false accusations.] After that Eloquence tooke place in Common­wea [...]es, th [...]se guides and leaders of the people were commonly Orators, who took vpon them to accu [...]e others in Iudgements and assemblies, where they were gladly seene and heard, because they spake things pleasing to the hearers eares [...] Diodorus Siculus in his thirteenth booke, the two and thirtieth chapter, speaking of the fiue Athenian Cap­taines, who had wo [...]n the most famous battaile by sea that euer had beene fought be­tweene [Page 275] A Grecians, and had euery way els behaued themselues well, saith that the people of Athens was so besotted and incensed against them through the smooth speeches of the wicked Oratours, that they wreaked the fury of their wrath on these valiant men, who deserued no punishment at all, but rather great honour and praise. Demosthenes in his Olynthian and Philippicke Orations doth very much complaine of such Orators who disguised the truth of things, and flattered the people.

WHEN these persons to please the people, doe vexe and oppresse the rich men.] So did the 3 two Gracchi at Rome, propounding the Law called Lex agraria, whereat the rich men made great complaints, being greeued to giue vnto the poore their houses, woods, and B lands which they had long possessed and manured. Appianus Alexandrinus in his first booke of the ciuile warres, chap. 2. and 3.

IN ancient times, when the same person that guided and led the people, was generall of the 4 armie.] When they who were in credite and fauour with the people, attained to the gouernment and conduct of the army, they did easily vsurpe on the Commonweale, & change it into a Tyranny, being skilfull and expert in feats of warre, and hauing in their owne hands the forces of the countrey, as Pisistratus did at Athens, Gelon, Hieron, Dionisius, and Agathocles at Syracusa, and infinite others haue in other places done the like.

C AT this day that Rhetoricke is mounted to the top of perfection.] Rhetoricke, as all other 5 Arts, came to great perfection & excellence whilest Aristotle liued, at what time there flourished in Athens tenne Orators together, of the which Demosthenes deserued the cheefe commendation, insomuch, that Cicero himselfe affirmeth, that he was in a ma­ner perfect, and in whom there wanted but little. Socrates was at the same time a great teacher of Rhetoricke, according to whose example for emulation and enuy, Aristotle began to teach this science, and wrote bookes of the same, as those which he hath dedi­cated to Theodectus and Alexander the great.

THE eloquent men gouerne the people, but because they are not skil [...]ull in warfare, they dare 6 D not enterprise against the state.] Demosthenes and Cicero most excellent Orators, were in great credite in their Commonweales, but neither of them were warriors. Plutarch writeth of Demosthenes, that he fled most cowardly from the battell of Che [...]onea [...] and performed not so much as any one act of vertue, or that was answerable to his goodly Orations made before the people, for hee forsooke his rancke, and cowardly cast away his armour, that he might with the more ease flie away. The same Authour in the life of Cicero saith, that he was not only fearefull in fight, but also in pleading.

THE Pritany.] [...] among other things signifieth to rule, to gouern, to admi­nister 7 & ordain. Demosthenes in his oration touching the Crown, [...], E charge or publicke administration. [...], a Gouernour or Steward. Plato in the Lawes calleth the gods [...], rulers or Gouernours of the world. Thucidides in his sixt book saith, [...]. Aristotle in his sixt booke of gouernment, putteth [...] as Bishops a­boue other Priests.

AS at Athens Pisistratus taking a quarrell against the Pediaci.] That is to say, against 8 the inhabitants of the plaine countrey, who fauoured the Oligarchie: And entring in­to league with the inhabitants of the mountaines, who fauoured the Democratie (as hath been before affirmed) obtained the Tyranny, of whom Herodotus in his first book F writeth in this manner: Pisistratus perceiuing that the inhabitants of the sea coasts vn­der the conduction of Megacles sonne of Alcmeon, were at controuersie with the in­habitants of the plaine country of Athens, whose head Lycurgus the sonne of Aristo­l [...]s was [...] determined to make himselfe lord, as the others: and to that end deuised a third league, for the guiding whereof [...] hee l [...]uied and assembled men togither, and vnder colour of defending the inhabitants of the high country, vsed this sleight: He [...] wounded himselfe, and with his sword hurt certaine mules, which neuerthelesse he [...] [Page 276] caused to draw him into Athens into the Towne hou [...]e, as though he had saued himself G by flying from the enemies that would haue killed him as he went into the field: There­fore hee required the people to graunt him certaine men for the guard of his person, considering especially that he had been already well thought off in the warres, wherein hee was generall against the Megarians, and that he had taken the Towne of Nise, and performed many other acts of great prowesse. The people hereupon were deceaued, and graunted him to chuse such Cittizens as he liked, vpon condition they should car­ry neither Iauel [...]nes, nor Halberts, but only clubs, as they attended him. These chosen men made an insurrection with him against the Citty, insomuch, that they tooke pos­session of the castle: and from thenceforth Pisistratus began to haue dominion ouer the H Athenians. Yet troubled he not the states and offices there, neither changed the Lawes of the Commonweale, but continued the accustomed statutes and ordinances, gouer­ning the Citty well and happily. It was not long deferred, but Megacles and Lycurgus with their partakers by common consent set vpon him, and cast him out of his domini­on. This Pisistratus was the first that tooke vpon him to haue the dominion of the A­thenians, and that lost his weake and ill setled dominion, as Herodotus affirmeth in his first booke.

9 Dionisivs by accusing the rich men, obtained the Tyranny, for the grudge and enmity which he shewed to beare against them, and for that hee was accounted one that held on the peo­ples 1 side.] Dionisius being before a priuate man and of low degree, obtained the Ty­ranny of Siracusa by this meanes: whereas the Siracusians sent him to Gelle, he finding the mightiest men of the towne at controuersie with the common people, began to charge them before the high Court or assembly, and so wrought by his reasons, that they were straightway condemned to death, and their lands & goods confiscated; with the benefit of which confiscation he paied the wages of the ordinary Garison of Gelle, and promised them that came with him from Siracusa twice as much wages as the City had appointed for them: whereby he got the good wils, as well of the keepers of Gelle, as of them that hee brought thether with him, and so was commended by the common K people of Gelle, who reported how it was he onely that had set them at libertie: forby reason of the enuy which they bore to the richest and mightiest Cittizens, they called their power Tyrannie. Also at his returne from Gelle to Siracusa, hee came home on a day, wherein by chance there had beene certaine plaies, and entered into the Towne at the same instant that the people came from the Thea [...]es, whereupon all the people ran presently about him, with great thrusting, asking him where the Carthaginians were, and what they did. Dionisius gaue them aunswere, that they considered not howe they had greater and more dangerous enemies at home then abroad, which were (saied hee) those that had in thei [...] hands the direction and gouernement of the Commonweale, in L whom the Siracusians put their trust, and spent their time at plaies and feastes, while they stole and wasted the mony of the Commonweale, and paied not the souldiors wa­ges, especially in so dangerous a time, when the Carthaginians made incredible prepa­ration for warre, and had determined to bring all their power before the City of Syra­cusa, whereof these goodly Gouernours made not any account, neither tooke any or­der for the remedying thereof: and the occasion knew I well (saith hee) before, but now I know it more certainely, for Himileo sent me a Trumpeter vnder coulour of parley about certaine pri [...]oners, and priuily hath giuen me to vnderstand, that he would yeeld me more then to any one of my companions, vpon condition that I would not spie or M inquire what his intent was to doe, and though I would not helpe him, yet at leastwise that I should not hinder him. Therefore (said Dionisius) that hee would no longer haue the office of a Captaine, and that he was purpo [...]ely come to giue it ouer, because that he thought it not reasonable, that he, whilst others [...]old the Commonweale to the ene­mies, should goe alone with other Cittizens to aduenture his person in all the perill of the warre, and be in danger to make them thinke that hee himselfe was consenting, and [Page 277] A partaker of their treason. The people were very much moued at these wordes, which were presently spread abroad in the eares of all the common people, and especially of the men of warre. But for the present time euery man went home to his house in great heauinesse. The next day Dionisius assembled the people in counsaile, and openly ac­cused the other Captaines his companions: And had attentiue audience, with great commendations at all the peoples hands, whome hee had greatly moued, so that at the last there was some one in the company who spake alowd, That it was needfull to chuse him alone Captaine generall, with full authority and soueraigne power: And that it was not exp [...]dient to stay vntill the enemies should batter the wals of the Towne: and that B the great importance of this warre, required such a Captaine as was a man fit to finde some ready way therein, and to giue good order in their affaires. And as touching the Traitors, they would consider at more leasure what was to be done to them, but as then the time serued not: and that in ti [...]es past their predecessors had vanquished and ouer­throwne in battaile before the City of Himera, three hundred thousand fighting Car­thaginians, vnder the conduct of Gelon their onely cheefe Captaine. At the hearing of these things, the people according to their custome, inclining sooner to euill then to good, made present choise of Dionisius for their Captaine generall, and gaue him full power, and soueraigne authority. Hereupon passing into the fields, and lodging in C his tent, he fained one night that his enemies went about to kill him, and that they were come to assaile him in his tent, and so made a rumour and outcry by his friends and ser­uants, and withall fled into the Castell of the Leontines Towne, where hee passed the rest of the night, causing fires to bee made in all places, and sent for such men of warre as hee trusted best, as a man that had great cause to doubt of his safetie, and perceaued his life to be laid for by his enemies. The next day in the morning hauing assembled a certaine number of the Syracusans in this Citie of the Leontines, he declared in open assembly many fained matters, carrying some outward shew of truth, howbeit, tending only to induce the people to credite him; that his enemies came and assaulted him trai­terously D to kill him, and hee tolde his tale so cunningly, that the people by their decree graunted him a guard of sixe hundred persons of his owne nomination and choise. This brought he to passe by the example of Pisistratus the Athenian, who as the report goeth, wounded himselfe in many places of his bodie, and all bloody as he was, ran in­to the market place, where, vpon the present assembly of the people, hee informed the audience, that his enemies and euill willers came and assaulted him, with intention to murder him, and had thus pitifully mangled him; vpon occasion whereof, the people granted him a guard of souldiours, by which meanes he vsurped Tyranny, and became lord of Athens. In like sort Dionisius by abusing the people of Siracusa by a like de­ceit E established his tirannous dominion. Diodorus Siculus reporteth this in his 13. booke, chapter 29 and 30. Who also (speaking of Agathocles, that vsed the like craft and subtlety which Pisistratus and Dionisius did, for the abolishing of the De­mocratie, and vsurping of the Monarchie) discourseth as followeth, in the begin­ning of his nineteenth booke: It is an old Prouerbe (saith he) that the popular states are not destroyed and abolished by all manner of men, but by those that excell others in vertue; vpon which occasion, many Cities that liued in liberty, vpon suspition of their citizens that haue greatest power, vse their indeuors to restrain & depresse their autho­rity; because they think the cōtinuance of their authority & preheminence, might easily F bring the state of the city into subiectiō & bondage. And because it is a hard matter for them that excell others, to refraine from aspiring to the Monarchie. For it is a very na­turall thing to them that desire great matters, to b [...]e couetous of wealth and honour: which couetousnesse hath neither limits nor bounds. Therefore Solon in his speech condemning the Tyranny of Pisistratus, vttered two verses to this effect: The great ci­tizens are the occasion of the destruction of the Citty; and the people through their owne [...]olly fall into the bondage of the Tyrant. But aboue all other Countries whereof [Page 278] there is any remembrance or record, the Isle of Sicilly hath beene vnder the dominion G of Tyrants, vntill it came to the obedience of the Romanes, by reason that the Citties thereof being deceaued and abused by liberality and courtesies, gaue so great authori­ty to inferiour persons, that they made themselues lords. And aboue all others, that of priuate Citizens, and from a low degree haue become Tyrans, Agatho [...]les who gouer­ned in the City of Siracusa, is the most notable: for he from a very base estate, attaining thereunto, committed innumerable mischeefes, not only in the Cittie of Siracusa, but also in the whole Isle of Sicilie, and in the countrie of Libia. For from the degree of a potter, hee came to so great authoritie and crueltie through whoredome and wicked­nesse, that hee brought into his subiection and bondage the largest and goodliest of all H the Grecian Islands, as also for a time the greatest part of Libia, with certaine Countries of Italie, and filled all the Cities of Sicilie with murthers and outrages, for all they that were before him, came nothing neere him in cruelty and insolence, to auenge himselfe on some particular person, he would cause al his kindred to be slain; and for the offence of some few Cittizens, hee would put to death all the inhabitants of a Citty that were of age. The meanes and practises which he vsed, thereby to attaine vnto the Tyranny, are recited by the same Authour in the chapter following [...] and examined by Machiauel in his Prince, chap. 8. Plato in the eight and ninth bookes of his Commonweale doth elegantly and learnedly shew in what maner a Tyrannicall state is made of a Democra­tic, I and how a Democratical person becomes Tyrannicall: which places are cited and set downe at large in the former booke.

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CHAP. VI. Of the changes happening in Oligarchies.

[Page 297] A OLigarchies are changed in two most plaine and euident manners: The one is, if the Gouernours doe vniustly oppresse the common people; For then the first that [...]hey light on seemes sufficient and fit ynough to be their patrone and protector, es­pecially if any of those that gouerne, do vndertake this charge, as did Lygdamus in [...]he Isle of Naxus, who afterward vsurped Tyrannie ouer the Naxians. The other maner o [...] changing the Oligarchie hath not his beginning from the sedition of the people, but i [...] caused by the rich men, and that in many sorts. For sometimes the Oligarchie is destroied by the rich men who do not participate in the gouernment, especially when the number of those that go­uern is very small, as it happened at Marsilia, Istrum, and Heraclea, and in other cities, where 1 B they who were not admitted to the Magistracies, did neuer cease from mutining, vntil they had changed the forme of the Estate, and made it lawfull first that the eldest brethren, and then the yonger might be admitted to the authority of gouernment. Certes, in some places the father and the sonne, and in others, the elder and yonger brethren cannot beare office together, but that is where the Oligarchie is more ciuilly ordained. At Istrum it became in the end a Democratie. At Heraclea from a smaller number, it rose to sixe hundred: and at Gnidus the Oligarchie was changed through the dissension which grew betweene the noblemen, because few persons were ad­mitted to the gouernment of the Commonweale: and (as it hath beene said) if the father gouer­ned, the son was by that meanes excluded; and if there were many brethren, the eldest only was C thereto admitted. So that the people rising likewise by reason of their discord, and chusing one of the Noblemen for their head and leader, assailed the rest and ouercame them, for euery factious cause is weake. And long since at Erythrae, during the Oligarchie of the Basilidae, although other­wise they demeaned themselues well, yet the people disliking to be subiect to a few persons, changed the forme of the gouernment. Oligarchies are likewise changed of themselues through the facti­ons of those that lead and flatter the people, and that in two sorts: The one, when there is a flatte­rer among the Oligarchicall persons themselues, although they bee very few in number: as at A­thens 2 in the time of the thirty Tyrans, Chares got himselfe power by flattering them, and Phry­nichus after the same sort, in the time of the foure hundred. The other is, when the lords who are 3 D of the Oligarchie doe flatter the people; as at Larissa they who were called the Cities guard, flatte­red the people, because they were chosen by them: as also it happens in all the Oligarchies, wherein the Magistrats are not chosen by the gouernors, but are thereto aduanced for their large reuenues, or by companies, & chosen by the souldiors or the people: as it came to passe at Abidus. In like sort, where the administration of iustice is not executed by those that gouern: for then the iudges seeke to please the people, that they may thereby obtain the soueraigne authority of iudgement, and they change the cōmonweale, as it happened at Heraclea neere the sea of Pontus. They are besides chā ­ged, whē men attempt to reduce the Oligarchy to a smaller number, for seeking equality they are constrained to cal their people to their aid. The Oligarchies are also changed when they that go­uern, E haue prodigally spent their goods, by leading a voluptuous & dishonest life; because thē they do altogither seeke innouation, & that so far, that they themselues vsurpe the Tyranny, or stir vp others therunto, as Hiparinus incited Dionisius at Siracusa; & one called Cleotimus at Amphi­polis, who brought in the Chalcidians to inhabite there, and after that they were receiued, he set thē at dissension with the rich men: And at Egina he that labored for Chares, practised to chang [...] the cōmonweale by such a means. These men therfore do sometimes attempt an innouation in the cōmonweale, sometimes they rob the state, & thereby fal to discord either with their own associat [...] or with those that would withstād this their thefts: as it happened at Apollonia on the sea of P [...]n­tus. But whē there is no dissension, it cannot be easily destroied by it self, wherof there is an euident F sign in the cōmonweale of Pharsalius, where few men cōmand ouer many, because they do honestly & quietly demeane thēselues one towards another. Likewise, such estates are destroied, when they 4 bring into the Oligarchy another form of Oligarchie, which thing cōmeth to passe, whē the prin­ [...]pal charges & dignities are not cōmunicated to al the gouernors, although they be few in num­ber: as hath sometimes happened at Elis, where the cōmonweal was gouerned by a few senators, & was yet brought to a smaller nūber, because they held their places during life, & were but 90 in [...] & because their election resēbled a Potentacy, & was like the election of the Lacedem [...] senators. [Page 298] Moreouer, there are many changes made in Oligarchies, as well in time of warre, as of peace: Of G warre, because they not daring to trust the people, are enforced to wage forraine souldiers; and he to whom they commit the charge and conduct of them, doth oft become a Tyran, as did Timo­phanes at Corinth: or i [...] many be ioined in this charge, they vsurpe a Potentacie: and sometimes they of the Oligarchie [...]earing to fal into such danger, admit the people into a part of the gouern­ment, b [...]ause they are constrained to vse them in their warres. And changes happen in time of peace, when for the doubt and suspition that one hath of another, they commit the guard & kee­ping of the citie to forraine souldiors, or to some captaine that is a Neuter, who doe sometimes be­come lords of two parts, as it happened at Larissa during the rule of the Aleuadians who were of Samos; and at Abidus during the factions, whereof one was the faction of Iphiadus. Further­more, H seditions arise through the mutuall offences which the Oligarchical persons do offer among themselues, persecuting each other for causes of mariages, or sentences of iudgement: of mariages, as may appeare by the examples before alledged; and Diagoras likewise being offended about a mariage, subuerted the Eretrian Oligarchie, which was held by the Horsemen [...] For causes of iudgement, as the sedition which was raised at Heraclea for a sentence giuen in iudgement; and at Thebes, by reason of adultery, where they did iustly proceed to the punishment of the crime committed, but seditiously and scandalously, as well they of Heraclea against Eurytion, as they of Thebes against Archius, whome their enmies bare so great hatred, that they caused them to bee bound by the neckes to the pillory with chaines of yron. Likewise many Oligarchies are destroied I because they are too imperious, and that by some who haue part in the same gouernment, and are offended with the insolence vsed by the rest: as the Oligarchie of Gnidus, and that of Chio. There doe yet further happen changes, as well in the Comonweale so generally called, as in Oligarchies, where [...]he counsellors of Estates, the iudges and other officers are chosen for their reuenues: For it doth oft come to passe, that the proportion of reuenues, which is at the first ordained, to the end that few men in the Oligarchies, and men of meane substance in the Commonweale, may attaine to publicke offices, is for a time obserued; but if through the prosperitie, caused by peace or by anie other meanes the same possessions amount to a greater value, then all the Citizens become capa­ble of al dignities, which change doth happen sometimes by little and little and secretly, & some­times K sooner. Such are the causes whereby Oligarchies are changed and trouble with seditions. Likewise, both Democraties and Oligarchies are sometimes changed not into contrary formes of Commonweales, but also into others of the same kind: as the lawfull Democraties & Oligarchies into those that vse absolute power, and they againe into those that are lawfull.

Oligarchies are troubled with seditions in two manners, the one, when the multi­tude of poore men are at variance with the rich; the other, when the rich men agree not among themselues. And this happeneth through many occasions, whereby the said Oligarchies are changed not onely into contrarie formes of Commonweales, L but also into others of the same kind, more gentle or more seuere. But when the Oli­garchie is not troubled with dissension, it cannot be easily destroied.

1 AT Marsil [...]a.] Strabo in his fourth booke of Cosmographie writeth thus: The Massilians being gouerned by an Aristocratie, doe surpasse all men in equity of Lawes; Their counsell consisteth of sixe hundred, who enioy this honor for tearme of life, and are called Timouchi: Of whom there are fifteene being cheefe of the Senate, who dis­patch all common occurrence: and of these fifteene there are three Presidents, who haue the soueraigne authority of gouernment. But none is receiued into the number M of the Timouchi, vnlesse he haue children, and be issued from the stocke of a Burgesse, at the least three descents: their lawes are publickely propounded after the manner of Ionia.

2 As at Athens in the time of the thirtie Tyrans.] The Athenians being vanquished by the Lacedemonians, were for a time constrained to abolish the Popular Estate, and receiue the gouernment of a small number, chusing thirtie men, who should haue the [Page 299] A whole authoritie and iurisdiction of all matters: These thirtie Gouernors were by their general name, Reformers, but in effect plaine Tyrans. They were to ordaine a Senat, and the other officers of the Commonweale, and besides to make lawes and statutes, accor­ding to which, the said officers should iudge and order themselues in their seueral char­ges. And touching the lawes and statutes which they were to establish, they vsed conti­nuall delaies, wanting thereto no colours of vaine occasions. And meane while they chose a Senate and the other officers out of their owne friends and sectaries, who had the name of Senators and Magistrates, but were in very deed ministers of these thirtie Tyrans wickednesse: yet at the beginning, they condemned in open iudgement, & put B to death some of the most notable caitifes that were in the Citie, so that for that time euen the better sort liked well their gouernment. But eftsoones seeking by little and lit­tle to doe things by force that were vniust, they sent to the Lacedemonians to demand of them a guard for the suretie of their persons, promising them to establish in Athens such a gouernment, as should tend greatly to their profite: which guard when they had obtained, they apprehended a great number of the wealthiest Citizens, such as they thought to be the fittest prey for them, whom they put al to death, and confiscated their goods, hauing falsely charged them that they had attempted and conspired some inno­uation. But when they proceeded in this Tyrannicall manner, banishing some, and put­ting C others to death, they became so deepely hated of all men, that they were deposed and expulsed. In whose places the Athenians chose ten other men, to whō they gaue so­ueraigne power and authority to see if they could without trouble or tumult pacifie all things: But they in stead of seeking to establish peace and concord betweene their Ci­tizens, attempted likewise to make themselues Lords and Tyrans, as the others had done. But Pausanians King of the Lacedemonians comming to Athens with an army, made agreement betweene them that were in the citie, and the banished men that were without: And from that time forward the Athenians began to gouerne themselues af­ter their ancient manner. Diodorus Siculus in his 14. booke, chap. 1.2, and 14. Plutarch D in the life of Lisander.

IN the time of the foure hundred.] The Oligarchy of these foure hundred is already 3 knowne by the places alledged out of Thucidides. Plu [...]arch in the life of Alcibiades; speaking of the change of the gouernment at Athens, which was put into the hands of a small number of the Nobility sayth, That although they were but foure hundred, yet they would be called and accounted fiue thousand: who were ouerthrowne and expul­sed by meanes of the aid & succour which Alcibiades and his friends ministred to those that tooke part with the people.

WHEN they bring into the Oligarchie another forme of Oligarchie.] That is, when an 4 E Estate is gouerned by a small number of Noblemen and rich men, and two or three of them hauing secret intelligence each with other, doe purchase to themselues the chee­fest emploiments in the Commonweale. Salust speaking of the Romane Senate, sayeth thus: Paucorum arbitrio belli domíque respublica agitabatur, penes eosdem aerarium, Prouin­ciae, Magistratus, gloriae triumphique erant. Caesar, Pompey, & Crassus, allying themselues together, brought in another Oligarchie, sharing among themselues the Romane Em­pire, in causing to be giuen each to other gouernements of Prouinces and charges of great armies. Which Monopoly of so great mightie Lords, caused the ruine of the Commonweale. For the force which was before diuided in two parts, did as it w [...] F equally ballance the Commonweale, (euen as a boat which is on both sides laden ali [...], so that it cannot tilt on either hand) but being afterward ioined in one bodie, and be­comming but one, did incline or bend so mightily, that there was none able to counter­peise it, so that in the end it turned it selfe vpside downe: as saith Plutarch in the life of Pompey, which Authour writeth also to the same effect this which followes, in the life of M. Crassus: The City of Rome being diuided into three factions, viz. of Caesar, and Pompey, & Crassus, the grauer and wiser sort held with Pompey, they that were lighter [Page 300] and more forward to attempt things with desperate rashnesse, followed Caesars hopes. G Crassus swumme in the middest, making his vse of both, and oft changing parts in the administration of the Commonweale, being neither a constant friend, nor a dangerous and deadly enemie, but did easily dissolue both friendship and enmitie, as hee saw it for his profit, so that very oft within small distance of time hee would praise and blame, de­fend and accuse the same lawes and persons. Then these three personages ioining their factions together, did for a time gouerne the whole state of Rome, according to their owne wils with generall consent, which was the ouerthrow of the people and Senate. And afterward he saith, When Caesar was come from his Prouince of Gaule, so farre as Lucca, many Romanes came to see him, and amongst the rest, Pompey and Crassus, H who hauing conferred with him in secret, concluded to goe throughly forward with their purpose, to the end, that they might haue in their owne hand all the power of the Romane Empire. And that for that cause Caesar should hold still the forces that he had, and that Crassus and Pompey should take other Prouinces and armies. Long before that time the Decemuiri, who had ben created and appointed at Rome for the reuiew­ing and establishing of lawes, sought meanes like newe Tyrans to establish an Oligar­chie by making their authoririe perpetuall, which was but for a time; so that the other Citizens were constrained to depose them by force, as writeth Titus Liuius in the third booke of his first Decade: and Osorius in his second booke, the thirteenth chapter. I

CHAP. VII. Of the changes happening in Aristocraties.

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BVt seditions are raised in Aristocraties, because fewe men haue any part in publicke honors: which we haue affirmed to bee the cause of troubles in Oli­garchies also, and indeed the Aristocratie is an Oligarchie. For in either state there are few Gouernours, howbeit not in one selfesame manner, and therefore seemeth the Aristocratie to bee all one with the Oligarchie. This necessarily happeneth where there is a m [...]lsitude of high minded men, that 1 thinke themselues equall in vertue, as they were in Lacedemon, that were called Parthenians (for of such were they begotten:) these vpon the disclosing of the enterprise which they practised a­gainst L the state, were sent to dwell at Tarentum. Or els seditions are raised when any of them that be of high calling, and not inferior in vertue, are vnworthily and spightfully handled by them 2 which are in more honor, as Lisander was by the kings. When some valiant man is not admitted 3 to office and honour, as Cynadon, who in the time of king Agesilaus, was author of the conspi­racie against the Lacedemonians. Againe, when some are very needy, and others rich, which hap­pe [...]eth cheesly by meanes of the warres, and befell at Lacedemon in the time of the wars of Mes­sina, according to the Poet Tirteus his opinion, as appeareth in his booke intituled the Eunomie: At what time many being impouerished by meanes of the long continuance of those warres, re­quired an equall partition of the territory. Also if any one be mighty, and haue the meanes to M make himselfe more mighty, so farre, that he indeuor to rule alone; as Pausanias seemeth to haue beene at Lacedemon, who was Captaine generall in their warres against the Medes; and Han­non at Carthage. But cheefly as well the Commonweale as the Aristocratie is destroied, when the law is not obser [...]ed. The gro [...]nd of which mischeefe lyeth in this, that the Democratie and the Oligarchie are not well mixed in the Commonweale; nor these two states in the Aristocraties with vertue, to wit, the Popular state and the rule of a few, which require a mixture with Com­monweales, [Page 301] A and many of those states that are called Aristocraties, wherein the Aristocraties doe differ from those that are named Commonweales, and therefore some of them last the lesse time, and some longer. For those are called Aristo [...]raties which bend most to the Oligarchie, and those are named Commonweales which bend most to the multitude. Therefore such kinds of states are more safe and sure then others. For they to whom the Commonweale is imparted and communi­cated, are the greater number and more strong; and when they enioy equality, they are the easier to be contented: but where they that abound in richesse, are of most authority in the state, they seeke for nothing else but to iniure and excell others too much. To conclude, towards which part soeuer of the two the Commonweale inclineth, it is changed, by reason either of them goe about B to augment their owne side. As for example, the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, and the Aristocratie into an Oligarchie, or into contraries, as the Aristocratie into a Democra­tie, because the poorest sort, as men iniuried, draw the Commonweale cleane to the contrary. And Commonweales are changed into Oligarchies. For equality alone according to worthinesse, ma­keth the state stable, when euery one enioieth that which pertaines vnto him. This my saying was verified amongst the Thurians, who at the first chose their Magistrats in respect of the greatest reuenues, and after came to a lesse stint, and had a greater number of them. And when the No­blemen had gotten all the land into their hands, contrary to the law in that behalfe prouided (by reason the forme of gouernment was most Oligarchicall, and authorised them greatly) then the C people being exercised in armes, and of experience in wars, ouermaistred the guards, and compel­led those which held too great possessions to yeeld them vp. Further, for asmuch as all Common­weales that are Aristocraticall do incline to the rule of a few, the Noblemen may doe more there: as at Lacedemon the wealth is in a few mens hands, and the Noblemen haue the most liberty to do what they wil, and to bestow their children in mariage, as best liketh themselues: which thing caused the destruction of the Commonweale of Locres, by the alliance und affinity which they en­tred into with Dionisius, which could not haue befallen in a Democratie or Aristocratie, well mixed and tempered. But then is there a secret change in Popular states, when they are marred by little and little, as it happeneth in all Commonweales, as hath beene before shewed, in speaking D generally of their alterations, when we said, that the neglecting of smal matters is one of the cau­ses thereof. For when men haue first omitted some matter appertaining to the go [...]ernment, then they do more lightly and easily change some other thing of greater importance, vntill at last they haue lost all the order and ornament of the Commonweale: as befell in the Commonweale of the Thurians, where for asmuch as it was forbidden by law that no man sh [...]ld be lieutenant general of the armie aboue the space of fiue yeares, certain yong men skilfull in the warres, and of good re­putation amongst the souldiors of the guard, despising the gouernours, and thinking easily to ob­taine what they pretended, vndertooke the abolishing and repealing of that law, to the end it might be lawfull for the selfesame persons to remaine continually in this charge, cheefly, for that E they perceiued the people would willingly assent thereto: Whereupon the Magistrats called coun­sellors, who being appointed to consider of this matter, were against it at the beginning, but after­ward consented therunto, thinking that whē this law was changed, the rest of the Commonweale should not be touched: but after when they would haue resisted other alterations which were like­wise attempted to be made, they could doe no good, but all the order of the Commonweale was changed into a Potentacie by the authors of this innouation. Moreouer, all Commonweales are dissolued sometimes of themselues, sometimes outwardly, when there is some contrary Common­weale either neere to it, or far from it, that is of might and power; as happ [...]ned to the Athenian [...] and Lacedemonians: For the Athenians in all places destroied the Oligarchies, and the Lacede­monians F the Democraties. Thus ha [...]e we almost declared from whence the changes a [...]d seditions of Commonweales doe spring.

Seditions neuer arise in right Aristocraties, but in those that are mixed. First, because a few men haue the gouernement there, and specially when there are others that thinke themselues nothing inferior to them in vertue. Next of all, when the vertuous men are either vnworthily and spightfully dealt with by those that are more honoured, or not [Page 302] admitted to beare office and honour. Againe, when some are verie rich, and others ex­treamely G poore: also if some one excell aboue all others, and bee able to vsurpe Tyran­ny. But cheefely, as well that which is called a Commonweale as the Aristocratie, is dissolued, when the law is broken; which disorder is bred, by reason that the Democra­tie and Oligarchie are not well mixed in the Commonweale nor in the Aristocratie, with vertue: For which cause such kinds of states are changed, one while into Demo­craties, another while into Oligarchies, according to the power of the factions. As for example, the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, and the Aristocratie into an Oligarchie; or the Aristocratie into a Democratie, and the Commonweale into an Oligarchie. Also these Commonweales are marred by little and little, as the others are, H by letting slippe some small mischeefe at the beginning, and after by suffering a greater mischeefe, till at last all the whole order and state bee there changed. Moreouer, euery kind of Commonweale is dissolued, either through an inward disease and mischeefe at home, or by another contrarie and mightie Commonweale, either neere to it, or farre from it.

1 AS they at Lacedemon, that were called Parthenians.] When the Lacedemonians moued warres against the Messenians, because they had rauished and defiled their vir­gines that went to their feast, they bound themselues by great oaths, neuer to depart I from Messina, till they had subdued it: at the siege whereof they obstinately continued by the space of tenne yeares By meanes whereof considering, their wiues as wearie of such long widdowhead sent for them to come home, and fearing least if they continued any longer, the warres would bee more hurtf [...]ll to themselues then to the enemies, by reason that if their enemies lost any of their men, they had others borne in their stead; but they themselues, besides the expences and detriment of the wars, dispeopled their Citie by the barrennesse of their wiues: Therefore determined they to chuse in all the armie the young souldiours that were come after the making of these oaths, and were not bound by the same, whom they sent home to their Citie, with leaue and license to K vse all their wiues indifferently according to their will, in hope that by meanes hereof they might more easily haue children, if they changed to their liking. Nowe those chil­dren that were thus begotten and borne, were named Parthenians, to couer the spot of their mothers. And when they came to the age of thirtie yeares, perceiuing themselues vnprouided of any manner of lands, or goods, because they had no certaine fathers whom they might succeed, they made choise of one Phalantus for their Captaine (who had beene the authour of sending the yong men from the armie) and conspired against their countrey. Vpon which occasion they were banished, and after long trauell by sea, arriued by chance in Italie, and took the city of Tarentum, wherein they staied, & draue L out the inhabitants thereof.

2 AS Lysander was by the Kings.] Lysander was one of the greatest captaines of his time, who hauing ended the warres which the Lacedemonians long time had against the Athenians, wonne to his Countrey the principalitie and superioritie of Greece, as well by sea as by land, wherefore he was much esteemed and honoured; but afterwards seeing himselfe debased and euill intreated by king Agesilaus, hee attempted for spight to take from the two royall houses their priuiledge of the kingly estate, to the intent, to deliuer it in common to all the families of the Spartanes: and about this controuersie, had raised a great trouble in the Citie of Sparta, if hee had not died so soone as hee did. M Behold how great ambitious minds that cannot hold a meane, and refraine from excee­ding too much in the gouernment of Commonweales, are oftentimes the occasion of more mischeefe then goodnesse: as Plutarch affirmeth in the liues of Lysander and Agesilaus: and Diodorus Siculus in the fourth chapter of his foureteenth booke.

3 OR when some valiant man is not admitted to beare office and honor, as Cynadon.] Ze­nophon writeth, that this Cynadon was a mightie and hardie young man, who in the [Page 303] A first yeare of the raigne of Agesilaus, conspired with other Lacedemonians against the king and the cheefe of the Citie: Vpon the disclosing of which conspiracie, hee was committed to prison, and then being demanded wherfore he had enterprised such kind of wickednesse, he made no other answere, but to this end, that hee would not bee the most vnderling of the Lacedemonians. Therefore hee and his complices with their hands bound behind them, were ledde through the Citty, and whipped and put to death.

AS Pausanias in Lacedemon seemeth to haue been.] The Lacedemonians for the not 4 diminishing of their forces with idlenesse, and for the reuenging of the outrage and B cruelties shewed vnto them by the Persians, made warre against them, inuading & spoi­ling the countrey that bordered next to theirs, and made Pausanias generall captaine, as well of themselues, as of the other Cities of Greece. This Pausanias minding of a captaine to make himselfe a king, conspired with Xerxes to bring Greece vnder his sub­iection, and for his reward couenanted with him to take his daughter in marriage: and to the end, that Xerxes should giue credite vnto him, hee deliuered into his hands, the prisoners that he had of his. And for the better keeping of the matter secret, he wrote vn­to him to kil al the messengers which he should send vnto him, as soon as they had done their message. But Aristides captaine of the Athenians, who was ioined in commission C with him, resisted his enterprises, and wisely disclosed his treason; and within a while af­ter Pausanias was accused and condemned: as Iustine affirmeth in his second booke, and Thucidides in his first booke and fifteenth chapter: Plutarch in the liues of Themisto­cles and Aristides. Diodorus Siculus in his eleuenth booke, and tenth chapter, which reasoneth in this sort concerning the matter of Pausanias: Whereas wee haue accusto­med in all places of our hystorie to enlarge and exalt the glory of vertuous men, by commendations ioined to the end of the declaration of their doings, and contrariwise to accompanie the death of the wicked with the reproches and shames that are due vn­to them, it is not reasonable that we should let passe the wickednesse & treason of Pau­sanias, D without condemning and blaming it: For who is it that would not wonder at his folly, sith after he had done so much good seruice to Greece, after he had wonne the battaile of Platea, and after hee had executed so many other goodly and great thinges, could not keepe his authoritie, but through too much loue and desire of the riches and delights of Persia, defamed and lost all the glory which hee had won before; for by too much pride and selfewening in his prosperity, he began to disdaine and hate the plaine manner of liuing, according to the Laconian fashion, and inclined to the f [...]llowing of the Persian superfluities and delights; where as himselfe was the man that least of all others ought to imitate the manners and factions of strangers, as one that knew not by E hearesay, but had himselfe tried by effect, howe much more the order and manner of li­uing vsed in his owne countrey, was better and more agreeable to vertue, then the fashi­ons of the barbarous people; and through his owne wickednesse alone was not he on­ly punished, as he had deserued, but also was the cause that his Citizens and Countrey­men lost the dominion and principality of the sea.

AND Hannon of Carthage.] Iustine in his one and twentieth booke, writeth, That 5 Hannon Prince of Carthage, seeing how his riches did excell the power of the City, attempted to make himselfe King and Lord, and to kill all the Senatours. For the accom­plishment whereof, he inuited them all on a solemne day to the marriage of his daugh­ter, F entending vnder colour of religion to commit this treason, to the end also that hee might the more easily bring to passe this his complotted intention and malice. There­fore caused he preparation to bee made for the people to dine in the porches and pub­licke places, but the Senate he inuited to his owne house, to the end, that hee might the more secretly and without witnesses cause them to eat the poisoned meates, and so kill them, and then bee maister of the Commonweale, when it should bee depriued of the gouernement. This treason being disclosed by the seruants to the Officers, was by them [Page 304] auoided, but not regarded, for they feared least in reuealing the matter, there would be G more danger by reason of the Princes power, then in dissembling it. And therefore fai­ning as though they would make a law for expences, and for refraining from banquets; they made a generall statute, whereby they gaue a certaine limitation to all marriages generally, without any mention of Hannon, to the end, that it should not seeme that they meant him specially. But when he saw how he had missed of his purpose, he deter­mined againe at a certaine day to procure them to be slaine by his souldiours; howbeit, he was againe bewrayed. Therefore fearing least he should be arrested of high treason, and arrained thereof, hee betooke himselfe to a strong Towne, with twentie thousand armed men of his familie: At which place whilest he solicited the Affricans & Mores H for aid, he was apprehended and taken: And after that hee had been beaten with rods, his eie [...] put out, and his armes and legs broken, to the end, he might receiue punishment in all the members of his bodie, he was put to death in the presence of all the people, and his bodie thus mangled, was hanged vpon a Gibbet. And further, all his children and others of his linage, though they were innocent in the matter, were likewise put to death, to the end, there should not any remaine of that so detestable stock, which might follow the example of so hainous an offence, or reuenge his death: as Paulus Orosus af­firmeth in his fourth and sixt chapter.

6 THE Athenians in all places destroied the Oligarchies, and the Lacedemonians the De­mocraties.] I Aristotle in the fourth booke of the Politiques the eleuenth chapter, spea­king of these two people, sayeth thus: They that haue obtained the principality of Greece, respecting each of them the forme of their owne Commonweales, haue founded and stablished in Cities, some of them Democraties, and othersome Oligar­chies; not regarding the welfare of the same Cities, but their owne priuate commodity. Diodorus Siculus in the seuenteenth chapter of his thirteenth booke writeth thus: These two cheefe cities striuing either of them for the principalitie of Greece, demea­ned themselues diuersly, and vsed cleane contrary proceedings: For the Lacedemoni­ans did alwaies accustome to deliuer the gouernement and authority of directing the K affaires of the cities, which they reduced to their league, into the hands of the noblest & worship fullest of the same: And the Athenians cleane contrary, established therein a popular gouernement, and deliuered the soueraigne authority into the hands of the multitude. And in the fifteenth booke, the twelfth chapter, he sayth: But in Greece the Ci [...]ies we [...]e in trouble and broile by meanes of the alterations of the gouernement, which were the occasion that many rose vp in the same, attempting innouations, by rea­son that in the most places there was not any manner of Magistrate that had authoritie to command; and for that the Lacedemonians supported & fauoured them that would establish a gouernment of a small number of honest men; and contrariwise, the Athe­nians L leaned to them that would maintaine the soueraine authority of the people, and establish the forme of a popular gouernment. Plutarch in the life of Lisander saith, In all the Cities tha [...] Lysander passed by, if they were gouerned by the authority of the people, or that there were any other kind of gouernement, hee left in euery of them a Lacedemonian captaine or gouernour, with a counsell of tenne officers of them that before had ben in amitie and secret confederacie with him. Thus did he also as well in the Townes, which had beene alwaies in league with the Lacedemonians, as in those which lately had ben their enemies. And lower he saith: In mine opinion Theopompus the Poet was deceiued, when he compared the Lacedemonians to vinteners, saying, M that they offered a tast to the Grecians of the sweet drinke of liberty, and after mingled it with vineger; for euen from the beginning, the tasting of their gouernement, and the digesting thereof by the Grecians, was very sower, by occasion that Lisander in all pla­ces, tooke the gouernment out of the peoples hands, and deliuered it into the hands of a small number of the most violent, most audatious, and most seditious persons that were in euery City.

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CHAP. VIII. Of the perticular preseruation of states.

NOw wil we treat of the preseruation of all states in general, & of euery one perticu­larly. First it is certaine, that if we perceiue by what meanes states are destroyed; wee shall also vnderstand those whereby they are preserued. Forasmuch as of con­trary causes spring contrary effects, and for that perishing or destruction is contra­ry to preseruation. Therefore in well tempered Commonweales, heed should bee ta­ken B aboue all things; that nothing be done contrary to the laws and customes, and specially that an inconuenience & mischeefe should be looked vnto at the first budding; how small soeuer it be. For the corruption that creepeth in by little & little, is no more perceiued, then small expences be, the often dibursing whereof consumeth the substance of a house. This change is not noted, by reason it commeth not altogether, for mans vnderstanding is therein deceiued, as by a sophistical and cap­tious reason, inferring that if euery part be smal, the whole must needs be small: The which is in some respect true, yet is not so: For the whole & all are not a smal thing, but are composed of small things. Therefore the cheefe point of all consisteth in taking diligent heed of this beginning, and the next in not crediting those subtleties which are craftily and captiously inuented to deceiue the C people. For why, they are sufficiently reproued and refelled of themselues by their owne workes. We haue set downe before what we call wiles and crafts of Commonweales. Againe, we are to consid [...] that some Aristocraties and Oligarchies continue, not for that they be safe and sure formes of go­uernment, but because they that are placed in the Magistracie, demean themselues modestly ther­in, as wel towards them that haue no authority in matters of state, as also towards the others tha [...] haue authority therein: to wit, by doing no manner of iniury to them vnto whom the Common­weale is not imparted & communicated, & by admitting the cheefe of the country vnto the pub­lick gouernment. Also by not defrauding thē of honor that be ambitious and desirous therof, nor depriuing the multitude of profit, & by liuing popularly & courteously with their fellows. For the D equality that the popular sort do seek for in the multitude, is not only iust, but also requisit to be ob­serued amongst such as are of like estate. Therfore if there be many in the gouernment, it is expe­dient for them to obserue many popular fashions: as to create the Magistrates for the space of sixe months, to the end, that all they that be in such sort like, may be p [...]rtakers of the same. Because such men amongst thē are already as it were some people. And therfore there often arise amongst them leaders & flatterers of the people, as hath ben before declared. Again, by this meane the Oligar­chies & Aristocraties fal lesse into Potentacies, for it is not so easie a matter to enterprise any wic­kednesse; by remaining a short time in the Magistracie, as by continuing a long space in the same: which breedeth Tirannies in Oligarchies and Democraties, for they exercise Tyranny that be of E most power in each state; as the captaines of the people, and the Potentates; or els they that possesse greatest Magistracies, if they continue long in the same. Also Commonweales are preserued, not only by being farre from those things that may marre & dissolue them, but also by being neer thereto, for feare maketh men more heedy and circumspect about affaires concerning the state. Therfore they that are careful of the welfare of the commonweale, ought oftētimes to propound & fain certain fears, to the end, that the citizens should be alwaies ready to make defence, as the soul­di [...]rs be in the nightwatch whē it is set, by making as great reckoning of the danger that is far off as though it were at hand. Further, great care is to be had by prouision and penalty of laws, for the withstanding of seditions between mē of great calling, and to preuent others before they fal into it. F For euery man cannot discern a mischeefe whē it first buds, but only he that is very skilful in go­uernmēt. And for the remedying of the alteration which growes in the Oligarchie & in the cō ­monweale, vpon occasion of reuenues when it happeneth, the reuenues continuing all one and the selfesame that they were before, & the m [...]ny being augmented, in that case it is expedient to c [...] ­ferre the quantity of the common or publick reuenue, with the reuenue in times past: To wit, in ci­ties where the examinations & surueiors of it are made from yeere to yeere in that space. And in those that are greater, from three yeeres to three yeeres, or from fiue yeeres to fiue yeeres. And if the [Page 306] wealth and substance be augmented or increased beyond the first stint & value ordained, concer­ning G the attainment to the gouernment of the Commonweale, then to augment or diminish that stint according to the tenor of the law, as the wealth encreaseth or decreaseth. For in Oligarchies & Commonweales, where the contrary is vsed, the Oligarchie and the Potentacie come too much aloft; or the Commonweale is changed into a Democratie, & the Oligarchie into a Commonweal or a Democratie. It is a cōmon rule in the Democratie, Oligarchie, Monarchie, and in euery form of Commonweale, not to make any too mighty, but rather to endeuour the directing and distribu­ting of promotions & honors, in such sort as they may be but small, and enioyed a long time by thē that are admitted and preferred vnto them; than for to order & dispose of thē, as that they should be very great, and enioied but a short time by thē that should be placed there: for men was naught H & cannot all abide the prosperity of fortune: or els when they haue committed all the honors into the hands of any, that in such case, they take them not away again altogether, but by little & little. And cheefly to prouide by law, that no man so rise & grow vp, that he excell all others in power of friends, or of riches; if it befal otherwise, then to cause such personages to absent thēselues frō the ci­ty. Also because they seek innouations in the priuat life, it is expediēt to establish a Magistrat, to haue an eie to thē that frame not thēselues to liue according to the form of the state; as in the Democra­ty, according to the Democraty; & in the Oligarchy according to the Oligarchy, & likewise of all other cōmonweals. And if any part of the city through prosperity become too insolent, or rise much, it is to be specially remedied for the same causes. The remedy herof is, to commit alwais the charges I & offices into the hands of those parts that be directly contrary to that part which wexeth insolēt; I meane that the good & vpright men be opposed to the multitude; & the poor to the rich; & that there be endeuor vsed for the mingling of the poor together with the rich; or that the part that is in a mean between both, be increased & preferred. For that preuēteth the seditions which might rise by means of inequality. But there is no greater rule to be obserued in euery cōmōweal, thē to prouide by the laws, that the publick offices be not gainfull, & specially this ought to be obserued in the Oli­garchie: for the cōmon people take it not in so euil part, that they are barred frō the gouernmēt (but rather reioice that they may spend their time about their own busines) as whē they think the Magi­strats rob the cōmōweale, for thē cōceiue they a twofold spight that they are depriued both of honors K & profit. And by this only meanes may the Democratie and Aristocratie stand, & be together by yeelding to the noblemen & to the common people what they demand: which is a thing that may be done. For the admitting of all men indifferently into the gouernment, is Democratical: And that the Noblemen should be Magistrats, is Aristocraticall: which wil befal whē the officers shall be stripped of all means to draw profit out of the same. In which case the needy will not bee hasty to haue it, because they shal get nothing by it, but wil be willinger to apply their own businesse: & the rich may better exercise the Magistracies, because they haue no need to gain by the commonweal: insomuch, that the poore wil become rich by hauing leisure to ply their work, & the noblemen shal not be subiect to the rascal people. But to the end the common treasure be not robbed, let payment L be made of the mony of the cōmonweale in presence of al the citizens, & the rols or bils of account deliuered into the custody of the fraternities, companies, & tribes of the city. And to the end the Magistrats may execute their offices without gain, it is reason that honors be set down by law for thē that wel & orderly shal execute the same. Now in Democraties it is reason the rich should be spared, & their possessions and fruits not diuided & made equal with other mens, as is priuily cō ­passed in some commonweals. And it is better to forbid them the making of great & vnprofitable expences, as at open shewes, & in the lanes with torchlight and such like. So also in the Oligarchie it behoueth to haue great care of the poore, and distribute vnto them those Magistracies wherein there is some profit to be had, & where any rich man doth thē iniury to punish him more greeuou­sly M then one poor man should be for hurting another. Also that inheritances descēd not by way of gift, but by right of kindred & consanguinity: & that no mā may haue aboue one inheritance. By means hereof, the goods & possessions shal be the equaller, & many needy persons shal become rich Also it is expedient in the Democratie & Oligarchie, to giue to them that haue least preferment and part in the gouernmēt, either an equal part or the cheef parts in al other things; as in the De­mocratie to the rich, & Oligarchie to the poore: except those offices wherein the authority of the [Page 307] A Commonweale consisteth, which ought to be committed to them onely, or to many of them that haue the gouernment.

Although the meanes requisite for the conseruation of states, may be vnderstood by the causes of their destructions already declared, yet for the clearer vnderstanding of the present matter a great mainie of them are set downe. And first, that nothing bee committed contrary to the lawes and customes, and that specially by remedying of in­conueniencies at the beginning, how small soeuer they be; that credite be not giuen to the guilefulnesse and craft deuised for the deceauing of the Commonweales, whereof B we haue spoken in the foureteenth chapter of the former booke; that they that be pla­ced in the Magistracies, behaue themselues modestly, as well towards them that haue the managing of publicke affaires, as towards those that haue not, in doing no wrong to the one sort, and liuing popularly and courteously with the others; that they who haue care of the welfare of the state, be watchfull alwaies, and ready to their defence, in propounding and faining feares often, to make the Citizens the more diligent in their matters; that contentions and debates arise not amongst the great personages, and that the others be preuented before they fall out; that a law bee made that no man shall vn­measurablie grow into honour and credit, & become very rich, or get too many friends, C vpon paine of banishing them out of the countrey, that are found so to exceed; that priuate persons frame their manner of liuing, according to the forme of euery Com­monweale whereto they are subiects, and that therefore Magistrates be ordained to looke vnto it; that no part of the City become too insolent by meanes of prosperity; that the Magistrates be not addicted to gaine, and that they draw no profite out of the offices by robbing th [...] Commonweale, and that in like sort they be forbidden by law to make great and vnprofitable expences. It doth particularly auaile the Oligarchies for auoiding of alteration, happening there by the stint of reuenues, to make from time to time surueyes of their wealth, and to augment or deminish the reuenue, according to D the tenor of the law, as wealth encreaseth or decreaseth. It is also behoofeful to Demo­craties and Oligarchies, to treat them in the best sort that is possible, that enioy least part in the state, as the rich in Democraties, and the poor in Oligarchies; except in such cases as concerne the cheefe Magistracies, wherein consisteth the soueraine authority of the Commonweale, which ought to be administred only by them of the gouerne­ment.

IT is requisite and behoofefull in the Democraties to spare the rich, and in the Oligarchie 1 to haue great care of the needie.] As Cicero affirmeth in the second booke of his offices. E In primis autem videndum erit ei qui rempublicam administrabit, vt suum quisque teneat, ne­que de bonis priuatorum publiè diminutio fiat. Perniciose enim Philippus in tribunatu cùm l [...] ­gem Agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est, & in eo vehementer se modera­tum praebuit: sed cùm in agendo multa populariter, tum illud malè. non esse in ciuitate duo mil­lia hominum qui rem haberent. Capitalis omnino oratio est ad aequationem [...]onorum pertinens: qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tenerentur Respublicae ci­uitatésque costitutae sunt. Nam & si duce naturae congregabantur homines: tamen spe custodia rerum suarum, vrbium presidia quaerebant. Et subdit: Qui verò esse populares volunt, ob cám­que causam aut agrariam rem tentant, vt possessores suis sedibus pellantur, a [...]t pecunias creditas F debitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta Reipublicae. Concordiam primùm tol­lunt, quae esse non potest cùm alijs adimuntur, alijs condonantur pecuniae: deinde equitatem, qua tollitur omnis, si habere suum cuique non licet. Id est enim proprium (vt suprà dixi) ciuitatis at (que) vrbis, vt sit libera, & non sollicita suae rei cuinsque custodia. Ergo in primis opera danda, vt iuris & iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat: & neque ten [...]iores propter imbecillitatem circum­ueniantur, neque locupletibus ad sua veltenenda vel recuper anda obsit inuidia.

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CHAP. IX. Of the qualities that are to be required in the cheefe gouer­nors of a state.

THey which are to exercise the cheefe Magistracies, ought to haue three thinges: First, a loue to the present state: next of all, great H sufficiencie to execute those functions and charges that are required in the office: Thirdly, Vertue and Iustice, fit for euery Commonweale. For if the Lawe bee not all one, and the selfesame in euery Com­monweale, it followeth that there must needes bee many differences of iustice. But there is a doubt, when all these thinges are not to bee found in one selfesame person, howe men shall proceed to the election, I meane if any one bee sufficient to guide an armie, but in other respects a bad man, and not a friend to the State; and another iust and a friend thereto; In what manner shall the election bee made? In mine opinion it is needfull to haue respect to two points, to wit, to that where­in I all men doe most participate, and are most endued withall; and to that wherein they least participate, and are least endued withall. Therefore in the choise and election of a generall captaine, wee must rather haue an eye to experience in martiall affaires, then to vertue; for there be fewer expert captaines then good and honest men. Contrariwise, in the keeping and disposing of the mony and treasure of the Commonweale, greater vertue is to bee required, then men for the most part are endued withall, although the science and skill be common to all men. Also a doubt may be mooued, if a man haue sufficiencie in him to gouerne, and beare good will to the state, what need he shall haue of vertue, if with those two things he may be able to perform as much as is expedient; or whether vertue be requisit also: because it may so fall out, that those men K that be indued with these two things, may bee vicious and incontinent liuers, who though they know they offend and loue themselues, yet can they not helpe themselues by gouerning their owne affections. So may it befall, that some men may thus demeane themselues toward the Common­weale. Generally, whatsoeuer we affirme to be enacted by law, to the benefit of Commonweals, doth preserue and vphold Commonweales. But the cheefe groundworke (as we haue already often tou­ched) lyeth in procuring that party and side which is content with the present state, to be stronger then the other that is malecontent therewith. Besides all this, we are not to bee ignorant of those things whereof those commonweales are ignorant at this day, that haue transgressed and swarued from the meane. For many things that are supposed to be ordained for the auaile of the people, do L dissolue the popular states. And diuers other things that seem apt and fit for the state and gouern­ment of a few, do marre and destroy the same. They who suppose any such thing to be a vertue and perfection, do draw the Cōmonweale to excessiuenesse, not knowing that as a mans nose that som­what goes out of that straight & right forme which is cheefly cōmended, so as it yeelds somewhat toward crookednesse or fatnesse, is notwithstanding faire & comely to the eie, howbeit, if any man stretch it further to excessiuenesse and too much, first he takes away the proportion and due mea­sure of the member, & at last brings it to that passe, that it will seeme no more a nose, by reason of the excessiuenesse or want of contraries. And so fares it with other parts of the body. The very like doth come to passe in Commonweales. For the Oligarchie and Democratie may be borne withall, M though they be far frō their good order: But if either of them be farther and more stretched out, first the Comonweale shall be impaired, and at last they will proceed so far, that it shal no longer be a Commonweale. Therfore the lawmaker and man fit to gouerne, must haue skill & discretion to know what popular means vphold or destroy the Democraties, & what things fit for Oligarchies do preserue the Oligarchy, sith neither of these two states can stand without rich men & the mul­titude; for if goods should be equal, thē must the cōmonweale needs change hir form. Therfore the [Page 309] A destroying of the rich, or of the poore, by vnreasonable lawes, is the ruine of Commonweales. Some doe offend and stray from the right way, both in Democraties and Oligarchies; namely, the ringleaders of the people in Democraties (where the multitude is maister of the lawes) by keeping the city alwaies diuided into two sects or parts, striuing against the rich, though to the contrary they seeme euermore to speake in the behalfe of the rich: and in Oligarchies, the gentle­men and fautors of the same, who ought euermore to shew themselues fauourers and furtherers of the peoples benefit, and to take other maner of oaths then they do at this time. For now adaies in some Oligarchies they sweare in this manner: I will bee the peoples enemie, and practise as much mischeefe against them as lyeth in my power. Yet were it conuenient that they should shewe B and dissemble the contrary, and promise vpon their oaths to doe the people no wrong. The readi­est way and greatest meanes that hath yet ben spoken off, for the vpholding and maintaining of Commonweales (which at this day is neglected in all places) is that the bringing vp & training of children and youth, bee fitted according to the Commonweales. For most behoofefull laws and decrees ratified by the consent of all the gouernours, doe no good at all, except the subiects bee accustomed and trained to frame their liues and manners, according to the pattern of the Com­monweale: as for example, if the lawes bee popular, let them bee trained and brought vp popu­larly; But if the lawes be fit for the Oligarchie, then let them be brought vp Oligarchically. For if there be incontinence in any one, it is also in the Citie. Now conuenient training and bringing C vp according to the patterne of the Commonweale, is not to accomplish matters for the pleasing of the Gouernours in Oligarchies or Popular states, but rather such kind of things, whereby the one sort may be maintained in the Oligarchie, and the other in the Democratie. Now in Oli­garchies the children of the Gouernours bee nicely and daintily brought vp, and poore folkes children are exercised and hardened with labour, so as they haue the more will and power to practise innouation. And in those Democraties that seeme most popular, there is no such kind of order as there ought to bee, because libertie is there not right; but euill defined and vnder­stood. For two things there bee, whereby the Democratie seemeth to bee defined and rightly taken, to wit, by the authoritie which is in the hands of the greatest part of the people; and D by libertie: For that which is iust and rightfull, seemeth to bee equall: and this seemeth to bee equall, that those thinges bee ratified which please the multitude: and liberty and equa­litie seeme to consist in this, that euery man doe what hee list. Therefore in such Democra­ties euerie man liueth according to his owne pleasure and desire, as Euripides sayeth: But that is starke naught. For the manner of liuing and demeaning of men according to the forme and patterne of the Commonweale, is, not to bee iudged a bondage, but a welfare and safetie. These be the meanes whereby Commonweales are changed and ouerturned, and whereby they are vpheld and maintained.

E Sith it is a thing most requisite for the vpholding of states, that the soueraigne Magistracies bee in the hands of fit and sufficient persons: Therefore are the qualities hereof declared, that bee necessary for the cheefe Gouernouts of a state, which bee three. First they must loue the present state; secondly, they must haue sufficiencie, skilfulnesse, and experience in gouernement; thirdly, they must bee indued with that kind of vertue and vprightnesse which is fit for the Commonweale wherein they are. If all these things bee not to bee found in one man, that kinde of qualitie is cheefelie to bee considered in the election of the Magistrate, which most sildome is found in men. But nothing is fitter for the vpholding of a State, then the ma­king F of that side (which is content with the present State) stronger then the other side that is not content therewith. Further, discretion is to bee vsed, that there bee no excessiuenesse and vnmeasurablenesse in those meanes that vphold Common­weales, as in the meanes that are fit for Democraties and Oligarchies. Because that by stretching them out too farre, such Commonweales are impaired, and at last ruinated, when the rich in the one are destroied, and the poore in the other driuen out. Also it is requisit for the preseruation of cōmonweales to fit the bringing vp of citizens [Page 310] according to the patterne of the same. As, if the lawes be popular, that they be brought G vp popularly: And if the Lawes be fit for Oligarchies, that then they be brought vp Oli­garchically: and that the one sort may be maintained in Democraties, and the other in Oligarchies.

CHAP. X. Of the changing, marring, and ouerturning of Monarchies. H

IT resteth that we discourse of the Monarchie, and consider what things may destroy and preserue it. Almost the same accidents doe gro [...] in King­domes and Tyrannies, as wee said, did chaunce in Commonweales: For the Kingly State doth imitate the Aristocratie, and the Tyranny is made of the extreamest sort of the Oligarchie, & of the Democratie, & is ther­fore very hurtfull to the subiects, for it is compounded of two corrupt com­monweales, retaining the transgressions and blemishes of thē both. Moreo­uer, it will easily appeare, that the beginning of Monarchies hath proceeded of contraries, for the I Kingly state was first ordained for the defence of good men against the multitude: and the King was created out of the number of good men, according to the excellency of his vertue, or vertu­ous deeds, or of the stock from whence he came. The Tyran was created by the multitude, against the Noblemen, to the end, that they should not oppresse them, as is manifest by the euents and is­sues of things. For almost all Tyrans haue become so, through being Captaines and leaders of the people, hauing gotten credite by forging accusations against the Nobilitie. Then one sort of Ty­rannies hath sprung vp in this manner, the Cities being already growne great. Others, of those that hauing been Kings before, haue violated the ancient customes of the Countrey, desiring to command more absolutely. Others, of such as haue been chosen to the cheefest Cities: for in anci­ent K times the people allowed long time to Magistracies and publick charges. And others of Oli­garchies, where they had chosen and preferred some one to great offices, for to hold them in man­ner of soueraignety: for in all these manners they might easily vsurpe a Tyrannie, if they were but willing thereunto, because some had alreadie the power of a Kingly estate, and others the ho­nor, as Phidon in Argos, and others which made themselues Tyrans, hauing before Kingly au­thority; and those of Ionia and Phalaris, the honour. Panecius among the Leontines, and Cyp­selus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens, and Dionisius at Syracusa, and others in the same sort, of Captaines of the people haue become Tyrans. So the Kingly state doth resemble the Aristo­cratie, in that it is giuen according to the persons dignity, or through his vertue, or birth, or ho­nourable L 1 deeds, or through all these things together, and through power. For all those that haue 2 well deserued, or might well deserue of Cities and Countries, haue attained to this honour; some 3 in defending them from bondage, as Codrus; others in setting them at libertie, as Cyrus; some for building a City, or conquering a Country, as the Kings of the Lacedemonians and Molossi­ans. 4 The office of a King, is to see that the rich be no way iniuried, nor the multitude outraged. The Tyrannical State (as hath been often said) hath no respect to the publicke commodity, vnlesse it be for his owne peculiar profit: and the only end end or aime of a Tyran, is pleasure; of a king, honesty. Wherefore the desire to exceed in mony, is Tyrannicall; and to excell in honour, more 5 kingly. The kings guard is of Citizens, the Tyrans of strangers. That the Tyrannie hath the vi­ces M and corruptions of the Democratie and Oligarchie, it is manifest: of the Oligarchie, in that it chuseth riches for the only end whereat it aimeth; otherwise the guard and magnificence ther­to requisite, could not be maintained: likewise, in that it doth in no sort trust the multitude, and therefore takes their weapons from them. Item, the oppression of the people, the driuing them out of the Citadell, and forcing them to disperse themselues, is common to them both, as well to the Oligarchie, as to the Tyrannie. It taketh likewise of the Democratie, the making of war against [Page 311] A the Nobles, the destroying of them by couert, or open meanes, and banishing them as aduersaries and enemies to that state, because they are the Authours of conspiracies: when some will seeke to rule themselues, others refuse to endure subiection. For which cause, Periander counselled Thrasibulus to loppe off the highest eares of corne; as if it were necessary alwaies to make away the cheefest Citizens.

The Philosopher, after hee hath declared the meanes whereby Commonweales are altered and destroyed, hee reasoneth likewise touching Monarchies, whereof there are two sorts, to wit, the Kingdome, and the Tyrannnie; shewing the beginning of ei­ther B of them, together with the difference of their ends, and causes which marre and destroy them: affirming them to be the very same that be in other Commonweales; the Kingdome following the steps of the Aristocratie, and Tyrannie imitating the Oligar­chie and the Democraties. The end and scope of the king is the profit of the Common­weale, whereunto he referreth all things. The end and scope of the Tyran is pleasure. The office of the King is to prouide, that the rich be not in any wise iniuried, nor the common people outragiously and reprochfully dealt withall. The Tyran regardeth not the Commonweale, except it be for his own priuate profite, hauing all the faults of the Oligarchie, and of the Democratie. The King excelleth in honour, the Tyran in mo­ney. C The kings guard is of Citizens, the Tyrans guard is of strangers.

FOR all they which had deserued well.] Aristotle in the third booke of the Politicks, 1 the tenth chapter sayth: Forasmuch as the first were benefactors of the multitude, ei­ther by inuenting of arts, or by warres, or by gathering them into companies, or in gi­uing them lands, they were voluntarily created Kings, and transferred the same King­domes by succession to their posterity. As Cicero affirmeth in the second booke of his Offices. Subijciunt se homines imperio alterius & potestati pluribus de causis. Ducuntur enim aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis praestantia, aut spe id sibi vtile D futurum, &c.

SOME by keeping them from falling into bondage, as Codrus.] There were manie olde 2 quarrels and grudges betweene the Athenians and the Dorians, which the Dorians minded to end by warres. And therefore sought they to learne of their gods what the successe of the warre should be: It was answered them that they should haue the victo­ry, so they killed not the king of the Athenians. For this cause they assembled them­selues against them, and comming to the battaile, before and aboue all thinges they commanded their men to take heed that they slew not the King of the Athenians, cal­led Codrus: who being aduertised of the answere giuen by the gods, and of the com­mandement E of the Dorians, clothed himselfe in base apparrell, and tooke a burthen of boughes vpon his backe, which he carried into the Dorians campe. And because there was a great throng, he of set purpose with a bill which he carried about him, stroke and hurt a souldior, who presently slue him. And after he was dead, the Dorians perceiuing it was Codrus King of the Athenians, went their waies without fighting any battaile. By which meane, and through the vertue of their king, the Athenians were deliuered from this warre: as Iustine reporteth in his second booke.

OTHERS by setting them at libertie, as Cyrus.] The Persians before his time, obey­ed 3 the Medes, out of which bondage they were not onely deliuered by Cyrus, but F obtained also the Empire of all Asia, transferring the Monarchie of Medea into Per­sia, as Herodotus and Iustine affirme in the first booke, and Diodorus Siculus in his second booke. Therefore Cyrus in the eight booke of his Pedia or institution, written by Xenophon, reioyceth when he made his last will, that he left his Country in noble state, and honoured aboue all other countries in the world, whereas before it had neither fame nor renowme in Asia.

THE office of the king is to keepe the rich that they bee not in any wise iniuried, nor the 4 [Page 312] common people outragiously or reprochfully dealt withall.] Cicero in the second booke of G his Offices sayth: Mihi quidem on apud Medes solùm (vt ait Herodotus) sed apud etiam ma­iores nostros fruende iustitia causa, videntur olim b [...]ne morati reges constituti. Nam cùm pre­meretur multitud [...] ab his qui maiores opes habebant, ad vnum aliquem consugiebant virtute praestantem: qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda, summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero hoc, vt ijdem etiam prudentes habe­rentur, nihilerat quod homines his authoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Therefore a good king ought to preserue the Noble and rich men, and not to displease his peo­ple; to resist the ambition of the mighty, and to represse the insolence of the common H people. Besides these two Offices, the Romane Emperours had one difficultie, which lay in fitting themselues to the crueltie and couetousnesse of the men of warre, a thing of such toile and loathsomenesse, that it wrought the destruction of the most of them. For it was altogether vnpossible to satisfie both the people and the souldiours together. For the people loue quietnesse and peace, and so doth the Prince that is of a mild and modest nature: whereas contrariwise, the souldious desire a Prince that is warlike, insolent, cruell, and giuen to spoile, wherein their desire was to traine the Empe­rours to the hinderance of the people, for the encreasing of their owne paies and pensi­ons, and for the satisfying of their couetousnesse and cruelty: which was the cause that I some Emperours hauing neither by cunning nor by nature the dexterity and skill to keepe both the one and the other in aw, did commonly continue small times their Mo­narchies. The great Turke is brought to the like inconuenience, who by keeping al­waies neare about him for his guard a great number of footmen, called Ianissaries, and of horsemen, must needs seeke their fauor and good will (without all respect of the peo­ple) as Machiauel affirmeth in the nineteenth chapter of his Prince.

5 AND the kings guard is of Citizens, and the Tyrans of strangers.] Aristotle in the third booke of the Politickes, the tenth chapter sayth, The Kings are guarded by the power of Citizens, the Tyrans by strangers. And the Kings gouerne according to K the law, and exercise dominion ouer such as are voluntarily subiect: The Tyrans rule by constraint: insomuch, that the one sort are garded by the Citizens, the other against the Citizens.

We must therefore deeme, that the beginnings of alterations in Monarchies, are almost all one with those that happen in Commonweales, as hath been already declared: for many subiects are prouoked to conspire against the Monarchies by reason of iniustice, and for feare, and for 1 contempt. Iniustice is cheefly committed by occasion of reproch and iniury, and sometimes also by occasion of spoiling men of their goods. And they tend to the same ends in Tyrannies, & king­domes, L as they doe in the aforementioned Commonweales: for asmuch as Monarchs abound in 2 riches and honours, to which things all men aspire. Some conspiracies bee made against the per­sons of Princes, othersome against their state. Those that are done for reproch and iniurie, are against the person. And as there be many sorts of iniuries, euery of them is cause of despight and wrath. The most of them that be incensed to wrath, doe conspire, to the end to bee auenged, and 3 not to excell others. As the conspiracie against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the iniury done to Harmodus his sister, and by reason that he himselfe had ben prouoked, and di­spightfully handled: For Harmodus became their enemie for his sisters sake, and Aristogiton for Harmodus his sake. Also there grew a conspiracie against Periander the Tyran of Ambracia, M for that as he sat at a banquet he had asked a yong boy that he loued, whether he were with child 4 by him. Pausanias slew King Philip, because he neglected the iniury that was done vnto him by Attalus. Derdas conspired against Amintas, surnamed the small, because hee boasted of the abusing of his youth. Euagoras the Cyprian conspired against Eunucus, whose sonne he slew, for the iniury which he thought he had receiue at his hands, in that he forsooke his wife, who was the said Euagoras his kinswoman. Also many rebellions haue been made against Monarchs, for [Page 313] A the villanous and shamefull acts that some of them haue committed against the bodies of other folke: as the rebellion of Crates against Archelas, who was alwaies greeuous and irkesome vnto him, because he had his vnlawfull company; insomuch, that this occasion, and also a lesse, sufficed him: or because he gaue not him any of his daughters in marriage, as he had promised. But when he was intangled in the warres with Sirria and Arrabia, hee married the eldest to the King of Elibee, and the youngest to the sonne of Amintas, supposing therby to haue lesse controuersie with him that was borne of Cleopatra. Notwithstanding, the ground and true cause of the hatred and turning of Crates his mind against Archelas, was for that hee tooke it in euill part that hee was procured and compelled to serue his filthy lust. Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired vpon the B very like occasion: For when Archelas had abused his youth, because he restored him not into his country according to his promise. This Hellanocrates imagined that Archelas had desired & vsed his company to iniury and reproch him, and not for loue. Paron, Heraclides, and Enian, slew Cotis to bee reuenged for the iniury done to their father. And Adamas forsooke Cotis and went from him, because he had caused him to be gelded in despight & reproch, while he was a boy. Also many in anger because they had ben beaten and wounded in their bodies, haue [...]laine or enterpri­sed to kill princes and kings: as at Mitilene, Megacles conspired with his friends, slew the Penta­lides gouernors of the towne, who in all places as they walked vp and down, vse with yron clubs to beat those that passed by them: and afterwards Smerdes slew Pentilas for that he had ben beaten C by him, and drawne about by his wife. Decamnicus was the author and director of the conspira­cie against Archelas, and the first that stirred vp the other rebels. The occasion of his anger was, for that Archelas had deliuered him to the Po [...]t Euripides to bee beaten, who bare a grudge, be­cause he had vsed some speech of the stinking of his breath. And many other haue for like causes ben slaine or laid in wait for to that end.

Three things prouoke subiects to conspire against Monarchs, namely, iniustice, fear and contempt: & conspiracie is made either against the person of the Prince, or against his state. That conspiracie which proceedeth of iniury, whereof there are many sorts, is D against the person of the king for reuenge of outrage, dishonor, or domage receaued. Touching the which Aristotle alledgeth many examples fetched from the manners & customes of Greece, whereto it is easie to adde an innumerable others, both ancient & moderne, wherwith we may be furnished by the licentious life of princes in their great authority. For the abusing whereof, many of them haue ben greatly despised, and either killed or shamefully driuen out of their states.

INIVSTICE is cheefly committed by occasion of reproch and iniury, and sometimes also vpon 1 occasion of spoiling men of their goods.] Aristotle in the chap. folowing saith, The Monarch ought to abstaine from all kinds of iniury, and specially from two sorts; the one, from E beating of folke, the other from dishonouring youth by filthy lust. Therefore iniuries concerne goods, bloud, or honour. Of those that concerne blood, the threatnings are more dangerous then the execution, yea they are most dangerous, and the execution without all perill; for he that is dead, cannot thinke of reuenge, and they that be aliue, for the most part, care very little or nothing at all for it: but hee that hath been threate­ned, and seeth himselfe of necessitie constrained to doe, or suffer, becommeth a dan­gerous person, and one greatly to be feared by the Prince. Next to this necessity, goods and honour are the two thinges which most offend men, and whereof the Prince is to take heed, for he cannot strip a man so naked, but he shall leaue him a knife to worke re­uenge F withall, nor so much dishonour him, but he wil yet retaine a stedfast mind to seek for redresse. Now amongst those honours which are taken away, the honour of gentle­women is of greatest weight & importance. And next to it the dispising and disdaining of a mans person.

SOME conspiracies are made against the persons of Princes, others against their state.] 2 Brutus and Cassius with their complices conspired against Iulius Caesar to kill him, desiring to deliuer their Countrey whereon he signorized, keeping it in thraldome. [Page 314] Henry Earle of Derby conspired against his owne kinsman Richard King of England, G to take the crowne from him. Richard and Edward Dukes of Yorke, against Henry the [...]ixt to the same end. Pepin & Lotarius conspired against Lewys the Pitiful, their father, Emperour and King of Fraunce, to compell him to leaue and resigne the imperiall dig­nity, and to lead the rest of his life in the solitarinesse of religion. Gaguin writeth in his fourth booke, and Paulus AEmilius in his third booke, Catiline and Hanno, of whome we haue spoken before, conspired against their countries, the one against the Romane, the other against the Carthaginian state.

3 THE conspiracie against the children of Pisistratus was caused through the iniury done to Harmodus his sister.] Pisistratus the Tyran of Athens at the time of his death left three H sonnes, Diocles, Hipparcus, and Hippias, against whome a conspiracie was made vpon this occasion: Diocles the eldest sonne, hauing forced a young Damosell, sister to Har­modus, was by him slaine. Hippias minding to reuenge his brothers death, caused Har­modus to be apprehended, and diligently to bee examined vpon the racke concerning them that were guiltie and consenting to the death of his brother, and Harmodus na­med all the Tyrans cheefe friends, who caused them presently to be all slaine. And af­terwards when the murtherer was asked againe whether he had any more complices in this matter, he answered, There be no more that I desire to see slaine, sauing thy selfe. By which speech he gaue him to vnderstand, that he had ouercome him and his Tyrannie, I euen as he had reuenged the shame done to his sister. Whē this came to the knowledge of the Athenians, they draue Hippias out of the Citie, and sent him into exile: as Iu­stine writeth in his second booke. Plinie declareth, that the Athenians erected Images for them. But Thucidides speaketh otherwise concerning this matter in his first booke: The Athenians (sayth he) beleeue and say commonly that Hipparcus was slaine by Har­modus and by Aristogiton, because he was a Tyran; and consider not howe at the same time that he was slaine, Hippias that was the eldest sonne of Pisistratus, reigned in the City of Athens, whose brethren Hipparcus, and Thessalus were, and that one day Har­modus and Aristogiron (who had vndertaken to kill them all three) imagining that the K matter had ben disclosed to Hippias by some of their complices, durst not execute their enterprise against him, doubting least he were aduertised of it. But neuerthelesse they determined to doe some act worthy of memory before they were taken. So they came and found Hipparcus, who was busie in offering sacrifice at the Temple, which was called Leocorion, and there slew him. As Plato writeth in his second Dialogue of the Symposes.

4 PAVSANIAS slew king Philip, because he neglected the iniury done vnto him by Atta­lus.] Plutarch in the life of Alexander the great, declareth that murther in this manner: When Pausanias had been villainously outraged in his body by the knowledge & com­maundement L of Attalus and Cleopatra, and could not obtaine redresse nor iustice at the hands of king Philip, he turned his wrath against him, and slew him for despight. The fault of which murther was for the most part imputed to Olimpias, for shee (as the report went) prouoke and incensed this young man boiling in anger, so to doe: but there was some suspition also that touched Alexander. Iustine in his ninth book setteth downe this matter more plainely. While King Philip expected the aid of Greece, hee determined to celebrate the marriage betweene Alexander, whom hee had made king of Epyrus, and Cleopatra his daughter. So the day was appointed whereon the marri­age should bee solemnised in great triumph, as the dignity of the two Kings required: M whereat there were many playes and pastimes. And as king Philip was comming to be­hold them being betweene the two Alexanders, the one his owne naturall sonne, and the other his sonne in law, without any of his guard about him. Pausanias a yong Gen­tleman, whome no man suspected, espied Philip in a narrow place, and passing by, slewe him. By this meanes the day which had ben appointed for great triumph, was turned in­to great mourning. This Pausanias had ben in his youth violently abused in his body [Page 315] A by Attalus, who besides the reproch & outrage he had done vnto him, committed ano­ther thing against him that was more villainous: For hee caused him to come to a ban­quet, and when hee was drunken, was not content to abuse his body, but exposed it to other of the gests, as a common strumpet, whereupon euery body after derided & moc­ked him: of which reproch and outrage hee had often made complaint to king Philip, who fed him with words, and laughed him to scorne. Therefore when hee saw that hee who had committed this reproch and outrage, was honoured, and made Captaine and lieutenant to the king, he turned his anger against the king himselfe. Thus reuenged he his iniury vpon the iudge, because he could not reuenge it vpon the partie. Many were B of opinion, that Olimpias (Alexanders mother) had procured him to this deed, and that Alexander was priuy to it, because he was no lesse angry and displeased that Philip had forsaken Olimpias his mother, to marry Cleopatra, then that Pausanias had ben so vile­ly abused, and specially for that hee doubted least Philip would leaue the kingdome to the sonne which he had by Cleopatra: Diodorus Siculus in the six and twentieth chap­ter of his sixteenth booke, declareth all the matter at large, concluding in this manner: Behold how Philip who was the greatest king of his time that was in all Europe, and who for the greatnesse of his power placed himselfe in the ranke of the twelue gods, pi­tifully ended his daies, after he had reigned the space of foure and twenty yeares. This C Prince had at the beginning of his reigne very small power, but he encreased it greatly afterwards, not so much by force of armes, as by his gentle speech and by his good be­hauiour, and the good countenance he shewed all the world. And it is said, that himself gloried more in his martiall wisedome, and the exploits he had done through good skil to deale wisely in matters, then in those that he had executed by prowesse and force of armes. For in victories (said he) all they which fight in the battaile, haue part; but in the exploits, which I haue done by skill of handling of matters wisely, the honour is due to none but to my selfe alone.

D The like happeneth through feare, which we haue reckoned as one of the causes that work the destructions of Monarchies, aswell as of other states. As Artabanus wrought a trech [...]rous practise against Xerxes, fearing the accusation made by his enemies concerning Darius, whome he had caused to be hanged without the commandement of Xerxes: and supposed that Xerxes would pardon him, and not remember it for the good cheare which he had made him at supper.

Conspiracie riseth vpon occasion of feare, when a man is threatened by the Prince, and will preuent it by practising to execute that first which he supposeth to be preten­ded against him. These threatnings are very hurtfull to Princes, and the cause of more E vehement conspiracies, then wrongs and offences be. Therefore they ought to refraine from threatning. For it is expedient to deale friendly with men, or to prouide sufficient security against them, and neuer to bring them into such tearmes, as to giue them occa­sion to thinke that they must needs die, or deliuer themselues from death. The Emperor Commodus had two Captaines of Pretorian souldiers, whose names were Letus and Electus, whom he accounted two of his cheefe and most familiar friend; so had he Mar­tia for the best beloued of his concubines: but because they often blamed him for those acts which he committed contrary to the dignity of his person, and of the Empire, hee determined their death, and wrote in a bill, Martia, Letus, Electus, & some other names F of men that the next night he intended to put to death. This bill hee laid vnder the pil­low of his bed, and when hee was gone to the hot house, a young man that was highlie in his fauour, playing about the chamber, and vpon his bed, found the bill, and as hee went out of the chamber with this paper in his hand met Martia, who took it from him and read it, and seeing the contents, sent immediately for Letus and Electus, who per­ceiuing the danger they stood in, determined to preuent it, and without delay the night following slew Commodus. The Emperour Anthonius Caracalla warred in Mesopo­tamia, [Page 316] and had for his lieutenant Macrinus, a man more ciuile then warlike. And as it G falleth out, that bad Princes stand alwaies in feare least that bee executed against them which they thinke they haue deserued, Antonius wrote to Maternianus his friend, be­ing then at Rome, appointing him to inquire of the Astrologers, if there were any that aspired to the Empire, and to aduertise him thereof. Maternianus wrote backe vnto him that Macrinus aspired to it. This letter fell first into Macrinus hands, and perceauing that he must needs kill the Emperour, before any new letter came to him from Rome, or else be killed himselfe, hee committed the matter to Martiall a Centurion his faithfull friend (whose brother Antonius a few daies before had slaine) who executed this com­mission. H

1 ARTAEANVS wrought a trecherous practise against Xerxes.] Diodorus Siculus in the 15. chapter of his eleuenth booke, setteth downe that conspiracie in this sort: Ar­tabanus of the countrey of Hyrcan, a man in great credit with his master king Xerxes, and Captaine of his guard, enterprised to kill him, and to make himselfe King: hee ac­quainted another with his enterprise, whose name was Mythridates, an Eunuch, who lay in the kings chamber, in whome the king put more confidence then in any other. This man was Artabanus kinsman and old friend, by reason wherof he easily consented to his treason. Therefore Artabanus comming secretly by night into the kings cham­ber I by the meanes of his Eunuch, slew him in his bed: & then went straight towards his children, who were three in number, to wit, Darius the eldest, the second Artaxerxes, and the third Histaspes, who at that time was absent from the court, for he had the go­uernment of the countrey of the Bactrians. Nowe then after the killing of Xerxes, Ar­tabanus went to Artaxerxes, for it was night still, and gaue him to vnderstand, that his brother Darius had slaine their father, to the intent to vsurpe the kingdome: And coun­selled him so to deale (before his brother had got all into his possession) that through his owne slouthfulnesse and want of courage, hee were not compelled to serue, where hee might be lord, make himselfe king, and bee auenged vpon him that had slaine his father; K promising him withall (if he would enterprise the matter) to giue him the guards of his fathers body. Artaxerxes beleeued it, and presently went with the guards of his father, to kill Darius his elder brother. Therefore Artabanus perceiuing his enterprise in such forwardnesse, tooke his owne children with him, telling them that nowe was a fit time to get the kingdome, and bending himselfe against Artaxerxes, stroke him with a sword: Artaxerxes feeling himselfe wounded, but not to death, quickly tooke his sword to de­fend himselfe, and stroke Artabanus so right, that he fell dead to the ground. Thus Ar­taxerxes being almost wonderfully saued, and hauing withall reuenged the death of his father, succeeded him in the kingdome and in the Empire of Persia. Reade Iustine also L touching this matter in the beginning of his third booke.

1 Other conspiracies are caused through contempt; as a certaine man seeing Sardanapalus spin amongst Gentlewomen, if it bee true that is reported thereof. And although it happened not so 2 to him, it may neuerthelesse happen indeed vnto some other. Dion rose against Dionisius the lat­ter, through contempt, chee [...]ly because he perceiued the other Citizens bore him euill wil, and be­cause 3 he was alwaies drunke. And some friends conspire against Monarchs, through con­tempt, whom they despise for the trust that is reposed in them, as men that can execute their en­terprise before they be disclosed. Moreouer, they that thinke they can obtaine the state, conspire M in some respects through contempt: For as men that perceiue themselues of sufficient power to at­taine their purposes, and making no account of danger, by reason of their power they easily enter­prise: 4 As the generals of armies against the Monarchs. As Cyrus did against Astiages, des­pising his life and power, because his army was corrupted, & because he himselfe wallowed in de­lights 5 and pleasure. And Senthis the Thracian against Amadoceus, being Maister of his armie.

[Page 317] A The Prince is despised when he sheweth himselfe variable, light, e [...]feminat, cowardly, and not well staied, from which imperfections he should more carefully keepe himselfe than from a rocke in the sea, and should so carrie himselfe; that men may acknowledge in all his actions a certaine maiestie, noblenesse of heart, grauitie and constancie; causing that in those things specially which concerne the perticular matters of his subiects, his sentence may stand for an irreuocable decree: and he should maintaine himselfe in such reputation, that men should feare to go about to deceaue him. The prince that procu­reth such estimation of himselfe, cannot faile to be greatly feared and redoubted, and be­ing so, hardly will any man attempt to conspire against him: neither shall he bee easily B assailed of any that knoweth him to be a lord that is valiaunt, and both honoured and o­beied by his people. It is therefore necessarie for him to cause the feare of his name in two places; the one within his owne countrie, in regard of his subiects; the other in for­raine countries, in regard of strange Potentates, from whome hee shall defend himselfe with good munition and good friends that are his allies and confederats, who wil neuer faile him, so he vse good order and gouernment in his owne forces: and when forraigne matters go well forward, domesticall causes will remaine in good state, vnlesse some se­crete conspiracie at home disturbe them: Wherein he cannot prouide a better remedie then by not making himselfe to be dispised and grudged at by his subiects, but conten­ting C them by honest means. For hatred and contempt, are the two chiefe causes of con­spiracies: for the conspirator thinketh he doth greatly-gratifie the common people by the death of the lord that hath their euill will and is despised. And where he should ima­gine to hurt him, he would scarce execute the enterpri [...]e, by reason of the infinite diffi­culties which are in the directing and performance of such attempts: for ther is nothing but all kind of dreadfulnesse, iealousie, distrust, and feare of punishment, before the con­spirators eies, to dismay and make them slacke in their purposes, wheras the Prince hath on his side, the maiestie of his crowne, the lawes, the helpe of his friends, and his Guard; whereto if the good will of the common people be added, there shall not bee found so D rash and foole hardie a man that dare take such follie in hand.

As a certain man seeing Sardanapalus spin with gentlewomen.] Sardanapalus king of the 1 Assyrians, who was far corrupter in all kind of lewdnesse then a light woman: And al­though his Lieutenants were not permitted to come to the sight of him, yet Arbactus his lieutenant in Media, through great ambition and means, obtained with much adoe to see him, and found him amongst a companie of his concubines, spinning of Purple, in womans apparell, lighter in countenance, in apparell, and wanton toies, than any of the rest, appointing the damsels to their tasks and worke: Whereat Arbactus was so offended, that so great a number of men wearing armour, obeied a woman which dealt E about a wooll, that he disclosed what he had seene, to his fellowes the lieutenants of o­ther Prouinces: to whome he declared how he would neuer obey such a kind of man as had rather be a woman than a man: And he did hereby so stirre them vp, that all with one accord made warres against him. When knowledge hereof came to Sardanapalus, he sought not (as a man should doe) how to defend his kingdome, but (as women doe) a place where he might hide his head. Notwithstanding within a short time after, when he perceaued himselfe driuen to it, he came foorth with a few men without order to the battel: where being immediatly ouercome, withdrew himselfe to his roial palace, wherin he caused a pile of wood to be made, then did he set himself & his riches vpon it, causing F fire to be put vnder it, performing in that thing only, a mās act. After his death, Arbactus was made king in his stead, who transferred the empire of the Assyrians to the Medes: as Iustine writeth lib. 1. But Diodorus Siculus lib. 2. cap. 107. wrote thus concerning that matter: Sardanapalus the 30 king of the line of Ninus, and last king of the Assyrians, went beyond all his predecessors in slouthfulnesse and idlenesse: for besides that he was neuer seene abroad by any man liuing, hee lead an effeminate life with his concubines, wearing one while a crimosen coat, another while a coat of fine wooll, another while a [Page 318] womans cloake. Hee painted his face, and all his body, according to the manner of a G strumpet, shewing himselfe more lasciuious then women themselues, and counterfei­ted his speech according to the imitation and likenesse of theirs: He desired not only to haue daily such food both in meat and drinke, as might prouoke him to lightnesse, but also gaue himselfe wholly to lust, abused one while the office of a man, another while the office of a woman, besides all honesty, without regard of kind, & without all shame. While Sardanapalus continued his manner of liuing in this dissolution and wicked­nesse, Arbaces of Medea, a man full of great vertue, and of a good stomacke, captain of the army that was yearely sent by the Medes before the city of Nine, subuerted & whol­ly destroied the state and kingdome of Assyria, which had so long lasted Budeus sayth, H That when Sardanapalus departed out of the world, he carried away with him and as it were spoiled the earth of goods, very neere worth fifty millions of gold.

2 DION rose vp against Dionisius the last, through contempt.] Dion, son of Hippias, ouer­threw the Tyranny of Dionisius, and with lesse meanes then euer man had, that before him tooke such matters in hand, ouerthrewe the greatest and mightiest state that then was in all Europe, contrary to the opinion and hope of all the world. For who would euer haue beleeued that he that arriued in Sicilia only with two ships of burthen, could haue ouercome a lord that had at his disposing 400 vessels with oares, an 100000 foot­mē, 10000 horsemen, with such prouision and munition of armour, corne, and money, I as was needfull to furnish the maintenance of so great a power, and that besides al these things, had in his obedience one of the greatest and mightiest cities that then was in al Greece, that had so many hauens, so many goodly storehouses, so many strong castles that could not be taken by siege, and besides all that, was in league with many great and mighty confederates? but the thing that gaue Dion the victory in this enterprise, was cheefly his noble heart and valiant mind, with the loue & good wil that they bare him, whom he came to set at liberty. And that which more auailed him then all this, was the slouthfuln [...]sse and cowardlinesse of the Tyran, with the hate and euil wil that they bare him, whom he vniustly kept in bondage. All which causes concurring together in one K selfesame time, brought those matters to effect, which otherwise were altogether incre­dible. The history appeareth in Diodorus Siculus his sixt booke, and in Plutarch in the life of Dion. George Gemist in his first booke of the acts of the Grecians, declareth al­so the enterprise of Dion, and what followed thereon.

3 AND some friends do conspire against the Monarchs through contempt.] Cōmonly, they that conspire against Monarchs, are familiar with them, and men of great credite about them, and there bee some that are prouoked to conspire sooner, by reason of too many benefits & good turns which they haue receiued, then by occasion of too much wrong and outrage: as Perennius did against Commodus, Plautian against Seuerus, and Seian L against Tyberius, who had ben aduanced to great riches by the Emperors, & to so great degree of honor, that they thought they wanted nothing to the perfection of their au­thority & power, but the Empire, whereof not minding to misse, they conspired against their masters, whose conspiracies had all such ends, as their vnthankefulnesse deserued. Therfore the Prince that will keep himself frō conspiracie, ought more to fear thē whō he hath raised to great preferment, then them whom he hath hardly dealt withall. For these of the latter sort want cōmodities wherwith the others abound, and their wils be all alike: for the desire of reigning, is as great or greater, thē the desire of reuenge. Ther­fore Princes ought not to giue so great authority to their friends, as that there should M not remain some ods and space betweene it & their owne soueraigne dignity; and that there should not be betweene both, something to bee wished for by them: otherwise, it shalbe a strange and rare case, if it fal not out with them, as it did with those Emperors.

4 As Cirus did against Asti [...]ges, dispising his life & authority.] Cyrus was son of Maridane, Astiages his daughter, that was married to Cambises a Persian lord. Zenophon in the first booke of the institution bringeth in Cirus a young child, flouting at the delights [Page 319] A and superfluities of Astyages his grandfather, the which in sum may bee referred to the saying of Aristotle-Neuerthelesse Herodotus in his [...] book writeth, that the cruelty and hard dealing of Astyages, was the occasion that he lost his empire, and the Medes their libertie.

And Senthis the Thracian, against Amadoceus.] Zenophon maketh mention of their 4 strife, in the fourth booke of the Greeke affaires.

Some conspire for many such things together, as for the contempt which they haue of Mo­narkes: and for the gaine which they seeke for, as Mithridates did against Ariobarzanes: & 1 B for this cause make they inuasions, specially they that be hardie of nature and couragious, and are preferred to honour by the Monarks, in martiall offices; for manhood possessing power, wexeth audacious: and by means of each of the same, rise they against their princes, as men that may ea­sily attaine to their purpose.

The bould and couragious of nature, being aduanced by the monarks, and preferred to the guiding of the armies, conspire against them through contempt of their persons, and for the hope they haue to get their state, or some grear Prouince depending on the same. So the last kings of the race of Clouys, being grown very slothfull, and so subiect to their pleasure, that no account was made of them, enioied no more for a certain time C but the bare and only name of king, and left the whole gouernment of the kingdome to the Maiors of the Palace, and Constables: who hauing the forces in their hands, and disposing of al affairs concerning peace and and war according to their own discretion, tooke so much boldnes vpon them as to driue them away and place themselues in their steads. Charles Martel with such power kept foure kings vnder his tuition, & by means thereof gaue an entrance to Pepin his sonne to obtaine the crowne, which caused Chil­deriks haires to be clipped (who was the last king of that race, without children & with­out wit) and put him in a Monasterie, and after practised to procure himselfe to be cho­sen king, as one that could well performe the dutie of a king, and to be placed instead of D him that was vnfit for it, by the Nobilitie of Fraunce: who to that end were by Pope Za­charie dispensed withall for the oath of fidelitie that they had taken to the other. And after came Stephan his successor into France, of very purpose to consecrate Pepin, and to settle Pepin in his vsurpation, vnder the cloke and authoritie of Religion: as Gaguin writeth in his 4 booke, and Paulus AEmilius in his 2 booke. Likewise Hugh Capet, a man of mightie courage, when there was none to withstand his practises and enterpri­ses, so handled his matters with force and violence, that hee obtained the kingdome, and procured himselfe to be crowned king of France; saying he was admonished to doe so as he was asleepe, by S. Valerie and S. Richard, because hee had worshipped their bodies E with great honour and reuerence, and was carefull to lay them againe in their own pla­ces, when they had bene transported out of their graues by the Normans: To which myracle he added the lawfull succession of his linage; for he boasted that hee was issued of Odo the Angeuyn, whom the Nobilitie of France by reason of the cowardlinesse of Charles the Simple, had placed in the kingdome: as Paulus Emilius writeth in his third booke, and Gaguyn in his sixt booke.

As Mithridates conspired against Ariobarzanes.] Zenophon in the 7 booke of the ex­pedition 1 of Cyrus the yonger, speaketh of one Mithridates gouernour of Lycaonia and Cappadocia.

F

But in them that conspire for ambition, there is another maner of cause besides those that are before recited: for they assault not the tyrans as some doe, to the end to possesse the great profits and honours which they see in them, but determine to hazard themselues in doing some act worthy of remembrance, therby to purchase reputation and renowne: they (I say) assault not tyrans to the end to get their state, but glorie. Notwithstanding there be few that attempt to conspire for this cause; for they must be resolued to make no accoūt of their liues, so they may attaine their purpose. [Page 320] And it is needful for thē to haue the like mind that Dion had, for he assaulted Dionisius the tyran G with a few soldiors, saying, that he was so minded that it should suffise him in what place soeuer he came, to haue set this enterprise so farre forward, though after he had entred neuer so little into the Tyrans countrey, hee should presently die, and that this death should bee honourable vnto him.

In old time great honors were set down in Greece for them that killed the Tyrans. Therefore many were pushed forwards by this ambition, to conspire against them, to get glory and reputation: such a one was Dion amongst the Grecians, who inuaded Dionisius the younger: and Brutus amongst the Romanes, who slew Iulius Caesar, to H free the Commonweale from Tyranny, and to purchase the renowme and reputation of a good Citizen. Plutarch in their liues compareth them together. Now when there are such ambitious conspiratours, which haue no care nor feare of death, so that they may effect their purposes, it is very hard for a Prince to beware of them: but the best meanes for the auoiding of such danger, is that he get the generall loue of his subiects, for when hee hath obtained that, there will not bee any man, how desperate soeuer he be that will attempt any thing against them. Nam (vt ait Cicero libro secundo Officio­rum) rerum omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas, quam diligi, nec alienius, quam timeri. Praeclarè Ennius. I

Multorum autem odijs nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea suit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec verò huius Tyranni solùm, quem armis oppressa pertulit ciuitas, interitus declarat, quantū odium hominum valet ad pestem; sed reliquorum similes exitus Tyrannorum, quorum haud ferè qui [...]quam interitum similem effugit. Malus enim custos diuturnitatis metus: contràque beneuolèntia fidelis est vel ad perpetuitatem. Nec verò vlla vis imperij tanta est, quae pre­mente metu possit esse diut [...]rna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter cateros nobilitata crude­litas, qui non ex insidijs interijt, nec à paucis, sed in quem vniuersa Agrigentinorum multitudo K impetum fecit.

The Tyranny is likewise destroyed by an exterior manner, as euery other Commonweale, to wit, if there be any contrary estate of greater power. For doubtlesse there wants no readinesse thereunto by reason of the diuersitie of gouernement; and that which all men desire, if they can, they will execute. The contrarie formes of Commonweales, are as the Democratie to the Tyrannie: in like sort, as one potter is contrary to another, according to Hesiodus: sith the last kind of Democratie is a Tyrannie. Likewise, the Kingly state and the Aristocratie, by rea­son of the contrarietie of gouernement. Wherefore the Lacedemonians destroyed manie L Tyrannies, and the Siracusans also while they were well gouerned. Sometimes the Tyran­nie is destroyed by it selfe, when there ariseth a faction betweene those that participate there­in, as it did long since come to passe in the Tyrannie of Gelon, it was ouerthrowne by the meanes of Thrasibulus, Gelons brother; who flattered Gelons sonne, and brought him vp in e [...]seminate delicatenesse, that hee himselfe might raigne: wherewith the young Princes friends being offended, gathered power and made resistance, to the end, that the Tyrannie might not be destroyed, but rather Thrasibulus: but their complices seeing this opportunitie, expulsed them all. And Dion hauing by force of armes, and with the helpe of the people expulsed Dionisius, whose kinsman he was, was slaine. M

The Tyrannie is destroyed in two manners, the one outward, the other in­ward. Outwardly, as euery other kind of Commonweale, when there is any con­trarie Estate of greater power, as the Romane Commonweale, hauing at­tained wonderfull great force and might, destroyed all the Kingdomes that it could, and made them small Prouinces. The Venetian Signorie extending her [Page 321] A dominion into the firme land of Italie, hath destroyed many petty Lords and Tyrans, at Padoa, Verona, and other places which it hath conquered. Contrariwise, the Tyranny is enemy to Commonweales, and doth euery where destroy them, if it haue power and meanes to doe so: as in ancient times the Macedonian Tyranny, destroyed the cheefe Commonweales of Greece: and that of Persia, the Popular sta [...]es of Ionia Demosthe­nes in his first Oration in fauour of the Olinthians, sayeth thus: [...]. Tyrannies are likewise destroyed by inward meanes, when the Lords of the Tyrans blood, and such as p [...]r­ticipate in the Tyranny, doe band themselues each against other: as the quarrell that B grew betweene Dionisius and Dion his wiues brother: and betweene Gelons kinsmen after his death. Gelon and Dionisius were both of them Tyrans at Syracusa, where their Tyrannies continued not long. Tamberlan or Themirlan the great Tiran of the Tartars established the seat of his Tyranny at Samarcand, where it presently failed through the dissension of his sons. In like sort the estate of Cyrus lasted not long in his progeny, but decaied through the enuy which Cambises bare to his brother Smerdis; and through his insolence. Neither did the estate of the Emperor Seuerus endure long, by reason by like dissension, growing betweene his sons. The Empire of Greece being possessed by the Paleologi, was brought to ruine through their mutuall discords.

C

As it did long since come to passe in the Tyrannie of Gelon.] Herodotus in the seuenth 1 booke of his hystory sheweth how Gelon attained to the Tyranny at Siracula, which as Aristotle saith here, was destroied through the discord of his kinsmen.

Now sith there are two principal causes for which men conspire against the Tyrannical states, to wit, hatred, and contempt: it is necessary that this hatred be against the Tyrans, yet their ruins and destructions doe for the most part proceed from contempt. There is an euident signe of this in that many who haue vsurped estates, haue likewise held them during their owne liues, but almost D all their successors haue presently l [...]st them: for by leading voluptuous liues, they grow into Con­tempt, and minister sundry occasions for the working of their owne destructions. Likewise, anger is to be accounted a part of hatred, sith it doth in some sort cause the same effects; and it is oft of greater force then hatred, because men being angry, cannot admit nor vse reason in that per­turbation of their minds. And men doe cheefly vpon the receiuing of iniuries, suffer themselues to be carried away by the impetuous passion of anger. By which meanes the Tyranny of Pisistra­tus his children was destroyed, as also sundry others. But hatred do [...]th greater hurt: for an­ger is with greefe, so that a man cannot easily vse reason therein: but hatred is without gree [...]e.

E

A Prince must aboue all thinges preserue his estate, which thing doth no lesse consist in doing nothing that is vnmeet and vnseemely for him, then in doing all that doth beseeme him. But he that doth fashion himselfe to austerity or affability, more or lesse then he ought, is no longer a King or a Prince, but becommeth either a popu­lar flatterer, or a prowd Maister, and procureth to himselfe either the contempt or hatred of his subiects: yet it seemeth that the one is an error, committed through too great bounty and humanity, the other through arrogance and fiercenesse. It is so difficult a thing for a Prince to carry himselfe well in the gouernement of a F great Estate, that many haue beene as much hated or [...]espised for being too gentle, or too seuere, as for being couetous, cruell, spoilers of the State, or cowards, effeminate and slothfull persons. Pertinax was created Emperour of Rome against the Souldiours wils, who hauing learned to liue licentiously vnder Commodus, could not endure the discipline and reasonable order where­unto Pertinax would haue brought them: Who hauing by this meanes pur­chased their hatred, and there being hereunto adioyned a certaine Contempt, [Page 322] by reason of his great age, hee was slaine presently after his aduancement to the Em­pire. G Alexander was of so great bountie and clemencie, that among other praises which his eternall renowme doth giue him, the hystories record, that for the space of foureteene yeares that he had raigned, there was neuer any man put to death but by sentence and order of iudgement: Notwithstanding, because he was accounted a man of small courage, and one that suffered himselfe to bee ruled by his mother, hee fell in the end into such contempt, that his army conspired against him, and bereaued him of his life. Contrariwise, if we consider the qualities of Commodus, Seuerus, Anthonius Caraculla, and Maximinus, we shall find that they haue all ben cruell and extreame ex­actors on the people, and that to please and satisfie their souldiors, exercised all the out­rages, H wrongs, and violences, that might possibly bee committed on their subiects: but each of them had a miserable and shamefull end, saue only the Emperour Seuerus, who was indued with such magnanimitie and prowesse, that by keeping still the loue of his souldiors, although he did greatly tyrannize ouer his subiects, yet it was easie for him to enioy an happy raigne, because his vertues made him so admirable both to his people and souldiors, that the one were astonished, and the other content and full of obedi­ence. Antonius Caracalla his sonne was likewise very valiant, and garnished with ex­cellent parts and vertues, which caused him to be feared of the people, & well thought of by the souldiors: For he was a warlike man, hardened to the enduring of all trauaile I and paines, a despiser of delicate fare, and all other pleasures, whereby hee woon the good will and loue of the souldiors: But his insolence and cruelty were so immoderate and excessiue (for he had put to death vpon particular and priuate occasions, the grea­test part of the Romane people, and all those of Alexandria wholly) that in the end hee was hated by all the world, & became dreadfull to his neerest and most familiar friends, and finally was slaine by a Centurion in the middest of his armie. Commodus being of a cruell and beastly nature, that he might the better exercise his greedie and extorting Tyranny against his subiects, did exceedingly fauour the souldiours, whom hee nouri­shed and maintained in an vnbridled and immoderate libertie: on the other side not ob­seruing K the degree of his high dignitie, hee would descend into the open Theatre to fight before all the Romane people with skirmishers and sword-players, and commit­ted sundry other base acts, and vnworthy of the imperiall Maiestie, whereby hee grewe by little and little to lose the good will of his souldiors, and so consequently being ha­ted on the one side, and despised on the other, it is no meruell that conspiracies were wrought against him, and that they of his owne traine, and of greatest account about him, caused his death. Maximinus was a great warriour, and for that cause was chosen Emperour through the disliking which the army conceiued of the saied Alexanders peaceable gouernement, but he held not the Empire long, by reason of two foule ble­mishes L that were in him; the one because he had been of base and abiect estate, hauing kept beasts in the countrey of Thrace, which was a thing notorious to eueryone, and bred a meruellous disdaine and contempt of him; the other, because at the begin­ning of his raigne, he deferring his returne to Rome, there to take possession of the im­periall seat, caused men to conceiue a generall opinion of his cruelty, by reason of the rigorous in humanities which his lieutenants did by his order and commandement vse both in the City of Rome, & in sundry places of the Romane Empire: So that the world disdaining him for the basenesse of his birth, and on the other side hating him for his cruell nature, which th [...] feared, first Affricke reuolted from him, then the Senate, with M all the people of Rome, afterwards Italy, and lastly his owne army which lay at the siege of Aquilea. But finding the City not to be woon, and hating his fellonious nature, and withall fearing him the lesse, because they sawe him bearded on all sides by many ene­mies, they slew him. The Emperor Nero was abominable for prodigality, whoredome, and cruelty, through which vices, he became contemptible to all the armes which rose against him, and hated by the Senate, which condemned him to haue his necke put in a [Page 323] A furke, as theeues were vsed, and to be whipped to death with rods: Whereof he hauing [...] intelligence, fled by night out of Rome, and lamenting that none offered to rid him of his life, he said, Haue I then neither friend nor enemy? Finally, as hee slew himselfe, hee cried out that he had liued filthily, and died more vilely. The whole City of Rome did so reioice at his death, that all the people wearing such hats as slaues doe when they are made free, triumphed as being deliuerd from a cruell raigne and Tyranny. Seneca won­dring at the dissolute and excessiue prodigality of Caligula, sayth thus, It seemeth to me that Nature brought forth this Prince, to shew what extreame vices can doe when they light on supreme and soueraigne fortune. He was so horribly depraued, and so in­comparably B vicious, that he would spend at one banquet one hundred thousand [...]ester­tians. But although he sought to further his insatiable humour with the wits and deui­ses of all the gluttonous and prodigall persons that hee could heare of, yet could hee scarse find meanes to wa [...]t in the charges of one supper the tribute of three Prouinces. He caused himselfe to bee called Lord and God, hee did carnally abuse his three sisters, made his Pallace a Brothel house, prostituting therein the Romane ladies, slew cruelly many Senators and others, for which wicked acts, hee was himselfe slaine by a Tribune of the souldiours. The Emperour Galien for his dishonest life, for the thinges that hee had impudently committed, and for his disloialty, was not only despised of men, but al­so C of women: Therefore in his reigne rose vp thirty rebellious Tyrans, among whome there was a Marshall, whose name was Marius that was called Emperour, and Xenobia and Victorina reigned. Iustine in the beginning of his third booke writeth, That Xerxes King of Persia, who had ben the terror of the world, began to bee despised by his owne men after he had ben so vnfortunate in the warres of Greece, insomuch, that one of his Captaines and most familiar Chamberlains seeing his Maiesty to decline and decrease from day to day, enterprised to kill him, and by that meanes to make himselfe King. I will passe ouer Domitian, Heliogabalus, Iulian, and others innumerable in all Monar­chies both ancient and moderne, as Heathens, Christians, and Mahometians, which D for their wickednesse and cowardise, haue had miserable ends, and come all to no­thing.

To knit vp the matter in few words, all those causes which wee haue affirmed to destroy the immoderate and last Oligarchie, and the vnreasonable and extreme kind of Democratie, may be applied to the Tyranny: for these formes of Commonweales distinct and seuered, are kinds of Tyrannies.

The latter kinds of the Oligarchie and Democratie, are a Tyranny, not of one man, E but of many together; when a certaine number of the richest play the Tyrans in the Oligarchie, and the people in the Democratie: as Aristotle sayth in his fourth booke of Politickes, the sixt chapter.

The Kingdome is least of all destroyed by outward causes, and therefore lasteth longest, but is commonly ouerthrowne of it selfe in two manner of waies. The one, when the cheefe lords of the 1 kingdome are diuided, and at variance amongst themselues. The other, if the Kings goe about to 2 reigne too Tyrannically, and will accomplish most matters according to their owne plea­sure, and contrary to the lawes. At this day there bee but few kingdomes, but are rather M [...] ­narchies F and Tyrannies, than Kingdomes: For the Kingdome is a voluntary state or g [...] ­uernment, giuen by mens owne accord, and the king hath power ouer the greatest matters: And whereas there are many like vnto him, & none so excellent, a [...] that he can be equall to the high­nesse and dignity of this estate, therefore men doe not voluntarily obey the same. If any men at­tempt 3 to raigne through deceit, or by violent force, this seeweth already to be Tyrannie. As fo [...] 4 kingdomes that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their destruction, (besides these that we haue declared) namely for that many persons indued with no vertue nor valour, but [Page 324] iustly had in contempt, doe succeed in the same, and that they not hauing Tyrannicall power, but G kingly honour, do liue more dissolutely, and therefore are easily destroyed. For hee is no longer a king, when his subiects will not obey him. But the Tyran exerciseth dominion also ouer them that are not voluntary subiects. Therefore the Monarchies are ouerthrowne for these causes and s [...]ch like.

Although of all publicke states, the kingdome lasteth best; and of kingdomes, that which passeth by inheritance is lesser subiect to sedition then that which goeth by ele­ction, and of those kingdomes that passe by inheritance, that which goeth by successi­on to the heire male only, not so subiect to sedition as that which may fall to the heire H female, by reason it may come to a man of a straunge Nation, hauing other manners, other language, and another fashion of liuing, whereby many troubles may happen, yet notwithstanding there is no kind of kingdome, whatsoeuer it bee, that lasteth for euer. For after they be established by the vertue and prowesse of the first founders, they grow a certaine space, then remaine they in their state another space, after that begin they to decay, and at last perish two manner of wayes, as all other Commonweales do: to wit, by outward and inward meanes; but sildome outwardly, and by forraine causes when they be well gouerned, and able to defend themselues with their owne forces, against the inuasions of strangers. By this mean did the Romanes, whilest their gouern­ment I was a Commonweale, destroy many kingdomes, as Macedonia, Numidia, Mau­ritania, Pontus, Bythinia, Cappadocia, and Suria, whereof they made prouinces. In­wardly, and by domesticall causes, are kingdomes ouerturned, when the cheefe lords of the same, be at diuision and discord; and when the Kings seeke to raigne by violence, doing most thinges according to their owne pleasures, and contrary to the auncient lawes of the countrey. So kingdomes that passe by inheritance, are sometimes ouer­turned by reason of Contempt and disobedience, when children or other imperfect and vicious persons vnworthy of that honour, succeed in the same.

K

1 WHEN the principall sorts of the kingdome are diuided, and at variance amongst them­selues.] As of late yeares, the greatest part of the kingdome of Hungary hath been oc­cupied by the Turke, by occasion of the diuisions that were betweene the cheefe lords of the countrey, taking part one while with one side, and otherwhiles with another side, as it came in their heads, or as present aduantage procured them. In old time the di­uisions and discords in France betweene the houses of Orleance and Burgoigne, inter­mixed with the Englishmen, were like to haue subuerted the kingdome, at such time a [...] king Charles the sixt was fallen into a phrensie.

2 IF the kings go about to raign too Tyrannically.] Aristotle in the chapter following saith, L As the kingdome is destroied through becōming more Tyrannical thē it should, so the Tyranny is preserued by approching neerer to the maners and fashions of a kingdome. Therefore the more moderate the authority of kings is, the more and the better it is settled, loued, and honoured. Contrariwise, if they will gouern too absolutely, they los [...] straightway the good will of their subiects, and hasten their owne decay.

3 IF any attempt to reigne by deceitor by [...]orce, it seemeth to be Tyrannie.] The Magician in Persia that vsurped the kingdome after the decease of Cambises, faining himselfe to be Smerdis, Cambises his brother, reigned a while by deceit; vpon the disclosing wher­of, he was slaine by the conspiracy of the seuen Persian Lords: The Hystory is recited M by Herodotus in his third booke. Christierne, King of Denmarke, who would raigne by force and rigour in Sweathland; for the cruelty which he vsed, was expulsed out of all his dominions, and after cast into prison, where he led the rest of his life: Munster in the fourth booke of his Cosmography. Therefore according to Aristotles opinion, A king is properly a personage excellent in noblenesse of blood, or in vertue, or in po­wer, or in beauty of body, and quicknesse of wit: the third of the Politiques, the [Page 325] A eleuenth and twelfth chapter, and in the seuenth booke, the foureteenth chapter, that gouerneth a State alone for tearme of his life, according to the Lawes, not regar­ding his owne perticular commodity, but the welfare of the Commonweale, as ouerseer of the same, and gouerneth voluntary subiects, being himselfe, religious, courteous, fauourable to the good, and full of industry and diligence, and dreadfull to the bad.

AS for kingdomes that descend by inheritance, there is another cause of their ruine.] 4 Siessell in his first booke of the French Monarchy, and the eight chapter: I presuppose (sayth he) that the greatest daunger of bringing those states that are gouerned by Mo­narchs B to confusion, and into the hands of the commons, consisteth in the chaun­ging of the Princes, and cheefly when they goe by naturall succession from father to [...]onne, or from one cousin to the next of the kindred, as the Monarchie of Fraunce vseth to doe. For it chanceth often, that to a good and valiant king succeedeth a wretch spotted with many vices and imperfections, or else a young child, whereupon ensue many disordered and wilfull things by occasion of the misgouernment of the same vi­cious king, or of them that haue the gouernement of the king that is a child, or alto­gether blockish; which may cause great desolation and destruction to a state, as hath beene seene by many examples in this our owne kingdome. And without all faile, C when vengeance is to fall vpon the same by the decree and will of God, it shall come by these or other like meanes, ordained aforehand by the wisdome & prouidence of God, which mans reason and wit shall not be able to withstand: and it may be, that it will hap­pen at such a time as there shall bee most likelihood of prosperity, and least doubt of change and aduersity; to the end, that men being deceaued in worldly matters, may know the frailety and instability thereof, and the power and prouidence of God; as hath been sufficiently seene to fall out in our time, and red off in many ancient Hysto­ries. Which God grant either neuer to come to passe, or at least not while there shall be a king of this most noble and ancient race. But to speake according to mans reason, I D affirme that all such remedies as can well be deuised and imagined for the withstanding of those inconueniences when they happen, are more ready and certaine in this Mo­narchy, then in any other. For to speake of the disorder that may happen through the imperfection of the heads and Monarchs, there be many remedies that may bridle their absolute authority, if they bee depraued and wilfull. And greater meanes to restraine them that might haue the Gouernment of the Realme, if they be imperfect and weake in all respects, through want of age, or otherwise. And yet notwithstanding euermore remaineth the royall dignity and authority in his perfection, not wholly absolute, nor too much restrained, but ruled and bridled with good lawes, statutes, and customes, E which be so established, that they can hardly bee broken and frustrated, though some­times, and in some places, there doe some breach and violating of the same happen. Af­ter he saith, there be three cheefe re [...]traints whereby the absolute power of the French kings is bridled, to wit, Religion, Law, and Gouernment; and declareth them in order, throughout the same third booke. Wee haue oftspoken of the same in our discourses, as occasion was offered.

CHAP. XI. F Of the maintaining and vpholding of Monarchies.

TO speake generally, they are preserued by such meanes as are contrary to those that de­stroy them: but to speake particulerly, kingdomes are maintained by reducing them to a more moderate form. For of how much the fewer things, the Princes be absolute lords, [Page 326] so much the longer must euery Princely state last, by reason they be lesse violent, and in manners G more equall to others, and consequently lesse enuied of their subiects. For this cause the kingdome of the Molossians lasted a great while, and so did the Kingdome of the Lacedemonians, by rea­son the state at the beginning was diuided into two parts, and afterwards king Theopompus mo­derated it, as well in other things, as by adding thereunto the Magistracie of the Ephori, or Tribunes. For by cutting away some part of the Kings power, hee augmented the Kingdome in continuance of time. Insomuch, that in a certaine manner, he made it not lesser, but greater, as it is reported that he answered his wife when she did chide, and demanded if it were not a great shame for him to leaue the Kingdome lesse to his children then hee had receiued it from his fa­ther: No (sayd he) because I leaue it them in such plight, as it shall last the longer. Now, Ty­rannies H are vpholden and preserued two manner of waies, very contrary each to other: The one is deliuered from hand to hand, and obserued by many Tyrans in their gouernements. It is re­ported, that the most part of those things which concerne this way, were inuented by Periander the Corinthian: and many like may be drawne out of the gouernment of the Persians. Therefore the meanes in old time inuented for the preseruation of Tyrannies, are these, as to abase and pull downe as much as is possible, the most excellent men, and rid away those persons that haue the no­blest minds, and not to permit vnto the subiects, feasts, assemblies, learning, nor any other like thing; but to beware of all things which haue accustomed to breed these two things, haughtinesse of stomacke, and mutuall confidence; to forbid them schooles and all other idle companies; and to I prouide by all meanes, that all the subiects shal not know one another, because this knowledge cau­seth greater trust and faithfulnesse betweene them. That alwaies the yeomen of the guard, and strange people, shew themselues in the streets, and walke before the citizens. So whatsoeuer the sub­iects goe about, shall not be kept secret, and they will grow by custome to haue lesse courage, by ser­uing continually: hereto may be added many other waies, according to the Persian and Barbari­an fashions, which are Tyrannicall, & of the same effect. Likewise, to seeke the disclosing of what­soeuer the subiects say and doe, and to haue spies; as they that at Siracusa were called reporters: & Ieron sent hearkeners wheresoeuer there were any companies and meetings of people. For they are the lesse bould to speake their minds freely when they stand in feare of such kind of men, and K if they should be bold to speake freely, then wil they vse the lesse secrecie. That they accuse one ano­ther, and fall at variance, friends with friends, the common people with the Noblemen, and the rich with the rich: and to impouerish the subiects, is Tyrannicall; to the end, there should be no guard kept, and that they being driuen continually to worke for their liuings, may haue no leisure to conspire. For example hereof, we haue those high towers of AEgypt, called Pyramides, the tem­ples dedicated to the gods by the Cypselides, the building of Olimpus by the children of Pisistra­tus, and the munitions of Policrates about Samos: which things tend all to one end, namely, to hinder aud impouerish the subiects: and so doth the exacting of tributes and money, such as hap­pened at Siracusa, where in the time of Dionisius the Tyran, the citizens in fiue yeares space were L constrained to contribute all their goods. Againe, the Tyran maketh warres, to the intent, to occupie the subiects, and that they shall alwaies haue need of a head or captaine. Surely, the king­dome is preserued by friends, but the propertie of a Tyran, is to mistrust friends; as though all mē would, and friends cheefly could destroy him. Also all those things are tyrannical, which are done in the last and worst kind of Democratie, as the liberty of women in houses, who disclose their husbands secrets; and the infranchising of bondslaues for the same cause; for slaues and women attempt nothing against tyrans: it is rather needfull for them, in respect of the good vsage which they recei [...]e, to wish well to tyrannies and Democraties: For the people desireth to be a Monarch. Therefore the flatterer is in estimation with both of them; namely, with the people, the Popular M captaine, who is a flatterer of the people: and with the tyrans, they that behaue themselues lowly to them, which is a worke of flatterie. And therefore tyranny fauoureth the wicked, in as much as tyrans take a pleasure to be flattered, which neuer would any man of free and noble heart doe. But the good doe loue, or flatter not: also the wicked are profitable for them in wickednesse, for one naile driueth out another, as the Prouerbe is. Also it is a point of tyranny, not to take pleasure in a graue and free person, for the tyran himselfe will needs seeme alone to bee such a kinde of man. [Page 327] A And whosoeuer on the contrary side vseth grauity and freenesse, he taketh away the excellencie and maisterlike authority of the Tyranny. Therefore Tyrans hate such manner of men, as the destroyers of their estate. Likewise [...] to feast and banquet more with strangers then with the Citi­zeens, it is a point of Tyranny, as if the one were enemies, and the other not aduersaries. These and other like things are Tyrannicall, and doe preserue the Tyranny, being neuerthelesse full of wickednesse. But all these meanes may in a maner be comprised in three [...] sith the Tyran doth aime cheefly at three things, The first is, that his subiects haue neither courage nor knowledge, because cowardly and ignorant men do neuer conspire. The second, that there be a mutual distrust among them, for the Tyranny is not destroyed, vnlesse some doe before repose confidence each in other. B And for this cause Tyrans are enemies to good and vertuous men, as to those that may endam­mage their estate, not only because they will not be vsed like slaues, but also because they are loyall and faithfull betweene themselues and to others, and doe not accuse either any of themselues, or any other. The third point is, that their subiects haue no power or meanes to execute any thing: For sith commonly men doe not vndertake things impossible, none will seeke to destroy the Ty­ranny, when they haue no power to doe it. These are the three ends whereto the Tyrans purposes do tend, and al the Tyrans enterprises may be reduced to these suppositions, that their subiects di­strust each other, that they haue no power, and that they be cowards and ignorant. And this is the first manner of preseruing Tyrannicall states. The other manner hath a contrary consideration C in the things aforesaid, and may bee gathered from the destructions of kingdomes. For as the kingly state is destroyed through becomming more tyrannicall then it should, so the tyranny is preserued by approching neare to the manners and fashions of a kingdome, retaining still force and power to command not only those that do willingly obey, but those also that doe it vnwilling­ly, sith by loosing this force, he looseth both the name and state of a tyran. This foundation being presupposed and assured, he must partly vse those other manners and fashions also, and partly seeme to vse them, making thus a fayre outward shew of a good kingly gouernement. First and cheefly he must faine himselfe to be very carefull of the publicke good of the state, and vse no such expences as may offend the people, as to wast prodigally the reuenues and treasure of the Citie, on D strumpets, strangers and players, but giue account of the money receiued and employed by him, as some tyrans in former times haue done. By doing so, he shall bee accounted a good husband for the Commonweale, and not a tyran. And he needs not feare want of mony at any time, being lord of the City: but it is good and profitable for tyrans when they goe abroad in any expedition, or other vrgent affaires, rather to want then to leaue treasure hoorded vp. For by this meanes, they that are deputed and appointed by them for the guard and keeping of the countrey in their ab­sence, will attempt the lesse against them. Now it is certaine, that these are more to be feared then the citizens, for the citizens goe with the tyrans, but the other remaine at home. Moreouer, tou­ching the imposition of taxes and subsidies, he must so carry himselfe therein, that hee seeme to E leuie them for the maintenance of the state, and to employ the money that is therby gathered, in the preparing and prosecuting of the warre when neede shall require: and hee must make such an outward shew, that men may esteeme him as a keeper and treasurer of the pablicke mony, and not as of his owne. He must also not seeme austere, but graue, and of such behauior, as that they who shall haue occasion to speake vnto him, may not feare, but rather reuerence him: which thing hee can hardly doe, that is contemptible. Therefore although the Tyran should make no account of other vertues, yet at the least he ought to haue that which is requisite for a Gouernour, and cause such an opinion to be con [...]ued of him, that not he only, but also his whole traine and seruants of­fer no iniury to any of his subiects, neither boy nor girle. And that his women doe in like sort de­meane F themsel [...]es towards other women, because many Tyrannies haue beene destroyed by reason of the iniuries which women haue offered. Touching bodily pleasures, hee must order himselfe cleane otherwise then the Tyrans that are now adaies doe, whom it sufficeth not to follow their delights from the morning to night, and to continue them for many daies and nights together, but they will also haue men knowe that they liue so, that they may haue them in admirati [...], as fortunate and happy men: but let him moderately vse such pleasures, or at the least let him see [...]e to others, as one that makes no account of them, and sh [...]s them. For he that is sober cannot easily [Page 328] be surprised or contemned, but the drunkard may; neither he that is watchfull, but the sleepy per­son. G And he must doe cleane contrary to the things before mentioned, in beautifying and ador­ning the City [...] as if he were a guardian and procurer of the good therof, and not a Tyran. He must further more make a shew to loue aboue all things God and religion, for the subiects stand in lesse feare of sustaining any wrong or oppression by Princes, if they thinke them to be religious, and that they feare the gods, and likewise they will lesse conspire against him whom they suppose that the gods doe loue and fauor. Now he must seeme such a manner of person without any suspition of wickednesse. Moreouer, he must honour and aduance good men that excell in any thing, so that they may not haue cause to thinke, that they might receiue greater honor or aduancement of their owne Citizens, if they liued in liberty. Besides, let the Tyran himselfe bestow honor on such men, H and inflict punishments by others, as officers and iudges. There is yet farther a common precept for the maintaining and preseruing of euery kind of Monarchie; that is, to make no man ouer-great, or at the least to aduance more then one, because they will watch, and haue an eye on each other: but if it so fall out, that he must raise some one, let him not chuse one that is haughty & au­datious, for such persons will boldly attempt what thing soeuer. Likewise, if he find it requisite to depriue any one of credite and authority; he must doe it by little and little, and not take from him all his power at once. Besides, hee must abstaine from all kind of iniury, and especially from two sorts, the one from beating folke, the other, from dishonouring youth by filthy lust; wherof he must take great heed towards those that are ambitious: For couetous persons doe take greeuously the in­iury I that is offered them in taking away their goods; and those that are either ambitious, or good men, doe the like for the losse of their honour. Wherefore such punishments are not to bee vsed, or els to be inflicted according to the law and custome of the country, and not in contempt or reproch. And if it chance that he so conuerse with the youth, as before was said, let him doe it for loue, and not through tyrannicall liberty; at the least, if he doe them any dishonour, let him recompence it with greater honour. But amongst all them that conspire against the Tyrans person, which pur­pose to kill him, he must feare and take great heed of those who care not for their owne liues, so as they may rid him of his life, and he must cheefly dread those who thinke that any iniury hath ben offered, either to themselues, or to such persons as they hold dearest: for they that through despight K and anger attempt such things, haue neither feare nor carewhat becomes of themselues, accor­ding to Heraclitus his saying, That it is an hard thing to fight against anger, which costs a man life. And whereas Cities consist of two parts, namely of poore men and rich men, it must be so pro­uided, that both parts thinke their safety and preseruation to depend on the estate, & there must great heed be taken, that they do not wrong or hurt each other in any thing. Only, let him haue the stronger on his side, that if any stirre arise, he bee not enforced to enfranchise the slaues, or to take the Citizens armour and weapons from them: for one of the two parts being ioined with his owne power, will be sufficient to resist the other part, if it should assaile him. But it were superflu­ous to prosecute such thinges particularly, sith the intention or aime thereof is manifest: for hee L must referre all his actions to this end, that his subiects may not esteeme him to be a Tyran, but a steward and a king, and not as one that applieth all to his owne peculiar profit, but to the publicke good of the state, as guardian thereof. And that he obserue a meane in his life, and be not giuen to excesse; vsing familiarity with the Noblemen, and gratifying the people. By these meanes he shall doubtlesse make his state and gouernment not only fairer and more desirable, in that he raigneth ouer better subiects, and not seruile or abiect persons, and in that himselfe shall not be either ha­ted or feared, but also of longer continuance. Finally, he must so fram [...] [...]d fashion his manners, that he be halfe vertuous or good; and not bad, but halfe bad.

M

The causes which destroy Kingdomes and Tyrannies, being declared; according to the former methode those causes also are set downe, which doe preserue and maintaine them: and first they are generally vpheld by those meanes that are contrary to the cau­ses of their ruines: as the Kingdome if it be lesse Tyrannicall and absolute, and the Ty­ranny, if it approch neerer to the Kingly state, which said Tyranny also is preserued and maintained in two manners, the one very rigorous, the other more moderate. To the [Page 329] A rigorous manner are referred all the seuere, or rather cruell acts which Tyrans are wont to doe, respecting onelie their owne safetie and profite, as to suppresse so much as may bee, the most notable persons, and to make away such as haue stout courages, to forbid their subiects the vse of banquets, schooles for studie, idle mee­tings, and all other things that breed haughtinesse of heart, and mutuall confidence, to keepe them from knowing each other throughly; (for this knowledge causeth grea­ter trust and faithfulnesse betweene them) to haue forraine souldiours, shewing them­selues in the streets, and walking vp and downe before the Citti [...]ens houses, thereby to strike the more terror into them, and to keepe them in continuall feare, to haue spies & B priuie hearkeners in euery corner of the Cittie, who may discouer and report to him whatsoeuer shall be therein done or said. Likewise to vse such meanes, that friends may falsely accuse and liue in discord each with other, the vulgar sort with the Noblemen, and the rich men betweene themselues; to impouerish them, and haue them alwaies busied, to the end, that through wealth or idlenesse they may not conspire; and that be­ing troubled with any warre, they may alwaies haue need of him to be their leader and cheefetaine. The kingdome is preserued and vpheld by friends, the Tyrannie doth al­together distrust friends, and therefore giueth great libertie to women and to slaues against their Lords. Tyrans must in no wise haue neere them graue and freeminded C men, because such persons doe diminish the Lordly excellence and authority of the Tyran, who will himselfe alone seeme and bee accounted such a kinde of man. Like­wise, when hee will banquet, let him doe it with strangers more then with Citizens: all which meanes being very Tyranncall, are reduced to three points. The first, that their subiects bee both cowardly and ignorant: the second, that they distrust each other: the third, that they haue no power nor meanes to conspire. Which three things being very pernicious, are not gathered by Aristotle to allow them, or instruct men in them, but rather that they may beware of them, by knowing the miserie of Tyrans, who are constrained to serue their turnes with such euils, thereby to assure D their persons and Estates. Machiauel of Florence writing of a Prince, hath taken from this place the most part of his precepts, adding thereunto Romane and Itali­an examples. Nowe almost all these meanes haue relation to the first manner of preseruing and vpholding Tyrannies, which is full of seueritie and rigour. The other manner contrarie to the former, as being more gentle and moderate, is, that the Tyran imitate the gouernement of the Kingly state; prouided that hee haue alwayes power, wherby he may command, not only ouer those that are voluntarily sub­iect (which thing a King doth) but also ouer those that doe vnwillingly obey. Hee must feine to haue great care of the publicke good of the State, and vse no prodigality, ther­by E to offend the people; not seeme a Tyran, but a steward; nor as Lord of the common treasure, but as bestower and keeper thereof; nor austere and haughtie, but graue and ciuile: hee must likewise beware that none of his traine doe iniurie any one, and especially that his women vse no outragious nor insolent demeanure toward other wo­men. He must moderately vse his pleasures, and aboue all things make shew of louing God and Religion. Hee must honour and aduance good men, and such as excell in any thing; and himselfe bestow rewards, but inflict punishments by others, as Officers and Iudges. The Tyran hath this common with the King, to make no man ouergreat, or els to aduaunce many, to the end, that they may haue an eye each to other: not to raise F haughty & audacious men, who are vsually prompt and forward to attempt any thing; and when hee hath raised them, if hee find it requisite to pull them downe, he must doe it by little and little, not taking from them all their credite and power at once: hee must abstaine from all outrage, especially from beating any, and from dishonouring youth by filthy lust, or if he doe so, he must seem to do it rather for loue then through ty­rannical liberty. And whereas cities consist of rich & poore, who do not commonly wel agree; that he maintaine thē friendly togither, hauing the strongest alwaies on his own [Page 330] side, that through their helpe hee may bee able to resist others that assault him. G That he be familiar with Noblemen, and gratifie the people, so framing his manners, that hee bee good or halfe good, and not bad, but halfe bad. Aristotle seemeth to haue beene too curious in the setting downe of these Tyrannicall meanes, sith euill Princes are sufficiently inclined of themselues, to inuent what will serue for the maintaining of their high estate and safety, so as it is not needful to instruct them by bookes. Machiauel fashioning his Prince, hath fetched from hence (as I haue alleadged) the principall grounds of that institution, which must bee red with great discretion, because it is written by an Authour without conscience, and without religion, respecting onely worldly power and glorie, which deceiueth many men. But we that purpose to set forth H nothing, which wee thought would not serue to the honour of God, and the com­mon welfare of mankind, will passe ouer these discourses, concluding with Cornelius Tacitus, That men are to honour things that be past, and to obey those that be present, and that they ought to loue good Princes: And whatsoeuer they bee, to tollerate and bear them, for the withstanding as much as is possible, of disorders that happen by alte­rations. And as touching the decaies and vpholding of Monarchies, we will say with Salust. Si Regum atque Imperatorum animi virtus, in pace, ita vt in bello, valeret: aequa­bilius atque constantius res humanae sese haberent, neque aliud aliò ferri, neque mutari ac misceri omnia cerneres. Nam imperium facile his artibus retinetur, quibus initio par­tum I est. Verum vbi pro labore desidia, pro continentia & aequitate libido atque super­bia inuasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur: ita imperium semper ad opti­mum quemque à minus bono transfertur. Idem alibi, Sepè ego cum animo meo repu­tans, quibus quisque rebus clarissimi viri magnitudinem inuenissent: quae res populos, nation [...]sve magnis authoribus auxissent: ac deinde quibus causis amplissima regna & im­peria corruissent, eadem semper bona atque mala reperiebam: omnesque victores diui­tias contempsisse, & victos cupiuisse. Et subdit: Saepè iam audiui qui reges, quae ciui­tates & nationes per opulentiam magna imperia amiserunt, quae per virtutem inopes coe­perant. Idem in Oratione ad Caesarem de Republica ordinanda: Postquam mihi aetas in­geniùmque K adoleuit, haud ferme armis atque equis corpus exercui, sed animum in li­teris quòd natura firmus erat, in laboribus habui. Itaque ego in ea vita multa legen­do atque audiendo ita comperi, omnia regna, ciuitates, nationes, vsque eo prosperum imperium habuisse, dum apud eos vero consilia valuerunt, vbicunque gratia, timor, vo [...]luptas, ea corrupere: pòst paulò, imminutae opes, deinde ademptum imperium, postrem [...] seruitus imposita est. Particularlie, As touching the preseruation and destruction of the Romane Empire, The Romane E [...]pire. which for any thing that is found in writing, and that euer was seene by experience, hath beene the mightiest and greatest Kingdome that euer was: I finde, that those wayes which the wisest Emperours inuented L for the assurance and preseruation of the same Empire, turned to the decay and destruction thereof. First the ordinarie armies that Augustus had ordained, as well about the Cittie of Rome, as in the borders of his State, did vndoe ma­nie of his successours, and brought to ruine the Romane Empire it selfe, which sometimes they put to sale, to deliuer it into his handes that would giue them most for it. Secondly, the transporting and remouing of the Romane Empire, which Constantine the great made from Rome to Byzantium (which since by his owne name hath beene called Constantinople) thereby to make it more sure and strong against the Persians, and other people of Asia: For by transferring vnto M this place the forces and cheefe richesse of the Romanes, and by deuiding the Empire into the Easterne and Westerne, hee did greatly weaken it, so as the Romane Empire was first destroyed, and then the Easterne: which if they had continued vnited, had beene able long, and almost for euer to withstand all in­uasions. Thirdlie, whereas the Emperours supposed to strengthen themselues by strange souldiours that were hirelings and helpers, whom they called to their succors, [Page 331] A and specially the Gothes, they by weakening the proper and naturall forces of the Em­pire, at vnawares put Rome and Italy, and consequently the other prouinces into the hands of the barbarous people whereof shall be spoken more at large in the hystory of goue [...]nement, wherein wee declare the beginnings, proceedings, continuances, fa­dings, and destructions of the great states that haue been hitherto. One rare thing amongst others, hath been obserued in the Romane Monarchie, That whereas it began in Augustus, it ended the foure hundred seuentie and one yeare after, in Augustus; who was expelled from Rome after the discomfiture and death of his father Orestes, by Odo­acer king of the Herules [...] who occupied all Italie: whereof hee changed the name, B calling it Odoacria, after his owne name. So failed this Monarchie, being wholly oppressed and destroyed.

CHAP. XII. That of all States the Oligarchie and Tyranny doe C least continue.

OF all Commonweales, the Oligarchie and Tyrannie continue the least space. For the Tyranny that hath lasted longest, was that of Orthagoras and his children at Sicione, which lasted [...] hundred years. 1 The cause of this lasting was, for that they dealt mode [...]ately with their subiects, and in the mos [...] part of their affaires, they submitted them­selues to the lawes: and for that Clisth [...]ne [...] being very skilfull in the D warres, shewed [...] himselfe conte [...]ptible: and because also in ma­ny things they endeuoured to vse the people fa [...]rably. Likewise, it is said, that Clisthenes crow­ned the iudge that had spoken against [...] victory. Some men hold opinion that the image of him that so iudged, is it that standeth in the market place [...] [...]t is affirmed also, that Pisistratus being ci­ted into the court of the Areopage, stood to iudgement there: The second Tyranny was in Co­rinth, which the children of Cypselus exercised, and that lasted threescore and thirteene yeares, and sixe months. For Cypselus raigned thirty yeares, Periander [...]re and thirty, and Psam [...] ­ [...] sonne of Gordus three yeares. The cause of this so long continuance thereof, was the same, for Cypselus dealt gently with the people [...] and neuer in all the time of his reigne E vsed any guard [...] Periander was a Tyrann [...]us man, howbeit warlike. The third Tyrannie was held by the children of Pisistratus at Athens, which was not contin [...]all: because Pi­sistratus who played the Tyr [...]n was twice exp [...]sed, insomuch, that in three and thirtie 2 yeares hee [...] and seuenteene of them, and his children eighteene [...] and so all the time of their rule m [...]fi [...]e and thirtie yeares. Amongst other Tyrann [...]es, that of Hieron and Ge­lon at Siracusa lasted not long, but onely eighteene yeares: [...] after Gelon had reigned seuen yeares, hee died in the eight, and Hieron reigned [...] yeare [...]. Thrasibu [...] [...] expulsed in the eleuenth moneth. Many other [...] h [...]e beene all of sl [...] con [...] ­ance. Thus [...] shewed wel [...]eere all the meanes whereby [...] also and [...] ­chies F are destroyed and preserued. Now [...] Commonweale treateth of the [...] ­gings 3 of sla [...]es, howbeit, [...] of them [...] hee assigneth [...] any pr [...]er chaunge of the best and [...] Commonweale [...] saying, how Nature hath so ordained, that 4 nothing la [...]teth for euer, and that all thinges [...] a certaine c [...]mpasse of time, or per [...]; 5 are chaunged. And that they begin to change by those things, [...] is the [...], 6 or third number and an halfe, which being ioined to a q [...]inary or fift number, maketh two har­monies, 7 that is to say, when the number of this description becomes ful and whole: a [...] if nature did 8 [Page 332] sometimes bring forth bad persons, whose malice could not be amended by instruction, it may be G he saith not altogether amisse, for that certaine men may bee borne altogether vnapt to receaue any manner of teaching or vertue whatsoeuer. But wherfore should this change be more proper to that best Commonweale of his framing, then to other Commonweales, and all things that come into the world? And as for the time wherein he sayth all things are changed, those same that be­gan together, are changed together, as if they be made [...]e day before the longest or shortest day of the year, they shal therfore change together. Further, wherefore shall this Commonweale bee changed into the Lacedemonian Commonweale, sith the most Commonweales are of [...]ener chan­ged into a contrary forme, then into that which is next vnto them [...] There is the very like reason in all other sorts of changes. For he saith that the Lacedemonian Commonweale changeth into H an Oligarchie, and the Oligarchie into a Democratie, and the Democratie into a Tyranny, al­though they also change cleane contrary, as the Democratie into the Oligarchie, yea rather then into a Monarchie. Againe, he speaketh not of the Tyranny whether it recei [...]e alteration or not, neither if it change, what is the cause thereof, nor into what kind of Commo [...]weale it chan­geth. Neither was it an easie matter for him to tell it, by reason it is vncertaine and vndeter­mined, for in his opinion the change ought to be mad [...] into the first and best forme of Common­weale, insomuch, that there should bee a continuall course or going round about. But one Ty­ranny is sometimes chaunged into another, as at Syeiene the Tyranny of Miro [...] into the Ty­ranny of Clisthenes: and into an Oligarchie, as at Calchis the Tyranny of Antileon: and into I a Democratie, as the Tyranny of Gelon at Siracusa: and into an Aristocratie, as the Tyran­ny of Charilas at Lacedemon, and likewise at Carthage. Also the Oligarchie is chaunged into a Tyran [...]y, as in S [...]cily w [...]lne [...]re all the old Oligarchies were, as that of the L [...]ontines into the Tyrannie of Pa [...]ius: and that at Gele into the Tyranny of Cleand [...]r: that at Rhegium into the Tyranny of [...] Anaxilas, and likewise in many other Cities. It is also absurd to imagine, tha [...] the Tyran [...] i [...] changed into an Oligarchie, because th [...]y that are authorised in the offi­c [...]s of the Commonweale, bee [...] and greedy of gaine, and the rather beca [...]se [...]here be ma­ny exceedingly wealthy, who thinke it not iust and reasonable that the p [...]ore should haue an equall part in the Citie with the rich. And i [...] many Oligarchies it is not lawfull to exer­cise K gainefull occupations, but there bee la [...] that forbid the same: howbeit, at Carthage, which is gouerned by a Democratie, they may lawfully apply the same, and yet neuerthe­lesse hath not their Comm [...]nweale vpon that occasion beene hitherto chaunged. Euen so is it impertinent to say, that in the Oligarchie there bee two Cities, the one of the rich, the other of the poore: For wherefore should there bee so in this kind of Commonweale more then in the Lacedemonian Commonweale [...] or in some other, where all men possesse not equall goods, neither are all alike good? And admit now that none wexe poorer then be­ [...]ore, yet when the multitude of the poore encreaseth, the Oligarchie is neuerthelesse chan­ged into a Demo [...]ratie: and the Democratie into an Oligarchie, when the rich be migh­tier L then the people, and the people shewe themselues negligent, and the rich vse more diligence and warinesse in their affaires [...] B [...]t whereas there bee many [...]ses of the chaun­ging, hee toucheth one onely, namely, that by liuing prodigally, and bei [...]g vtterly vn­done by vs [...]rie, men [...]ull into pouertie; as though they had beene all, or th [...] most of them rich at the beginning, which is false: For when any of the cheefe sort haue wasted their wealth, then attempt they in [...]tions; but not the others: for at their hands there is not any trouble to bee feared [...] neither cha [...]nge they therefore rather into a Democratie then into another kind of Commonweale [...] Againe, if they bee barred from p [...]blicke ho­no [...]rs, or when some ini [...]stice or wrong i [...] d [...] vnto them, they raise seditions, and M chaunge Commonweales (though they h [...] an spent their substance) by reason of the li­bertie which they haue [...]o doe what they [...]s [...] The cause whereof bee sayeth, is too much libertie. And whereas there be many s [...] of Oligarchies and Democraties, Socrates reciteth the cha [...]ges thereof, as though either of them were but one.

[Page 333] A Of all Commonweales the Tyrannies and Oligarchies doe least continue, because they are full of violence and iniustice. And if any of them last somewhat long, it is by reason of the moderation thereof, and the vertue of the Gouernors. Further, the opini­on of Plato in the eight book of his Commonweale touching the short or long lasting of Commonweales, is found fault withall: The which opinion, though it bee iudged most obscure by Iamblicus and Ficinus, and such, as left by Theon, who had specially vndertaken the exposition of the mathematicall places in Plato; yet we haue assayed to enlighten it in some kind of sort, in translating his Commonweale, and here will touch the necessariest points thereof, for the vnderstanding of Aristotle.

B WHICH lasted an hundred yeares.] The longest Tyranny that is spoken of here, hath 1 not lasted aboue a hundred yeares. Kingdomes last very long, as we see the kingdome of France hath lasted aboue eleuen hundred yeares: the kingdome of Castile eight hun­dred: the kingdome of England in the race of William the Conquerour, fiue hundred yeares: the kingdome of Hungary seuen hundred: that of Poland four hundred: the Mo­narchy of Assyria lasted twelue hundred and nine and thirty years, which is the longest age of a Monarchy that is found: That of the Medes continued three hundred: that of Persia two hundred and thirty, when the naturall Persians reigned first there, who were bereaued thereof by the Macedonians; then the Parthians gouerned there, and after C that the Saracens, then the Tartarians, and after it returned againe to the Persians. The Monarchie of Alexander continued three hundred yeares, that of Rome foure hun­dred threescore and tenne. The Empire of Constantinople eleuen hundred and three­score. The reigne of the Turke hath already lasted neere three hundred yeares, descen­ding alwaies from father to sonne, euen to the twelfth heire now reigning, which was neuer seene elsewhere. The kingdome of Tunis lasted nine hundred years: the Empire of Almaine aboue sixe hundred.

BECAVSE Pisistratus playing the Tyran, was twice expulsed.] Herodotus in his first booke, also Plato in Hipparcus, declareth how the said Hipparcus sonne of Pisistratus D was slaine by Hermodus and Aristogiton [...]

NOVV Socrates in Platoes Commonweale, treateth of the changes of states.] Plato 3 in the eight book of his Commonweale bringeth in the Muses reasoning of the chan­ges of Commonweales in this manner: It is hard to chaunge the Citie that is thus constituted; But for as much as all things that haue beginning, are subiect to pe­rishing, so this kind of constitution shall not last for euer, but shall bee dissolued. This dissolution happeneth not only to plants, but also to earthly liuing creatures, with the fruitfulnesse and barrennesse of the soule and bodies, when the reuolutions of euery circuite of the circles, do fall shorter to them that bee shortliued, and contrary to them E that be contrary. They whom you haue trained and brought vp to be Gouernors of ci­ties, though they be wise, shall not for all that know by reason together with vnderstan­ding, the fruitfulnesse or barrennesse of your kind, but shall be ignorant of the oportu­nity to engender, and now and then shall beget children out of season. Nowe the peri­ode or circuit of the diuine generation, is it that containeth the perfect number; and of the humane generation, in the which, first the increasings that surmount and excel; and three distances that be surmounted and taking the foure tearmes or bounds of likes and vnlikes, and of encreasing and decreasing, haue made all things answerable and compa­rable together, of which tearmes the sesquitercian root ioined to the quinary, being F thrice augmented, doth make two harmonies; the one equall equally, an hundred ti [...]es an hundred; the other odde, and longer by an hundred numbers of Diameters, compa­rable to the Quinarie, one and ones, and two vncomparable, and of a hundred cubes of the Ternarie. All this Geometricall number in sooth hath great vertue and efficacie touching good and bad generations, which being vnknowne by the keepers of your Cittie, if they match the Husbands with the Wiues out of season, the children that shall bee borne of them, will bee neither wittie nor happie. [Page 334] And though their elders appoint them to bee Princes that are found to bee the better, G yet because they are vnworthy to succeed their fathers, they will begin to neglect their subiects, and will not haue such care is requisite, of musicke, or religion, and of exer­cise of the body, which shall be the occasion of making your children also more igno­rant of good learning: and the Magistrates that shall be so appointed, shall bee the lesse apt to discerne the kinds of men, recited by Hesiodus: and being amongst you, to wit, the Golden, the Iron, and the copper kinds, and because the yron shall bee mingled with the siluer, and the copper with gold, there shall arise therein vnlikenesse, and discordant inequality. And where such things happen, they breed alwaies warres and enmity, so that in all places where there are such kind of men, there is continual trouble through H seditions and tumults. Thus may you see what the muses sing in very darke tearmes tou­ching the changes of Commonweales.

4 SAYING it is so ordained by Nature, that nothing lasteth for euer.] There is nothing vnder Heauen that lasteth alwaies. But all things that haue beginning, must come to an end, and whatsoeuer groweth, must likewise deminish, being subiect to corruption and change, according to the time appointed vnto it by the course of Nature, as is seene by experience in plants, and in wights, which haue their ages and lastings certaine and de­termined. This instabilitie is also found in Prouinces, Nations, Cities, Maners, Lawes, Sects, Empires, Realmes, Commonweales, Potentacies, States, Families, Sciences, and I Languages. We look for nothing but for the destruction of the world, and the day that shall consume this whole frame, containing all things both diuine and humane; and re­duce it to that old Chaos, and first darkenesse. Plato in Timeus, and in his Dialogue of the Gouernour. Aristotle in his Meteores, and Seneca in his natural questions, suppose this to happen by the fatall law of the world, as well according to the mouing of the first heauen, whereof the other inferiour or lower mouings, and all natures, do depend: As by the coniunctions and separations of the plannets, whereunto the elements, and all things that are composed of them, doe obey. Whereas then mens materiall bodies being created and composed of the foure elements and humors that bee contrary, are K maintained and preserued in life, so long as the said humours do agree, yet is it vnpossi­ble but at the last one will exceed the others, and thereby the masse or lumpe, returne to his first matter by the dissoluing of the same combined mixture. Euen so falleth it out with the mysticall bodies of the societie of mankind, which being ioined by a ciuile and politicke vnion, do begin to decay by the diuersity of wils disagreeing, and at last come to nothing. And as mortall men liue so much the longer, and in better health, as they be of better complexion, and vse better gouernment; so are those cities and states that are best established and gouerned, maintained longer and in better sort: notwithstan­ding, there neuer hath ben nor can be any that endeth not quickly or slowly, how good L order soeuer be vsed therein: Such is the instability and course of all things that are here below, especially of states. Whereunto the most renowmed Astrologians doe agree, and that so farre, that they will determine not only the liues and fortunes of men, but also the prosperities and aduersities of Nations, as after the old Chaldeans and AEgyp­tians, Ptolome hath done in his Quadripertite, and sithence the Arabians and some Christians adding thereto the lasting of sects Plutarch in the life of Romulus, speaking of Astrologers sayth, They will say that a Towne hath the reuolution and the time of the continuance thereof, prefixed, as well as the life of man; and that it may be knowne by the scituation of the star [...]es in the day of his birth. M

5 AND that all things in a certaine circuite of time, or period, are altered.] Plutarch in the life of Silla. The skilfull Southsayers of Tuscane being demanded, answered, That this so strange signe declared the change of the world, and the passage from the same into another age: for that they hold opinion how there must be some ages cleerely differing one from another in manners and fashions of liuing. To euery of the which God hath prefixed a certaine time of continuance, howbeit, that all come to the ending of their [Page 335] A course within the space of the reuolution of the great yeere. And that when one is fini­shed, and another ready to begin, there happeneth some meruellous and strange signe in the earth, and in heauen: so as they which haue studied in that science, doe straight­way cleerely know how there be men borne, wholly differing from them that were be­fore, in their liues and manners; and that be more or lesse acceptable to the gods, then they that were before. For they say, that amongst the great changes that happen at these passages from one age into another, the skill of foretelling things to come, groweth in reputation, and doth foretell aright when it pleaseth God to send more fit and more certaine signes, whereby it may be able to know and foreshew thinges to come. And B contrariwise, in another age it falleth into contempt, and groweth out of credite, be­cause it is rash, and faileth in the most part of her Prognostications, by reason it hath but darke meanes, and deformed instruments, to know what shal come to passe. Cicero is Scipios dreame, thus describeth this great yeare. Homines populariter annum tantum­modo Solis, id est vnius astri reditu metiuntur. Cùm autem ad idem, vnde semel pròfecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint, eandémque totius caeli descriptionem longis interuallis retulerint, tum ille verè vertens annus appellari potest, in quo vix dicere audeo quam multa se­cula hominum teneantur. Namque, vt olim deficere sol hominibus, extinguíque visus est, cùm Romuli animus haec ipsa in templa penetrauit: quandocumque eadem parte sol, eodé­que C tempore iterum defecerit, tum signis omnibus ad idem principium, stellísque reuocatis, ex­pletum annum habeto. Cuius quidem anni nondum vigesimam partem scito esse counuersam. Plato in Timeus sayth thus, From thence is proceeded the virietie of the night, and of the day, and therefore hath ben brought in the reuolution of the circuit, alone & wise: the moneth, after that the Moone hath gone about her circle, and ouertaken the sunne: The yeare, when the sunne hath accomplished his course. As for the reuolutions of others, there be few men that vnderstand them, know their names, measure and distin­guish them by number; insomuch, that they know not the times, and that their reuolu­tions are infinite in multitude, and wonderfull in varietie. They may notwithstanding D easily vnderstand, how the perfect number of time doth then make vs the yeare perfect when the eight reuolutions that are measured by the circuite of one, and the same na­ture and alwaies like, shall be all returned to their head and first beginning. In the tran­slation of Timeus, which was published a good while agoe, we haue declared that Pla­to meant by the perfect number of time, when the seuen plannets, and other fixed stars come backe againe to their first places, and represent vnto vs the same nature that was in the beginning of the world, which time containeth an infinity of years, and renueth the world, giuing newe motion vnto it: Some say this great yeare containeth 15000 yeares of the sunne, others 36000: the firmament, on the which it is ruled, passing one E degree in euery hundred yeares: and because there be 365 degrees, therfore the course thereof cannot bee accomplished in lesse then 36000 yeares. Others reckon as farre as 49000, and that the neather world, from seuen thousand to seuen thousand yeares: and the heauenly, with al things generally, from fifty thousand to fifty thousand successiue­ly, are infinitely renued: which proceedeth of the variable mouing of the eight sphere, one while from the East, another while from the West, sometimes from the South, and sometimes from the North, which the Astrologians call a mouing of Trepidation. This sphere from seuen thousand to seuen thousand yeares, maketh his said mouing, to wit, seuen times in all his secular reuolution: euery of which times causeth the dissol­uing F and renuing of this neather world: and when it is come to the seuenth after 49000 yeares, which are seuen times seuen, the heauenly world commeth to be entirely dissol­ued, to the end, that it may be thereupon renued, and take againe a communicating of forme and matter. The Chaldeans, Persians, AEgyptians, and old Grecians considered and iudged the cheefe euents of the world by the eclipses of the sunne and the moone, and by the starres, whose aspects are toward the places of the eclipses, or which ascend together, or are in the middest of the skie. Afterwards the Arabians, and specially A [...] ­bumasar, [Page 336] haue deuided the space of time whereof we spake, by the great coniunctions G of the plannets, specially of the three vppermost, to wit, Saturne, Iupiter, and Mars, whom they affirme to haue wonderfull power in the alterations of this neather world, & the changes of kingdomes, laws, sects, & other notable things, according to the qua­litie of the Triplicities wherein they happen, firy, airy, watery, and earthly: & that there haue been seuen of them since the beginning of the world, according to the Hebrewes and their computation, and that the eight shall be in the yeare of the world 7040, and of the incarnation of Christ, 1593. P.d'Ally Cardinal in the concord of Astrologie and Theologie, and of the hystorie, and in the booke of laws and sects: Roger Bacon in the Epistle to Pope Clement: Sepulueda of the mouing of the sunne: Leon an Hebrew in H the third Dialogue of loue: Ptolomy in the the Quadripartite: But Picus Mirandula hath taken great pains in the confuting of those opinions and fantasies in twelue books written by him against Astrologers.

6 BY those things whose root is the sesquitertian, or third number, and an halfe.] The Sep­tenary or number of seuen, is made of foure and three, wherein is found a sesquitercian proportion, because foure conteineth three, and a third part. And the septenary ioined to a quinary maketh twelue. So the quinary is composed of two and three, in which there is a sesquialteran proportion, for that three containeth two and a halfe, and there­in is found the consonancie, [...]. The third consonancie is [...], in double I proportion, whereas then the septenary and quinary put together, make vp the twelfth: certainely the twelfth containeth two harmonies, to wit, dia tessaron, and dia pente, and is as dia pason, for as much as dia pason is a sound composed of dia tessaron and dia pente. Now Plato hath written this according to the opinion of Pythagoras & his Disciples, who did account numbers, proportions, and mathematicall figures for the first causes of all effects of the world, which Aristotle controlleth in the thirteenth and fourteenth bookes of his Metaphisicke.

7 SOLIDE number.] Solide numbers are those which adde depth to length & bredth, as cubes, piramides, and pillers, &c.

8 AS if nature sometimes brought forth euill people, whose naughtinesse cannot be remedied K by instruction.] The cause wherefore the Commonweale, yea the best Commonweale may be marred is, that some men in a certaine period or reuolution of time, are borne with so naughty a nature and disposition, that it is not possible to reforme them by in­struction; and when they meet in such a Commonweale, they marre it: Certainely, in considering the records of things passed till this age, it seemeth that there hath beene alwaies in the world some good mingled amongst euill, and that vertue and vice goe by turnes, passing from countrey to countrey, and reigning more at one time, then at ano­ther. For sith mens matters are in perpetuall mouing, they goe vp and downe incessant­ly, L mending or empairing anterchangeably. It is seene how a Prouince or Cittie foun­ded by some exeelent personage, prospereth a while through the vertue of his gouern­ment, and wexeth better and better, aiming right toward the middest or the top of his perfect course of gouernement: and after declineth from height to lownesse, or from the middest to the vttermost part. Vertue had her first seat in Assyria, from whence shee remoued into Media, then passed shee into Persia, and at last walked so farre, that shee came to dwell at Rome. And if sithence the destruction of the Romane Empire, there hath not ben any that hath lasted long, nor wherein the world hath holden his vertue assembled and vnited; in recompence thereof, it hath spread the same into diuerse pla­ces, M as into France, Castile, Portugall, Almaine, England, Poland, Muscouie, into the Empire of the Turkes and of the Souldan, and a good while since into the lands of the Saracens, whose kings accomplished so great conquests, subdued so many countries to their obedience, and at last destroyed the Eastern Empire of Rome. At this day Greece may serue for an example, which in times past hauing florished in riches, feats of armes, and learning, aboue all other countries, is nowe brought into miserable slauery, being [Page 337] A full of pouertie and ignorance: Italy which had bene dreadfull through all the world, was afterwards occupied by the Gothes, Hunnes, and Lombards, & at this day is come asunder, being without Religion, without law, without mar [...] and ciuile discipline, full of vncleannesse, loosenesse, and beastlinesse, if we credit M [...]chia [...]ell, who dooth so em­blason it in the second booke of his discourses. Behold how vertue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, prowesse and cowardlinesse, doe follow one another, honouring and de­faming countries and nations in diuers seasons, through the prouidence of God: who will haue euery of them as his turne falleth, to take part of good and bad, to the end they should not forget themselues, of wex too prowd and insolent by remaining in perpe­tuall B prosperitie.

For he sayth the Lacedemonian state changeth into the Oligarchie, and the Oligarchie into 9 a Democratie, and the Democrati [...] into the Tyrannie.] Such kinds of change [...] are layd foorth in the eight and ninth bookes of Platoes Commonweale, and by vs tran­slated in the fourth of these bookes of Politiques, or touching Go­uernment, as they were found to haue correspon­dence to Aristotles discourses.

CHAP. I. K Of the properties and congruities of euery Commonvveale, and of their ioinings and knittings together.

WE haue be [...]ore shewed how many Commonweales there be, and what be the differences betweene the counsell and the cheefe part of the Com­monweale, and spoken of the order of Magistrates and iudgements, and which doe fit each Commonweale. Againe, wee haue treated of the L destroying and vpholding of Commonweals: from whence they spring, and for what causes. But sith there be sundry kinds of Democraties, and likewise of other Commonwea [...], if there remaine any point, not sufficiently declared, it shall not be [...]misse to examine it, and to deliuer and set d [...]ne a way that is fit and conuenient for euery thing. We are also to examin the ioinings and knitting together of all the waies before mentioned, which make the varieties and diuersi­ties of Commonweales: so that the Aristocraties drawe neere to the likenesse of Oligarchie [...] and Commonweales seeme to be more popular, I meane the ioinings and knittings together, that are to be treated of, and haue not yet ben handled. As for example, if the counsel, and the electing and M creating of Magistrates, be ordained according to the vse of the Oligarchie, and the courts and iudgements according to the manner of the Aristocratie; or the iudgements and the counsell, ac­cording to the [...]auor of the Oligarchie, and the creating of the Magistrates, according to the or­der of the Aristocratie, or in some other maner that such properties of Commonweales may be knit and brought together. We ha [...]e already discussed for what city what kind of Democraty is fit, and likewise what Oligarchie for what people, and so of other Commonweales, which sort is fit [Page 339] A for ech of them: notwithstanding it is expedient not only to declare which of these commonweals is the best for cities, but also how it ought to be constituted: therefore will we breefly reason of these commonweals and others, and first of all of the Democratie, for thereby shall we vnderstande the cleane contrary Commonweale, which is it that some call the Oligarchie: For this method will we take in all kind of popular things, and that seeme to imitate the Democratie; for of the ioyning and knitting of these together, do grow the kinds of Democraties, wherby it falleth out that there is more then one Democratie, and that they differ. There be two causes wherefore the Democra­ties be many in number: the first is before mentioned, namely, that there is a difference betweene people, in that some be apt to tillage, othersome to base occupations, and others bee workemen and B hirelings. If we ioyne the first to the second, and the third to both those, the [...]e shall not be onely a difference that the Democratie is better or worse, but also that it shall not be the same. The second is that whereof we speake now; for the ioining of those thinges together that are conuenient for Democraties and seem fit for them, doe mak the diuersities of Democraties, when there be more of the same things in one Democratie then in another, or that all of them meet together in one De­mocratie. The knowledge whereof is behoofull as well for the founding and ordaining of new De­mocraties, whosoeuer shall be so minded, as for the reforming of them that are alreadie founded. For the founders and establishers of Commonweales doe assay to ioine all things together that are fit and conuenient for their purpose: But they erre in the doing thereof (as we haue in our former. C booke alleaged, when we treated of the destructions and vpholdings of Commonweals.) Now will we declare the cheefe grounds and allowed opinions, with the maners and things that euery State desireth.

The matters treated of in the fourth and fift bookes are here briefly repeated, to re­new the remembrance thereof, and to serue as a preparatiue for the more ample vnder­standing of Democraties and Oligarchies: which being of many sorts, are varied accor­ding to their parts whereof they consist: As the Counsell, the creating of Magistrates, and forme of iudging, are compacted somewhile one way and somewhile another; cau­sing D the Aristocraties to seeme Oligarchies, and the Commonweals more Popular: as if the Counsell and creating of Magistrates be founded after the manner of Oligarchies, by the stint of wealth: and the manner of Iudging according to the Aristocratie, in re­spect of vertue and skilfulnesse: Or the creating of the Magistrats according to the Ari­stocratie, and the office of Iudging according to the Democratie [...] the bringing together or separating of which properties or congruieties of Commonweales, doe make them better or worse: the consideration whereof is most necessarie, as wel for the establishing of a new Commonweale, as for the reforming of an old alreadie marred. Now begin­ning with the Democratie, he considereth all thinges pertaining vnto Democraties: of E which ioynings and knittings together, diuers kinds of Democraties result two waies; the one through the difference of people, by reason some be Farmers, some Grasiers, o­thers Craftsmen, and others workemen for wages: the other, through the afore mentio­ned congruities and properties of the D [...]mocratie, whereof shall bee spoken in the sixt chapter.

CHAP. II. F What the end and ground of the Democratie is.

THerefore the end and foundation of the popular state, is Libertie: For it is an olde saying, that in this commonweale only men enioy libertie, at it seemeth that euery Popular state aimeth at the same. Obeying and gouerning by turns, is one t [...]ken of libertie: for the right or law of the people is to haue equalitie according vnto number; and not according to dignitie [...] and where this is right, the multitude [Page 340] must needs haue the cheefe authority, and that which pleaseth many, must be the end and law. For G they say it behooueth that euery of the Citizens haue equality, insomuch, that in Democraties the poore haue greater authority then the rich, by reason they are the greater number. And in such a kind of state the opinion of the most preuaileth and is preferred. It is then a signe of liberty, that all that be popular or holders on the peoples side, doe set the same alwaies before their eies, as the end and foundation of the Commonweale: another token of libertie is [...] to liue as men list; which they call the effect of liberty: For as much as the propertie of bondage is, not to liue according to a mans owne descretion. This is the second end & ground of the popular state; whence hath procee­ded the not obeying of any man, sauing by turnes, and it furthereth the maintenance of that li­bertie, which is according to equality. This being presupposed, and this kind of beginning or H foundation being laid, we affirme that these are popular institutions or properties, namely, that all the Magistrates be created out of all the citizens; and that all the citizens commaund and gouerne euery particular person; and that euery man when his time and turne falleth, gouerne all the Citizens; that the Magistracies be distributed by lots, either all, or those that require experi­ence or art; that in the giuing of Magistracies there be no respect in any wise had of reuenues, or very small; that no man may enioy one Magistracie twice, or very sildome, or very few, except the offices and charges of the warres; that the Magistrates continue but a small time in office, either all, or as many as is possible; that all the Citizens iudge causes, and that they be chosen out of men of all degrees, and haue the iudging of all controuersies and matters, or at least of very many, I and of the weightiest and cheefest, as the correcting and calling to account of the Magistrates, and of the state of the Commonweale, and of priuate contracts and bargaines; that the assembly or congregation of the people haue the soueraigne authority of all matters, or of those that bee of greatest weight and importance; that the Magistrate haue cheefe authority in no matters, or in those that be of small weight. Now of Magistracies, the counsel or Senate is very popular, where no fees be appointed to all: for therein the power of this Magistracie is taken away, whē the peo­ple to whom great fees are assigned, doe take into their owne hands all the iudgements, as hath ben declared in the former bookes: Then also that fees be giuen to all, cheefly to the assembly or ge­nerall court, to the Iudges, and to the Magistrates; if all that be not possible, at least they giue fees K to the Magistrates, the Iudges, and the counsell, and to the cheefe assemblies, or to the Magistrates that are constrained to take their diet together. Againe, sith the Oligarchie is defined by noble­nesse of birth, richesse, and skilfulnesse, their contraries seem to be popular, to wit, basenesse of birth, pouerty, and being mechanicall. Likewise that no office be perpetuall, or if any remaine of the old change, that the power thereof be taken away; and that it be not giuen by election by voices, but by lots. These things be common to popular states. Now that which cheefly seemeth to be a popular state, and the extremest kind, proceedeth from the right or law that all men acknowledge to bee popular, which is, that all the Citizens enioy equality in number: For this is equality, that the rich gouerne not more then the poore, and that they alone haue not the authority, but all equally L in number: for by this meanes they thinke that they haue equality and liberty in such a kind of state.

Libertie being considered as the end in euery sort of Democratie, it dooth appeare in two things, namely, in the course of ruling and gouerning by turnes; and in the li­cense of liuing, as pleaseth euery man best, without yeelding obedience to any man otherwise then in his turne. There be tenne properties of Popular states, that the Ma­gistrates be created indifferently out of all the Cittizens, and all gouerne euery man, & euery man all men, as their turnes fall; that the Magistrates be created by casting of lots, M either all wholly, or at least they in whom science and experience is requisite; and that they be not authorised in respect of any proportion of reuenue or wealth, or that it bee small; that one and the same office, may not be borne twice by any man, except it be sil­dome, and by few, sauing martiall offices; that the Magistrats continue but a little while in office, either all, or as many as shall bee possible to bee reduced to this reason; that all created out of all, doe iudge and determine of all matters, or of many, and the princi­pallest; [Page 341] A pallest; as of the correcting of the Magistrates of the gouernement of the Common­weale, and of priuate contracts and bargaines; that the assembly or congregation of the people doe order all or the greatest things; the Magistrate cheefe of none, or those that be of very small importance: that the Counsell haue no fees: that if there bee any common reuenue, all bee feed, to wit, the Counsell, Iudges, and Magistrates; if that cannot bee, then the principall assemblies, and the high Iudges, or the Magistrates that haue their diet together: that the Popular state be gouerned by men of base birth, poore men, and base craftsmen: that no Magistracie bee perpetuall, or if there bee any one, to put it downe and reduce it from election to lots.

B

CHAP. III. How right is to be obserued in the Democratie.

NOw next of all it may bee doubted after what manner they shall haue this C equalitie, to wit, whether the goods of fiue hundred Citizens must be made equall to a thousand, and that those thousand are to haue as much power as the fiue hundred: or if the equalitie must not bee framed after this fashion, but rather when the equalitie is thus made, to take as many out of the thousand, as out of the fiue hundred; who shall haue all the authori­tie of determining and iudging: whether is this Commonweale most iust, according to the right or lawe of the people, or rather that Commonweale which regardeth the great num­ber. For they which hold with the Popular states, affirme that to bee lawfull and right which seemeth good vnto many: They that holde with the Oligarchies, is that which is D thought good by the richest, maintaining that the proportion of wealth must bee respected in iudging and determining: but both of them haue inequalitie and iniustice. For if we account that right which few men determine, it is a Tyrannie, because if one rich man possesse more substance then the rest, according to the Oligarchicall right, he shall bee worthie of the go­uernement of the State. Or if wee account it according to many in number, they will deale vniustly and iniuriously, confiscating the rich mens goods, as it hath bene said before. What manner of equalitie then shall that bee which both confesse and allow? Wee will consider and find it out by those things which both hold to be iust and right: for they say that ought to bee ratified which seemeth good to the greater part. Be it s [...], yet not altogether, but sith the Ci­ty consisteth of two parts, to wit, of rich men and poore men, let that bee followed which seemeth E good to both, or the greater part: but if they bee of contrary opinions, then that which seemeth good to the greater part, and to those which haue most reuenues: as if the one bee te [...]ne, the other twentie, and sixe rich men be of one opinion, and fifteene poore men of another, and so there bee added to the poore foure rich men, and to the rich fiue poore men, when both parts are counted, let that part preuaile which hath greatest reuenues. And if it so chance that they be equall, there should bee the same doubt that nowe is, if the assembly were double, or the iudgement, be­cause then it must bee remedied by lots, or by some such other meanes. But touching equa­litie and right, although it bee very hard to finde the truth thereof, yet it is easier to at­taine thereto by the hazard of lots, then by persuading those which may bee superiours: F sith the inferiors doe alwaies seeke equalitie and right, whereof they that haue most power make no account.

Sith equalitie and right ought so to bee obserued in the Democracie, that th [...] poore may haue therein as much power as the rich, to knowe howe this may best bee done, suppose that in a Cittie, whose gouernement is Popular, there [Page 342] are a thousand poore men, and fiue hundred rich men; the question is, whether parts G opinion shall be followed in consulting or iudging any thing, the rich men being com­pared with the poore touching the valuation of wealth, so that one rich mans voice preuaile as much as two poore mens. Aristotle concludeth that this is equally good in two manners, the one, in causing the opinion of a thousand poore men to haue no lesse force then that of fiue hundred rich men, the other, in electing and aduancing to the Magistracies as many out of the number of the fiue hundred rich men, as of the thou­sand poore men, which are twentie on the one side, & twentie on the other, both which manners are more iust and reasonable then to establish that which pleaseth the grea­ter number, as doe they of the Popular estate, or to follow that which the rich men will H haue decreed, as doe they of the Oligarchies; sith from both these manners sundry in­conueniences arise.

CHAP. IIII. Which is the best kind of Democracie.

I

NOwe sith there are foure kinds of Democracies, that is the best kind which is the first in order, as wee haue declared in the former discourses, and it is the auncientest of all. I meane the first, according to the distinction of people. For the best sort of peo­ple are the Husbandmen, so that a Democracie may bee establi­shed, where they liue by Husbandrie or pasture. For such peo­ple because they haue not much wealth, are not idle, and cannot therefore frequent the publicke assemblies, and sith they want things necessarie for the sustenance of life, they follow their bu­sinesse, K and seeke not other mens goods, but take greater pleasure in labouring then in gouerning and hauing Offices, especially if there bee small profite therein; for the vulgar sort preferreth profite before honour. There is an euident token hereof, in that men in an­cient times haue endured Tyrannies, and at this present they indure the Oligarchies, proui­ded, that they bee suffered to follow their labour, and that their goods bee not taken from them: for presently some grow rich, and the others are not in extreme want. Besides, to haue the authority of electing and controuling, or punishing the Magistrate, doth satisfie their de­sires, if they haue any ambition. For among some people, although they haue not the right and power of electing the Magistrate, but some are by turnes appointed therevnto, as at Manti­nea: L yet many are content to haue authority in the cheefe Counsell, and wee are to thinke that this is a forme of Democracie, as it was sometimes at Mantinea. It is therefore behoofefull for the aforesaid kind of Democracie, and the custome is such, that all doe elect and controule the Magistrates, and haue in their owne hands the power of iudging, that the cheefe Magistra­cies be held by persons chosen, and the greatest by those that haue greatest reuenue; or els without hauing any regard to the reuenue, by those which are fittest for them. The Commonweales which are so gouerned, must needs be well gouerned, for the Magistracies shall alwaies bee in the best mens hands with the peoples consent, who will not beare any enuy to good men: and they who are noble and good, ought to content themselues with this order, to the end, they be not gouerned by M others worse then themselues: and in this manner their gouernment shall be iust, because the cor­rection or punishment belongs to others: for it is very requisit and profitable that the Citizens be kept in order, and not suffered to doe what they list, for such absolute liberty causeth the same euill in a City, as it dooth in euery particular man; so that it is necessary that the Com­monweale shall receiue great good, when good men doe gouerne without the hurt and [Page 343] A reproch of the people. It is therefore manifest that this is the best kind of Democracie, as also for for what cause it is so, viz. beeause the people therein is such. But for the inducing of them to follow Husbandry, there were certaine lawes which were in a [...]ncient times vsed by many, and are very profitable, as to suffer no man to haue any land, but according to a certaine measure and quantity, or els to a certaine place of the Citie. It was anciently ordained in many Cities, that the first inheritances might not bee sold. There is also a certaine law ascribed to Oxylus, tending to the same effect, which forbiddeth the lending of money vpon any peece of land. We may at this time ordaine and accommodate this, by meanes of the law of the Aphytali, which is very expedi­ent for that which we speake of: [...]or although there be many, and they possesse a small territory, B yet they are all Husbandmen, because they let not the whole possessions, but diuide them into so many parts, that the poore also may exceed them in reuenues. Next to the multitude of Husband­men, the best sort of people are sheepeheards, who liue on their Cattell, for they agree in many things with the Husbandmens profession, and by exercise grow very fit for the warres, and haue their bodies hardened to liue and continue in the open aire without seeking any couert. Almost all the other kinds of people, whereof the Democracies consist, are worse then these, because their liues are bad, and because there is no vertue in the exercises of mechanicall and mercenary men, and of such as vse buying and selling. Besides, because all that sort of people is daily in the market place, and in the City, it is therefore easily assistant and present at publicke assemblies, but the hus­bandmen C being scattered abroad the Country, doe not assemble themselues, neither haue they such need thereof. And where the scituation of the place is such, that the Country is [...]arre distant from the Citie, it is easie to establish a good Democracie and Commonweale, the multitude being con­strained to make as it were Colonies in the fields. And therefore although there be a great number of those of the City, and of such as keepe or haunt the shops and markets, yet cannot they assemble themselues without those which dwell in the Country. Sith we haue declared how the best & first kind of Democracie should be constituted, it may be easily vnderstood how the other kinds should be established, if men proceed therein by following the same manner, in separating or remoouing alwaies the worse sort of people. Touching the last kind of Democracie, because it is communica­ted D to all, it cannot bee endured by euerie Citie, nor bee easily preserued, vnlesse it bee established with good lawes and customes. Now wee haue shewed be [...]ore almost all the cor­ruptions which destroy both such a forme of Commonweale and all other formes: but to esta­blish this Democracie, and to make the people thereof mightie, they that haue knowledge in such matters of gouernment, haue beene accustomed to receaue thereinto as many men as they could, and to make Citizens, not only those that were lawfully borne, but bastards also, and those whose fathers or mothers only were Citizens, sith all this is fit for such a kind of [...]eople. When the guides and leaders of the people haue thus taken order for it, yet they must receiue so many, that the number of the vulgar sort may but exceed the Nobles, and those of meane E Estate, and they must passe no further, for if they exceed them too much, they trouble the Com­monweale, and they cause the Nobility of the Democracie to conceiue disliking and discontent; wherevpon the sedition at Cyrene was raised: for men make no accouut of a small incon­uenience, but by encreasing it dooth more appeare. Furthermore, such ordinances are pro­fitable for this kind of Democracie, as Clisthenes vsed at Athens, seeking to augment the Democracie: and that which they of Cyrene vsed, who established the Popular state: for it is requisite to make sundry other tribes and fraternities, and to reduce the priuate sacrifices to a lesse number, and to make them common, as also to inuent all meanes possible, whereby they may all bee mingled, and to abolish the former familiarities and conuersings together. F Moreouer, the Tyrannicall customes seeme to bee all Popular, as the permission of slaues, which may be in some sort behoofefull, as also of women and children, and to suffer euery man to liue after his owne pleasure, which thing shall much profite such an estate, because the vulgar sort had rather liue disorderly then modestly.

There are four kinds of Democraties, as hath ben said in the 4. book. cha. 4. The first is of Husbandmen: the second of sheepeheards, & where the citizens liue vpon pasture: [Page 344] the third is of tradesmen, and mercenary people: the fourth, where euery one liueth as G he list himselfe, without respecting or regarding the laws and Magistrats, sith all is ther­in Tyrannically administred, according to the will and decrees of the people, through the persuasion of their flatterers and leaders. The first kind of Democratie is the best, which consisteth of Husbandmen, who hauing small wealth, are constrained to labor, and haue little leisure to frequent the publicke assemblies, by which meanes the lawes beare rule amongst them. The popular properties of this Democratie are, first, to haue sildome any generall assembly; secondly, that in this generall assembly or great counsel, they haue power to create, and controule or punish Magistrates, and to hear them giue account of their doings, either all together, or some certaine chosen by all; thirdly, that H the greatest and highest Offices be giuen according to the valuation of most wealth & reuenues, and executed by men of sufficiency, full of vertue, knowledge & experience. There are foure Lawes very requisite and profitable for the maintaining and vpholding of such a kind of Democratie: The first, that it bee not lawfull for any one to possesse more land then the measure or quantity allowed by the state: The second, not to sell the first inheritances: The third, to lend no money on any peece of land: The fourth, not to giue whole inheritances to particular persons, but to diuide them by so many parts, that euery one may haue a portion thereof, and may follow Husbandry. The second kind of Democracie, is of those people that liue by the keeping of Cattell, which for the most I part consist of sheepeheards, who because they remaine commonly in the open aire, without any couert, liuing simply and poorely, haue both their bodies and mindes har­dened to the enduring of military trauailes and troubles: Wherefore such a forme of Commonweale hath the second place of goodnesse amongst the Democracies. The third kind of Democratie is not so good, the people therein being of all sorts, Mer­chaunts, Artificers, and Mercenary men, who are farre worse then Husbandmen and Sheepeheards, because their employments and actions haue nothing agreeable to ver­tue, and because by reason of thier idlenesse they haue leisure to meete and assemble themselues often. Touching the last kind of Democratie, sith it is worse then the rest, it K hath need to preserue it selfe by sundry meanes, which are reduced to foure. The first is, that the Gouernours admit as many Cittizens as they can, not onely such as are law­fully borne, but also bastards, or them whose fathers or mothers onely were Cittizens, vntill the multitude of the vulgar sort exceed the number of the Noblemen, and those of meane estate, without passing any further. The second manner is to encrease the number of the Tribes or linages, by making the priuate sacrifices lesse and publicke. The third, to vse all meanes for the entermixing of them together. The fourth is, the liberty of slaues, women, and children, and the suffering of euery one to liue after his owne pleasure, as is vsed in the Tyrannie: for the people is a Tyran. L

CHAP. V. An aduertisement for the preseruing of Democracies.

IT is the office of a Lawgiuer, and euery other person, which vndertaketh the ordaining and establishing of an estate, not to make it great or only, but M rather that it may bee of continuance, because is no hard thing for any whatsoeuer forme of gouernement to last two or three dayes. It is therefore requisite that wee returne to the discourse which we haue made before tou­ching the preseruations and destructions of Commonweals, and thence ga­ther or frame the safety therof, shanning the causes which destroy them, & [Page 345] A following such lawes, as well written as vnwritten, which doe cheefly containe the meanes where­by Commonweales are preserued, and not to thinke that it is either a Popular or Oligarchicall thing, which causeth the Citie to liue in a very Popular or very Oligarchicall manner, but that which causeth the stability and continuance thereof. Nowe adaies the Gouernours to please the people, doe make the most part of the goods common, by way of Iustice. But they who haue care of the Commonweale, must doe cleane otherwise, for they must ordaine that the goods of condemned persons bee not made the peoples, nor appropriated to the state, but that they bee adiudged to the vse and seruice of religion. By this meanes men will beware as much of of­fending, because such punishment is proposed, and the vulgar sort hauing no hope of gaine, B will not bee so forward to condemne those which are accused. Likewise, publicke accusations must bee alwayes seldome made, by imposing great penalties on false accusers, sith they are not wont to accuse the people, but the Noblemen. Furthermore, it is requisite that all the Citizens wish well to the Commonweale, or at the least that they repute not the gouernours for enemies. But be­cause the last kinds of Democracies are greatly peopled, and because also it is very hard to haue generall assemblies, without setting downe some fee or allowance, which thing is dangerous for the Noble and rich men, where there are no publicke reuenues, sith it is necessary to com­mit exactions and confiscations by false iudgements, whereby many Democracies haue beene de­stroyed: Therefore where there are no reuenues, it is good to haue few assemblies, and to de­cide C many matters in few daies, for that is very profitable, to the end, that the rich men feare not the greatnesse of the charges, if not the rich but the poore haue fees allowed them for iud­ging. It is also profitable, to the end, that causes may bee the better decided, sith the rich men will not bee long absent from their priuate businesse, but for a small time they are well content to doe it. But when there are publicke reuenues [...] that which the guides and leaders of the people doe now adayes, must bee shanned, for they in taking their part, diuide that which remaines, and haue neede thereof againe, because such an helpe to needy persons, is like a vessell full of holes. And hee that is a true Popular Gouernour, must see that the people bee not too poore, for that maketh the Democracie worse. Wherefore, it is D necessarie to prouide with great care and diligence, that there may bee such abundance as may continue. And sith the same is also expedient and profitable for the rich men, the money which is made of the publicke reuenues, must bee gathered, and then distri­buted to the poore, especiallie if so much money may bee made, as may serue to buy some land; if not, then to helpe them thereby to vse Merchan [...]ise or labour; and if this may not bee done to all, yet at the least let this destribution and equalitie bee made by the Tribes or linages of the Citie, or by some other part of the same by turnes; and that in the meane while the rich men doe beare the Offices and charges of generall assemblies, being freed from superfluous and vnnessarie charges of the Commonweale. E The people of the Carthaginians by obseruing this forme of Gouernement, wonne the fa­uour and good will of the people: for by sending some of the people to bee Magi­strates in their Colonies, they did by this meanes enrich them. Likewise, the Noble­men that are courteous, and haue anie iudgement or vnderstanding, ought to distri­bute amongst themselues the poore and needie people, furnishing them with meanes whereby they may labour: and it should bee good to imitate the people of the Taren­tines, which make the vse of their possessions common and equall to the poore, and hereby they get the good will and fauour of the vulgar sort. Besides, they haue deui­ded all the Magistracies, and will haue some to bee giuen by election, and others F by lots: by lots, that all the people may haue equall part therein: by election, that they may bee the better ruled and gouerned. This may bee done by equally diuiding the same Office and authoritie, that is, by giuing it one time by lots, and another time by election. Wee haue thus declared howe the Democratie ought to bee establi­shed.

[Page 346]Whosoeuer will establish the fourth kinde of Democratie, ought to obserue tenne G precepts: the first is, not to haue respect so much to the greatnes, as the cōtinuance ther­of, and to seeke or worke the safety and stability of it, shunning those euils that may de­stroy it, and seeking meanes for the preseruation thereof, both by written and vnwritten lawes: the second is, to adiudge the goods of condemned to the vse and seruice of reli­gion, and not to apropriate them to the state, nor distribute them to the people: the third, to see that there be few publicke iudgements and condemnations, by imposing great penalties on false accusers: the fourth, that all the Citizens do both like and wish well to the present state, or at least they hate not the cheefe Magistrates: the fift precept H is, that in the last kinde of Democraties, wherein there is great store of people, and no publicke reuenue, there be sildome any assemblies made, and that many matters be dis­patched in few daies: the sixt, that the baser sort of people grow not too poore, and that where there is publicke reuenue, it be spared and saued by good husbanding thereof, to the end, that the needy people be therewith holpen, either euery one particularly, or generally by the tribes and linages by turnes, that they may be able to buy lands, and so be busied in husbandry, or else to vse Merchandise: the seuenth, that the rich men lea­uing their vaine and superfluous charges, bestowe those that are necessary in conuoca­ting the generall counsell, and other publicke assemblies: the eight, that they send al­wayes I some of the people into the colonies with charge and commission, where they may be employed and enriched: the ninth, that the rich men distribute among them­selues the poore, and maintaine them: the tenth, that some Offices bee giuen by electi­on, and others by lot; by election, to the end, they may bee the better executed; by lot, that the people may participate in them: which thing may be done in the same Office, by giuing it one time by lot, and another time by election.

K

CHAP. VI. How Oligarchies ought to be preserued.

WE shall also hereby perceiue how Oligarchies are to bee ordered. Now euery Oligarchie must be framed of contraries, in respecting the contrary forme of Democracie, cheefly, that which is well tempered, and the first kind, which re­sembleth much the Commonweale, so generally called, where the wealth and reuenues are to be diuided, and the one made lesse, the other greater; lesse, as L those according to the rate, whereof the necessary Offices are giuen; and grea­ter, as those according to the rate whereof the cheefe Offices are giuen: and that euery one that hath reuenues, be admitted to the authority of gouernment. Likewise, that the people be thereun­to receiued, according to the valuation of wealth, in such number, that the gouernours may haue more power then the rest which doe not gouerne. And there must alwaies be associated in the go­uernment of the Commonweale, some of the better sort of the people. We will in like sort ordaine the Oligarchie following, by stretching and extending it a little: but that kinde of Oligarchie, which is opposite to the extreame kind of Democracie, and which is the most violent and Tyran­nicall M of all Oligarchies, because it is the worst of all, it hath therefore greater neede to haue the safety thereof carefully and warily prouided for. For as bodies of good & healthfull constitution, and shippes well furnished with Marriners, doe beare many faults or imperfections without dan­ger; but contrariwise, as sickly bodies, and leaking vessels, or such as haue bad Marriners, cannot beare the least faults, so the worst kinds of Commonweales haue most need to be carefully vpheld. The great number of inhabitants preserueth the Democracies; for it that is opposed to the [Page 347] A right, that is according to worthinesse. But on the other side, the Oligarchie is preserued by good order.

Aristotle hauing purposed to treat in this sixt booke seuerally of Democraties and Oligarchies, after he hath dispatched and finished his discourse touching Democraties, entereth now into the Oligarchies, wherein hee doth insist the lesse, because the one is vnderstood by the other, sith they are contraries: for there are as many kinds of Oligar­chies, as there are of Democraties, which are opposed correspondantly each to other, viz. the first kind of Oligarchie to the first kind of Democraty, and so the rest. Touching B the first kind, it is very good, and draweth neere to the Commonweale, so generally cal­led, that the wealth and reuenues be therein diuided into lesse and greater: lesse, as those whereby men may attaine to necessary Offices: greater, as those according to the rate & valuation, whereof they are chosen, which shall execute supreme and soueraigne Offi­ces: wherein such regard is to be had, that the Gouernours haue more power then the rest, and that the better sort of the people, may participate in the gouernment. The se­cond and third kind of Oligarchie, are likewise to be established by augmenting the re­uenues: but the last kind of Oligarchie, correspondent to the last kind of Democratie is most bad and Tyrannicall, which like a sickly body or a shippe at sea ill rigged and fur­nished, C hath need of greater care for the vpholding and maintaining thereof. Nowe, as Democraties are preserued by the great multitude of people, so are Oligarchies vpheld and continued through good order.

CHAP. VII. Of the parts of the people that are meet for warre, and how all kinds of D Oligarchies ought to vse them.

NOw sith there are four cheefe parts of the people, the Husbandmen, Ar­tificers, Merchants, and Hirelings: and foure parts for warre, the Horsemen, Footmen armed, Footmen unarmed, and seafaring men: where the Countrey is fit for Horsemen, there may bee well established a mighty Oligarchie, for the inhabitants may maintaine themselues through this power, and it dooth also belong to men of great wealth to E keepe horses. Where the countrey is fit for the training vp of footmen, there may be established the second kind of Oligarchie, for the vse of heauie armour is fitter for rich men, then for poore men. But the power of the light armed souldi­ours and seafaring men, is altogether Democraticall. Now a daies where there is a great multi­tude of such people, if there arise any sedition, they doe oft fight worse, which euill must be remedi­ed by the example of good Captaines, who mingle with the horsemen & footmē that are through­ly armed, a sufficient number of light armed men. And in this manner the popular sort doe in seditions ouercome the rich men, because being lightly armed, they doe fight with ease against the horsemen, and well armed footmen. Then by establishing such a power of them, they doe establish F it against themselues. But whereas there are two ages, and some are old, others young, children must be instructed and trained vp while they are yet young, in light and easie exercises, and when they shall be past their childhood, they must be enured and hardened to endure labour, as wrast­lers. It is requisite to allow the multitude a part in the authoritie of gouernment, either (as it hath ben said before) those which haue reuenues, or as the Thebanes doe when they abs [...] for a time from mechanicall labours, or as they doe at Marsilia, chusing the worthiest as well of those that are in office, as of those that are out of office. Besides, there must bee annexed some extraordinary [Page 348] charges to the chee [...]e [...]ffices, possessed by those that are o [...] other estate, to the end, that the people G may willingly forbeare them, and not enuy those that for the enioying of them, bestow such costs. Now it is seemely and expedient, that at their entring into office, they make sumptuous sacrifices, and some publicke buildings, that the people being feasted, and seeing the City adorned and gar­nished both with Temples and other buildings, may rest content with such a kind of gouernment. It will also be expedient for the rich [...]en to leaue a memory of their bounty and magnificence, al­though the gouernors in Oligarchies, doe at this time cleane contrary [...] seeking profite no lesse then honour. And therefore it were better to cal such estates little Democraties. Thus we haue decla­red how Democracies and Oligarchies ought to be.

Almost all the properties of the Democracie and Oligarchie, being shewed, it is de­clared, H in what places both the one and other may be conueniently ordained, and what sorts of people are fit and apt to receiue them: and Aristotle doth likewise continue the recitall of those meanes whereby Oligarchies are preserued.

CHAP. VIII. What Offices are necessary [...]or any estate, and what commodious and honourable.

WE will now intreat of offices, and shew how many there are, and what they be, & of what things they haue charge, as we haue said before. For the City cannot I be without necessary Offices, nor be well gouerned without those that concerne the good order and ornament thereof. Moreouer, it is necessary that there bee fewer offices in small Cities, and more in the greater, as hath ben already said. We must not then be ignorant what offices are to be conioined, and what are to be seuered. Of the necessary Offices the first is to haue charge of the market, and thereto must bee appointed an Officer, who may ouersee mens contracts, and to looke that there bee honest dealing among them. For in euery City almost some things must of force be bought, and others sold, for the mutuall and necessary use thereof, and this approchet [...] very nigh to that sufficiency, for which they seeme to haue been gathered into the body of one Commonweale. The second charge being al­so K neere to this, is of publicke and priuate things that concerne the city, to the end, that the houses and streets may be well and decently kept, and such as are fallen to decay, repaired; & the bounds obserued without strife or contention, and all other things, requiring like care. Many doe call such a kind o [...] office an Edilitie [...] which containeth sundry parts, & in those cities which are much peo­pled, some are appointed to one charge or part therof, & some to another, as some to the repairing of the wals, others of the conduites, and some to the keeping of the hauens. There is also another necessary charge, and like to this, as consisting in the same things; which neuerthelesse are in the fields without the city, & they which haue the ouersight thereof are called, some of them maisters of the fields, some of the forrests, & so there are three charges of these things. There is another of­fice, L wherto belongs the receiuing of the publick reuenues, & the keeping of the mony that is made therof, as also the disbursing thereof, as the necessity of the state shal require: such officers are cal­led receiuers and treasur [...]rs. There is another, which consists in writing priuat contracts, and the sentences pronounced by the iudges, as also sutes, accusations, and actions are to be framed by those which haue this office. But in some cities such offices are diuided among many, who are al reduced vnder the charge of one cheef, & they are called notaries, scriueners, & by other like names. That office which follows next to this, is very necessary, & the most troublesome of all other offices, cō ­sisting in the executing of iudgements on accused and condemned persons, and in cōmitting men to prison. This office is little pleasing, by reason of the great enmity which is thereby purchased, M so that vnlesse there be great gaine to be gotten by it, no man wil vndertake it, or if any do vnder­take it, they wil not deale therein according to the laws, yet it is necessary, because the iudgements giuen on sutes & causes, should be bootlesse & to no purpose, if they were not put in execution, and had effect. For if ciuile societie cannot continue without the vse of iudgements, much lesse can it endure, vnlesse they bee executed. Wherefore, it is better that this Office bee not one, but that there bee sundry thereof in sundry places. It is requisite to diuide after the same [Page 439] A manner the actions and sutes of lawes, as also that seuerall Magistrates do execute seueral mat­ters, and that young men doe rather put in execution the causes of young men, and that such as concerne men more in years, condemned by one Magistrat, be executed by another; as that which the Pretor or Prouost of the citie shall haue decreed, to be put in execution by the AEdile, and so ge­nerally those causes executed by one Magistrat which haue beene iudged by another. For sith they that execute them, shall purchase lesse enmity, so much the rather shall they take effect. But if the same Magistrates doe both condemne and execute, they incurre double hatred, and by medling in all matters, they become odious to all men. In many places the iailor and executioner are two seuerall offices, as at Athens that which is called the office of the eleuen. It is therefore better to di­uide B their charge also, and to vse meanes for it by some deuise, sith it is no lesse necessary then any of the former. For good and honest men do greatly shunne this charge, & it cannot be safely com­mitted to bad persons, who ought rather to be kept & looked vnto themselues, then to keep others. It is then expedient that they haue a seuerall office, and that they doe not exercise the same office continually, but that the young men where there is any degree or order of young men & keepers, be appointed to these charges one after another. Wherfore we will set those offices first, as being ve­ry necessary, next these, others lesse necessary, but of greater authority, wherein there is required great experience and faithfulnesse: as are those offices which concern the guard and defence of the City, and all those that are ordained and instituted for the warre, and it is necessary both in time C of peace and warre, that there be some appointed to keepe and looke vnto the wals and gates of the Citie, and to make inquisitions, and to enroll the Citizens. Then ouer all these charges there are in some places more officers ordained, in other fewer, as in smal cities there is one ouer all: such of­ficers are called Captaines generall, or Cheefetaines of armies. Besides, if there bee horsemen or light armed footmen, or archers, or mariners, offices are sometimes appointed ouer euery of them, whom they cal Admirals or Generals of the Horsemen, or Colonels of the footmen: vnder whome againe there are others as Captaines of gallies and of companies, hauing Centurions, Decurions, and other particular officers vnder them: and they are all comprised vnder the kind of military affair [...]s. Such then is the maner of this office, but because the Magistrates, if not all, yet some at D the least doe deale in publicke affaires, it is therefore needfull that there be another Magistrate, who may reuiew and controule their accounts, and not be employed in any other matters: some cal them controulers or Censors, some maisters of the accounts, others inquisitors, and some againe protectors. But besides all these offices, there is another, and that the cheefest of them, which who­soeuer doe execute, they haue the ouersight of the state, and gouerne the multitude, where the peo­ple dooth beare rule. For it is expedient that there bee some to assemble them, who may haue the cheefe authority. They are in some places called forecounsellors or preconsulters, because they con­sult before: but where the p [...]ople commands, they are rather called a Senate or counsel. Then there are almost so many offices belonging to the City. There is another charge concerning the seruice E of the gods, as are Priests and others, to whom is committed the administration of religion, as to haue care of the Temples, to reedifie those that are ruinous or decayed, and to prouide and looke to such other things as are ordained for the honor of the gods: which charge is in some places all one, as in small Cities: sometimes also there are many sorts thereof, and all diuided or distingui­shed from the office of Priesthood, as keepers of the consecrated money, sextons. The other charge next to this, which is seuerally ordained for al publick sacrifices, which are not by the law appoin­ted to the Priests, but concerne the honour of that God which is protector of the Citie, these are named Kings of the sacrifices, or high Bishops, called [...]. Then to repeat this matter, the necessary offices consist almost in these things, in religion, warre, publicke reuenues, expences tou­ching F the market, the Citie, the hauens, and the religion: furthermore in iudgements, contracts, writings, executions, imprisonments, accounts, inquests, controlling of Magistrats, and finally in the Senate or Counsell of the Commonweale. But properly and peculiarly in those Cities that are quiet and wealthy, wherein great care is had of descence or comelinesse, there is appointed a Ma­gistrate for the discipline of women and children, for the obseruing and keeping of the lawes, and for the gouernement of places for exercise: and besides, for gimnasticall and musicall games, and other like shewes. Of these Offices, some doubtlesse are not popular, as that for the discipline of [Page 350] women and children. For poore men must of necessity vse their wines and children, as seruants, G for want of slaues. And whereas there are three sorts of Magistracies, by which the cheefe Of­ficers are chosen, namely, they that looke to the obseruing of the lawes, the Preconsulters, and the Senate or Counsell [...] they of the former, haue an Aristocraticall office; the second an Oligarchicall; and the last, which is the Senate or Counsell, is Popular. Thus haue wee breefely handled al­most all the publique Offices.

Some Offices are necessary, and others honorable: those are necessary which Citties cannot want, and those honorable which serue for the ornament and beautifying ther­of; and some of them belong to ciuile gouernment, others to religion. There are seuen­teene H kinds of Offices, the first necessary Office is of them that are Clearkes of the mar­ket: the second of them that haue charge of the publicke and priuate buildings of the City, and they are called Ediles: the third concerneth the same thing in effect, but with­out the Cittie: the fourth is of receiuers and treasurers: the fift of Notaries and Scriue­ners: the sixt of executioners and iailers: all which Offices be very necessary, as bee also those that follow, which are withal of greater authority, wherin there is required much experience and faithfulnesse, as are those Offices which concern the guard and defence of the Citie, and all those that are ordained and instituted for the warre, which wee re­ferre to the seuenth kind of Offices, as Captaines, Generals of Armies, Constables, I leaders of the Horsemen, Colonels of the footmen, Admirals; vnder whose command are sundry other inferiour Officers: the eight is of the Masters of accounts, and control­lers of other Offices: the ninth is of those that haue the ouersight of the State, assemble the Counsell, and are therein President; as were the Consuls at Rome, and now in Swit­zer land the Auoyers, Burgmaisters and Amans: the tenth is of the forecounsellers, preconsulters, or procurators, who examine matters, & then propound them to the coun­sell, as are the Sauij or Sages at Venice, being sixteene in number, and so called, because they seeme to haue a farther insight and iudgement in causes of weight, then all the rest: the eleuenth is of Priests, and others appointed to the seruice of the gods, and the K administration of religion, as Bishops, Chanons, Curates, Chaunters, and others di­stinguished from the Office of Priesthood, as Wardons, and Sextons, &c. the twelfth of the Kings of the sacrifices, as at Rome, at Lacedemon, and in AEgypt; or of high Bi­shops, called [...], as at Athens, to whose charge were committed the publique sa­crifices made in honour of that God who was protector of the City: the thirteenth is of those Officers who are appointed for the discipline of women: the fourteenth for the institution and education of children: the fifteenth of those that looke to the obseruing of the lawes: the sixteenth of such as ouersee the exercises: the seuenteenth concernes the publicke games and shewes. Of all which Plato doth treat at large in the sixt booke L of his Lawes, where he declareth how they should be ordained, in what number, and af­ter what manner created, and what euery Magistrats charge is, in matters tou­ching either humane affaires, or the seruice of the gods, in warre and peace, in the Citie and abroad. Aristotle hath already spoken of it before in the fourth book, the eleuenth chapter.

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CHAP. I. Of the perfect Commonweale, and the happy Citie.

HE that will vndertake duly to treat of the best Commonweale, ought first of all to declare what life is most to be wished and desired: for if he be ignorant E thereof, he must needs be ignorant of the best forme of Commonweale, for it stands with reason that they should liue well, who vse a good forme of Comon­weale, according to their commodities, vnlesse there happen some extraordi­nary le [...]. Therefore is it behoo [...]efull first of all to determine what kind of life is by all men most to be wished, and next of all to examine whether the same bee good publick [...]ly and priuately, or diuerse. Now then supposing that we haue elsewhere sufficiently discussed many points concerning the good life, we will repeat them here. Doubtlesse, as touching the diuision al­ready set downe, it cannot be denied, but that whereas good be diuided into three parts, namely, into those that are externall, into the goods of the body, and into the goods of the mind; all men F cannot be happy, for he shall neuer be accounted happie, that hath not any portion of manhood, nor of temperancie, nor of iustice, nor of wisdome, nor he that is afraid of euery flie, nor hee that being hungry or thirsty refraineth not from the worst things, nor he that for the value of a far­thing will kill his dearest friends, nor likewise he that is sencelesse and without reason, like a child or mad man. Now ought all men confesse these things to be so as we haue declared them: Neuer­thelesse they disagree in the quantity and in the immoderate excesse of them. For how little ver­tue soeuer they haue, they thinke that sufficient: But their desire is to excell infinitely in riches, [Page 352] possessions, power, glory, and such like things: whose error is easie to be refuted by the workes them­selues, G sith vertue is not gotten and kept by the outward goods, but the outward goods are gotten by vertue, and that the happy li [...]e, whether we account it to consist in pleasure, or in vertue, or in boh, falleth rather to them which excell in goodnesse of manners, matched with wisedome, and ha [...]e outward wealth in a reasonable measure, then to those which haue greater store therof then they haue need of, and lacketh the other goods. But vpon good consideration of the matter we shall ha [...]e vnderstanding of the same by reason. For the outward goods haue some end wherefore they are, being as it were instruments: and euery profitable thing is such, that the excesse thereof must needs be hurtfull, or of no profit to him which hath it. But how much soeuer the goods of the mind do abound, so much the more good do they, and therfore are not only honest, but also profitable. To H be short, it is certaine that such is the comparison and proportion of the good dispositions, or best states and affections of euery thing [...]mongst themselues, as is of the excesse, by which the things themselues doe differ one from another, whereto we account the dispositions to appertaine. There­fore if the mind, both as it is absolutely taken without respect of the good which we reape thereby, and as it hath relation to our selues, is of greater honour, and more precious then the possessions of the body, then must the good disposition and best state of euery of these, haue all one the same prop [...]rtion that is in their subiects. Moreouer, such goods are naturally to bee desired for the mind, and all wise men ought so to desire them, and not the mind for them: let vs then resolue our selues, that there happeneth as much felicity to euery man, as he possesseth vertue & wisdome, I and so farre as he worketh according to them; taking example from God who is blessed, not in re­spect of any outward good, but in respect only of himselfe, and because hee is of such a kind of na­t [...]re: for good fortune doth dif [...]er from felicitie, in that the goods that are frō without the mind, come vnto vs by chance and fortune; but no man is iust nor wise of fortune, nor by fortune. Ther­fore it followeth, and is to be inserred by the like reasons, that the Citie is happy and blisful which is good, and doth order well her affaires. Now it cannot be that they should order their affairs wel which doe not good things: neither is any kind of action whatsoeuer, either of man or of Citie, to be acco [...]ted good, without vertue, and wisedome: withal, the strength, iustice, and wisdome of a Citie, haue the same vertue and forme, as haue those qualities of perticular persons, in respect K whereof they be called iust, temperate, and wise. Thus haue we set downe these matters by way of a preamble, because we could passe no further without saying somwhat of thē, neither was it possibly for vs here exactly to examin al the reasons belonging to the same, for why, it is a work pertaining to another enterprise and place. Now let vs presuppose, that the good life seuerally & perticularly of euery citizen by himself, and iointly and commonly of the cities thēselues, is it that is so furthered and furnished with vertue, that it is able to performe vertuous actions. We will for this time omit those doubts which may be obiected herein, and consider of thē afterwards, if there be any which will not [...]eeld to our saying.

L

Whereas after Aristotles opinion, happinesse consisteth publickely and particuler­ly in the enioying the goods of the mind, of the bodie, and of fortune; which are from without vs: as well the Cittie, as the priuate person, is to be accounted happie, which partaketh and enioyeth all the three goods together. But that hee doe abundantly en­ioy the goods of the mind, as Morrall and intellectuall vertues, and the other goods in meane sort, to wit, the goods of the bodie; as beauty, health, and strength; and the outward goods, which be riches, honours, glories, and such like things.

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CHAP. II. Whether the felicity of one perticular person, and of the Citie be all one, and which life is to be preferred, either that which is imployed in action, or that which is spent in contemplation and study.

[Page 353] A IT remaineth now to examine whether the happinesse of each particular man & of the City, be all one or not. But this is a manifest thing, because all men do con­sent that it is all one: for all those which place the good life of each perticular per­son in richesse, do account the whole city happy which is rich: and the preferrers & fauorers of the tyrannical life, think that city most happy that cōmandeth & ruleth many. And he which commends each perticular person, cheefly in respect of honesty and vertue, will call that city happy which is vertuous. But herein two points are to be considered, the one, what life is to be preferred, whether that which consisteth in the publicke go­uernment, and fellowship of the city; or rather that kind of li [...]e which is solitary, and is separated B from the ciuile society: The other point is, what forme of Cōmonweale and disposition of a Citie is good, or whether the publick gouernment, is to be desired of all men, or of certaine, and not of all. Now it appertaines not to the mind and consideration of him which dealeth about ciuile matters, to set down what is to be desired of each perticular person, but what is to be wished for of al men in general: And therfore haue we put forth this question, as peculiar to our methode, leauing the other as being strange. Now therfore that Cōmonweale must needs be good, by the order whereof euery man may do wel & liue happily, wherin there is no doubt. But there is a cōtrouersie (amongst those which confesse that the vertuous life is to be wished) whether the ciuile & actiue life is more to be desired then that which is seuered frō all outward things: as the contemplati [...]e life, which all men C thinke to be fit only for a Philosopher, for they as well old as new, which haue feruently aspired to vertue, seeme to chuse these two liues, I say the li [...]e which is emploied in gouernment, & the Philo­sophers life, & it is a matter of great importance to know in which the truth lieth: for wise & dis­creet men should alwaies apply themselues to the best end; both euery man particulerly, and the city generally. But some think that the rule and gouernment ouer neighbors & borderers that is exe­cuted with lordly a [...]thority, stands with great iniustice: but if it be ciuilly executed, that thē there is no iniustice in it, but yet that it is contrary to peace & tranquility. Others contrarily think that the life spent in action & gouernment, is only worthy for a man, & that priuat persons cannot bet­ter exercise the works of euery vertue, then those which deale in publicke affaires, and go [...]erne the D Commonweale: these be their opinions. Others vphold, that the Lordly and Tyrannicall maner of cōmonweale is only happy, and in some places the hauing of dominion, & bearing rule ouer neigh­bors and borderers, is the end and marke whereas the lawes of the Commonweale do aime. Ther­fore where there be many lawes made, and dispersed here & there in many places, if they haue re­gard to some end, doubtlesse they tend wholly to haue rule and dominion: as at Lacedemon, and in Crete, almost all their whole discipline & multitude of laws, are framed and directed for the wars. Furthermore, this faculty is honored amongst all nations which are able to bring others into sub­iection, as among the Scithians, Persians, Thracians, & Frenchmen. In some places there be laws made for the incouragemēt of this vertue, as at Carthage they honor men with as many rings as E they haue ben times in the wars. There was in times past a law in Macedon, that those which had not slain some enemy, should weare a girdle of a halter: and amongst the Scythians, it was not law­ful for him which had not slain an enemy to drink of the cup which they caried about and dranke o [...] in the solemne feasts. The Hiberians (a warlike nation) set as many pillers about the graue of euery person deceased, as he had slain enemies in his life time. There be in other places many oth [...]r like fashions, either stablished by law, or allowed by custome; although if we look well into the mat­ter, it should seem against reason, that the man who is fit to gouern a Commonweale, would inter­meddle with shewing the maner & fashion of commanding and bearing rule ouer such neighbors and borderers as willingly yeeld, and such as are compelled to obey: for how can that which is not F lawful, beseeme him? for it is lawfull, not only to gouern iustly, but also vniustly: and it may be that a man may ouercome other men vniustly, which thing notwithstanding we see not to fall out in other sciences: for it is not the office of a Phisition or Pilot to cause compulsion to be vsed; one to the sick, the other to the mariners. But many think the lordly kind o [...] gouernment to be citilike, & that which they say is not iust & behoo [...]eful for thēselues, they are not ashamed to exercise against others: for they seek for a lawfull gouernmēt among thēselues, & care not what iustice is done else­where: a matter against al reason, except by nature one be a master, & another a seruant. Now if it [Page 354] be so, it is not behoofefull to straine a mans selfe to gouerne all men, but them onely which are fit by G nature to liue vnder gouernment; as Hunters ought not to take men to be sacrificed and eaten, but wild beasts which are good to eat, and fit for such purposes. Notwithstanding, a Citie may be hap­py by it selfe, to wit, that Citie which vseth a good forme of gouernment, if it were possible to find some one City inhabited seuerally by it selfe, vsing vertuous lawes, whose order and discipline ten­ded not to the wars, nor to get victory ouer the enemies: for let vs put the case that there were no such thing in it, therefore all martiall exercises are to bee accounted honest, howbeit, not as the last end of all things, but as ordained for the same. The vertuous Lawgiuer ought there­fore to haue consideration of the Citie, and of the kind of men, and of all other societies, howe they shall attaine to that good life and felicitie, which is possible and conuenient for them. It H is also the Office of the Lawgiuer to see if there be any neighbours and borderers, after what ma­ner euery of them is to be vsed and dealt withall, and what duties are to be obserued toward them. But wee will hereafter treat in conuenient place, to what end the good Commonweale ought to tend.

The whole Citie is happie in the selfesame manner that each perticular man is, be­cause the felicity of perticular persons, ensueth the welfare of the Citie, and is accoun­ted such, as the opinion is that they haue therof: some men placing it in richesse, others in great power, and large compasse of dominions, referring all their discipline to war, I and to gouerne as in old time the Lacedemonians and Romanes did: which Aristotle reproueth as wicked and vniust, except by chance they light on some such to bee com­manded, which are naturally slauish. Plato also in his first book of Lawes findeth great fault with the Lacedemonians, who set by nothing but Fortitude, neglecting all other vertues. Others place felicity in morrall and intellectuall vertues, whereabout they are at strife still to learne which vertuous life is most to be desired, and whether that which consisteth in action and in the gouernment of the Commonweale, or that which con­sisteth in contemplation, being farre from entermedling in any affaires.

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CHAP. III. Whether felicity doth consist in the actiue or contemplatiue life.

WE will dispute against those which confesse that the life ioined with vertue, is most of all to be desired, and yet disagree about the vse thereof, and will set downe the reasons of either party: some despise the offices of the Commonweale, deeming that the life of a free man differeth from the life of a ciuile gouernour, and howe that L kind of life is most of all to be wished for: others affirme that the gouernours life is the best, because it is not possible by doing nothing, to do wel; and that well doing and felicity is all one and the selfesame thing. Both of them doe partly say well, and partly not. The one affirme the life of him which is free from such trouble, to be better then his that gouernes: which thing is true, because there is no generositie in vsing a slaue, as he is a slaue; and besides, in the commanding of things necessary, there is no decence or honesty: yet it is an error to think that euery gouernmēt is a lordly kind of rule, for the gouernment of free men doth no lesse differ frō that of slaues, thē doth he which is free by nature from him which is a slaue by nature, whereof we haue sufficiently spokē in the former discourses: but it is not good to prefer the doing of nothing before labor and emploi­ment, M sith happinesse consists in action: besides, the actions of good and iust men haue for their end many good things. This being thus determined, some will thinke that it is very good to bear rule ouer al, sith herby many iust & honest things may be done: so that he who may bear rule ought not to resign his power to another, but rather to take it frō him: & that the father haue no regard of his childrē, nor the childrē of their father, nor one friend of another, in this respect: for that which is [Page 355] A good is greatly to be desired, and to doe well is good: perhaps they sho [...]ld say true, if that which is most to bee desired, did happen or befall to spoilers and oppressors of people, which thing cannot possibly be, and therefore they presuppose a falshood, for such a kind of man is no more able to vse honesty in his actions, vnlesse he doe as much excell others as a man doth excell a wom [...]n, or the father his children, or the lord his slaues. Wherefore he which doth herein transgresse, shall not be afterward able to do so wel, as he hath done ill, and swarued from vertue [...] for between those which are like, honesty and vprightnesse consisteth in turnes or enterchange; for this is equall and like: but inequalitie betweene equall persons, and vnlikenesse betweene like persons, is against nature. And nothing which is against nature, is honest. If then there were any other better in vertue & B ability to doe wel, it were honest to yeeld vnto him, and iust to obey him. Now he must not be endu­ed with vertue only, but with power also, by meanes whereof hee may vse action. If these bee well propounded, and if we account felicity to consist in well doing, it followeth that the actiue life, as well publickely of the whole City, as particulerly of euery peculiar person; is the best. Neuertheles, as some suppose, the actiue life is not to bee referred to others: neither [...]re the meditations only ac­tiue, which are caused through things that spring from our actions, b [...]t rather those which [...]re perfect in themselues, and the contemplations and considerations which are desired for thēselues: for to do well is a finall cause, and consequently some [...]ction [...] We do likewise say that they do cheefe­ly and properly vse outward actions, who marke by conceit and cogitation, as a Maister builder. C Furthermore, it is not necessary that Cities which are scituated apart [...] other, and haue cho­sen this manner of life, should be wholly without action, for as much as this may happen by their parts, sith there be many mutuall actions betweene the parts of a Citie one with another [...] The like is seene in euery man: otherwise God could hardly be in good estate, nor the world [...] [...]ith they haue no outward actions, besides those which are proper vnto them. It doth therefore [...]ppe [...]re, that one selfesame life is good for euery one in particular, and likewise publickely for cities and men.

Aristotle continuing his discourse of the actiue and contemplatiue life, doth com­pare them together, and saith that the fauorers and affecters of both these liues, do erre, D as wel they who leauing the actiue life, doe extoll the contemplatiue only; as the other who commend so much the actiue life alone, and esteeme not the contemplatiue. For they who preferre the quiet kind of life before the busie kind, & that which is imployed in gouernment, are deceiued in that they think that euery gouernement is a lordly kind of rule; which is properly ouer slaues, far different from that which is ouer free men. In like sort they are deceiued who prefer the busie before the quiet kind of life: in that they suppose that they who are giuen to contemplation, do nothing; because they onely are not to be knowne, who exercise iustice, and the vertues referred to another; but they al­so E whose nature is contemplatiue [...] sith contemplation is a kind of action, and that a most excellent kind, because the perfection thereof is inward, and because also it is desired for it selfe. Aristotle who was very studious, doth in the tenth of his Ethicks, and first of his Metaphisickes maintaine that cōtemplation is the more excellent. Cicero in the first of his Offices, doth learnedly and elegantly handle the [...]ame question: and hee who tooke pleasure in the managing of publick affairs, doth preferre action before contemplation.

CHAP. IIII. F Of the commodities requisit for the establishing of a good kind of gouern­ment, and of an happy city, and of the greatnesse of a city.

BVt sith we haue premised these things, and disputed be [...]ore of other Cōmonweales, we will now speake of that which rem [...]ines, and first we will shew what grounds it is requisite to haue for the cōstituting of such a city as mē might desire. For it is not possible to establish a [Page 356] Commonweale, without hauing in some different measure the things which are thereto expedient G and needfull. We must therefore presuppose sundry commodities, as it were in wishing for them, whereof neuerthelesse there is none impossible: I meane the multitude of Citizens, and greatnesse of the territory; for euen as other Artificers, as an Embroderer and Shipwright, must haue stuffe meet for their worke, which by how much the better it is, so much the fairer and better that peece of worke will bee which is made thereof, in the like sort, the Gouernour and Lawmaker must haue his proper matter well and conueniently prepared; The first commoditie hereunto requisite, is the multitude of inhabitants, how many, and of what nature they ought to be. Like­wise, regard must bee had to the territory, how bigge and what kind of soile it must bee. Many then suppose that an happie and flourishing City should bee great, if this bee true, they know not H which Citie is great, and which is small, for they iudge it to bee great by reason of the number and multitude of the inhabitants, whereas they should rather respect the power then the multi­tude: for there is a certaine duty and worke proper to a Citie, and that Citie which can best per­forme it ought to bee accounted great, as, you will not say that Hippocrates was a greater man, but a greater Phisition then another man who may exceed him in greatnesse of body: yet if men in iudging the greatnesse of a Citie respect the number of the inhabitants, they must not haue regard to euery multitude of men, because there is of necessity in Cities a great number of slaues and strangers: But they should haue regard to those which are a part thereof, and of whome it consisteth, as of her proper members; for the abundance of these dooth witnesse the I greatnesse of a Citie: but that Citie which can affoord many Artificers, and fewe Souldiours, cannot b [...]e great, for there is difference betweene a great, and a populous Citie. And it is knowne by experience to bee very difficult, or rather impossible that a Citie which is too much peopled, can bee well gouerned. Certes, of all the Cities, whose gouernement is accounted good, wee see not any which is too populous. And hereof reason it selfe dooth assure vs, for the lawe is a certaine order, and the good instituting of lawes, is of necessitie good order: But the excessive number of inhabitants is not capable of order. For this should be a worke requiring Gods omnipotent power, which comprehendeth and gouerneth the globe of the whole world. Then sith goodnesse or fairenesse dooth vsually consist in multitude and great­nesse, K that Citie wherein there is the prescribed proportion of greatnesse, it is doubtlesse the best or fairest. There is also a certaine measure of greatnesse in cities, as in all other things, in liuing creatures, plants and instruments, for each of them being too small, or of excessiue greatnesse, cannot retaine his power, but shall thereby wholly loose his nature, or remaine vn­profitable: as a shippe of an hand breadth is not in very deed a shippe, nor that also which is of two furlongs, but being come to some greatnesse, either through being too little, or through excessiue highnesse, it will saile ill: in like sort, the Citie which hath few inhabitants, is not sufficient, although a Citie bee a thing sufficient. If it haue too many inhabitants, it shall bee furnished with things necessary as a Nation, not as a Citie, neither is it possible to go­uerne L it well. For who could bee the guide and leader of an huge multitude, or a crier, vn­lesse hee were like to Stentor? Wherefore that is to bee accounted the cheefest Citie which hath such a number that may suffice first and principally of it selfe to liue well in ciuile societie. And although a Citie may bee greater by exceeding this proportion, yet it is not infinite, as hath been said. It is easie to vnderstand by the effects themselues, what is the tearme or bound of this excesse: for the actions of a Citie are sometimes in commanding, and sometimes in obey­ing. The authoritie of commandement and iudgement, is the action of a commander. Nowe, to iudge vprightlie, and to bestow the Magistracies on worthie persons, it is necessarie that the Citizens doe knowe each other, of what estate and qualitie they are: And where M this is not done, neither can Offices bee well disposed, nor iudgements well ordered: For it is no reason that they should rashly proceed in either of them, as doubtlesse they doe in a ci­tie which is too populous. Besides, strangers and forriners may easily intrude themselues into the Commonweale, because it is no hard matter to bee hidden in so great and ex­cessiue a multitude. Wee will then conclude, that the good definition of a Citie is a great multitude of inhabitants, hauing sufficient meanes whereby to liue, and a naturall [Page 357] A knowledge of and betweene themselues. Thus wee haue spoken ynough of the greatnesse of a Citie.

The former discourses touching a happie life and touching action and contemplati­on, haue bene propounded as preparatiues for the better consideration of a good form of gouernement, the foundation whereof is grounded on the abundance of things ne­cessary, which abundance consisteth in two commodities, the one is the multitude of inhabitants, the other the quantity and quality of the country or territory. An happie Citie should bee neither too great, nor too little: but sith fairenesse consisteth in multi­tude B and greatnesse, that City whose proportion is moderate, must needs bee faire and flourishing: which proportion must not bee iudged by the number or multitude of all sorts of inhabitants, as bondmen, soiourners, and strangers resorting thether, but by re­specting the true and right Citizens, whereof it is composed, as of the proper parts or members: also the ability thereof, for it is not possible to gouerne a Citie well that is too populous, as Caire in AEgypt, Constantinople in Greece, Paris in France, Chambala in Cathaia, Muscho in Muscouia, Fez, Samarcand, Milaine, by reason of the multitude and confusion therein, repugnant to the lawe and to discipline grounded on good or­der. There is besides this another euill, that the Citizens not knowing each other, the C vertues and sufficience of those who are to bee chosen to Offices and Magistracies, re­maine vnknowne: and strangers being hidden in the excessiue multitude, doe more ea­sily intrude themselues into charges of gouernment.

CHAP. V. Of the soile or prouince, which is the most commodious.

D

WE may say the like of the country, and need not doubt touching the quality ther­of, but that the best and most praiseworthy by the consent of all men, is that which is furnished with most sufficience, as of necessity that countrey is which is fertile and abundant in all things. For to haue all things, and to want no­thing, is sufficience. Now it must be so sp [...]tious both in length and largenesse, that the inhabitants may liue together in quiet, both in sufficient and modest sort. If this which we haue propounded be well said or not, we will hereafter discourse therof, when we come to that place, where we shall fully and at large treat of the purchasing, and of the abun­dance E of wealth, how and in what manner men should dispose themselues for the vsing thereof: For many doubts arise in this consideration, by reason of those who draw this matter to the one or other excesse of li [...]e, some to sparing, some to superfluity. It is nothing hard to know what the forme of the region ought to be. And in some places we must beleeue skilfull Captaines, who say that the entrance thereof should be difficult and dangerous for the enemies, and the issue easie for tho [...]e of the country. Besides, as we said that the multitude of inhabitants in a City, should bee no greater, then that they might easily know each other, there is the like reason touching the country. And to be easily knowne is nothing els then to be of such a scituation; that it may easily be succou­red. If we should constitute or establish a Citie according to our owne desire and wish, We would F seat it in a place which should be commodious by sea and land. One of the profits growing hereby, is before alledged, to the end that it might haue succour from all places; the other, that graine & all manner of fruits, may be commodiously brought thither, that the carriage of wood, or what­soeuer other commodity the Country doth yeeld, may be easie.

The soile or region that is fruitful, & aboundeth in al things, is very good, being withal so spatious in length & largenesse, that the inhabitants therof may liue without discord in su [...]icient sort. The forme that is sure and safe for war, must haue the entrance thereof [Page 358] difficult and dangerous for the enemies, and the issue easie for those of the Countrey, G that they may saly out, and succour each other within. It shall also bee commodious hauing an easie way for the conueying of wood, and other commodities growing there, from one place to another. Those Authors that wrtie of Husbandry, as Columel­la, Varro, Cato; and of building, as Vitruuius, and Baptist Albert a Florentine, doe han­dle this matter at large.

CHAP. VI. H Whether the nearenesse of the sea be profitable or not.

TOuching trafficke by sea, whether it bee profitable or hurtfull to well go­uerned Cities, there are many doubts: for some affirme that it is very per­nicious to the good discipline of a City, that strangers trained vp in other lawes, resort thether: and that to people it much by the trafficke of the sea, in sending forth and receiuing into the City a multitude of Merchants, it is against the ordinance and institution of a good gouernement. But if I these inconueniences bee auoided, there is no doubt that it is better both for [...]afety and abundance of all necessaries, that a City or Countrey bee neare the sea. For to resist the enemy, the inhabitants for the full assurance of their owne safety, must be able to haue succour easily conueyed vnto them from all parts, as well by sea as by land, that if it be not possible to hurt the enemies both waies when they assaile them, yet at the least they may the more offend them by the one or the other, hauing both. Besides, they may furnish themselues with such necessaries as they want, and send out those whereof they haue abundant store: for a City must vse trafficke and Merchandise for it selfe, and not for others. And they which keepe open marts for al the world to repaire to, doe it to gaine thereby. If such couetous desire beseeme not a City, neither also dooth K the keeping of such marts beseeme it. But sith we see at this present in many Countries, harbors & hauens lying commodiously neare the City, in such sort, that they are not within it nor [...]arre from it, yet inclosed with wals and other like fortifications; certainely, if there growe any good by their communion, the City that is so scituated shall haue it; and if there bee any inconuenience, it may be easily auoided by statutes, declaring and appointing who may conuerse and trafficke together, and who not. Touching power by sea, there needes no doubt to bee made, but that it is good to bee furnished therewith according to a certaine quantity, for it is not requisite and behoofeful for the Cities selfe onely, but also for some bordering friends, to bee [...]eared, and to haue succour readie, as well by sea as land. The number and greatnesse of this sorce must bee according to the state and L manners of the City. For if it flourish, and be as a Princesse and commandresse of others, it must of necessitie haue this power proportionable to the actions thereof. Neuerthelesse, it is not needful that there bee in Cities great store of seafaring men, neither is it meet, that such men bee a part thereof. For they which are employed as chee [...]e aboord the ships, and haue the ouersight and com­mand of such people, are free, and are taken out of the [...]ootmē. But if there be great store of peasants and husbandmen dwelling neere, there wil neuer be any lacke of Marriners, which thing we see at this present in some places, as at Heraclea, where they haue their gallies furnished, although their City be lesse then many others. Wee haue spoken sufficiently of the soile or Countrey, and of Hauens, Cities, the Sea, and power in shipping. Touching the number of Cities, we haue before dis­cussed M how it is to be determined.

The nearenesse of the sea is profitable for safetie and abundance; not for mens man­ners which are corrupted by receiuing straungers, or resorting into other Countries. Plato maketh the same discourse in his fourth booke of Lawes. There is at this presant [Page 359] A a most sharpe and rigorous lawe in China, whereof wee haue spoken in the fift booke, forbidding on paine of death the entrance of strangers into the Countrey, or the brin­ging of any thither by their saylors and shipmen: as it appeareth by Osorius of Portu­gall in his booke of Nobility: and by the Iesuites Indian Epistles, and particularly that wherein is declared the death of Frauncis Xauer, who would goe thither to preach the Gospell.

B CHAP. VII. Of what qualitie or nature the Cittizens ought to be: and a commen­dation of the Grecians.

WE will speake of what nature the Citizens ought to be: which thing is easily knowne, if we consider the most famous Cities of Greece, and all the habita­ble 1 parts of the earth, considering howe many sorts of people there are. For those Nations which inhabite cold places, and in Europe, are full of courage, C but haue no sharpenesse of wit, nor cunning; for which cause they do the longer continue in libertie: but they are without any good forme of gouernement, & cannot beare rule ouer their neighbours. They of Asia are wittie, and more apt to the learning and practising of arts, but they are not so couragious, and are therefore subiect, and doe serue con­tinually. The Greeke Nation as it is in the middest betweene these two places, so doth it partici­pate of both, being couragious and ingenious, for which cause it dooth continue and keepe her li­bertie, and is well gouerned, and might command the whole world, if it had but one manner of gouernment. The people of Greece haue the same difference betweene them, sith some of thē haue one onely nature, and others are well disposed to both qualities. It is therefore n [...]essary that they D who are fit to be trained vp in vertue by the Lawgiuer, haue by nature both wit and courage. For 2 whereas some affirme, touching those to whome the guard and de [...]nce of the City is committed, that they should shew themselues friendly to those whom they know, & rough or rigorous to those whom they know not: ammositie or couragiousnesse is that which causeth loue, sith that is the fa­culty by wich we loue. The signe hereof is, that a mans mind is more prouoked against his famili­ars and friends, then against vnknowne or strange persons, when he thinkes himselfe to bee despi­sed by them. Wherefore the Poet Archilechus, accusing his friends, dooth very fitly speake thus to his mind, Art thou not tormented by thy friends? Likewise, the commanding, and liberty, come to all men from this facultie; for the mind is imperious, and inuinsible. Yet it is not well said that E they should be rough towards those whom they know not, because they ought not to bee so towards any person, neither are magnanimious men rough by nature, saue only towards those which iniu­ry them. And that which wee said before, dooth rather incense them towards their familiars, if they think themselues to be iniured by them, and that by good reason; because from whom they ex­pected some good turne, they doe both see themselues depriued thereof, and besides, receiue [...]urt: Hence is the Prouerbe come, That the contentions and enmities betweene brethren are most bit­ter, and that they who haue extreamely loued each other, do extreamely hate. Wee haue hitherto shewed what the nature and number of Citizens ought to bee, and haue moreouer almost deter­mined the quantity and quality of the region or Countrey. For wee are not to seeke for the same F certainty in things which depend on reasons, as in those which are discerned by the sences.

Hauing treated of the greatnesse of a Citty, and the commodiousnesse and scituati­on of the Country or region, he speaketh now of the nature of Citizens, who for the maintainance of their liberty must be both courageous and ingenious: and he sheweth what kinds of people haue these two qualities, namely, the inhabitants of those Coun­tries that are in the middest betweene the North and South, being temperate in heat & [Page 360] cold, in the fourth and fift climate, wherein stands a good part of Greece, Italy, France, G and Spaine, from which Countries hath sprung almost all the excellence that hath euer been in the world, in Learning, in Armes, and in all Liberal and Mech [...]nicall Arts. But the Meridionall or Southerne people, who are in the second and third climate, through the excessiue heat thereof haue commonly sharper wits, but smaller cou­rage: and they that inhabite the farthest parts of the North, by reason of the exces­siue cold and abundance of blood, are very couragious, but of small wit and prudence. Aristotle sayth the like in his little Treatise De sensu & sensibili, and in the foureteenth Section of his problemes. Plato in the Epinomide doth write in like sort of Greece, and of the Grecians; and in Timeus, of the Countrey of Attica, and the Athenians. Like­wise H Hippocrates in his worke of the Aire, Waters, and Places, dooth vse the like dis­course touching the parts of the habitable world, affirming that the people of Asia are such as they are here described. Galen likewise doth very learnedly examine this point in that little worke, wherein hee proueth that the motions of the mind, doe follow the temperature of the body: and it seemeth that Aristotle hath borrowed this discourse of Hippocrates and Plato. Marcus Varro in his first booke De re rustica is of the same opinion, praising his Countrey Italy, as Aristotle doth Greece; and hee alledgeth Era­tosthenes, who diuided the whole world into two parts, viz. the North and South, from which proceedeth all that diuersity of things which we see, according to the neerenesse I or distance of the sunne.

1 AND all the habitable parts of the earth, considering how many sorts of people there are.] Claudius Ptolomeus in his second booke of the iudiciall part, the second Chapter, which concerneth the vniuersall property of Countries: The properties of Countries (sayth hee) haue been vsually distinguished either by all Paralleles and all Angles, or by their sci [...]uation towards the Eclipticke, and the sunne: For they that inhabite our coun­trey, which is scituated in a Northerne quadrant, who are vnder the Southerne Parral­leles, that is, who are described by the Equinoctiall, euen vnto the Sommer tropicke, as K the Sunne passeth ouer them, haue their bodies as it were burnt, their haire curled and thicke, their faces narrow, and their stature slender, and they are whote of nature and manners, cruell through the great heat which raigneth in those countries, and are those whom wee commonly call AEthiopians, who are so disposed as wee haue said, and haue such a constitution of the Aire. And herein both all liuing creatures, and those things that growe on the ground, are found to agree. But they who are vnder the Nor­therne Parralleles, that is, they that dwell in the Countries which are set vnder the North, because their verticall point is farre from the Zodiake, and from the heat of the Sunne [...] doe abound in cold and moisture, wherein there is great nourish­ment, L which is not drawne by the heat that is neere: For which cause men are there of white colour, hauing long haire, with great and well proportioned stature, but they are cold of nature and manners, and cruell by reason of the vehement cold that is in those Countries. The sharpenesse of their Winter is hereunto correspondent, as also the greatnesse of those thinges that growe on the ground, and the fiercenesse of the beastes: wee doe generally call them Scythians. As for them that inhabite the Countries scituate betweene the Summer tropicke, and the North, because the sunne goeth not ouer their Zenith, yet runneth not too farre from it towards the South, they liue in a very temperate air, wherein there are small differences of heat and M cold, they are therefore of meane heat and stature, and of a temperate nature, dwelling neere together, and being of mild and gentle manners. And they who are neerer to the South, are more ingenious and aduised in their actions, and are commonly more skilful in matters that cōcern the state & motions of the heauenly bodies, because their vertical point is neerer to the Zodiake, & to the wandring stars which are vnder it, by the neere­nesse wherof they haue their minds prompt and readie to conceiue and search out arts, [Page 361] A especially the Mathematickes. Likewise, the Easterne people are more vigorous and sound of conceit, keeping close nothing: for we doe truly say that the East is of the suns nature, and therefore that part of the day is to bee accounted more manly and dextrall. We see also in liuing creatures, that the right sides are stronger. Contrariwise, the We­sterne people are more effeminate, soft, and giuen to secrecie: for that part belongeth to the Moone, which doth alwaies shew herselfe towards the West betweene the interlu­nar spaces, and for this cause as nocturnall and sinistral, she is accounted opposite to the East. Then hee treateth of the manners and naturall institutions which are in the pla­ces scituated vnder euery signe of the Zodiake, which matter is handled likewise by B Iouianus Pontanus in his whole worke De rebus Coelestibus, and in his Vrania: by Mani­lius in the Astronomicke: and by Iulius Firmicus.

FOR whereas some affirme touching those to whome the guard and defence of the City is 2 committed, that they should shew themselues friendly to those whom they know, and rough or ri­gorous to those whom they know not.] Aristotle meaneth Plato, whome hee reprooueth for bringing in Socrates in the second booke of his Commonweale, discoursing thus of this matter. SOCR. Shall hee not need such a nature as is thereto proper and fit? ADIM. What els? SOCR. Let vs chuse then if we can, the natures meet for the guard C and defence of a Citie. ADIM. It seemeth that we ought to doe so. SOCR. By Iupiter it is no small enterprise, yet we must not feare, but doe what we can. ADIM. No certes. SOCR. Thinke you that a generous dogge differeth in nature from a generous young man, in as much as concernes this dutie of defence and watchfulnesse? ADIM. What say you? SOCR. Both of them should haue a good sent, bee swift to follow that which they haue found by their sent, and strong to fight when they shall haue ouertaken it, as need shall require. ADIM. It is necessary that they haue all this, and besides be couragi­ous, if they meane to fight well. SOCR. Why not? Hee that is thus hardy, will hee not bee cholericke, bee it horse, or dogge, or any other beast? Or doe you not know that the D passion of anger is inexpugnable and inuincible, making the mind fearelesse, and alto­gether vntamed, when it is present? ADIM. I know it well. SOCR. Then it is manifest what manner of body such a person should haue. ADIM. Yea certes. SOCR. And that his mind should be enclined to choler. ADIM. It is so. SOCR. But tell mee Glaucon, shall not they hauing such a nature be sharp and rough among themselues, and towards the other Citizens? ADIM. Not easily. SOCR. They ought to be gentle to their owne, but rough to the enemies: Otherwise they will not tarry till others destroy them, but they wil destroy themselues. ADIM. Yea verily. SOCR. What shal we doe then? Where shall we find a gentle and chollericke nature together? For the gentle nature is in some E sort contrary to the cholericke. ADIM. It seemeth so. SOCR. But whosoeuer shall want either of these, cannot bee a meete person for this place, and it seemeth impossible that these two natures can bee ioyned together, whereupon it followeth, that there cannot be had any such a one as we require. ADIM. I beleeue it. Thē (quoth Socrates) thinking on the aforesaid discourse, we haue reason to doubt, for wee haue straied farre from the similitude that was propounded. ADIM. How say you? SOCR. Are there not found such natures as mē would neuer haue thought, hauing these contraries? ADIM. Where. SOCR. This is seene in other creatures, but cheefely in this, wherewith wee compare ours. For you know, that the nature of a generous dogge is to bee gentle towards those F whom he doth familiarily know, and cleane contrary towards those whom he knoweth not. ADIM. I know it. SOCR. Then it was possible, and not against nature, to find for this purpose such a one as we sought. ADIM. It was not against nature.

G

CHAP. VIII. What the true parts of a citie be, and the necessarie parts thereof.

BVt as in other things which consist by nature, those are not parts of the whole substance, without which the whole cannot be: so also all those thinges are not to be set downe as parts of a City which are of necessity in Cities, neither yet H of any other whatsoeuer society, whereof there is made one certaine kind. For any thing being equally or vnequally communicated, ought to bee com­mon, and the same to all that communicate therein [...] as necessary sustenance, or the proportion & quantity of the territory, or some other thing. But where things are so dispo­sed, that the one is done for this cause, and the other thereunto appointed: they haue nothing com­mon, sauing that the one d [...]th, the other receiueth: I mean as the toole or instrument, & the work­man, haue nothing common with the worke which they do, for there is nothing common between the house and him which buildes it, but the house is as it were the end proposed to his science. In like sort, although the Citie haue need of riches, yet riches are not any part of the City. And there are many liuing things which are parts of riches: but the Citie is a certaine company or society of I such as are like, whose end lead the best kind of life that is possible. Then sith felicitie is the cheefe and soueraigne good, and sith it is an action and a certaine perfect vse of vertue, wherein some do sufficiently participate, others little or nothing at all; doubtlesse that doth cause the seuerall kinds and differences of a Citie, and the sundry formes of commonweale: for sith euery one aimes at this diuersly, and by diuerse meanes, hereby it commeth to passe, that the manners of mens liues, and that Commonweales doe differ. We see then how many things there are, without which a city can­not be, because thererein are of necessity comprised the parts, wherof we say that a city consisteth: And because my saying may bee the better vnderstood, I will set downe the number of a Cities actions: first therefore it must haue victuals; next it must haue Trades, sith mans life hath need of K many instruments; thirdly armour, because it is necessary that the citizens be furnished therwith as well for the safetie of their estate and chastising of rebels, as for their defence against the at­tempts and enterprises of strangers; besides, there must be some store of wealth and money, where­with the Citie may helpe it selfe both in domesticall occasions, and in the warres; the fift and prin­cipall thing is the obseruance of religion, which is called Priesthood; the sixt thing in number, & the most necessary of al, consists in the administration of iustice, touching the commodities and rights betweene them. These are the actions requisite in all Cities: for a Citie is not euery kind of multitude, but such a kind as is of it selfe sufficient to liue in good estate, as we said before. And if any of these things want, such a society hath no absolute sufficience in it self. Then sith a City stan­deth L by these actions, there must of necessity bee therein Husbandmen to prepare and furnish the Citie with victuals, tradesmen, souldiours, rich men, Priests, and Iudges of things necessary and profitable.

In this Chapter and that which followeth, he speaketh of the parts of a Cittie, what they are, and howe the exercises thereof may bee communicated, according to the diuersitie of gouernements and ages. There are then about sixe actions, without which no City can be. First it must haue victuals, wherewith the husbandmen and shepheards doe furnish it: secondly many trades and handicrafts: thirdly, armor as well to defend it M self, against subiects that rebel, as against strangers that may inuade or assault it: fourth­ly, abundance of wealth and money to employ in publicke and military affaires: the fift action, is the obseruance of religion and maintainance of seruice and worship of the gods, which is committed to the Priests: the sixt and most necessary of all, consisteth in [Page 363] A iudging, which charge is double, the one assigned to the Iudges of ciuile and criminall causes, the other to Senatours and Counsellours of Estate. These are the actions ex­ceeding necessarie, for the constituting and maintainance of euery Cittie: without which it cannot bee, nor consequently without those that doe them: Namely, Hus­bandmen, Sheepeheards, Artificers, Souldiours, Rich men, Priests, Iudges, and Coun­sellors of Estate.

B CHAP. IX. Whether all the charges of a Cittie are to be indifferently communicated to all persons, or whether some are peculiar, others common.

THese things being determined, we are yet farther to consider whether they ought all to be communicated to all: For it may so happen, that the same C persons shall be all both Husbandmen and Artificers, and Counsellors and Iudges: or whether each of these aforesaid charges is to bee giuen se­uerally, or whether some are of necessity peculiar, others common, yet not in euery Commonweale, as wee haue said. For it may be that all men doe participate in all things, and that al do not participate in all things, but some in some, from whence proceedeth the diuersity of Commonweales: for in Democracies all doe participate in all things, in Oligarchies not so. But sith wee nowe discourse of the good forme of Commonweale which may cheefly make a Citie happy, and sith it is impossible that hap­pinesse can be without vertue, (as hath been said) certainely in that City which is wel gouerned, D and which hath men that are iust in very deed, and not by supposition, the Citizens ought not to liue by mechanicall arts, because such a kind of life is base and contrary to vertue; neither ought they also to be Husbandmen, because rest is required for the attaining of vertue, and for the go­uernement of the Commonweale. And sith they likewise which are appointed and employed in the warres, bee therein required, as also they which consult of things profitable, and iudge of things iust or vniust, which seeme [...]o be the principall parts of the City, Whether these charges ought to be diuerse, or whether both may be committed to the same persons. They may doubtlesse in some sort bee committed to the same persons, and in some sort to sundry persons: for in re­gard that either charge requires a diuerse vigour of age, and that the one hath need of wise­dome, E the other of strength, they should bee committed to sundry persons: but in regard that it is impossible that they who can vse violence and prohibite them, will alwaies endure subiection, they should be cōmitted to the same persons: for it is in their power which manage armes, to con­tinue or not continue that form of gouernmēt wherby the state is ruled. It rests therfore that the Commonweale be committed to both, not at the same time, but as Nature hath ordained, which giueth strength to yong men, and wisedome vnto those which are elder. It is iust and expe­dient to distribute them after this manner vnto both: For this distribution is according to worthinesse. Besides, whereas wealth and possessions are necessarie for Citizens, and such on­ly as haue them, are true and right Citizens, it followes by necessitie that they ought to be rich. F For handicraftsmen or anie other sort of people, whose actions swarue from vertue, are no part of the Citie, which thing is manifest by the supposition that wee made before, because felicitie must needs bee ioined with vertue, neither ought wee to call a Citie happie, respecting any part thereof, but hauing regard to all the Citizens. It is likewise manifest that the pos­sessions must belong to them, sith the Husbandmen are either slaues, or barb [...]rous people, or such of the peasants as dwell thereabout. There rests yet to speake of, among the charges by vs recited, the Priests charge, whose institution is manifest. For sith the Citizens ought to [Page 364] honour the gods, certes they are not to make any Husbandman or Artificer a Priest: and where­as G also the Citizens are diuided into two sorts, namely of those which are employed in the warres, and of Counsellors, and sith it is meet that the gods be honoured, and that they who haue long la­boured, may in the end liue at rest and quiet, the office of Priesthood is to be bestowed on such per­sons. We haue declared those things, without which a Citie cannot stand, as also how many parts there are in a City: for although Husbandmen, Artificers, and all sorts of mercenary people bee thereto needfull, yet the warriors and Counsellors are parts thereof, and each of them is separate, the one alwaies, the other by turnes.

The necessary actions of euerie Cittie being declared, it is demanded whether they H may all bee exercised by all sorts of Cittizens, as in the Democracies: or some by some, and other by others; as in the Oligarchies the rich men exercise Merchandise, Armes, the Offices of Priesthood and iudging, & the poor men do by their toile furnish the ci­tie with victuals, and vse trades. It is resolued and concluded, that in a good Common­weale, Artificers, Merchants, and Husbandmen, cannot be true Citizens; the exercising of which professions are either base or too laborious: but the Warriours, Counsellors, Iudges, and Priests, are the true parts of a Citty: and the charges thereof may bee well committed to honest Cittizens, and to the same persons in diuerse ages, according to the order of nature, which giueth strength to young men, whereby they are fit for war, I and wisedome to ancient men, and greater knowledge to iudge and consult. Touching the dignities of religion, it is meet to bestow them on those of the elder sort, that they may in their old yeares rest and repose themselues after they haue passed through the seuerall charges of gouernement, and haue long time laboured and taken great paines. Besides, wealth, possessions, and money, should bee in such persons hands that are rich, and constitute the cheefe parts of a City; sith slaues, barbarous people, or such peasants as dwell neere thereabout, doe vse Husbandry.

K

CHAP. X. That the distributing of Citties by the kinds of the inhabitants, hath been aunciently vsed.

THis seemeth no new thing nor lately come to the knowledge of those which haue 1 discoursed and written of gouernement, that the Citie should bee diuided by 2 orders of exercises, and that they who are employed in the warres, should not L 3 be Husbandmen. For this manner is yet obserued in AEgypt, and in Crete, ha­uing been ordained in AEgypt by Sesostris, (as men say) and in Crete by Mi­nos. Likewise, the manner of eating publickely together, seemes to bee very auncient, and to haue beene obserued in Crete since the raigne of Minos, and in Italie long be­fore. For they who know the Countrey, say that Italus was king of Oenotria, of whom that people tooke the name, and in stead of Oenotrians were called Italians. Wherevpon that coast of Europe betweene the straight of Sicile and the Lametique gulfe (which are distant each from other halfe a daies iourney) was named Italie. Now they affirme, that this Italus caused the Oenotrians, of wandring Sheepeheards to become Husbandmen, and that among other lawes which hee gaue M them, he did first institute that manner of dieting together, and that euen at this present some that are descended from him, doe vse it, with certaine lawes of his which they haue receiued. The Opicians dwelt towards the Tyrrhene coast, and were in auncient time, and are yet at this present called A [...]sonians, and the Chaonians dwelt towards Iapicia & Ionia, called Sirtis: which Chaonians descended from the Oenotrians. Then the manner of eating publickely together, was [Page 365] A here begun, and the diuision of the Citizens by kinds, was first vsed in AEgypt. For Sesostris raig­ned long before Minos. Perhaps it is to be beleeued, that many other things haue in length of time been oft inuented, or rather infinitely. And it is likely, that want hath first shewed and cau­sed the finding out of things necessarie, and that afterward such as serue for ornament and plen­tie, haue b [...]n augmēted. We are to thinke that the same hath come to passe touching formes of go­uernement. Now that all these things are ancient, we may know by the AEgyptians, who are held to be of very great antiquity, and haue lawes and ciuile institution. Wherefore it is expedient to vse those things which haue beene well in [...]ented, and to assay the supplying of whatsoeuer shall want. We haue shewed before that the Countrey ought to be in their hands who manage armes, B and in theirs which gouerne the Estate, and why the Husbandmen should be distinguished from them, as also of what quantitie and qualitie the region should bee. First wee wil speake of the di­stinction or separation, and shew what kind of people Husbandmen should be. We find it not good that the possessions should be common, as some would haue them, but we like wel that the vse ther­of be common by way of courtesie, and that no Citizen want sustenance. All men agree, that the manner of dieting together is profitable for well ordered Commonweales, we will afterward shew for what cause we doe likewise thinke so. Now it is requisite that all the Citizens bee thereto ad­mitted, although it be no easie matter for poore men to contribute out of their owne substance the portion which is set downe, and maintaine their other [...]amily. Besides, the charges which are re­quired C for the seruice of the gods, are common to all the Citie. It is therefore necessary to diuide the country, into two parts, and to assigne the one part to the publicke vse of the state, the other to priuate persons: and to diuide either of them againe into two, so that one part of the publick reue­nues be imploied on the seruice of the gods, and the other laid out in defraying the expences which grow by their dieting together: and that likewise of the priuate, one part lie on the frontiers, and the other neare the City, to the end, that each of them hauing two lots distributed vnto him, they may all haue part in both places. By this meanes they shall enioy equal right, and shal better agree if there arise any warre against their neighbours or borderers. And where this manner of diui­ding is not obserued, there doth the one part little care for the enmity of any neighbour state, and D the other feares it too much. For which cause in some places there is a statute, that such as dwell neere the frontiers, may not be admitted to counsel, when consultation is to be had about the m [...] ­uing of warre against their borderers: as if they could not well determine by reason of their p [...]r­ticuler interest. It is therefore expedient to diuide the country in this maner, for the reasons afore­said. If it might be according to my desire and wish, I would haue the husbandmen to be slaues, not all of one nation, nor too courageous; for by this means they wil be meeter for labour, and lesse sus­pected of attempting any innouation. secondly, I would haue them to be some of the barbarous peo­ple which dwell round about, being of like nature with the former, and that some should peculiarly belong to those which hold and inioy the possessions in particular, & that others should be appoin­ted E to labor in that part which is publicke. We will afterward shew how slaues are to bee vsed, and why it is better to propose libertie for a reward vnto all.

S [...]th Citties haue need of many necessary actions, it is better that they which vse them, be distinguished and separated; as husbandmen from Souldiors, Iudges and Sena­tors from Artificers, which should also be diuided by their trades, and euery trade haue his quarter, euen as we see the Channons and Monkes dwell apart in cloisters. And this manner of distributing the multitude or vulgar sort of Citizens by kinds and orders of different exercises, is very ancient, which the AEgyptians did long time vse, who gloried F that they were the ancientest people of all the world, (as it appeareth by the beginning of Platoes Timeus) hauing receiued this said manner of distributing from Sesostris, who ordained it first in AEgypt, from whence it came afterward into Crete, at this pre­sent also is vsed at Caire, & Fez (as Iohn Leon writeth) and in many great Cities of Asia and Affricke. Others suppose, that the manner which is vsed at Paris, is more seemely & commodious, where Tradesmen and Artificers are intermingled. The Citizens being thus diuided, as it hath been said, by kinds, and separated in their exercises, should diet [Page 366] together by fifteenes, twenties, or such other number, to the end, that they may knowe G each other, and continue their mutuall good wil: which thing was first ordained by Mi­nos [...] Crete, then at Lacedemon by Lycurgus, and before them in Italie by king Italus. Now the Citie onely should not bee diuided in such manner, but the Countrey also is to bee diuided into two parts, the one publicke, the other priuate. And againe each of the two parts must be deuided into two other, so that one part of the publicke is to bee appointed for the defraying of charges that grow aforesaid, meetings and dieting togi­ther, (which are necessarie for euery well ordered Commonweale) the other, for the ser­uice of the gods, and matters of religion. In like [...]ort, of the priuate, one part must lie on the frontiers, the other neere the Citie, to the end, that euery Cittizen hauing two por­tions H distributed vnto him, all may haue like interest in both places; and being in like estate, like suretie; and the same care, if there arise any warre. As touching husbandmen Aristotle according to the ancient manner of Greece doth wish, that (to the end they should be more meet for labour, and lesse prone to rebellion) they were slaues, of diuers Nations, not too couragious, to whom libertie should bee proposed for their reward; or else that they should be strangers who might dwell scatteringly about the Country, and hirelings of like nature to slaues, and that some of them should peculiarly belong to those that hold the possessions in particular, and the rest appointed to labour in that part which is publicke. I

1 THAT the Citie should be diuided by orders of exercises.] Plato in Timeus, in that place where he bringeth in the AEgyptian Priest talking with Solon, touching the antiquitie and gouernment of Athens, and of the City of Saith: If you consider (saith he) the laws which they vse, and compare them with ours, you shall find therein great likenesse: First the Priests dwell apart from the common people, next the Artificers vse their trades, each sort by himselfe, and not indifferently or confusedly one amongst another. The like doe their Sheepheards, Hunters, and Husbandmen. Diodorus Siculus in his first booke, the eight chapter. The policie of the AEgiptians consists in three sorts of people, name­ly husbandmen, shepheards, and artificers: The husbandmen taking small wages of the K priests and noblemen, do from their youth continually al their life time follow husban­dry, by which meanes they become farre better and skilfuller therein then the people of any other country, both because they haue learned it of their fathers and ancestors, and also by reason of their continual vse and experience, so that they know better then any other men the natures of soiles, the seasons fit for watring and sowing, and the manner how to gather and keepe graines and fruits, as wel by the obseruation of their ancestors as by their own care & diligence. In like sort the shepheards hauing learned also of their ancestors how to driue, feed, and keep their cattel, continue alwaies that manner of life, being greatly furthered, both by that which their said ancestors haue foūd out touching L pasturage, and other no lesse necessary matters therunto belonging, & by such things as some among themselues haue by their diligence & study obserued: For they that keepe geese and other housebirds, do take therein such care and paines, that beside the cōmon nature which those birds haue with others that are kept elsewhere, they make a wonder­ful increase therof, because they let not the said birds hatch their own egs, but taking thē from them, they do themselues by such means as they haue inuented, reare vp the yong ones, far otherwise then in other countries men are wont to do. Touching arts & trades, we see that in AEgypt all kinds of works are maruellously wel made, & come as it were to their perfection: For the artificers and workmen in AEgypt do imploy thēselues in those M works only which are permitted by the laws or which they haue learned of their fathers, not troubling thēselues with matters of the Cōmonweale, so that neither the dislike or hate of the teacher, nor ciuile discord, nor any other thing whatsoeuer can hinder thē in their exercise. In other coūtries euery tradesmā may leaue his first estate to take another, and to follow some of thē husbandry, others merchandise, & others sundry occupations: yea some of thē wil oft repaire to publicke assemblies, which are vsed in Cities, gouer­ned [Page 367] A by the people, where being corrupted with mony, they cause and consent to things that turne greatly to the cities hurt. But in AEgypt, if an Artificer entermeddle in the affaires of the Commonweale, or vse many trades, he is greeuously punished: Finally, the same custome and institution in publicke and priuate matters hath beene anciently obserued by the AEgyptians, which their ancestors left vnto them.

AND that they who are employed in the warre, should not be Husbandmen.] Herodotus 2 in his second booke writeth, that in AEgypt it is not lawfull for them that are employed in the warres, whom they call Calasyres and Hermotyiues, to vse or exercise any other thing saue armes; the knowledge whereof is shewed and taught vnto them from hand B to hand, and from father to sonne. Diodorus Siculus in his first booke: The whole re­uenue (saith he) of the realme of AEgypt being diuided into three parts; the Colledge of the Priests receiues the first portion thereof [...] for the said Prelates are in great credite and authoritie among the inhabitants of that country, both because the charge and ad­ministration of religion is committed vnto them, as also because they are indued with knowledge and learning, and teach the rest. And they haue this portion allowed them, as well for the ordering and offering of sacrifices, as for their necessary sustenance; for the AEgyptians thinke, that they ought not to neglect, much lesse omit the seruice and reuerence due to the gods, or that the ministers and officers employed in the affaires of C the Commonweale, should want maintenance. These Prelates giue attendance about the Kings to aduise and counsell them in matters of great weight, foretelling things to come through the knowledge that they haue, as wel by the starres, as by their sacrifices, and report out of their holy bookes such things as haue come to passe in former times, that the Kings may thereby know what is expedient and profitable for them: and they are not (as in Greece) one man or one woman onely appointed to keep the consecrated things, but many of them are as it were dedicated and emplo [...]ed in the seruice, honor, & worship of the gods, who afterward leaue the charge and administration thereof to their children. All which Priests with their posterity are exempted from all subsidies, D and haue the second place after the king, of honour, dignity and reputation among the AEgyptians. Another portion of the publicke reuenue belongeth to the Kings, who im­ploy the same in their wars, the maintenance of their estate, and in rewarding those that by their good seruice haue deserued it; by this meanes the people is not charged with tributes or new taxes. The third part and portion is receiued by the Gentlemen, and others appointed to serue in the wars, wherein through continual vse and exercise they are skilfull, and by reason of this pay that they receiue, are the more readie and forward to vndertake whatsoeuer dangerous enterprises: for it were against reason, that they who are whollie bent and emploied in the defence of the people safetie, should receiue E no allowance nor profite of their Countrie, for which they fight. There is yet besides another far greater profit herein, for they being hereby more enriched, are the willin­ger to procreate children, and to leaue issue behind them, so that the countrie being by this meanes well peopled, hath no need of forraine souldiors, and the children hauing receiued from their fathers the knowledge of all things that concern warfare [...] and being trained vp and enured thereto, become both skilful and valiant souldiours. Plato in the second booke of his Cōmonweale. SOC [...]. Tell me, doth not the exercise of armes seem very artificial? GLAVC. Yes surely. SOCR. Is there greater care to be had of a shomakers trade thē of military discipline. GLAVC. In no sort. SOCR. We haue forbidden the shoe­maker F to take vpon him to be a husbandman, an embrotherer, and builder together, but to be only a shomaker, to the end he may be skilful in his trade. We haue also assigned to euery one that profe [...]ion whereto he is inclined by nature, and which he is to vse all his life time, leauing all other professions, that by obseruing oportunities, he may doe it the better. Is military discipline of so smal reckoning, that a man may easily be both an hus­bandman and a souldiour, and vse the trade of a shomaker or anie other; although none can euer plaie well at a cunning game, vnlesse hee haue vsed it from his youth, and [Page 368] diligently practised it? And shall he which taketh a buckler or any other weapons, bee G presently a skilful souldier? But among other instrumēts there cannot be found any that can make a good workeman or wrastler, or that can profite him which is ignorant of his owne art, and him that hath not sufficiently exercised it. ADIM. Instruments were then greatly to be esteemed, if they had such vertue. SOCR. Sith a soldiors profession is grea­ter, shall it not therefore require greater leisure, greater Art and Exercise? ADIM. Yes surely in mine opinion. The same Authour repeateth in the beginning of Timeus the cheefe points of his Commonweale. First of all (sayth Socrates) haue we not separated the souldiors from the husbandmen and artificers? TIM. Yes. SOCR. Assigning to euery one that which is sit for him according to his nature, with one onely exercise to euery H art. We said that they who were cheefly to follow armes, should only keepe and defend the Cittie against those that would attempt to endammage it, were they strangers, or of the same coūtry; vsing great modesty towards the inhabitants, as true friends by nature; but fierce in fighting against their enemies. TIM. Doubtlesse it is euen so. SOCR. For it is requisite that they be (as we haue said) by nature partly chollericke, and partly courte­teous, hauing both these qualities so tempered that they may demeane and carry them­selues aright, both towards their friends and enemies. TIM. They should indeed bee such. SOCR. And touching their education, is it not meet that they vse bodily exercises and musicke, and be instructed in all other disciplines that are meet for them? TIM. Yes I surely. SOCR. We said farther that they who shall be thus trained vp, shall haue neither gold nor siluer, nor ought els peculiar to themselues, but as helping and seruing the Commonweale, they shall receiue wages of those whom they guard and defend, who shall therewith sufficiently furnish them, that they may spent it in common, and liuewel & orderly together, hauing no other care thē only of vertue. TIM. You said so indeed.

3 PERHAPS i [...] is to be beleeued that many other things haue in length of time ben inuen­ted, or rather infinitely.] The same Aristotle in the twelfth booke of his Metaphisickes, the eight chapter saith, That Philosophie hath ben oft found out (as it is likely) and lost againe. Plato in the third and sixt booke of his Lawes affirmeth, that the knowledge of K gouernment began when cities were begun, and the institutions and ordinances there­of when mankind was multiplied: and hee thinketh that in an inestimable, and as it were infinit length of time, innumerable cities haue ben built and destroied, & that they haue sometimes of little ones become great, and of great ones little; sometimes of good bad, and contrariwise of bad good. So Aristotle who thought the world was eternall, & Pla­to which said that it had a beginning, but that it should neuer perish; haue affirmed that the same things in kind, haue ben infinitely, and that they should infinitly remaine, that there is nothing the like wherof hath not ben, that there should bee nothing which had not been before, and that there had been nothing that should not be againe afterward: L which vicissitude or successiue change being continuall and perpetual, must be referred to the mouings of the celestiall bodies, and to their powers: whereto Plutarch agreeth, writing thus in the beginning of Sertorius his life. It is not perhaps (saith hee) a thing to be meruailed at, that in infinite space of time, euen as fortune doth diuersly turne and change, it doth happē through the casuall meeting of accidents that are altogither like. For whether there be a prefixed and certain number of chances which may happē; For­tune hath sufficiēt plenty of matter to produce effects that may haue mutual resēblance; or whether humane effects be comprised in a determinat number, there must needs of­tentimes happen things wholly like, sith they are done both by the same causes, and the M same meanes. Pomponatius in his book of inchantments, writeth thus towards the end: They then that hold the world to be eternall, say that the same things haue ben infinitly found out, and infinitly lost, when as the countries wherein such things florished, were destroied by fires or deluges, which must of necessity happen at certain seasons, through the mouings and progresses of the stars. Which is confuted by Vines in his first book de veritate Christiana, in that chapter wherin hee prooueth, that the world is not eternall.

A

CHAP. XI. Of the scituation of a Citie, and of foure things.

WE haue shewed before, that a City should be seated in the most cōmodious place that may be, both by land and sea, and in respect of the whole Countrey. Touching the B situation thereof referred vnto it selfe, we are to wish it such, that regard may bee had to foure things. First to the East, as being a thing very necessary, for those Ci­ties are most healthful which are set towards the East, and towards the winds that blow from thence. Secondly, to the North for coolenesse. Touching the rest, it must bee ordered, that the situation of the Citie be accommodated to the actions both of peace and warre: of warre, that the Citizens may issue and make salies with ease, and the enemies not approch nor besiege it without great paine and trouble: But that aboue all things it be wel furnished with wels and foun­taines, but if this cannot be, they must haue recourse to the remedy thereof which hath ben in for­mer times found out, which is, to haue great cesternes able to receiue and hold abundance of raine­water, C so that they may haue no want thereof, if they be besieged & depriued by warre of the com­modities of the country. But because it is necessary to prouide for the inhabitants health, which consisteth cheefly in the situation, that the city be seated in such a place, & haue such a prospect, se­condly in vsing good & wholsome waters, great diligence in herein required: for the things which we do oft and much vse about our bodies, do greatly further our health: sith then the vertue of wa­ters and winds is of such a nature, it is very expedient in well gouerned Cities, where the waters are not all alike, and where is no store of conduites to diuide them, that those waters which are good to drink, may be separated from those which serue for other vses. Touching strong places, they are not in like sort profitable to all estates; high built fortresses are good for Oligarchies and D Monarchies: equall and euen places for Democracies: and neither of both for Aristocracies, but rather it is requisite to haue in such a state many strong places. Touching priuat houses, that form is held to be most pleasant and meet for other respects, whē they are well framed and built af [...]er the modern fashion, deuised by Hippodamus: But for the greater surety in war, it shal be better to haue thē built after a contrary maner, and as they were in ancient times, because by this meanes stran­gers cannot without difficulty and danger come vnto them, nor the assailants being once entan­gled, wind themselues out. It shall therfore be good to vse therein both these formes, which thing may be done, if we dispose them as husbandmen do the arbor of their vines, and make not all the city penetrable, but in certain parts and places, as it shal be requisit for the safety and beautifying E therof. Touching the wals, they who affirm that the cities which honor & imbrace vertue, should not vse any, speak very simply, and after the ancient maner, & do plainly see that experience hath controlled the error of those cities which did therein glory and boast. I grant that there is no honor in defending thēselues by the help of their wals against those which are either like, or do not much exceed them in number: but because it is possible, and sometimes it doth so fal out, that humane prowesse, and the valor of a few persons cannot resist thē; if they wil saue themselues, & not be de­stroied nor outraged, they must hold the strength of wals to be most assured and profitable for war, especially at this time wherein so many engines for the assaulting of besieged places haue ben deni­sed. For not to enclose cities with wals, is as much as to lay open the country to the roades and in­uasions F of the enemies, and to pull down and lay leuell the highest places, or as much as not to wal priuat houses, least they which dwel therein, should become cowards. We are not likewise ignorant that the inhabitants of those cities which are inclosed with wals may vse them in two manners, both as if they had wals, and as if they had none: which thing those Cities which are vnwalled, cannot do. If this be so, thē should the wals not only be built round about them, but also such order be takē, that they may serue both for an ornament to the city, & for the necessary occasions of war, as wel against other subtleties, as against these moderne deuises. For as the assailants doe by all [Page 370] meanes seeke to preuaile, so are there some meanes already found out, and more must be sought and G inuented for the defence of Citie, for commonly men do not enterprise war against those which are prepared and furnished.

In chusing a place fit for the building of a City, regard must be had to the scituation thereof, that it may stand commodiously by land and sea, to the wholesomenesse of the aire, to the wind that commeth from towards the Sunne, and cheefely to the Easterly next to the Northerly winds: likewise to the suretie of the place, that it may not be ea­sily besieged, but that the approch thereunto be painefull to the enemies, and the salies or issues easie for the Citizens: whereof he hath alreadie spoken in the fift and sixt chap­ter H of this booke: but aboue all things that it be wel furnished within with running and wholesome waters, which greatly further health, or at the least with cesternes, therein to keepe the raine water. See Hippocrates in his Treatise of the Aire, of Waters, and of Places: Plato in the sixt of his Lawes: Vitruuius in his eight booke de Architectura. Touching places of strength, they are not in like sort fit for all Estates: but for Oligar­chies and Monarchies, those that are built high: for Democracies, equality and euen­nesse: and for Aristocracies many places well fortified. Aristotle writeth of the building of priuate houses, according to the auncient forme of Greece, which is declared by Vi­truuius in his sixt book, the tenth Chapter. The Citie must likewise be compassed with I strong wals, bulwarkes, trenches, and rampires to resist warlike engines, which were many and terrible while he liued, but more ingenious and violent in these our times, as is artillary, which more then a thousand fiue hundred years since, was found out in Ger­many, the vse wherof is come now to such perfection, that nothing can withstand it. Po­lidore Virgil De rerum inuentione. Herein is the Lacedemonians vanitie reprooued, who remained a long time without wals, and were in the end constrained to wall their Cittie.

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CHAP. XII. Of temples, publicke or common houses and places to diet together in.

NOw sith the multitude of Citizens must be diuided by companies, who are to diet together, and the wals fortified in sundry places with towers and bulwarkes, wher­soeuer they may be fitly erected: it shall bee doubtlesse very expedient that some of L these aforesaid companies, doe assemble in the Bulwarkes. It seemeth then that these things should be thus ordained. The Temples consecrated to the gods, & the places where the cheefe feasts of the Magistrates are kept, should haue a conuenient, and the selfesame place alwaies; reseruing holy places that bee seuered by the law, or if there be any oracle. Such will this place be, if it haue such excellencie, and stand so much aboue others as is fit for the seat of vertue, and be stronger then those parts of the city which be next vnto it: & it is expedient to make about it such a publick place, void of buildings, as is called in Thessalie the Free place: In which place there is no buying and selling of wares, whither no craftsmen, Husbandmen, nor such like doe repaire, except they be called by the Magistrates. The publicke place also shall bee beau­tifull M and pleasant, if there bee exercises appointed there for old men. It is conuenient to deuide this ornament according to ages, and to cause the Magistrats to be amongst the young men, and the old men amongst the Magistrates. For the presence of the Magistrates before their eies, doth breed a right shamefastnesse, and honest feare. The market ought to bee seuered from the publicke place, in a place conuenient for the conueying and bringing of all things that come by sea, and by land. And sith the multitude of the Citie is diuided into two parts, to wit, into Priests and [Page 371] A Magistrates: The place appointed for the Priests to take their diet in, should bee neere about th [...] Temples, and that of the Magistrats which haue authority in matters of contracts, and in pleas, in attaching and arresting of persons and such like businesse, and also of them which haue the charge of the Market and of the Towne, ought to be neere the publicke place, in some famous and frequented part of the Citie. This place is very needfull about the publicke place, which wee would haue to be void of buildings, and this to serue for necessary actions. It is conuenient to ob­serue this order in the Countrey, and to set vp for the Magistrates, whome they call keepers of the woods and forrests, and gouernours of the Countries, some forts and places to eat in, seruing for defence. Also there must be Temples in the villages, dedicated as well to the gods, as to famous B and noble personages. But it were superfluous to stay now too curiously about these matters, seeing they are not hard to be known, but rather to do. For to discourse on them is the Office of wishing, but the execution thereof is the benefite of fortune: Wee will therefore for this time let them alone.

This Chapter containeth the things that belong to the beautifying and profite of a Citie: as Churches, Oracles, publicke places appointed for playes and exercises, and market places, seuered one from another, common places to diet in together, lodgings of Priests, and of Magistrates.

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CHAP. XIII. Of felicity, and the meanes to attaine thereunto, and how men wexe vertuous by three things.

D BVt let vs returne to our discourse touching the Commonweale, and declare whereof, and of what manner of things that Citie should bee founded and compacted, which is happy and wel gouerned. There be two points wherein euery kind of goodnesse consisteth: The one, that the intent and the end wher­fore actions are enterprised, be vprightly grounded and ordained: the other, that the meanes of attaining thereunto bee found out. For these things may agree and disagree amongst themselues, seeing that now and then the scope and end is well laid & proposed, but there is an error and ouersight in the meanes of attaining thereunto; and contrari­wise, it may fall out, that the meanes are good, but the proposed end naught. Sometimes, each of E them is naught worth, as in Phisick oftentimes they iudge not aright, what maner a one a health­full bodie should be, neither direct their care to that end which they haue propounded. Notwith­standing that, in all Arts and Sciences these two things must needs bee, to wit, the end, and the meanes of attaining to the end and purpose. Nowe it is a most cleare case, that all men desire to liue well and to obtaine blisfulnesse and welfare: howbeit, some are able, and other want meanes so to doe, either by reason of some kind of fortune, or by nature: for a good and blessed life requireth some helpe, yet lesse in them which are of good nature and well disposed; and greater in them which are of an euill nature, and euil disposed. Others at the beginning seeke not felicity aright, although they are furnished with meanes which may lead thereto. Sith therefore our intent is to F see what is the good Commonweale, (which is that whereby the Citie is well gouerned, and the Citie is then well gouerned, when it cheefely happeneth to bee blessed) doubtlesse men should not bee ignorant what felicitie is: Whereof we haue treated in our Ethickes, if any good may bee reaped of those bookes; and haue declared, that felicity is an action and perfect practise of vertu [...]; not by way of supposition, but simply and absolutely: I meane by supposition, the things which bee necessary; and by simply, the things which are honest: as iust paines and punishments proceed from vertue, yet neuerthelesse bee necessarie, and necessity maketh them honest: for it were better that [Page 372] men and Cities had neuer need of such things. But the actions which concerne honour and plen­tie G of wealth, are absolutely honest: for the one riddeth away euill, and such actions contrariwise are preparatiues and workers of welfare. Now although the vertuous man doe constantly suffer pouertie and sickenesse, and other calamities, yet notwithstanding happinesse consisteth in contra­rie things. For the vertuous man (as we haue declared in the Ethickes) is he which by meanes of vertue possesseth such goods as are absolutely good. Therefore it must then follow, that of necessity his vse of them is vertuous, and absolutely honest. Therefore men thinke that outward wealth is the cause of happinesse. In like sort, as if a man should thinke, concerning good playing vpon an Harpe, that rather the instrument then skilfulnesse were the cause thereof. Wherfore of the things aboue touched, some ought to be had aforehand, and othersome to be prepared by the Lawgiuer. H For which cause when we lay the foundation of a Citie, the fauour of fortune is to be wished about those things which depend of her, and whereof we account her mistresse. But as for the making of a Citie vertuous, it is not the worke of fortune, but rather of science and election. Now the Ci­tie is vertuous, when the Citizens that be members and partakers of the Commonweale bee ver­tuous, and in mine opinion all Citizens are pertakers and members of the Commonweale. There­fore let vs examine how men become vertuous. For if all men could be vertuous together, so as it were not needfull for euery Citizen perticularly to be vertuous, that were most to be desired, because then all men could not be vertuous, but euery one must be so to. Now men become good & vertuous by three things, to wit, Nature, Custome, and Reason. For first one must be borne, as to I be a man, and not some other creature: then must be haue some disposition, according to the body and the soule. There be some things which is not sufficient for one to haue by nature, because they alter by custome; other some of a variable nature, and through custome wexe one while worse, and another while better. Therfore other wights liue more according to nature, & few there be which liue by customes: but man liueth also according to reason, wherewith hee only of all other liuing things is indued. Wherfore these things ought to agree and frame wel together. For men by reason performe many deeds against customes and against nature, if they bee persuaded that it is better otherwise. We haue before declared of what nature Citizens ought to be, for the making of them tractable and obedient to their Lawgiuer. It remaineth that we speak of the institution and trai­ning K of people. For some things are learned by custome, and othersome by hearkening.

Two things there bee wherein men proceed well and euill, to wit, in the end, and in the meanes tending to the end. They proceed well, when the end and purpose is good, and they haue found out the meanes that lead thereunto: and they proceed euill, when there is no meane to attaine thereunto: and whereas it is not good to erre in ei­ther, and that all men desire to liue happily; some attaine to this happinesse, and others cannot attaine thereunto, by reason they are hindered by fortune, or by nature. Now the happy life consisteth in the perfect vse of vertue, being assisted with bodily and out­ward L goods, as instruments: as appeareth by the discourses made in the first and tenth booke of the Ethickes, wherein two sorts of actions doe depend, some of which bee necessarie and good by supposition, as the punishments executed by order of Lawe, whereof Cities necessarily haue need, although it were better to make the men good: otherwise the other actions are simply and absolutely honest, which concerne honour, noblenesse, liberality, and such like. Therefore the vertuous City is happy, and that city vertuous where the Citizens that be members of the Commonweale be vertuous; be­comming such by nature, custome, and reason: which three things when they frame well together, doe make the bringing vp and institution good, and when they disagree M they make it nought. Plutarch treateth of this place of the institution, learnedly and grauely, in his little worke of the bringing vp of children.

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CHAP. XIIII. Whether the gouernours and obeyers, ought alwaies to be all one and the selfesame persons, or changed by turnes, and to what end the Commonweale ought to be directed, that it is for peace and tranquility, and not for wars B and lordly dominion.

NOw forasmuch as euery ciuile societie consisteth of gouernors and obey­ers, let vs examine whether the gouernours or obeyers ought to bee changed, or continue alwaies all one and the selfesame persons during their liues. For the discipline & institution ought alwaies to be applied to this end. If thē some persons were so excellent aboue others, as we sup­pose the gods and heroicall personages do excel men, and that straight­way they would shew thēselues to haue great excellency, first in body, & C then in mind, as that the excellencie of the gouernours were vndoub­ted, and manifest to the obeyers; certainely it were better, that all one and the selfesame persons should alwaies gouerne, and the selfesame alwaies obey during their liues: But sith as this is no easie thing to find, neither doth that commonly happen (which Sillax writeth to bee a custome amongst the Indians) that their Kings so much excell their subiects: it is necessary for manie causes, that the turne and course of gouerning and obeying, should bee equally imparted to all the Citizens: for there is one kind of equality amongst those that are like, and it is a hard matter for a Commonweale to last which is founded contrary to right. For why the other inhabitants [...] of the Countrey which are desirous of alterations, doe alwaies ioine with them which are barred D of the gouernement: and the gouernours cannot bee so many in num [...]er, as that they should bee strongest. Notwithstanding, there is n [...] doubt but there ought to be some difference betweene the gouernours and obeyers. Therefore it is the Lawgiuers duty to consider how these things shall goe, and after what manner the Commonweale should be communicated and imparted: whereof we haue spoken before. For nature hath giuen the choise, making of all one and the selfsame kind, some young, and others more aged, and it is meet for some to obey, and for others to gouerne; and no man will find himselfe greeued to obey according to age, nor account himselfe an vnderling, specially being in possibility to attaine this honour, when he shall come to more yeares. We may then in some sort say, that they which gouerne and obey are all one and the selfesame persons, and E in another sort that they are not the same, so that it is necessary that the institution be sometimes the same, and sometimes diuerse: and he which will command, must first haue obeyed. Now the Estate of gouernment, (as we haue said in the former bookes) is either for his ca [...]se and sake which gouernes, or for his which obeyeth. The one, is called a Lordly manner of gouernement, the other a gouernment of free men, and there are certaine employments which differ not so much in the actions, as in the end for which they are done. Wherefore many actions which seem seruile, may be well performed by young men which are free borne, sith regard of credit and dis­grace differ not so much in themselues, as of the end and cause for which they are done. But wher­as we said that the vertue of a Citizen, of him which gouernes, and of a good man, is all one; F and that the same person must first obey, and afterward command; the Lawgiuer must both in­deuour to make men good, and consider by what exercises he may make them become so, & what the end of a good life is. Now there are two parts of the soule, whereof the one hath reason of it selfe, the other hath it not of it selfe, yet can obey reason. Of which parts we say that those vertues are in regard of which a man is called in some sort good. It is no hard thing to vnderstand i [...] whether of the two the aforesaid end is, specially to those which follow our diuision: For the worse is alwaies for the betters sake, as it appeareth as well in things which are done by art, as in those [Page 374] that are naturall. Now that part which is endued with reason, is the better, and is diuided like­wise G into two, according to our vsuall manner of diuiding, namely into actiue and contemplatiue reason: So must this part be of necessity diuided, and there is no doubt but that the actions haue the same correspondence, & that the actions of that thing which is better by nature, are more to be desired of those which can obtaine them all, or two which are the most to be desired amongst thē: For that is alwaies most to bee desired of e [...]ery man, which is the cheefest and last to be obtained. Our whole life is againe diuided into labour and rest, warre and peace. And of those things which are to be done, some be necessary and profitable, others honest, in which it is requisite to obserue the same choice which is obserued in the parts of the soule and their actions, as to make war for peace, to vse labour for rest, and to doe things necessary and profitable for those which are honest. It doth H therefore behooue the Lawgiuer in making lawes to haue regard to all these things, as well to the parts of the soule, as to their actions, but cheefly to stay on the best, and in those which are finall. The same order also is to be kept in the diuisions of mens li [...]es and affaires. For it is good to bee so disposed, that one may b [...]th follow his businesse, and serue in the warre; prouided that rest & peace be still preferred, and that necessary and profitable things be done, but rather those which are ho­nest: So that the training vp of those which are yet children, and of other ages who haue need of discipline, must be directed to these ends. They among the Grecians who are at this day thought to be well gouerned, and those Lawgiuers who haue formed and constituted such Commonweales, seeme not to haue directed them to the best end, nor their lawes and ordinances to all vertues, I but to be wholly inclined to those which seeme most profitable. They likewise which haue written since of such matters, doe therein shew that they had the same opinion: For they praising the La­cedemonians Commonweale, commend their Lawgiuers intent and purpose, who referred all his lawes to victory and warre; which error may be easily reproued by reason, and hath ben confuted by the euents of things. For as the most part of men doe greatly couet and thirst after rule, sith by that meanes they may obtaine many commodities, and great prosperity: So Thibron seemeth to praise the Lacedemonians Lawgiuer, and so doth also whosoeuer els hath written of their Com­monweale, because they being long exercised and enured to the perils of warfare, haue greatly ex­tended and enlarged their dominion: But sith they doe now no longer beare such rule, it is certain K that they are likewise no longer happy, nor their Lawgiuer good. Besides, it is ridiculous, that obser­uing still his lawes, and being no way hindered from vsing them, they haue lost their happy life. Neither doe they iudge well of bearing rule, whereof the Lawgiuer should seeme to make great ac­count, because the commanding and gouerning of free men is better, and hath more vertue ther­in, then the lordly kind of ruling. Furthermore, a Citie is not to be thought happy, nor that Law­giuer to be praised who doth exercise it in subduing their neighbours and borderers, to the end, to signorise ouer them, sith many inconueniences doe thence arise: For whosoeuer can, will doubtlesse attempt as much against his owne Citizens, and seeke to make himselfe lord of his owne Country. Whereof the Lacedemonians accuse King Pausanias, although he were aduanced to so high a de­gree L of honour. Then no such reason or law is profitable or meet for Cities, for the Lawgiuer must imprint in mens thoughts this opinion, that the selfesame things are good both publickly and pri­uately. Neither ought men to exercise armes, thereby to bring others into subiection, who deserue it not: but first and cheefly that themselues be not brought into subiection by others, next, to winne some estate, whereby profite may grow to the vanquished, not with intent to raigne ouer men in what manner soeuer, but to command those which are apt and meet to serue. Now the euents of things, agreeing with the reasons which may be framed, do sufficiently witnesse, that the Lawgi­uer should rather study to referre warlike affaires and all other lawes to rest and peace, sith many such Cities haue ben preserued by making war; and hauing attained large dominions, haue soone M after decayed: for in peace they doe as it were rust and lose their brightnesse, euen like yron, wherof the Lawgiuer is the only cause, who hath not taught them to liue in quiet.

The better to take order for the education and training vp of youth, it is first requi­site to know whether they that gouerne and obay the Citie, should be alwaies the selfe­same, or els sundrie persons, who may command and obey as their turnes fall. But if [Page 375] A there were any such gouernours that excelled both in body and mind, it should bee bet­ter that the most excellent might alwaies gouerne: But among those that are like and equall, it is both more iust and sure to command and obey by turnes. The Common­weale then must be ordained and instituted according to the order of nature, which of the same kind maketh some young, some old; to the end, that the elder may gouerne, and the yonger obey: so that both the gouernors and obeyers are in some sort the selfesame, and in another sort diuerse, by applying herevnto the discipline: touching the gouern­ment of young men, it ought to bee free, not lordly, respecting their commoditie that obey, not theirs that command, because the actions that are cōmanded, be iust, honest, B or dishonest, not so much in regard of thēselues, as of the end for which they are done. Wherefore the Lawgiuer must consider by what customes and endeuors the Citizens may be made good, sith the vertue of a good man, a good Citizen, and of him that com­mandeth in a good state, is all one: And sith vertues are certaine habites of the mind, as Aristotle writeth in the second of his Ethickes, the Lawgiuer must therefore know the difference betweene the parts of the mind, of which, the one is reasonable, the other vn­reasonable, yet cannot obey reason, first of the Ethickes, and the last chapter, and that the vnreasonable part is as it were the subiect of morall vertues, and the reasonable part the subiect of intellectuall vertues: sixt of the Ethickes, and the first chapter. And although C a man be called good in respect of both these kinds of vertues, yet are the intellectuall better, and in the vse of them doth cheefly consist an happie life. But as there are two kinds of reason, namely, actiue and contemplatiue, sixt of the Ethickes, the first chapter; so are there also two kinds of vertues, and the contemplatiue is the better, by meanes whereof an happy life is sooner attained then by the actiue: For honest things are to be preferred before necessary and profitable things, as rest before trauaile, peace before warre. And in such sort must be ordered the bringing and training vp of youth, & other ages, whereon it followeth, that the Lacedemonians Commonweale was not well in­stituted, because the lawes and actions thereof were all referred to war and victory, not D to quietnesse and peace; which thing causeth many inconueniences, and is likewise con­demned by Plato in the first of his Lawes.