CHAP. I.

Sect. 1 Praeface to the Auditors con­cerning the scope. IF Plutarchs discourse be reasonable, that a Philoso­pher should be so far from being shy and shunning the converse with great Men, that are in place and magistracy, that they should take most pleasure in taking paines to instruct them because their lives being ex­emplary, their labor with them might re­dound to the benefit of the whole common weal: as a Physitian that hath any sparke of in­genuous honesty will delight more in the cure of that eye which sees for many: and if that be recorded of that of the Jewes in the Eccle­siasticall [Page 2]history as an act of Barbarous inhu­manity, that they poysoned the fountaines in ha­tred of the Christians, or mankind rather: then will I labor to forget the difficulty of this im­ploiment, and rather think upon the publick utility of such an exercise appointed for the training up of the Sons of the Prophets, the cu­ring of the eyes (as they call the Universities) that see for many, the healing of the waters (by casting salt into them as the Prophet Elisha did) whose streames make glad the citty of God, the Churches throughout the whole king­dome. Cast thy bread upon the waters, sayth the Preacher, thy seed in fruitfull ground in locis irriguis & propterea benedictionis feraci­bus, as Junius expounds it. Cast it as I ob­serve, with a secure cheerfulnes in hope of a rich and copious benediction.

He that makes an harpe would go more willingly about it, if he were assured, it were for one that would build the wals of Thebes with it as Amphion did: he that makes an helme if he knew it were to guide Themisto­cles his ship, in which he fought for the liberty of Greece, or Pompeyes in which he overcame the Pirats, or the famous Argo, in which the ancient Heroes fetch'd the golden fleece, and I think saith Plutarch, the Artificer had ra­ther hew and square that wood in which So­lons laws were to be written, then of which a plough or some such rusticall instrument [Page 3]should be made: The accommodation is as easie for me, to incourage to this worke in hand, in this seminary of Religion and lear­ning: as it was for him to provoke Philo­sophers, to apply themselves to great persons: for students in Divinity are like tables in which not the Lawes of Solon, but of God are to be written, and those that polish them with precepts, hew and square them, fit for that imploiment: like Pompeyes ship in which God overcomes the enemy of mankinde the Divell, the most dangerous Pirat, who is therefore stiled in Scripture [...]: like Themistocles, that fights for the liberty not of Greece, but of the Gospell: like Argo that brings the golden fleece, the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who is the Lambe of God that ta­keth away the sinnes of the World, as John cals him: and they that furnish them with instru­ctions, do as it were make an helme to guide them: they are like Amphion that build not the wals of Thebes but of the new Jerusalem, and he that explains the Principles of Religion, the Analogy of Faith, tunes an harpe for them, by whose sweet harmony the living stones come together into the building: And these places of learning if any, are those waters of the preacher which are feraces benedictionis, like that good ground in the parable that yeelds increase a hundred fold, or like the land in Babylon, that with good husbandry as you [Page 4]have it in Pliny gives a hundred fifty encrease.

Artic. 2 Now that the graine may hold some pro­portion with the ground, the seed with the soyle, and have some such multiplying virtue as they say the virginian wheat hath, every corn of which sends forth many stalks, and e­every stalk in the multiplicity of sides as it were in so many little granaries, stores up ma­ny scores of graine; I have made choice (ac­cording to the institution and nature of this exercise) to handle the fundamentall points of Divinity, which though they may seem as they are few in number, yet are many in vir­tue, in sight small, but great in weight, like gold which being soild is contracted into a narrow room, but may be drawn into so large an extent, that one Angel may cover an whol acre of ground as you know the naturalists have observed: And because it was the counsell of Polybius for history [...], to frame a body of it, which is applyed by a lear­ned Divine by better right to Divinity. I purpose to follow that advise and contrive a body of Divinity: wherein if you find me va­ry for the form, yet you shall not for the sub­stance: if weakenesse make me erre, yet stub­bornes shall not make me an heritick: I can­not hold it any shame after Austin to write Re­tractations professing my name among those, qui proficiendo scribūt, & scribendo proficiunt, as he speaks.

I know it will be objected against this course that I shall not be able to make any great progresse in it, muchlesse finish it, and therefore might more profitably propound some shorter project.

But I answer first, though I should but make an entrance, yet I should meet with ma­ny matters of great importance & use (as you shall perceive) which have not been explai­ned within the memory of the greatest part of this Auditory.

Second, I hope to ride some way because I intend to point at onely all petty passages and to prosecute them alone, which I shall judge fundamentall and necessary.

Third, that which shall remaine I meane God willing to fill up at other opportuni­ties.

One thing more I desire you to remember, that as he sayd by way of Apology for himself, of the harsh & barbarous names of towns that are in the Catalogue of those things that will not be written in a florid stile [...], as the Greek; elegantly: so may I say of some things in Divinity; that you may not look for ornament in my discourse, but emolu­ment: Verba nostra non lenocinia esse volumus sed media, to speak with Salvian: The foun­dations of houses are laid under ground, and madnes it were you know, to carve or paint them: and so it were to deck and trim the [Page 6]fundamentall points of Divinity: they would be so fine (as we say of some effoeminate gal­lants) that they would be the worse for it.

Sect. 2 And thus without any more premised in commendation of this manner of proceeding, I begin with that which first offers it selfe in the consideration of any Art, the Definition of Divinity: which I will propound two wayes.

The first defini­tion of Divinity according the rules of Art. First according to the Method of Art; which as a strait garment to the body keeps close to the nature of the thing expressing it exactly, and cutting off all other things counting them but superfluities.

Second, according to the Method of pru­dence, which gives a little more scope; which inclines and bows truths, without injurious violence, to the condition and satisfaction of the Auditors, in regard of some circum­stances. The first I conceive thus.

Divinity is a Doctrine of mans Happinesse. Or in equivalent termes, of living well and happily: wherein you have according to the law of definitions, two portions.

First, the generall, conteining the com­munity, by which it agrees with other Arts and Sciences; it is as they are, a Doctrine.

Second, the speciall, conteining the Pro­priety, by which it is divided and differenced from all other and constituted that which it is in its own peculiar essence, which two if they be rightly taken the definition must needs be [Page 7]accurate; and therfore that this may better appeare, I will indeavor to open them both severally and distinctly.

Artic. 2 First of the generall, that it is a Doctrine, by a Doctrine I understand a comprehension or­derly of certaine catholicall precepts that are homogeneall one to another, and tend to one common scope as you know, for I do but borrow these from the ordinary notions without much scanning, because that sutes not with this exercise and argument, in which a Divine must presuppose not proove those ge­nerall principles: and the matter is not great whether you call it a Doctrine, or a Discipline, or a Science, or Art, or Prudence, or Sapience: all which words may be put upon, in the same signification, though in diverse respects, as I might easily shew, if I were not afrayd I should be prevented by the time in more ma­terial things: but in this indifferency & choice of words I rather call it a Doctrine then other­wise.

First, Because it is in more common use a­mong the best Divines then any other (which is the best rule to follow in this case) and sounds most gravely and fitly in my eare.

Second, Because it prevents an ambiguity, which lyes hid in the other, for whereas an Art is properly, those Catholicall precepts, and truths, which as I said it comprehends, whether a man be habituated in the know­ledge [Page 8]of them or not, whether they be writ­ten in books, and delivered or not, as the Lo­gitians you know teach you to distinguish those termes of Science, Art and Prudence and the like, signifying primarily habits of the understanding, have misled many (and all the School-men) and made them misconceive the nature of them as though they were no­thing else, but intellectuall habits, which in­deed they are considered as attained by us, but this respect is but accidentall to them and seperable, and no wayes essentiall.

Third, I might adde that as those Arts which they call Mathematicall, have their name from learning, because by reason of their difficulty they are not often attained without learning from others, or because it was one of the first and common things, which the An­cient were wont to learne: so this name of Doctrine attributed to Divinity may inti­mate (as some have observed) the impossibi­lity of attayning to this skill without a teacher (How can I understand without a teacher, sayd the Eunuch in the Acts to Philip) and withall the excellency of the Doctor because all that come to it must be [...], taught of God as the Scripture speaks, we have one Doctor, saith our Saviour, Cathedram habet in coelo qui corda docet, according to the Father: and so there will be a great Emphasis in this word Do­ctrine: And for these reasons, though the [Page 9]matter be of small consequence, and though in the originall of it, it import but an extrin­secall and adventitious relation of teaching, I rather prefer this, and call it a Doctrine: and this is the gneral part of the definition, though not a Genus in exact language and rigor of speech, because as I apprehend it, the distribu­tion of Art is not generis in species, but adjun­cti in subjecta, all the distinction of them be­ing taken from the Objects as all agree, which in an Analogicall sense are said to make a spe­cificall difference between habits: and as in Method we call the precepts generall or speciall, though the distribution be not of that kind, but integri in membra as in Logick, and the same may be said of others.

Artic. 2 But it may be said that this seemes not the full, and immediate Genus (for so we will call it) because it expresses only that agreement which every Art hath with another, where­as without doubt some have neerer affinity to some then to other, for example, Divinity to Ethicks then to Geometry, and so are tyed together in neerer references: In answer to this I say,

First, the division of Arts is taken (as I no­ted even now) from the subjects by which the same thing in essence comes to be multiplyed and diversified, so that the Generality of that word Doctrine seemes to be sufficiently re­strained and limited by the mention of the [Page 10]proper object without any further curio­sity.

Second, It being not agreed what is the best and most accurate distributions of Arts, I judge it more convenient to rest in that which is commonly received, and had rather that Generality too much should be taxed as insuf­ficiency, then too much particularity should breed obscurity, especially considering that this is a place not to examin, but to set a work those grounds which Divinity must needs borrow from higher Arts.

Third, to give some satisfaction I will en­quire of these three things.

First of the kinde of this Doctrine (the thing now in question) out of the lawfull subordi­nation of Arts.

Second, of the condition, whether it be Sci­entia or no.

Third, of the end whether it be Practicall or speculative; of all very briefely.

For the kind I will mention but a double Series of Arts out of which you may fetch the primum genus of Divinity, the first is known to the most or many of you, where Arts are first divided into Generall and particular, then particular into Mathematicall and Philosophi­call; Philosophicall againe into Naturall and Morall; Morall into the root Theology, and the branches Ethicks; Oeconomicks and Po­liticks and the rest; so that if you would frame [Page 11]the next Genus of divinity you must call it a Particular Art the root of Morall doctrine &c. I might produce many other of ancient and moderne authors if it were needfull or profi­table, but I will onely suggest a second, and that in a word: as many precepts about a cer­taine subject collected make one Art, so many Arts make one [...], between every of which there is as lawfull sequence and subor­dination as there is between the severall parts of the same Art: so that all are truly one, though we divide them (and not amisse nei­ther) for our commodity, as Suarez relates the opinion of Aegidius and Antonius Miran­dula concerning Metaphisicks: now the hint of this division must be taken from the Objects as I noted before: Therefore if the object of Art in generall, be ens, in generall as is commonly said (and for ought that I know truly) the species of Art will accompany the Species of ens, and goe hand in hand with them: Now ens is first divided into Increa­tum and Creatum (supposing this to be an A­nalogicall division according to the most re­ceived opinion, though there can be no gene­ricall community between God and the Crea­ture as the Schoolemen shew) and so ars is ei­ther de ente increato, or de ente creato: Art de ente creato, is either of it in generall or in par­ticular: that in generall shall treat of the na­ture and affections of it and the species, and [Page 12]so cut out that which the particulars shall make up, which borrow their subjects from it: for all being comprised there where any affection or species swels to too great a bulk, it will send forth a colony as it were, and erect a particular Art: For example, Reason is a generall affection of ens creatum, which is so large that it deserves particular considerati­ons, so speech, so quantity, whence Logick, Grammer, Mathematicks are risen: so there is scarce any species of created nature, whence some particular Art is not budded: the last of which, man, more fruitfull then the rest is branched into many: all which guide him in his operations towards his happinesse and perfection, as the generall Art (wherein he is handled as well as the rest) regulate him in his essence and constitution: and they consider man either single or in society, concerning man single, either in ordine ad Deum, which is Divinity, or in ordine ad hominem, which is E­thicks: and out of this you may collect more strictly the proper genus of this Doctrine from the speciall habitude to the neerest object, which is the operations of man single, or eve­ry man as dirigible toward happines: and this may something give light and limits to the generality of the word Doctrine which I used; But I will not insist upon these Meta­physicall and generall notions, which are lit­tle sought into by reason of the difficult ab­straction [Page 13]from particulars, but for the same reason, are very scientificall; and hee that should travaile in them with diligence & dex­terity, should do very good service to all stu­dies: & so leaving the first inquiry concerning the kind of this Doctrine, I come to the second, concerning the quality, whether it be Scientia.

Artic. 3 I promise a distinction and answer it brief­ly; Scientia is taken two wayes.

First, for an Intellectuall habit apprehen­ding an infallible truth, and this is according to the notion of the word most proper, and then the question will be whether our know­ledge of Theologicall truths be Scientia.

Second, by a Metonymie of the Adjunct for the Subject, for the truths themselves appre­hended, and this is most pertinent to our pur­pose, for you may remember I sayd that was the best meaning, when we speak of an Art or Science, and then the question is whether the precepts in Theology be such as are the Subject of such an habit, as we call a Science. viz. of infallible truth, Catholicall and Scientificall.

According to this latter sense I answer af­firmatively to the question, that they are, and therefore it may justly challenge the name of a Science: the precepts in this being as in other, desinitions, distributions and consectaries that explaine proprieties, all which make re­ciprocall and Catholicall axioms: and if it [Page 14]be objected that many things in Divinity de­pendupon contingent fact, as the fall of our first parents, and the Incarnation of our Saviour, with the rest of his performances, for the Redemption of man kinde, of which there cannot be a perpetuall and unvariable rule: I say,

First, these instances are but few (not ma­ny more I think then I have named) and therefore can bring no prejudice to an whol Art.

Second, Divinity makes not a bare histori­call narration of the contingent fact; but sup­posing that explaines a constant affection with which it's proper Subject, man, in order to his happines, is invested upon those occasi­ons.

Third, I distinguish the existence and es­sence, or rather the condition of the things, and the connexion in the Rule, the former is contingent and mutable, yet the latter may be notwithstanding immutable and constant: But these things shall appeare more plainly afterward. If the question be put in the for­mer sence, whether our knowledge of Theo­logicall truths be properly Science: I say,

First, it is not much materiall what it be.

First, because the consideration of an Art is extrinsecall to the nature of it, as I conclu­ded before of an Art in generall.

Second, if that were regarded according to [Page 15]the diverse habitudes, to diverse apprehensi­ons the form would be diverse habits, yea con­trary in one Scientia (as without question the knowledge that God hath of Divinity is Scientia, in another opinion which appre­hends them not without doubting cum formi­dine oppositi, as the Schoole speaks, in ano­ther Faith that assents to them only, because commended to him by divine authority; and so the same habit of Theology, would be all of these, and by consequence none of them, which were absurd to say: but to come up closer to the point I say,

Second, that it may be more fully answered by this distinction of Scientia: Scientia may be taken three wayes.

First, for the knowledge of a Catholicall axiom, or an immediate proposition as other Logicians call it, whatsover the condition of that knowledge be: and according to this acception the resolution of this question, fol­lows from the former affirmative, because there I determined that the precepts in this Doctrine are such.

Second, for the certaine knowledge of any axiom, whatsoever the cōdition of it be: which is the most common signification of scire in common phrase of speech: and thus also the resolution of the question is affirmative, be­cause the certainty of faith by which we assent to divine truths upon a divine testimony is as [Page 16]great as of any demonstrative syllogysme: and for this reason, saith Gregory de Valentia the nobility of this Doctrine deserves the name of a Science, amd cannot well be stiled by any other.

Third, for the evident knowledge of a con­clusion by a convincing reason, or demon­stration, and in this sense it seems to be used by Aristotle; and after him the Schoolmen, and according to this strict acception the question is more doubtfull: for this including that which was most restreined in both the former, that the object must be a Catholicall axiom as the first required, and that the assent must be certain, as the second exacted, superads three qualifications.

First, that the Object must be a Conclu­sion.

Second, that the assent must be evident.

Third, that the motive must be a eonvin­cing Reason or demonstration, as it were necessitating the understanding to assent: The first and last addition I passe over, as imperti­nent, because few precepts of any Art are such Conclusions, for neither definitions nor distributions (which make the greater part) are so demonstrated being most prime, and immediate, and therefore cannot be proved by any that are priora or magis immediata & perse, then they are. Only it is said that pas­sions may be so demonstrated of their proper [Page 17]subjects which may well be called in question by the same reason that I alleadged for the o­ther.

Second, few Arts have such precepts except onely the Mathematicks as is observed, when it is that [...], are grown almost into a Proverbe.

Third, if they were necessary, Divinity is in the like condition with the rest for the pre­cepts of the Art, though not for other acces­sary: We will therefore enquire of the se­cond condition, and propound the question a new; whether our knowledge of Theolo­gicall truths be evident or not.

To answer it then with as much circum­spection of judgement, and yet with as lit­tle circumstance of words as may be.

First, I lay this foundation, that Evidence is a metaphoricall speech, from the eye to the understanding, and a relative thing impor­ting a faire proportion of the object, to the faculty in both; so that there is a concurrence of three things to it.

First, the aptitude of the object to be di­scerned.

Second, the ability of the faculty to di­scerne.

Third, the disposition of the medium fit for conveyance, which is distinct in the vision, but included in the two former, in the action of the understanding.

Second, I distinguish the three principall termes of the question.

First, the knowledge of which must be considered according to his different conditi­on either in natura integra or corrupta, for many things he did know then scientifically, which now he doth so much as opinio native­ly: and againe as corrupted, he is either im­mersed in it, or elevated by the infusion of grace.

Second, the precepts of Divinity are in a double difference, some are aeternijuris, some are liberae voluntatis, that I may speak so for distinction sake: for instance, in the state of innocency the promise of another life, to which Adam should have been exalted upon observance of the covenant, was liberae volun­tatis, as the most agree, and the precept of that I call so, though it also be indeed aeternae veritatis, as all rules of an Art should.

Third, Evidence is either in regard of the simple termes, the things themselves, which by reason of more or lesse abstraction or such like circumstances, may be evident or obscure, more or lesse.

Or second, in regard of the connexion and cohaesion of them one with another:

And now thirdly, I resolve the question in these Assertions.

First, all Theologicall precepts areevident in themselves though not to us, as Thomas Distin­guishes [Page 19]of propositions that are per se nota secū ­dum se though not quoad nos, of which this he gives as one Deus est: the reason is because the termes are essentiall one to another as they must be in all Catholick axioms.

Second, Man in his integrity had proper Science of all those precepts, which I called ju­ris aeterni: though of the other, as a better state in another life, he had not without a double helpe.

First, ex parte objecti, which was Divine Revelation to convey it.

Second, ex parte facultatis, which was an o­ration of grace strengthening, and comfor­ting it; the reason of the first part of this as­sertion, that man had Science of those which were juris aeterni is, because they were evident of themselves, and there was no impediment of his part, his faculty being proportionable to them: of the second, that the other he could not scire of himself, because they depended on the free liberall grace of God, which he could not penetrate, till it pleased him to sig­nifie his good pleasure by Revelation, and withall were supernaturall to him, and above his Spheare: the reason of the third part that those helps supposed, he could, is because then nothing was deficient, either in object or fa­culty, as I said of the first three Assertions: Man faln, can know neither the one kinde nor other, scientifically and savingly, with­out [Page 20]Revelation of the object and elevation of the faculty, and then he may evidently: so that his knowledge may in truth and proprie­ty be called Science, for the reasons hitherto intimated: I confesse I seeme in this to strive against the streame of the Schoolemen, who seem to make evidence of the nature of Faith, out of the Apostle, who saith faith is of things that are not seen, and make faith and science opposite habits; but they also may admit a good interpretation: for I think they meane of the condition of some things, not the con­nexion of the termes in the precepts, or of man considered with naturall reason only, to which I grant they are not evident: But if there be any doubt of this last (to which I have without any necessity condiscended) I think the former answers may suffice: And so I will passe from this, adding but this one observa­tion, that when an Art or Doctrine is called Scientia, there is a Synecdoche in the word, for properly the knowledge of one scientifical axiom is a science, and in that sense, neither Divinity (as Durand and Ariminensis well di­spute) are one Science, but so many conclu­sions (so they call them) as there are so many sciences, yet by this Synechdoche as I sayd the collection of many are called one, and are so unitate ordinis, which sufficeth sayth Grego­ry of Valentia to the unity of a Science.

Artic. 4 And now I come to the third inquisition [Page 21]of the end, whether this doctrine be Specula­tive or Practicall: where I premise a few necessary observations for the better under­standing of it, and then resolve it in a word.

First observe Speculative and Practicall are not specificall differences of Arts and essenti­all, but accidentall only, as Valentia rightly judges more probable, though I like not his reason, because sayth he, they are taken from the objects as things, for Arts as I said are spe­cifically distinguished by their objects in that large sense of specificall before mentioned, but because they are taken from the habitudes, which Art, have to us, who use to aime at Spe­culation, or operation in the purchase of them and end in those.

Second, every Praxis doth not constitute and denominate a Practicall Art, but you must note a threefold latitude in the use of this word.

First, in the largest extent of the significa­tion, it comprehends these three things under it [...] and [...] for all these are opera­tion, the first of the understanding, the second of the will, the third of all the faculties.

Second, in the narrowest it is opposed on one side to [...] on the other to [...], and then imports nothing but the second, the e­licitus actus voluntatis, as Scotus speakes, or an immanent act perfected within it self.

Third, in the middle way it is opposed [Page 22]to [...], but includes the two latter: now in both these latter acceptions, it is taken when we speak of a practicall discipline, but more principally and more particularly in this question, in the first of them the middle of the three:

Third, the [...], and character of a pra­cticall Science is not the end that any particu­lar man makes to himselfe, for that is fallible, for in both kinds of practicall, [...] & [...], they may propound to themselves Speculati­on as a Gentleman may study Architecture for delight in the contemplation, and do study both Divinity and Morality whose pur­pose if it be not bare Speculation I know not, but the issue we see is not practise; therefore the judgement of this must be from the nature of the object, and the end of the art it self: These observations being thus dispatched, I answer in a word affirmatively that Divinity is a Practicall Doctrine, and conclude this truth in this one Reason: That Art is pra­cticall whose Subject is res operabilis à nobis, in the language of the Schoole, and whose proper end is operation, for these make it practicall, and it is sayth Durand very well, practicall, radicaliter à subjecto formaliter à fine, but Divinity is such as shall appeare in the explication of the latter part of the Defini­tion immediately succeeding; therefore Di­vinity is Practicall.

Second, things may be objected against the Assumption of this Syllogisme.

First, that God is the object of Divinity, who is not res operabilis à nobis, and there­fore the first condition of a Practical Art is not found in this: I defer the full answer of this till I come to a particular decision of that questi­on which shall be the next time, for the present I say God is not the subject of Divinity nor principally considered in it according to his nature for he that doth so sayth Durand, sumit formam Philosophi, but in Relation to our works as they are terminated in him objectivè, and in some sense that is true, which the same Author affirmes, not qua Deus, as the Thomists would have it, but qua salvator, not qua cogno­scendus, say I, but qua colendus.

Second, it is objected that the last end of Divinity is the vision of God, which is specula­tive and therefore the second condition of a Practicall Art agrees not to Divinity, to which I answer.

First, the last end of Divinity is eternall happinesse, but not the whol end, and in eter­nall happines that vision is something, but not all, for without doubt there shall be many o­ther operations, as praysing of God &c. To w ^ch that is rather subordinate then otherwise.

Second, the next end makes an Art Practi­call not the remote, but that vision is as Du­rand disputes: yet that is produced by an [Page 24]habit of glory, which is of another kinde, then our habit of Divinity; but these things shall appeare better in that which follows: There­fore I still hold that conclusion that it is Pra­cticall: and that Scripture gives good testimo­ny to this truth, Evidenter apparet conside­ranti omni Scripturam a principio usque ad fi­nem, quia semper pro una scripturae columna in qua agitur de his quae sunt pure speculabilia à nobis sunt plusquam quingenta folia in quibus agitur de pure practicis, as Durand writes: I will alleage some few places to make this good in part. 1. Tim. 15. The end of the Commande­ment is charity. Out of which and such like places Alexander Hales made it a third, nei­ther Speculative nor Practicall; but Affective, which opinion is true though not in oppositi­on to practick, for that affection is in order to action, that that is the last: more plainly. 2. Tim. 3.16.17. All the scripture is profitable for doctrine for instruction in righteousnesse that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished [...], to every good work: John 13.17. If you know these things, blessed are yee if ye doe them, sayth our Saviour. James 1.22. But be ye doers of the word and not hearers onely deceiving your selves. I shall not need to heap up more: for Scotus and many of the best Schoolemen concurre in this opinion, and all our modern and orthodoxe Divines with one consent agree in it: and therefore I will con­clude [Page 25]this in the words of Bernard, Is recte legit Scripturas divinas, and so Theologiam, qui verba vertit in opera: Blessed are they that heare the word of God and keep it.

Artic. 5 The last time I propounded the first defini­tion of Theology conteyning so much, as I con­ceived necessary for the accuratenesse thereof: which was this that Theology is a Doctrine of mans happinesse: and then I dispatched the former and generall part of it, that it was a Doctrine, explayning foure things for the clearing of it.

First, how it was a doctrine and where­fore I called it so, rather then by any other name.

Second, what kind of doctrine in particular that seeming large and generall.

Third, what manner of doctrine for the condition and quality whether scientia or not.

Fourth, what was the end of it whether Speculation or Praxis.

It remaines now that I proceed to the se­cond and particular part of that definition that this doctrine is of Mans happinesse, that this same thing may be expressed in other e­quipollent terms I touched before, and mean not to trouble my self, or you with unnecessary scruples in that kind: whether you list to speak as I have done, or like beter to call it, a doctrine of living well; with Ramus, or a Doctrine [Page 26]guiding man to his happynes; or such like, the sense being the same, the terms are indiffe­rent: but thus much I wish to be observed in the words.

First, that I call it happines rather then Sal­vation, because this latter word in the com­mon acception there of implies and presup­poses a state of evill and misery from which man is to be saved, which is not generall e­nough for our purpose, being but one parcell of that divinity doctrine as it is usually and rightly handled of all, and as you shall per­ceive by that short declination of the parts, which I shall make the next time.

Second, I rather mention happynes in ge­nerall then eternall happines, as the most ei­ther expresse, or understand it; for the same reason: because though that be the highest and last and principall, to which all other things in Divinity are in their kinde subordi­nate, yet it is not all: for both Adam in the state of integrity had actuall felicity, and should still have had so long as he continued in inte­grity & so have the children of God in the state of Regeneration, though they be translated into the kingdome of heaven and glorified, though this be of a lower ranck and order then that other: so that Eternall happinesse is too narrow for the generall end of this Art: except perhaps it be widened two wayes.

Either first, by extending the signification [Page 27]of the word eternall happinesse (which is ordi­narily taken for that estate which abides with the children of God in the kingdom of heaven; because that is to indure without alteration and change to all eternity) so that it may take that happinesse of this life along with it, both together making but one context of E­ternall happines.

Or secondly by changing the whole phrase, delivering the sense in these or the like terms that it is a Doctrine teaching to live well here, that we may live happily hereafter and that to all perpetuity, which will come to the same ef­fect: thus much you may observe for the word

Second, under the word Happines, I compre­hend both the end it self, to which that word is in a manner appropriated, and all those means that lead unto it which are either, those graci­ous acts of God such as are Redemption, Vocati­on, Justificatiō, Sanctificatiō & the rest, or those pious acts of man, w ^ch are necessary for the ob­teining thereof, especially those that direct­ly and immediately have God for their object, being his proper worship and service: whe­ther these actions have a Relation of efficien­cy to that happines, under which notion we conceive of meanes ordinarily, and perhaps not amisse in this case, if we speak of happines as it signifies that future estate of glory; or whether rather those actions are parts of it, or happines it self; which respect seemes to agree [Page 28]better to it, as it is taken generally for the whol end of man, and makes the adaequate subject of this Art: because as you know the Phylosopher defines felicity to consist in the operation according to virtue: And accor­ding to this explication of the word, you may easily discerne that those opinions would not stand in opposition one to the other, one of which saith that mans operations are the sub­ject of this Doctrine: as Durand doth, ex­pressing it in these words actus meritorius, (sayth he in their Popish language) is the sub­ject of Divinity, and better actus humanus ordinabilis in beatitudinem: as Arminius al­so in his private disputations makes, actio homi­nis quam Deo praestare tenetur, and in word Religio, which is the same with the former, on­ly it omits the reference that those actions have to the end, happines, which notwithstan­ding the same author addes expresly in his de­finition of Theology: But the other makes Happines the subject of this doctrine: which hath no repugnancy to the former as I said but includes it as subordinate: And thus I judged it to sute better then the other: for these two reasons,

First, because actus Religionis, is not large enough for the whole latitude of Theologi­call precepts for there be some, as I noted of the Acts of God which are necessary to make man happy: it being as impossible in ordi­nary [Page 29]course, that man should bee redu­ced to his perfection, his happines, without the culture of Gods grace, as it is that other infe­rior creatures should be reduced to their per­fection, their last end; without intervention of mans care: there being the like proportion in the dependance of other creatures upon man, to be managed by him, that there is of man upon God, to be managed by him, and something more:

Second, the acts of Religion, may be redu­ced to happines by a more direct attribution then happines can be reduced to them: and therefore seeing both are conteined, and it is not needfull to expresse both, I made choice as neere as I could of the fittest: And so much also of the signification of these words.

Third, therefore to dispatch the explicati­on of this latter part of this definition, and shew how these words of mans happines, con­teine the specialities of divinity: they may sustaine a threefold relation.

First, of the subject, because this doctrine is conversant about the nature and affections and parts of happines.

Second, of the form, because Arts being di­stinguished by their objects the form is alway included in them.

Third, of the end, which indeed is prima­rily either of the artificer, or rather of the sub­ject; [Page 30]and so secondarily may be considered as of the Art it selfe: the first therefore of the subject is the most principall and essentiall re­lation as you see, and requires a little further illustration.

That is the subject of a Science or Art saith Gregory de Valentia, which is the subject of those conclusions (as he cals them) or pre­cepts that are principally intended in that Science: and distinguishes nicely between this subjectum & objectum, which he makes the precepts themselves where you may note scientia, to be taken for the habit of our un­derstanding: Durand also distinguishes be­tween subjectum in quo, which he makes the understanding to be of all Arts, and subjectum de quo, of which the present question is, and that saith he must have these three condi­tions.

First, it must be aliquid incomplexum scili­cet terminus & non propositio.

Second, it must be primo & principaliter consideratum in scientia, and all things there must have attributionem ad ipsum.

Third, it must be such de quo aliqua praedi­cari possint denominativè: that third of these is obscure by reason of a Scholasticall terme, but included in the former, for any thing ma­teriall: and the two former agree with that I brought out of Valentia: so that not to hold you longer in this, I conclude that in a word [Page 31]to be the subject of a Science, that is the sub­ject of the Scientificall precepts therein con­teined: now I assume, But mans happines so taken as I have explained it, including all the meanes unto it and the parts of it, is the subject of the precepts of divinity which are principally intended in it, as might appeare by a particular enumeration now, and shall better afterward: for except the definition it selfe of Theology, wherein it is a part of the praedicate it or some part or affection of it is the subject in all the rest: there being many precepts of this Art, because there be many particulars of this subject, as I shewed the last time that Arts are multiplied because their subjects are multiplied: and the unity of a Science likewise depends upon the unity of of the subject: I conclude therefore that mans happinesse is the Subject of Divinity: man is as it were the materiale and happines the formalis ratio subjecti: And thus much of this first de­finition of Theology that it is a Doctrine of mans happines.

There may be diverse things objected both against this latter part, which I have passed o­ver more lightly and lesse distinctly then I purposed for some reasons, and against the whole: but I shall meet with them more con­veniently in another place, and that by and by, and therefore will not meddle with them here, the rather also because I have [Page 32]deteined you too long already in the en­trance.

Only give me leave to illustrate this defini­tion out of the Scripture, for though the word of God aime not at the laying down of artificiall and notionall truths; but beats al­most altogether upon fundamentall in a me­thod of divine wisedome and prudence: yet even those must have the ground and sub­stantialls, from thence, though Art may put a form and modification upon them: therefore it will not be amisse to give some light to this definition out of it: The places are infinite, which I might alleage, but I will confine my selfe to afew, and that of two sorts.

The first point at it, in generall as for in­stance. John 6.68. Peter cals the doctrine of our Saviour, [...], for when our Saviour upon occasion of the going back of many of his disciples from him asked his A­postles, will ye also go away, this is Peters an­swer; whether shall we go? thou hast the words of eternall life: Luc. 1.77. It is stiled [...], for in Zacharies song this is said to be the scope, and imploiment of John the fore­runner of Christ, to prepare the wayes of the Lord to give knowledge of Salvation to his peo­ple in the forgivenes of their sins: Acts 13.26. Paul termes the preaching of the Gospell by himself, and the rest of the Apostles [...]: as that evill spirit in the maid, Act. 16.17. [Page 33]to the same effect in a Scripture meta­phor cals it [...]. the way of Salvation. I will content my selfe with these that I have already mentioned though many more offer themselves and perhaps more preg­nant.

The second sort of places seeme more fully to comprehend the definition, of which it shall suffice to have produced but three, 1. Tim. 6.3. the Apostle Paul expresseth it in these words, [...], a Doctrine of Religion or godlines, or according to godlines, which by some of our Divines is used in so many words to this purpose; and therefore I need not stand to explain it: on­ly I observe that this defines it by the means to happines rather then the end happinesse it self, as you may remember I said some Di­vines did: the second place is more plaine and full. Tit. 1.1. [...], where you may have both expresly mentioned: the third and last place, is rather more accurate for, 2. Tim. 3.15. the Scriptures, and so the rule of Divinity conteined in them are thus circumscribed, [...]: I should inlarge these with explication and accomodati­on of them to my present scope, but they are perspicuous of themselves; and I have been too tedious in this matter: I will therefore ob­serve [Page 34]this onely in all together, that the Scrip­ture instead of happines useth rather to name eternall life and Salvation, the latter because it is directed all to man faln, who must be raised from misery; so that his happinesse is properly Salvation: the former, because the most noble member of our happines is eter­nall life, and therefore by a familiar Synech­doche names that for all and insists in that: and both in a dispensation of heavenly wisdome, because they carry most majesty and divine authority with them, and are most powerfull & efficacious to work upon the heart of man: And so I leave this first definition, and passe to the second.

Sect. 2 Now the second, as you may remember I said in the beginning, is to bow the same truth a little to the common apprehension taking liberty to dispense with the strictnes and seve­rity of Art, by Prudence, and that I think may be fitly conceived in these or the like words; Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his word which teaches man how to know and worship God, so that he may live well here and happily hereafter: I intend not to spend any time a­bout those parcels in this definition, wherein it agrees with the former: and for circum­stantiall differences, I will passe them over likewise; because I suppose there will not arise any difficulty, which may not tolerably be satisfied out of that which hath been said al­ready.

There be two additions onely of moment, which must be expended.

First, concerning the Scripture.

Second, concerning the knowledge of God.

The first, I shall cleare in the opening of these three propositions.

First, that divine Revelation is not the for­malis Ratio of the subject of Theology.

Second, that mention of the Scripture is not to be inserted into the definition of divi­nity, when we go about to lay downe the nature of it accurately.

Third, that for some circumstances of pru­dence it may be convenient to do it: the truth of which three I shall shew in a word.

For the first: Valentia distinguishing of formalis ratio quae & sub qua, makes divine Revelation the formall respect of the subject of Theology acccording to the latter, and the Thomists generally make ens divinum Revela­bile: and make good the unity of this Do­ctrine by that, though it treat of many dif­ferent things as God and the creatures &c. Yet it is one because all are considered in one for­mall respect as they are revealed, which is e­nough: and he goes so far that in answer to an argument of Aureolus, to the contrary, that if that were true, if God should reveale Mathematicks and Metaphysicks to one man they would be but one Science because there [Page 36]would be the same ratio formalis sub qua, viz. divine Revelation he thinks it no absurdity to grant so much.

But, I take it, this cannot be: for if Revela­tion were the formalis, by which any thing were brought into the compasse of Divinity; then,

First, nothing should be handled there, but quatenus Revelatum, and so Divinity should have no proper subject of it own.

And second, every thing quatenus Revela­tum, should be handled there, upon which must needs follow this inconvenience that the truths of all Arts should belong to Divinity, because many of them are revealed in the Scripture (as for example, naturall, morall, Politicall, Historicall, Architectonicall, Ma­thematicall, and almost of all kinds) at least all of them may be revealed, if God pleased, as well as Theologicall are.

And second it would follow, that Theolo­gy should not be distinguished from other Arts by any essentiall difference; but only by this extrinsecall respect, of being revealed which may as I said be a common affection of all truths: 'tis true indeed that de facto, all truths necessary to Salvation are Revealed and de jure they had need to be revealed, and if that opinion aimed at no more I think it should offend not against the verity of the thing so much as the propriety of the language [Page 37]but they seeme to say more, and in that sense I reject it.

For the second, that mention of the Scrip­ture is not to be made in the definition of Divinity, when we go about to lay down the nature of it accurately I shew it thus.

First, because it is but an extrinsecall rela­tion as hath been said, and therefore as it were absurd to say of Logick, that it is an Art of Reason delivered in Aristotles Organon, or in Ramus, and it were inconvenient to de­fine any Art, that it was such an one attained to by naturall reason and humane industry, (which have the same habitude, to the Sci­ences of humanity that Revelation hath to the Doctrine of Divinty) so in a like (I say not an equall) proportion, it would be at least unnecessary to interpose this in the defi­nition of Theology that it is revealed by God in his word:

Second, because it is not of so generall con­sideration as to be placed in the title and fron­tispiece of the Art, as may if you do but re­member,

First, the finis cui, or the object of the Scrip­ture, which is either onely, or especially man faln, in which estate it is absolutely necessary that he should have the word of God, to bee his guide toward his true happines.

And second, if you remember the efficient cause of the Scripture which beside the princi­pall, [Page 38]the holy Spirit, is instrumentall, holy men inspired by God the pen-men of the holy Ghost which were alway extraordinary ministers of the Church having such immediate assistance of the Spirit: now both these the fall of man and extraordinary officers of the Church, with­out which the nature and use of the Scriptures cannot well be unfolded, are of later consi­deration and follow afterward in the body of this Art: and therefore the treating of the Scripture cannot be exalted so high as the de­finition without an obscure anticipation of exact order.

For the third, that this notwithstanding, it may be convenient to define it, so for some circumstances of prudence, it will be no hard matter to demonstrate.

First, because it conteines all thing necessa­ry to Salvation, and therefore is coextended with the object of Divinity; and in this sense also the Scripture may be called a Rule or Ca­non, because though it be not every way ad­aequate, as that uses to be (conteining many things in it which are not properly Theologi­call, as I noted before) yet it hath all those things in it: but it is more aptly resembled to a Rule or Canon, as it respects faith and things to be beleeved, with which it is every way reciprocated, for every thing revealed in the Scripture is to be beleeved, and every truth to be beleeved is revealed in Scripture.

Second, because all men now are in the state of corruption of the fall, so that it is absolutely necessary as the case stands for all men: and so it is well commended to all in in the very entrance as a principle and ground of all that followes, and is placed at the top as a candle upon a candlesticke to give light better to all the roome: And thus much of the first addition in this latter definition, that Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his Word.

The second follows, which is, that this Do­ctrine teaches man to know God; concerning which, I shall deliver my minde what I think in so many propositions likewise.

First, that God is not the subject of divi­nity.

Second, that he is not (according to his na­ture) at all to be handled in divinity.

Third, that there is just reason why he may and should according to the method of pru­dence.

The first may appeare by the same argu­ment negatively concluded, by which I pro­ved that man, as he is to be guided to his end or [...] (which in a reasonable nature is called happines) is the true subject about which all the precepts in this Art are conver­sant: but I passe over that.

Second, it may appeare by this reason, be­cause divinity as hath been proved, is a practi­call [Page 40]Art not a Speculative: now a Practical Art is that whose end is operation and that imme­diate not mediatè, as Valentia well observes, for the remote and mediate end of any con­templative Science, may be operation; and a Practicall Art hath alway such an object, as is res operabilis à nobis: but if God be the sub­ject, neither of these can agree to it, as it is more then manifest: therefore God is not the Subject.

The second, that God is not at all to be han­dle in Divinity, though perhaps it be inclu­ded in the former and might be proved by the same reasons; if he be neither the subject nor part of the subject, yet because it will seem more strange to some. I will rather prove it distinctly, and severally.

First, because Divinity, as we for the most part generally conceive of it, is a particular Art one of the lowest and last: but God must be needs handled in the first, or very neer the first: for if ars be ranked according to ens, God who is the first being, may justly challenge the first Art at least, next to that of Art in generall if there be any such in the whole [...],

Second, because if there were any reason why God should be handled in this Art, it would be this, because he is the object of the operations of man which are here regulated namely (in which regard I deny not, but he [Page 41]may be called a remote object of it) but this is not sufficient, because by the same reason the nature of man should be handled here also, he being the object of some acts, as for exam­ple, of charity and the rest: which to say would be held absurd:

Third, because supposing that to be, true that it is an Art Regulating mans actions and directing him to his happines, which I think is out of question, I cannot see how things of so different nature can be homogeneall to the same scope, and beside the unity of a Science will not beare it, as Keckerman sayth well, even in this respect, because it should be both pra­cticall and Speculative, which are indeed in­computible though some Schoolemen have attempted such a reconciliation: It may be objected,

First, that it can be handled in no other Art: But I have prevented this objection when I reasoned that it must be in the first art, before we descend to the treatise of ens crea­tum: and Bradwardine confirms me in this, saying that Deus est that truth is the first of all, upon which all other verities have depen­dance.

Second, the very name Theologia argues God the subject of it: I answer.

First, I granted before that he is the remote object namely of mans operations performed to him, and that may salve the Etymologie.

Second, the name supposed, the reason may be drawn otherwise then from the subject, as from the author and efficient God, or from the end because it is to bring us to God, &c.

Third, which Durands Arts (or habits as he speakes) are many times denominated not a formaliratione subjecti, but a digniori, & so it might well come to passe that Divinity, which is Scientia salutis humanae, might be denominated from God: where I observe that he fals upon the same definition that I have given.

Fourth, the imposition of the name usually follows the common opinion (which was so, I confesse) rather then the accurate truth of things, which perhaps would rather call this art Anthropologia, or some like name then Theologia: lastly the consent of all may bee objected as a prejudice against this opinion: But I answer.

First, it is no strange thing for many to erre in such a matter of notion, artificiall rather then substantiall truth, and yet many give good hints of that which I have said.

Second, the error hath been not so much pofitive in defending, as negative in not at­tending or expending this truth, not so much of judgement maintaining, as practise follow­ing this, which also they had good reason for, which I must shew in the last proposition,

Thirdly, therefore I say that the Doctrine [Page 43]of God is not unfitly handled in Divinity.

First, because the nature of God and our actions tending to happinesse are of so neere affinity, for the former affords a firm ground to build the latter upon, so that the explica­tion of that is necessary to this which indeed should be supposed out of an higher Art as I have often intimated; but seeing God com­municates the knowledge of the one, to men of the common sort, it would not be expedi­ent to distract them between two arts; but it is much better to comprise them in the same, by a dispensation of Prudence condescending to their capacity.

Second, because they are conjoyned in Scripture in which the knowledge of both is conveyed unto us joyntly, therefore Divines finding them there together thought it not meet to seperate them in their treatises.

Third, this is a singular priviledge and pre­rogative of the Schoole of Christ, that in it all Christians besides the way to their own feli­city, in which they are properly directed, do withall learne the knowledge of God in all his excellencyes, which must needs adde much grace and majesty to the former: and thus much of this third proposition, and of both the definitions of Divinity in generall, me thinks too much, and yet when I looke to the particulars too little, too jejunely & nakedly.

The uses may be,

First, for instruction to teach us that this Art concernes all, every one must be of this trade, for it is of Mans felicity.

Second for exhortation.

First, to thankfulnesse, second to diligence, from the Certainty, Nobility and Necessity of this Doctrine.

I will not trouble you with repetition of any thing that hath been formerly delivered, only because that which follows hath the rise and ground out of that which is gone before, Let me call to your mind the definitions of Theo­logy, which I have hitherto propounded and in some homely manner expounded, and that in generall only: the first was a Doctrine of mans Happinesse, or of living well and happily, which I thought sufficient for accuratenesse: the second was this, that Divi­nity is a doctrine revealed by God in his word, which teacheth man to know and worship God so that he may live well here, and happily hereafter. Which perhaps as I said may give more popu­lar satisfaction though according to the rules of Art, if it were examined, there may be some superfluityes in it to be cut off as I shewed: and thus having only presented these a fresh to your consideration, that you may the more clearly understand the succeeding discourse, I begin with that where I left, then to draw some practicall observations out of that which [Page 45]hath been taught, before I proceed any further: and they shall be but two.

First for Instruction, we may learn from hence that this Art or Doctrine belongs not to some few, onely, but concernes every man to know and practice.

Second for Exhortation, and that twofold.

First, to thankefulnes, that God hath plan­ted us like trees by the rivers of waters, and taking such care to guide us in the way of hap­pinesse.

Second, to diligence, in the use of those meanes and golden oportunityes, which God hath afforded us, toward the gaining of our happines in this seminary of Religion and lear­ning, which we cannot let slip unlesse we will shamefully betray our owne soules.

The first appeares out of the definition be­cause it is a doctrine of mans happines: where you see both the materiall subject man, and the formall happines intimate unto us, and com­mend the consideration of the generality of this Art, that the use thereof extends it selfe indifferently unto all men: indeed if there be any that have drunk so deep of Circes cup, that are so bewitched with the Sirens songs so besotted with the charmes of pleasure, that they have put off the shape and name of men, and are turned into beasts, or if any that beare the name and shape of men are so degenera­ted from their nature that they are not asha­med [Page 46]to confesse themselves altogether voyde of humanity; they may perhaps consequent­ly to that hypothesis though not reasonably, reject this Art as nothing appertayning to them: but if they be men homo sum, huma­nitas nihil à me alie num puto, as you know he said, if they be men, this is the doctrine con­cerning man to guide and regulate him, of which therefore they may not only claime the use, but also challenge propriety in it: for it is a Doctrine of mans happinesse: man may be conceived as the materiall object of it, and so that implyes the generality of it reaching to every man: Againe if there be any Art con­cerning man, which perhaps concerns not e­very man in particular, and so the former il­lustration be thought insufficient; yet that which is of mans Happinesse, the generall end of all, must needs belong to all: except there be any that have so far defaced the image of God in their Soules, that they have blotted out also even those common principles which nature hath left engraven and imprinted not only in men, that are endued with the highest perfection of reason, but also in all creatures (at least in a kind of Analogy) that have but the lowest degree of being; all which have a naturall impetus or appetitus to their perfecti­on, which in the reasonable nature is called properly Happines: and though men be di­vided in their desires and inclinations toward [Page 47]particular good, some affecting one thing someanother according to the variety of their dispositions, yet all agree in this generall, all hunt after happinesse: Though bonum be not defined according to the proper essence accu­rately, quod omnia appetūt, yet with the empha­ticall article. I think it may be not absurdly de­scribed as the Philosopher hath done it, [...]: that good is that which e­very one desires, every one desires to be hap­py: and though all they misse their marke when they thinke to finde it here below, bea­tam vitam quaerunt in regione mortis, as Au­stin speaks, yet in grosse they aime at this: and therefore this Art, as this end, is generall and concerns every man: And thus it appeares that this observation is reduced out of the former definition, which I therefore mention least any here should think the study of this ali­enum opus, a matter that pertains little to him, and therefore behave himselfe as it is said of Gallio in the Acts, as if he cared not for these things: whosoever thou art if thou hast but the nature of a man, if thou hast but any pro­pension un [...]o happinesse, hoc ad te pertinet, the study of Divinity belongs unto thee: the wisdome of swaying scepters and managing Kingdomes and Common wealthes, which the Philosopher stiles the Architectonicall art, may prescribe to every man a particular im­ployment and vocation, according to their [Page 48]naturall abilities in subordination to the pub­lick utility, but every one must take this a­long with him, this is the generall calling of all men, which they must walke in directing all their actions to this end: this is one diffe­rence of this▪ from other Arts: The great Turk himselfe they say, you know though born to beare rule and inherit the Empire, yet beside is trayned up to some trade of life, which he exerciseth perhaps in his Royall pal­lace and chaire of estate: I am sure the grea­test Princes and Potentates must be skild in this trade or else all their glory will be not on­ly splendida servitus as he said, but also splendi­da miseria: the Rabbins had such a constitu­tion that all their Doctors together with the profession of Divinity should joyne the pra­ctise of some handicraft: what the conveni­ency of that was I know not, but I see a neces­sity of the contrary, that every craftsman with the profession of his craft, should joyne the practise of Divinity; Some are imployed in Magistracy, some in Merchandise, some in Agri­culture, or otherwise, but from the highest Statesman to the lowest craftsman, all should be divines; all should be imployed in this: Not so that every one should be, or labor to be a teacher of others, as we commonly take the name of a Divine, otherwise then that ge­nerall obligation to the private duties of cha­rity, as admonition and the like, that is not [Page 49]my meaning: but that he should be able at least to teach himselfe and guide his owne acti­ons to the last end of all his happinesse: And thus far I say it stands every one in hand to be a Scholar in this Schoole, least any should be mis-led with that vulgar opinion which rejects all knowledge and study in this kind, as pro­per to Divines: But wherefore then hath God tempred the stile of his word, and bow­ed it to the capacity of all sorts of men; mo­dus ipse dicendi sacrae Sripturae quo contexit? sayth Austin, quamvis paucis penetrabils omni­bus tamen accessibilis: that I may a little alter his words, Nam quae aperta continet ea quasi amicus familiaris sine fuco ad cor loquitur in­doctorum ac doctorum: eaverò quae in mysteriis occultat, neceloquio ipso superbo erigit, quo non audeat accedere mens tardiuscula & ineru­dita quasi pauper ad divitem sed invitat omnes humili sermone quod non solum manifesta sed etiam secreta exerceat veritate &c. And wherefore hath God erected his oracles every where in his Church, and his Schools and the chaire of Moses in every Congregation, to have them taught and expounded: whereas other Sciences are professed and practised in some places only of the Commonwealth: but that they belong to all, & must be part of the care of every man? but I need not urge this, neither did I purpose any more then to pro­pound it when I first thought upon it: espe­cially [Page 50]in this place and among you, who both by the generall appellation that is given to U­niversityes, that are called the Schooles of the Prophets, and by particular situation of this, compassed with hils as Jerusalem the vally of vision, and by proper dedication of this Col­ledge, whose gates will scarce admit of any, but such as are at the least welwillers to Divi­nity, but as Plato's Auditory exacted Ge­ometry [...], so this seemes to examine as it were and pose every one it receives in their purpose for Divinity Sacrae Theologiae studiosis posuit: All which do put you in mind that howsoever others may stand affected to this study, yet it behoves you to be in a singular measure addicted thereunto, and desire to be in the number of those that not only in the Apostles words, let the word of God dwell in them richly and plen­tifully, but also labor for it, and therefore as it were dwell continually in the study of it: and true it is of these places that Nazianzen speaks, I think of his mother at least a god­ly mother, [...], or to that purpose for I do not well remem­ber his direct words: they are mothers in Israel to nurse and give suck; that same [...] the sincere milke of the Word as Peter cals it to us that we may prove Nathaneels true Is­raelites in whom there is no guile: so doth she deserve that title of Alma mater, which you [Page 51]see written in her Arms: and we may well beare that devise which Domitian used where his word was this optimae matris: as you have it in Tacitus: And thus much of the first ob­servation that the use of this Doctrine extends it selfe generally to all men, and to us in a more particular manner: wherein because I have been longer then I purposed, I will passe over the rest, though more material, the more briefly.

The second follows for Exhortation,

And first to thankefulnesse upon a double ground.

First, that God hath set us in so honorable a station, a calling so worthy as you see that of a Divine must needs be, whose imployment is about that knowledge, a small portion of which to have attained is the happinesse of o­ther men: what though the tribe of Levi hath no inheritance among their brethen, shall not we thinke this a Royall recompense of that want, since the Lord is their inheritance, the Lord is their portion, [...], as Lucian speaks of his Preists, not their revenues are their, God as some prophane person might invert the words & pervert the meaning, like them whom the Apostle Paul reproves that would have gaine to be godlinesse, which he corrects affirming that godlinesse is great gaine, so here God is their revenues: let other profes­ssions please themselves in the gaine or glory [Page 52]that they procure, Dat Galenus opes, dat Justi­nianus honores, I envy them not: but let my Soule delight in the law of the Lord and me­ditate therein day and night, and let me alway account that the chiefe part of my blessednes: Prayse the Lord ye house of Israel, for in Jury is the Lord known, he hath given his statutes to Is­rael: great is the priviledge of the Jew, for them did the Lord betrust with his Oracles: but especially prayse the Lord ye house of Aaron, prayse the Lord ye house of Levi, whom he hath entertained into neerer service: though your condition be full of difficulties and your vo­cation obnoxious to the obloquies of the world, say with the Psalmist, The lots have faln to me in pleasant places, yea I have a faire heritage: and this may be the first ground of thankfulnes, in a word plainly, that God hath honored us with such a calling in which we have liberty and meanes to study for that which all desire, the Art of Happinesse:

The second is from this, that God affords so many meanes unto us to furnish us for the dis­charge of this calling, [...], that the name of God may be even and square and perfect to all due performances, you all know and have heard often how Plato than­ked the Gods that he was borne a Graecian, an Athenian, and especially in the time of So­crates: and you can all make the application without my helpe, that you have greater cause [Page 53]to thank God that you are born Christians in the wombe of the true Church, that you are brought up Athenians in the bosom of a most famous University, and that in this flourishing estate of Religion, and time of the go­spell, when God hath powred forth of his Spirit so plentifully among us especially in these places, that as Plutarch saith of the neighbour villages of Rome in Numa's time, that sucking in the aire of that City they brea­thed [...], righteousnesse; so from the o­verflow of this place, all parts of the kingdom are full of knowledge, I wish I could say of Religion and Piety: Behold a greater then So­crates is here: even God himselfe in his or­dinances; we are wet with the influence and dew of heaven, as Gedeons fleece, though all the region about be dry in comparison; and againe when all about us are wet with the wa­ters of affliction, we are dry and free: we are in the land that floweth with milke and hony: and though it were but a wildernesse other­wise, yet God raining Mannah from heaven the food of Angels, in that respect it were a mappe of heaven: we sit under our vines every man, and under our figtrees: and are planted in Paradise neere the tree of life, plainly, we injoy all blessed meanes for the knowledge of the way to Salvation in the practicall study of Divinity: and of that knowledge which was so dainty heretofore we have Gods plenty: [Page 54]Silver is like dust, and gold like stones in our streets, the most pretious treasures of divine wisdome and understanding are open un­to us: And have we not as good cause to thanke God as Plato had? The Queen of She­ba came from the South to heare the wisdome of Solomon, and accounted his men happy, and those his servants happy that stood ever before him and heard it: Behold a greater then Solo­mon is here even the Spirit of God, teaching us in the doctrine of Divinity, the way of life and happinesse: Blessed are your eyes that see and your eares that heare these things: Yea bles­sed be God that hath given us these meanes and o­portunities: Deus nobis haec otia fecit.

But I passe to the second exhortation which shall be to the diligent study of this Doctrine and use of the meanes thereunto: because there I shall lay open better the grounds of our thank­fulnesse, and withall keep my selfe closer to the matter in hand: Now we may be provoked to alacrity and diligence in this study from some considerations out of the definitions: the summe of all which is the ex­cellency of this doctrine above others which may appeare in three particulars.

First, the Certainty of the truths conteined in it from the manner of the conveiance of them to us which I told you was by Divine Revelation.

Second, the Nobility of the object which as [Page 55]this Art is usually and wisely handled, is God and divine things.

Third, the necessity of the end, which is mans happinesse, or Salvation: a word of each of these and so I will conclude.

First, of the Certainty of the truths: where­as all other Arts, the skill of which we are to attaine unto by naturall reason upon observa­tion and experience are so uncertain for the most part that a man when he hath done his best may remaine a Sceptick or Academick: by reason of the weaknes of our understanding, proceeding from the wound of originall sin; it is not so with this where we receive all our light and information from God himself, who being the fountaine of wisdome not subject to the least ignorance, and the Ocean of goodnesse far from all malice can neither de­ceive nor be deceived; and therefore the light of our knowledge being derived from his light in lumine illius videmus lumen, is pure from all darknesse and eclipse of error: and as among all the delight that Mathematicks afford to the students of them, the evidence and certainty of the truths, is one great part of the witchcraft, which makes them dote with love upon them: so I do see no reason why in this the same convenience should not be an effectuall argument to incourage us to di­gest the labours of our calling with much ala­crity and cheerefulnesse,

Second, for the Nobility of the object, God and divine things, if the Poets thought so highly of the study of Astronomy, because it is occu­pied about the Spheares and stars and celesti­all bodies, that he pronounceth the first au­thors thereof and professors happy:

Then how happy are those that are busied in the contemplation of God himselfe, who made the heaven and stars and all, for it is not onely true which the father said, facilius in­venit syderum conditorem humilis pietas, quam syderum conditionem superba curiositas, not only facilius, but I am sure much more feli­cius: this is the chiefe happinesse (in an higher degree then here we do) which we look for in heaven as all the Schoolemen determine, [...], saith Nazian­zen: this is an Angelical office, for I say un­to you, their Angels behold the face of their heavenly father continually sayth our Savi­our.

Third, for the necessity of the end which is that one thing that is necessary eternall life and happines: we read in the 19. Acts. That of those that beleeved many which used curious Arts [...], brought their books and burnt them be­fore all men, and they counted the price of them, and found it fifty thousand peeces of silver, all other Arts and books in comparison of this [Page 57]are but superfluous and curious: this is that one thing that is necessary: and if all were ei­ther burnt as they did, or banisht as Lycurgus did all unnecessary trades out of Sparta, that they might be the more unnecessary, that wee might more excell in this, the matter would not be so great.

Fourth, I might adde to this the Antiquity, and use no other probation for it then the last commendation: for as Peter Martyr hath well observed, as the Athenians proved themselves the most ancient people, because the invention of corn, that most necessary helpe for the life of man proceeded from them, so that Doctrine must needs be most ancient, which hath the bread of life, and is therefore most necessary.

Fifth, I might commend it from the Author which I touched in the 1 condition, God him­self: which makes much to inflame our affecti­ons toward it: for who would be ashamed to be Gods Scholler? Or who would not rather think himself highly honored? When Moses had tal­ked with God in the mount, his face shined: and shall not the Doctrine of Gods own mouth, make their face shine whom God vouchsafeth to instruct in it.

Wherefore ô yee Prophets sons, cast off all impediments, and let no other imployment hinder your alacrity in this study: consi­der the excellency of this Science, and know [Page 58]the time of your visitation: while the Sun of prosperity shineth, labor whiles the harvest of the Gospell lasteth, gather the sheaves unto the barn that winter find not you unprovided:

When the Emperor passing through Jury, be­held the Land a goodly land, but without culture and tillage through the lazines of the people, he cryed out; O marcomanni, ô Sar­matae, ô Qua di &c. O lazy Germans, I have found a people more lazy then you: take heed this be not said of you, that Themistocles said of them; [...]: that foole hath a price in his hand, but he hath no heart to use it.

First, be diligent therefore in reading the word of God, say with David, thy word O Lord is more sweet unto me than hony, and more pretious than gold; Desiderabilia super aurum pretiosum multum, as the old translation hath it in the 19. Psal. aut multum aurum aut multum preti­osum, aut multum desiderabilia tum multum hoc haeretico parum, as Austin glosses upon the variety of the construction.

Second, Be diligent in hearing the word of God: let every word be pretious unto thee, and let not one of them fall to the ground. O how rich, how soon would this divine husban­dry make us:

Third, Be diligent in prayer: the father [Page 59]said he got more by Prayer than by study, 'tis most true in this Art: if thou want wisdome, faith James, ask it of God: the secret of the Lord is with them that feare him, saith the Psalmist: this knowledge is better gotten by praying to God, then prying into Schoolemen:

And to conclude, alway remember that this is a Practicall Art, and requires not knowing but doing: bare and naked speculation is the tree of knowledge, that bears nothing but the apple of strife betweene us, and God, and death: Practise, Practise is the tree of Life.

CHAP. II. The Distribution of Divinity.

HAving already dispatched the definition of Divinity, with such incident observa­tions as I thought fittest to raise from thence, the threed of method leads me by the hand to the distribution therof, to which I think I may not unfitly accommodate that cōmon Maxim of Machiavellian policy, Divide & Regna, di­vide [Page 60]and rule and say to the best Divines not abusing it, but alluding to it, Divide & Regna, divide Divinity, and be King of Divines: di­vide it and I will warrant you Master of your. Art: these knots of divisions, are nodi Gordi­ani, that portend an Empire, as you heard in another case: this Argument of Distribu­tion is [...], the Royall Argument as Plato cals it, professing also that if he could meet with such a Captaine or leader that had the skill of dividing aright, he would follow him as some God: and for this Art especially I would think my selfe happy to be his com­panion: my purpose was to have represented unto you a veiw, a Synopsis of Theology and to have taken some more then common paines in the contriving thereof by reason of the ex­cellent use it might have yeelded, and the great variety which you shall finde among au­thors: and withall to have examined some of the most received forms, where I judge them defective: for the maine I continue still in the same mind, but I shall not do it so fully as I thought.

First, because of the difficulty, it being the highest pitch and last point of all in an art, to digest the precepts and parts into method, and supposing an exact inquisition and certain determination of all particular truths, as you know out of Logick: but for my selfe I con­fesse I am but a Scholler to search, not a Do­ctor [Page 61]to teach authentically: viator, not com­prehensor that I may allude to the Schoole di­stinction:

Second, because of the inconvenience: for if I did so, I should be forced to hold you too long in a Scholasticall and artificiall discourse of notions, which I have done too much al­ready, and desire now to proceed to things rather substantiall and more profitable, if not for instruction of knowledge at least for di­rection of practice. And therefore I will con­tract my meditations and draw them into as narrow a compasse as I can: propounding only two of the most usuall manner of procee­ding out of infinite variety, and onely pro­pounding them without any strict search made into them; and then commending a third and new (for mine owne exercise and yours in this inquiry) to your better consi­deration: because being now in the entrance of this Art, and so in the highest and most ge­nerall, I thinke this the fittest place for such a prospect, which may subject to your eyes the particulars: but very brieflly because I would not seeme to lodge you like strangers over the porch or entry, but like the houshold of Faith, Domesticifidei, as the Apostle cals them, and of Divinity likewise, in the inner and more remote roomes, according to the cu­stome of the Ancient, which you shall observe in Homer were strangers, are [...], [Page 62]but the housholders [...].

The first that I mention shall be that of M. Perkins, and Tilenus, and Soh nius, and other learned Divines, who divide Theolgoy into two parts:

The first of which treats de Deo,

The second, de actionibus Dei, which they prosequute proportionably in the particulars, Which I will passe over that I may keepe my promised brevity, and the rather because it is easie for you to be fully informed of them: and that I may not stand to examine this ac­curately; I thinke you may know my judge­ment concerning it sufficiently, out of that which I said in the definition, explaning whether and by what right God may come to be handled in Divinity: where I shewed that in the method of Art he was not, but in the method of Prudence he might profitably, which ground there laid being now granted, this Distribution will fall to the ground of it selfe without any more a do.

This observation onely I will now adde, that though that division be not according to the rule of Art, yet many actions of God in­deed come to be considered in this Doctrine, namely, such as, without which man cannot attaine to his last end and happines, to which this rule guides: for there are some immedi­ate actions of God, as for example Redempti­on, [Page 63]and all the actions even of man, are in some sort actions of God being performed by the help of his Spirit and assistance of his grace, without which they cannot be perfor­med: insomuch that Durands puts this for an objection that Divinity is not a practicall Art because these actions are not wholy ours, nor in our power alone to perform: and in this sense I deny not, but the actions of God are handled in Divinity so far as they tend to mans happinesse: but this helps that distri­bution but a little.

First, because that comprehends under it the nature of God and attributes, which make the first part, not only his actions.

Secondly, because it extends it selfe to o­ther actions beside those that conferre to the fornamed scope of mans happines, both which respects shew it to bee of too much genera­lity,

And thridly, therefore that which belongs properly to this doctrine is but a small portion in that distribution, and those actions of God which are necessary may well be ranked un­der another order: many other exceptions I might bring against that division if it would stand with my purpose, but I omit them both for that reason, and because they shall better appeare out of that which follows.

The second that I will name, shall be that which Ramus, as I think, first observed, and [Page 64] Polanus after him hath much confirmed, and many modern divines approve and follow, which makes two parts of Theology,

First, of Faith de fide.

Second, de fidei operibus of good works, the first de credendis, the second de faciendis, and so forward in all the subdivisions: and this I confesse I thought absolute a long time both for the commendation of good authors, as also for the consanguinity with the Scripture and congruity with Reason, till that upon better consideration I found it did not satisfy me.

For first, beside the ambiguity of the word fides which cannot be avoided if it be taken in that infinite extent to comprehend so much and so divers things in it as it must of neces­sity according to that distribution, all which cannot possibly be conceived to agree in one univocall praedication or formall respect, as I might easily demonstrate: but are brought under it, not without apparent force and vio­lence.

And secondly, beside the seeming agree­ment of the parts one with another against the nature and rule of a distribution which re­quires they should be opposite; which though it may be well answered, yet in my opininon were better avoided: for it sounds harsh and seems unreasonable that one part should treat of the habit another of the act of faith: and [Page 65]whereas it may be said for that, that the mea­ning of it is not to oppose and sever the habit of faith from the formall effects of it, for that would be absurd indeed: but by opera fidei you must understand other graces and virtues, so that the opposition stands between the ha­bit of faith, and the habit of them graces and virtues which are therefore called the works of faith, or effects; because beside their owne pro­per habits from whence they proceed formali­tèr, they must and doe also in some sort flow from faith, and from it they have all their com­mendation and acceptation with God, being without it but splendida peccata, as you all have heard out of Austin often: for without faith it is impossible to please God, saith the Apostle Paul: but this is not enough if to excuse it, yet not to justifie it.

First, because the terms are so ambiguous that they give too much occasion to mistakes and stumbling, as I said before.

Secondly, because in sanctification, which they that propound this distribution range under faith, the habits of all other graces and virtues are infused, and so included as well as of Faith.

Thirdly, because in the Decalogue, the rule of obedience and good works, and conse­quently a principall portion of the second part, faith is also included or else other worse inconveniences will follow: and so there is a [Page 66]mutuall [...], and immeation in these parts, as Divines speake in another case, which cannot be without a strange and wonderfull confusion: in which regard I cannot see that these parts are artificially and accurately cut out: but beside that which hath been alledged I could produce many more exceptions which I omit rather: and in both these I would be thus understood, not as rejecting ei­ther as unprofitable: for I approve them both as very good though not exact: and stand not much upon formalities of Art, so as they comprehend in them the substance of Theo­logicall truths: preferring this before the other as I would preferre a peece of gold for weight rather then for workmanship, for value rather then for elegancy, like that French coyne in the historian that in qua plus formae quam pon­deris. And now give me leave to commend a third a new form of this Art to your consi­deration with two cautions.

First, I do not think that I can see further, or go beyond those ancient Heroes in Divinity, who were so richly furnished with understan­ding, which they so thriftily improved by incomparable paines and industry: that is far from my meaning, but only as I said, to exer­cise my selfe and you in this inquiry: and yet ye know what the Philosopher saith, that there is an [...], an increase and growth in all Arts: And the common saying is discipu­lus [Page 67]est prioris posterior dies: Day unto day ut­tereth speech, and night unto night sheweth know­ledge, saith the Psalmist: and though a Gyant be taller then a Pygme, yet a Pygme upon his shoulders hath advantage of him, though ancient surpasse modern times, yet we plough­ing with their heifer may understand their se­crets, and with their helpe may outstrip them: in a word it is with the light of know­ledge, as with the lamps at the games in A­thens, one generation caries it as far as it can, and after it, doth tradere lampada, to the succeeding generation, which runs along further with it.

Secondly, I do not imagine that which I am to propound absolute, though compa­ratively I prefer it, or produce it rather ei­ther to give some further light to these dark passages, or at least some illustration to that which hath been said already by others:

Thirdly, though for the generall I hope I shall insist in the right way, yet for the parti­culars I do not intend them, as full or accu­rate, neither much lesse will I contend they are so: for I could not hope to satisfie my self in them on the sodaine, and therefore content my selfe to propound them, [...], as the Philosopher speaks.

Now that I may proceed according to the nature of method, which deduceth one axiom one precept out of another: for it is there as [Page 68]you see it in spinning, the lock of wool is first fastned upon the spindle, and out of that the threed is drawn in a long series, and then an hint of that is left to which the next is fastned, till all be done in like manner: so in an Art, first, the Definition is laid down, out of which must be spun, and drawn all the succeeding precepts: and thus I will do with this: the Definition then you may remember to have been this.

Divinity is a Doctrine of mans happinesse: there be two words which note the subjectum formale, Happinesse; and the subjectum materi­ale, Man; and according to these two, I frame the Distribution thus:

First, of Happines simply considered.

Secondly, of Happines in the Subject.

First, of Happines in generall.

Secondly, of Happines in particular, accor­ding to the divers states of it in relation to the Subject: to illustrate this I will put you in minde of three other distributions which harpe upon this, though they doe not fully agree.

The first is of some that considering Divi­nity to be medicina animarum, borrow termes from the Physick of the body which they ac­commodate to this, and part it proportion a­bly into [...], of mans misery by nature, and [...], of his recovery by Christ, from which the common method in Ʋrfin differs [Page 69]but little: this supposeth mans fall or begins with it, and therefore I think either omitteth something necessary, or else incurreth a neces­sary confusion of those things which would better be more distinctly handled.

The second I find in a learned Author Esti­us in his preface upon the sentences, who di­vides it into Theologia prima, that treats of man in his first estate of integrity, and Theologia secunda, that considers him after his fall, as to be guided to his happines; and this comes a degree neerer to that I propounded than the former, because it mentions both estates and handles them, and yet it seemes short by one degree.

The third comes up yet closer, and you shall find it in Trelcatius, who divides Divinity thus: there be two parts.

First, de causis Salutis nostrae eoque de Dei operibus.

Secondly, de Subjecto illius id est Homine, varioque Hominis statu: and explaning the ground of this distribution in the next words, he speakes for my purpose more directly: Sa­lus enim (saith he) quae Theologiae finis proxi­mus est, duobus modis consideratur, tum in se & causis suis simpliciter, tum Relate ad Subje­ctum ad quod ordinata est, qua ratione variè mo­dificatur, pro conditione Subjecti multiplici in quo est: where ye see ye have the same distri­bution of that I gave, and in the same forma­lity [Page 70]of termes almost: and this superads a degree to the former which I think is neces­sary.

The first takes man as he is now faln, and so applies meanes for recovery of his happi­nesse:

The second considers, both of his standing first, and then his fall.

This third abstracts, what is common to both estates, what is the common nature of his happinesse, and so descends to the particular accommodation thereof, according to the difference of his condition: and this I think is full enough and large in extent, to compre­hend all things that this Doctrine is to meddle with: and I will use no other reason to prove it, because I think it carries some evidence of truth or at least probability with it, especially supposing the grounds formerly laid, but only that it is drawn out of the definition with such facility, that it appeares to be a naturall distribution: the doctrine of mans happines hath two parts.

First of Happinesse in it selfe in generall.

Secondly, of mans happinesse, in reference to the proper subject: and now I proceed to some few principall subdivisions to give you a view and Synopsis of the whole Art.

Happinesse in generall hath two things in it to be considered.

First, the parts or degrees, or affections, for [Page 71]I desire you to remember that I am not curi­ous for termes.

Secondly, the kinds of happinesse: the parts or degrees are two.

First, the Constitution of it, or Habituall happinesse.

Secondly, the Continuation of it, or Actuall happinesse: the former I briefly touched the last time; the latter I conceive to consist in two things especially.

First, the gracious Administration of all things without a man by God, in ordine ad fe­licitatem: for it is impossible that man should natare sine cortice, and attaine to his own suo marti, by his own endeavors, without Gods providence supporting him, and suggesting all necessaries to him, there being the same proportion between him and God in this case that there is between inferior creatures and man: and therefore as it is in architecture and such like Arts, which in regard of the natu­rall aptitude of the subject may be speculative, but in regard of the Artificer, whose actions must passe upon it to bring their potentia to actus, their possibilities to perfection, are Practicall: so or not much unlike in divinity, it is Practicall most in regard of God: as I noted in part before:

The second thing, for the continuation of Happines, the virtuous and religious operati­on of man; which by the helpe of the former [Page 72]the grace of God: he is able to produce, in which respect Divinity is also properly Practi­call on mans part, as hath been said; these are the two things which I call the continuation or the fluxus of happines, the Operation of Gods grace toward man, and the grace of mans O­peration toward God: for habituall happinesse standing most, as I said, in the relation recipro­call of God to man being his God, and man to God being his servant, the [...] and act of it must needs be placed in the reflexion of mutu­all offices of love, according to the peculiar condition of either: And now follow the kinds of happinesse, which are two.

First, of this life;

Second, of the life to come: in the former according to that which hath been said there be two things.

First Constitution, which is in a certaine de­gree of our union with God, and consequently fruition of all good, far inferior to the second estate which is future:

Secondly, the Continuation, which is,

First by the gracious providence of God, sup­plying all things necessary for such an estate, and enabling us to action agreeing to his will.

Secondly, our Religious action being thus enabled, which is of two sorts.

First, our generall worship of God.

Secondly, our speciall: the generall wor­ship [Page 73]of God is in the observation and of his will and gracious covenant which he pleases to make with man: where two things are to be noted.

First, Substance of the Covenant.

Secondly, the Seales: the Substance in two things.

First, to love and honor God above all things for himselfe.

Secondly, to love other things respectively in subordination to God: and in these three are divers particulars, but I must leave them here.

The Seales of the Covenant are sensible things, applyed according to the condition of mans nature, who is both intellectuall and sen­sitive; the use of which according to Gods in­stitution should both confirme the promises on Gods part, and as it were ingage him to per­formance, and confirme man in his duty, and as it were oblige him more to the performance of it: the speciall worship of God is in prayer, thanksgiving, praising of his glorious name, and the like: and this is the happines of this life: the happines of the life to come is that state which God is pleased voluntarily and freely to promise to man; where be two things like­wise.

First, the Constitution, which far surpasseth the former, man being to be elevated above himselfe in supernaturall perfections.

Secondly, the Continuation, first, in Gods singular and immutable Grace, secondly, by the operations of man, more noble and pro­portionable to such a glorious estate: and (which I should have mentioned before) these two are subordinate, the former to the latter: insomuch that this is called happines by ap­propriation and excellency; the other, but the way and means to this Happines among the most of our Divines. And all these come to be handled in the first part of Divinity con­cerning Happines in generall, because they belong indifferently to man in all estates: out of which the second part with some inflexion, may be easily conceived: and therefore I come to that:

The second part of Divinity is concerning Happines in speciall, in reference to the sub­ject, Man; who must be considered.

First, in the state of integrity.

Secondly, in the state of the fall and corrup­tion: in integrity,

First, the constitution of his happinesse, was (in one word) the Image of God.

Secondly, the continuation.

First, in Gods grace giving all things meet, for upholding that estate.

Secondly, mans observance in the worship of God, first generall, secondly speciall.

First, Generall for the covenant, first the Substance as it was.

First, Morall in these two things, first to love God above all as a creator, secondly, all other subordinately.

Secondly, Ceremoniall, abstaining from the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evill, secondly for the Seale of the Covenant, which was then the tree of life.

Secondly, for speciall worship it was prayer &c, the propiety of which was, that it might be, without a mediator:

Secondly, the Future life was an elevation above that naturall estate to a better, but in­ferior to that we look for in Christ: and this for the first estate of integrity:

The second for the Fall, in regard of the pre­sent life is mixt and worse then the former: and first for substance is the same alway, se­condly, for circumstance different:

The substance first for constitution must be bestowed wholly by God, and that by a dou­ble act, first of Redemption by the Sonne, se­condly of Sanctification by the Spirit.

Secondly, the continuation, first by the grace of God, in Christ, secondly by the acti­ons of man guided by the Spirit: which are,

First, Observation of the new covenant in a mediator, whereof first, the substance is in two things, first to love God above all things in Christ, 2. all other things for Christ, secondly the Seales are all representative of Christ: and secondly Prayer to be put up in the name of [Page 76]Christ our mediator: and this is the substance, the summe.

But secondly, this is varied in circumstance, of Christ; first promised, secondly performed, where the chiefe difference is in regard of the outward parts of the Sacraments, and the ce­remonies: and this is the state of this present life: the future life is not onely passing the present, but also that future which Adam should have been exalted to in the state of in­tegrity, as Divines think, because in it concur both the free gift of God, willing to advance us, and the merit of Christ purchasing it, and a congruity that the humane nature being ad­vanced to the incomparable dignity of the hypostaticall union in Christ the head, should bee proportionably dignified in the whole kinde.

I know I must looke for many objections which I should incounter withall concerning the order of the generall, and the insufficiency of the particulars: but I will not incomber my selfe and you with a long answer; only in briefe I say,

First, if the generall mold and frame be convenient, that is as much as I aime at, the particular passages I stand not much upon.

Secondly, it is no wonder if many Theolo­gicall things may seem to be wanting; for my purpose was to touch only summa rerum fasti­gia, not to descend to all inferior parts.

Thirdly, you must remember there may be a great difference between Divinity, as it is u­sually handled, and as it should be exactly; be­tween the method of prudence and the me­thod of Art: the latter I would willingly find, because it keepeth closest to the nature of the Object to be regulated: the former notwith­standing I will be content to follow, and I thinke is best absolutely, all things conside­red, as I am sure it is more usuall and more use­full: and among all those methods, as I easily dislike none especially those two that I men­tioned in the beginning: so I most approve that of Trelcatius which premiseth two prin­ciples.

First, Cognitionis, the Scriptures.

Secondly, Re [...] which is God: and then pro­ceeds to the parts, because it comes neerest to the accurate method in generall: though in many particulars I prefer either of the other two before it. I will now in a word commend unto you the use of that which ye have heard, from whence you shall perceive my scope in this delineation: I confesse I have done it so rudely and rawly, that it may bee rather a meanes to breed a loathing, than a liking of Divinity: as Socrates to beat down the pride of Alcibiades (as Aelian tels the story) which the opinion of his great possessions had bred in him, shewing him a map of Greece, bid him find out his land if he could, but when hee [Page 78]could not, said thus to him, and are not you ashamed then, to be proud of those lands, [...]: so may some man thinke the worse of the rich possession of Di­vinity, because in the little map that I have drawn many parcels are not to be found, and as Tully sayth of hangings, or such like, so long as they are folded together and wraped, there is no sight of them, nothing that may draw liking or wonder: so long as these Divine truths are folded and plighted together in these few divisions, there is no lustre or light sparkles from them, that may inflame the be­holder with love towards them; but if they were opened and displayed mirabiles amores excitarent sui: yet my purpose was, because I cannot go through all, at least to give you a light a far off; as the tempter led our Savior into an high mountaine whence he shewed him all the Kingdomes of the earth, the glory of which might intice him; so have I presen­ted you a view of all divinity to incite you to a love and study of them: But why do I use such a comparison: rather as the Lord caried Moses into mount Nebo, whence he saw the holy land though he could not enter into it: so because I cannot lead you into the possession of this holy land, I have at least lent you a prospect of it: I might out of all the particu­lars single out some more excellent peeces to kindle your affections, but I must omit it: and [Page 79]end with this counsell; that every one that in­tends the study of Divinity, would indeavor to get and hold [...], as Paul advertiseth Timothy, a form of wholsome words, for the singular utility that it will bring to him: first in regard of his memory, which is wonderfully helped by this, as you al know, though I spare to tell you: both out of your first principles of Art, as also by experience: And he that carries about with him in his head a frame of Divinity, shall have a safe trea­sury, where to repose all scattered and loose notions that he heares or reads, the severall branches of it shall be like so many borders of herbs, so many beds of flowers, so many boxes of spices, in which he may meet with them againe upon all occasions.

Secondly, in regard of Judgement which is much strengthened and backed by this: for this will furnish him with the most principall things of the Art, which he shall behold un­der one, so that he may compare them toge­ther and examine them at his pleasure: and as in a map a man may see places how they are situat for North and South or the like, and what distance there is from place to place, may easily be measured: so in such a frame, or tipe, a man may behold what agreement or distance there is between one thing and another in Di­vinity: how one thing borders upon another &c. without any difficulty, and this reduced [Page 80]to use will appeare better either in a contro­versie, which will receive much light, the doubtfull truth being reduced to his proper seat, and there examined and decided by some infallible truths: and so in the explication of a place of Scripture according as a man hath made a plat forme of Divinity familiar to him; so will he expedite himselfe better or worse according as it is: for it will direct him how to conceive of a trope or proper signfication of a word; and so in other cases.

Thirdly, and lastly for invention, this will furnish him with an inexhaust treasury of matter springing from the conference of one portion with another; but will be most be­neficiall, for the discovery of two arguments most necessary, the Genera I meane, which will appeare out of the Series, and the Defi­nitions which will be as succinct and perspi­cuous in such an order, as you see they are ob­scure and tedions without it: a Divine with­out this cannot chuse but have all his know­ledge snared and intangled, as if he were in a labyrinth without a clue.

Of the Happinesse of MAN. CHAP. III.

MY purpose was, according to the me­thod that is commonly received and practised among the best Artists in the delive­ry of Arts, immediately after the definition of Divinity explaned, to have proceeded to the distribution: because I desire to make haste out of these Scholasticall and notionall truths, to such things as may be more practicall and profitable: but the time approching, and the duties to be then performed by us, putting me in mind, I will alter my course a little, and di­rect my speech so, that if it be not every way sutable, which my generall project would not permit, yet I hope it shall not be altogether unseasonable: though it concerne not the re­ceiving of the Sacrament in particular, yet it shall in generall concerne matters of practise and use: though it direct not receivers in a peculiar manner, yet it shall not stand Sholars only in hand (as perhaps the other doth) but every Christian in their measure to know and doe: for I meane to speake of the Happines of [Page 82]man, wherein it consists: and though I in­tended to have interposed the distribution and Synopsis of Divinity between the defini­tion and this, as I said, yet as he in Plutarch said more prittily then piously; when he threw at a dog, but hit his stepmother, [...] so I may say: for if I had continued in my first resolution for my method, I should have gone forth by the footsteps of the stocke, and fed my kids, by the tents of other shepheards, as our Sa­viour counsels his Spouse, in the first of the Canticles, I should not have straid a whit out of the common road: but as I have now al­tered it, I think I shall gaine this advantage, to go the neerest way, according to the exact pre­script of Art; for by the same reason that I thought it probable, before that the distribu­tion of art in generall arises from the Object, it being in it self specially indivisible, & the mul­tiplication of precepts in the same Art arises from the multiplicity and variety of the seve­rall branches of some particular object: I think it will follow by good consequence, that the Distribution of an Art will follow the distri­bution of his object: the Art it selfe being di­vided, but by accident in reference to the ob­ject, with which it goes along: even as Lo­gick would be perhaps not more truely, be­cause the matter is the same, but more truly (as we say) in formality, be ordered thus, if it were defined Dialectica est Ars rationis: Ratio [Page 83]est simplex vel Composita, so that you should understand the object primarily to beare the division, which should notwithstanding se­condarily redound to the Art it selfe, with which that is linked in so neer a conjunction: but thus much by the way, onely upon occasi­on of the alteration of that method, which I first propounded to my self: I come now to the point, I meane to prosequte, namely con­cerning the Happinesse of man: wherein, that I may proceed with least offence and most ex­pedition,

I will first premise some few observations unfolding the ambiguities of some terms, that occur in this argument, and may otherwise breed some obscurity in the matter:

And then secondly, I will deliver the prin­cipall things to be known, in two conclusions or assertions: for the first I will name three onely, and that very briefly.

First, Summum bonum, may be taken two wayes.

First, for Bonum praestantissimum and sin­gulare, which excels and surpasses all other in comparison, and that is some one particular good, which is exalted above his fellows, to the highest degree of eminency.

Secondly, for Bonum integrum or universale which is a collection of all the particulars, comprehended under the Spheare or latitude of bonum, and therefore called summum, be­cause [Page 84]all being ranked according to methods heraldry, that sits in the highest place, that justly challenges the precedency: to accom­modate this to our present purpose, in the first acception, God is said, and most truly to be summum bonum, for to whom will yee liken mee, saith the Lord in the Prophet, or what may compare with God, as it is in the Psalme: but in the second meaning it is not so, neither is it any one particular that can claime that name, but it is a confluence and concurrence of all together that makes summum bonum: the use of this distinction shall appeare by and by.

Secondly, you must distinguish between Summum Bonum taken in either of the former senses, and Beatitudo, as Polanus doth: the for­mer consideration is of good things, barely & absolutely, as so in themselves, the latter beside that, is respective and includes an habitude in which they stand to man, who injoies them: or as the Schoolemen have it, in other words there is a double beatitude, objectiva, the same that summū, and that is God, as it is taken for praestantissimū, or a collection of all, in a word, humanum bonum, according to the other sig­nification, and secondly formalis, the same that I cal'd beatitudo in propriety, as distinct from summum bonum, and that is, either that operation by which we have union with the summum bonum and injoy it, as they say com­monly, [Page 85]or that habit or state as I rather think from whence a man hath the denomination of Happinesse, or both, for both of necessity must be conceived.

Thirdly, you must observe a triple latitude in the signification of this word Happines.

First, in the largest sense, the fruition of any good, being a portion of it, doth also get the name of happinesse, and he is at large an happy man, who injoyes any such particular good, and so we use to say occasionally, hearing of any good befals any man, he is an happy man, so far namely as that will extend, for otherwise the same man may want many things, and be simply to say, very miserable.

Secondly, in the strictest sense that is hap­pinesse only that arises from a confluence of all humane good, and he onely deserves the name in whom they all meet and are married; and thus no man upon earth, is or shall bee happy.

Thirdly, in a middle sense, that is happines where the fruition of good, though not free from all mixture of evill; yet is so prevalent & predominant, that it may justly denominate a man happy simply, though not simply hap­py in all respect, and that man is happy where this is to be found: this last you may call out of the Schoolmen essentiall happinesse and true, the second integrall and compleat happinesse, the third for distinctions sake if you will, par­tiall [Page 86]and incompleat Happinesse: I might add something also of true and false happinesse, sound and supposed, but the homonymie is so palpable that I shall not need, and therefore will content my selfe with that which hath been said already of the first point, reserving other things that may seeme to be of moment and consequence to their proper oportuni­ties: and passe now to the second part I pro­mised, which was to shew, what happines is, and wherein it consists in two conclusions, and that according to the two stricter acceptions of the word even now mentioned.

The first shall declare what integrall and compleat happinesse is, and wherein it con­sists.

The second what true and essentiall happi­nesse is, and wherein it consists: the first I will dispatch briefly meaning to insist most upon the latter.

Compleat happinesse, I call that where no­thing is defective, and you may conceive it, I think tolerably, by such a discription or a like. Happinesse is a perfect estate of a reaso­nable nature wherein it injoys all good that is due unto it.

I describe it by estate rather then Operati­on, because no operation doth denominate the efficient, but happines doth the subject: again every operation is transient, and in a conti­nuall flux, but happinesse seemes to be some­thing [Page 87]permanent: and thirdly operation doth never perfectly exist: but happines doth: otherwise, that of Solon should be true which the Philosopher rejects, Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera foelix: and a man should not be happy till he were not at all.

Secondly I adde a perfect state, which needs no further explication.

Thirdly, I say of a reasonable creature: be­cause as Scaliger well taxes Cardan, for attri­buting vitam beatam muscae quae sane ex optimo purissimoque loquendi genere soli debetur homi­ni: and if the meaning be, because nothing is wanting to it, non improbè sentit sed plus­quam improbè loquitur: for that reason is no sufficient appellation or warrant for that, for if we would deglubere significationem, as he speakes in that manner, by the same ambitious superstition we might call an element happy, because it is in his own place, which would be nugae sed [...], though we read in Xeno­phon [...], by a trope improperly so stiled: but whereas, as Scaliger seemes to appropriat happinesse to a man, I think that is not right, neither is it his purpose so to re­straine it, for an Angel may be happy even in propriety of language: and therefore spea­king in generall I extend it as far as it goes to all reasonable creatures, though I intend the particular application and use to man only now follows the other part of the description [Page 88]which saith it is such an estate of the reasonable creature, wherein it injoyes all that good which is due unto it. And this perhaps might have sufficed alone to have described Happinesse to have been the fruition of all good due to man, though the other make it more plaine and full; where,

First, by good that is due, I meane not by a­ny necessary bond or obligation in which God is tyed to the creature to give it, but that which hath proportion unto and congruity with the nature of man, and to which there­fore man hath a naturall aptitude and appetite or propension.

Secondly, by all good I say, because man be­ing a compound creature must have a com­pound happines of many ingredients, because the perfection of the whole must result from the perfection of every part; and you may di­gest them thus: the good is either Summum which is God, as I said; or Subordinatum, and this again is either internum within the essence of a man; or externum without him: Inter­num is either Bonum Corporis or Bonum Ani­mae: bonum Animae is either Intellectus or Vo­luntatis: or if you had rather take them with­out this curiosity of Art, they are five.

First, God and his favor, as the supreame Lord.

Secondly, Reason, right and conformable to God.

Thirdly, a will in tune and conformable to right reason.

Fourthly, a body in good temper and dis­position serviceable to a will tuned.

Fiftly, outward blessings answerable to all the rest: these make the spheare and circle of good; which, upon whose head soever they fall, doe crowne him with compleat and per­fect happines: which, because of my pro­pounded brevity, it shall suffice to have made an enumeration of, without illustration.

Thirdly, for fruition I may conveniently and proportionably name five degrees of it: though perhaps every one of them shall not be judged exactly necessary.

First, possession and usurpation or use of those good (for I joyn those two together) be­cause perhaps they cannot alway be well di­stinguished in that respect (they have to hap­pinesse) which is for the most part by the action of virtue, secondly, knowledge of that possession, and a consideration reflected upon our riches and happines, Thirdly delight springing from that knowledge, fourthly quiet of all parts filled with that delight and satisfied, fiftly, security of that quiet upon assurance reasonable of the continuance and perpetuity of that estate and those good: All these where they meet are enough to milk out all the good that can be in them; to suck out all the juice and sweetnesse, all the marrow and [Page 90]fatnesse that they have: and the name of fe­licity sometimes imports some one of these, sometime two or more, and the opinions of Philosophers and divines accordingly pitch upon them: but where there is a concourse of all, I cannot see what should bee wanting: for he that hath such a fruition of all good e­ternall, internall, externall, in body Soule and whole man, as brings with it a perfect quieta­tion of the naturall appetite joyned with un­speakable delight, and unmoved security (that I may contract all into a narrow roome) Quis non illum beatum dixerit & non potius beatissimum: I might enlarge these things with illustrations and probations if the matter required, but I think it so perspicuous and e­vident to any that will consider it, that it would be but lost labour to dwell any longer upon it: especially this being agreeable with that definition which you know is common out of Boetius, that Beatitudo est status bonorum omnium aggregatione perfectus, and that of An­selm Sufficientia commodorum omnium, and that of Austin, Beatus est qui habet quicquid vult & nihil mali vult as they are alleaged by Gre­gory de Valentia: and I thinke it is the com­mon notion that presents it selfe to all men, when they heare that word Happines, to think presently upon some universall good: and he that would make an emblem or picture of happinesse, must set it forth like that of Peace [Page 91]among the Ancients with a cornucopia an horn of plenty in the hand, or like the picture of Pan, with all shapes and infinite variety: and therefore according to my promise and desire I will now proceed to the second assertion which shall explaine what essentiall happinesse is, and wherein it consists: wherein I may be more punctuall, because it will be more pro­perly Theologicall as you shall perceive:

Essentiall Happines I understand, which though it want many particulars, which are de integritate felicitatis, yet it hath all things that are de essentia, and hath enough to salve the name and title of happinesse in truth and propriety: as a man that wants his arms or legs is not integer homo; but so long as the Soule is united to the body is a man: or, as the name being given according to the predomi­nant part; wine doth not lose the name of wine for a little water mingled with it: so here, though there be some wants and conse­quently some misery mingled with this happi­nes, yet taking more of happines then misery, it hath the name and nature of happines; and this I call essentiall Happines: and this I say must be placed in God alone and our fruition of him or union with him. But to handle this point more fully, as I purpose in the rest here­after to take some place of Scripture for a ground and foundation to build upon (where it may be done conveniently) so I will doe [Page 92]here: and that you shall find in the last verse of the 144 Psalme, where ye have these words Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: which as you see, speaks of blessednes, and as I con­ceive, couch as much of that argument, and for our present scope, as any that I could meet withall: and I am only sorry the time is so short that I shall be forced but to name the things I have to deliver, because I resolve to goe through with this point and dispatch it at this time.

The Psalme as may seeme, was composed in time of war, and is partly spent in a lauda­tory thanksgiving for successe and victory; Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight: and partly is petitory, conteining a suite to God for further safety and deliverance from the proud enemy and war, that the Church might injoy the blessings of peace Bow thy heavens ô Lord and come downe, touch the mountaines and they shall smoke: that our sons may be as plants grown up in their youth; that our daughters may be as corner stones polished after the similitude of a pal­lace: and there having made a Catalogue of the benefits of peace, the Psalmist concludes all with this Epilogue, this sweet and patheticall Epiphonema; Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: which hath two parts, as ye see, like [Page 93]the portion of Acsah that Caleb gave her, the Springs above and the Springs beneath; like the blessing of Isaak divided among his two sons: the blessing of Esau, the fatnes of the earth and the dew of heaven shall be thy portion; and the blessing of Jacob, the dew of heaven and the fat­nes of the earth: the blessings of the left hand, Blessed are the people that are in such a case; and the blessings of the right hand, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord: I must speake something of either; and principally, as ap­pliable to any man single; yet so, that I will sprinkle something as they concerne a nation or people, for which the letter of the text is most direct.

Doctrine. The first point is this, that outward prospe­rity and peace is a blessing of God, and confers to our happines, whether you consider one person or an whole people: you must understand this according to the ordinary distinction in this case, of per se & per accidens; it is so per se, in his owne nature, though we through our sin may interpolare naturam, that I may use Ter­tullians phrase of the Divell, in a sense not much different, we may alternature and make that which is of it selfe helpfull unto us, hurt­full: and thus that truth is evident and cleare.

Reason First, because those outward things have an aptitude in them to satisfie mans naturall ap­petite: for in every man (being a compound nature, the vinculum of heaven and earth in [Page 94]which both are, as it were, married by the con­junction of his soule and body) there is a dou­ble man, inward and outward: now this ho­mo externus, agrees with that [...], as well as his inward with the [...], as the Platonicks speake: and therefore stands in need of outward things both for necessity to sustaine and preserve him, as also for lawfull delight to cheere and refresh him.

Secondly, outward good things are to him both the subject and instruments of many vir­tues, and so great advantages in his course of godlinesse, both to furnish himselfe, and to helpe and further his brethren, and in both to promote the honor of God in his true wor­ship, and therefore David, who was a man of war, could not build the house of God, and that Solomon his son might, God gave him rest round about from all his enemies, and riches in such aboundance that gold in his time was like stones in the street, and silver like the dust of the earth, and hence it is,

Thirdly that God is said to give these bles­sings to his children as testimonies of his love and favor, and as rewards of their faithfull o­bedience: he brought the children of Israel out of Aegypt the land of bondage into Canaan the land of promise, out of the land where they were fed with onions and garlick, into the land that flowed with milk and hony: and wishes pathetically in the 81. Psalme, O that my [Page 95]people had harkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my wayes, I should soone have subdued their e­nemyes, and turned my hand against their adver­saries; He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat, and with hony out of the rocke, I should have satisfied them: But why do I go about to prove this since all the world almost is more prone to dote upon these externall blessings, as the only happinesse, rather then to doubt, whether they confer to it at all or no! it was well said that he that cal'd Riches bona goods first, was a better husband then di­vine, but it may be thought that the most are such husbands that enquire who will shew us any goods, as though they were the onely good: and therefore I had more need to im­prove it by making use, then prove it by rea­son, and a threefold use, offers it selfe to our consideration.

Application. First, not to fasten our eyes upon the things themselves, but to looke up to heaven and ac­knowledge God the author of all the good we in­joy, with humble thankefulnesse, and thank­full humility: Thou crownest the yeere with thy goodnes ô Lord and thy steps drop fatnes, 65. Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of my enemyes. Thou anointest my head with oyle my cup runneth over: the Lord hath given us that health and prosperity, and peace and plenty of all things that we injoy, Blessed bee the name of the Lord: But this not enough but therefore.

2. Let us labor to imploy and improve all these blessings, that he hath so liberally bestowed on us, to the best advantage of his glory: least God complain of us, as of the Jewes once in the Prophet, That we abuse his corn, and his wine, and his oyle, I may say, his time and his wit, and his learning, to our unlawfull lusts and lovers: O that now when God hath given us peace from our enemies round about us, while we have meanes, we had also minds to build the Temple of the Lord, to advance the king­dome of our Lord Jesus Christ: let us make these externall favors, but looking glasses through which we may behold the beauty of God that gave them; but as ladders Scala crea­turarum, and stairs to climbe up to heaven: though they have a naturall goodnes in them­selves, yet they have no morall to us, but in ordine to this end without which they are va­nity.

Thirdly, if these be good blessings and con­fer to happinesse, then let us sympathize with the Saints that want them; Let us pray for the peace of Jerusalem: Peace be within thy wals, and prosperity with in thy pallaces:

And now I come to the second and more principall point, which I thought to have stood most upon, but the time hath prevented me: and therefore I will delineate onely the particulars, and perfect them at some other oportunity; for the former is not enough: [Page 97]he is not an happy man, whose bones are full of marrow, and his eyes stand out with fatnesse: that swims in pleasure and riches, and shines in purple and scarlet and fares deliciously eve­ry day: that lives in a land that flowes with milke and hony, and washes his paths in but­ter: but who then? Blessed is the man, the people whose God is the Lord: the point then is this:

Doctrine. Our chief happines consists in our union, with God and fruition of him: the phrase I think whose; God is the Lord imports thus much, they who are in covenant with God, when God accepts some for his people and servants and testifies so much especially by acquain­ting them with his ordinances, and when re­ciprocally they acknowledge and imbrace him for their God walking in humble obedience to his commandements, so that happines stands.

First, in that relation between us and God.

Secondly, is maintained by those actions mutuall on either part: and thus the truth may be cleare for these reasons.

Reason. First, because God is the most eminent good of all, imcomparably beyond all other, both se­verally and joyntly; and therefore the fruiti­on of him is essentiall happines though others be wanting, because there will be more good then evill in such an estate, as that man is rich that hath a pearle suppose of infinite value, worth many thousands though he want many things.

Secondly, because God conteines all other things virtually in himselfe, so that he that hath God hath all, for he alone can and will give all.

Thirdly, because God alone can supply the want of all the rest, in the proper effect of Hap­pinesse by himselfe, and all that we would desire to find in them, we may have in him; for a full content and quiet of the mind and satis­fying of the whole appetite, is that which we hunt for, and would faine distill, and milk out all the particulars we desire, but this is richly and royally afforded us by God alone: How excellent is thy loving kindnes ô God when the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wing, they shall be aboundantly satisfied with the fatnes of thy house; and thou shalt make them drink of the river of thy pleasure; for with thee is the fountaine of life, in thy light shal we see light.

The uses of this point may be these,

Application. First, for confutation of all those fond, and vaine opinions of the vulgar, or of the learned Philosophers about happinesse, some placing it in pleasure, some in honor, some in riches, the most reasonable in virtue, which well inter­preted hath some truth, we have better learned to place it in the fruition of God.

Secondly, for reprehension of the practise of carnall and worldly men, that even in the bosom of the Church and Schoole of Christ, are such non proficients, that they seek no further, neg­lecting the communion with God, and follow­ing [Page 99]those things with great greedinesse, tan­quam haec sint nostri medicina doloris.

Thirdly, for instruction of all, Many say who will shew us any good: but come hither, and as God said to Moses, Ostendam tibi omne bonum, when he gave him but a glimps of himself, & his glory, god is al good god is perfect happines.

4. For Exhortation, there is no man but desires happines: when the jugler undertook to tell every man what he wished for, and de­sired, and much company was met to see the issue of his promise with great expectation, out comes the mountebank and bids them be at­tentive, and then said, Hoc omnes vultis, vili e­mere & caro vendere: and another said Omnes laudari se exoptant, this Austin finds fault withall. At si dixissent inquit omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixissent aeli­quid, autē nullus in sua nō agnosceret voluntate: Behold then this happinesse to enjoy the favor of God to have communion with him, labor therfore for this, use al means that God hath ap­pointed, particularly this Sacrament to w ^ch God invites us now at this time; wherein God of­fers himselfe to every beleever in a most neer communion: the Sybarites, when they invi­ted to a feast were wont to give their women a yeeres warning to deck and trim and pre­pare themselves: this is an anniversary solem­nity with some, and it were to be wished it were not so seldome with us: let us prepare [Page 100]our selves accordingly to be fit guests, for this table, not without the wedding garment: that we may present our selves before our God adorned with lively faith in Christ, and a reso­lute purpose of denying our selves and our lusts and yeelding sincere obedience to all his Commandements, and so he may dwell with us, and we may walk with him: we may be incorporated into him, he may live in us, & we in him: we may be assimilated to him in all ho­linesse and righteousnes and conformed to his image, which neere union is livly set forth in this Sacrament, in a word we may be so nou­rished with this heavenly mannah that we may go on from strength to strength till we see God in Syon:

Fifthly and lastly, for Consolation for those that injoy God a mid all other wants: Excel­lently the Prophet Habakuck, Although the figtree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines: the labor of the Olive shall faile, and the fields shall yeeld no meat, the flesh shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no heard in the stalls: though all earthly comforts forsake us, yet I will rejoyce in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.