The diuision of Logique.

THis Arte is deuided into .ii. partes. The first parte stādeth in framing of thinges aptlye together, in knitting woordes, for the purpose accordingly, & in Latin is called Iudicium. Iudicium

The second parte consisteth in fin­ding out matter, and searching stuffe agreable to the cause, and in Latine is called Inuentio. Inuentio. For you must vnderstande, that when one goeth about to proue any thing, he must firste inuente somewhat to proue his cause, the which whē he hath done: he muste vse iudgement, bothe in fra­ming the same reason so inuēted, & also to see, whether it serueth for the pur­pose or not.

¶And now some wil say, that I should first speake of the finding out of an ar­gument, [Page] before I should teache the waye how to frame an argument. Truthe it is that naturally we finde a reason or we beginne to fashiō thesame. And yet notwithstanding, it is more mete that the ordring of an argument shoulde be first handeled: forasmuche as it shal no more profit a man to find out hi [...] argu­ment, except he first know how to or­der thesame and to shape it acording [...]y (which he doth not yet perfectli know) then stones or Timber shal profite the [...]a [...]ō or Carpenter, which knoweth not how to work vpō thesame. A reasō is easlier found then fashioned, for euery manne can geue a reason naturally and without arte, but how to fashion and frame thesam [...], according to the art, none can do at all, except they be learned. Therfore, because euery mans wit can geue lightly a reason of diuers thinges without any learning at all, e­uen by the instinct of nature, & yet not be able to set thesame in order Scho­lerlike, either to proue or to confute: I purpose firste to shew the maner of [Page] making an Argumente, as whyche is more nedefull: Nexte after that ye shall learne the maner of finding of an Argument. And the places where all Argumentes dooe reste, and laste of all ye shall know the captious or de­ceiptful Argumentes, as they be in A­ristotle.

¶The difference betwene Logique and Sophistry.

LOgique otherwise called Dia­lecte (for they are bothe one) is an Arte to try the corne from the chaffe, the truthe frō euery falshed, by defining the nature of any thing, by diuiding thesame, and also by knitting together true Argumentes and vntwining all knotty Subtiltees that are bothe false, and wrongfully framed together.

¶Sophistrie is euer occupied ey­ther in prouing the truthe alwayes to bee false, or els that whiche is false to be true, so that euermore [...] one parte of the argument is either false, by vsing some ambiguous worde, or by not wel appliyng it to the purpose, or els not framing it according to the Rules: so that a skilful artificer [...] mai y ^• soner put the vayne Sophister to silence by ope­ning the fraude, & declaring the crafte of his inuencion. Wheras otherwise an argument made by the rulers of Lo­gique cānot be auoyded, but must nedes be true, whosoeuer say nay. And so [Page] muche more is Logique to be preferred before Sophistrie, as he is the more to be estemed that telleth a true tale, thē he whiche telleth a lie. And euen as a Grammarian is better liked, that spe­keth true and good Latine, then he is that speaketh false: Euen so Logique of it selfe is good, when Sophistrie on the otherside is nought. And wel may we saye, that Sophisters are like those whiche play with false dice, and would make other beleue that they are true, or els properly to tearme them, they be like those that go for honest men and are none.

The difference betwene Logique and Rethorique.

BOthe these Artes are much like sauing that Logique is occupied aboute all matters, and doeth playnly and nakedly setfurthe with apt wordes the summe of thinges by the way of Argumentacion. Againe of the other side Rethorique vseth gay paincted Sentences, and setteth furth those matters with fresh colours and goodly ornamentes, and that at large

[Page]Insomuche, that Zeno beyng asked the difference betwene Logique and Rethorique, made answere by De­monstration of his Hande, declaring that when his hande was closed, it re­sembled Logique, when it was opē & stretched out, it was like Rethorique.

The Office of Logique.

LOgique professeth to teach tru­ly, orderly & plainly. And here wee may se how vniuersall this cōmoditie is, and howe largely it ex­tendeth, not onely to know worldly af­faires: but also to know God, and all his heauēly workes, so farre as nature may comprehend.

There be .iiij. partes of this office or duty wherunto Logique is bounde. That is. To define the nature of euerye thing, to diuide, to knitte true argumentes, and vnknit false,

Of Questions.

THIS same maner of knitting wordes in a due order, beyng one of y ^• partes of Logique, or rather Logique it self, sheweth the maner of all Questions, called otherwise either [Page] Propositions, or seueral wordes.

A questiō is either a word or sentence put furth, as when I aske what such a thing is, & would know an other mans aduise therin, as thus, What is man? What is truthe? What is ambicion?

Euery Question is either Single or double. A single questiō resteth in a single word, as thus. What is frendship? What is Philosophy? A doble questiō standeth not in one word, but in .ii. seue­ral sentences, as thus. Is the study of Philosophy praise worthy, or is it not?

Lykewise a propositiō, which is a sen­tence vttered in plain wordes e [...]presly signifiyng either truth or falshed, is ei­ther single or doble. A single Proposi­tion as thus: Wicked men cānot abide to reade the word of God. Of the whi­che you may make a double proposition by addyng somwhat therunto as thus. Wicked men not onely can they not a­bide to reade the word of God, but also they seke by al meanes possible to ouer throwe the same.

¶Of the [...]iue Predicables, otherwise called the fiue common wordes, which are spoken of other

[Page]WHen we go about to expound any matter, first we must be­ginne with the definition, to know the very nature of the thing, the whiche we cannot do, except we first learne the predicables, for thei shew the largenes and the narrownes of wordes, how farre they do extende, and how muche they comprehende in them. As when I se one afarre of come vnto me, first I know that he is a man, then when he commeth nigher, I know whether he be of mine acquaintance or no. Likewise, when I go aboute to de­clare what one is, & to open the nature of any thīg, I vse the largest words, & so it must nedes bee, that I begin with the Predicables, because they shewe how muche euery worde doth compre­hende in it selfe, and how large or nar­row it is. They be called Predicables because some one thing is spoken of an other. And they are (as a mā wold say) markes or notes of words y ^t are spoken of many, shewing how & by what man­ner the same words are atributed to o­ther.

[Page] Genus

The general worde.

Species

The Kinde

Differentia

The difference.

Proprium

The properte.

Accidens

The thing chaūcing or cleuing to the substance

GENVS is a general word, Genus the which is spoken of ma­ny that differ in their kind: as when this Question is asked, What it is. As Ani­mal. A liuing creature. Ars an Arte. Virtus, Uertue. Gemma. A precious stone. Or els thus. Genus, is a general worde, vnder the whiche diuers kindes or sortes of things are comprehēded, as vnder a liuīg creature are cōprehēded men & beastes. Under art, are cōprehē ­ded, Logique, Grāmer, Retorique. &c. Euery general word, hath diuers kin­des, & is spokē euermore, of theim al. As Gemma. A precious stone. comprehen­deth in it self, A Saphire, A Rubie, A Christal, A Turkas. As thus. Saphi­rus est gemma. A Saphire is a preci­cious stone. And so of other.

¶Euery general worde is .ij. wayes considered, and commonlye called the [Page] ch [...]ef general, in latin, Genus [...]mum. and the midle general, in latin, Genus intermedium.

The chief general is so [...] that where as it is the head of al & aboue al, it can neuer become inferior, to be of any kinde or sort in thinges. As the Substance the Quantitee, the Qualitee, are euer chief generall wordes, and cannot bee comprehended vnder any other.

The middle general, is the same that beyng comprehended betwixt the chief general, and the lowest kinde or sort in thynges, maye be also some kynde or fourme it self, as a body, a liuing crea­ture: the whiche .ij. beyng compared with their in [...]eriors, are generall wor­des: beyng referred to their superiors, they are Species. That is to say, sha­pes, kindes or sortes in thinges.

Species, seu fo [...]ma, the kinde, or sort of any thing comprehended, vnder a worde more vniuersall, is thesame of whome the general woorde, is spoken, when the question is asked, what it is. As when I aske, What is Iustice? I answere a Uertue. Therfore in this [Page] proposition (Iustice is a vertue) Iusti­ce is the Species, and vertue is the ge­neral worde, which comprehendeth the sayde Iustice, and is spoken of the same

Or thus, Species [...] is a common word that is spoken of many whiche differ only in number, as manne is spoken of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of eue­ry proper name belonging to any man. As Socrates is a man. Plato is a man. Aristotle is a man.

Euery Species or kinde in thinges is of .ij. sortes. The one is called the low­est kind, whiche is alwayes spoken of euery proper name, & euer is Species neyther can it at any tyme be Genus, although somtime it beare the name of genꝰ. The other is called Species īter­media, that is the kind placed betwixt the higheste and the loweste, whiche at diuers times and by diuers considerations may both be Genus, and Species For that whiche is vnder the gene­rall Woorde that same maye be called Species or Kinde, that whiche com­prehendethe other, maye bee called [Page] the general word.

¶A Nowne proper is that wher­of the kinde is rehersed. As Cato est Homo. Cato is a man: in this proposi­tion, Cato is the Nowne pro­per, which belon­geth to one man only, and Man, is the kinde, whiche is more large, and compre­hendeth all men.

THis Table sheweth the Order of e­uery substaunce and kinde as they are apoīted by nature, what are the chief generall woordes, what are the midle general, what are the lo­west kindes in euery thing, and what are the kindes bewixt bothe.

[Page] Di [...]erentia.¶ Differentia, that is to say the diffe­rence, is the same that is spoken of ma­ny whiche differ in fourme and kinde, when the question is asked, What ma­ner of thing it is, as when wee saye. Quale quid est homo? What maner of thing is man? we must answere, He is endued with reason. Yf the question be asked what is a man, we must answere by his Genus, or general word, he is a liuing creature. If the questiō be asked what maner of thīg a beast is? We may sai, He is without the gift of reasō. E­uery difference that is moost proper to euery thing, is naturally and substāci­ally ioyned to the kinde [...] [...]hiche is cō ­prehended vnder the general worde,

Proprium. PROPRIVM, That is to say a properte, is a natural pro [...]e [...]es, & man­ner of doyng, whiche agreeth to one kinde and to the same onely and that e­uermore. And also mai be spoken of the same kind, and by conuersion, the same kinde may be spoken of him also. As to speake & to haue power to laugh, doeth only agre to man, & to none other crea­ture earthely. And as I may say, Whosoeuer [Page] is a man hath power geuen him of nature to speake: So may I also say by conuersiō backewarde, whoso e­uer hath power geuen him of nature, to speake, that same body is a ma [...]. To barke is proper to a Dogge, and onely proper ād euermore proper. Ergo whosoeuer hathe power or rather an incli­nation geuen of nature to Barke, that same is a dogge. And again, Whatsoe­uer creature is a dogge, that same hath powre or rather an inclinatiō to bark. To go vpright is proper to a man, & only to a mā, & to none other liuing crea­ture. Notwithstanding, you must mark one thing, that although many men go crooked & some also cannot speak [...]: yet bothe to go vpright & to speake are proper to all men generally, and therefore this rule serueth to auoid such obiecti­ons. Verba in definitionibus posita, nō actū, sed potētiā significāt. which is asmuch to say, y ^t wor [...]s vied in defi­nitions, do not signifie the very acte in dede, but the power, the apines, or the inclinatiō of nature therunto: as whē I sai, it is proper for euery mā to speke [Page] I meane to be able or to be apt by Na­ture to speake, is proper to euery man.

¶Note further that Proprium is not alwayes taken after one sorte, but it is foure wayes considered.

• First the propertie is that which agre­eth to some kinde only, although not to euery persone comprehended vnder the same kind. As it is proper to a man on­ly to be a Poete, or to be a Phisition, and yet not proper to euery man.
• Secondly, the propertie is that whi­che agreth to euery singuler persone, and yet not onely to Man. As to haue two fete agreeth to euery singuler persone, and yet not to man onely.
• Thirdly, the propertie is that whiche agreeth to euery man, and to man only and yet not alwayes nor for euermore. As to haue hoare heares in the old age agreeth to man only, & yet not alway­es, but for the moste parte menne haue hoare heares in theyr olde age.
• Fourthly, the propertie is that which in dede is most aptly and chiefly called Proprium, when any thing doeth agre to euery man, to man only and alwaies [Page] to man. As to be able to Speake, to laughe, to go vpright, agreeth to euery man, to man only, and alwayes to man

This diuersite many haue made be­twixt the differēce & the properte, that the difference is one parte of Mannes substance, and is the parte that maketh vp man. As to haue the gift of reason doeth signifie the minde, whiche is one parte of man, for man himself is cōpact of body and minde.

A Propertie doth signifie a certaine thing, Whiche is attributed to Man when he is made, and as a man woulde say, doth come after, when man is holy made, as to be able to speake, to laugh, to go vpright.

Accidens (that is to say, a thing clea­uing, or chaunsing, or cōming to a sub­staūce) is that which doth not stande by himselfe, neither is the parte of a sub­stance, but rather is after suche sorte in the substaunce, that it may bothe be a­way, and be there, sometimes more and sometime lesse, without destruction or losse of the Subiecte, or substaunce, as mirth, sorow, to runne, to sit, to be well [Page] coloured, all these may be away, & yet the man maie be on lyue in whom they ware before. So that the lacke of them in their quantite, or greatnes, is not y ^e losse of the Substaunce. And al though no Substaunce at any tyme doth alto­gether forsake his Accidētes, Yet this we see, that one & the same Substan̄ce, doth some time alter his Accidētes, for­saking some, and takyng other. As wa­ter beyng sette on the fire, altereth the coldnes, & taketh heat, so that we maie iudge by this, that coldenes in the wa­ter is not a Substaūce, but an Accidēt.

An Accident is two wayes conside­red, for either it may be separated, or it maie not [...] some maie be separated from their Subiecte as colde maie be taken from water, and knoweledge from the mind. Other are inseparable, be­cause they cannot be taken awaie al to­gether, as [...]ature or brodenes, can­not be taken from man. Heate cannot be taken from fire, nor moisture from water, the which notwithstādyng they are not separat frō their substaūce, yet the quantite or greatnes is changeable [Page] in euery one of them, for some time it is more, and some time it is lesse. And wee se heate in other thynges to be separa­ted from the Subiecte. Where vpō we iudge that the heate is an other thyng then the very Substan̄ce of fire. Ther­fore this is worthy to be knowen, that the Substaunce is one thyng, and the Accident an other thyng, and mete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus. The soule is one thyng, the feare of God is an other thing. Man may be without the feare of God (as many one is at this day the more pite) Therfore the feare of God is an Accident, the soule is a Substaunce.

¶The vse and commodite, which we hau [...] by these fiue commune wordes cal­led otherwise Predicables.

THere be .iiij. especiall commo­dites. First they shew the lar­genesse, and the narrownes of the most generall wordes, cal­led otherwise Predicamentes, whiche hereafter folowe: so that here by, you may perceiue howe muche euery word comprehendeth in it selfe, and howe [Page] farre it may be applied. The second profite is, that euery thyng is defined by these fiue common woord [...]s, foras­muche as al thynges the more narowe they be, are alwayes defined by wor­des that are more large. As by the ge­neral worde, by the difference, and the propretie. Thirdly, they are good to iudge the knitting of wordes, and to se what thing may truely be ioyned to o­ther. for there is no Proposition, nor yet ioi [...]ing together of any sentēce (ac­cordyng to the commō order of nature) but they alwayes agre to these aboue rehersed Predicables: so y ^t either the kynd is spokē of the singular or proper name (which is euer some one person, as thus [...] Cicero est homo. Cicero is a mā) Or els the general worde, the dif­ference, the propretie, or the accident, are all spoken either of the kynde, or of some one person [...] as thus [...] Homo, vel Cicero [...] est animal ratione praeditum, lo­quendi facultatem habens, album, lō ­gum, latū. A man, or Cicero, is a liuing creature, endewed with reason, hauing aptnes by nature, to speake, beyng, [Page] white, long, and brode. So that no pro­position can be, but the partes of the same are comprehēded with in these .v. cōmune wordes. Fourthlie, the general worde, the kynde, the difference, & pro­prete are ioyned together necessarily, so that when yow name one, al thother folowe. Therfore when a propositiō is made from the kynde, to the general, to his difference, or propertie: it is euer­more an vndoubted true proposition, as this. Homo est animal ratione prae­ditū, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a liuing creature endewed with reason, hauyng aptenesse by nature to speake. A man can not he except he be a liuyng creature, endewed with reason and hauing aptnes of nature to speake. The accident not withstandyng is not necessarely spokē of the subiect, but is there casually, & may be chaunged, as thus. Homo est albus. Somme man is white. This proposition may be af­treward false, for he may be blacke, or alter his complexiō some other way, so that the accidēt is often altered, & an o­ther succedeth in his ronme. Therfore [Page] it is good to be knowē, when you haue a Proposition, whether it be vndoub­ted true, for euermore, or els maye be false at any tyme.

¶Of the Predicamentes, called in En­glishe Generall wordes.

A Predicament is an ordre of sin­gle wordes, wherein thynges of one kinde, are couched aud com­prehended vnder one woorde, whiche is most generall.

A Predicamente is nothyng els in Englishe, but a shewyng or a reher­syng what wordes maye be truely ioy­ned together, or els a settyng furthe of the nature of euery thyng, & also she­wyng what may be truely spoken and what not. and for this cause artes were inuented, because that the truth might be knowē, & euery thyng vttered with his propre wordes. For when I say, A man is a creature, I know this propo­sition hath his propre wordes, and that like as Man is a Substaunce, so is the creature, which is the generall worde vnto him, which bothe are in one Pre­dicamente, and the ordre in this Pro­position [Page] is obserued accordyng to the Arte, for we muste alwaies begynne at the lowest and go vpwardes, which or­dre agreth also to nature, when thyn­ges lesse knowne, are declared by thin­ges that are more knowē, as shall more plainly hereafter appere.

The Predicamentes are deuided in to the Substaunce, and the Accidente. The first, is both called the Substaūce and is a Substaunce in deede. The o­ther are Accidentes, as not beyng of the Substaunce, but cleauyng there­vnto.

The commoditee of these Predica­mentes is great. First, where as they be deuided into the Substaunce & Ac­cident, it is a good lesson to know euer­more the substaūce, frō the thing which is Accidentall. Again, of these moste generall woordes ariseth this profite [...] that if you wil define any thing, or shew the nature thereof, you maye know in which of al these store houses the wor­de resteth, whiche shoulde expresse the nature of another.

Thirdly, yf one will bestow a litle [Page] diligēce herin, searchyng where euery worde is setteled, & knowyng to which of al these most general wordes he may best referre it: he shal faithfully knowe the nature of all thynges, no man bet­ter, then the which, nothing is more ne­cessary. and this difference is betwixte the .v. commune wordes otherwise cal­led the Predicables, and these most ge­nerall wordes called Predicamentes, that the Predicables, set forth the lar­genesse of wordes, the Predicamentes do name the verey nature of thynges, declaryng (and that substātially) what they are in very deede.

¶A note of certaine thynges diligently to b [...] obserued before the rehersal of the most generall wordes.

COnsideryng ambiguite bredeth error, moste warenesse ought to be vsed, that the doublenesse of no one worde deceaue the hearer. The cause of all controuersie, is either the not wel vnderstanding, or els the wily vsyng of wordes that in sēce haue dou­ble meanyng. Aristotel the Scolemai­ster to all scholers, geueth good war­ning [Page] that all men be right ware in any wyse to haue the ryght vnderstanding of euery seueral worde.

There be wordes that vnder one & the same title, comprehende the nature of many thynges, as these wordes fo­lowyng.

• as a Croune.
• as a Beare.
• as Tyme.
• as Sage.
• a noble

A croune signifieth the croune of a mās head, & also signifi­eth a croun of gold, suche as is curraunt, or els suche as Kynges weare at the daye of their coronacion. A beare, signifieth a brute beast that is baited with dogges, & also signifieth the cophine where in a dead man is caried to his burial. Tyme no­teth both the space of howre, daie and yeare, and yet we call an herbe by that name, whiche groweth in gardyns. Sage also betokeneth an herbe, & yet we cal wyse men, sage men: so y ^t euery one of these wordes haue a double meanyng, and ioyned onely together by fe­lowship of name, by nature, and in ve­ry deede, do veri muche dissente. Therfore this ought euermore to be marked [Page] that al wordes be wel noted according to their natures, that the rather wee may escape errour. Those are onely to be receiued and vsed, for the maynte­naunce of all truthe whose name, and nature is all one, or the which are euer more to be taken and vnderstanden af­ter one sorte. As homo a mā, signifieth none other thing but mā. Arbor, a tree signifieth none other thyng in all the worlde but a tree only, and so of other. If any worde be vsed that hath a dou­ble meanyng, restrayne the largenesse therof, and declare how yow wil haue it taken, by meanes wherof, the fraude shall soner be auoided, and the truthe bette [...] knowen.

¶The diuision of the Sub­stance.

THe substance is diuided into the first, and second. The first substance is called euery sin­guler persone or propre name as Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Homere.

¶The second substance cōprehendeth both the general worde, and the kinde also of euery singuler persone, as thus Tullie, Coesar, Hanibal with other. Likewise this word (a liuīg creature) being a substance and general worde to [Page] euery propre name conteineth al thin­ges particulerlie that haue life.

It is profitable to marke the order of substaunce, set furthe in a table a li­tle before, for we maie by the same, de­uide seuerally euery substaunce, of all thynges in this worlde [...] the whiche when we knowe, and remembre in our myndes, we perceiue euidētly, the dif­ference, betwene God, and his creatu­res, & seyng the thyng created of God and the properties there with all, we rest vpon the same, and learne the vse, and propre cōmoditie of many thinges here in yearth. We maie define many thynges, by the same table: as we maie define God, man, heauen, yearth, beast stone, & any thyng els y ^t is a substance.

¶Of quantitee.

THe quantitie, is the greatnes of a thyng, or the nombre. And proper it is to this mooste ge­nerall woorde, to be deuided, as greatnesse, is deuided into seuerall partes, and nombres into euery seue­rall nombre.

¶Quantitee is .ii. waies considered.

[Page]The one is called Continua quan­titas, that is, when the question is as­ked, how greate, or brode any thyng is [...] and therefore the length, the latitude, and the depenesse of bodies artificiall, are herein obserued: the vse whereof, is moste sene in Geometrie.

The other is called discreta quan­titas, when the question is asked, how many thinges there be, and is occupied altogether in nōbryng. The vse of this is perceiued in Arithmetique.

¶Of qualit [...]e.

THe qualite, is a forme, or shape of the body, or mynde, wherof some name is deriued, as of wisedom, men are called wise, of Iustice, men are called Iust.

There be three maner of qualitees, whereof the first doth contein the ha­bite, otherwise called, the perfecte ha­uyng of any thyng. The other is, a for­wardnes in any thing, gottē by labour and trauaile, not geuen by natures goodnesse, or els wee maie call it, the halfe attainyng of that, whiche we go aboute to haue, wantyng perfeccion, [Page] for lacke of full tyme, and is called in Latine dispositio, as to haue meane knowlege, & not to be fully instructed in y ^e practise of iustice, is dispositio. A­gain to be fully learned, to haue accō ­plished all thynges, due to righteous­nesse and Iustice, is called in Latine, habitus, as who should saie, the abso­lute atteinyng, and strong hold of the­same. The pith of this worde habitus, can hardely be vttered with one worde in this our tongue. Notwithstandyng it maie in mo wordes be opened, for the better vnderstandyng of it. For e­uen as wax chaufed with the hande, is made softer, euen so some partes of mā are made by vs more apte to compasse any thing. He that vseth oft to speake Frenche, shall by continuance, obtein perfecciō: he that vseth much to write, at length shall haue a redy hande, and this is called habitus. So that no mā hath knowlege, or perfecte skill in any thyng, except he get it by labour, & ac­quaint nature with trauail. Notwithstandyng, I muste nedes confesse, that all natures be not like apte, to receiue [Page] knowlege. Some are geuē to one thing and some to another. Therefore [...] whiche by nature haue a promptnes [...]e [...] shall so [...]er attein perfeccion, then any other can do, if by labour and earnest trauaile, they will stretche to attein that whereunto thei are apt, and with good indeuoure, [...]ilip nature forward. God geueth some one manne a passyng gift, to serche the influence of the star­res, to another he graunteth, a natu­ral enclinacion to Musike, and al hea­uenly harmonies. So that if either of these two, would seke to folowe their natural aptnesse, it wer moste like thei should e [...]cell. Other that do not finde nature so fauorable, can neuer come to any suche perfeccion.

The full atteinyng of any thyng, by long tyme, is twoo waies considered, for either it is of the body, or els of the mynde. Perfectiō, gottē b [...] helpe of the body, is when men can by muche vse, leape, wrastle, or cast the barre, better then any other, or els do excell in any handie craft, aboue the common sorte.

The habite of the mynde, that is to [Page] saie, that constaunt hold of any thyng, whiche is in the mynde, either consi­steth in knowlege, or els in practise. In knowlege, are comprehended all artes as Grāmer, Logique, Astronomie &c. and all other learnyng, wherunto wit canne atteine. That habite of the mynde, whiche is in practise, and by good aduisement is chosen, standeth in the will of man. As all vertue, and all vice do. Iuste dealyng euermore, man­hode in sufferyng all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperaunce of life, in forbearyng lust, and [...]ilthie glo­tonie. These vertues though their of­spryng be from God, yet tyme maketh them perfect, in the iyes of man. Other vertues are geuen of God wholy, and altogether without mannes labor to attain thē. As faithe, hope, charitee, & all other like giftes of the holy ghoste.

The secōd forme, is called y ^e power strēgth, or pronesse of nature, in latine Naturalis uis. And the contrary here­vnto, is called the weakenesse of na­ture, when she hath denied her power, to any one thyng, in Latine it is called [Page] Imbecillitas naturae.

The natural strength, is an aptnes of nature, geuen either to the body, or to the mynd. To the mynd, as the apt­nes to learne, the prōptnes of memory [...] of the body (in mā) to be apt by nature to wrastle, for a horse, to be quicke and stirryng, for a birde, to be apte to flie, for fishe, to liue in the water, (the whi­che man cannot dooe) for an Asse to be slowe, for a stone to be hard. &c. Natu­rall weakenes, is whē nature dimini­sheth her gift, as when she denieth apt­nes to learnyng, as we see many dull wittes for lernyng, & muche vnfit that waie. Nature hath denied some men, health of body, that thei are neuer wel at ease, some men are so sicke in their braine, that thei are neuer wise, some are capons by kynd, and some so blunt by nature, that no arte can whet them An Asse will neuer bee swifte, a stone will neuer be soft of nature. All quali­ties be instrumentes of nature, where by the worketh, as heate, is the instru­ment of fire. The heate and cold, in the iuyce of herbes are instrumētes, wher­by [Page] menne either are healed, or els past healyng, for this worlde.

The third kynd comprehendeth, the affeccions of manne, called in Latine, pe [...]turbationes, and also those passiōs whiche tary but for a litle while.

A perturbacion, or els affeccion, is a sodain chaunge of the mynd, and also of the body.

There bee .iii [...]. perturbacions prin­cipall, whiche are in the mynd, where­of all other haue their ofspryng.

Libido, seu cupidi [...]as.

Lust or desire.

Leticia.

Mirthe.

[...]g [...]tudo.

Grief.

Metus.

Feare.

The whiche are stirred vp, by some mociō of the mynd, either desiryng any thyng earnestly, or abhorry [...]g the same

There be fiue perturbacions of the body, whiche moue the senses, and are c [...]lled thynges offered to the senses [...] as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse, or any like, moue the iyes. All soundes and [...]oyses that be made [...] moue the hea­ryng, as co [...]ghyng, speakyng, bra [...]yng of a D [...]ere [...] [...]lowyng of a Cow, or neigh­yng [Page] of an horse. Sauors moue the smellyng, as perfumes, swete odours, the strong smell of ordure, and suche filth. Sauces moue the taste, as bitternes, tart [...]es, sow [...]rnes. Suche qualities as are touched, moue the sēce of touchyng as hardnes, softnes, roughnes, plaines.

The affecciōs, called Patibiles qualitates, (the passions that abide but a­while) differ from perturbacio [...]s, for as muche as thei tary not long, but so­dainly come, and sodainly goo, as blu­shyng in a mānes face, sodain feare, so­dainly to chaunge coloure, and ware pale. The other tary longer, as en [...]ie, ambicion, loue, continuall feare, gre­dinesse, with suche other.

The fourthe comprehendeth [...] the fi­gure, and fourme of any thyng. The fi­gure comprehend [...]th the shape of thyn­ges that haue no life, as the fashion of the Element [...] of trees, of floudes, of an house, a shippe, a cote, and suche like.

The forme cōteineth the portrature of al liuyng thynges, as the very liuely image of man, of an horse, or a liō, as we cal a mā well fauored, or hard fauored.

¶Of Relatiues.

RElatiues are those, whiche are comprehended with other, or the whiche are named, one with another, and (as a man [Page] would say) haue a mutuall respect, one to another.

The other predicamentes before re­hersed, were absolutely spoken, so that we maie vnderstande by one, and the­same woorde, what it meaneth. As we may perceiue what a man is, although we ioyne nothyng to hym, wee knowe what Iustice is, although we compare hym with none other thyng. But these Relatiues, cannot bee so well vnder­standen, excepte we ioyne some thyng to them. As when I saie a father, I cā not so call hym, excepte I vnderstande a sōne that he hath. So that euery bo­dy is called a father, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Again, no body can be called a Schole Master, except he haue scholers. There is no husband except he ha [...]e a wife.

Therefore we maie se, that Relati­ues are referred euermore to another, neither can thei bee taken absolutely, without hauyng respect, to some other worde. There is no worde, but we maie considre thesame to bee a Relatiue, if we referre it to some other thyng, and [Page] therefore wee maie go throughout all the predicamētes, with this one place, and finde relacion in euery one of thē.

Those that are referred to some thyng, are of two sortes. First thei are properly so called, as the father, and the sonne, the master, and his seruaūt, neither can thei be considered, excepte thei bee compared with some other, for when one is called father, he is properly so called, because he hath a sonne, and thereof hath he his proper beyng.

Again relatiues, vnproperly so cal­led, are those seuerall woordes, whiche are knowen, & haue their beyng, euen when thei stande alone: and yet consi­dered with other, thei haue diuerse re­spectes. as loue, is the loue of the thyng loued. Or thus, loue beholdeth the thyng loued. Faithe beholdeth that thyng, whervnto it leaueth. And ther­fore where as Paule saieth, we beyng iustified by faithe, haue peace before God, it is asmuche to saie, that we are not receiued for the worthinesse of the qualitee, but for his sake, that is the sonne of God. For I praie you, wher­vnto [Page] leaueth faithe, or what thyng doeth it els behold? Sauyng onely our Lorde Iesus, that died freely once for al. Or els thus, Relatiues are so cal­led, (and yet vnproprely) whiche are not accordyng to their propre beeyng, but accordyng as thei are so named, whereof the .vj. predicamentes that fo­lowe, beare the name. As he that doth any thyng, is referred to a thyng doen, whe [...]ein the twoo places that folowe are declared, whiche signifie, to do, and to suffer. By the place ( vbi) where, one neighbor is cōpared with his ne [...]t neighbor. By the place quando, whē, A childe of .vj. yere olde, is compared with a child of thesame yeres. He that lieth vpright, is cōpared with him that [...] lieth doune grouelyng. In all these the proper beeyng, is not declared, for a childe maie bee sixe yeres of age, al­though he be not compared with ano­ther, and therefore it is called relatio secundum dici improprie. But a man can neuer be a father, sauyng o [...]ely in consideraciō of his sonne And yet note this one thyng, it is proper to all Re­latiues, [Page] alwaies to be true, euen by cō ­uercion. And thus whosoeuer is a fa­ther, thesame hath a sonne, whosoeuer is a sonne, thesame hath a father. Who soeuer hath faithe, that same man lea­neth to Christ onely. Whosoeuer lea­neth to Christ onely, that same manne hath faithe. Here are twoo thynges to be marked in relacion. The ground of euery thyng, and the ende wherevnto it hath respecte, or consideracion. As a father is the grounde, in that he doeth begette, and hath respect to his sonne, in that he is begotten. The sonne is the ground, in that he is begotten, & hath re­spect to his fa­ther, whi­che did beget hym. And thus likewise in all other.

¶The maner of doyng, in latin called. Actio.

A Gere, seu facere, is whā we are saide to be occupied in a matter that is before vs, or whan oure [Page] labor is extēded vpon a weaker or lesse thing, and in this place, ar conteyned al verbes actiues, as to write, to dispute, to banket, to beget, to encrease, to di­minishe, or to chaunge, and to speake at a word, al those are cōteyned in this place, which answere to this question, what doth he, or what doth it, excepted alwaye verbes perteinynge to the senses or affections, as to heare, to tast, to see, to enuye, al which haue the passiue significacion.

Euery action is either naturall, or volūtary. That is called natural, whi­che is done by the mighte of nature, as to begette, or to bring forth, to encrea­se, or decrease, to alter by qualite, as to be moyst, drye, colde, or hotte, to moue from place, to place. That is called vo­lūtarie, which doth betoken any thing done freely, as to teache, to write, to reade, to playe the marchaunt man, or to do any other action. And hereunto maye be referred euerye mans deutie lyuyng.

¶ Perpessio called in Englishe a sufferynge.

[Page] PAti, fieri, seu accipere, to suffer, to be done, or to take, is the ef­fecte of the action, and to make it [...]lai [...]e, it is a verbe passiue, euen the [...]ame, which the grāmarians vse, as to [...]e taught, to be encreased, to be dimi­nished, all these are passiues, and are referred to this predicament.

Vbi. Where.

VBi is an order, or predicament, whiche comprehendeth the de­scriptiō of places, wherin some [...]hyng is reported either to be done, to [...]aue ben done, or els hereafter, to be [...]one. As to be at London, to be at Cā ­ [...]rydge, to be at home, to be in a cham­ [...]er, to be aboue, beneth, on the righte hand, lefte hand, before, or behinde, and what soeuer is answered to this que­stion, whan I aske where any thynge is, or where any thyng is done. This place wel serueth for cōiectures, either [...]n praysyng or dispraisyng.

Quando. When.

THis Predicamēt Quando, cō ­teineth the difference, & diuer­site of times, as. Nunc, Nowe Heri, yesterdaye, noctu, in the [Page] night time, Interdiu, in the day tyme. This place also gyueth lighte to con­firme causes. As to proue that one is paineful, I may say such a one studieth day, and night, so muche as nature can beare. Therfore he is a payneful man.

Situm esse, to be settled.

Situm esse, is than considered, whan a mans body is in any wyse place, a [...] to lie a syde, to stande vpright, to sitte, to leane, to lye grouelyng, to lye wyde open.

Habitus, the araiyng or clothyng.

SOme call this Predicament Habitus, integumētum, that is a coueryng or apparelynge of any body, as to haue a coate to weare a goune, to be harneysed, to haue a iacke, a sheart of mayle, a cote armoure. Also to go gorgiously, as to weare cheines of golde [...] to haue brase­lets, rynges, ouches, & stones, to hau [...] asceptre or mace in his hand. Thirdly to possesse gold, siluer, land, wyfe, and children, or to contayne any thynge, as the hogges head dothe hold wyne, the barne holdeth corne. &c.

¶The vse and commoditie of these Predicamentes.

IF you will define any worde, & knowe the propre nature of the same, ye must nedes know these ten Predicamentes. As for an example, if ye will knowe what a man is, ye muste haue recourse to the place [...]f Substantia, and there ye shall learne [...]y the same place that mā is a liuyng creature endued with reason If ye wil knowe what vertue is, ye must go to the Predicamente Qualitas, and there ye shall se, that vertue is a con­stant habite of the mind, makyng them praise worthye in whom it is. If ye wil define the nature of a father, seke for Relatiua, and there ye shal learne that he is a father, that hath a sonne, he is a maister, that hath a seruaunt, and so forthe in the realte. Therfore ye muste nedes haue these Predicamentes rea­dye, that whan so euer ye wyll define any worde, or geue a natural name vn­to it, ye maye come to this store house, and take stuffe at wyll.

Of a diffinition.

[Page]THere is nothyng in all this whole art of logique more ne­cessarie for man to know, than to learne diligentlye the defi­finition, and diuision of euerye matter that by reason maye be comprehen­ded. For he that firste well vnder­stādeth what he doth go about, (know­yng fullye the nature of euery cause propoūded,) shal lesse erre in the whole discourse folowing, and easie shal it be for him to auoyde false argumētes, if he can lear [...]e firste to se the verye nature, & substantial propretye of euery thyng.

A definition is .ii. wayes considered, for either it is a defi [...]ition of a worde, or of a substaūce. A definitiō of a word, is any maner of declaration of a word, as, a Realme, is so called by cause it is by a kynge ruled, and meryly to saie it, A woman hath her name so giuen her, by cause she bringeth wo vnto man.

A definition of the substaunce, is a speach, which sheweth the very nature of the thyng, & euery perfect definition is made perfect by the generall worde, and his difference ioyned together.

[Page]So that what soeuer is defined, it is [...]l wayes the kynde or sorte of some [...]hyng, as thus. Man is a lyuyng crea­ [...]ure endued with reason: man, is the [...]hyng defined, and the other (that is, a [...]uing creature endewed with reason) [...]s the definition.

There be .iiij. rules to be obserued [...]n euery perfecte definition. Firste [...]hat the definition conteyne no more than the thing defined, nor yet that the thyng defyned, conteine any more than [...]he definition dothe. Againe we muste [...]ake hede, that the definition expresse [...]he very nature, and substaunce, of the [...]hynge defined, or els it is no good [...]efinition.

Thirdly, we must see that the defi­nitiō be plaine, and open, without am­biguitie, not hauynge anye obscure or [...]ar fetched wordes.

O [...] a diuision.

IT is an old saiyng. Qui bene distinguit, bene docet. He y ^t doth well diuide, doth teache well. And Socrates in Phedro Pla­tonis praisyng muche the maner of di­uidyng [Page] saith at length, that if he kne [...] a man whiche coulde well deuide, and seuerallye set euery thyng in his pla­ce, he woulde followe hym as though [...] he shuld follow god himselfe. In what miserable blindnes ware we, yf we knewe not the difference betwixt the law, and the gospel, the whiche onelye we do knowe by the benefite of diui­sion. There be manye fonde people whiche haue muche dispraised all tem­poral lawes, & ciuile lawes, thinkyng [...] it mete that al common weales should onlye haue the gospell, and none other [...]awe at all. This maye seme to some a gaie saie [...]ge, where as in dede it is bothe folishe, and wicked. For ther is a difference betwi [...]te Politicall lawes, and the gospel: For the politicall lawe dothe cause an outwarde discipline to be obserued euē of the wycked, so that thei dare not offende outwardlye for feare of corporall punishement. The magistrate whiche hath this charge is ordeyned of god, and first his charge is to sette forth the ten commaundemen­tes geuen to Moses, in the stony ta­ [...]es, [Page] and to cause the same to be obser­ [...]d vniuersallie, punishyng the offen­ [...]urs for their euil dedes corporallye. [...]fter this he must enacte other parti­ [...]lar lawes, as occasion shall serue [...]hich do not dissent from these .x. con­ [...]eryng these lawes are generall, and therefore particular thynges maye be [...]awen out of them. As where it is s [...]d. Thou shalt do no thefte, the ma­ [...]trate seynge falsehode in bargay­ [...]yng, and muche disceipte vsed to de­ [...]aude one, an other, straight causeth [...] to be proclaimed that all suche as v­ [...] disceipt in bargaynyng, committe [...]efte, a [...]d shalbe attainted therupon [...] felc [...]s, the whiche man in so doyng h [...]th fulfilled goddes commaund [...]mēt. Nowe againe, as for the preachynge of the Godspell, it is an other maner of thyng, for thereby sinnes ar forgiuen. [...]e inheritaunce of lyfe euerlastynge [...]aunted, and an euer liuyng Churche [...]f mankynd gathered to be Goddes [...]osen people, and also the true know­l [...]ge of God, perfite rightuousnes, and the hope of life euerlasting, is kindled in [Page] the hartes of al godlie through the po­wer of goddes holie ghoste. But there be fewe that will obey wyllynglie, and with all ther hartes, the wordes of the gospell in suche wyse.

Neither can any Lawe be able vio­lentlye to force the inward thought of man. Therfore the outward magistrat though he cannot binde mens cōscien­ces frō y ^e thing that is eui [...], yet doth he muche to with draw them from doyng euil, and in dede if lawes ware, not men coulde not liue. Therfore the political regiment, and the gospell are .ij. diuer­se thynges. This [...]horte distinction ge­ueth a lighte to many waightie mat­ters, the which thyng whan men know not, they wander in greate darkenesse, and for lacke of light, faull in to error.

What a diuision is.

A Diuision is a diuidynge of that whiche is more commune, into those whiche are lesse common. As a definition therfore dothe declare what a thyng is, so the diuision sheweth howe many thynges are con­tayned in the same.

[Page]A diuision, is either the deuidyng of a worde, or of a thyng. A diuision firste of a word, is whē any worde that signi­fiyng diuerse thynges, is deuided into euery seueral significatiō that he hath, as if I would deuide this word, Canis, into a dog, a fish of the sea, and a starre in the Elemente, thus might I say, Ca­nis is either a dog that liueth vpō the yearth, or els a starre in the elemente.

A diuision of the thyng is .iij. wayes considered, for either it is whan the generall is deuided into his kynde, the whole into his partes, or els whan the substaunce is deuided into his acciden­tes. The generall is deuided into his kynde thus, as an Element is deuided into the fier, the aier, the water, and the yearth. A common weale is deui­ded into the state of people whiche be­are rule, & also into that powre where the beste, and wisest haue the gouer­naunce, and thirdly into ones hande whiche alone beareth the stroke and is chief magistrate. Of liuyng creatures some are endued with reason, some are with out reason.

[Page]The whole is diuided into his par­tes as thus. The body is diuided into the head, bealie, hādes, & feete. A man is deuided into bodie, and soule, & this kynde of deuidyng is proprelie called Partitio. And the very difference be­twixt diuisio, and partitio is, that in a deuision where the general, and the kynde are, the generall worde is spo­ken of the kynde it self, as. Iustitia est virtus. Iustice is a vertue, where as it cannot be so, when the whole is de­uided into his partes, that the whole should be spoken of his part, as I can not saye, Caput est homo. the head is man. For the head is not man, nor yet the bealy, al though they both be par­tes of man. We haue euermore nede of this Partition in all matters. The law of Moses is deuided into .iij. par­tes, for either it is Morall, Iudiciall, or Ceremonial, neither is this Parti­tion necessarie for Moses common weale only, but for all other regimen­tes that be. The morall law standeth for euer, and is not altered at any time but is receyued from tyme, to tyme, e­uen [Page] as Moses receyued the same of God in stony tables. The Iudiciall law is next, the which although we be not boūd to obserue as the Israelites ware, yet must ther be actes of Par­liamente made for the reformacion of thinges that be amisse, and Magistra­tes apointed to punysh such as breake the ten commaundementes, called the morall lawe, and euen so maie we iud­ge of the Ceremoniall Lawe. that al­though it appertaine nothing to vs to kepe suche Ceremonies as Moses, and Aaron haue enacted, yet it is nedefull that there be an ordre in al our doings and that we resort together to the temple reuerently, and that the Parentes appoint their childrē a tyme to learne at schole, and for their seruauntes a tyme to do their true seruice.

The substaunce is deuided into his accidētes, as thus, of men, som are fre, some are bo [...]de.

¶An other maner of deuiding there is contrary to this, as when the accidentes are deuided into there substaunces, as thus. Of good thinges some are of the mind, some of y ^e [Page] bodie, and some of fortune. Also there is a deuision when accidentes are de­uided into accidentes, as of good thin­ges, some are honeste, some profitable, and some plesaunt.

¶Rules necessarie to be obserued in euerie diuision.

FIrst it must be prouided that the diuision as muche as maie be (for it cannot alwaies be so) ought to be made with twoo contrary differences, fully containyng in them self the whole cumpasse or wi­denes of the generall worde, or that which is deuided, for it is a fault to forget any thyng, or let slip any part.

Againe the differences whiche de­uide the generall worde, beyng ioined both together, must be egall to the said generall worde, and the partes coupe­led together, must be asmuche as the hoole, or els the diuision is not good. A liuyng creature is deuided into his twoo differences, as into a thyng ha­uyng reason, and a thyng that hath no reason. Nowe what so euer is a liuyng creature, the same is a thyng that ei­ther [Page] hath reason or els that lacketh reason. And agayne euerie thyng that is endewed with reason, and without reason, that same is a liuing creature. So that in euerie diuisiō, the membres, or partes that dooe deuide, by conuersion are turned with y ^e thyng deuided, euen likewise it is with partitiō, as I haue spoken before of deuisiō. Where as lo­gike hath two partes, Iudgement and findyng o [...]t of thynges, euen as I saie logique is nothing els but iudgement, and findyng out of thynges, so of the other side, iudgement, and findyng out of thinges, is nothyng els, but logique it self. Wherby appereth a plain [...] con­uersion, that what so euer the one is, the same is the other, whiche thyng must diligentlie be obserued in euerie diuision. Fo [...] if the membres that do deuide, be either more or lesse than the thyng deuided: streight waie the diui­sion is not good, for accordyng to a Precept that we haue in latine. Memb [...]a diuidentia semper cum diuiso conuerti debent. The partes that do deuide must alway be equall with the thyng [Page] deuided, and turned by cōuersion with the same, or els the diuision is not law­full.

¶The maner of handeling a single Que­stion, [...]nd the readie waie howe to teache and sette forth any thyng plainlie, and in or­der, as it should be, in latine Methodus.

IN handeling of any single que­stion, the preceptes and rules geuen before in the commune wordes, in the moste generall wordes, in the definition, and diuision, doe very good seruice, and helpe to­wardes the orderyng of euery suche mater. The whole nature of suche questions are thoroughlie sene by vsyng of this order. Euery single question is eight waies examined, first to aske whether the thing be, or no. As thus. Is there any one man that maye be called wise? Is there any lawe? Is there any frendship vpon yearth? This question is often proued, either by experience, or els by authoritee of the wise. Therfore in questionyng what the thyng is, we muste declare the very nature [...] as if I shall speake of frendshippe, I will [Page] first be at a pointe of what frendshyp I must speake. For frendship is of two sortes. The one is true & perfect frendshippe, whiche commeth from the hart for vertues sake, and is onely among good men: the other is fay [...]ed fauour, when one for lucre beareth a fayre face outwardely, and fedeth inwardly a maliciouse stomake. And this is the commune frendshippe, wherof the wicked onely are partakers. The seconde question is, to aske what a thyng is. And this cometh from the definition, whiche is of two sortes. either of the substaunce of any thyng, or els of the name. Of the name as thus, a realme is that countrey whiche is ruled by a kyng. Of the substance thus. A realme is a gatheryng of people together, be­yng able to liue, and withstande other for preseruatiō of thēselues, abiding se­uerall. The law is an ordina [...]ce which commaundeth thynges in ordre, to be done, and forbiddeth the cōtrary. The third question is, when the partes, and euery seuerall kynde is considered, & for this question the deuision and par­tition [Page] dooe much good. As the lawe of the Gospell and the politicall lawe. The fourthe question is to aske what are the causes, and especially what is the efficient cause, and what is the fi­nall cause, or the ende of any thyng. The efficient cause of all good lawes, is God, and his minister. The finall cause, or the end, is to liue vprightlie in the feare of God, and to walke all the daies of our life in the obseruacion of his holy will. The fifte question is, when the effecte, the office, or propre workyng is examined. As the effecte of the lawe is, to conserue the state of mā to continue peace vniuersally, to en­creace wealth, and make loue betwixt all. The syxt question is when thinges be asked that happē after, or the which haue great affinite, or likelyhode toge­ther. As if lawes be kept and folowed, we se our childrens children waxe to welth. We se muche neyghbourhode and good will to helpe the needie, & so forth. The seuenth is to aske what are disagreyng. As from the lawe, dissen­teth rebellion, stubbournesse, pryde, [Page] with other. The eight question is to bryng in witnesse, & to showe by whose authoritee the lawe taketh place. The scripture teacheth that God gaue the lawe to Moses, and Poule with Pe­ter also, and Christ himself commaun­ded euery man to obeye the higher po­wer in all thynges, that are not direc­tely repugnaunt from the wil of God. Thus [...]he question is eight waies exa­mined, and the maner taught thereby to frame it in dewe ordre, so that he whiche kepeth well this trade, can not faile in ani cause that he taketh in hād. And because they maie the rather be remembred, I wil sette them altogether.

As touching the lawe .8. waies.

• 1 [...] whether it is or no
• 2. what it is [...]
• 3. what are the parte [...].
• 4 [...] what are the causes.
• [...]. what are the effec­tes or propre workyng.
• 6 What are next adioyning, what are like, what happē therbi
• 7 What do disagree, or what are contrarie.
• [...]. What example there is, or authorite to proue it.

And this lesson ought diligentlie to be learned of al, that euermore thei be­ginne from the generall, and come to euery seuerall parte. As in declaryng what vertue is, first to tell the nature of it generally, and after to handle e­uery [Page] vertue by it selfe. And this order both Tullie hath folowed in his boke de officijs, and also Aristotle in hys Ethikes hath done the like, to y ^e great admiration of al those that be learned.

¶Of a proposition.

EUen the very ordre of nature requireth that first of all we should speake of seuerall wor­des, and as a man woulde saie, teache one his lettres, and teache hym the maner of spelling, before we teache him to rede, and afterward ioyne sen­tences together, & frame propositions by knittyng seuerall woordes in or­dre, for it is the very office of the mind first to knowe, and then to knitte [...] ney­ther can any chylde vtter a sentence, before he learne to speake a worde. A­gaine, when nature hath taught seue­ral wordes, then the minde ioyneth to guether, deuideth, and afterwarde ge­ueth a Iudgement whether they be well or no. For a man ware litle better then a brute beaste, if he could but one­lie apprehende seueral wordes, hauing no gifte, or aptnes to ioyne them in or­der, [Page] and to iudge howe thynges are ioyned together. But seyng God hath kindeled th [...]s light in man, that he can both ioyne, and iudge, we will nowe speake of the knittyng together, & the ioynyng of wordes in a proposition.

¶What a Proposition is.

A Proposition is a perfite sen­tence spoken by the Indicatiue mode, signifiyng either a trewe thyng, or a false, without al am­biguitie, or doubtfulnes. As thus, eue­ry man is a liar.

There be two partes in a proposi­tion, the one is called Subiectum (that is to saye that where of sumwhat is spoken,) the other is attributum, com­mōly called predicatum, that is to sai, that whiche is spoken of any thyng, as in the aboue rehersed propositiō. Eue­ry man is a liar, Man, is that whereof this saiyng (to be a liar) is spoken, and this same saiyng (to be a liar) is that whiche is spoken of man.

Euerie proposition is two waies deuided, either it is a single sentence, standing of one perfect sentence, as Iustice [Page] is a vertue, or els it is a double sentēce hauyng two propositiōs in it, as thus. If iustice be a vertue, it is a good thing prayse worthie.

That propositiō is called false, the which either naturall reason proueth to be plaine false, or the experience of man declareth to be vntrue, as thus. The stone doth feale. the soule of man is mortall. Experience showeth the soule to be immortall, and nature tea­cheth vs that no stone hath the sence of fealyng.

The second diuision of a Proposition.

AGaine Propositions do either affirme, or denie, as this propo­sitiō. Pleasure is a good thing, dothe affirme that pleasure is good. Againe, pleasure is not a good thyng, doth denie y ^t pleasure is good. That Propositiō doth affirme, whē a­ny thing is reported to be in any thing That Proposition doth denie, when any thyng is denied to be in any thing.

¶The third deuision of a Proposition.

[Page]THirdly al Propositions ar ei­ther, generall, particular, in­diffinite, or singular [...] Those Propositions ar called gene­ral, or vniuersal, the which haue a ge­neral signe ioyned to the first parte of the Propositiō, as thus. Euery coue­tous mā is poore. No mā both loueth, and is wise. No man is euermore hap­pie. General signes are these [...] Omnis, Nullus, Quilibet, Nemo. Euery bodie, nobodie, all the world, not one in all the world.

Particular propositions are these, where a particular signe is added to the former parte of the Proposition, which doth not conteine al but a part or a fewe, as thus. Some men feare God. Some men are to muche desie­rous of glory. The particular signes be these. Quidam, Aliquis, Plerique, Plerun (que). A certain man, some bodie, all men for the most part, oftentymes.

The Propositions are called Inde­finite (that is to say, vncertain) where the former part of the Proposition is a generall woorde without a signe, as [Page] thus. The soule is immortall. Man­hode is a vertue. One man is better then an other. Old men are couetous. And note this diligētly, that those In­definite Propositions (whose laste re­hersed parte is necessary, and is so spoken of the former part, that it doth alwaie agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) do implie as muche as a generall propositino, as in the aboue rehersed Proposition. The soule is immortal. this word (to be immortall) whiche is spoken of the soule, agre [...]h not to one man, or to cer­taine, but to euery man liuyng. when the Accidentes are spokē of the former part, it implieth as muche as a parti­cular Proposition doth. as [...] Homo ho­mini prestat ingenio, virtute, doctri­na. (Some man is better then an o­ther in witte, learnyng, and vertue,) is no more to say, than Quidam homo homini prestat. Some one mā is bet­ter then an other.

A singular Proposition, is when a propre name of a man is conteined in a Proposition, and is the former part [Page] of the same, as. Cicero est Orator. Cicero is an Oratour. Alexander est bellicosus. Alexander is a warriour.

The repu [...]naunce of Propositions

REpugnācie, is the diuersitee of .ij. propositiōs, which haue both one subiectum, (called the former part,) & one attributum, which is the rehersed part, and in sence spoken of the former.

There be .iiij. in nombre, called in Latine. Contrariae, Subcontrariae, Cō ­tradictoriae, and Subalternae.

Generall cōtrarie Proposiciōs, are those, whereof the one doth affirme, & the other doth denye, as thus. Omnes homines gloria ducuntur, All men are moued with glory. Nulli homines gloria ducuntur, No men are moued with glory.

Particular contrarie, are twoo Particulars, whereof the one doth af­firme, the other doth deny. Aliqui ho­mines gloria ducuntur, Some men are moued with glory. Aliqui homi­nes gloria non ducuntur, Some men are not moued with glory.

[Page]Contradictory Proposiciōs are, whē the one is Uniuersal affirmatiue, and the other Particular negatiue. or els when the one is Uniuersal negatiue, and the other Particular affirmatiue, as thus. Omnes homines gloria du­cuntur [...] All men are moued with glo­ry. Aliqui homines gloria non ducū ­tur. Some men are not moued with glory, and likewyse backeward.

Subalternae are those, whiche be ei­ther Uniuersall affirmatiue, & Par­ticular affirmatiue, or els vniuersall negatiue, and particular negatiue.

¶A single P [...]oposicion, is thre waies denided.

PRopositio Categorica (other wise called a single Proposi­tion) is deuided into, true and false Propositions.

They are true Propositiōs, whiche agre to the matter, and are either ne­cessarie, or els such as maie be either true, or false, called in Latine fortuitae or contingentes.

Necessarie Propositions, are assu­redly true, and knowen so to be either [Page] by nature, or els by experience.

Of those that necessarily be knitte together are these. The propre name, the kynde, the generall worde, the dif­ferēce, the propretie, the definition, the causes, the propre worke of causes, and some Accidentes that euer tarie, as thus, Cicero est homo, Cicero is a man. Homo est animal ratione praedi­tum, aptum ad risum, A man is a li­uyng creature, endued with reason, apt to laugh. Dies est necessario, quo­niam Sol exoriens est, It must nedes be day, because the Sonne is vp. Ignis calidus est, Fier is hotte.

Those Propositions are chaungea­ble, whiche may be true, or chaunce to be so; as. Pecunia est bonum, Mony, is a good thyng. & whersoeuer the Ac­cident is spoken of that which contei­neth hym: euery suche Proposition is called chaunceable or that which may be true, as: Water is made whot; here we see that it chaunceth to water (cō ­trary to her nature) to be warme, and therefore it is called chaunceable as the which maie chaunce [...] or be chaunged.

[Page]

[Page]HEre we must be diligent that in all such repugnauncie of Pro­positiōs, there be no doubtful­nes in any worde, and that al­waies there be one maner of woordes that go before, and also one maner of wordes that ende the sentence, plainly and without double vnderstandyng. This diuersite of Propositions is ve­ry necessary to discerne, the truth, frō that which is false, for when we ioyne two Propositions that are dissonant, we shal easely trie the chaffe from the corne, the which when we haue done, we maie the better, sticke to the truth with full assente, the contrary beyng ones disclosed and reiected.

¶ De Conuersione, of the turnyng of Propositions.

COnuersion, is the chaungyng or alteryng of wordes in a Proposi­cion, when y ^e former part (wher­of any thyng is rehersed) and the hynder parte (which is rehersed of the former) are chaunged, the one, into the others place.

There be .iij. maner of Conuersiōs, [Page] Simplex, per Accidens, per Contra­positionem.

A plaine Conuersion is, when both the Proposition [...] are like in all thy [...] ­ges, both in signes, and also in affir­macion, or negation, sauing onely that of the last rehersed, is made the former part of the sentence, & the former part, is made the last rehersed part.

Suche Conuersion is made, when both Propositions be either Uniuer­sall negatiues, or els particular affir­matiues, for the first thus. Nemo ti­mens Deum, cōtaminat se adulterio. Ergo, Nemo contaminans se adul­terio timet Deum. No man that fea­reth God, de [...]ileth him self with adul­trie [...] therfore, no man that defileth him self with adultrie, feareth God. Here we maie see the Conuersion plaine, as the rule aboue rehersed teacheth. For ij. particular affirmatiues, this shalbe an example. Quidā aulici, boni sunt. Ergo quidā boni, aulici sunt. Some courtiers are honest, Ergo some ho­nest men are courtiers.

A Conuersion by Accidēt, is when [Page] the former parte of y ^e sentence, is made the last rehersed parte, and the last re­hersed parte, made y ^e former part, both the Propositions affirmyng, or deni­yng, sauyng onely that the signes bee chaunged, that is the one beyng Uni­uersall, the second beyng Particular. First a Conuersion is made of .ij. affir­matiues, thus. Omnis virtus est lau­dāda, Ergo laudandū aliquid, est vir­tus. All vertue is to be praised, there­fore some thing to be praised is a ver­tue. A conuersiō of .ij. negatiues, thus. Nemo malus foelix, foelix igitur (sa­piens cum sit) non est malus. No euill man is absolutely happy. Therfore an absolute happie man (consyderyng he is wise) cannot be euill. This kynde of Conuersion is very profitable for him that wil dispute. for where as we rea­son often frō the general worde, to the kynde, we must nedes vse this maner of Conuersion, as thus. If al exercise be good, then this exercise is good, and so of other.

A Conuersion by contraposition, is when the former part of the sentēce [Page] is turned into the last rehersed parte, and the last rehersed part, turned into the former parte of the sentence, both the propositions being vniuersall, and affirmatiue, sauyng that in the second Proposition there be certaine negati­ues enterlaced, as thus.

Euery mā desireth to se, to heare, or to know somwhat, therfore what soe­uer he is that desiereth not to see, to heare, or to know somwhat, that same bodie is not a man. This Conuersion is profitable, and serueth well to rea­son by. thus reasoneth Christ by this Conuersion against the Iewes in the viij. Chapter of Iohn [...] Qui ex Deo est, verba Dei audit, vos igitur cum non audiatis, ex Deo non estis. He that is of God, heareth the woordes of God, You therefore because you heare not, be not of God. This Conuersion co [...] ­futeth the Iewes plainly, & proueth that they are not of God. Yf, we will [Page] reason from the general worde to the kynd, or from the greater, to the lesse, we may vse this Conuersiō very wel. Omnis homo est animal, Ergo quod­cnn (que) nō est animal, id nec homo est. Euery man is a liuing creature, therefore what soeuer thyng is not a liuyng creature, that same is not a mā. Take away the general worde, and there cā no kynde remaine at all. From the su­perior vniuersall, to the inferior, thus we maie reason. All pure golde loketh yealowe, therefore what soeuer loketh not yealowe, y ^t same is not pure golde. This Conuersiō serueth wel to make an Argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the whiche ought diligently to be obserued.

Propositio Hypothetica, that is to say a double Proposition.

PRopositio Hypothetica, is a sentence with two single Proposi­tiōs knit together alwaies, with some Coniunction, as thus. Si iustitia est virtus, est laudabilis. If iustice be a vertue, it is praise worthie.

¶There be .iii. maner of double Propositions.

[Page]A Double Proposition standet [...] of .iij. partes, wherof the one is a conditionall Proposition, af­firming a thing to be either true or false, with an (if.) As thus. Yf faith be vpon the yearth, some men feare God. Yf the worlde continue stil as it doth, walowyng in most abhominable synne, God wil at length punishe the offenders very sore. All which Propo­positions are euer true, whē the par­tes are so knit together: that the lat­ter parte, must nedes folowe vpō that, which goeth before. The second part is, when a Proposition hath a disiun­ctiue, which knitteth the sentence vp, as thus. Either it is daie, or els it is night. Suche Propositions are true, when bothe the partes are true, & the same also are false, when either of the partes are false. The thirde parte is, when coniunctions that do denie are ioyned toguether, as thus. Battail beyng not laufull, is not to be desiered.

By all which double Propositions wee maie reason formally in diuerse causes, is thus by the first. If faith be [Page] vpon the yearth, some men feare God, but no mā feareth God, therfore faith is not vpō the yerth. Again, if we feare God, we are in charite, but we are not in charitie. Therefore we feare no [...] God. By the seconde thus. Either it is daie, or els it is night, but it is daie, Therfore it is not night. Couetouse men either be the seruauntes of God, or els of the Deuill, but they are not the seruantes of God: Ergo, they are the seruauntes of the Deuill. By the third thus. Battail beyng not lauful, is not to be vsed, but battail is lauful Therfore it is to be vsed.

Of makyng an Argument.

I Haue rehersed hetherto al sin­gle wordes, what the nature is of euery one, & in what gene­ral worde they may be founde. I haue set forthe the nature of a defi­nition, and a diuision. I haue taught also to ioyne these seuerall wordes in­to a proposition, and to make the same a perfect sentence. Nowe therfore by goddes grace, I wyll shewe the maner how to ioyne sentences together, and [Page] to proue a matter by knittyng proposi­cions handesomely in an argument, or els to cōfute any thing that a man list, by placing the proposiciōs accordingly. Therefore there ought good diligence to be vsed in this behalf, for as muche as it is the clerkliest part of al, and the hardest piece of worke, to frame an ar­gument aptly, & to know the very rea­son, why thynges are so knit together.

¶What an argument is.

An argumēt, is a waie to proue how one thyng is gathered by another, and to shewe that thyng, whiche is doubt­full, by that whiche is not doubtful.

¶To finde out the reason, that shall proue, (in Latine) called medium, (in Englishe) the double repete.

After this sort we maie finde the reason, whereby to proue our matter. When we haue a question or sentence, that we would either confirme, or con­fute, Aske the cause of our selfe, why, and wherefore that thyng, whiche is spoken of the former parte in any sen­tence, should be so applied to thesame. And to make the matter more plain, I [Page] will make this question. Est ne auarus pauper? Is a couetous man poore or not? I maie thus reason with my self. why shoulde a couetous man be called poore, what affinitie is betwixt theim twoo? marie in this poynct, thei bothe agree, that like as the poore man, euer lacketh and desireth to haue: so the co­uetous manne euer lacketh, wantyng the vse of that whiche he hath, and de­sirereth stil to haue, beyng neuer cōtēt though god geue enough. Then seyng it is euen so, that bothe doe lacke, and bothe do desire to haue: this same rea­son is the onely cause, whereby myne argument is made perfect. For thus I maie frame myne argument aptly.

Thus this argumēt is made perfect by askyng this questiō, wherfore a co­uetous man is poore? As hereafter I [Page] wil shewe it more at large, by other e­xāples, [...]o make the thyng more plain.

¶There be foure kyndes of argumentes.

Syllogismus

a perfect argum [...]

Enthymema,

an vnperfect argum [...]

Inductio,

an induction.

Exemplum.

an example.

SYllogismus, is an argument wherby the last sentēce, whi­che we would proue, is confir­med by other proposiciōs, and sentences, more vniuersall, and better knowen, then the thyng whiche is pro­ued: conteinyng in themselfes the rea­son, why the laste sentence is true, and why thei are applied to the same. This kynd of argument, is from the general worde, to the kynde, as thus. If I wil proue theft worthie of punishement, I must first aske the questiō, why? & that thyng that commeth to my mynd, more vniuersall then theft, cōprehēdyng the offēce of theft in it, maie serue to make the argument. As I maie thus reason, that theft should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischeuous deede, and [Page] then thus I knit vp myne argument.

Here we se thre proposicions, or sen­tences, whereof the first is called Ma­ior, that is to saie, the proposicion at large. the seconde is called Minor, that is to saie, the seuerall proposicion. the thirde is called conclusio. that is, the lappyng vp of all. And here we muste note, that like as there be thre Propo­sitions, euen so there bee thre diuerse endynges, called in Latine, Termini, of the which, thone is called the terme at large, in the first proposicion onely, and afterwarde is referred, to the for­mer part of the conclusion, called sub­iectū conclusionis. The second terme is called the seuerall, whiche is in the second proposicion, & this is the worde whereof the question is made, & is spo­ken of in the conclusion. The thirde is called the double repeate, whiche is [Page] twise rehersed, before the conclusion, and therefore it is twise rehersed, be­cause it is the knitting together, of the ij. proposicions, and the cause, why the former part of the proposiciō, (wherof a thyng is saied,) and the last rehersed part, (beyng attributed to the part goyng before,) are ioyned together in the cōclusion. As to make the thyng plain by the former argument, I will proue this conclusion. Thefte is to be puni­shed. Thefte is called the former parte whereof this worde (punished) is spo­ken, and this worde (punished) there­fore is called the last rehersed part, because it is spoken of theft, which went before. Now to make my argumēt, and to proue this sentēce true, I must seke a worde, whiche is more generall then that, whiche is proued. And that worde that commeth to my mynd, & is pertei­nyng to the cause, beyng more vniuer­sall: (for euery thyng that is proued, is proued by a thyng more knowen) that same worde or reasō, is called the dou­ble repete. whose propertie is twise to be rehersed in an argument, and that [Page] in the first and seconde proposicion, ne­uer enteryng into the conclusion, as thus. Euery vice is to bee punished, (vice) is the double repete, which must be rehersed in the seconde proposicion, (for I saied before) it must be twise re­hersed because it maie be euident, that the former [...]art of the conclusion, is in very deede comprehended, vnder the former part of the first proposiciō. And then the argumēt is made as foloweth.

Here we se the double repete (whi­che proueth the matter) is twise reher­sed in the first, and second proposicion, and entereth not into the conclusion. The terme at large, is in the first pro­posicion, and the terme seuerall, is in the second proposicion, and enter both into the conclusion. So that we maye se that, whiche proueth the thyng, doth not entre into the conclusion, but is twise rehersed in the two propo [...]iciōs, and so the conclusion foloweth, by rea­son that these twoo woordes, vice, and [Page] theft, agree in a third altogether, and whatsoeuer is saied of the one, is saied of the other, and nothyng can be com­prehended vnder the generall, but all the kyndes haue thesame conteined in in theim, which in this proposicion, are r [...]ferred to the generall. (Al vice is to be punished, vnto vice, is referred this worde punished) therfore, whatsoeuer is cōprehended vnder this worde, vice, as theft, adultery, wrōg dealyng, mur­der, this worde punished, is rehersed of theim all: because it agreeth to the ge­nerall, & is rehersed of thesame. Ther­fore I reason thus. All vice is to bee punished.

Therfore

• Adultery [...] are to be pu­nished
• Wrong dealyng. are to be pu­nished
• Murder. are to be pu­nished

For if that, whiche is general, is to be punished, then the kyndes, or sortes in thinges, are al [...]o to be punished. Ac­cordyng to this saiyng. whatsoeuer is truely, and altogether rehersed, of the generall, that same also is rehersed of the kynde, whiche is included in the generall.

¶There be .v [...]i. Rules, especially to bee obserued, for the makyng of [...]n ar­gument called Syllogismus.

FIrst, that in euery Syllogis­mus, the firste proposicion bee vniuersall I call that propo­sicion vniuersall, when there is omnis, that is to saie, all: or els nul­lus, that is to saie, none, in the propo­siciō. As for example. Euery vice is to be punished, this proposiciō is vniuer­sall, because it hath omnis, in it, which signifieth all, or euery one. Likewise I call it perticular, when the proposiciō hath quidam, or aliquis, that is to saie certaine, or some body, quidam aulici sunt honesti, some courtiers be honest.

¶The se [...]ond rule.

If one of the proposicions be perti­cular, or negatiue, the conclusiō is per­ticular, or negatiue, I call that propo­sicion negatiue, when nullus, or nemo, (that is to say) none, or no body, is in y ^e proposicion. As nullus Christianus est foenerator, no Christian is an vsurer.

¶The third rule.

In a Syllogismus, bothe the propo­sicions, can neither bee negatiues, nor [Page] yet particulars togethers, for euen as of two negatiues, there foloweth no­thyng, so of two particulars, there fo­loweth nothyng. Therefore, when any suche argument is made, we maie bol­dely saie it is not lawful, because it is in no mode, as it is very plai [...]e to se in makyng of this argument folowyng.

Or this.

This argument is not lawful, first, bycause by my rule I am taught, that of pure particulars, nothyng doth fo­low, as Quidam (somme) is a particu­lar Ego, I, is a singular word, or signi­gnifieng asmuche as a propre name, & againe it is in no figure as hereafter I shal shewe. Thirdly it is mete that the firste parte of the seconde proposition shoulde be included in the first propo­sition, whereof some what is rehersed [Page] or els it is no good argument, in the first figure.

This is no good argument, bicause that Nero (which is the first worde in the second proposition of whome some thing is rehersed) is not comprehended vnder the former part of the firste pro­positiō, which is Kynges, for this for­mer part (some kinges) doth not speake of Nero, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest, and godly disposed gouer­nors. And yet in weightie causes suche argumentes haue been vsed, euen of those that would haue drawen vs from the obedience of gods holie worde, and persuaded some that we ware free frō the obseruation of any one thyng com­prehended in Moses lawes. As thus.

Where as this first proposition comprehendeth not all the lawes of Mo­ses, but the lawes ceremonialle whi­che ware as figures ordeined in decla­cla [...]ation of Christes commynge, and therfore the scripture saith vntyll Ihon, the lawe was, and the Prophe­tes, signifiyng that in Ihons tyme he was come, in whome the olde ceremo­nial lawes ware fully verified and fulfilled, whiche at his commyng beganne to cease, seyng he himselfe was the ful­fillyng of the lawe, not that we should not obserue the morall lawes of the heauenlye preceptes commaunded by God, for Christ hymselfe repeteth the obseruacion of them, yea and byndeth vs to a more straightnesse, that not on­ly we should do none euill, but that al­so we shoulde consent to none euyll, therfore this firste proposition, is not general, but particular, and so though the ceremoniall lawe be gone, yet the morall lawe taryeth still accordyng to Christes holye wyll.

[Page] Medius terminus, called the double repete (whiche is a worde rehersed in both propositions) must not entre into the conclusion, because the other two partes, called termini, be proued by this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason they agree with this thirde, the whiche two otherwise could not entre into the conclusion, if this double re­pete were not mencioned in both propositions, and kept out it selfe from the conclusion, as is euidently to se by an argumentacion.

¶The fift Rule.

In an argumēt, called Syllogismus there ought not to be doubtfull wor­des, or mo wordes in y ^e conclusion then was before rehersed. For mo thinges to be in the conclusion, this example shall serue which An [...]honius maketh in the first boke of Tullie de oratore.

Unprofitable thynges are not to be taught.

In Philosophie are vnpro­fitable thinges.

Ergo philosophie is not to be taught

This argument is to be denied, be­cause [Page] there is more in the conclusion, then was rehersed in the two first pro­positions. For this shuld haue bene the conclusiō. Some vnprofitable thynges whiche be in philosophie, are not to be learned, not y ^t philosophie it selfe is to be reiected, for els we myght make this argument likewise.

Dronkenes is not to be al­lowed.

In drinking is often times dronkenes.

Therfore drinkyng at any tyme is not to be allowed.

Therefore we must frame our argument so, that nothing be more in the cō clusion, then was in the other proposi­tions. As thus.

Dronkenes is not to be al-alowed.

In some drinkyng is oftentimes dronkenes.

Therefore some drinkyng is not to be allowed.

¶The sixt Rule.

There ought not to be mo termes [Page] in an argumentacion then thre, for o­therwise there is no good argument.

Euerie politicall Magistrate ought to kepe vnder disobedient persones, with corporall punish­ment.

Peter is an Apostle.

Therefore Peter shoulde pu­nishe the disobedient.

In this argument, is no ioynyng together of the first proposition, and the second: for the politicall magistrate, & an Apostle, are two maner of thynges. Therfore it hāgeth together like ger­maines lyppes as we vse to saye.

¶The seuenth Rule.

The double repeate, which is twise mencioned in both propositions, ought to be no doubtfull worde, for doubtful wordes make foure seuerall termes whiche should not be, as thus.

No bondman is free.

All that beleue the Gospel true­ly, are free.

Ergo none that beleue the go­spell truely, are bond men.

This argument is false, and must [Page] be de [...]ied at the first, because, there be foure termes, for in the first propositiō, fredome, is taken for such a libertie as men do vse in cōmon weales, to make seruauntes, and apprentises fre, in the seconde proposition, fredome is taken for deliueryng the soule frō the wrath of God, from sinne, and from death e­uerlasting, as we rede in the scripture. Whom the sonne hath made free, they are fre in very diede, not that this fre­dome taketh away all orders in the cō ­mon weale, that no man shall haue an apprentise, or a bond mā. For although the father in heauen hath made them free from sinne, from death, and from the wrath of God, yet are they still ap­prentises, and bond by a political law [...] therfore we may see that there be .iiij. endynges or termes, consideryng he speaketh of one libertie in the first proposition, and of an other in the second, so that the argumēt is not good. A like argument there is, which one made to Diogenes.

That whiche I am, thou art not

I am a man.

[Page]Ergo thou art none.

Here is ambiguite in this verbe (I am) far if it be vnderstanded in the first propositiō that this worde (I am) is not considered accordyng to the ge­nerall substaunce, but according to the qualitie, or rather propre beyng, spea­kyng of y ^e diuersitie of men, as when I liue, I haue mine own bodie, my flesh, and mine owne bones, thou hast thyne also propre vnto the, and not that I am thou, nor thou art I. Then it is well sayde, that whiche I am, thou art not. But if I vnderstand this word (I am) in the first proposition as a substaunce vniuersall, or rather generall copula­tiue, to be rehersed of the inferiors, thē it is not good. For as I may saie, Dio­genes is a mā, Aristotle is a man, so I maie saye of al men. Whereby we may see here also foure partes, or endinges, and therfore the argument must be de­nied at the first, geuyng this reason y ^t I haue shewed before.

Nowe that I haue set forth the pre­ceptes whiche are to be obserued in an argument, I will declare howe to seat [Page] be & place an argument, that any bodie may geue a reason, why euery worde is set in an argument, in this, or that place. First therfore we must considre, there be foure figures, whiche serue for the makyng of an argument, & mo­des also, whiche teache the ordering of propositions whether they shalbe vni­uersal, particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue. I wil define them both after this sorte.

A figure is a lawfull placing of the double repeate, in the twoo proposi­tions, and euen as the double repeate is placed, so we maie iudge with ease in what figure the argument is. The first figure is such an order of proposi­tions in an argumēt, that y ^e double re­peate must be the former part in y ^e first proposition, and the last rehersed parte in the second proposition, where vpon the cōclusion doth folow. And the rea­son that it must be so, is because that where as in this figure the argument is euermore made from the generall, to the kynde vniuersally, (for y ^e first pro­position euermore in these two figures [Page] must be vniuersal, either affirmatiue, or negatiue) and because of the general worde, there is sumwhat rehersed of the kynde: one of the propositions must be so placed, that it may euidently ap­peare that the kynde is encluded in the general. And therfore y ^e general is spo­ken in the seconde proposition of the kynde.

A mode, is a lawfull placing of propositions in there due qualitie, or quantitie. I call that in the propositiō a qualitie, when it doth affirme or de­nie. I call it a quantitie, when it is ei­ther vniuersal, or particular. Unto the first figure belong foure modes, which may be perceiued by these .iiij. wordes.

• Barbara.
• C [...]larent.
• Darij.
• Ferio.

THese foure wordes must not be forgotten if we wil make an argument truely in the first fi­gure, for euery argument that is made in this figure, is in one of these [Page] foure modes, or els it is no argument of the first figure. If the double repete be the former parte in the first proposi­tion, and the laste rehersed parte in the second proposition, it is in the first [...]i­gure, notwithstandyng, except it be in mode also, it is no argument. There­fore we must learne to place an argu­ment in mode al [...]o. And for the better knowledge of this thyng, note that in these wordes there be foure vowels to be considered, and marked. That is to saye, A, E, I, &, O. And where we see A in Barbara thrise, we must cōsidre that these thre AAA in this one worde, de­clare vnto vs thre vniuersall proposi­tiōs affirmatiue, E, declareth a proposi­tion negatiue vniuersall. As in Cela­rent we se twise. E, whereby we are taught that the argument (if we make it in this mode) must haue two vniuer­sall negatiues, and one vniuersal affir­matiue, by reason of A, which is in the middest of Celarent. I dothe signifie a particular affirmatiue. O. doth signi [...]e a particular negatiue, as in Ferio, the first must be a negatiue vniuersall, the [Page] second an affirmatiue particular, the third a negatiue particular. That the­se thynges may be more euident to ma­ke an argument, both in figure, and mode, I will gyue examples for euery mode of this figure, that one may plai­nely see the whole matter as though it were in a glasse, remembryng alwaies, that these modes serue for this figure, whiche figure is knowē (as I sayd be­fore) when the double repete is the for­mer part of the first proposition, and the last rehersed part of the second proposition. And where as I sayde before that certayne argumentes were in no mode, althoug they were in the first fi­gure, and therefore not good because they were not both in one mode, and fi­gure, these shalbe to vnderstande, they were not in one mode, because the first proposition must be vniuersall euer, or els it is not good. Now therefore here folowe examples of the first figure and of the modes thereof.

Bar

All honest thynges are to be em­brased.

ba

All law made by a christian ma­gistrate [Page] are honest.

ra

Therfor all lawes made by a Christian magistrate are to be embrased.

Ce

No contemner of the magi­strate is a christian.

la

All Anabaptistes are contem­ners of the magistrate.

rent

Therfore no Anabaptiste is a Christian.

Da

Whatsoeuer deserueth the fa­uor and grace of god, the same only doth iustefy.

ri

Faith onely deserueth the fa­uor and grace of God.

f

Ergo faith only doth iustifie.

Fe

No extorcioner is godly.

ri

Some riche man is an extor­cioner.

o

Ergo some riche men are not godlye.

The second figure is, where the the double repete is the last, rehersed parte in bothe propositions, after this sorte followynge, and there be .iiij. mo­des [Page] belongyng to the same figure, as it shal appere, whiche all they haue these iiij. vowels in thē. A.E.I.O. so that they make the proposition to be vni­uersal, or particular, affirmatiue, or ne­gatiue, as it was before.

Note that the cōclusion is alwayes negatiue, for asmuche as the firste, and the second, are alwayes repugnaunt, neither do they agree in the double re­peate, called Medius terminus. And therfore the conclusion is negatiue by contraposition, wherof I spake before when I entreated of the conuersion or turnyng of propositions.

Ce

No iust mā, before god hath an vnquiet, and doubtful cōscience.

sa

All they that trust to be iusti­fied by their workes, haue vn­quiet consciences.

re

Therfore none trusting to his workes, is iust before God.

Ca

The christian righteousnesse, is the purenesse of the mynde.

mest

To weare a tipete, a coule, a shauen croune, is not the purenes of the minde.

[Page] tres

Therfore the outwarde attyre is not the christian righteousnesse.

Fes

No true diuine cōtemneth phi­losophie.

ti

Some Englishe preachers con­temne philosophie.

no

Ergo some Englishe preachers are no true diuines [...]

Ba

All christians refuse to gette goodes vngodlye

ro

Some vsures refuse not to gette goodes vngodlye.

co

Therfore some vsurers are no christians.

The .iij. figure is, where the double repete is the former part in bothe pro­positions. And ther be .vj. modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclu­sion muste nedes be par [...]icular, in this figure where y ^e [...]ormer part in both propositions is the double repete, for lyke as we reason in the first figure frō the general word, to the kynd, that is frō the vniuersal, to the particular, so in this figure we reason from the kynde [Page] (which is lesse) to the generall worde whiche is more vniuersall, but so not withstandynge, that the conclusion be particular. and therfore this kynde of argument is very good. For the Spe­cies, or kynd, beyng ones put, the gene­rall, must nedes folowe.

Da

Euery common weale hath nede of armour, and lawes.

rap

Euery common weale is goddes ordenaunce.

ti

Therfore lawes, and armour, are goddes ordenaunce.

Fe

No vertue should be eschued.

lap

All vertue hath her wo with her.

ton

Therfore some wo shoulde not be eschued.

Di

Mercie only forgyueth sinnes.

sa

Al mercie is purchased by faith.

mis

Therfore by faith onely forgy­uenesse is obteyned.

Da

All those that thincke them sel­ues holie by their beades, by [Page] our ladies fast, and by we aryng a heary shirte, are neither wyse nor godlye.

ti

Some priestes in Englande think no lesse.

si

Ergo some priestes are nei­ther wise, nor godly.

Bo

Some battaill is not to be eschued.

car

Euery battail is full of mo­che miserie.

do

Ergo some miserie is not to be escheued.

Fe

None that beare any deadly malice, feare God.

ti

Some beare their neygh­bours deadly malice.

son

Therfore some feare not God.

It is verye necessarie that there shuld be .iij. figures, as I haue shewed alreadye. for in euerye argument that hath the shape of a Sillogismus (for the induction & the exāple haue it not, ne­ther be thei in mode & figure) euermore we reason from the general, to the kind [Page] vniuersal, makyng the conclusion vni­uersal, or els we reason from the kynd, to the generall, makyng the conclusion particular, or els there is a repugnan­cie of the terme at large, and the seue­rall, when they do not agree with the double repete, or laste of all we ioyne many causes, and many effectes toge­ther, wherof is made an argument, cal­led Sorites, or coaceruatio, that is to say, a heapyng together of thinges

Whan we make an argument, and procede from the general worde, to the kynde, it is in the first figure. and euen by oure reason we learne this, that if the greater be not, the lesser cannot be. As thus, if one be no liuyng creature, howe can he be a man, if he be a liuyng creature, he muste either be a man or a brute bodye.

Whan we procede from the kynd, to the generall, makynge the conclusion particular, the argumēt is in the third figure. And this is for euer true, that whan the kynde is rehersed, the gene­rall must nedes folow.

But whan there is a repugnauncie [Page] in an argument of the terme at large, and the seuerall, so that they agree not [...]ith a thirde word, it is euer in the se­cond figure. And this is playne to see that suche an argument must nedes be well concluded, whan we go about to co [...]ute any thyng, seyng: that .i [...]. kyn­des which are repugnaunt, must nedes be disseuered, and so the conclusion to be made vpon the same. As it is easie to se in the argumentes of the second fi­gure. Therfore it is good reason that both there shoulde be two figures, and also that the argument doth well pro­cede beyng made in any of them.

Some tymes an argument is made whan we couple many causes together & the very effectes of the same, as thus [...]

Of an halfe argument called Enthimema.

AN halfe argument, is an argu­ment vnperfect, the whiche is, whan one proposition is reher­sed, and the conclusion straight brought in there vpon, as thus. That is not good whiche bryngeth a man to mischefe. Therfore money is not good [...] The bible teacheth a man his duetye towardes god, and his neighbour, Er­go it is necessary to be knowen, & read of euery bodye. Pleasure bryngeth en­deles payne after it, Ergo pleasure is to be eschued. These argumentes be­halfe argumētes, wantyng one propo­sition euermore, the whiche if we adde a perfecte argumentation foloweth therupon, as thus.

These half imperfect Argumentes called Enthymemata, consiste parte­ly of likelyhodes, and partely of infal­lible reasons.

Likelyhodes, are those, that often hitte the trueth, & yet are not alwaies so, as thus.

This maie be true, and this maie be false. for although the coniecture haue some probabilite with it, yet is it not for euer true. The other called infalli­ble reasons, or rather necessary Argu­mentes, muste by all reason be euer­more true, as thus.

¶An other.

Therfore in all cōmunicacion, good hede ought to bee taken, that likely­hodes of thynges, be not vsed for ne­cessarie reasons

¶Of an Argument, called Syllogismus Expositorius.

THis kynde of Argument hath euermore a nown propre, to be as the double repete in both Propositions: cōtrarie to the maner of all other Argumentes [...] and it maie be referred to the thirde figure.

For what so euer is truely gathered of particular thynges, the same also is propre to thynges generall, & what soeuer agreth to the propre name, the same also agreeth to the kynde, to the difference, or propretie, of the saide nowne propre.

Inductio.

AN Induction, is a kynde of Ar­gument when we gather suffi­ciently a nōbre of propre names, and there vpon make the cōclu­sion vniuersall, as thus.

¶An other Example.

Dathan for dis [...]obience againste the superiour poure, ended his life wretchedly.

Likewise Abiron,

Likewise Chore,

Likewise S [...]mei.

Neither is there any example to the contrary.

Therfore all rebelles, and tray­tors to their Prince, & Kyng, shall dye wretchedly.

¶An other Example.

Nembroth although he was a iolie [Page] hūter, yet he liued like a wretche in great miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly,

Pharao was sore plaged,

Amalech, Madian, Abimelech,

Herode, with other ware scourged greuously for their wickednes, neither is their any example to the contrary,

Therfore the ende of wicked men is wretched.

This kynde of Argument is called Inductio, because that shewing diuer­se propre names, it enduceth at length, and moueth the mind to make a gene­rall conclusion. Therfore necessary it is, that in such Argumentes al the ex­amples which are induced be like, for if any be found contrary, the Argument is of no force, as thus,

The Argument is not Lawful, for­asmuche [Page] as diuerse haue been maried in the Primatiue Churche, as Spiri­dion, Hermes, Hilarius, Policrates, Tertullianus, and diuers other. for it was the maner in y ^e primatiue church that honeste maried men were chosen to be Bishoppes, and had the charge of christes flocke. The Apostles also (as Egnatius wittenesseth) had wiues aswel as other men, and as I think v­sed them, as other mē do their wiues, or elles asked their leaue, and consent to forbeare them.

De Exemplo.

AN example, is a maner of Argu­mentation, where one thyng is proued by an other, for the like­nes, that is found to be in them both, as thus. If Marcus Attilius Regulus had rather lose his life, then not kepe promise with his enemie, thē shoulde euery man beyng taken priso­ner kepe promise with his enemy. Yf cities haue bene destroied for breaking of wedlocke, then adulterers muste nedes be punished. Yf Alexander daw­ned a weake souldiour when he was [Page] almost frosen for colde, and did set him in his owne chaire against the fier: thē should al captaines, and mē of warre, be tendre ouer there poore warriours and base souldiours.

E [...]er more take hede that in this kynde of Argument the causes be like of both sydes, or els the Argumente proueth not, as thus.

The examples are not like. Peter did kill Ananias with the worde, & po­wre of the holy Ghost-therfore prea­chers must not kil the body, but onely excommunicate men, accomptyng thē vnworthie to be in the congregacion. The sworde is lauful for the tēporall Magistrate onely, & for none other.

¶Sorites.

SOrites, vel coaceruatio, is a heapyng together of causes, one, vpon an other. A kynd of Argument when the last re­hersed [Page] worde of the first Proposition, is repeted in the firste parte of the se­conde Proposition, necessarily agre­yng there vnto, and so goyng stil forth in like maner, til at the length the last rehersed worde be added vnto the first woorde, called Subiectum of the first Proposition. And it is a kynde of Ar­gument muche vsed, when we ascend vpward frō the lowest, to the highest. or els when we go from the causes, to the next thyng done. whiche thynges done, are the occasiō of other thynges besides, as thus.

¶An other.

No Argumentes be made negatiue­ly by this kynd of Argumentation, as thus.

¶Or thus.

But these, and such like be as wise as this that foloweth.

And the reason is: No Argumentes are made negatiuely by this kynde of reasonyng, neither is the consequent good, when wordes that agree not ne­cessarily, [Page] are ioyned together.

This knittyng is not laufull, for e­uil maners of them selues, are not the occasion of good lawes, but the godly mynd of good Magistrates is the very chiefe cause [...] as the disease, is not the cause of healyng, but rather the Phi­sicion, and his Medicines, and mans nature, whiche resisteth the poyson of sickenes is the very cause. Again in e­uery heapyng vp of Argumentes af­ter suche sorte, learne, and marke, how they procede, and you shall easely se false packyng.

¶Thus merie fellowes reason when they are at nale.

Marke the procedyng and you shal easely auoide the errour, for although in slepe, we sinne not, yet by drinkyng we cause synne, & no one man, at one time both drynketh & slepeth: therfore though in slepyng he offended not, yet in drynkyng he passeth measure.

¶A horned Argument, called Dilemma.

DIlemma, otherwise comple­xio, vel cornu [...]us syllogis­mus, called a horned Argu­ment, is when the reason cō ­sisteth of repugnaūt membres, so that what so euer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take the foile. As yf I should aske whether it were better to marie a faire woman, or a foul. Yf you say a faire. Then answer I, that is not good, for thei comōly say, she wilbe co­mō. If you say it wer good to mary an hard fauored woman, then I answere, she wil be lothsome, and so ye fall into an inconuenience. Notwithstandyng if either of the partes maie be turned [Page] into the aduersaries necke againe, or both of them, it is a faulty Argument. and you maie confute the same by in­uersiō, that is to say, turning his taile cleane contrarie, as thus. If I shall marie a faire womā, I shal haue great pleasure, and cōfort in her: yf I marie a browne woman, she shal not be com­mon to other, for few men wil seke af­ter her. Therfore, I shal haue comfort both waies.

De Consequentiis.

IF profiteth not a litle, after the rehersall of such Argumentes briefly to show the knittyng of Propositions, and to declare the maner of a shorte Argument vtte­red by twoo Propositions, which are said to stand vpon the Antecedent and the Consequent: as the Logicians vse to terme them.

¶The f [...]rst rule.

From the vniuersall to the particu­lar, the argument goeth well, but not contrary, as thus.

¶The second rule.

From that, whiche by nature is in any thyng, to that whiche happeth ca­sually, or cōmeth by some miseuill, the reason is not good. As thus.

The second proposicion is not true, for wicked concupiscence, came in by mannes foly, and hath muche defaced that, which nature first ordeined. Therfore nature it self through god, geueth increase, whiche is muche contrary to the wicked lust of concupiscence.

¶ [...]e third rule.

Thynges disagreeyng, are not con­ [...]idered bothe one waie, and with one [Page] respecte.

These do not disagree, consideryng their endes are diuerse. The scripture forbiddeth supersticion, in the obserua­cion of daies: the Phisicen hath respect to the state of a mannes body.

¶The fourth rule.

The argument is good, when sub­staūces are set, accordyng to their pro­pre differences. But when thei are set, the one against the other, accordyng to the accidentes, whiche are conuenient to bothe, the argument is not good. As thus.

Where as this woorde lawfull, is common to bothe, aswell to drynke, as not to drynke.

¶The .v. rule.

Euery thyng, the more that other thynges are through it, thesame is al­waies the more it self. As thus.

Some argumētes made, accordyng to this rule, are nothyng true. & ther­fore it is good to geue warnyng of thē.

It is wel said, and wisely, this rule holdeth in causes, that are next adioy­nyng, and the whiche wholy compasse a matter [...] not in those causes, that are fetched farre of, and beeyng but halfe causes, partly and by the waye, geue onely the occasion. As thus.

The argumen [...] is not good in those causes, that are but half causes, for O­uid is not a Poete, onely because he [Page] learned Preceptes of his Master, but al [...]o because he had a greate aptnes by nature, and a wonderfull witte, to do better then another.

Some hold fast vpon a saiyng of. S. Augustine, and buylde wonders vpon that text. I would not beleue the Go­spell saieth Augustine, excepte the ca­tholike churche did perswade me. And herevpon saie thei.

And here thei heape a nōbre of mis­chiefes. Therfore (saie thei) the church maie make lawes, appoynct tradicions whatsoeuer thei bee. But I answere thus, the Antecedent is false. For I chiefly beleue the Gospell, cōsideryng God is the aucthor: and seyng the wō ­ders that he hath doen, I geue credite to it for his sake. I graūt we do beleue the Gospell, for the churche sake, but yet principally, for that GOD is the chief aucthor, that perswadeth vs to receiue his worde, and after the chur­che [Page] (as the secōde cause) telleth vs that the Gospel is the truth of God. Therfore if thei will make this suche an ar­gument, as thei seme to saie it is, then this that foloweth, is of as good force, for in all thynges it is like.

¶What a place is.

A Place is the restyng corner of an argumēt, or els a marke whi­che giueth warnyng to our me­mory what we maie speake pro­bablie, either in the one parte, or the o­ther, vpon all causes that fall in que­stion. Those that be good hare finders will sone finde the hare by her fourme. For when they se the grounde beaten flatte round about, & faire to the sight: thei haue a narow gesse by al likelihod that the hare was there a litle before. Likewyse the hontesman in huntyng y ^e foxe, wil sone espie when he seeth a ho­se, whether it be a foxe borough, or not. So he y ^t will take profite in this parte of logique, must be like a hunter, and learne by labour to knowe the borou­ghes. For these places be nothyng el [...] but couertes or boroughes, wherein if any one searche diligentlie, he maie fynde game at pleasure. And although perhappes one place fayle him, yet shal he finde a dousen other places, to ac­complishe [Page] his purpose. Therfore if any one will do good in this kynde, he must go from place to place, and by serching euery borough, he shall haue his pur­pose vndoubtedlie in moste part of thē, if not in all. We se that euery proposi­cion dooth either affirme a thyng to be true, or els denieth, y ^t it is true. There­fore when any thyng is cōstantly saide [...] it nedeth somewhat euermore to con­firme it. As for example. The Sacra­mentes are necessarie in the churche of God. I maie proue this sayng true, by reasonyng from that place whiche is called the ende of euery thynge. As thus.

To geue testimonie of our faythe, and to nousell our selfe in the practise thereof, is very necessarie.

The Sacramentes geue testimo­nie of our fayth. &c.

Ergo the Sacramentes are verie necessarie.

When anie proposition doth denie, it is nedefull to haue a thirde worde whiche maie agree with one parte of the proposition. As if one should thus [Page] saie. Man is not iustified by his wor­kes. The place of repugnaunt wordes that do altogether disagree geueth iust matter. And therfore I maie saie, man is not iustified by his workes, because he is iustified by his fayth onely. For if mercie come by grace, and that frelie, then workes cannot saue vs. Paule proueth the first, therefore the seconde is for euer true.

¶The diuision of the places, whiche are .xxii [...]. in nomber.

• Some are inward places called loci in­terni & thei ar
  • Partly in the very subst &c. a [...]
    • Definitio
    • Genus
    • Species
    • Proprium
    • totum
    • partes
    • Coniugatae
  • and partly incident to the substance as
    • Adiacentiae
    • Actus
    • Subiectum.
• Either kult [...]e with a nigh affinitie, called Cognata of the which [...]
  • some are causes as
    • Efficiens
    • Finis,
  • Some are those, whi­che spring of the cau­ses called Euēta. as
    • Effectae [...]
    • destinata
• Some are outward places. called Ex­terni, that is not in the substāce or natur of the thyng, but without it and these are.
  • ¶Or els applied to the thing, not Kyng the cause thereof, but onely geuyng a name therevnto, called Applicita. As
    • Locus.
    • Tempus.
    • Connexa
  • Or els thei be acci­dentes, wherof there be .v.
    • Cōtingentiae.
    • Pronunciatae
    • Nomen r [...]i,
    • Comparat [...].
    • Similia.
  • Or els thei are re­pu [...]nancies, as
    • Opposita.
    • Differentia.

¶Of the difinicion.

There be seuen places, whiche are in the substance, or nature of the thyng

• The definicion.
• The generall worde.
• The kynde.
• The propretie.
• The whole.
• The partes.
• The yoked wordes.

A Definicion is a perfect sentence whereby the very nature of the thyng it self, is sette furthe and expounded. You maie reason frō this place, bothe affirmatiuely, and ne­gatiuely, as thus. Fortitude is a ver­tue, that fighteth in the querel of right I maie reason thus from the definiciō to the thyng defined, if I wil proue for­titude praise worthy.

Da

Whatsoeuer is a vertue, figh­tyng in the querell of right, the­same is praise worthy.

ri

Fortitude is a vertue, fightyng in the querell of right.

i

Therefore fortitude is praise worthy.

[Page]If I will define a good thyng, and proue that money is [...]ot good, I maie reason thus.

Ce

No such thyng is good, that is desired for respect of another ende

sa

Al money is desired, for respect of another ende.

re

Therefore no money is good.

¶The generall rule.

To whom the definicion doth agree to thesame also doth the thyng defined belong. And cōtrary wise, bothe affir­matiuely and negatiuely.

¶The maner of reasonyng

If Socrates be a liuyng creature indued with reason, then is he a man, if he be a man, he is a liuyng creature indued with reason. If he bee not a li­uyng creature. &c. then is he no man. If he bee no man, then is he no liuyng creature, indued with reason.

¶The vse.

The nature of euery thyng, is kno­wen by the definiciō, and therfore this place aboue al other is moste necessary

Of the generall worde.

The generall woorde, is spoken of many, that differ either in kynd, or els [Page] diffre in nombre, when the question is asked, what it is, we maie reason nega­tiuely, from this place thus.

Ce

No wastfulnes is a vertue.

sa

Liberalitie is a vertue.

re

Therfore no wastfulnes cā be called liberalitie.

Or thus.

¶The generall rule.

If the generall woorde be taken a­waie, the kynde tarieth not. If the ge­nerall woorde doo remain, it shall not straight folowe, that the kynd shall en­sue. For it is no good argument, if I se a tree a good way from me, to say, it is a tree, therefore it is an Apple tree. I maie say thus well negatiuely, it is no tree. Therfore it is neither apple tree nor other.

¶The maner of reasonyg.

If euery creature by nature loue it self, then man doth loue hymself. If e­uery [Page] vertue be praise worthye, then in thadministracion of iustice, to geue euery man his awne, it is praise worthy.

¶The vse.

The generall worde, declareth the largenesse of any thyng, so that where the generall taketh no place, the other that be inferior cānot be. As if there be no liuyng creature, in some one house, then there muste nedes be no maner of man in thesame house.

Of the kynde.

The kynde beynge reckened emong the places, is taken to be anye one thynge that is lesse generall than an other, and by this shyfte euen propre noumes or names of thinges shal serue for the kynde, and go in steade thereof. Therfore as we reason from the kynd to the generall, so may we reason from nownes proper, to their kyndes.

Of the kynde

From the kynde to the generall, an argument is made affirmatiuelye, as thus. if iustice is to be desyred, than vertue is to be desyred. Such a man is a slaunderer, ergo he is a naughtie mā.

The general rule.

To whome the kynde doth agree, to the same also the general doth agree.

The maner o [...] reasonyng.

Yf sobriete be praise worthie, then vertue is praise worthie. If drōckenes be deuelishe, then surfeytyng is de­uelishe.

The vse.

The kynde is general to euery pro­pre name, and therfore in describynge the nature of euery noune proper, we haue muche nede of this place, to know vnder what kynde euery seueral thing i [...] comprehended. Againe what soeuer is defined, that same is y ^e kynd of some one thynge, so that hereby we learne how farre this worde stretcheth beyng ordeyned to sette forthe the nature of euery propre name.

Of the diff [...]rence and propr [...]tye.

From the propretye, and difference argumentes are deriued both affirma­tiue, and negatiue. he can reason a mat­ter artificiallye, therfore he is a good logicien. Aesope coulde not vtter his minde at large, but dyd stammer, and [Page] staye muche in his speche, therefore he was no Oratour.

The general rule.

When the propretye, or difference is graunted, then the kynde straight fo­loweth, take awaye the same, and ther remayneth no kynde at all.

The maner of reasonyng.

Whosoeuer is endued with reason, the same is a man

The vse.

The difference, and the proprety de­clare natures workyng in all thynges lyuyng, and therfore they h [...]lpe wel to shewe what euery thyng is by his pro­pre gyfte.

we spake before of a methode, or di­recte order to be vsed in all our doin­ges: and herein we maie wel se the vse therof. for hetherto we handeled those places which do nothyng els but com­prehende the nature of a perfecte defi­nition. nowe whereas the place folo­weth of the whole and his partes, it is nothynge els but the right maner of a perfecte diuisiō. the places that folowe [...]fter, declare the causes, the effectes, [Page] what be incident, what be disagreyng frome the matter, shewynge example and testimonies of the auncient.

Of the whole and the partes.

The whole is that same which con­sisteth of his partes, and is deuided .ij. maner of wayes. Firste there is the whole in substaunce, which standeth of suche partes, that if one betaken away, the whole decayeth straight, neyther can it afterwarde kepe his name, as it did before. For an example. A man is diuided into bodye, and soule. Take away the bodie, who cōpteth the soule to be that man, which before had his bodye ioyned thereunto? we saye the soule liueth whā the body is dede, but no man saieth the soule is the ve­ray man, euen as we called hym before, when he was compacte of both.

Againe there is the whole absolute with his partes, which serueth to make the whole perfect, addyng suche thin­ges that althoughe they be awaye, yet the whole notwithstandynge remay­neth, and hathe his name still, as whan a mā is made of body, and soule, [Page] (whiche are the partes of his substāce, and cannot be away) yet hath he othe [...] partes, whiche although thei be away, the whole notwithstandynge kepethe his name stil. As if a man lose his hand [...] his arme, or one of his fete, yet is he called a man, and these be called partes integrales, that is to saye, the partes whiche finishe the whole, and make it perfecte, after that it hath those partes whiche make the substaunce.

The general rule.

Yf the whole be, the partes of the substance muste nedes be. As if a man be alyue, the bodie, & soule, both lyue.

The maner of reasonyng.

Yf philosophie be good, then it is good to knowe the nature of thynges, the waye of ordering mans life, and the skyl howe to reason probablie, for phi­losophie it selfe is diuided into these thre partes.

The vse.

Here by we learne to examine the whole by the partes, that if we cannot obteyne our purpose to haue the whole graunted, to examine it by the partes, [Page] and force oure aduersarie to assente to some member.

The integrale partes, whiche make perfecte the whole, and cause the big­nesse therof, are called partes like, or not lyke.

Partes like, are those which are al­wayes like, and deuided euermore into like. As the flesh, bones, sinewes, fyer, water, gold, yron, wyne, wood, stone. Euery part of al these, is called asmuch as the whole. as a piece of fleshe, is cal­led flesh, apiece of wood, is called wood a droppe of water, is called water, as wel as a gallō of water is called water. They be called in latin Similares par­tes, bycause thei are named like vnto the whole, for a piece of fleshe is aswel called fleshe, and asmoche hath it the name of fleshe, as a great braune hath. The partes which haue not like names to the whole, are partly prīcipal, & par­tely not principal. the principal partes are those which in no wise mai be away without losse of the whole it selfe: as the partes of mans bodye whiche con­teyne life, cannot be awaye withoute [Page] losse of the man. As the head, the bealy, the hart, & the entrailes. Ye [...] notwith­standyng the partes of these cannot be called lyke to the whole, for no man saith that a piece of the hart, is a hart, or a piece of the heade, is a head, & so in the other.

Those which are not principal par­tes, maye be awaye: and the whole not withstandyng remayne stil, as the han­des, the fiete, the legges, & the armes.

The general rule.

When the chief partes are taken a­waye, the whole nedes decaieth: the chief partes beynge brought altoge­ther, the whole nedes muste followe.

Suche a man hathe learned moral philosophie, natural, and logique, therfore he is a Philosopher.

Badius can neither write wel, spea­ke well, nor yet recite authours acor­dyngly. Therfore he is no grāmarien. This man is no rethoricien, because he cānot place his thynges in good ordre. For where as fiue thinges be required [...]n an Oratour, first, to inuente, aftre to place thynges inuented, thirdlie, to set [Page] forth y ^• matter in good wordes, fourth­ly, to remembre all these, and last of al to vtter the same distinctlie, and with a clere voice. If one lacke any of these fyue, he cannot be called an oratour. Therfore I may saye, suche a one hath an euell memorie. Ergo he is no ora­tour. or such a one hath no vtteraunce. Ergo he may not be called an oratour. In the negatiue part, it is enoughe to take one part away, for the disalowing of any thyng. But if I wil affirme any thyng by y ^e partes, I must take all the partes, and not one, or two partes. For he is not an oratour that canne inuent onely, or place thynges in good ordre onlie, except he can do the whole as it is required. Agayne he is no good ora­tour that can teache onelie, or delite, but he is absolute that can both teach, delite, and also perswade.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

We reason frō the part to the whole affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. Thus. Suche a one can neither iudge the knitting of wordes together, nor frame thē in order accordyng to the arte, nor a­uoyde [Page] any subtilties. Ergo he is no lo­gician.

¶The vse.

The partes sette forth the whole, and are a great beautifieng to the same, beyng seuerally handeled, and in their natures sette forth at large.

¶Of woordes yoked together.

Yoked wordes whiche beyng deri­ued of one, are chaunged in the spea­kyng. As of Sapiens, sapientia, sapien­ter. A wise man, wisdome, wisely. He­re we se that of a wise man, is deriued wysdome. I may reason from this pla­ce both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely, If one be not wise, he hath no wisdom, if one be wyse, he hath wisedome. If o­ne do circumspectely, he is called a cir­cumspecte man. If it be no misery to die, then death is not miserable. Such a one is a philosopher, therfore he hath studied philosophie. Argumentes deriued from hence haue great force, if the only yoked wordes be ioyned together without additiō of an other, or els they are not strong. As thus. Preachers be euell liuers. Ergo preachyng is euell.

¶The generall Rule.

When one of the yoked wordes is added, or put away, the other also is ad­ded, or put awaye.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

Suche a one is a priestely minister, Ergo he is a priest. Suche a man hath serued the kyng nobly. Ergo he is a noble man. The preacher handled his matter learnedlie. Ergo the preacher hath learnyng.

¶The vse.

We maie learne by this place to knowe what thynges are, beyng consi­dered in other. For if I woulde knowe whether it be good, or no, to be a mā of honour, and to haue rule in the cōmune weale: I may learne by them that do rule, what it is to be a man of honoure, and howe daungerouse a callyng they haue, that are placed in high estate.

¶Of wordes adioyned to the substaunce and yet not of the substaunce.

Wordes adioyned are called those accidentes whereby the singuler word, or propre name, hath an other name thē of the verie substaunce, as vnto Cato, [Page] (whiche of his substaunce is a man) wisdome doth happen, whereby he is called wyse. Unto Cicero also (whiche by his substaunce is a man) there hap­peneth eloquence, whereby he is called eloquent. So that he hath an other na­me then his substaunce geueth, whiche is to be eloquent, and this is the word adioyned. Al quantities, qualities, and those that are comprehended in the predicament of relation, are referred to this place, when they are considered to be comprehended in a substaunce. Uertue referred to the mynde whiche con­teyneth it, is a worde adioyned: compa­red with vice, it is a contrarie: refer­red to iustice, it is a generall worde. Wordes adioyned are perceiued. either by the senses (as those whiche are sub­iect to the senses) or els by vndrestan­dyng. As swyftenesse may be conside­red to be in a man, although we se him lie a longe. And so we saye suche a lac­quie ronneth wel, although we do not then presently se him runne, but we remembre that he hath ronne, saiyng now as we haue sene before in dede. Againe [Page] some wordes adioyned are by nature in the thyng which conteine thē, as heate is naturally in fire. And because we se that y ^e same heate, although it neuer go awaye, yet at all tymes it is not of like strength: but at some time less whote, then at an other, we iudge y ^e same heate to be an accidēt. Some wordes adioy­ned are not naturally cleauyng, but by some other waye are ioyned to y ^e thing conteinyng them, as heate in water set vppon the fyer.

¶The generall Rule.

I fone of the wordes adioyned be in the subiect or thyng conteinyng, the other also is lyke to be there, which fo­loweth vpon the first. As thus. Cato is a mā worthie praise, because he is ware sober, and full of experience. Prayse foloweth vertue, as the shadow doth the bodie. Therefore whosoeuer hath mo­destie & great knowledge of thynges, the same mā of necessitie winneth prai­se, and fame, that cannot die. Agayne if the wordes adioyned be, y ^e subiect that conteyneth them must nedes be also, as thus. If God be all goodnes then [Page] there is a God.

¶The maner of reasonynng.

Christ came to this worlde beyng gentle and milde. Ergo Christ came not to destroye the lost shepe, but to saue them. Scholers be godlie, ver­tuouse, and occupied in learnyng. Er­go it is a graciouse dede to helpe suche of theim as haue nede.

¶The vse.

We maie by this place either prai­se, or dispraise, setting forth the nature of men, & iudgyng thē by their workes.

¶Of dedes done, or suffred to be done, called Actus.

THe maner of doyng, or suffe­ryng is, when we are suppo­sed to bee occupied, or affected any maner of waie, either in doyng, or in suffryng. There be so ma­ny maner of doinges, as there be adia­cētes, or wordes adioyned. And of the­se adiacentes, feare, sorowe, trauaile, reste, heate, colde, are deriued these: to feare, to be sory, to trauaile, to rest, to be hotte, to be colde. And generally all those wordes that are referred vnto y ^e [Page] two Predicamentes called the maner of doyng, and the sufferyng, are com­passed with in this place, if the same woordes be considered as Accidentes which cleaue to the substaunce, & maie both be present, & also be a waie with­out losse of the substaunce. For if thin­ges done, be waied accordyng to their proper maner of doing, they are refer­red to the two places aboue, called the differēce and the propretie. For where as we saie. Such a one speaketh, Ergo he is man (for nothyng els can speake naturally but man onely) although in this case (to speake) be a maner of do­yng, yet it is not referred to this, but rather to the propretie, bicause it belō ­geth to man alone, & alwaies to man.

¶The generall rule.

If the maner of doyng, or sufferyng be, the thyng conteynyng is also, and the woordes adioyned also (whereof doyng, and sufferyng haue their of spryng) folowe vpon the same.

¶The maner of reasonyng from this place.

If one breathe, the same man hath [Page] life in him. If Iulius Cesar came into England, then there was such a man called Iulius Cesar. Yf Richard the third plaied the tyrante here in Eng­lande, then there was suche a man in Englande.

¶The Use.

This place much helpeth either for praise, or dispraise. Some officers bribe the poore, robbe their Maister, and wayst their own. Ergo suche are wor­thie death.

¶Of the thyng tonteynyng.

The Subiecte, or the thyng contei­nyng, is a substaunce being the stoore­house of Accidentes, & the very proppe to hold vp diedes done: for neither wis­dom, strength, health, nor Policie can be at al, except they be conteined with in some one body.

¶The generall rule.

Take away the thyng conteinyng, and there remaineth nether adiacent, nor yet dede done.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

There is fie [...], Ergo it is hotte. Christ was a very mā, Ergo Christ died, and [Page] sufferde the panges at his departyng.

¶An other.

Why doest thou say that I owe the a croune, whome I knowe was neuer yet worth a grote. Melāchthon liueth and readeth. Therfore there is great learnyng to be had where he is.

¶The Use.

By naming a worthy persō, his prayse is sufficiently set forth, euen when his name is ons vtterd. For what learned man hearing the name of Cicero, doth not remembre thereby, the ful practise and the absolute skil of all eloquence? These places therfore helpe aswel for the amplifiyng of matters, either in prayse or disprayse, as they do for the stedfast prouyng of any cause.

¶Of outward places beyng not in the sub­staunce, but only touching the substaūce, and without the nature of it.

THe firste are called, the cau­ses of thynges, and the thyn­ges comming of causes, which only are ioyned t [...] the thyng necessarily, where as the other places folowyng are not coupled necessari­ly, but are only ioyned together by a [Page] certain alliaunce to y ^e present matier.

¶The deuision of caus [...]s.

Some causes, are called the very causes of thynges, euen by their owne nature: other causes are happenyng causes, the which may perhapps bryng forth the effect, lastely there be causes without the which, thinges can not be done, and yet are they not any cause to force the effecte [...]

The very cause of thynges, is such a one that if it be practised in ve­ry diede, and set forth with other na­turall causes, the effect must nedes fo­lowe: and againe if it be not putte in practise, although the other be put, yet the effect shall not folowe. As for exā ­ple, although one haue a cloth, yet can he not haue the vse of it, excepte the tailer cutte it out. And although the milner grinde, yet we are like to dine without breade, excepte the baker, do his parte also in the batche.

The happenyng cause, is such a one that although it bee putte in practise in very diede, yet it shall not straight waie so be, that the effect muste n [...]des [Page] folowe. As an ague may be the happe­nyng cause, that some one man kepeth good diet, & yet not any forcyng cause: for then all sicke folke might be comp­ted for sober men. The cause without the whiche, thynges cannot be dooen, as thus. The Surgean cannot heale a wounde, except the dedde fleshe be cut out. The waiefarer shall hardly come to his iorneis end, except he haue some money in his purse. In time of warre, it is euill trauailyng without a passe porte, & this is called in Latine, Causa sine qua non, that is to say, the cause without the which we cā not, and yet it is not the cause of our iourneyng.

¶The de [...]inition of a very cause.

A cause in very dede, is a meane, by whose force some thyng doth folowe.

¶There be .iiii. such causes.

• The efficient cause.
• The end.
• The matier.
• The shape.

The efficient cause, is the working cause, by whose meanes, thynges are brought to passe.

Of those that are workyng causes, [Page] some by nature bring thynges to passe, some by aduisement, and by a fore pur­posed choyse. Thynges woorke by na­ture (and that necessarily) which lacke knowlege to chuse this, or that, & haue no iudgement, to discerne thynges. As the Sonne, the fire, herbes, precious stones. The sonne, euen by nature, ge­ueth light to the daie, and cānot other wise doo. the fire burneth naturally [...] Herbes kepe their vertue of necessitie. The Adamant draweth Iron, euen by nature. And so the bloud stone, stoppeth bloud. Some of these causes worke by the force and violence of nature, some by an outward powre, beyng strained thervnto. Thei worke by the force and violence of nature, whose beginnyng, is within theimselfes: beyng ayded by none other outward thing. As fire burneth, euē by the natural force of heate, which is in the substance therof. Thei woorke by an outward powre, whiche are strayned to woorke by another meane. As water set vpon the fire, wa­reth hot, & yet is not hote by her awne nature, but is made hotte by the na­ture, [Page] and might of fire, of whō the wa­ter taketh heate. In like maner bou­lettes of leade, shot out of a gunne, an arr [...]we out of a bowe, a stone out of a slyng: all these flie not into the ayre, by their [...]wne power or might, but by force, & violence of him that casteth thē

¶The generall rule.

From the naturall workyng cause, the effecte must nedes folowe, as thus. If the Sonne shine, the daie muste ne­des be, whiche is the effecte, or worke­manship of the Sunne. Suche a man hath eaten Hemlock: Ergo he is poy­soned, and in daunger of death. Fire is in the Chimney, or in the toppe of the house, therefore it muste nedes burne. Take away the cause, and theffect can not be at al: for if there be no fire, there can bee no flame, nor burnyng neither.

The seconde workyng cause, is whē thynges are dooen by aduisement, and by choyse, not by any necessitie at all, for thynges maie aswell not bee doen, as be doen, as if there be a Shomaker, there maie be shone made, and contra­ry, if there be no Shomaker, there can [Page] be no shone at all.

¶The [...]enerall rule.

When the voluntary cause in put, the woorkemanship, or the thyng doen maie folowe. As if there be a Carpen­ter, a house maie be made. If one reade good a [...]cthors, and herken to the rea­dyng of learned men, he maie come to good learnyng.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

Suche a one hath drōke poyson, er­go he will dye shortly. Christe hath re­conciled mankind to his father, by suf­feryng death vpon the Crosse, Ergo suche as beleue in this sauyng health, shall liue for euer.

¶Another diuision of [...]auses efficient.

Some efficient causes, are cōmaun­dyng causes. As the Kyng is the com­maundyng cause to his subiecte, to doo this or that. The Master of workes, is the commaundyng cause, to all the la­borers. The other efficient causes, are obediēt causes, when the seruant wor­keth at his maisters commaundement.

¶Another d [...]uis [...]on of causes efficient.

[Page]Of suche efficiēt causes as do obey, some doo their woorke, as the Mason worketh vpō the stone, the Carpenter vpō wood. Other efficient causes that are obedient, are but instrumentes of dooyng, as hatchet [...]es, hammers, pike a [...]es, with other. In battaill, the capi­tain is the efficient commaunder: the souldiour [...] the efficient obeyer: gunnes dartes, bowes, and billes, the instru­mentes of doyng. Good hede ought to bee had, that in all causes wee make a difference, not confoundyng one with another, that the nigh causes, & the farther causes, be not taken all for one. A cause farre fetched, is this. Such a one fell out with his neighbour: Ergo he killed hym. Fallyng out bryngeth chi­dyng, chidyng bryngeth hatred, hatred causeth fightyng, fightyng geueth blo­wes, blowes sone dispatche, sone dis­patchyng, is ready death. Therefore, I might more probably reason thus. Suche a one gaue his neighbor a ded­ly wounde: Ergo he hath killed hym. And thus the argumeist is made from the nighest cause.

¶Another diuision.

Some causes are principall causes, as the holy ghoste workyng all Godly mociōs, and stirryng our nature, euer­more to the best. Other causes, are the inclinaciōs in mā, that are either good or eiuill Thirdly, there are helpyng causes, whiche are meanes the rather, to further vs in all vertue. As lear­nyng, practisyng of honest behauor, ac­quaintyng our nature, euermore with the best. The principall cause, that Io­seph forbare, to company with another mannes wife: was the holy ghost, that stirred his mind with the fear of God. The secōd cause, was his awne mynd, that remembred the worde of God, and the punishement dewe for synne. The thirde cause was, that he accustomed himself, euer to liue vprightly, and not onely to auoyde synne, but also to a­uoyde the occasion of synne. There be other diuisions, but I leaue to reherse them, for feare I should be ouer long.

¶The ende, called. Finis.

[Page]THe ende is, for whose cause a­ny thyng is doen, and is twoo waies considered. For there is an absolute ende, whervnto al other are referred, beeyng called the perfeccion, and chief propertie in any thyng: as the chiefest ende in any man, is to be perfectly endued with reason, and to attain euerliuyng felicitie. The chiefest propertie in a horse, is to be of a very good courage, & to want no sto­macke: the chifest perfeccion in fire, is to bee very hote, and very drye. There is another ende, called a helpyng ende, whiche serueth to an higher ende, and is onely ordeined for this purpose, that wee might attain thereby, the perfecte ende of all. As meate, drinke, apparell, and other necessary thynges, are hel­ping endes for man, to attain the chifest ende. For without these endes, mā could not liue. To liue honestly in this life, to be vpright in dealyng, with all per­sones, is an helpyng ende, (as the Phi­losophiers take it,) and a testimonie to the worlde of our faith (as the Christi­ans take it) for man to liue, world without [Page] ende. To mary a wife, is a helpyng ende, for a man to auoyde fornicacion. The pore man laboureth, and where­fore? To get his liuyng. Wherfore getteth he his liuyng? That he maie the better be able to serue God. The souldiour fighteth at his princes commaū ­dement, chiefly because God commaū ­deth him, next after for loue of the kyng and his countrey: thirdly and last of al that he might liue the rather, in quiet at home with his wife, and childrē. So that of one, and thesame thyng, there maie bee many endes, beeyng orderly considred.

¶The general rule.

Whose ende is good, or euill, the­same thyng is good, or euil, as a sweard is good, because it is good for a man, to defende hymsef. Faithe in Christ Iesu is good, for by faithe we are saued. To vndo my neighbour, with lendyng for gain, is moste vngodly: therefore to be an vsurer, is moste vngodly. To desire another mannes wife, is vngodly, be­cause adultery, is vngodly. Battaill is good, because it bryngeth peace. For al [Page] men should fight, for this ende, that we might liue in quiete, with our neigh­bours. If thou wilt be honest [...] and este­med for a godly person, do the accions of vertue, and thou shalt be wel repor­ted of, especially of the honest. It is good to learne, because learning it self is good, whiche is thende of our study.

¶Of th [...] mat [...]r or substance, called, Materia.

THe substance called materia, is ready to bee framed of the woorkeman, as hym liketh, by the whiche substaunce, either thynges naturall, or els thynges arti­ficiall are made. As first a man, whiche is a naturall thyng, is made of body, & soule. An Image, whiche is an artifi­ciall thyng, is made by the hādy worke of man, & is grauen out of stone, or mol­ten in gold, or in brasse. Frō this place are made argumentes, that bothe do af­firme, and also deny. As thus, if a man haue cloth, he maie haue a garmēt made if it like hym. But if a manne haue no clothe at al, how can he haue a goune, or a coate? If the Baker lacke meale, [Page] how can he make bread. The matier is cōsidred . [...]. waies. Fir [...] it is a substāce, that tarieth stil, as whē a house is made of stone, wodd, & plaister, or an Image of gold, brasse, or siluer: Here the sub­stance tarieth still, although the forme be altred. Likewise whē a house is ta­ken doune, the stone, & tymbre remain stil, and k [...]pe their substance, and serue as thei did before, either for erecciō of thesame house again, or els other wise, as it shal please him that is the awner. Again, the substaunce is that, whiche chaungeth into another nature, and cā not bee thesame, that it was before: as of meale and water, bakers make their bread: now thei cānot resolue thesame breade, again into Meale, and water, whiche was the former substaunce.

¶The generall rule.

When the substance is at hand, the workmanship maie folowe, and the ef­fecte maie appere: But when the sub­stance is taken awaie, there can be no­thyng made at al. As if a man lacke sil­uer, how can he make an Image of sil­uer? There is no stone, wood, nor plai­ster: [Page] Ergo there is no house. But if I reason thus by the substance, that chā ­geth into another nature, and cānot be thesame, that it was before: I reason then amisse, as thus. Ther is no meale or flower, ergo there is no bread: but I should saie rather, there was no meale nor flower, ergo there is no bread.

¶The maner of reasonyng

The Shoomaker hath no Lether, how can he then make a Shooe? The Printer hath no paper, ergo he cannot set his men on worke.

The shape called Forma.

The shape, or fashion of any thyng, is a cause whereby the thyng that is made hath his name, as leather, when it is m [...]de, or fashioned for the foote, is called a shooe. Suche a man wearēth a liuery coote garded with Ueluet, and all the Yeoman seruauntes haue but plain cootes, ergo he is one of the gen­tlemen. He hath a siluer pot gilte, and wrought with Goldsmithes woorke, Ergo it is better then a pot, wrought with plain siluer, beeyng of the same quantitie or bigg [...]enes.

The general rule.

Whan the shappe or fourme is made: theffect, or thyng [...]oen may folow: take awaie the shape, & the vse also is taken awaye. A cup is made, ergo a man maie drinke in it: breake the cuppe, and how shal you drinke of thesame cuppe. The element goth compasse wise, because it is round. Reason is called the shape of man. Therfore I maie saye, suche a one lacketh the gift of reason, Ergo he is a foole.

Thynges comyng after the cau­ses, called Euen [...]a.

Those which come of causes, are .ij. waies considred, for either thei are cal­led thynges that in due tyme folowe the cause that went before, or els thyn­ges ordeined to some certain ende.

Those thynges whiche come after the cause, and are made of the same, are called effecta. And euery argument is either deriued from theffect of the mat­ter, of the forme, or of thefficient cause.

¶From the effect of the matter or sub­staunce, called Materia, thus ye maye reason.

He hath a Sworde made of Iron, [Page] Ergo he hath yron. Here is a house, Ergo here is stone, and wodde.

From the effect of the fourme.

A bowle beynge turned, rouleth, Ergo it is round.

From the effecte of the eff [...]c [...]ent cause.

It is bright day, Ergo the son is vp.

The gen [...]ral rule.

When the effecte is come forthe, it muste nedes be, that either his propre cause is then, or els that it hath been before.

The maner of reasonyng.

Yf slaughter be not to be borne in a commune weale, then these pyke qua­rellers, these roisters, and fighters, are not to be suffered to go vnpunished.

The thyng apointed for some [...]nde.

That whiche is appointed for some certayne ende, and vse: is called desti­natum, as a house is buylded to dwell in. Armour is prouided for man to defēde hymself. Medicines are helpyng mea­nes, for mā to recouer helth. I shewed before that there was an [...]ende, whiche was a helpyng ende, & a meane to come to the perfect, & moste absolute ende, for without this appointed meane and pro­uision [Page] of God, man could neuer liue, muche lesse could he come to any per­feccion in this life, as touchyng the ac­ciōs, & worthy feates required of man. Thus we maie reason from this place. Seyng it is lawfull for man, to defende himself, it is lawfull for man, to weare a weapō. If warre be lawful, then mo­ney is necessary, without which, no mā can go forward, or set furthe an armie.

The generall rule.

Those thynges that agree to that whiche is apointed to the ende, agree also to the ende it selfe.

The maner of reasonyng lawfullye.

If a manne maye lawfully buye the greate bible in Englishe, he maye then also euen without askyng leaue, reade it at his pleasure.

The v [...] of all these causes.

The commoditie of these causes is so great, that in settyng furthe the vse of them, a man might soner lacke wor­des, than want matter. First we know that nothyng is done without a cause, and therfore seyng this worlde framed as it is, euerye thinge proporcioned in [Page] his due order, we maye trulie gather that there is one aboue all, that ruleth all, whom the Christian calleth God. In praisyng or dispraysyng, how can a man better procede, than by rehersyng the ende of euery thyng. Again in exa­minyng and searchyng out the profite or disprofite, by thende we knowe what is gainfull: by the efficient cause we knowe what maie be dooen. For whatsoeuer is profitable, the same is profita­ble for some ende, and whatsoeuer we wolde haue done, we maye soone per­ceaue by the efficient, if it may be done. yea in causes of iudgement, we maye iudge, what wil some one mā had to do this or that, when we consider, to what ende he did this or that. Last of all, we know hereby, that God hath ordeyned nothing in vayne, and that euery thing is ordeyned for some one end. The end of Christes death was, to merite mans redemption. The ende of mans lyfe is, to trust wholly in Christes passion, and to lyue thereby for euer.

Of thynges outwardly applied, called Applici [...]a.

[Page]Thei are called thinges outwardly applied to a matter, whiche are not the cause of the same matter, and yet, geue a certaine denomination to it. There be iij of this sorte.

• The tyme.
• The place.
• Thinges annexed, or knitte together.

And these .iij. are nothyng els, than the .iij. Predicamentes or general pla­ces, whiche I rehersed before.

Vbi.

Where.

Quando.

When.

Habitus.

The arayeng.

The maner of reasonyng.

Yf one list to reason from the place, called in latin Locus, he may thus say. Suche a one is in the countrye, Ergo he is not in the Citie. Yf I will proue that a man beynge accused of murder vniustly, did not offend: I may reason both from the time, and the place. The man was killed in the fieldes, aboute iij. of the clocke in the after none, all whiche time this other man came not [Page] abrode. No, he loked not out of his house all that daye. Ergo this man dyd not kyll hym. Clodius was accused at Ro­me that he had made a spoyle of the re­liques in the tēple of Bona Dea, where as he at the same tyme when this dede was thought to be done, was at Inte­ramna, a village in the countrye beside Rome. Quintilian saith thus. Thou hast killed an adulterer, which the law doth permitte, but bycause thow haste kylled the same mā in a brothels house, thou art worthye to dye thie selfe. Notwithstandinge these .i [...]. places are ra­ther vsed of the Rethoriciens, than e­mong the logiciens, for when a man is taken of suspection we go aboute to proue hym faultie by diuerse coniectu­res. As if he ware about y ^e same place, at the self same time, whan a man was slayne, and also had his sworde aboute hym: we coniecture that he might haue killed hym. Againe if we perceiue one to be a riotous felowe, readie to fight with euery bodie, accompanyeng with naughtie packes, and euermore at one end of al frayes, waxyng pale when he is ap­prehended, [Page] shakynge for feare, or run­nyng awaye, when he should be taken, we suspect suche a one that he is not al­together cliere. Therfore Oratours do vse to marke thinges that go before the facte, as whether he hated the man or no, or what gaine he might haue by his death, and also obserue thynges ioy­ned with the faulte, as changynge of hewe, when he is apprehended, or his sworde to be blodie, or any parte of his apparell, and thyrdlye thei note what followeth. that is, if he ran awaye, if he cannot tell his tale plainlye, and so they conclude as they are led by suspe­ction. Some Argumētes are necessary, some probable, as thus, from the conse­quent. Such a womā is brought in bed with a childe, Ergo she hathe had the compaignie of man. Suche a man had a bluddye sworde in his hande straight after the death of his neyghbour, euen in the same fildes wher his neyghbour was slaine, Ergo it is like this mā hath slayne hym. All which argumentes are deriued from the place called Contin­gentia as I wyll shewe it hereafter.

¶Of wordes annexed, or knitte to the substaunce, called Connexa.

AS touchyng wordes knitte, ye maie vnders [...]and, that they are ioyned outwardly to the Sub­iect, and geue a name vnto him, according as they are. As Richesse are ioyned to a riche man. For where as Crassus is called a man by his owne substaunce, yet not withstandyng by his richesse, he is called a riche man.

So he y ^t hath a wife, is called a hous­band. He that hath a maister, is called a seruaunt. He that hath a father, is called a sonne. Wordes knitte, are de­uided diuersly, for some are called such as are nighe, & touching the substaūce. As to be full of fish, is agreyng to the water, to be full of grasse, is annexed or agreing to the earth, to be cloudy is annexed or agreyng to the aier. Again woordes knitte, are called those thyn­ges, that a mā weareth, as to weare a cote, a iacke, a harneis, to haue shoen, to be merie, to be dustie, and al such as are casual to mā. Some are called, an­nexed or agreyng, which are knitte to [Page] man, and thynges not worne vpon his backe, but farther of, and rather per­ceiued by vnderstandyng [...] then knowē by eiye sighte. As nobilite, powre, fa­me, aucthorite. To bee an Officer, a Mayour, a Sherieue, lord Chaunce­lour, cōptrollour, or any other officer in the common weale, all these are an­nexed to their inferiour, ouer whome thei haue aucthorite. In this point dif­fer wordes knitte, called annexed, from wordes adioyned, called adiacentia, that all adiacentes, or woordes adioy­ned cannot be with out the subiect, as heat, colde, whitenes, or any other like cannot be, except they be comprehen­ded with in some Subiecte. For it is propre to euery Accident, to be in some one thing cōteining him. If ther be nothyng conteynyng, then the Accident cannot be. Not withstandyng, wordes knitte, are so placed, that one is without the other, & may be, either of them seuerally, if the one happen to perishe: as a housebande is without the sub­staunce of his wife, and although his wife dye, yet the housband maie be on­liue, [Page] sauyng that he loseth his name to be called housband, but if a wise man die, wisedom must de [...]a [...]e also, because it must ne [...]es be in some one subiect, or els it cannot be.

¶Of Accidentes.

THose are here called Accidēts which both them selues, and the thyng also, maie be toge­ther, one [...] with another, & also may be away, the one, from the other.

¶There be v. of this sort.

• Thynges chauncyng.
• The name of a thyng.
• Sentences of the sage.
• The likenesse.
• Thinges compared to­gether.

¶Thinges chauncyng called Contingentia.

THose accidētes are called thinges chauncing, which chaunce about a thing so, that whether these thinges chaunce, or no, y ^• thing it selfe may be, or though y ^e thing be not, these may so [...]aunce to be. As palenesse, which thing may chaūce be­fore sicknes, & thesame also may chaūce [Page] though a man be not sicke. And a man also maie be sicke, and yet nothing pale at all. Likewise loue and feare. A man maie loue, although he feare not, a man may again feare, although he loue not.

¶The diuersitie of thre diuerse places.

Wordes adioyned, wordes knit to a­nother, & wordes chauncyng to a thyng differ thus, that in woordes adioyned called adiacentia, the cause why thyn­ges are so named, is euer in the subiect neither can the wordes adioyned conti­nue, except thei be cōprehended within some one substaunce. Wordes knit, are of suche sorte that by namyng one, the other is strayght knowen. As when I name a Scholemaister, I signifie scho­lers also, although I do not expresselie name them. But in wordes chauncyng called Contingentia, we must at the lest compare .ii. together, that we maie better knowe them to be of this place. Therfore if I name this worde (craft) by it self, without any further conside­raciō, then it is an adiacent, or a worde adioyned. If I name this worde (ser­uaunt) crafte is referred to the place [Page] called a word knit, considering craft is mencioned in respect of the seruan̄t. If I say thus (a craftie seruaunt) then these two are considered to be in thys place called Contingentia, whiche is a place of wordes chancing to a thing so, y ^t whether they chaunce or no, y ^• thyng it self maie be notwithstāding. As a seruaunte may be, & yet not craftie. Again one may be craftie, & yet not a seruant.

¶The diui [...]ion of thynges chauncyng.

Some go before the thyng, somme are ioyned with the thyng, some folow after the thyng.

Thynges chauncyng before. As thus. The skie was very red this mor­nyng. Ergo we are like to haue rayne or nyght.

Thinges ioyned with the matter at the very instaunte. As thus. Anger is in olde men. ofte fetchyng of wind declares a sickenes of the lunges. If y ^e bequether or maker of any wil, be onli­ue, the will taketh no place, and maie be voyde. Suche a one goeth ga [...] in his apparell, spendeth with the bes [...], & yet hath nothyng to maintain his char­ges. [Page] Ergo it is like that he commeth by his goodes noughtely.

Thynges happenyng after. Suche a one is well learned. Ergo he hath gone well to his boke heretofore.

¶The name of a thyng, or the inter­pretation of a worde.

THe interpretacion or name of a thyng is a worde made by the agrement of men, to signifie this, or that. As P [...]ilosophus is y ^• man whatsoeuer he be, that hath a desire, and a loue, to the knowledge of wysdome. Therfore if ye will expound what a philosopher is, you maie reason thus, from the interpretation of the worde. Whosoeuer he be that hath an earnest loue to philosophie, and seketh knowledge thereof, that man is a phi­losopher.

Cato hath an earnest loue to phi­losophie, and seketh knowledge therof.

Ergo Cato is a philosopher.

Againe the interpretacion of a thing is thē thought to be, whē a metaphore or translation is vsed, & the meanyng thereof takē. As when this word Ignis [Page] (fire) betokeneth loue. Where as of y ^• owne nature it signifieth fire, as we reade in Ouide, thus.

Wherin is nothyng els signified but loue, whiche is so hote of it selfe that it must nedes breake out into flames, and shewe it selfe at one tyme, or other.

¶The generall Rule.

To whome the interpretation of a nowne doth agree, to the same also the nowne it selfe agreeth.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

Suche a chylde is called dawson, And he maie well be so called, for his father is but a dawe.

¶Of the place called authoritie, other­wise named sentences of the sage.

AL suche testimonies maie be called sentences of the sage, whiche are brought to confirme anye thyng, either taken out of olde authours, or els suche as haue bene v­sed [Page] in this commune life. As the sentences of noble men, y ^e lawes in anie real­me, quicke saiynges, prouerbes, that either haue bene vsed heretofore, or bee nowe vsed. Histories of wise philoso­phers, the iudgementes of learned mē, the commune opiniō of the multitude, olde custome, auncient fashions, or anie suche like. Testimonies, are two waies considered. For either they are such as pertayne to God, or els to man. Those authorities which come from God, and are spoken by the holy ghost, are vn­doubtedly true, neither can they be false: therefore we ought moste reue­rentlie to receiue the worde of God, & agre to such textes as are writen & spo­ken, euen as though we heard God him selfe speake, with liuely voice vnto vs. Mās autority hath no such great force, although noble men, learned Philoso­phers, and stoute capitaines haue pro­nounced manie thynges moste wiselie. For although Aristotle saieth that the worlde neither had beginnyng, nor yet at any tyme shall haue endyng: I maye reiecte this saiyng, (if anie man bryng [Page] me it for his confirmation,) although this great philosopher did pronounce thesame. For except I be perswaded bi reason, it is in my choyse, either to ad­mit, or to refuse such authorities. Not withstandyng we shoulde not forsake wyse mens wordes rashely, but with a modest answer desire y ^• aduersarie not so muche to sticke to his authoritie, as to proue the same by some good reason. In prophane thynges ye maye reason affirmatiuely very well, as thus. The best thynges are first to be learned, for so doth Quintilian teache. Nusquam tuta fides. It is hard trustyng any bo­die. For so saieth Virgile. But I can not reason negatiuelie, when I bryng mine authoritie out of prophane auc­thours. For I reason amysse if I saie. There is no suche disease called the Frenche pocques, because Galene the chiefe of phisicians neuer maketh men­cion in al his bokes of any such disease. For this euell hath crept in, sence his tyme, through the noughtines of men. And although it were then, yet may it be that he neuer hearde of it. Hereun­to [Page] myght be added all suche sentences as by the lawe of nature are graffed in man. As these folowyng. Do as thou wouldest be done vnto. Be thankefull to hym, that doth the a pleasure. Ho­noure thy father, & thy mother. Know there is a God. He that hath not these opiniōs naturally fastened in his hart, he maie iustely bee thought rather a beast, then man endued with reason.

In matiers of scripture I may rea­son both affirmatiuely, and negatiue­ly, Christ saith to his disciples. Rege [...] Gentium dominātur, vos autem non sic. Kinges beare rule ouer coūtreis, but you must not doo so. Therfore no ministres shoulde haue any temporall powre, because Christ saith so. Ye may reason negatiuely thus, we reade not in all the scripture frō Genesis to the reuelatiō of sainct Ihō, that euer there was frier, moncke, nonne, or chanon, ergo let them go frō whens they came. We reade not in y ^e scripture that wor­shipping of ymages, was euer allowed to be Laie mens bookes. Therefore, take down suche idolles, and let them [Page] serue for other vses.

The generall rule for prophane au­thorities. That whiche is allowed by al wise men, or at the leaste by the bet­ter part: no mā ought rashely to gaine saie it, or thus. Euery connyng man must be beleued in his owne art.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

Aristotle thought best that dronkerds should haue double punishemēt. ther­fore they deserue it. By textes of the scripture we may better reason y ^• matter, as thus. Cursed be he that doth y ^e worke of the lord guilefully, saith the Prophete. Ergo euil Bishops, or loy­tering pastours are accursed of God.

¶Of the similitude, or likenesse.

A Similitude, is when .ii. thinges or more, are so compared toge­ther, that euen as in the firste there is one propertie, so in the other there is a like propretie, accor­dyng to bothe their natures seuerally obserued. For like as water by conti­nuance weareth a stone, so there is no­thyng so hard, but by time it maie be compassed, or brought to passe. As spi­ders [Page] make their own copwebbes without any other helpe: so some good fe­lowes can bring vp newes & tel stran̄g tales without any hearyng, whē there is not one woorde true. As the palme tree beyng ouerlaide with weightes, riseth higher, & buddeth vpward more freshelye: so a noble stomake vexed with muche aduersite is euermore the s [...]outer. And this ought diligētly to be obserued y ^t the thing which is brought to make the Similitude, be like vnto that which is proued.

¶The maner of findyng out a similitude.

In euery cause that we do purpose to hādle at large, we must obserue di­ligently, what thynges are spoken by translacion, that is, from the propre si­gnification, to a meanyng that is not propre. As speakyng in the prayse of a Kyng, and callyug hym the bright son of the yearth, I may gather a similitu­de by this worde (sonne) and make it thus. Euen as the sonne onely geuet [...] light to all the whole yearth: so there ought to be in a cōmūe weale one king [Page] that should be ruler ouer all.

¶The gen [...]rall rule.

Of similitudes there is like iudge­ment, that is, euen as we think of the one, so we maie thynk of the other.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

As a dogge standyng at the table [...] side, eateth that vp by and by whiche his maister hath cast to him, and euer loketh for more, & more: So some whē they haue receiued a liuyng for which they hoped before, by and by they are ready, to take another, and although they be full, yet still they are hungry.

¶Of thynges compared.

THinges are cōpared toguether in one thirde worde, whereūto they both do agre, as thus. If thefte be worthye death, then murther is worthy no lesse. Here ye se that thefte, & murther are cōpared together in one third worde, which is death.

Comparacions are deuided twoo maner of waies, for either they bee e­qual, or not equall. They are equal in this wise. if the father haue aucthorite [Page] ouer his sonne, he hath also aucthorite ouer his daughter.

¶The generall rule.

Where thinges are equal, ther must nedes be equall Iudgement. Compa­racions are vnequall, when I reason either fro [...] the greater to the lesse, or els from the lesse, to the greater. From the greater to the lesse, ye may reason thus. If a Capitain with his whole companie be not able to sacke a toune, muche lesse one base souldiour can be able to do it. The scholemaster cannot vnderstande the Greke, or the Hebrue toungue, muche lesse can the scholer, whiche neuer learned either of them.

Frō the lesse, to the greater, ye may reason affirmatiuely, as thus. Chil­dren can suffre muche cold, and cannot young mē beare a frost? Custome bea­reth swynge, and shall reason take no place? Women haue died for there cō ­trey, therfore may not mē be ashamed to feare death? Noble menne are desi­rous to haue a good horskeper that cā kepe their horses well, and they spare not to geue great stipendes to suche, & [Page] shall thei not muche more be desirous, to haue a good scholmaster, that might Godly bryng vp their children, in ver­tue and wisedome? If a horse bee not well broken, the awner will se that he maie be made gentle: & shall not a man seyng his naturall child, euill brought vp, take paines, and se hym brought to some good order? We can se a spauain, a splent, a ring bone, or suche other di­sease in a horse, and shall we not be as ready to loke, that there bee no fautes in our childrē, or in the teacher, to whō we geue the charge, to bryng theim vp in learnyng, and good maners?

¶The generall rule.

If that which semeth to be the grea­ter, be not added, neither shalbe added, that whiche is the lesse. Again, if that, whiche is lesse be added, that which is greater, shalbe added also.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

The scholer vnderstandeth Latine, ergo his scholemaster also hath know­lege in thesame toungue. Negatiuely thus. If God will not allowe a vowe, [Page] made by the daughter, without the knowlege of her father, although the vowe bee but for one daie: how muche lesse shal that mariage take place, whē young folke make priuie contractes, without the good wil obteined of their parentes.

¶The vse.

This place helpeth muche to exhort especially, when wee reason from the lesse, to the greater, or contrary. Nei­ther can any one that teacheth, wante thuse hereof, if thei purpose, that their saiynges shall take place.

¶Of repugnauncie.

A repugnaunce, is suche a disagre­yng state of thynges that no one thyng can be thesame, that thother is, by one nature, or substance, as thus. Manne, and vertue, the one cannot be the [...]ame, that the other is.

¶The [...]euision.

Thynges repugnant, are deuided in to discordantes, and into wordes diffe­ryng one from another, by any maner of meanes.

¶Of discordantes, called Opposita.

[Page]Discordantes, are when onely one worde or sentence, is contrary to ano­ther, so that the one cannot be thesame that the other is, nor yet bothe at one tyme, can be in one, & thesame subiect, as hote, and cold, the father & the sōne, sight, & blyndnes, night and dar [...]enes.

¶There be .iiii. of th [...] sort.

• Contraries.
• Relatiues.
• Priuation.
• Contradiction.

COntraries, are suche discordan­tes, as cannot be, at one, and the­same tyme in one substance: not­withstandyng, thei maie both se­uerally be, in two subiectes, or substances [...] at one, and thesame time. As whit­nes, blacknes, vertue, and vice, wise­dome, and foolishnes. Contraries are two waies cōsidered, for some be suche that if one be not, the other must nedes folowe, and thei are called in Latine, Contraria immediata, that is to saie, contraries, where nothyng commeth betwixt: as thus. A wise man, a foole. [Page] Uertue, vice. Faith, vnbelief. Al these are suche, that if the one bee not in a man, the other must nedes be. As thus. Such a one is wise, ergo he is no foole. If a man be not wise, it must nedes be, that he is foolishe. Wee are saued by faith: ergo we are cōdēned by vnbelief

Again, other contraries be so, that though the one be awaie, yet the other foloweth not therfore of necessitie. For blacke, and white, be cōtrary, and yet thei be not so cōtrary, that if the white colour be not, the other must nedes be. For a manne maie be high coloured, or sallowe coloured, and yet not blacke. Therefore in suche contraries, where some thyng may be put betwixt the ex­tremes, it is no good reason to say, that if the one be not, the other muste nedes be. Note further, that all discordantes are not cōtrary, accordyng to their ge­nerall worde, or common accidentes, but according to their proper differēce [...] For if we reason thus.

The argument is not good, for fir [...] [Page] and water are not contrary, accor­dyng to their generall woorde, whi­che agreeth to theim bothe, but accor­dyng to their proper differences, as in that, fire is hote and dry, it is contrary to water, whiche is colde and moyste. Thus some, that mainteined counter­feicte chastitie, were wont to reason a­gainst Mariage.

Whereas Uirginitie, and mariage, are not contrary, accordyng to their generall woorde, whiche is (good) but accordyng to their proper difference. As thus.

Therefore this worde (good) in the aboue rehersed argument, doth signify a thyng graunted of God, and alowed by his will, whiche doth aswell, com­prehende mariage, as it doth virginitie therefore this argument, is of no more force, then if I should saie.

And yet there is no mā, but wil saie, that bothe these two vertues are good Or thus merily.

Whereas God hath geuen, bothe high and lowe, riche and poore, the spi­rite that s [...]all liue euer. But this I speake, to set furthe more at large, the fondenesse of the other argument, con­cernyng Mariage.

¶The generall rule.

But awaie one of these contraries, where nothyng commeth betwixt, cal­led immediata contraria, and thother must nedes folowe, whiche is not true in those contraries [...] where some thyng commeth betwixte theim, called con­traria mediata.

RElatiues are those, whiche are compared emong themselfes, or els referred to some other. As a father, a sonne. A master, a seruaunt. A [Page] kyng, a subiect.

¶The general rule.

If one of the relatiues be, the other muste nedes be: if the other be not, the other cannot be neither.

¶The maner of reasonyng

Thou art my seruaunt, why doo [...] thou not knowe me, to be thy maister? Thou art a subiect, and wilt thou take in han [...]e to rule?

PRiuaciō, is the absence of tha [...] thyng frō a substance, whiche by nature, might haue been there [...]

The habite, is the hauyng of that thyng, in the substance, whiche natur [...] hath graunted to be there.

¶The generall rule.

Euery priuacion, is the destruccion of that, whiche by nature was.

¶The maner of reasonyg.

Blyndnesse, is called priuacion, be­cause it is the absence of that thyng, [Page] whiche either by nature was, or might haue been, in the substaunce. Neither doth any mann [...], call a stone blynd, be­cause nature hath vtterly denied, the gift of seyng to all stones.

Synne is called priuacion, because it is the destrucciō, of that great good­nesse, whiche God powred in man. And therefore God iustly punisheth those, that haue forsaken his grace.

¶Sentences gainsaiyng, otherwise called, contradiccion.

SEntēces gainsaiyng, are two proposicions, the one deniyng that, whiche the other affir­meth: as thus. Christ is in the Sacrament really: Christ is not in the Sacrament really. It cannot bee, but one of these two proposicions, must ne­des be false.

¶The generall rule.

If one of the twoo proposicions, be graunted to be true, the other must ne­des be graunted to be false. Neither cā it be, by any meanes possible, that both of thē should either be true or false, at one, and thesame tyme. Alwaies pro­uided, [Page] that there be no doubtfulnes in the wordes: for if one worde signifie di­uersely, then maie bothe proposicions, be either true, or false, at one, and the­same tyme. As thus.

In these two proposicions, there is no contradiccion, or gainsaiyng, but that thei both maie be true, at one an [...] thesame time, cōsideryng thei are both diuersely taken. Christes fleshe eaten and chewed, with our tethe, profiteth nothyng, Christes fleshe torne vpō the crosse, profiteth muche, as the whiche purchaseth to al beleuers, life for euer

¶The maner of reasonyng.

If we be iustified frely, through the onely merites of Iesus Christe: Then this is false, that we are not iustified, onely through the merites of Iesus Christ: but the other is true: ergo this is false.

¶The vse.

[Page]Of Priuacion, Contradiccion, and of contraries that immediatly folowe: cōdicional argumentes are made, with the addicion of some one coniunccion, of the which, when the one is true, the other must nedes be false, as thus. Ei­ther the soule is immortall, or els it is not immortall, but the first is true: er­go the second is false.

¶Of wordes differyng.

THen haue wee the vse of this place, when we reason & proue that one thyng is not thesame. that another is, as thus. King Lud is not thesame, that Iulius Ce­sar, or Brutus was: Kyng Lud buyl­ded London, of whom the citee had his name, beyng called Luddes toune, and afterwarde, by alteracion of letters, called London. Ergo neither Cesar, nor Brutus, builded thesame. Discor­dātes called opposita are not thesame that wordes differyng are, called diffe­rentia. For asmuche as where discor­dātes be [...] one thyng onely is set against another one. As for example. Nothyng can be set against brightnes, as discor­dant, [Page] but onely darkenesse, nothyng cā be set against heate, but onely cold, and so in other. But in this place, there maie many thynges differ from some one thyng, and whatsoeuer is not the­same that another is, maie bee called a worde differyng, in Latine, differens, or disparatum. Socrates is a man, er­go he is not an ore, a stone, a horse or a­ny other thyng els.

Thynges differ foure waies, either by nombryng. As euery singuler man, diff [...]r [...]th one from another. Iames is one, and Ihō is another. Other differ in th [...]ir kynde, when thei are compre­hended vnder diuerse kindes, as Be [...]u­uis of Hampton, & Arundell his horse: or els Alexander, and Bucephalus. O­ther differ by the generall worde, whē thei are comprehended, vnder diuerse generall wordes, as Baptisme, & ma­trimonie, thone comprehended vnder a Sacrament of God, the other vnder a certain ordinaūce of God. Lastly, wor­des differ by their moste generals, whē thei are placed in diuerse predicamētes A kyng, manhod, thone is placed emōg [Page] the relatiue, is the seconde in qualitie.

¶The generall rule.

We cannot make thynges, that doe muche differ, to be of one nature.

¶The maner of reasonyng.

We reason from wordes differyng, negatiuely altogether.

From suche as differ in nomber, we reason thus.

Suche a one is called Thomas, therfore he is not thesame, that Ihon is. Peter is not Paule, nor yet Paule is Peter. Faithe is not woorkes, nor yet workes are faithe.

From suche as differ in kynd, thus,

I am a man, therefore I should not be vsed like a brute beast.

Frō such as differ by y ^e general word.

I did borowe plain clothe of the, & why doest thou require raysed veluet of me?

From suche as differ in predicamēt.

Uertue is a qualitie of the mynde, therfore it is no substance.

AFter knowlege atteined, exercise is moste necessary. And happie shal he be, that vnto skill, addeth [Page] practise, for then learnyng is best cōfir­med, when knowlege is put in vre.

Therfore consideryng, I haue sette forthe the places, I thynke it necessa­rie after knowlege of the same, to de­scribe matters by euery one of them, as thei lye in order: that other maye lyke­wyse, when anye question commeth in controuersie, go thorowe the places themselfes with it, and examine euery worde, by euery seueral place.

And to make this thyng more plain, I wyll go through the places with one certaine worde, and loke what helpe I shall finde there for knowlege of the same. The worde shall be (a kyng) or (a Magistrate.)

The definition.

The definition of a magistrate. E­uery Kyng, or magistrate, is the mini­ster of god, for a good ende, to the pu­nishynge of naughtye persones, and to the confortyng of godlye men.

The general rule.

The Minister of God.

The kynde.

Either a tiraunt, or a godlye kyng, [Page] thone ruleth accordyng to his lust, the other accordyng to right, and Iustice.

Wordes yoked.

The officer, the office, to beare an office, if the office can not be spared, the officer can not be spared.

Adiacentes necessarily ioyned.

Wisedome, earnest labour, cunnyng in sciences, skylfull both of warre, and peace, these all must nedes be in euerye Magistrate.

Adiacentes adioyned casually.

To be liberal, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, all these happen to be in good magistrates.

Dedes necessary.

To defende Religion, to enact god­lie lawes, to punishe offendours, to de­fend the oppressed, all these are neces­sarye in a kyng, and are neuer found in any tiraunt.

The thyng conteynyng.

Moses, Dauid, Salomon, Ezechia [...], Iosias. Charles the Emperour. Ed­warde the .vi. of that name. Kynge of England.

The efficient cause.

[Page]God himselfe, or els the ordinaunce of God.

The second efficient cause.

Unquiet people, rebelles, disobediēt people, are the cause why magistrates are ordeyned.

The ende of a magistrate.

This ende he muste nedes obserue that alwayes the people lyue in quiet­nes, and in honeste conuersation passe their whole life.

The effecte, or els thynges done by a Magistrate.

Peace is made, the realme enriched, all thinges plentuous, but where a ti­raunt ruleth, al thinges are contrary.

The authoritie.

The .xiij. to the Romaines, let euery soule be subiecte to the powers .i. Pe­ter .ij. Be subiecte to the kyng.

Thynges inc [...]dent.

The scepter is a token of Iustice, e­uen as the sword is a signe of reuenge­ment, or wrathe paiyng of Subsidies, taxes, tributes, rent, or any suche like, yeomen of the gard, and all other wal­ters, souldiours in warre, the obedi­ence [Page] of the subiectes, the honour geuen vnto him, triumphes made, runnyng at the tylte, fightynge at the Barriers fightynge at the tourney. Al these are cōtingentia to a king, that is, although these thinges be not in a cōmō wealth, yet maye there be a kynge, yea and al­though there be no kynge in some com­mune weale, yet these thynges may be euery echone of them, as it was in A­thenes where the people had the rule of the common weale, and all was refer­red to theire Iudgement.

¶Similitudes.

That whiche the shepeherd is to the shepe, the same is the magistrate to his subiectes. That which the maister of the shippe, is to the ship, or the mai­ster of an houshold, to his house, or the head to the whole bodie: the same is the magistrate to his subiectes.

¶Thynges compared.

Seruauntes must be obedient and subiect to there maisters with all reue­rence, as we reade in the scripture: howe muche more then should the sub­iectes be obedient to their kyng and so­uereigne [Page] lorde, whiche by the ordina­unce of God, is appointed to rule, and to haue gouernaunce ouer them.

Ye maie se by this one exāple, that the searchyng of places, ministreth ar­gumentes plentifully. For if ye wyll proue a magistrate necessarie, ye maie reason from the definition, from the causes, from the authoritie, from the thyng conteynyng, from the adiacen­tes, from the similitude, and make good reasons for the purpose. Not withstandyng, I thynke it not necessarie that ye searche all the places at euerye ty­me, and for euerye matter: but that ye searche moste parte of them. And al­though we cannot finde a good argu­ment in euerie one of them, yet it is wel if we maie gather but thre or .iiij. good argumentes. As when we go into a gardyne, we shall not finde all herbes growing there, although we searche euery corner: so when we loke in all y ^t places of inuention for the profe of ou [...] matter, we shall not finde in euerie place a good argument for oure pur­pose. Not withstandyng it is moste ne­cessarie, [Page] either when we will proue a matter oure selfe, or els trie an others labour, which is set forth at large most eloquentlie: to bring the whole some of his long tale to these places, & make an argument in thre lynes of that, whiche he dilateth, into thre shietes.

And for our selfe, if we wil reason a matter earnestlie, it shalbe profita­ble to see oure owne argumentes be­fore hand deriued out of the places, the whiche shall make vs more bolde to speake, when we shall euidently per­ceiue oure owne reasons suerly groū ­ded. And the better able we shalbe to confirme our owne cause, & to auoyde all obiections, when we knowe suerly by this arte, wherunto we maie leaue. For although other shall empece oure doynges, and wrest oure wordes, yet we shalbe able euermore to kepe oure owne, when we playnelie perceaue whereof oure argumēt hath his groūd Many speake wisely which neuer read logique, but to speke wisely with a iudgement, and to knowe the verie foun­taine of thynges: that can none do, ex­cept [Page] they haue some skill in this art.

Therefore what diuersitie there is betwixt a blynd man, & hym that seeth, the same difference is betwixte a wise man vnlearned, and a wyse man lear­ned. Ye haue sene the commoditie of this art by this one word (magistrate) which I dyd applie to euery place, that myght geue any light for the makyng of an argument. Nowe ye shall haue a question set forth, and both the partes of a proposition referred to the places of inuention, that thereby ye maie knowe wherein the places do agree, & wherein they do not. For where as the places agree (that is to saie, al thynges are referred to y ^e one, that are referred to the other) there the proposition is good, and the latter parte of the propo­sition, is truly spoken of the first. But where the places do not agree (that is to saie, some thynges are referred to y ^e one worde, that are not referred to the other) ther the thinges themselues can not agree. I will vse this question for an example. whether it be lawfull for a priest to marie a wyfe or no. And first [Page] of all I will examine a Priest, aud ap­plie hym to all the places. Next after that wee will refe [...] a wife to all the places, & se when we haue done, where in these .ij. do agre, and wherein they do not agree.

¶From the definition.

A Preacher is a clerck or shepeherd which will giue his life for his shepe, enstructed to sette forth the kingdome of God, and desierouse to liue vertu­ousely: a faithfull, and a wise steward whō the lorde doth set ouer his house, that he maie gyue the householde ser­uauntes meate, in due time.

¶From the generall worde.

A minister a seruaunt, a holie man, a gospeler, the minister of God should be vpright in his liuyng, faithfully be­stowyng the wordes of truth.

¶From the kynde.

Peter, Paul, Ihon Baptist, Esaie, Esdras, and Steuin, Ambrose beyng a temporall man was after that a mini­ster of the Churche. Chrisostome be­came [Page] of a lawer, an ernest preacher of goddes worde. yea Peter & Andrewe both ware fishers, therefore temporal men may be called, if they be worthie, and desire this spirituall function.

¶From the Propertie.

To be miete to teache, to be godly wise, to do, and to teache all thynges that they are cōmaunded. Sainct Hie­rome is his Epistle to Nepotianus, as touchyng the life of Preachers, saith thus. I will not haue the pleade cau­ses, & to be abrabblyng ianglar with­out all reason, but I will haue the to be a faithfull minister of the Sacra­mentes, and very skilfull in the lawes of the Lorde.

¶The whole.

To be brought vp in the scripture [...] euen from his youth, to be godly in cō ­uers [...]cion, and wholly to be enstructed with all thynges, necessarie for a prea­cher. whoso euer is thus armed, is wor­thie to be a minister, in the Churche of God. This Argument is deriued from the whole.

¶The partes.

To inuent matier out of the scrip­ture, accordyng to the aptnes of his heares, to decke his doynges hādsom­ly, to place his sentēces in order, to re­member what he speaketh, and to vt­ter his wordes distinctly, plainly, and with lowde voice.

¶Thynges yoked together.

A preachyng, a Preacher, to do the worke of a Preacher. Timoth. iiij. He that by his preachyng edefieth, y ^e same man is a preacher.

¶Thynges cleauyng, or adioyned to the substaunce.

Labor, diligēce, witte, knowledge, sobriete, gētlenes, vertue, mariage, an earuest desire to bring vp his childern wel, with other such. A bishop must be without fault, y ^e housbād of one wife, watchefull, sober, modest, herberous, apte to teache, no greate dryuckar of wine, no fightar, not giuē to filthie lu­cre, but vpright, voide frō brawlyng, from couetousnes, &c. i. Timoth. ii.

¶Dedes done.

[Page]To feade Christes flock, to put his life in daunger for the flocke cōmitted to his charge, to bryng vp his flock & famuly in the feare of God, in y ^e know­ledge of his woorde, and in due obser­uyng of the same.

¶The thyng conteynyng.

Hierome in his first boke of the Cō ­mentaries which he made vpō the Ga­lathians .j. cap. Let vs not thinke that the Gospell resteth in the woordes of Scripture, but in the sense, not in the outwarde rynde, but in the very hart, not in the leaues, but in y ^e very roote of reason. Let the woordes of Christe dwell plenteously in you, with al wis­dome. Collos. iii.

¶The matier.

The woord of God. The olde Te­stament, & the new. Hieremie the first. Behold, I haue giuen my woordes in to thy mouth.

¶The shappe, or forme.

The shappe may be taken of the cō ­uersation, speche, spirite, or the maner of the preachers liuyng.

¶The efficient cause.

God himselfe, the Scripture, good prechers, Euangelistes, the Lord will giue his worde, to those that preache, plentefully. Psal [...] lxvii. I haue graf­fed, Appollo hath watered, but God geueth encrease.

¶The ende.

The ende of preachyng is, that the wicked might be conuerted to repen­taunce, and the iust mā kept in his vp­right liuyng. Ezechiel, iii.

¶Thinges done by vertue of the cause.

To winne men to Christe, to make mens consciences quiete, to moue thē to prayer. When Peter made a sermō, out of hand there was about .iij. thou­sand conuerted to the faith of the gos­pel, that selfe same day.

¶What is appointed to hym, and propre to this reasonyng.

To stude ernestlie, and searche the scriptures that he maie proue a true minister of God, to liue a good life, & seke to kepe a household, that he maie be herberous.

¶The place.

The churche, the pulpite, the vestia­rie, the chauncell. I spake openly to in the sinagoge saith Christ, and in the Churche, to all the Iewes that came thyther, & I spake nothing in corners.

¶The time.

A young man, and elderly man, and old man, to preache early and late .i. Timothie .iiij. Let no man contemne thy youthe.

¶Thynges annexed.

To haue some stipende for his prea­chyng. worthy is the labourer to haue his wagies. Matth. x.

The other places folowyng, becau­se they are not absolutely considered, but referred to some other, & euer ha­uyng respect to the next worde, which is rehersed in y ^• question of that which wente before, they cannot seuerally handle any one woorde: and therefore ye must marke the whole question, and in one Argument comprehend aswell the wife, as the minister. Nowe ther­fore ye shall haue this worde, vxor (a wife) described through out the places.

¶The definition.

A wife, is a woman that is lawfully receiued into y ^e felouship of life, for the encrease or gettyng of childern, and to auoide fornicacion.

¶The generall worde.

A wife, is a woman.

¶The kynde.

A chaiste wife, a learned wife, a ma­nerly wife, or els ye may vse the propre names of women, for the kyn [...] it selfe, as Lucretia, Cornelia, Portia, Hipsi­cratea, &c̄.

¶The propertie.

To bryng forth childern.

¶The whole.

The whole woman herselfe alto­gether.

¶The partes.

The heade, the breast, the armes, the backe, the thighe, the hart, the vaines, blood, and flesh.

¶Wordes ioyned.

Housewifely to do y ^e worke of a wife. She doth y ^e dutie of a good wife: Ergo she is a wife. She haudleth all thinges [Page] housewifely: Ergo she is a good hous­wife.

¶Wordes adioyned.

The loue in mariage, care ouer the famulie, keping of herself to one hous­bande, be obedient vnto hym, loue of her children, losse of her childern.

¶Dedes done.

To be obediēt, to be shrew shakē, to bryng vp her childern well, to liue in mariage with her housbande both at bed, and at borde, accordyng to the wil of God.

¶The thyng conteynyng.

The woman her selfe.

¶The matier, and forme.

The bodie, and soule, or the woman and the mā, are the matter of mariage, the consunctiō it selfe is the forme of it.

¶The efficient cause.

God himselfe, the Scripture, let a man be the housbād of one wife. They shalbe .ii. in one fleshe. The cause that one woman is maried to a seueral per­son, and liketh him before al other, and the mā her in like wise: is god himselfe [Page] first, that kindleth such affections, next after, their consent, and full agrement doth enseue.

The ende.

To bryng forth children, and to kepe h [...]m sanf, and to auoyde synne.

The effecte.

Children godlie enstructed, the hou­se wel ordred.

Thynges apointed for some ende.

To please her husbande, to lyue a good life, to prouide thynges necessa­rie for the furniture of her housholde.

The place.

The house, the chambre of wed­lock, the halle, or parlour.

The tyme.

A younge woman, or an olde. Ari­stotle saith, it is mete for men to marye at .xxxvj. for maidens to marie at .xviij. but then was then, and now is now, al thynges in this worlde are ripe before there tyme. I meane not that honestie it self is so, for I neuer knew it ripe as yeat, but euer rawe. But thus ye see the time of mariage was not so hastely loked for, as it is now. In this worlde [Page] a child shal scant be out of his shel, but he shalbe suer to one or other, y ^• which I doubte, whether it maye be called a mariage or no: for those that be of ripe yeres, no man doubteth, but if thei can agree both, & haue there frendes good wyll (for that ought to be sought for, and also obtained) the mariage is al­lowed before God.

Wordes anne [...]d or knitte together.

Mariage is referred to this place, for a wife is so called, bycause the hath a housband, neyther can any woman be called a wife, except she haue an hus­band, therfore she is placed emonge the wordes annexed, that is, where one thynge is knitte to an other, so that the one cannot be, except the other be also.

Nowe that we haue drawen these wordes, the preacher, and the wyfe, af­ter this sort, through out the places, so far as we could: we shuld cōpare them together, and se wherein theido agree, and wherein they varie. Let vs com­pare the definitions together, and we shall finde sumwhat euen there, where these wordes be (desiryng to liue ver­tuously) [Page] whiche shall gyue light for an argument, as thus.

Now if mine aduersary wil deny the proposition at large, called the ma­ior, then can I doe no good with it, ex­cept I finde somwhat in the definition of a wife, whiche is agreing to this a­boue rehersed proposition. I finde in this worde (wife) that she is maried for the encrease of children, and to auoide fornication. Then I reason thus for the confirmation of my purpose by the argument called Sorites.

[Page]Againe the generall worde of bothe these definitions gyueth light for an argument. Euery wyfe is a woman, euery preacher is a man, and nature hath ordeyned that man and woman may liue in mariage, (if they be so dis­posed) of what degre, cōdition, or state, so euer they be, nothyng in all the scri­ptures to the coutrarye. Therfore I may reason thus.

Euen as I haue doen in these pla­ces, comparynge one to an other, so ye may doe in the residew, and where ye se any thyng serueth for your purpose, that they agre together on bothe par­ties, ye maye vse the same: if they do not agre in some places, ye may refuse them, or els so mollyfye the thyng that suche repugnauncies maye not harme your cause at all. As where it is in the wordes adioyned that a womā is often [Page] [...]imes ouerthwart, froward, disobe­diēt careles ouer her childrē forasmuch as these be no causes of mariage, they shall not hynder mariage, for a godly man wyll beare al aduersitie, and suf­fre suche euill happe, and not therfore eschewe mariage, bycause these incommodities chaunce in mariage. Nowe I wil entre into the other places which doe not seuerally handle one word, but haue respecte euermore to an other, and so by the knittyng together of .ij. thyn­gs, or setting the one against the other, the trueth of oure purpose is espied, and the cause confirmed.

From the similitude.

As he is not to be compted a good gardiner, or a good orchard keper that is content with suche fruict as he hath alredy, only cherishyng his old trees, and hath no [...]are neither to cut downe the olde, nor yet to fet newe graffes: so that man is to be compted no di­ligent member in the common weale, whiche beyng content with the present compaignie of mē, hath no minde to en­crease the nomber of people.

From authoritie.

If the greate workeman of thynges god almightie himselfe after the floud being reconciled to man made this law (as we reade in scriptures) that men shulde not liue single, but encrease and be multiplied, that the yearth might be filled: and seyng also that Christe him­selfe sence that time hath allowed ma­riage by a miracle of chaungyng water into wine, which miracle was the first that he dyd vpon yearth: and seynge Paule also biddeth euery man that cā ­not liue chaste, to marie, and that it is better to marye, then to burne in fil­thie desires, and besides this willeth a bishop should be the husbande of one wife: it muste nedes be that preachers may lawful marye, aswel as any other temporal men.

From comparison of the lesse, to the greater.

It is a shame to se brute beastes obey the lawe of nature, and man, especial­lye a learned man, and a preacher, like a stoute giaunt to striue with nature, & do contrarye to her biddyng.

From the greater to the lesse.

Yf the daughters of Lot doubted nothyng at the matter to lye with the [...] own father when he was dronke, thin­kyng it better to prouide for encrease [...]y filthie lust, than that māky [...]d shuld decay: shal not than a preacher whiche shulde haue regard for the encrease of mankynde, and also a desire to auoyde fornication, marye, if he be disposed, or other wise cannot liue chast?

Of discordantes.

Ye maye reason from the contrarye thus, if virginitie be a thyng geuen to aungels and almost aboue mans reach, than mariage is a thynge propre to man.

From the Priuation.

If the lacke of children be a thynge hateful to man, than the hauing of chil­dren is a thyng ioyful to man.

From the rela [...]ion.

If a Bishop be allowed by the scri­ [...]tures to be a husbande, then is he al­lowed to haue a wyfe, and by the scrip­tures we reade that he is allowed to [Page] be a husbande, for Paule saith. Let a Byshop be the husbande of one wife, Ergo he is allowed to haue a wyfe.

¶From wordes differyng

That worde is called a differyng worde, whatsoeuer it is, whiche is not the same, that an other is. As thus. A preacher is a man. Ergo he is no God. Priestes be men as other men be, and that some maried men [...]re nowe haue well knowen. Therfore he maie marie a woman, if he cannot liue chast, consi­deryng there is nothyng in al the scri­ptures to the contrarie.

As I haue done for the office of a Prince, and the mariage of a priest, so maie I also go thorowe out the places with any other matter, that is nowe in controuersie.

As faith, workes, penaunce, the sa­crifice of the masse, baptisme, the lawe, the gospel, synne, slaunder, rule, prea­chyng, and euery other thyng that man is bounde to knowe.

What is faith? faith is a trust and full perswasion, whereby onely we d [...] assure vs that oure synnes be forgeuen [Page] vs, and we accepted as iust be [...]ore god, thorowe the merites of Christ.

Or thus.

Paule in the Epistle to the He­brues. Faith is a sure cōfidence of thin­ges which are hoped for, and a certain­tie of thynges, whiche are not sene.

¶The generall worde.

A sure confidence, and a certaintie of thynges.

¶The kynde.

A faith, whiche is occupied about thynges both corporall, and also spir [...] ­tuall, beleuyng that Christ was both God and man, by whome saluacion is atteined.

¶The difference.

Thynges whiche are hoped for, & the whiche are not sene.

¶The propretie.

To beleue assuredlie, and trust the promises of God.

¶The partes of fayth.

The true faith hath no partes. All beit faith is diuersely taken in the scri­pture, for there is an historic [...]ll faith. [Page] As I do beleue that William Con­queror was kyng of Englande. There is also a iustifiyng faith, wherbi I loke assuredly to be saued. There is a faith, when one man faithfullie promiseth an other, to do this or that, and wil stande to his worde. There is also a faith of miracles, wherby the Apostles did cast out deuels, and helped oft the diseased persones.

¶Thyn [...]es adioyned to faith, and also thynges annexed to [...]ayth.

Hope, charite, to be good to the poore, to forbeare from wicked attem­tes, to speake well of all, to eschewe excesse.

¶The thyng conte [...]nyng.

The mynde of man, or the soule of man.

¶The efficient cause.

The worde of God, or the holie ghoste, stirryng the harte of man, and cō [...]ortyng him in the merites of Chri­stee passion.

¶The ende of fayth.

Life euerlastyng, whiche is geuen [Page] frelie to euery beleuer that confesseth in his harte, Iesus to be Christ, and assuredly trusteth to be saued by the o­nely merites of his passion.

¶Contraries.

Unbeliefe, desperation, whereby man falleth from God, to his vtter dā ­nation for euer.

¶The maner of confutacion twoo waies considered.

For the firste, either we purpose by disputacion, to answere fully to the matter, or els secondly (if power want to compasse that) wee seke some other meanes, to satisfie the manne, and that thre maner of waies, either by makyng the obiecciō seme lesse then it is, or by bryngyng some other example against it, or els by sekyng some meanes, to go from the matter.

We make the argument appere slē ­der, whē we receiue it laughyngly, and declare by wordes, euē at the first, that it is nothyng to the purpose, and so a­bashe the opponent.

Again, we turne another argument in our aduersaries necke, when wee bryng another exāple against hym. Or els when wee charge hym, with a like faute, and laye some greater matter in [Page] his dishe. Lastly, we shift awaie, from the violence of our aduersarie, by ma­kyng some digression, or geuyng occa­sion of some other talke, whereby the aduersary, either is driuē to forget his argumēt, or els beyng blynded with to muche matter, is forced either to go no further, or els to thynke hymself con­tent. In all whiche maner of confuta­tion, when we purpose to put a man to silence, I would wishe greate modera­tion to be vsed, and as litle aduantage takē by suche meanes, as may be possi­ble. For although it be a poore help (as in deede it is none other) yet many a mā loseth his estimacion, by muche vsyng of suche fashiōs. It is a world to se the subtle brain, of many braggyng bodies whiche with bold countenaunce, beare an outward shadowe of wisedome, ha­uyng onely the maskyng visage, & lac­kyng the naturall face. Thei wil stand stoutly in maintenance of an vntruth, and with countenaunce seme to shewe it: yea, and by their bold bearyng it out almoste perswade the hearers, that thei onely haue the true parte, and that o­ther, [Page] are altogether deceiued. Thei wil saie, that no wise manne, would ones thinke that for shame, whiche their ad­uersarie, vttereth without all shame, yea, thei will saie, he speaketh too too baby shelye, and so dashe hym out of countenaunce, that he shall not well knowe what to saie, and last of all, thei wil trifle and toye merely, and so with imp [...]dēt laughyng [...] make the other past speakyng. I will not putte any in this memento, as though thei ware gyltie: but their awne doynges, shall put in theimselfes, on Goddes name, for me. Notwithstandyng, I would gladly wish (as I said before) that there ware a measure vsed, and then suche doyn­ges, might better be borne.

We answere to the matter, ij. wa­yes, either generally, or particularly. A generall answere is made thre wa­yes. First, whē the faute is in the mat­ter, that is to saie, in the wordes of ei­ther proposicion, when thei signifie di­uerse thynges, or be diuersly applied, to shewe it plainly: & either denie it a [...] folishe, or els dissolue it, as doubtfull. [Page] As thus, the libertiues reason.

The seuerall or seconde proposicion is not true. And therfore the argumēt i [...] false, in the matter it self. For God did create the nature of man, pure and cleane, and saied, that all was good, whiche he made, at the firste creacion. Neither was it Goddes will, that mā should altre his commaundement, and swarue from the pathe, of his appoyn­ted lawes, but rather the suggestion of the deuill, and the weakenesse of oure fleshe, brought man to helle, death and dampnacion.

Again, when the faulte appereth in the forme, and maner of makyng an ar­gument, we must declare that it is not framed [...] accordyng to the rules, whiche require that euery argument, should bothe be in mode and figure, as I haue before sufficiently declared. As thus.

This argument, beyng made in the second figure, is of no force, cōsideryng it is in no mode, of thesame figure. For in this figure, all the proposicions, doo not affirme altogether, but one of thē euer doth deny, as it appereth plainly, to hym that list to se.

Thirdly, when the fault is bothe in the matter, & in the maner of makyng, we must refuse the argument, & shewe the faultes plainly. As thus.

First the faulte is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre tyme, it is lawfull to kill, and euery man maie stand in his awne defence, against vio­lent robbers, and rather kill then bee killed. Thirdly, the argument is in no mode [...] although it be in the secōd figure

The particular auoydyng of an ar­gument, [Page] is .v. waies vsed, either by de­claryng in what deceipfull subtiltie, it is conteined, or from which of the pla­ces, it is wrōgfully deriued, or to shewe the wrong framyng, in euery mode and figure, or to make an argument, with a like reason, and so to auoyde the cause, or last of all, to vse the strange deceipt­full places, which shalbe last rehersed.

And now will I tell particularly, euery deceiptfull argument, that whē suche a subtle argumēt shalbe vsed, ei­ther in disputacion, or priuate talke: any one may espie the fault out of hāde and shewe in whiche of these capcious reasons, the subteltie resteth.

And first, a false conclusion, is a de­ceipte vsed in an argument, whereby one vnder the colour of truth, goeth a­boute, to inuegle the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument, appe­ryng to the ignorant, as though it wer true, and yet is nothyng true at all. A­ristotle doth deuide them into two par­tes. Some be called deceiptfull argu­mentes, when a doubtfull worde is v­sed, or the kynd of speache is straunge, [Page] and maie be taken two waies, and that the fault is rather in the kynd and ma­ner of speakyng, then in the matter or very thyng it selfe. Therefore those y ^t be good grāmarians, and know the properties of wordes, and are skylfull in the tongues, can gailie wel solute such errors as be made by the mystakyng of wordes, or by false vnderstandyng of phrases, whereof in verie deade manie heresies, and muche false doctrine haue had there first beginnyng. There be a­gayne some craftie subtilties whiche are not in the worde, but rather spring either of the euel knittyng together of the propositions, or els of the confu­sion of thynges, that is to saye, when one thyng is falsely appointed for an o­ther, as in this proposition, a man maie easely espie false packyng whiche is in the second figure.

Fes

No synne doth beget a man.

ti

Cōcupiscēce doth beget a mā

no.

Ergo concupiscence is no syn

The seconde proposition although it may deceiue a man, that is not ware, yet is it altogether false, because na­ture [Page] which is a thyng ordeyned of god, doth begette man, not the wicked im­potencie or rather the destruction of nature, which afterward followed. Here it is playne that a mingle mangle is made of thynges, when generation which should be attributed to nature, is referred to the cōcupiscence, becau­se it is in nature, and next adioynyng vnto it.

Nowe for the nombre and deui­dyng of these deceiptfull argumentes, it is to vnderstande, that there be .xiij. whereof syx are called subtilties in the worde, or maner of speakyng, and the other .vij. ar called subtilties, without the worde, when thynges be confoun­ded, and one taken for an other.

¶Deceitpfull argumentes.

In the worde are these folowyng.

• 1. The doubtfulnesse of a worde.
• 2. The double meanyng of a sentence [...]
• 3. The ioynyng of wordes that shuld be parted.
• 4. The partyng of wordes that should be ioyned.
• 5. The maner of speche.
• 6. The Accen [...]e.

[Page]ALl these names be comprehen­ded vnder this one worde (dou­btefull) notwithstandyng Ari­stotle setteth forth diuerse wa­ies, that he maie shewe the differēce of these doubtful thynges. For some argumentes haue the doubte in a worde sig­nifiyng diuersly, some in the propretie o [...] the phrase, some in the ioyning toge­ther of wordes, and some other in the deuidyng, and displacyng of the same, as it shall appere more playnlie in the handelyng of these places seuerallye. Homonumia, whiche maie be called in english, the doubtfulnes of one worde, when it signifieth diuersly, is a maner of subtiltie, when the deceipt is in a worde that hath mo significations then one. And the reason is, that suche argu­mentes are not good, because there are foure termes in the two propositions, for the double repete, sygnifieth one thyng in the first proposition, and an o­ther thyng in the seconde proposition. Therefore nothyng is proued in the cō clusion, when suche doubtfull wordes are placed in a proposition. And there­fore [Page] when suche a subtiltie is espied, a man maie denie the cō [...]equente, geuing this reason that it is a subtiltie drawen from [...]his place of doubtfulnesse.

¶An example.

Da

Euery arme is a substance made of flesh, bloud, bones, sinues, and veines.

[...]i

God y ^e father hath an arme.

i.

Ergo God the Father is one that hath a substance of flesh bloud, bones, sinues, and veines.

I aunswere: This knittyng is not good, and therefore I deny the whole. The reason is, because it is a subtiltie of a doubtful word [...], for in the first pro­position, the arme is considered to be such a one, as a mā hath, but in the se­cond Proposition it is not so ment, for [...]t signifieth by a Metaphore the po­wre, strength, or might of God.

¶An other example.

Fe [...]

There is none euil in the Citie, saith the Prophete, which the Lord hath not done,

[Page] si-

There be many sinnes and hor­rible euilles in the Citie:

o.

Ergo God is y ^e aucthor of sinne.

I denie the consequent. Because their is doubtfulnes in this worde euill: for in the first Proposition euill doth sig­nifie, the euill of punishement, as wee call cōmonly all calamitie, euil, and al punishemēt euil, which are not sinne: & in the second Proposition, euil doth signifie offence, & all naughtines that is committed. Therefore the seconde Proposition is not agreeyng with the first, and therfore the argument is not good.

¶The second subtiltie, called Ambiguitas.

The Ambiguitee, is, when the con­struction bringeth errour, hauyng di­uerse vnderstandinges in it, as when the woordes be placed doubtfully, as thus. Craesus halim penetrans ma­gnam peruertet opum vim. Cresus going ouer the floude halim, shal ouer­throw a great empire. Here is not mē ­cioned, whether he shal ouerthrow his [Page] owne, or an other mannes. By the which Oracle in dede, he beyng decei­ued, lost his owne kyngdome, when he thought to subdewe his enemies, and bring theim vnder subiectiō. Therfore when sentences be spoken doubtfully, that they may be cōstrued .ij. maner of waies, they are referred to this place. Notwithstanding the vse of this place is very rare, and seldome happeneth, therfore I wilbe the shorter, and only showe two versies in Latine which by cause they be very pretie [...] and may be .ij waies taken, I thynke it not amisse to sette them forth here.

In English thus:

These verses beyng red backwarde [Page] either in English or in Latine, begin­nyng at the last woorde, haue a clea [...]e contrarie vnderstandyng, as thus.

To come to honor worldelye, with authorite much, and gre [...]t richesse,

Hereunto, brought the, goodes, not godlinesse, wilinesse, not worthinesse.

These two verses were written to the Pope, as worthy such a one, and s [...]tte vpon Pasquillus in Rome, euen for very loue, as I take it: not of thee Pope, but of Goddes holy worde.

¶The thirde dece [...]pteful argument.

COniunctio distrahendorum [...] a ioynyng together of those thin­ges which should be disseuered, and either to bee applied to the thinges that go before, or to the thyn­ges that folowe after.

Da-

Whosoeuer knoweth letters, now hath learned them,

ri-

A Grammariā knoweth letters

i [...]

Er [...]o a Grammarian now hath learned them.

Here this Aduerbe (nowe) if it had [Page] ben referred to the first point which is as ye se in this woorde (letters) & the point afterward made, whē this worde (nowe) had bene put to it, al had bene well: but because the worde (nowe) is other wise placed, and referred to the next sentēce, (which is now hath lear­ned them) it is a false Argument, be­cause this worde (nowe) should be re­ferred to the first poinct, as thus.

And so this Argumēt is good beyng thus placed [...] but though this subtiltie seme childishe [...] yet olde babes haue v­sed it, euen in the weightiest cause of our redemptiō, and thought therin to foile the godly, reasonyng in iest after this sort, & yet meanyng good earne [...].

[Page]Here, one may se a false packing, for in the first Propositiō, faith is seueral, and referred to the last woorde of the same Proposition, which is (doth iu­stifie) in the second Proposition faith is referred to the .ij. wordes (without workes.) so that the same faith is not ment in the seconde Propositiō, that is mēt in the first, and the reason is, that woordes are ioyned together, whiche should not be so ioyned, for now there are .iiij. termes, whereas by the rules of Logique, there shoulde be but thre, (faith) is one, (doth iustifie) is the se­conde, (faith without workes) is the third, (a dead faith) is y ^e fourth terme. And the reason that there be .iiij. is, that faith is first seuerally considered, which neuer wāteth workes folowing her, as frute declaryng what the tree is, not that the frute doth purchace iu­stification, but rather geueth a token y ^t by faith it self, where of such workes do spryng, iustificaciō is atteyned. In the second Proposition, there is men­cioned a deade faith, a faith without workes, which faith the deuill himself [Page] hath, where as if the Argument ware true, there shoulde be none other faith considered in the second Proposition, then was rehersed, and mencioned in the first Proposition. I haue labou­red the rather at large, to make this matter more plaine to the ignoraunt, not that it so muche neded, for the eua­sion is easie of it selfe, and this Argu­ment is of no greater weight, then the other aboue rehersed were.

¶Of partyng wordes that should be ioyned together.

DIsiunctio coniunctorum, is a diuidyng of thynges whiche should be ioyned together, & a makyng of wordes seueral, or els a disseuering of .ij. partes, which should be but one. for like as by the o­ther place, wordes are ioyned together whiche shoulde be diuided, so now by this place, that thing is diuided, which should be all one.

In this Argument (the woorde of God) beyng a whole thyng of it selfe, is diuided, and where respecte shoulde be had to the two partes ioy [...]tely con­sidered together, whiche are nothyng els but the whole: the partes are seue­rally vnderstanded, and referred to the whole, not both together as they shoulde bee, but seuerally with their pro [...]erties, as they shoulde not be. For the worde of God is not the Law one­ly, or the Gospell onely, although it stand of these two, but is the Law and the Gospell both ioyned together: for where as a man is made of bodie and soule, the bodie is not man, nor yet the soule neither, and yet they both ioy­ned together, make vp a perfect man.

¶An other example.

This Argument is to be denyed, because the doubtfulnes riseth of the diuision, for, to beleue in God the Fa­ther, & in Iesus Christ his only sonne, are the Articles of our faith, and yet they .ij. are not the whole .xij. in nōber. Therefore they two beyng of the .xij. are wronglie placed if they be diuided into .xij. Aagain there be .iiij. endes, or termes. for in the first Propositiō, this part (the articles of our faith) comprehend the .xij. in nomber, but in the se­cond Proposition this part (to beleue in God and in Iesus Christe) do not comprehend all the articles, but twoo onely, therfore it is an euil Argument.

This kynd of Argument is vsed of­ten times of those, which by reporting an other mans labour, and his wel do­yng, depraue the same, either by ad­dyng, or diminishyng the same, as by takyng a piece of a sentēce out of some Doctour, & applieng it for there pur­pose, or by adding more then they find, [Page] as both diuines & lawers often times full vngodly haue done, not regarding the whole course, & order of the thing, but takyng out patches and pieces to serue their vngodly purposes, whiche in dede, made nothynge for thē, neither they them selues do vnderstand, what they bryng, when they doo not marke the whole course of the matter. The Romishe, reason thus.

This Argument is false by leauyng the best out, for the doctrine of the gos­pell must first be had, our faith must be fastened, and Christ must sanctifie our doinges, before they can be good. Nei­ther is any thyng good because we do it, but because it pleaseth god so to ac­cept it. It is true, he y ^t doth wel, shall haue well, but who is he? euen y ^e same bodie, whiche first beleueth in Christ, & apprehendeth mercie by faith, whose workes God accepteth for good, other wise he shall neuer come where God [Page] is. Therfore espie the subtilties of the vugodlie, and flye there fraude.

¶The fifte place.

FIgura dictionis [...] called other­wise in good Latine Forma orationis, the maner of the speche, is whē the phrase bre­deth errour, and the propertie of the tounge not well knowen, engendreth ambiguite, as in the .viij. Chapiter of Math. When Christ bad those which were healed of the leprosy: Go & shew thēselfes to the Priest, our forfathers applied this saiyng to confession, thin­kyng that euery one was bonde in con­science vnder payne of damnation, to confesse his sinnes to the priest euerye yere ones, whereas Christes meanyng was nothynge so, & therfore they ware moche deceyued in the maner of spea­kyng. This order was in the olde lawe as we maye read in Leuiticus, that le­pers came not into the towne, but if a­ny happened to be whole, and amended, he was first commaunded to shew him selfe to the priest, that the curate seing his bodie cleane, might be a witnesse to [Page] the parishe of his amendement, and so the man after that, might the rather be suffered to go abrode, and be in compa­ny with other men.

But euen as they haue fondely wre­sted this place to confession, euen so might light women, and euil disposed wyues, abuse their husbandes fondely, expoundyng sainct Paules wordes in the .vij. of the first, to the Corinthians, where he saith. The wife is bonde to the lawe, as longe as her husbande ly­ueth, but if her husbande slepe, she is at lybertie to marie wyth whome she wyll. God forbidde, women shoulde take this aduauntage of theyr husban­des slepyng, as the Romish folke haue abused all men wakyng. Slepe in this texte, signifieth nothyng but death, and yet, might women aswell abuse this texte, as other mē haue abused christes saiyng, for the maintenaunce of confes­sion. Therfore the propretie of euery speche, and the maner of speakynge ought alwaies to be obserued: we say in Englishe some time, to some one with whom we are offended, Ah sirrha ye are [Page] an honeste man indede, and yet we do not meane that he is honest indede, but thinke rather that he is a naughty fel­lowe. So likewyse, Christe when he should be taken of the Iewes saide to his Apostles, Dormite & requiescite, slepe one syrs, and take your rest, not that he would they should so do, but to ther rebuke and shame he spake it, be­cause they were careles, and toke there rest. So Paule rebukyng the Corin­thians, bycause thei made heathen men their iudges, and pleaded there causes vnder them, said, if there be no body e­monge you to heare your owne causes, make vile persons and abiectes, to be Iudges emōgst you. Not that he wold it shoulde so be, but to their shame, he spake it, as he saith hymselfe. Also vnto this place maye be referred the kynd of phrase propre to euery tonge. As where it is in the gospell. Non exibit, donec vltimum quadrantem soluerit, he shal not go out, vntil he hath payd the las [...]e farthyng, this sentence doth not signi­fie a condition, but it signifieth that he he shall neuer come out at al. Therfore [Page] those that be ignoraunt in the tonges are easely deceyued: Likewyse in Ma­thewe we reade. Qui dixerit verbum aduersus spiritum sanctum nō remit­tetur ei, neque in hoc seculo neque in [...]uturo. He that shal speake a worde a­gainst the holy ghost shall not be forge­uen nether in this world, nor yet in the worlde to come, that is to say, he shall neuer be forgeuen. Although the papi­stes referre this place to purgatory, most vainely and vnlearnedly. The ac­cent causeth ambiguite, by reason of the affinitie in wordes, as when one hath lost al the money in his purse, and for lacke of coyne is fayne to holde the candel: for an other man when he seeth the same bodie doe his duetie with his cappe of, to his better, to say merely by the waye of a sute to the worthiest per­son: I praye you syr let this good fel­lowe be couered, he is bare, where as bare signifieth a bare purse: as­well as a bare heade, and is properlye so sayde. Againe and moste aptely this subtiltie taketh place, when sentences be euill pointed, and the sense therby [Page] depraued, as some that mainteine iu­stification by workes, haue straūgely a­bused a texte of sainct Augustine, ma­king the point plaine, whereas it shuld be an interrogatiue, and hath bene of late yeres so founde in an olde writen hand. The sentence is this. Qui fecit te sine te, nō potest seruare te, sine te? he that made the without the, can not he saue the, without the? whereas, ma­kyng it a playne point in latine, it hath a cleane contrarie vnderstandyng, and maketh muche for the maintenance of false religion. for it is asmuche, as who should saye: he that made the, without the, cānot saue the, without the. More­ouer, wordes spoken by imitation, that is to saye, whan one reherseth that whiche an other man saith, muste dili­gently be obserued. Paule writyng to the Collossiens sheweth the noughti­nes of some men that will kepe simple folke in subiection with there tradi­tions, and trouble the consciences of the weake, saiyng, do not touche, do not tast, do not handle meate, which Paule reciteth, in rebuke to the hypocrites & [Page] obstinate Pharises, and yet some not­withstandyng fondly haue misconstrued th [...] same, persuadyng them selfes that Paule gaue suche commaundement. Therfore those thynges whiche ar [...] spoken by imitation folowynge an o­ther mans speache, muste otherwise be vnderstanded, than these wordes whi­che a man speaketh of him self, and ge­ueth instruction certainly thereby. Thus farre haue I handled these sub­tile argumentes, which are in the wor­des, nowe wyll I reherse all such false cōclusiōs as are in the matter. And first this is to be noted, that the faultes of euery argument are either in the wrōg definyng, and not wel se [...]tyng forth the nature of any thyng, or els in not apte­ly diuidyng, or lastely not aduisedly weighyng the causes of thynges, but heapynge them vp with oute order or reason. The other subtilities aboue rehersed maye either be aduoyded by well markynge the true definition, or els hauyng respecte to the diuision, by declaryng seuerally howe large euerye worde maye be taken, and what errour [Page] may rise by the false vnderstandyng of some one worde: The subtilities folo­wyng cōtein suche absurdities, whiche rise not vpon the nature of some one woorde, but take their grounde of the matter and thyng it self.

¶There be .vii. in nombre.

• [...]. From the accident.
• [...]. From that, whiche is partely and after a sort so, to be full and wholy so.
• 3. The mistakyng of sentences gainsaiyng.
• 4. The consequent.
• 5. The cause that is not, put for the cause.
• 6. The cuckoes song [...] or by thin­ges doubtfull [...] to proue thygnes that are as doubtfull.
• 7. Many questions asked for one thyng.

¶The first deceipt.

FAllacia accidentis, the deceipt fulnesse of the accident, is whē diuerse thynges are ioyned to gether, in one subiecte, that is to saie, when one, and thesame thyng, [Page] is referred bothe to the substance, and also to the accident, or els, when the ac­cidētes (which are not of the very sub­staunce of man, but maie be awaie, the man liuyng still,) are not well ioyned together, or els, when we make our ar­gument ab euentis, that is to saie, by that thyng, whiche happeneth to a man casually, and pronounce thesame, to be the very proper cause, why, and wher­fore, this or that is so. Of the first, this maie be an example.

In the firste proposicion, I vnder­stand the substance of fleshe, and in the seconde proposicion, I meane the acci­dent or propertie, whiche is in theim bothe, and therfore myne argument is not lawfull. because I referred, bothe the substance and the accident, to one, and to thesame subiecte. For although fleshe and breade, be not all one in sub­stance, [Page] because fleshe is one thyng, and bread is another, and either of thē hath their proper beyng, & distinct substāce: yet thei agree bothe in their accident, that is to saie, in foode, to serue for the sustenaunce of man.

The first proposiciō is true, and the seconde also, for what soeuer is not of faithe, thesame is sinne. Neither can a­ny thyng be wel, how soeuer it semeth in our iyes, except our faith be first fa­stened vpon the free mercie of Christ. Therfore the Iewes, how soeuer [...]he [...] liue, kepyng order, obseruyng lawes, forbearyng riot, yet all their doynges, are nothing but sinne, whatsoeuer thei do, seme it neuer so honest, or Godly, to the sight of man. And yet this argumēt is not truely lapte vp. For in the firste [Page] proposiciō, (synne) is not considered by hymself, and therefore it is truly said, that no synne muste be committed. In the second [...]roposicion, where execuciō of Iustice, is reported to be synne, it is not so of it self, but because the person is euill hymself, whiche executeth the Lawe, and therefore the offence com­meth casually, and as the Logicians saie, per accidens, where as synne be­fore was considered, accordyng to the substaunce. And therefore, though the officer beeyng naught, offendeth when he ministreth Iustice, (because faithe maketh al workes good) yet must he do iustice, because it is so cōmaunded, euen as he must assuredly beleue, that Iesus is the Messias, and the promised sauior sent of God. And though the doyng be euill to hym, yet it is good to other.

Again, thus reason some.

This proposicion is false, conside­ryng that faithe, in the first proposiciō, [Page] is thesame, through whiche we are iu­stified, not by the worthines of our be­leuyng, but through the free mercie of Christ, the whiche we apprehende tho­rowe faithe. And therefore we must in this saiyng consider, that faithe is re­ferred by relacion to Christe, through whom onely, al mercie is atteined, and that grace commeth, not because faith is a worke, but because mercy goth be­fore, and receiueth frely all beleuers, without worthines either of beleuyng or els of doyng any other worke. Therfore in the first proposicion, faith beyng not so taken, as it is in the seconde, we maie saie well, it spryngeth frō this de­ceiptful place, & is therfore not lawful

¶Another argument.

This is euident false, because the accidentes of the body, are referred to the substaunce of the mynd, as by this last argument, ye maie see that lame­nesse, [Page] whiche is of the body, is attribu­ted to the mind, and the reason is vain.

The thirde deceipte is, when many thinges are referred to one subiect, we make that to be the very next and chief cause, whiche is a casuall thyng, and cōmeth by hap vnto any body as thus.

I deny the consequēce, because it is a deceiptfull argument, by that, which is the accident. For when many thyn­ges chaunce to one manne, we must se what are the very causes of that thyng whiche wee attribute to the subiecte. Dauid is a blessed mā. And wherfore? Not because he was an adulterer, for that happened to hym casually, but be­cause he was chosen of God, and had the feare of God before his iyes, and although this happened by the instinct of the deuill, yet he called for grace, re­pented sore, and trusted in Gods mer­cie, as the Psalmes plentifully be are witnesse, and this was the cause, why [Page] [...]e was blessed.

Ye must obserue, that in this deceiptfull argument, although many thyn­ges, are referred to one subiect, yet are thei not after one sorte, comprehended in thesame subiect, but diuersly consi­dered, as whē I ioyne accidentes, bothe of body, and mynd together, as thus.

Here ye maie se the accidētes of the mynd and body, ioyned together, whi­che should not be so.

¶The Anabaptistes reason thus.

In the first proposiciō, that thyng is ment, whiche is not at al, but is cleane gone frō nature, or els neuer was with in the nature of thynges. In the secōde [Page] proposiciō, (synne) is to bee reported to bee nothyng, because it self beyng no­thyng worthe, spoyleth a man of his o­ther vertues, and so ouerthroweth na­ture, asmuche as it can. When we se a man blynde, we iudge that he hath lost his sight, herein we esteme the sight, to be a gift geuen of God, and blyndnesse to bee the taker awaie of that, whiche was geuen of God. In like case, synne is the destruccion of that, whiche was, beyng of it self nothyng. And so in this case, to dooe well, is a thyng, the want wherof, is nothyng, the whiche, is sin.

¶Another.

I answere, the lawe e [...]creaseth not synne, by the awne nature, but casual­ly. For when man himself, is corrupted with vice, then the Lawe maketh his synne appere hainous, and en [...]reaseth [Page] y ^e knowlege of sinne in him. So that i [...] the firste proposicion, the nature of in­creasyng sinne, is considered: in the se­cond proposiciō, the casuall happenyng is rehersed when thynges are euil not of theimselfes, but made euill through the wickednesse of the offēdor. Al suche arg [...]mentes, muste be aduoyded by di­stinccion, that is, ye muste declare the double meanyng in the two proposici­ons, & thē ye haue soluted the subtilitie

¶The seconde.

FRom that, whiche is partely and after a sorte so, to be full, and wholy so, and by colour of the part, to geue iudgement of the whole.

This argumēt is from the particu­lar, to the vniuersall, the which is easy [Page] to be aduoyded. Therefore errors doo often chaunce, when we comprehende the whole, speakyng onely of the part, or when we make the signe, to bee the very self thyng, and although ye haue had childishe examples before, onely to make the matter plain, ye shall se that in weightie matters, this deceiptfull argument hath been vsed.

We heare many nowe a daies crye out and saie, the lawyers are naught, they meane no truthe, but onely seke for lucre, where as no man I thynke condemneth all lawyers, although he haue iust cause to accuse somme wret­ched lawyers. Some saye agayne that priestes haue lefte fornicatiō gaily wel [...] and are neuer suspected nowe a dayes for adulterie beyng yoked in lawfull mariage: But some spare not to saye a­gayne, that they haue made an exchau­ge, leauyng vp whoredome, and folo­wyng couetousnesse, the deuell and al: marie God forbidde that all priestes should so do. And in dede if anye one should so reason, I would recken hys argument to be comprehended within [Page] the compasse of this false conclusion. Thus reason the Anabaptistes.

By this meanes we shall haue no kyngdome, no lawe, no political order, no trade, no discipline, no iudgement for offendours. But this argument is to be reiected, because it is deryued frō the part, to the whole. For although many thynges be amisse in a politicall bodie, yet the whole therfore must not be dissolued, the lawes must not be ab­rogated, nor yet good order abādoned: for the chiefe thynge that is in euerie empire is a thing, ordeined of God, and a righteous thyng, as for an example. Political order, lawes, statutes, Iud­gement, execution, and punyshyng of­fendours, and therefore they reason a­misse, that saye there is an abuse in a politicall ordre, therefore we shal haue no order at all in anie common weale, & [Page] agayne ye shall perceyue, that there is more in the conclusion, then was rehersed in the two former propositions. Therfore we ought diligently to note the circumstaunce of the thyng, if we will auoyde this subtiltie, and when a thyng is spoken in parte, we must not thereby iudge the whole: or measure y ^e vniuersall, by that whiche is compre­hended vnder the generall.

This is from the inferior to the vniuersall, whiche is not well gathered, as it standeth here: for although a man maie forsake his wife, beyng naught of her bodie, yet maye he not forsake an honest woman, when it liketh hym to change. for this worde (wife) in the first proposition, is hedged with her circū ­stance, that is to say, aduoutry, whiche causeth diuorcement. Neither is this argument good, the Kyng maie put to death euery euill man, Ergo the kyng maie put to death euery man. Againe if we will reason negatiuely, as we dyd [Page] before affirmatiuelie, we shall frame our argument amisse. As thus.

¶Agayne.

This is from the vniuersal, to that which is inferior, and as ye would saie hedged with his circūstance, & compas­sed with that, whiche before, was nei­ther in wife, nor yet in wine. For a wife so lōg as she kepeth her self to her hus­band only, she is no aduoutresse. Wine that drinketh of itself, is not myngled, and therfore the argument is not good because that thyng is in the lesse, or in­ferior, whiche was not in the generall.

There is a figure in Rethorick, cal­led Hiperbole, that is to saye, when a thyng is spoken beyond measure vncrediblie, and yet is not so largely ment. As when I wyll prayse a man for hys strēgth, I wil say, he passeth Hercules in manhode, meanyng that he excelleth [Page] in manhode and valeauntnes. If we knowe one that ronneth well, eyther dogge, man, or horse, we vse to saye, he is as swifte as a swallowe, he flieth li­ke an arrowe out of a bowe, meanyng onely that he is excedyng swifte. Therfore we must diligētly take hede, when such speches are vsed, that we take not them as they be spoken, but as they are ment, neyther take the whole for the part, when the whole is expressed in wordes, and the part ment in vnder­standyng. Ieremie saieth.

This consequent is not good, for Ie­remias saiyng, muste be vnderstande exclusiuely. The waie of man, that is to saye, the callyng of man, is not only ruled or led by the powre, strength, or force of mā, neither can he do any thing of himselfe alone, without the helpe or [Page] grace of god. Sennacherib that wicked kyng, thought by his own powre and wisdom, to wynne his spurres against Ierusalem, but he trusted so muche to himselfe, & hys owne wisdome, that he lost his bootes & al, at lēgth. The chief and principal cause of all godly actiōs, procede from God, but so not withstandyng do they procede, that man hath choise, wil, and libertie, to do what him liketh, beyng assisted with the grace of God. As Christ prayseth the labou­rer and saith. To him that hath, shalbe geuen. And Chrisostome saieth verie well. God draweth vnto hym, but he draweth the willing. For god wil haue our good wil, to be ioyned with his callyng. Therfore Plato in his .iiij. booke where he framed his cōmō weale, doth well mitigate this Hiperbola, in this sentence whiche semeth credible (God doth al thynges, & orders euery action) saiyng, I do wel allowe this sentence, that God ruleth al thynges, but so not withstandyng I allowe it, if it be well vnderstād. For it ware best to grounde it so, that mans will, labour, and dili­gence, [Page] must be ioyned thereunto, as we se in sailyng vpon the sea, Shipmen cal to God for helpe, and God will helpe them, but so not withstandyng, if they helpe them selfes. Accordyng wherun­to there is in the fables of Esope a ta­le of one, whose cart stode fast in the myre, whiche man seyng his cart laied faste, cried to Hercules for helpe, and praied that he might come from heauē: answer was made, that he should first helpe himself, & then cal vpō Hercules, or els his cart were like to stick fast stil.

¶An other argument.

The disceipt is, from the particular to the vniuersall. As who should saie, some do not erre in the churche, Ergo no bodie doth erre at all, that be of the churche: which is false, for the churche is as wel of the euel as of the good. The good men that are trayned in the truth of God, and taught the true loue of God, by ofte readyng and folowyng [Page] his worde, haue the true lyght & erre not: Other that be slouhtfull, careles, brouned in ambition, and all wordlie luste, both can erre, and do erre, from tyme to tyme. Therefore where as I saie, the church doth not erre, it is cal­led Synecdoche, that is to saye, when the part is vsed for the whole.

An other argument made by the Anabaptistes.

This argumēt is frō the part to the whole: he is deliuered frō the lawe, for somuch as perteineth to his condem­nation, but he is not fre for so muche as belōgeth to the due obediēce, which he oweth vnto God: for this order stā ­deth for euer most stedfastly, that euery creature be obedient to God the crea­tour. Again for asmuch as in euery iust man that is conuerted from his euill waies there remaineth a wycked incli­nation, [...] [Page] [Page] [Page] the same must alwayes be bride led and kepte in, euen with the ter­rour of the lawe, as thoughe it ware with a mouserolle.

¶The signe is often tymes turned into the thyng it selfe, as I reher­sed before.

This argumēt men haue vsed, when they haue seen a man painted in a wal, or grauen in a stone, as thus. This is sainct Christopher, this is sainct Loy. This is the picture of Christ, Ergo it is Christe. This is an Image of oure Ladye, Ergo it is oure Ladye, and here she wyll worke wounders. more than in an other place, as she dyd at walsingham, at Boston, at Lincoln, at Ipswiche, and I cannot tell where, when priestes gatherd monye, & poore folkes ware mocked. here, ye must denie the consequēt, bycause the signe is not the thing signified, neither is god boūd to any place, to the whiche he hath not bound hym selfe by his worde, nor yet and saint neither. This rule ouerthro­weth [Page] all maner of Idols whiche haue ben in all ages from tyme to tyme. In this kynd of subti [...]tie, ye must diligēt­ly obserue .iiij. circumstancies, the par­son, the tyme, the place, and the maner of comparynge thynges together, all which are false & deceipteful reasons.

The p [...]rson.

The tyme.

The place.

The maner of comparyng.

Compare these .ij. together, & marke [Page] the accident adioyned to a man, and ye shall perceiue that it taketh awaye all substaunce, and leaueth only the sha­dow: for this worde painted, restray­neth the other & compasseth hym with in his boūdes, so that a painted mā can no more be called a man, then an adul­terous wife can be called a wife: for so longe is a woman called a wife, as she kepeth her selfe within the boundes of matrimonie, other wise she is no wyfe, although men vse to cal them wyues.

The .iii. deceipt.

SEcundum nō causam, vt cau­sam, that is, when a cause that [...]s not able to proue the mat­ [...]er, is brought in as though [...] it ware of force and strengthe, but the ground beynge considered, the fault is easely espied.

Wyne is not to be reproued altoge­ther, although some abuse the same, for it is a good thinge ordeyned of God for the sustenaunce of man.

An other argument.

In all suche argumentes, wherei [...] good thynges are reproued, bycause e­uil bodies abuse thesame, the euil wyl [...] and the naughty inclination of the man whiche abuseth suche thynges is to be rebuked: and therfore whē it is other­wise, it may be said, that a cause which is not, is put for a cause. As some abuse Paules meanyng, when they go about to depraue philosophie.

The argument doth not folowe, for a good thyng may be much abused, and yet the thynge it selfe may not be alto­gether reiected as naught: therfore Paule doth not condemne demonstra­tions and principles whiche are assu­red truthes, taught by the sciences, as in arithmeticke .iiij. and .iiij. make .viij. In philosophie. The whole is greater [Page] then the parte, do as thou woldest be done vnto, but he reproueth the abuse of sciences, when there is made a min­gle mangle of them, and one confoun­ded with an other, as some haue sayde that philosophie wil teache a christian, asmuche for his profession, as all the Prophetes and the whole Bible besi­des wyll doe: this made Paule byd men take hede, that they be not deceaued by philosophie.

Now a dayes they wyll saye. I can­not tell, here is is muche preachynge, muche teachyng of godes worde, but I see fewe folowers of it, it was a bet­ter worlde when we had not halfe so many preachers, heresies were neuer more ripe, naughtinesse neuer more a­bounded, therfore gyue vs the olde learnyng again, and take you the new.

This reason is not worthy a strawe, The wickednes of the Preachers co­meth not of their learning, but of their vicious natures, and naughty desiers: for out of one and the same floure the Bee sucketh hony, and the spider dra­weth poison. By these and such other [Page] like examples, ye maie easely espie, wherefore the Argument is not good, yf ye marke whether the true cause be in the former Proposition, or some counterfect reason, whiche semeth to proue, and yet in diede doth not proue the matter at al. for if I reason thus.

What man seeth not, that doth see any iote at al, that this geare hangeth together like a brokē potte sheerd, and that the Antecedent doth nothyng at all, proue the Consequent: and yet the other Argumentes aboue rehersed (if they bee narowlie marked,) are as folishe, & as worthie to be laughed at, as is this folishe fonde reason, and madly inuented argument.

¶An oth [...]r Argument.

The Consequent is false, for Christ doth forbid his Disciples, to feare the [Page] signes, not by cause they signifie none euil to come, but by cause that where as they signifie harme, & punishemen [...] to the worlde, & wicked persons: yet he wilbe a present succour to his church, and neuer leaue it comfortles. As whē the godly heare this (feare not death) it doth not folow, but that death is an horrible thyng, and much repugnaunt to mans nature. This deceiptful Ar­gument is muche vsed in this our life, and made a bucklar for diuerse mat­ters. As when I am lothe to bee of a quest, or that any such busines shoulde trouble me, beyng sent for, I faine my self sicke, because I would not gladlie come. Or whē one that is riche should healpe a poore mā, to saie: God healpe you syr. I haue a great charge my self, I can not do for you. Or when a Bis­shoppe shoulde be desired to teache or preache, to saie: he is sick. Or when a lawyer being desired to healpe a poore man, and profered there vpon, a litle mony, euen so muche as the poore man can not well spare, and yet not halfe so muche as the lawyer woulde haue: [Page] streyght to saie, I am sory, I can not do for you, if I were not called vpon otherwise by diuerse men, I woulde not fa [...]l to do you good. This is as thei saie in English, better a badde excuse, then none at all, in Latine it is called, non causa pro causa posita. And the vsing of such excuses emōg the Retho­ritians, is called, translatio, that is to saie, a shiftyng, or puttyng of the faulte from one, to an other. As wee reade that Demades vsed a wōderfull good shifte, whē it was laidesore to his charge y ^t he had writttē a very naugh­tie decre and vnhonest, for the obtey­nyng of the peace at Alexanders hand: He aunswered that the same Decree was not writtten with his owne wri­tyng pen, but with Alexanders war­ryng speare, which is asmuche to saie, feare did driue him to take suche, and such conditions of peace. We reade a notable Historie of a younge childe in Rome, called Papirius, whiche be­cause both it is pleasaūt, & much to be woundred at, and also serueth for this purpose right aptly, I thinke it meete [Page] to be rehersed in this place. This Pa­pirius beyng a young ladde of .x. or .xij. yeres olde, and sonne to one of the Se­natours in Rome, whiche were then, as noble men be nowe in Englande, lords of the Counsail, went euery day with his father to the Parliamente house, and hard from time to time all matters that were debated there. His father euermore charged hym that he should not vtter any thyng, which he hard, to any bodie liuing. It happened afterward that vpon vrgent causes & weightie affaires, the Counsail did sit muche longer then they were wount, and cōtinued so, for the space of a seuē-night. Euery bodie meruailed what this matter shoulde be. This boy Pa­pirius knew all. His mother beyng most of all desirous to knowe what it should be, when she could not attaine the knowlege thereof by her housbād, she called the boie to confession, & ha­uyng the instrument of absolution by her, that is, a very good birchē rodde, charged her sonne truely to tell her e­uery whitte that was debated in the [Page] Parliament house, or els he shoulde smart for it surely: for, what with the secretenesse of the thyng, and what with the silence of her sonne, she was wonderfull with childe, till she had gotte some what of the boie. The boie himselfe, first remēbryng his fathers cōmaundement, and consideryng how he shoulde be paide at his hande, if he tolde al thynges in diede as they were: and again of the other side, seyng pre­sente paine before hym, the rodde at hande, his mother with childe till she were somewhat satisfied, thought it better, pretely & by the waie to mocke his mother, and so to stop her mouth with some forged tale: then falsely to bewraie his father, his frendes, and al his country. and therfore thus he be­gan craftely to shape his tale: Mo­ther if you wil promise me to kepe that close, which I shal disclose vnto you, and tell it no body liuynge, you shall heare the whole matter, euen as it is. She aunswered, she would not tell it againe whatsoeuer it were. Then said he, Mother the matter wholly cōcer­neth [Page] mariage, and the Counsaill haue long debated, whether it were better for one man to haue two wiues, or one wife to haue two housbandes, and as yet the matter hangeth in suspence. When she harde this, her hart burned & her stomake was ouercharged won­derfully, that except she had laied it in one of her neighbours lappes, it was like she woulde haue brast. Out she goeth, & maketh asmuch spede with her toung, as she doth with her fete, & tel­leth it immediatly to her nexte neigh­bour, and from one, to an other, till at length a nomber knew it, where vpon they agreed wholly to go all together to the Counsaill house, to entreat the Senatours to sit no longer vpon this matter, but clearely to determine with one assente and consente, that it were best, & most expedient for euery womā to haue .ij. housbandes, and not other­wise for no worldes good, any thyng heretofore to the contrarie notwith­standyng. By this example ye maie see the subtiltie of this deceipte. For whē the mother asked her sonne, what the [Page] cause was of their lōge sitting, he told [...] her a cleane cōtrarie thyng, which the Counsaill neuer thought nor yet once minded, this is, nō causa pro causa po­sita. A cause that is not, put for a cause

¶The .iiii. deceipt.

FAllacia consequentis, when the consequent, that is to saie the latter proposicion, is euill gathered by the antecedent, whiche goeth before. And the waie to knowe the fault of this deceiptfull ar­gument, is to examyne the argument, with the preceptes of Logique, aboue rehersed.

The argument is not good, first cō ­sideryng, we cannot fulfill the law, by our selfes. Again, workes are wicked, that are doen without faithe, so that first we must be in the state of grace by faithe, and assured through faithe, to liue euer, before our workes shalbe ac­cepted for good, neither can our doyn­ges [Page] bee perfecte, in any parte, to fulfill Goddes will, and his commaundemē ­tes, and therefore, though euill deedes deserue death, yet good deedes can ne­uer purchase life, so long as we be not able, to fulfill the Lawe, as God kno­weth, we shall neuer be: scripture, our consciences, the worlde, and all, bea­ryng witnesse against vs. Of signes that bee not proper, neither tary long, no strong argument is made, as thus.

Palenes maie come of study, of care and thought, of abstinēce, of watchyng of some distēperature in the body, and many other waies besides.

Again, there is an other rule. A pos­se ad esse, non est bona consequentia. Because a thyng maie bee, it shall not therefore folowe that it is. As the Ca­tholikes haue serued vs, for the Sacrament, saiyng, that because God is om­nipotent, and maie bee in the Sacra­ment, by his power really: Ergo he is there really. For so maie I saie. God [Page] may fede euery christian, both in body & soule, with the might of his worde. Er­go he doth so. The prophet saith, I ne­uer sawe a iust mā forsaken of god, nor his sede begging his bread. And yet god doth not fede al christiās with his word only, but vseth his appoyncted wil ge­nerally. Likewise in the Sacrament, God fedeth vs spiritually, because the fleshe eatē, profiteth nothyng, and thei that eate the Sacrament in faith, tary in God [...] and God in them spiritually [...] & haue life euerlastyng, whereas other that eate it without faithe, haue it not at all, for lacke of faithe, consideryng God is in no wicked mā. But in thold world, many wonders were wrought, and because thinges might be [...] al thyn­ges should be, as thei would haue it, & yet I cannot bee perswaded to thynke that because al priestes maie be honest, therfore thei all be honest.

From the general, to the inferior, af­firmatiuely, is no good argumēt made.

He maie notwithstandyng, bee an [Page] euil man, yea, & soner euill, then good, for none can tell almoste now a daies, where the good men d [...]ell. Or if thei haue dwellyng places still, yet few cā finde them at home. Again, to make an argument, from those thynges, whiche happen to a man, and maie bee awaye: the reason cannot of necessitie folowe.

In this reason, a likelihode is made necessary, as though it could not other wise bee, but that he was in loue, be­cause he went in freshe apparell, yong man like. But for this whole capcious cause, I thynke it best, that ye marke the rules, aboue rehersed, and ye shall not faile to espie the faulte, for the de­c [...]ipte is sone seen, if ye call the argu­ment to accompt.

¶The .v. deceipt.

PLures interrogationes, many questions, that is, when I goo aboute to deceiue one, askyng hym this & that, & he thinkyng [Page] not to what end I aske hym, at length is brought to an inconuenience, by his former grauntyng, of thynges particu­larly. And it is two waies considered: First when we aske of many thynges, one: and again, when wee aske of one thing, many thinges, & put forth diuerse questiōs, before we come to y ^e pur [...]ose. For the first, this maie be an example.

Is water and wine whot or no?

The questiō is asked, so that he must answere to them bothe, whiche he can not do at one tyme, and geue one reso­lute answere directly, accordyng to the demaunders will. But this is a trifle, and one that hath but a spōfull of wit, maie answere to this question, v [...]yng a distinccion, and seuerall shewyng the qualities, of bothe wine and water, o­therwise he cannot be able, to make a­ny reasonable answere, as the question is propounded.

Is worshippyng of sainctes, and praiyng to god himself, allowed emong Christians, or no?

Here ye se, that for .ij. diuerse thyn­ges, one certain question is directly re­quired, [...] [Page] [Page] [Page] whereas no man can iustly an­swere at a worde: and therfore the que­stion beyng vain made ioyntly, must se­uerally be soluted.

I will merily adde another, whiche agreeth to the secōd maner of askyng, & I wil adde thesame, rather to geue matter of laughyng, then that there is any great waight in it. A lawyer toke pai­nes in a matter of law, for a certain gē ­tleman, that was some tyme a scholer. The gentleman promised hym a horse for his labour, the lawyer after paines taken, requireth his horse, the gentle­man denieth his debt, although the lawyer had witnesse. And thus the gentle­mā reasoned merily for hym self: sir qd he, all horses be not of one colour, but of diuerse coloures, some blacke, some white, some baye, some daple: if I owe you any by promise, I owe you no more of one colour, then I do of another, cō ­sideryng, I did promise you no more of one colour, then I did of another, and I maie be discharged of my promise, as well in deliueryng one certain colored horse, as another. Therefore, either I [Page] owe you horses of all colours, or els I owe you none at all: but I do not owe you horses of all colours, (consideryng I promised you but one) therefore I owe you none. Yea, serue you me so, qd the Lawyer, mary this schoole poynct, much passeth al our lawe poīctes. Wel sir as it pleaseth you, qd he, if you be at that poynct. Whē the gentleman sawe hym so reasonable, and heard hym saie so, he gaue him accordyng vnto his pro­mise, cōsideryng, he referred the whole matter so gently, to his pleasure.

For this seconde maner of askyng, when of one thing, many are asked, one maie easely be inuegled and brought to an incōuenience, before he be ware, & of this kinde of askyng, there is also a no­table exāple in Tullie, where he spea­keth in his boke De inuentione, of this figure inductio, whiche is by thynges not doubtful, to proue that thyng true which is doubtfull. Socrates sheweth that Aspasia had this talke with zeno­phon, and his wife, in maner and forme folowyng, after other communication had before. And tell me in faith, (quod [Page] Aspasia) if thy neighbour had more precious Iewels then thou nowe haste, whether wouldest thou wisshe to haue hers, or thine owne? She aunswered. I woulde haue hers, what if she had more costelie garmentes, more fine ap­parell, wouldest thou not haue it also, ye mary would I, (quod she.) Ah well I say, what if thy neighbour had a bet­ter husband then thou nowe hast, whe­ther haddest thou rather kepe thyne owne still, or hers? With that she bloushed. Then Aspasia when appor­tunitie serued, spake to zenophon like­wise, and said merelie vnto him, he not knowing of this that was spoken be­fore. I praye the tell me zenophon, What if thy neighbour had a better horse then thyne is, haddest thou ra­ther haue thine own or thy neighbors? I would haue his saieth he. what if he had better lande then thou hast, woul­dest thou haue [...]is, or thyne owne? I would haue his saieth he. What if he had a better wife then thou hast, wouldest thou chaunge or no? Here zenophō sayd neuer a worde. Then spake Aspa­sia. [Page] For asmuche as both of you onely hath not aunswered me, in that poinct, which I moste desired to knowe: I my selfe will showe what both you thinke. For you beyng a woman, first you desi­re a very honest man to your husband: and zenophon beyng a man, desireth to haue a ryght honest woman. Therfore except you both shall so behaue youre selfes, that there maye be founde, ney­ther man, nor woman, more honest vnd earth, then you two be: vndoubtelie you both will euermore moste earnest­lye desyre that, whiche you thinke pri [...] cipale and best of al, both that thou be­yng a husband, might haue a ryght ho­nest wyfe, and you also beyng a womā [...] myght be maried to a ryght honest hus­bande.

¶The syxt deceit [...].

PEtitio princip [...], the cuckowes song, that is, a repeting of that wholly in the conclusion, whi­che before was onely spoken in the first proposition: or els by thynges doubtful, to proue thynges that are as doubtfull.

The conclusion is not well gathe­red, for it should not be vniuersall, but particular, & therefore seyng the same is repeted that was spokē before, with out any good probation: in my mynde it maie be called the cuckowes songe. Agayne, when an vnknowen thyng is proued by a thyng, that is as much vn­knowen, as the other is.

This wyse reason, fond preachers heretofore haue made, that therefore we must haue masse for the dead, be­cause in purgatorie sinnes be forgeuen the dead. And yet doubte I asmuch of this place purgatorie, as I mistruste this folish massyng, & to saie truth it is sinne to like either of thē both, & as for purgatorie, I thynke there was neuer [Page] none suche, but onely inuented to feare the simple, as children haue bene made afraied with a visar, or els founde out to pike mens purses. An other.

I aunswere, whoredom hath bene vsed these many hundreth yeares, Er­go it is lawful both to haue the stewes and to go to the stewes still.

Euery man may see howe foolyshe this argument is, and yet it is as good as the other, euery ynche of it. For al­though men haue praied, mē haue gone on pilgremage thus lōg, and thus lōg: yet it is not therfore true, that the people did well therein. For we Englyshe men knowe (not only by heare say, but also by good experience) that custome is the mother, and the sucke geuer vn­to all error. And therefore, when suche argumentes are made, we saie. Dubiū per id quod aeque dubium est, confir­matur. That which is doubtful, is proued by that whiche is as doubtful, and [Page] so we do not allowe the argumēnt.

Thirdly, when that thynge is taken to proue, as thoughe it ware vndoub­ted, and euery bodie agreed therunto: where as yet it is in controuersie.

Who knoweth not, that hath any knowlege of the truth, that the firste may lawfully be doubted, and rather denied, then graunted.

Fourthly, this deceipte is then vsed when that whiche foloweth, proueth that which goeth before, as though the cart went before the horse, for often ti­mes that thynge whiche is proued, is more assured then that whiche dothe proue, as thus.

The consequent is vndoubtedly true, for as muche as we fi [...]de it so in the scripture that in y ^e primatiue chur­che whole families wer baptised, chil­dren and all: for we reade not that they [Page] were excepted: and yet some doubte, & that of the greatest clarkes, whether children haue faith or no.

The .vii. deceipt.

IGnoratio elenchi, (that is the mistakyng of cōtradictorie pro­positions) is a disceiptful argu­ment which comprehēdeth in it selfe al other aboue rehersed subtilties Aristotel notwithstandynge hath com­passed this deceipt with in his boūdes. First when respect is not made to one and the same thynge, but diuersely ap­plied.

Truth it is & yet shal it not folowe, that whosoeuer eateth, the same man doth offende: cōsidering to eate is law­full, and is none offence to God at all, beyng ones allowed by the magistrate, in whose hande lyeth the whole orde­ryng of this matter.

[Page]Againe, this deceipt is vsed when contradiction is made according to di­uerse respectes, as thus.

It is euen so, and yet not true ney­ther, that the law is alwayes to be re­iected, and to be folowed, as it pleaseth our phantasies.

Thirdly, this subtiltie is fashioned, when a contradiction is vsed, and yet not vsed of lyke sorte, so that the latter parte doth not denye the former in one maner of vnderstandyng, as thus.

Those that liue licentiously, & feare not the general resurrection, may iust­ly be here included, and the .ij. senten­ces whiche seeme to gayne saye, maye both be true in them: for some knowe that the scriptures are of God, or at least, thei know that the scriptures are [Page] commonly taken for the worde of god, and yet they themselues, knowe not one worde of gods will, nor yet passe a whitte for it. Or we may say that those poore soules in the Popes reigne knew the word of god o [...]ly by here say, when thei hard the ghosphell redde in latine, & coulde not tel one word what it mēt.

Fourthly, the time, maye alter thin­ges, and make .ij. diuerse thinges to be both true, thus.

It is an easye matter to auoyde all suche deceiptes. Therfore there is a rule in logique that .ij. contradictions can neuer be both, either false or true, at one and the same time, and that in one respect, as thus.

These .ij. propositions can neuer be [Page] bothe together either true or false. Nowe the other whiche were made before, maye be both true, at one and the same time, & therfore they are not con­tradictories, bycause they are not con­sidered in respec [...]e of one, and the same thing, at one and the same time, but di­uersly applied and considered, as thus.

Al this is true being diuersly consi­ [...]ered, first, a womā may not preache, & yet a man may, & so the sentēce is true, and it maye well be sayde to preache is meete and not meete, with out anye contradiction at all, bycause of the di­uerse respectes, whiche be had bothe to the man, and to the woman. if the rule of contradictorie propositions before rehersed, be well marked, all these de­ceiptes may easely be auoyded.

Of particular auoydyng false argume [...] ­ [...]es whiche are deryued from the places.

[Page]WHen I see an argumrnt deri­ued frō these subtile places, or els frō the places of inuentiō, which I haue before at large declared: I ought to obserue diligently the general rules & preceptes there gy­uen, for if one reason thus from the ge­nerall worde, suche a man foloweth noughtines, Ergo he is a thefe, the ar­gument is not good, and the error ap­pereth the rather, by this general rule, From the gene [...]al to the kynde, the ar­gument is not good. for though one be noughte otherwise, yet maye he lyue noughtly longe, and be no thefe at all, as he may be an aduouterer, a swearer, or suche like.

False [...]casons made through the euil framyng of an argument.

THe wrong framyng, may with ease be espied, if the rules be ones learned, that are before set forth for the same purpose. And again all other kynd of argumen­tes, haue rules especiall, and propre to themselfes whereby the true orderyng of an argument is better knowen.

Of obiections made to an argument.

OBiections are then vsed, whē we doe not dissolue the argu­ment by the rules of logique, or directly auoyd the danger, but bryng an other thyng, as an exam­ple, to ouerthrowe that whiche was spoken before, and this maner is foure wayes vsed.

• By takyng occasiō of the self same. thing, that is put forth, and wre­styng it otherwyse.
• By v [...]yng the like example in an o­ther matter,
• By makyng cleane cōtrary exāple.
• By standyng to aucthoritie, or v­syng sentences of the sage.

For the first, this example may serue, richesse are good, bycause they brynge pleasure. naye marie, richesse are euil, bycause they bryng wo.

Of the second, thus. Suche a one is an honest mā for I saw him ones gyue almose to the poore, I answere, such a one is no dronckarde, for I sawe him ones sober.

Of the third, thus. Suche an honest [Page] man hathe ones receaued a great dis­pleasure of his frinde and neighboure, Ergo he maye hate hym deadly for e­uer. Naye not so, for the wycked man will sometimes forgyue, receauyng dis­pleasure, and therefore the goodman must muche more forgyue.

Of the fourth, thus. Forgyue hym, bycause he is a child, nay not so, for Salomon byddeth, that the rodde shoulde not go frō the childe, therfore it is good to beate hym, when he offendeth.

I haue trauayled thus farre, to dis­close vntruthes, and to open cloked errors, wherein though sometimes the examples be but slender, yet in greate matters the same dec [...]ipte hath taken place. Therfore though to the English eare, they maye seme straunge, yet I hope they wilbe better taken, when this is knowē and fullie seen, that thei gyue light to greater matters, and that logique bi good order, & perfite reason [...] doth rule all and espieth faultes whi­che otherwise would brede offence: for loke what false argument is vsed, the s [...]me maye with ease be founde in some [Page] one of these deceipteful corners, or els­where in the places of inuention, and therfore maye by arte easelye be auoy­ded. especiallye, if the other rules a­boue rehersed, be ones well dige [...]ed. for the rules are touche stones to trye vntruthes, and to frame matters right. And generally good hede ought to be had, that the matter, & forme of euerye argument be true accordyng to the ru­les [...] for by these .ij. pointes, al errors are espied. The faulte is in the mat [...]er (cal­led in latine Materia,) when wordes are doubtefull, and may diuersly be ta­ken, & also when the pithe, or substāce of the matter is cōfounded, & straunge­lye vsed by woordes ioyned together, & thinges not orderly placed: in al which kynd of argumentes, ye must vse either a flatte deniall of the proposition, or els vse a distinction to shewe howe the ar­gumēt may be true, and how it may be false, accordynge as it is vnderstanded. We vse a denial when of .ij. propositiōs in the Argument, wee denie either the proposition at large, or the seuerall by showyng the fault to be in the definiti­on, [Page] in the diuisiō, in the causes, or some other place, as thus.

Here the fault is in the definicion, for if I would go about to d [...]fine an honest man, euery bodie would la [...]gh me to scorne, if I would thus define him. That man what soeuer he be that ma­keth me good cheare at his house, is a very honest man: but I muste rather say thus. What so euer he is that doth as he woulde be done vnto, and wron­geth no body, but liueth stil vprightly [...] godly, and continently, that same is an honest man, or els not. For vertu is gotten by longe practise, and by well doyng of many good thynges, not by makyng a good dinner, and therefore the other aboue rehersed definition, by cause it is not lauful nor agreing with the rules of a definition, it is vtterly to be denied, this reason applied there vnto that the definition is not lawful. Albeit I knewe one in my life, & that no smal birde, which was better lear­ned [Page] then wise, and yet not so wel lear­ned in d [...]ede, as he thought himself in his owne opinion, wise, and vsed the like reason. For where as it chaunced by occasion of talke, that one in his cō ­paigny inueighed agaynst y ^e same mās frend, speaking thinges nothing toth­some, & otherwise then he would glad­ly heare, although not greatly missing the quishyne in reportyng truthe, he toke the matter very hotte, and like a frende spake earnestly in his frendes cause, testifyeng for his honestie with most constant wordes, and to persuad [...] hym y ^e better he vsed this sore reason. Thou art to blame, quoth he to depra­ue such a mānes estimaciō, for by gods mother he is a very honest mā, for he is my special frend, I would thou shoul­dest know it, & therrfore cease thy rai­ling: with that, other came to part thē. for they fell to reasonyng with Argu­mentes, that were neither in figure, nor in mode, but stode in plaine buffef­tes, whiche is a subtiltie, that is not mencioned with in the cōpasse of this boke, aud therefore daungerous, nei­ther [Page] can it be auoided, except one haue a headpece, or some weapō in his hande to beare of, suche deceipte, & so to saue himselfe harmelesse. Some cal suche rough dealyng, Carters Sophistrie, when the fiste reasoneth a matter by buffites, which the tongue should pro­ue by Argumentes. Again for the diui­sion when it is not well made, it is to be denyed in like maner, the cause sho­wed why and wherefore, as thus.

This deuision is not good, for many men offende in neither, but liue mode­rately [...] content with there owne, be it neuer so litle. Moreouer whē no true cause is applied, but a false reason for­ged, ye may auoid daunger by denieng it, as thus.

¶Or thus.

¶Or thus.

In all suche Argumentes the true cause is omitted, and a counterfecte cause vsed. for neither mony, nor [...]ire, not yet water, do harme of thē selues [...] but the naughtines of nature whiche abuseth them, & the necligence of man which forseeth not to thē, is the verye true cause of their euil doyng: and yet in waightie matters suche fonde rea­sons haue bene vsed, as for the reading of Gods worde, for women to be lear­ned, for Rethorick to be taught, or the temporall law at this daye in this our realme to be frequented, or occupied.

A distinction must be vsed, whē any worde is doubtfull, and maie be taken diuersly [...] As thus.

Here a distinction must be vsed, for tyme aswell signifieth an hearbe, as it [Page] signifieth the space, whiche is of an houre, daie, or yere. A frende of myne was called Harris. one not well kno­wyng his name, called him Harrisōne. I deny the sonne ( qd he) not meanyng the second person in Trinitie, but the addicion of this worde (sonne.)

A learned man & a Phisician (some knowe whō I meane) hauyng at a cer­tain tyme a coate of Ueluet, that was muche worne, and bare at the brest, be­yng then also poore withall, & hauyng a thyn [...]e purse, sittyng at a table, and laiyng his hande vpon his brest, saied thus merily to his frende: well ( qd he) for all this harde worlde, at the worste I am thus muche worth, euen in bare Ueluet. Thesame man afterward, sit­tyng at a Table, not hauyng elbowe rowine, but beyng troubled, & his cote somwhat araied, which was dressed at the Shermans, not past two or thre da­yes before, said merily: I praie you my Maisters bee good to my coate, for I promise you, within these two or thre daies, it hath scaipt a skowryng.

A young man of Cambridge, stan­dyng [...] [Page] [Page] [Page] in a Galarie ouer the water, and lokyng on his boke: hauyng the water on the one side, and a gardine on the o­ther side, wherein as it chaunced then, were diuerse maidens of the toune (for it was aboute Easter, at what tyme maidens gadded abrode, after thei had taken their maker, as thei cal it) he be­yng thus beset, one of his felowes be­yng abrode, and seyng hym there, bad hym come to hym. He answered, I can not come. The other demaunded why? Mary (quod he) because I am compas­sed with fire, and water. Meanyng the maidens to bee fire, and a prouocacion to lust, burnyng worse then fire: and [...]o all good aucthors haue vsed this worde fire. As Terence. Accede ad ignem hunc, iam calesces plus satis. Come to this fire, saieth Parmeno to Phe­dria, meanyng Thais the harlotte, and you shalbe as whote, as coles by & by. Therfore where such speache is vsed, it is alwaies called in latine metapho­ra. That is to saie, a turnyng from the proper significacion to that, whiche is not proper, wherein the olde Philoso­phers, [Page] haue wonderfully excelled, as Diogenes, Socrates, and in our tyme sir Thomas More, a mā for his witte, very singulare.

The faulte that is in the forme, or maner of makyng, as we cal it, maie be dissolued, when we shewe that the cō ­clusion, is not well proued, by the for­mer proposicions, and that the argu­ment, is either not well made, in figure or in mode, or in bothe: for of true thyn­ges, none other thyng can be concluded but truthe, if the due forme of conclu­dyng be obserued, and the iust placyng or settyng of the termes, called in La­tine, termini, as ye hard before, be tru­ly ke [...]t, as the rules before haue taught Notwithstandyng of false proposiciōs an vndoubted truth, maie wel enough be concluded, as thus.

[Page]The two first proposicions are ma­nifestly false, and yet the conclusion is very true. So that ye maie se, after .ij. false proposiciōs, a true cōclusion may folowe, and not contrary wise, of two true proposicions, a false conclusion cā bee made. For as we saie in Latine. Ex ueris, nil nisi ue [...]ū sequitur, that is to saie, of true saiynges, nothing doth fo­lowe but truth. Therfore whē the con­clusion semeth not good, ye maie iustly suspect the other two proposicions, al­though thei seme neuer so true, for vn­dou [...]tedly, the fault is either in the e­uill knittyng, (when the argument is not in his mode, and figure accordyng­ly,) or els in the cōfoundyng of wordes either not well placed, or euill applied or els in the doubtfulnes of some word

Thus we se a false conclusion, made of twoo vndoubted true proposicions, and yet I said before, of true saiynges, nothyng doth folowe but onely truth. [Page] But abide, ye must examine this argu­ment with the rules, & then ye shal se, that the fault is in the forme, or maner [...]f makyng an argument. For it is in no mode of the first figure, although it be an argume [...]t of the first figure.

Some time the fault is only in the matter, & not in the maner of makyng an Argument, whereof there are di­uerse examples aboue rehersed Som­times the faulte is both in the matter, [...]nd in the maner of makyng an Argu­me [...]t, as thus.

First, it is in no figure, because the double repete in the first Proposicion is the substaunce of the yearth, and in the seconde Proposicion, is the beyng in the yearth, and so there [...]e .iiij. ter­mes, in the twoo Proposicions. Again it is in no mode, because the first Pro­posicion in the firste figure is not vni­uersal. And this may suffise which he­therto [Page] I haue rehersed for the solu­tyng of an Argument, for asmuche as he that cā deuide, define, and make his Argument in mode and figure, accor­dyng to the rules before mencioned, and diligētly marke doubtful wordes: shall sone espie the faultes in an euill Argument, for asmuche as it cannot o­therwise be, but y ^t he which knoweth the beste, shall easely iudge, and with out difficultie espie the worst.

And nowe the rather to delite the reader, I wil adde here certaine wittie questions and argumentes, which can hardely be auoided, and yet pleasant, & therfore not vnworthie to be knowne.

¶They are called trappyng Argu­mentes, because few that answere vn­to them, can auoide daunger, and thu [...] they are named in straunge wordes.

• Crocodilites.
• Antistrephon.
• Ceratine.
• A [...]is [...]aton.
• Cacosistaton.
• Vtis.
• Pseudomenos.

¶Crocodilites.

CRocodilites, is suche a kynde of subtiltie that when we haue graunted a thyng to our aduer­sarie beyng as [...]ed before what we will say: the same turneth to our harme af­terward: and causeth an inconueniēce thervpō to ensew. Authours do feigne that the Crocodile beyng a monster in Egypt did take a womans childe from her, and spake with the mother in this wise: Womā I wil geue the thy child again, if thou wilt saye truth to me, & tel me assuredly, whether I will geue the thy childe againe or no? She aun­swered, I knowe assuredly thou wilt not geue me my childe again, and ther­fore it is reason I haue my child again because I haue said truth. Nay, saied the Crocodile, I wil not geue the thy childe again because thou maist be seen to haue said truth, lesse that yf I geue the thy child again, thou shouldst haue made a lie: neither yet woulde I haue giuen the thy child again, if thou hadst [...]aid otherwise, because thē thou hadst not said truth. And hereof this Argu­ment [Page] hath his name, called Crocodi­lites. Notwithstandyng Luciane tel­leth this tale after an oth [...]r sort, & ma­keth Chris [...]ppus to aske an other man what he would saie, in case he shoulde be asked such a question of the Croco­dile, as I haue before rehersed.

¶Antistrephon.

ANtistrephon, is nothyng els, then to turne a mans saiyng in­to his owne necke again, and to make that whiche he bryngeth for his owne purpose, to serue for our purpose, in Latine it may be called, In­uersio. Aulu [...] Gellius hath a notable e [...]ample of Pithagoras, a noble So­phiste, & Euathus scholer to the same Pithagoras. This Euathus was a ve­ry riche young mā, and glad to learne eloquence, and to pleade causes in the common place. This young man ther­fore consideryng Pithagoras to bee a singular man in this behalfe, & a mete Scholemaister for his purpose, desired to be his scholer, and promised to giue him a great some of mony, for his pai­nes, [Page] euen asmuche as he woulde aske, and gaue him vpon agrement halfe in hāde before he learned, and couenaun­ted their vpon that he should haue the other halfe euen the first daie that he stode at Bar [...]e, and by pleadyng, gotte the ouerhand in Iudgement of his ad­uersarie. After this, when he had bene a good while Pithagoras scholer, and profited very muche in the Law, & yet notwithstāding came not to y ^e Barre, but stil shifted him of [...] and tracting the time (of like because he would not paie y ^e residue of his mony) Pithagoras ta­keth aduisemēt as he himself thought, very subtlely, & chargeth him with his promise, hauyng an action of debte a­gainst him, and therefore he called him to the Lawe. Where when he had hi [...] before the Iudges, he begynneth his tale in this wise.

Here I haue the nowe (saieth Pi­thagoras) and learne, therefore folishe felowe as thou art, & marke this poinct for thy learnyng: whether the iudge­ment be geuen with the, or against the, I shall haue my money euery grote of [Page] it. If thou art cast in the lawe, I haue wonne by vertue of the lawe, yf thou art not cast, but gettest the ouerha [...]de by iudgement of the [...]e men, yet must I haue it neuerthelesse, because our bar­gain was so made, when I first began to teache the. Euathus hearyng this, aunswered as ye shall heare. I coulde easely syr auoide this your croked sub­tiltie, and be without all daunger, if I would not stand at y ^e barre my self, but get some aduocate to stande for me, for by suche meanes, you could not charge me with any debte, consideryng I my selfe pleaded no cause. Notwithstan­dyng I like it better a thousande fold, that I my self am here personally, and speake in myne owne cause: seyng that not onelie, I will get the ouerhande of you in this our matter, wherebi I shal be discharged of debt, but also euen in this argument I will turne your own wordes into your owne necke agayne, and so triumphe both waies. And ther­fore learne you agayne as wyse as you are, and marke this poinct for your learnyng, whether the iudgement be [Page] [...]euen with you, or again [...]t you, I shall saue my money, euerie grote of it. For if you be cast in the lawe, I haue wōne by vertue of the law, a [...]d so I owe you nothyng. If you be not cast, but gette the ouerhande of me, by the iudgement of these men: then according to my bar­gain, I shal paie you nothyng, b [...]cause I haue not gottē the ouerhande in iud­gement. The iudges seyng the matter so doubtefull, & so harde to determine for eyther partie: fearing to do amisse, lefte the matter rawe without iudge­ment for that tyme, & differred the same to an other season. Thu [...] ye se that the yongin [...] be [...]ng y ^e scholer, gaue his mai­ster a bone to gnawe [...] and bette hym with [...]is owne rodde, whiche the mai­ster had made for his scholars tayle.

There is in Aristophanes a wonderful pretie talke, betwixt the father and the sonne, whiche serueth well for this purpose. For where as the sonne had beaten the father contrarie to al order and honestie, yet not withstandyng the sonne, thought he had as good auctho­ritie to beate his father if he did am [...]sse [Page] [...]s the father to beate hym. And there­fore he sayde [...] wherefore should my fa­ther beate me? His father made auns­were. Mary (quod he) because I loue the, and would thou shouldest do well. Mary therefore (quod the sonne) will I beate the to, because I loue the also good father, and would thou shouldest do well: and with that laide on strokes surely, tyll he made his father graunt that it was as lawfull for the sonne, to beate his father, as for the father to beate his sonne.

Ceratinae.

CEratin [...] argumentationes, are called horned argumentes, the which are so daūgerouse to auns­were vnto, for both partes pro­pouned, that it wilbe hard to escape a foyle. Euen as whē ye se a bul, & wold catche hym by the hornes, ye se asmuch daūger in the one horn, as in the other [...] and so you feare to take him on either syde: In like case, when these horned argumentes are propouned, a man vneth can tell what to aunswere. As we reade in the gospel of Mathew the [Page] xxij. Chapiter, whē the Phariseis did send their disciples (whiche did pretēde holines, & bare a face of true religion) to take Christ in a snare. And therfore first thei came, geuyng hym a name of aucthoritie, & called him maister flatte­ryngly, as though he might speake his mynd frely to them, because ther was none but his Scholars, and suche as sought vnfaynedly to bee edefied in the truthe: secondly, they praise him for his goodnesse, that he is true in all his dealynges, and vseth no dissimula­cion, and again thei saie, that not onely he is true, but also teacheth the waye [...]f truthe, and then thus thei begin to questiō with hym, and to fele his mynd what he wil say (for truly thei thought to take hym in a trip, whether he helde his peace, or spake) and therefore thei said. Sir may we lawfully pay tribute to Cesar, or no? Or how thy [...]ke you, doth it stand with Goddes word [...], that we maie paie, or no? Here Christe was beset twoo waies, first it was daunge­rous for him, to hold his peace: for then he might seme by so doyng, to haue re­spect [...] [Page] [Page] [Page] to the person of men [...] and for feare not open the truth, in suche a weightie matter, and so stain the glory of God. Of the other part, if he should answer it ware a daungerous pece of worke, in like maner, for thei thought, he would either speake on Cesars side, & allowe payeng of Tribute, and so incurre the hatred of all the people, whereby thei might more boldly afterward [...] put him to death: or els thei thought, he would speake against Cesar, and so he should commit treason, and be apprehended therevpon, as a Traitour. But Iesus knowyng their naughtie purpose, and plainly seyng where about thei went, disapoyncted theim of their will, that thei could take none aduantage of him at al. And therfore he saied, because he would publishe their falsehode, what tempt you me ye ypocrites? Shew me the coyne of the tribute, and thei toke hym a penny, and he saied vnto theim: whose is this Image and superscripci­on Thei said vnto hym, Cesars. Then said he, geue therefore vnto Cesar the thynges whiche are Cesars, and vnto [Page] God those thynges whiche are goddes. Christ did not at the first whē thei pro­pounded their questiō vnto him, plain­ly saie, geue vnto Cesar the thynges, whiche are Cesars, but whē he had as­ked them whose coyne it was, and that thei by their awne cōfession, had gran­ted it to be Cesars, whereby thei bare witnesse of themselfes that they ware subiect to Cesar, he saied, for asmuche as you graunt your selfes by the ver­tue of this coyne to be tributaries, pay on goddes name to Cesar the thynges that pertayne to Cesar, & vnto God those thynges that are gods.

Cacosistata.

CAcosistata are suche argumētes that beyng propounded, betwene twoo persones, thei serue aswell for the one parte, as the other, as thus. You muste forgeue hym, because he is but a child, no mary, therfore wil I beate hym, because he is a childe [...] or thus. This man should not be iudged to dye, by any temporall lawe, because he is a priest. yes mary therfore should [Page] he be Iudged to dye, because he is a priest, and hath offēded, whiche should haue geuen good example to other of well liuyng.

Asistata.

ASistata are suche argumentes, as are impo [...]sible to be true, as when a child of two yeres old, should be accused of aduoutrie, as though it wer like, that he could of­fende in suche filthinesse.

Vtis.

VTis is nothynge els, but when one goth aboute to proue a thyng, and maketh that which shoulde proue, to bee as vncertain, as that thyng, whiche is proued, as thus. In Purgatorie synn [...]s are forgeuē, by vertue of the Masse, ergo we must say Masse still. Whereas I thynke there is no godly wise man, but doubteth as­muche that Purgatorie is, as he maie iustly saie, that the masse saueth no mā.

¶Pseudomenos.

THis is called a liynge argument, for what so euer ye shall saye, [Page] ye must nedes sa [...]e ami [...]e. Epimenides a man borne in Crete saied that the people borne in Crete, were liers, said he true, or no? if ye saye that he saide truth, I may well say [...] [...]hat can not be wel said, for if the p [...]ople in Crete be lyers, then lied Epimenides, because he was a man their borne, and one of Crete, and saied they ware l [...]ers. A­gaine if ye iudge that Epimenid [...]s said false, and that the people there, be no liars, then Epimenides saied truth e­uen when he said, the people of Crete are liars, because he himself was a mā of Crete. But this subtiltie is thus auoided, yf ye will saie that where as mentiō is made of the people in Cre­te, yet all are not comprehended vnder the same, neither is the Proposicion vniuersal but indefinite, that is to say, not comprehendyng all but certaine, as thus. The people of C [...]ete are ly­ars, truth it is, that many of them be liars, & y [...]t Epimenides may be excep­ted, & be a true man of his worde, not­withstandyng. As also he y ^t was war­ned in his slepe not to giue credite to [Page] any dreames, did not thinke that drea­me vaine, although he iudged many o­ther to be litle estemed, and smal hede to be taken to them. For by this drea­me he was warned not to beleue gret­ly other dreames, and yet not with­standynge he was warned to beleue this dreame.

NOw that I haue brought this rude worke to some ende, and for this tyme framed it, so wel as I coulde, I desire of al men th [...]re fauourable helpe, to supporte my weakenes, or at y ^e least, to geue me none euell reporte, for my well meanyng, & then I shall thinke my selfe sufficient­lie rewarded. But if offence shoulde breede through laboure susteined, and no fauour gottē, when gentlenesse had bene offered, it had bene as good (in my minde) to plaie and lose nothyng, as to take paines, and lose all. But my trust beyng stayed vpon the honest and god­lie affected, I haue trauailed without feare, hopyng well that my doynges shalbe taken without blame. And therfore this obtei [...]ed, I shal desire al men [Page] for the loue of God to embrace the tru­the, and not to wedde themselfes to any opinion without some staye or sure foundation of goddes truth. And where as God is the authour of peace and cō ­co [...]de, and loueth thē, that vnfeynedly call vpon hym in truth: I shall hartely praie to God that al we maie drawe af­ter one line, and seke one vniforme and sounde doctrine, to the prayse of God, and the comfort of our soules. And be­cause some heades are very bolde to entre farther, then witte can retche, or el [...] haue a mynde vaynelie to question, of thynges not ned [...]full: I thought it not amysse to set forth here Aristoteles minde, as touchyng thynges that shold not be brought in question. There be foure thynges (saieth he) which should not be examined by reason. And first no mā ought to argue of those thynges wherein if any one put doubte, he de­serueth punishement. As to reason whether there be a God or no. And therefore Tullie sayeth very wel, it is a wicked and an vngodly custome, to dispute or talke against God, either in [Page] earnest, or yet in sporte. Again it is fondnesse, to reason of those thynges which our senses iudge to be true. As to know by reason, whether fire be hote, or no. the whiche were madnesse to aske, and surely, if any one should so reason with me, I would bidde hym putte his fyn­ger in it. Thirdely, it is euell to reason of those thynges, whiche can not bee knowen by mans witte. As to knowe what God y ^e father is in persone, what the holy ghoste is, howe they sytte and are placed in heauen, or of what makyng the soule of man is. Fourthlie, to talke and dispute of those thynges, whiche are vndoubtedly true. As in Arithmetike .iii. and .iij. are syx. In Philosophie. The whole is greater then the parte. In all whiche matters to moue any earnest questiō, or to doub­te ouermuch in thinges nothing doub­tefull, is either starke madnesse, or els playne foolyshnesse. Therefore I wy­she of GOD, that all oure reasonyng myght be fastened vpon suche m [...]tters, as are necessary both for the bearer to learne, and also good, for the godlye [Page] reasoner, to teache. Wherein though I haue done nothyng so well my selfe, as my good will was thereunto, yet I trust al honest hartes, wil testifie with me, that I haue moste earnestlie myn­ded the glorie of God, and the settyng forth of his holy name, throughout the whole course of this my rude and sym­ple booke: the whiche ones done and knowen [...] I hope the gentle reader will beare with me in other thynges, and pardone such faultes, as through ignoraunce haue escaped, or els for lack of tyme could not well be altered. God be praysed.