Of Pleasure, and hir partes.

Pleasure is a certeine exultation, or an excéeding reioysing, sprounge of the euentes of things desired.

Pleasure is of two sortes, one is saide of honest and good thinges, the o­ther of dishonest: In respect of honest things, it is called Voluntas: In respect of dishonest Voluptas.

A wise man ought not to be puffed with pleasure: for it is the foode of fil­thinesse, it killeth the body, weakeneth the iudgement and taketh away vn­derstanding.

Of Ill-will.

Ill-wil is that which neuer speaketh wel, neither can take any plesure at the prosperity of anye man but hir owne: it is a token of an abiect & seruile man, at an other mans prosperity to be grée­ued, or to reioyce at y ^e hurt of any man: bicause the common state of mankinde is such, as none hath assuraunce of per­petuall felicity. For Fortune is lyke glasse, which then may easily be broke, when it shyneth moste.

Of Delectation.

Delectation is a pleasure, which in­fecteth the minde, by a certeine swéete­nesse, conceaued by the eare, with-out some recreation, cares would ouercom vs.

We ought to beare the discommo­dityes of this lyfe patiently.

Of Oblectation.

Oblectation is a certeine bending, or inclination of the mynde, to a plea­sure gentle, and swéetely moliūyng the minde.

This Oblectation in the beginning a man ought to restrayne by reason: For if it once come to a custome, it will easily come to a habite, and hauing got an habit in pleasure, impossible it is to put it away, and to be indued with vertue.

Insultation.

Insultation is an an excéeding delig [...]t and pleasure, aken at the hurts of an­other: especially, as when we ouercome our enimyes, to laugh them to scorne, and vnreasonablye to reioyce at the same.

More shame for insultation, thē same [Page] for their victory haue many mē purchased, as much honor for clemēcy, as glo­rye for victory, haue diuers atchieued.

Of Boasting.

Boasting is a iesting ioyfulnesse, exalting it selfe insolently.

If a wise man be defiled with this affection, it maketh him not only with pride to be puffed, but also ridiculous.

Who immoderatly lyketh to praise him-selfe, is a good vice to make wise men sporte. As the shadow doth folow the body: so should Fame folow good déedes, it ought not to be hunted after.

Boasting makes vs not onely to forget our selues, and the cause of our well doing, which is good in déede, but also causeth many to be ashamed of their parentes, then which, what can be more impietie.

Of Prodigalitie.

Prodigalitie is sayde to be a disso­lution, or a to much losing of a vertue.

A prodigal mans property, is to co­uet other mens goodes, and not to care for his owne, to spend lustily, & to fare deliciously: so he hath, he cares not how he getteth it: & so he spendeth, he cares [Page] not how, when, or who consumes it.

No admonition of friends, neyther feare of pouerty can make a prodigal man thrifty.

The ende of prodigall persons, for the most parte, is straunge & wicked.

Of Ambition.

Ambition is a loue and care of pro­motion, or an vnmeasurable desire of glory.

Except ambitious persons be cut frō euery common weale, impossible it is to be without ciuil & continual discord.

Of Lust.

Lust is a desire raised against reason, or a wylde and vnbrydeled appetyte, which in whome soeuer it raignes, so kylleth all good motions, y ^t vertue can haue no place in the minde of him.

Lust makes a man to haue neyther care of his owne good name, nor con­sideration of the shame which his po­sterity shal haue by his wicked liuing.

Of Needinesse.

Néedinesse is an insatiable coueting or a desire w ^tout al mesure immoderat

Couetousnes is neuer minished, nei­ther with lacke nor abundance, and it [Page] lacketh as well those thinges which it inioyeth, as which it wanteth.

Where little is, little is the care, and little ought to be coueted.

Prodigality and couetousnes, are the two plagues, which ouerthrowe great and famous kingdomes.

Of Anger.

Anger is defined after two sortes, ei­ther according to hir nature, or accor­ding to hir effect: according to hir na­ture, Anger is a heate of bloud, and in­flaming of the same, euen to the inner­moste parte of man.

According to hir effect, Anger is a lust or desire to punish or to be reuenged on him, which séemeth to haue hurt vs.

Of Wrath.

Wrath is a desire to be reuenged sée­king a time or oportunity for the same.

Anger consisteth in habit and dispo­sition: but wrath in déede and effect.

It is a hard thing to alter the minde of man, and sodeinly to plucke away, that w [...]ich by custome is come to an habit.

[...] Anger doth most moue vs, then [...] we most carefully keepe y ^e tonge.

Of Palenesse.

[Page]Palenes is called an anger, newly begonne, or but newly beginning and after a little while is quickly gone.

A man infected with palenes, is soone hot, & soone colde: bicause reason ouer­cōmeth the outragiousnes of y ^e passion: for if it should persist & continue long, it would easily come to hatred.

Of Hatred.

Hatred is an olde grudge or a desire by which we wish ill to some body, that so may come either to welth or profit.

The difference betwéene hatred and anger is, time can asswage an­ger, but hatred once rooted, can-not be (or very hardly) pluckt from the hart.

He which is angry desireth to haue hī vexed, w ^t whō he is angry: but he which hateth, desireth his death, whom he ha­teth.

Of Discorde.

Discord is an anger cōceiued very at y ^e hart, by an extreame & inward hatred.

He which is dissentius, as an vnpro­fitable member should be cut from the body of a common weale. The dissen­tius person can agrée with none, can yéelde to none, but dissenting from all, séeketh by conspiracies, Insurrections, [Page] poysoning of Prynces, the playne e­uersion and ouerthrowe of all.

Not the inequality of power, but the dissētion of mindes maketh dissention.

By discord the greatest things come to nought, and by the same, the world and all thynges els shall perysh.

An angry man, in his heate, dyffe­reth not from a mad man, beholde his lookes, his colour, his iesture, voice wordes and behauiour, and no diffe­rence shall you finde.

Of Loue.

Loue is a diuine mistery, giuen vnto man, for his conseruation & comforte.

The greatest and moste burning affection is Loue, for Loue is the bond of friendshyp.

A wise man may loue, so long as it is without care and sighing.

The cause of Loue is delyght, which by the aspect and sight of beauty is taken, whosoeuer in viewing and beholding taketh no pleasure, can at no tyme loue in déede.

Loue is an vnsatiable desire, in­truding it self into man, by some won­derfull beautye, a passion vnméete for [Page] a noble man.

The effects of loue are straunge, & more to be shunned then anye other perturbation.

This loue vexeth the minde and ca­steth the body into sickenesse.

Loue is the cause of deadly hatred, and can abide no partner in the same.

Loue makes valyant captains, most vile captiues, and those which are sub­duers of the stoutest, to be in subiecti­on to the most abiects.

Through loue, whoredome, deflou­ring, adultery & incest, are committed.

Loue is remedied either by fasting, by time, or w ^t an halter, for good chéere, nourisheth and increaseth loue, time doth take away or at y ^e least asswage the same: But if neither fasting nor time wil do good, then the next remedy is to take an halter & hang him selfe.

Of desire and longing.

Longing is an immoderate desire of a thing wished for, and therefore hastening is a lyngring to him which longeth.

Euery thing is most estéemed whē either it beginneth to want, or we al­together [Page] lack it, wherfore it appeareth that we know what a thing is, and of what estimatiō when we haue it not,

It is vnméete for any wise bodye, whose part is to beare patiētly, which must néedes be borne, to be subiect to this perturbation of longing.

Of Feare and Sorrow.

Feare is an opinion of some euill comming towards vs, which séemeth to be intollerable.

A wise and valyant man, shoulde alwayes bée héedefull, but neuer fearefull: for there is more euil in fe­ring, then that which is feared.

A mā wer better to repēt him of his il fortune, thē to be ashamed of y ^e victory.

Of Slothfulnesse.

Slothfulnesse is a feare of labour to ensue, & as dilygence helpeth & pros­pereth al enterprises, so contrariwise, Slothfulnesse marreth euery thing. Slothfulnes riseth of too much abū ­dance, & Idlenes maketh of men wo­mē, of womē beasts, of beasts mōsters.

It commeth to passe often-times, that industrious and dilygent men, by their paynes, excell euen those, to whō [Page] Nature hath bene most beneficiall.

Of Bashfulnesse.

Bashfulnesse is a feare of iust re­prehension, or it is a vehement moti­on of the minde, flying shame, desiring commendation, it is the best ruler of the lusts when it is raysed by the care and studie of honestie.

Bashfulnes is raised somtime by ill déedes, but shamefastnesse is alwayes through consideration of goodnesse.

Of Terror.

Terror is a certein fere, springing frō y ^e imaginatiō of an vnacustomed thing

He is properly called a valiāt man, to whom y ^e feare of an honest death doth strike no terror.

Of Dread.

Dread is a feare that troubleth the minde, before any euil doth happen.

Dread maketh vs not to enioy our riches nor other commodities of this lyfe, through a feare of death.

It is the propertie of a wise man, with a quiet minde, to suffer al things, whome prosperitie can-not inflame with disdaine, nor aduersitie ouer­throw: but those things which he pos­sesseth, he inioyeth, and those thinges [Page] which he hath not, he doth not greatly couet.

Unto euery wise man it belongeth to haue a fore-cast of those thinges, which may happen.

God will not suffer man to haue the knowledge of things to come, for if he had a prescience of his prosperitie, hée would be carelesse: and vnderstanding of his aduersitie, he would be senceles.

Hope of all paissions is the swée­test, and most pleasant, and héere-off it is sayd, that hope cōforteth captaines.

Of Trembling.

Tremblyng is a sodain motion of the minde, ioyned with an amazednes of the same.

He is but a wretch who can-not kéepe his griefe in secrete.

Wicked men séeke the destruction of those which meane best.

Of Conturbation.

Conturbation is an affection con­trary vnto Fortitude, without which nothing can be accomplished worthe­lye, and with commendation.

The whole glory of a battaile, con­sisteth in the pollycie of a Captaine.

[Page]The head being troubled the mē ­bers cannot fulfill their dueties.

Of Fearefulnesse.

Fearefulnesse is when the minde being mooued, doth as it were forsake the body.

Fearefulnesse is an imbecilitie or weakenesse of Nature, in respecte of yeares, in childhood, or doting olde age, or by sickenes, or it riseth from a con­science conuict and guiltie of some of­fence.

Of Sorrow.

Sorrow doth cause in the minde of man, a biting grief, & vexation: Feare causeth a fight and departinge of the minde: Pleasure rayseth an ouer pro­digall merinesse, and Lust an vnbri­deled appetite.

Sorrow is an vnmeasurable con­trition of the minde.

Of Pitie or Compassion.

Pitie is a sorrow conceiued by the miseryes of an other man.

Pitie and mercifulnes, brings cre­dite both with God and man.

A mercifull conquerour, a friendly foe: Wherefore euery man ought to [Page] endeauour to séeme, and to be merci­full.

Of Enuie.

Enuie is a sorrow, taken at the prosperitie or welfare of an other mā.

As the Auker eateth and destroy­eth yron, so doth Enuie eate and con­sume the hearts of the enuyous.

Such are most enuied as either by wealth, riches, renoume, authoritie, or vertue, are better then the rest.

Enuie gotten by vertue, obscureth not the name of any man.

The enuious like of none, but such as are causers to bring those which ar at rest and in felycitie into misery.

Of Emulation.

Emulation is defined to be a grief of the minde, bicause one doth inioye that, which we are desirous to haue.

That man is sayde to emulate, which labours with tooth and nayle, to get the praise and glorye which an other hath, vnto vnto himselfe.

Emulation brings Infamie vnto those which are infected with y ^e same, when they will contend and chalenge their better.

[Page]Emulation is naught, and neces­sary: nought, when it springs of an ambitious Enuie, and necessarye, when it riseth, of a vertuous Stu­dye.

Of Obtrectation.

Obtrectation is a griefe of minde, bicause others woulde haue that, which our selues inioy.

A good thing, the more common, the more commendable.

Of Fretting.

Fretting is a sorrow of the minde, mightely bringing downe a man, and altering his constitution.

Of Sadnesse.

Sadnesse is a sorrow continuing déepely rooted in the minde.

Melancholyke persons are conti­nually vexed, both in minde and body, they are very seldome wel at ease, bi­cause they disgest their meate verye ill, they are strong in imaginations, and for sharpenesse of witte, they excell.

Sadnesse is to be condempned, but grauitie is commendable.

Of Pensiuenesse.

Pensiuenesse is a dolefull or wée­ping sorrowfulnes, and withereth the body of man.

Of Mourning.

Mourning is a sorrow, conceiued of y ^e death of him which was dere to vs.

Their deathes, whose lyues haue béne good, and without any notorious crime, shoulde alwayes be a comforte vnto vs by a continual remembrance.

Patiently should that be borne, which no strength can ouercome, nor counsayle auoyd.

He dyeth not vntimely which dyeth vertuously.

Of Troublesomnesse.

Troublesomnesse is a laborsome sorrow.

No dolour nor daunger ought we to shunne and auoyd, if there-by we may doe good.

Of Lamentation.

Lamentation is a sorrowfulnesse, shewed by a certeine howlyng & cry­ing out.

Of Carefulnesse.

Carefulnesse is a sorrowfulnesse [Page] of the minde, procéeding frō some great and déepe cogitation fixed at the hart.

Study & carefulnes in a naughty dis­posed persō, causeth gret hurt: but in a good and vertuous person, it conuer­teth all his endeuors to good exercises.

Of Molestation and Affliction.

Molestation is a griefe of minde, not ceasing, but continuing.

Of Desperation.

Despayre is a sorrowfulnesse, with-out all hope of better fortune.

Who contrary to the wil and time prescribed of God, will parte the soule from the body perpetually: he is to be punished.

Of mortall vertues lyfe, and of the chiefest felicity.

SOme men haue supposed the delight of the minde, to be the chiefest felici­citie: Others the beastly pleasure of the body: Others a good constitution of the body, and perpetuall health with­out sicknesse. Some haue thought ho­nesty linked with pleasure. Some to be frée frō sorrow and griefe of minde. [Page] some learning & profound knowledge, some to liue honestly, and to folow ver­tue, some not to declyne from the law of nature, some in the goods of nature, fortune, and the minde: so that howe many sectes, so many sentences, how many men, so many opynions.

Felicity is a vertuous prosperity or a floryshing estate, ioyned wyth an honest conuersation: or els a way suf­ficiently of it self, teaching how to liue well, or a lyfe indued with al kinde of pleasure, quiet and gloryous.

Of the goodes of Fortune.

The goods of Fortune are riches, and will of men, Nobility, Fame, Au­thority, Honour, many and vertuous Children, and such lyke.

Riches do rather stir to vices, then prycke to vertue.

We shoulde rather gather wealth both to relieue our want, and also to succour the necessity of others.

Riches are according to theyr vse, good, if they be well vsed: bad, if they be abused.

Riches with-out wisedome to vse them, can-not honest a man.

[Page]Uertue or good qualityes with-out riches, are as it were a candel vnder a bushell.

Riches without vertue do litle profit.

A true friende is he, whose care is to pleasure his friend in al honest things, moued ther-vnto by a méere good-will, which he beareth vnto him.

Noblenesse of byrth, is eyther vni­uersall or perticuler. Uniuersall, as to be borne in a noble and famous coun­trey. Perticuler, to come of noble pa­rentage. An obscure countrey bringeth no credit to a man, be he neuer so ver­tuous. And to come of noble parentage, and not to be indued with noble quali­ties, is rather a defamation, then a glory.

It is better by vertue and good déedes to get renoune, then to depend vpon the opynion of a noble house. Then a good name, nothing is sooner lost, and no­thing harder to be recouered.

As fier cast into the water is quick­ly quenched: so a false accusatiō against an honest lyfe, is soone extinguished.

Honour is the rewarde of vertue.

Those men haue most excellent wits, [Page] whiche are pricked with the desire of glory.

The getting of children in honest wedlocke, is one of the chiefest benefits that can be in a common weale.

Better vnborne, then vntaught.

Of the goodes of Nature.

By this worde Nature is vnder­stoode the vertue, force, and property of euery thing. In this place the goodes of Nature be also vnderstoode, all such thinges as are in the body of man, as health, strength, beauty and bignesse.

If a man want the goodes of Na­ture, he can-not be happy in this lyfe.

Necessary it is for him that is inso­lent, to be brought to the acknowled­ging of him selfe, by sicknesse, or other misery. Moste couetous is hee, which is desirous to get, carefull to kéepe, and vnwilling to forgoe.

He is not valiaunter, which killeth a Lyon, then he which mortifieth his wilde concupiscences.

Beauty, riches, pleasure & prosperity, causeth forgetfulnesse of our selues.

Of the goodes of the minde.

Sweeter and more comfortable, are [Page] the pleasures of the minde, then the de­lyghtes of the flesh.

Of ciuill or actiue felicitie.

A man should not lyue to himselfe but should haue a care of his parents, of his children, and countrey-men.

He is a ryght good man, which ser­ueth God deuoutly, and dealeth vp­rightly with all men.

The diffinition of Vertue, and hir partes.

Uertue is nothing, but auoydinge wickednesse.

Fortitude, when it excéedeth, falleth in-to rashnés, when it faynteth, in-to childysh fearefulnesse.

Liberality when it lauisheth out of reason, is called prodigality, when it is not extended any whit, purchaseth the name of Couetousnesse.

In good thinges, nothing is eyther wanting or superfluous.

Wickednes cannot be cōprehended, but godlynesse may: Therfore easier it is to become wicked then vertuous.

Uertue is deuided into foure partes, the first is Prudence, y ^e second, Tempe­rāce y ^e third Fortitude, y ^e fourth iustice.

Of Prudence and hir partes.

Prudence is a knowledge of good things, bad things, & things indifferent

The very cause of all goodnesse, is only wisedome, by that we know what to eschew as hurtful: and againe, what to chuse as profitable.

Socrates much giuen to wickednes, by wisdome reformed him selfe, and be­came a good example of a godly man.

Wisedome doth not commit, or do any thing, for which she may afterward say, Non putaram.

The partes of which Prudence de­pendeth, are Reason, Iudgement, Cir­cumspectiō, Prouidēce, Docility, Héede; Aristotle adioyneth warines, Iolines, Craftines, Subtilty & Righteousnesse.

Of Reason.

Reason is an order to do all things, by the consideration of things to come.

Before a man begin any thing, con­sultation shoùlde be had: but hauing delyberated, spéedy execution.

Of Vnderstanding.

Understanding consisteth in descer­ning truth from falshood, and in taking heede, least the minde be ouer-much [Page] delighted, and so deceaued, by the vain pleasures of the body.

By Idlenes, mē learn to liue naghtely.

The way to extinguish the burning passion of loue, is to beware of Idlenes. He which ruleth others ought to be frée from all affections: for anger suffereth not a man to sée that whiche is expe­dient, hatred hasteneth to vniustice, loue weakneth the Iudgement, lust offereth wrong, griefe stirreth to reuengment, and enuy ouerthroweth a man.

Euil manners come by euil company.

To al men shew a good countenance: yet enter familiarity with none, but such as are of good conuersation.

Sodeine coūsail bring spéedy repētance.

Of Circumspection.

Circumspection in an especiall care of the minde, to bring those things which we haue in hand, to a good purpose.

Circumspection in war, is the cause of escaping many daungers, in peace doth al thinges to the increase of vnitie, a­mongst mē. The causes bringing circū ­spection, are feare, care, necessitye and affection: feare afflicteth, care cōpelleth, necessity byndeth, affection woundeth.

Of Prouidence.

Prouidence is a certein vertue and force of the minde, by which we foresee a thyng, before it comes to passe.

Prouident mē ought to be admitted into the consultation of great matters.

Of Docilitie.

Docility or a good capacity, is a cer­teine vertue of the minde, by which we quickly conceaue, and easily vnderstād those thinges which are taught vs, of an-other, we account not that a good wit, which will easily attayne to the perfection of wickednesse.

Docility gotten by industry, though it be harde in conceauing: yet is it not hasty in forgetting.

To whom Nature hath giuen sharp­nesse of wit, they are most carelesse, and least commended in their exercises.

Noble mē, whether they giue thēselues to godlines or wickednesse, in eyther of thē they so excel, as none of our calling.

They haue not onely a good wit, but also a power to bring al that to passe, which they are desirous.

Of Heede.

Héede is nothinge els, but wyth [Page] Iudgement, to decline from thinges hurtfull.

A man ought to encounter at the pleasure & time appoynted of the eni­mie.

Contrary to Héede, is temeritie, a foolishnesse, which runneth all vppon the head, & neither obeyeth reason nor the perswasion of friends.

Great care ought to be had, whom we may beléeue, for faire tongues of­ten-times worke mischiefe.

Of Warinesse.

As it is the parte of a wise man, wisely to consult, and giue counsaile, so is it the duetie of a wary man, wel to conceiue and vprightly to iudge.

He is the most excellent, which is endued with that discretion, that in al extremities, can giue him-selfe that counsaile which is profitable.

Of Wilynesse, Craftinesse and Subtiltie.

The minde of a craftie man, by prac­tise is hardened, euen as the hande of a worke-man by great labour.

To be wily, craftie, subtil, are hor­rible, if they be vsed to wicked purpo­ses, [Page] so are they to be imbraced, when they be referred to honest endes.

Of Equitie and Righteousnesse.

Equitie or Righteousnes, is defined to be a more gentle sentence, giuen to malefactors, then commonly y ^e lawes doe giue.

Equitie iudgeth with lenitie, lawes with extremitie.

Ther is a Iustice naturall, & a Iu­stice legal, the legal iustice is the writ­ten law, according to which common Iudges giue sentence. The naturall Iustice, is y ^e discretion which euery prudent & wise man is endued with­all, wher-with he being driuen ther­vnto, through consideration of circū ­stances, doth oftentimes make things bitter swéet great & daūgerous, easie, haynous & horrible, either not so at al, or not so horrible, as they are suppo­sed to be.

Equanimitie is a trāquilitie of the minde, by which in aduersitie, we doe not through grief & thought, hurt our selues, nor in prosperitie, exalt nor re­ioyce ouer-much.

Of Temperance and hir parts.

[Page]All vertues are to bée deuided into . 2. sorts according to Cicero, who calleth thē either vertues of knowledge or of cōuersatiō: those of knowledge he cal­leth prudēce, & wisdom: wisdō he saith only cōsisteth in cōtēplation, prudence in y ^e knowledge of common matters. Domestical prudēce is whē euery pri­uate man doth prudētly cōsider of his own affairs: & ciuil, whē we bend our selues to y ^e profiting of y ^e weale publik

The learned haue deuided vertue in­to foure parts, to wit, prudence, tem­perance, fortitude, and Iustice.

Temperance is a vertuous habite of the minde, wher-by we abstain, frō all vaine and pestilent pléasures both of minde and body.

It is y ^e office of tēmperance, to couet nothing, wheroff it should afterward repēt hir.

Of Modestie.

Modestie is a vertue teaching a man how to rule his affections, and in all his actions to kéepe a meane.

Modestie is perceiued by y ^e coun­tenaunce of a man, for by the same, we may gather the disposition of any. The gretest kīgs haue y ^e gretest cares.

[Page]It is the part of a good shepheard to shéere his shéepe, & not to fleay them.

The true modestie of an honest man, striketh more shame, then the sight of many wicked and immodest persons, can stirre to filthinesse.

Of Shamefastnesse.

Shamefastnes is a natural blush­ing, by which we are afrayde & asha­med to cōmit, any thing which is not honest.

Blushing is iudged to be a feare comming of a guyltie conscience, but shamefastnesse of honest things.

Of Abstinencie and Continencie.

Abstinencie is a kinde of tēperance, wherby we bring vnder the power of reason, our appetite, when it is allu­red vnto vnlawfull delectation.

Continēcie is a kéeping of our selues from those things, which are not to be coueted.

Abstinencie consisteth in the ha­uing our appetite: Continencie, in tempering our lusts of the flesh.

Honestie to be preferred before le­chery, chastitie before incontinēcie, & a faithful promisse, before sinful plesure.

[Page]Incontinent is he which kéepeth no measure, in the coueting of worldlye things, or cannot conteine himself frō the effect of fleshly desires.

Of Chastitie.

Chastitie, is the rule or patron, how a man may leade an honest and ver­tuous conuersation.

He is to be sayd to haue chast eares, which can-not abide to heare that, which is dishonest.

Of Honestie.

Honestie, is a frée election of the minde, to doe those things, which are agréeing to the rule of vertue.

Nothing can make men so misera­ble, as wickednesse and impietie.

God hath giuen this gift vnto man, that by honestie he may best profite.

The pleasure that commeth of ho­nestie, is continuall, not transitorye.

The pleasures springing from dis­honestie, be mingled with griefe, and vexation.

Players of Enterludes, are not to be allowed, bicause they both speak that which is not séemely, & by iesture shew that which is dishonest.

[Page]He whose desire is to lyue well in the world to come, shall for a time, lyue wretchedly.

He which chooseth to lyue well for a time, shall for euer lyue vnquietly.

Of Moderation.

Moderation doth so measure all our actions, that it will not suffer vs to passe y ^e bonds prescribed by honesty.

By moderating our selues, we learn to forbeare, when we are iniured.

A man should beare & not blame, which can-not be auoyded.

A man ought not to reuenge his owne priuate cause.

Of Sparing or Hardnesse.

It is y ^e common vse of most mē vnder y ^e show of one thing to engraft in our mindes an other: & theroff prodigality is called by y ^e name of liberality, cru­elty of equitie, foolish boldnes of forti­tude, & couetousnesse of sparing. We ought therefore to be carefull, leaste those vices deceiue vs, which séeme to accompany the vertue. A couetous man is hée, which out of reason co­ueteth, sparing is like a good husband thriftily to kép, not vnthriftily to spēd

Of Sobrietie.

A sober man is he, whose minde is not ouercome, but hath y ^e vse of wit, & sences, & contrary wise wée call him dronken, whose head, hands nor féete, can-not discharge their duetie.

Dronkennes, is the beginning of dishonestie and whoredom.

Sobernes of dyet doth not only kéepe our bodyes frée from grose humors, which springs of ill dyeting, but also prolongs our dayes very much, and makes vs liue a healthful olde age.

Of Fortitude.

Ther is no vertue, but either sword, strēgth, or threats will weakē y ^e same. To vanquish affectiōs, to resist anger, is only the part of a most valiāt man. Fortitude is a knowledge, instructing a man how with cōmendatiō to aduē ­ture, daungerous, troublesome & fear­full things, & in the taking of them in hande to be nothing terrified.

Of Magnanimitie.

Magnanimitie is a certein excellēcie of y ^e mide, placing before hir eies, at al times vertue & honor & to y ^e atteining off, bends al hir cogitations & studies.

[Page]It is the nature of him that is mag­nanimious, for the loue of vertue, one­ly with-out hope or desire of recom­pence to doe euery thing, he is deligh­ted, in a good conscience: in aduersitie he mourneth not: in prosperitie, hée insulteth not, and in trouble he pineth not, he stands in admiratiō of nothing, he thinkes not any thing too hard, too be brought to passe, he is constant, but in a good cause, neither wil, he goe a­bout any thing, but that which will bring him credite, hée is no hipocrite nor flatterer, he can-not abide to cur­rey any mans fauour, if he hate a mā, he shal know it, if he loue one, he can­not kéepe it secret.

He is ashamed, by a benefite to be bound to any man, he thinkes him a conquerour, which bestoweth a good tourne, and him which receiueth, hée numbreth amongst them which are vanquished. If he receiue any thing, he is neuer well vntill he haue requi­ted the same with greater measure. He thinkes hée shoulde not bée desired vnto any thing, neither doth he loue to request a thing at any bodyes hande, [Page] for to beg a thing at a friends, is to buy it, it is no small griefe to a good nature to trye his friende.

More honesty is gotten by forbea­ring, then by reuenging.

Of Trust or Hope.

Trust or Confidence is a certeine perswasion, rather of a prosperity to come, then at hand.

The causes of this Confidence, be two, eyther former good lucke, and in hope of the like good-luck, we are anima­ted to take any thing in hand, seeme it neuer so daungerous, or the authoritye of some person.

Men ought to take great héede, least by too much confidence they fall into perilles.

Confidence, except it be guyded by modesty, and procéede from iudgement. may rather be called arrogancy.

Through arrgoancy haue manye come into hatred.

A wise man ought not to take vpon him, more then he can discharge, ney­ther to contend with him, with whom he is not to be compared.

Of Security.

Securitie is one parte of fortitude, by which, after we haue cast in our minde, all inconueniences, and knowe the worst that can happen, we are qui­et and with-out care.

Of Magnificence.

Magnificence a vertue only to princes.

Of Constancie.

It is the dutie of Constancie, to re­sist dolours of minde, and of continen­cie to expell all foolysh pleasure.

Wisdome is in nothing more appa­rant, then in constancie.

Constancie, except it be in trueth, and in a good cause is impudencie.

Of Suffering.

Suffering teacheth vs to go for­warde in an honest matter, with-out griefe and gruding.

By familiarnesse, humblenesse, and quiet bearing of thinges, we win the hartes of men.

It is his parte, which gouerneth o­thers, not with wordes and whyppes to waxe cruell against malefactors: but with suffering and gentlenes, to draw them to his minde.

Of Patience.

Patience is a voluntary aduenturing of hard thinges for the desire of vertue.

At some tymes it is méeter to re­uenge, then to forgiue: and some-times it is a part of Iustice, with iniuries, to requite iniuries.

It is no lesse euill to requite, then it is to offer an iniurie.

Frayes, fightings, & contentions, a­ryse onely, bicause wicked layng aside all patience, séeke occasion to moue troubles and tumultes.

Impatiēce being set against misuse, it ministreth matter of continual debate.

He which bendeth him-selfe to re­uenge, doth immitate his doinges, of whome he is molested: and he which immitateth an euill man, can-not be a good man in any sorte.

Of Stabilitie.

Stabilitie is a continuing in that which is well begone.

Stable vertue ouercōmeth al things,

To say, and vnsay with one breath, is to wauer, as a wether-cocke.

It is no lesse vertue, to kéepe things gotten, then to be desirous of new.

Of Iustice.

Fortitude without wisdom, is but ra­shnes, wisdome with-out iustice, is but craftines, iustice with-out temperance, is but cruelty: temperance with-out fortitude, is but sauadgnes.

Iustice is a diuine and celestial ver­tue, which if men would imbrace, they might lyue quietly from troubles, and happely to theyr hartes desire.

Philosophers makes foure sorts of Iu­stice: Celestial, natural, ciuil, & iudicial.

Celestial Iustice, is a perfect cōsidera­tion & dutifull acknowledging of God.

Natural Iustice is that, which al peo­ple haue in them selues by nature.

Ciuill Iustice is that, which is made eyther by the lawes of nature, the sta­tutes of the people, the consultations of Senators, the deuices of Princes, or authority of graue and wise men.

Iudicial iustice dependes vpon lawes, made for the cōmodity of a cōmon wele.

The alteration of a Prince, bringes the alteration of a common weale.

A good Prince, more by the example of godlines, then by godlines it selfe doth persist: so a wicked Prince, more by the [...] [Page] challenge, as due vnto them.

Euery good subiect should prefer a common profit, before a priuate, and a vniuersall, before a peculier.

By how much more any man kno­weth the thing, which he loueth, then the thing knoweth him, by so much he loueth it better: but a father doth bet­ter know the sonne, then the sonne the father: and therfore the father doth loue him better.

They which take y ^e greater paines in getting of any thing, loue that which is gotten more intyrelye, then they which take lesse paines: But the mother doth with great paines attaine to them, then the father, and therfore hir loue must néedes be greater.

Of ciuil Friendship.

Ciuil Friendship is of thrée sortes, the firste is common or general good-will, wher-by we wish wel vnto al men: the second is good felowship, which cōtinu­eth but a time, as long as pleasuré la­fteth, but no pleasure, no frienship: the third is a perfect friendship, which brin­geth to passe y ^t amōg mē, ther be a great agréement, both in will & in working.

[Page]There is no more certeine token of true friendship, then in consent and communicating of our cogitations, one with an-other.

The gréement of the wicked, is ea­sily vpon a smal occasion broken: but the friendshyp of the vertuous conti­nueth for euer.

As a kingdome cannot haue manye gouernours, nor one wife many hus­bandes, and loue them: so one can-not loue many intyrely, and be beloued of them againe hartely, with-out hypo­crycye.

Strength is then weakened, when it is deuided.

That man is a faythfull friend, to whome we may vnfolde the secretes of our hartes, and fréely communicate, as if we weare alone those thinges, which any way trouble vs: whose wisdome is great, with whome we may talke bold­ly & familiarly, without fayling, with­out dissembling, with-out hiding anye thing from him.

A faythfull friend, come wealth, come wo, come prosperity, come aduer­tie, is no chaungeling.

[Page]example of godlinesse, then by the thing it self, doth corrupt the manners of his subiects. For the common sorte of men, perswade them selues, al y ^t to be well done, which is done by example.

It is the parte of euery Prince and Magistrate, that he beware least by e­uil example, he bring a wicked custome in-to his dominion.

The vertues of the law, are foure, to beare sway, to forbid, to punish, & suffer.

The precepts of the law, may be com­prehended vnder these thrée thinges, to liue honestly, to hurt no man wilfully, to render euery man his due, carefully.

Of Innocency.

Innocencie is an affection of the mynde, which will not molest, iniurye, nor hurt any man.

An innocent man, in respect of a good cōscience, contēneth al worldly things.

A rumour raysed of nothing, vany­sheth of his owne accorde.

Innocency may for a tyme be op­pressed, but it will ryse againe: it may be obscured, but it will shine againe: it may be ouerwhelmed, but it can neuer be drowned.

[Page]The remembraunce of a good con­science, is a comfort in aduersitie.

Euery man should consider, that hée is borne to helpe, and not to hurt hys felow neighbours.

Of Friendship.

Friendship is a naturall good-will of well disposed persons, caused through sicknesse of manners, and motions of the minde, fancying ech other for no­thing els, but only for y ^e increase of ver­tue, not for any pleasure or profit.

The kindes of friendship are three, na­turall friendship▪ Ciuill and Hospitall.

Of naturall Friendship.

Naturall Friendship is deuided into pittie, kockring, and kynred. Againe it is deuided into the loue towards God, towardes our parentes, and towardes our countrey.

We ought to behaue our selues to­wards our parents as we would haue our children loue vs.

Nothing is more according to nature then to loue thē of whom we are borne.

No man is borne for him-selfe, but a parte of our byrth, our countrey, a part of our parents, a part our friends [...] [Page] should not be ashamed to confesse the same.

Thankefulnes doth consist in truth and Iustice: truth doth acknowledge what is receiued, Iustice doth render good-will for good-will, and one good tourne for another.

There is no more manifest signe of an vngratefull minde, then to dis­semble a debt, when we are not able to discharge it.

He is an vngratefull man, with whome the benefite perisheth, but he more vngratefull which will forgette the same.

It is impietie not to loue our Pa­rents, but not to acknowledge them, is more then madnesse.

That is not well giuen, which is not willyngly giuen.

How much a benefite is lyngered before it is bestowed, so much it lée­seth of his grace.

We had rather léese all, then long for a thing.

The gift of an enemie, better vn­taken then receiued.

[Page]As good it were to eate meat from a serpents mouth, as to take a bene­fite of our enimy, in both daunger, in both death.

Hee which receiueth a benefite, should not onely remember it, but re­quite the same lyberally and fruitful­ly, according to the nature of y ^e earth. which rendereth more frut, then it re­ceiueth séede.

Pietie is onely a gratefull good wil towards our parents.

Of Gentlenesse.

Greatly are inferiours bent to per­fect obedience, whē they perceiue their Prince gentle and easie to be spoken with-all, not scornefull or full of dis­daine.

A Prince shoulde bée for counte­naunce so amiable, and for behauiour so gentle to towards his subiects, as none at any time should goe from his presence, pensiue, or troubled in minde.

Of Faithfulnesse.

Faith is a constancie, and perfor­maunce, of that which is promised.

Of Hospitalitie.

This friendship of Hospitalitie is deuided into foure parts, wher-off one is called a glorious enterteinment of men, onely to be thought off, an other is a couetous kinde of hospitalitie on­ly for the penny, the third is a courte­ous receiuing, either of our friends or straungers, the last is a relygious en­terteinment, of al such as truly with­out hipocrisie serue God.

Hospitalitie should be only for the release of such, as are pinched with po­uertie.

Of Concord.

Concord is a tower of strength in­uincible against all inuasions.

The common weale with common aide is defended, if men cleaue not vn­to parts.

Of Godlinesse.

Godlines is a Religious worship­ping of God.

In defending Religion both with others and alone, oughte we to fight against our foes.

[Page]Rare & few are those men, which call them-selues from the world, and are taken with an earnest desire of he­uenly things.

With-out the vnderstanding of the wil of God by his word, our sight is but blindnesse: our vnderstanding, ignoraunce: our wisedome, foolishnes: and our deuotion, diuelyshnesse.

Of Humanitie.

Humanitie is to be obserued of such, as will be called humaine or courte­ous: for nothing should be more con­trary to mans Nature, then to offer iniury to any.

Humanitie teacheth vs to aban­don crueltie, to loue & cherish one another, euen bicause we are men of one nature reasonable, & by y ^e reason gen­tle, with-out crueltie, not fierce with­out mercie, as are sauage beasts.

According as man doth excell in riches, let him towards the poore ex­céede in lyberalytie.

Of Gratefulnesse.

Gratefulnesse is nothing els, but to kéepe a benefite in memory.

He which doth receiue a good tourne

[Page]THe giuer of all goodnesse, God al­mightie, so assist vs with his holye Spirit, that affections may so remaine with-in vs, as they doe not raunge, and stirre to wickednesse, but that they being rather banished or abated, and brideled by the Spirite of God, we may embrace Uertue, which God hath promised in this worlde to re­ward, and in the world to come, not to sée vnrequited.

WHo will sée more of this mat­ter at large, let him reade Ma­ster Rogers Booke, of Morall Philosophie: Entituled, The Anatomie of the Minde.