Of the manner and diuersitie of Lies.

TO the ende that the nature of Lies may the more easilye bee knowen, and when the Lie ought to bee giuen and when not, and in what cases, it is requisite I should parti­cularly discourse thereof: For some Lies bee certaine, and some conditionall, and both the first and the later, some of them are generall and some of them speciall. Vnto which two sortes, I will adde a third kind of lies, which may be tearmed Vaine-lies.

Of Lies certaine.

LIes certaine, are such as are giuen vppon wordes spoken affirmatiuely, as if anie man shoulde saie or [Page]write vnto another. Thou hast spoken to my discredit, and in preiudice of my honour and reputation, and therefore doost lye. And in this respect is this a lye cer­taine, because I affirme that such a one hath spoken e­uill of me: yet because I doe not particularly mention wherein or how he hath offended me by speeche, the lye which I gaue him is generall, and therefore of no force. For to haue the lye giuen lawfully, it is requisite that the cause whereupon it is giuen, be particularlye specified and declared. Wherefore lyes speciall, and such as are giuen vpon sure and expresse wordes, are such as assuredlye binde the parties vnto whome they be giuen, to proue the same which they haue spoken, when as they cannot deny that they haue said, where­vpon the lye was giuen them, as for example; Alexander thou hast said, that I being imploied by his highnes in his seruice at Pauia, haue had secret conference with the enemie: wherfore I say that thou hast lyed. This is a sure & a specially, and by consequence lawfully giuen.

Of conditionall Lyes.

COnditionall lyes be such as are giuen conditionally: as if a man should saie or write these woordes. If thou hast saide that I haue offered my Lord a­buse, thou lyest: or if thou saiest so heerafter, thou shalt lye. And as often as thou hast or shalt so say, so oft do I and will I say that thou doest lye. Of these kinde of lyes giuen in this manner, often arise much contention in words, and di­uers intricate worthy battailes, multiplying wordes v­pon [Page]wordes whereof no sure conclusion can arise: the reason is, because no lye can bee effectuall or lawefull, before the condition is declared to bee true, that is, be­fore it be iustified that such words were certainly spo­ken. For the partie vnto whom such a lye is giuen, may answere according as he findes him selfe guiltie or not: if chaunce he haue so saide, he may by generall wordes seeke meanes to escape the lye which is giuen him: and withall vpon those words which the other hath spoken or written vnto him, he may happilie finde occasion of a meere quarrell, and giue him a lye certaine. And on the other side, if indeed he haue not spoken those words wherupon the lye was giuen him, then may he saye ab­solutelye, that hee spake them not: adding therto some certaine or conditionall lye, as for example: Whereas thou chargest me that I should say that thou art a Trai­tor, and thereupon saiest that I lye: I answere, that I neuer spake such words, and therfore say, that whosoe­uer saith that I haue spoken such wordes, he lyeth. Yet notwithstanding I cannot like of this manner of pro­ceeding, because therby men fal into a world of words.

Some holde an opinion, that such an answere might be framed: Thou doost not proceede in this case like a Gentleman, neither according to the honorable cu­stome of Knights: which when thou shalt doe, I will answere thee. Vnto whom I cannot giue applause, con­sidering that the other maye replye, that hee lyeth, be­cause hee saith hee did not as a Gentleman, &c. allead­ging that many Gentlemen haue obserued and vsed that manner of proceeding, and so shall the other haue occasion by his ignorance, in not knowing how to an­swere the lye conditionallye giuen him, to giue him a [Page]certain lye: therfore not to fall into any error, all such as haue any regarde of their honor or credit, ought by all meanes possible to shunne all conditionall lyes, neuer geuing anie other but certayne Lyes: the which in like manner they ought to haue great re­garde, that they giue them not, vnlesse they be by some sure means infallibly assured, that they giue them right­ly, to the ende that the parties vnto whome they be gi­uen, may be forced without further Ifs and Ands, ei­ther to deny or iustifie, that which they haue spoken.

Of the Lye in generall.

THe lye in generall is considered in two sortes, the one hauing respect to the per­son, and the other to the iniurie. That which toucheth the person, is termed ge­nerall, when no especiall person is named to whom the same is giuen: as if one should say, whoso­euer hath reported of me that I haue betraied my lord, doth lye falsely. And to this lye it is holden of braue men of reuerence, that no man is bound to answer the same: which seemeth to me to be excellent well vnder­stoode, because this charge or imposition maye seeme to touche manye, beeing that manye haue spoken the same, and so one with many should be bound to fight: which were to graunt an conuenience directly, for it is not allowed that any man should enter into com­bat more then once for one quarrell, and that no man shal put his honor vpon another mans sword or valor: so might it come to passe that such a one might take the quarel, that the lie was neuer meant vnto. wherupon, to auoid such disorders, the best meane is, that this lie so gi­uē be not adiudged lawful, nor approued for sufficient.

The other lye which we haue termed generall in re­spect of the iniury, is this: Antony thou hast spoke ill of me, or thou hast saide some what in preiudice of my re­putation, and therefore I say that thou hast lyed. This lye for that it is vpon words in which the lye especially declared not what is the thing from whence the slaun­der was, or speeche preiudiciall to reputation spoken is, for that in many sortes a man maye be ill spoken of, and ones reputation preiudiced: happening verye of­ten, that hee whosoeuer talketh of another man, in di­uers matters speaketh that which hee of whome they were spoken, might esteeme them to his shame and disgrace: and therefore it is most necessary to expresse the point whereupon he holdeth himselfe offended: to the end that it may be considered, Specification of the quar­ [...]ell. whither hee wil take vpon him to proue his sayings, or whither he wil proue it with his weapon, or ciuillye by the lawe. And thus for these causes this lye cannot be accompted no waies of value nor lawfull: and he that hath giuen the same, if hee will come to the definition or determination of quarrell, must write the particular and declare it: for in right hee is bound so to doe, if so much time bee per­mitted.

And this I say, a lye giuen in this sorte, doth not only binde, but is verye dangerous to bee wrested, and the danger whereof I speake, is thus: as by this case follow­ing you may easilie see. Paul vnderstandeth that Ni­cholas hath saide of him that he is an Vsurer, and hauing vnderstanding of these wordes, writeth vnto him: Ni­cholas thou hast spoken ill of mee, and therefore I saye thou lyest. Paul peraduenture knowing many defaults more then this in Nicholas, maye answere him thus: I [Page]confesse that I haue spoken ill of thee, but I specified the particularitie of that which thou hast doone, and I saide that long since thou committedst such a fault, and such another, and shew how and thus bring foorth the ground of his speech, without making mention at all of that particularity of which Paul charged him with: and this maye adde more, that so thou lyest thy selfe, say­ing that I speaking ill of thee doe lye. Heere if Paul re­turne to write, should reply, I say that thou lyest in say­ing that I am an Vsurer. Not for all this shall his lye make him guiltie, because the generall lye permitting an exception, it maye be well wrested, being apparant that in speaking ill of Paul, Nicholas did not lye. And af­ter the first lye is accompted false, it is to be presumed that also the second containeth a kinde of falsetie: for whosoeuer is accounted once naught, is alwaies estee­med naught in the same kinde: and the presumption being against Paul, it behoueth him to be the actor, so as for the effect in the generalitie of the lye, he shal fall in­to this inconuenience. Besides, such may be his default as the same by lawe might be proued against him, that neither as Defendant or Plaintife, he may enter the du­ello or combat. I conclude therefore, for the small va­liditie of the generall lye, that it hath qualitie to put an other man to the paines of proofe: as for the danger that it bringeth with her, all cauilieres, and braue men ought to take heede of it altogither. Although there were no other thing, then to auoide the multitude of cartelles, being a thing more comely for gentlemen to binde themselues to the action, then lay themselues open with many words.

Of the Lye in particular.

THe speciall lyes are those which are giuen to speciall persons, and vpon expresse and particular matter, and the example is this: Siluano thou hast sayde that at the daye of the battaile of S. Quintin I did aban­don the Ensigne, whereof I saye thou lyest: and this is that lye that before wee tearmed assured and law­full. It is verye necessarye that hee that goeth thus to worke, must haue such profes, and witnes of the speech of that hee which intendeth to beginne the repulse with the lye, that the other maye not denye it: for if I haue not proofes conuenient, hee maye answere that I haue lyed my self in so giuing him the lye, and in such a case I shall not onely be driuen to prooue that I aban­doned not the Ensigne, but proue that he hath laid that blame vpon me vniustly: but if he cannot iustly denye it, then there is no doubt but that he must also proue it. But when he shall deny that he spake these wordes, and I haue proued them by iust circumstance, if then he ask the combate to prooue his saying that way on me, the same then is to be vtterly refused, for the deniall of his speeche commeth so to be an vnsaying of his worde: and thereupon it is to be presumed, that as well in his accusation as deniall, The office of great Lords. The office of Caualieres. hee was a lyer. And in these quarrels, wherein appeareth manifest falsitie, those who commaund (as soueraigne Lords) ought not to permit [Page]the combat, nor braue men (I meane caualieres) ought not to be ashamed in such cases to refuse the battaile, being more honorable to auoide it with reason, then to enter it against all right, and all bond of duetie. Now this true and lawefull lye beeing that wee would in this chapter specifie, with which onelye braue men ought to giue the repulse vnto all iniuries, wherewith they finde themselues offended with any body, and wil either by mouth or writing giue it, they must so per­fectlye manifest themselues in the words wherein they finde themselues outraged, and in such sort build their intent, that no one of their words may be denyed nor wrested: if they determine not afterwards to haue que­stion or doubt of the Challenger or the accused, which is in english Plaintife and Defendant.

Of foolish Lyes.

THe common opinion is, that he who giueth the lye, looseth the election of weapons, so that hee saie vnto another that he lyeth, without hauing regarde to the manner how he doth it, wherby he thinketh to haue done great matter. And heereupon it com­meth, that euerye daye there riseth from the common sorte new and strange foolishnesses, The lye the other speakes. as he who wil giue the lye ere the other speake, saying: if thou saye that I am not an honest man, thou lyest in thy throate.

And this is a changing of nature, for the lye beeing but an answere, in this manner it commeth to answere that which was neuer spoken. Here let vs put a case, it is true that sometime one hearing that another hath sayd that he is a theef, will answere: If thou saie that I am a theefe thou lyest: this Lie is generall, helde incontinentlye to charge another. A lye that gi­ueth meanes to be repented. But the forme of this giueth (as it see­meth vnto me) meanes and waie to the speaker thereof to resolue with himselfe well whether he will continue therein or no, as though hee would saie to himselfe, take heed if thou wilt affirme that which thou hast spoken, that auouching it I pretende to giue thee the Lie, and hee not returning to saie the same, that lye doeth not binde, for that a man maye sometime repent himselfe, saying somewhat in choler or with little consideration. But now to returne to our foolish Lies, A lye at plea­sure. whose fashion will giue cause of laughter. If thou wilt saie that I am not thy equall, thou lyest: where he doth not onely an­swere himselfe before the other hath spoken, but also putteth himselfe vppon his pleasure, that saie I what I canne, till I haue spoken it I doo not lie: as I cannot saie that I am going into France, vntill that I am in the waie, and that I am imbarqued. And of such lyke Lyes I haue heard some good store amongest no common men. There are not anie of these more right than this, which is much vsed, in that thou hast spoken ill of mee, thou lyest: and if thou denie the same thy saying, thou liest also. That if I haue spoken il of thee, or if thou canst proue that I haue spoken it or no, if thou canst proue it, it behoueth thee to tell it. Let this bee an example, thou hast said that I am an heretike, and shew plainelie that I haue sayde it, and vpon the expresse and particu­lar [Page]iniurie, giue me [...] certaine and especiall lye, if thou canst not proue that in such words I haue iniuried thee, and wilt enter into qu [...]rr [...]ll with me, then it is thy part to lay before me that I haue spoken ill of thee: so it tou­cheth me to answere and repell the blame that thou doost giue me. It is no reasonable matter that thou wilt lay vpon me the title of a slaunderer, and yet take away the meanes both of my answere & repulse, and be both Challenger and Defender in one matter. But these are certaine fashions of writings or challenges, found out eyther of men which thinke themselues too wise, or those which vnderstand very little. These kinde of lyes I esteeme not onely to be vnlawfull, but that they may bee turned backe with a lye in the throate: that I who know that I haue not iniured him, may safelie answere him that he lyeth, that I denying that I haue spoken ill of him doe lye.

And I maye speake of the other, that one meeting with his enemie saith: holde or giue me thy hand, that I may tell thee that thou art a lyer, & he answereth that thou lyest: and so not vsing any otherwise his handes, thinketh sufficiently that he hath discharged himself of his aduersaries charge, and dooth not vnderstand that these wordes, hold thy hands, will signifie, I will proue it if thou holde thy hand: and not holding his hand, he is not bound to goe any further. It is sometime seene that one asking another a thing, as a man should saye: hast not thou saide such wordes? wast thou not such a day in such a place? in stead of answere yea or no, it is answered by a lye: of all such, and such like, I doe not intend to mencion or remember, being to great a labor [Page]to gather them together, for that they are woorth no more, A lye giuen w ^tout cause, than as he that had lost his girdle, sayd that who­soeuer had taken awaie the same lyed. Or he that heard another breake winde behinde, sayd, if you speak to me sir, you lie in your throate. To these I will ioyne others as vaine and foolish, whereof I will giue examples. I say to you, A lye giuen a [...]ter an ill sorte. like to lyke, whosoeuer you bee, that hee is an whoremonger, and hee then not giue them one word, but another daie with aduantage of weapon or compa­nie, will tell me that I lyed. The other beeing himselfe lykewise iniuried, wil make no answere, and afterwards out of audience will saie vnto the giuer of the iniurie, that hee lyed, or will publish a cartell full of giuing the lie. These I saie, and such lyke are of no woorth, for that they are not giuen like Gentlemen or Caualiers, In dis­grace giuen and receiued in the presence of others with out aduantage, there must no aduantage bee sought in the answering of them, but vnto the iniuries presently giuen, present answere must bee made. To those a farre off giuen, farre they are to be answered: and such as are writ, written answeres are allowed. Neither must that lye be called lawfull which is giuen with more aduan­tage, than the iniury was giuē, because no respect ought to withdrawe me to answere him who doeth iniurie or hurt, so that he be not armed, or so accompanied, that I answering him, hee might doo me wrong in oddes of weapon, in such maner iniuring me, I ought not vnsaie my worde in seeking my aduauntage, yet it is certaine, that if anie person, I hauing meanes to doo supersticery and wrong, should charge me with infamy, I ought not to staie from giuing him the lie therefore, for so is my dementie or lie lawfull. Neither can he alledge, that my [Page]challenge therein was supersticery, the fault being to be giuen by him who sawe me so aduantaged vnder him, & would come to outrage me. But Gentlemen out of this case must obserue, that the lie or dementie ought to be giuen in more honest manner than the iniuries are done. And if that one far off thee haue spoken ill of thee thou straight maist giue him the ly, & maist write to him that he lieth in his throat, and so likewise present. And if he haue written anie thing in preiud [...]ce of thy reputati­on, thou by writing maist answere him, and very hono­rably thou maist also giue it him present. And seeing now mention is made of writing to him who farre of speaketh ill of another, I will adde this, that I know that of some it is said, that whosoeuer is the first that writeth he is accounted Chalenger, which opinion is in no sort to be allowed, for the Challenger is he that moueth the quarrell, and he offereth the quarrell that giueth the in­iurie, whether it be by worde or deede present or farre off: and for that the other shall not preiudice the matter with the maner of writing, the writing first or last is no matter at all. But I haue seene it disputed amongest the wisest sorte of Gentlemen, that cartelles of demen­ties or giuing the lie, beeing heere and there cast a­broad, euery one did defend for themselues to bee the first that published, pretending amongest themselues, that he who was the first that wrote hast the best aduan­tage.

And because wee haue spoken of supersticerie, which is not onely considered in respect of the aduan­tage of weapons or of persons, but for respect of priui­ledged places, or the sight of the prince, where it is not lawfull for one that he maye freely shewe his griefe.

Heere one may aske me what hee ought to do, if in the presence of the Prince, one will giue mee outragious wordes? An answere in the view of the Prince, To this I will alwaies thus aunswere, that nei­ther, he ought to let passe the repulse by the lye, nor the Prince ought at all to take it in disdaine, for hee ought rather to bee tollerated that giueth another a repulse of an iniurie, then he who doth it. and hee that beareth that in his presence an iniurie should be done me, of a greater reason ought to beare that I defende the same: but yet so, and with such reuerence must he answer the same by aduenture, as the same may seeme full of mo­destie. And this I will now saye, that so much the more I holde my selfe bound to answere, by how much that I know that he that did me iniurie, is accounted of the Prince, before whom I may be accused: but heerein I prescribe no lawe to any body, but onely shewe mine opinion, which whosoeuer followeth, shall doe hono­rably and for his reputation: whom it shall not like to followe, let custome stand in stead of lawe. And now turne to saye, that Princes ought more patiently com­parte the discharge, then the charge that another hath giuen in his presence.

Of iniuries rewarded or doubled.

HEere yet there resteth a new question, yea, euen in the Challenger and De­fendant, which wee will not let passe without some declaration, and this is in such cases, as when on the one parte they speake, and on the other they an­swere with iniurious wordes, and that either they reply the same, or doo adioyne vnto them others, of which I haue made this title of requited iniuries or redoubled.

For requited iniuries I vnderstand, when one replieth only the iniury that was giuen him, and doth adioyne nothing thereunto: as thou are a theefe, a theefe thou art. The redoubled I call those, when one is not con­tented to haue saide to his aduersarie the selfe same wordes of outrage, but doth ioyne thereto an other or more, as if I should say to another, that he is a false mo­nie maker, and he should say to me I am so, and an ho­micide withall: vpon these causes the writers of Duel­lo moue manye questions, whither vpon them there should be any fighting or no: and if they should fight which should be Challenger and which the Defen­dant: heerein to shew you that which I think, before I will speake thereof any thing at all, I do adiudge him an ill brought vp gentlemen, who feeleth himself to be charged with any blot of infamy, shall not be as wel at­tētiue to take away that, as to seek with like or greter in­iurie to slaunder his aduersarie, that he ought with a lye put backe that which shalbe spoken to him, rather then either reply the same, or multiplie any other in words: and so doing, two commodities will followe him, the one that with the lye he shall charge his enemye with that dutie to bee Challenger: the other that hee shall make himselfe knowne a person farre from iniurious intention. But if the case happen in any of the formes aforesaid, there is somewhat to be marked how a man must behaue himselfe therein. I say therfore when one calleth me traitor, and I say thou art a traitor, & do not thereto only ioyn any word that hath not the force of the lye, no combat is to follow: An iniurie no thought. and if hee come to re­plye, the same iniurie many other times, it shalbe as [Page]much as if an iniury once repulsed, there is no more repulse to be spoken of.

But if it should be answered, thou lyest that sayest I am a traitor, for that thou art the traitor: I doe not see wherefore the combate should not followe heere, for with these words I haue discharged my selfe with that he charged me, and laide vpon him the slaunder of traitor, which is that I send back the iniurie done to me, and iniurie him with the repulse thereof, binding him to his proofe: and although he should replye, but thou lyest thy selfe that I am the traitor, for all this hee is not discharged, but answered to that iniurye that I gaue him: and because the lye was giuen of me in time, it will haue the greater reason, and is required at his hand to proue the truth of his speech: but hauing called me traitor, I should answere him, thou art the traitor, and hee afterwarde subioyne thou lyest: now the case of Challenger will come vpon me, because he dooth not staye himselfe vpon the firste iniurye, but answereth to that I saide to him: and now to me there remaineth no more meanes to binde him to the proofe, beeing al­readie with the lye giuen me made Challenger. Nei­ther can it be saide, that that answere, thou art the trai­tor, hath so much the force of a repulse, as of an iniury: for that the repulse standeth in the negatiue, and if the negatiue haue not the force of a lye, it chargeth not: and that being answered Traitor, the iniurie with a lye may be put back lawfullie, that although it be true, that an iniurie once wrested will not permit any more wri­ting: it is to be vnderstoode that there is great diffe­rence betweene the wresting & repulse: with the wre­sting, [Page]I say to thee that thou saiest of me, but with the repulse I giue thee not that blame that thou giuest me, but onely doe free my selfe thereof, charging thee with no blame at all, but with the dutie to prooue that thou hast saide, and that that which I say should be so: if one should say that I am a theefe, and I should answere him that he lyeth, this shalbe tearmed iniurie, and not wre­sted, but repelled: and if to one of these lyes which we haue shewed before, which haue the nature of an iniu­rye, an answere should be made to them by another lie, this shalbe called wresting. And this is a true resoluti­on, and so to be approued and followed according to the stile and order of Gentlemen and Caualiers. And that which I haue saide of rewarded iniuries, I saye the same of the redoubled, that hee must not bee tearmed Challenger by the multiplication of iniuries, but must be ruled by the lye, hauing saide to you before that about question of words, the proofe of the lawes are appointed to the iniuryer, and not to the iniured: true it is, that when neither of the one side nor the other the lye is, hee shall not remayne without some blame to whome the same was firste spoken, how manye or great soeuer they be.

Nor that is not to bee taken for good aduise which is set downe by some writer, that if I should call another Traitor, and he shoulde answere that I am a Traitor, a Theefe, a robber by the high way, I shoulde subioyne I will prooue it to thee with my weapon, that I am neither Traitor, Theefe, nor robber by the high waye, but that thou art the traitor thy selfe.

What a foolish enterprise shall this be of mine, that ha­uing the meanes to make me Defendant, will make my selfe Challenger, Quarrels must be simple. and offer my selfe to the proofe. Be­sides, what an ill kinde of proceeding should mine be, to come to the determining of so many quarrels with one battaile or combat, the same not being to be gran­ted for diuers things together: for it may come to passe in the one they maye be true, in the other false: and so fight for the one with reason, and the other without: a­bout which, those that will forme quarrels ought to be wel aduised: and if they be not rightly framed, the Lord before hee giueth licence for the fielde, must reforme them, or at the least prouide that when the gentlemen or caualieres bee conducted thither, that their godfa­thers in capitulating, giue them a conuenient forme.

That straightwaies vpon the Lye, you must not take armes.

NOw if in the discourse about the lyes which we haue made, it is concluded that the lyed, which is he that hath the lie giuen to him, is to be Challēger, we doe not say therefore that is to be vn­derstoode, that presently for the lye a man should runne to his weapon: for the triall of the sworde being doubtfull, The sword and ciuile proofe. and the ciuile certaine, the ci­uile is that way by which euery man of reckoning and reputation ought to iustifie himselfe. For he ought to [Page]be esteemed honorablest, who with certain proofe ap­proueth his honor, then the other that with an incer­taine testimonie, doth think to answere his reputation. But I see amongst Gentlemen to be noted such an a­buse that they thinke themselues to haue committed villanye, to attempt any other meanes than by the sworde: wherein how much they deceiue themselues which thinke so, I will say nothing else at this present, but that the ciuile profe is the profe of reason, & fight­ting but the proofe of force: and that reason is proper vnto man, and force of wilde beastes. Leauing the ci­uile proofe and taking the armes, we leaue that which is conuenient for men, to haue recourse to that which is belonging to brute beastes: which peraduenture Gentlemen would not doe very often, if they vnder­stoode wel their dutie, and when they would wel con­sider that it is no lesse the parte of a Caualier to know, to put vp well his sworde, then well to drawe it out.

Those therefore which think they haue the lye duly giuen them, ought if they haue meanes by the way of reason to proue their saying, they ought by the same I say, proue it, and not follow the other way of armes, if thereto they be not constrained by necessitie, and so as they could not by any other meanes iustifie them­selues.

Those other which are offended for that they haue not the lye duelye giuen them, those maye wrest the same, or by some meanes lightly reproue it.

Of the forme of Cartels, or Letters of Defiance.

WHen Cartels are to be made, they must be written with the greatest breuity that may be possible, framing the quarrell with cer­taine, proper, and simple wordes: and spe­cifying whether the cause was by woord or deed, you must come to the particulars of the same, shewing well the persons, the thing, the times and pla­ces, which doe appertaine to the plaine declaration thereof, so that one maye well resolue to the answere: for the Duello being a forme of iudgement, as in the ciuile, criminall, and in action of iniury, a particular set­ting downe is required: no lesse can be saide of the iudgement belonging to Gentlemen and Caualiers, theirs being of no lesse force. And he that shalbe Chal­lenger, shall call his partie aduersarie to the field, hee that shalbe the Defendant, shall ioyne thereto his lye.

And in such manner of writing, the least eloquence and copie of woordes that maye be must be vsed, but with naked and cleere speeche must knit vp the con­clusion.

And this I say principally of the Defendant, which with superfluous speeche most commonlye confound themselues, and in that they are not content to haue re­pelled the iniurie with the lye, and will set downe the field, and saye that they will defend their saying with their weapon: which thinges are not onelye superflu­ous, [Page]but dangerous, because when one hath giuen the lawfull lye, certaine, and particular, so incontinent is he to whom the lye is giuen made the Challenger, and the proofe belonging vnto him, it is in him to chuse what way best liketh him to proue his saying: whether it be ciuile, that is by law, or by armes: and mine aduer­sary choosing the proofe by armes, the choyse of them commeth vnto me.

Now if I giue the lye, and afterward set downe the proofe of armes, I enter into his iurisdiction, and doe the office of Challenger: whereupon it is most reaso­nable that mine appertain to his, and seeing that I haue elected the proofe of armes, the election of them doth not remaine to him: for it is no reason nor honestye, that I both call him to armes, and also take the choise of them.

And here I must adioyne another thing, that albeit that ordinarily he that hath the election of armes, is ac­counted the guiltie or Defendant, I should saye that the same should cease in this case, that if peraduenture by speaking of armes I happen to preiudice my selfe in the election of them, for all that the quarrell dooth not alter; but he that hath accused me of any default, is to proue his saying, & not I to proue my repulse: & ther­fore we say, that by the force of the iniurye done vnto me, and by me put back, he is to be Challenger, and I for hauing called him vnto armes, do lose the election of them: wherupon it followeth that he must be forced to proue his intention with those armes which shal be elected by himselfe.

And although it seemeth to me superfluous to remem­ber it, yet for that it is a thing not to be passed in silence, [Page]for that it is oft to be considered, because there must be alwaies had in regard, what words they vse euery time they speake of the fight: and the proofe and maintay­ning are taken in the same sense or signification, and do appertain to the Challenger: where the Defendant ought not to put forth himselfe, but to defend and su­staine: and if he should offer to maintaiaine or defend, he should become presentlie vpon the same to be chal­lenger. Of the answeres which are to be made vnto the cartels, there is no more to be saide, but so much as is spoken alreadie. In the giuing of the lye, the answers yet may be ruled and ordered, and that when vpon the lye there happeneth no disputation vnto him that re­ceiueth it, there resteth nothing but his iustification, ei­ther vnto the proofe, or satisfaction of the iniurie.

And heere I will not stay to tell you, that it seemeth vnto me a most gentleman-like thing, in all manner of writings to speake honourably of his enemie, for so a Gentleman or Caualier doth honor to himselfe, shew­ing thereby to haue quarrell with an honorable per­son: whereas otherwise, hee dishonoreth himselfe, and sheweth himselfe rather to haue minde to fight with the pen then with the sworde.

Of the manner of sending of Cartels.

GEntlemen were wont to send a gloue for a defie, and with fierce wordes did dispatch the same, when they came vnto the fight: for it was not then a­mongst them esteemed peraduenture any aduantage to bee Defendant, not vsing that (I cannot tell what to tearme it) wittie or ca­uelling kinde in election of Armes, which in these our daies are accustomed. The electi [...] Armes is cauelling. Afterward came the custome of sending of Cartelles, in which manner of proceeding there was much difficultie and newnesse, and diuerse offences to bee carried. Lastly, the publication is taken vp, the which is more sure and more readie, chiefely the Lordes hauing seene the multiplication of quarrelles, haue prouided that in their states no cartels maye bee presented, which beeing so effectually brought to passe that euerie one of them doth vse it, it leaueth no occasi­on to speake many wordes vpon it: Thus much I saie, that as Cartels are published, & in assurance thereof the daie intimated and notified, then there is no place lefte of excuse or alledging of ignorance. And by this means all manner of hiding the matter, and all other euasions that might haue beene vsed in the time of appresentati­on are cleane taken awaie.

This I shal saie more, which I haue touched before speaking of the foolish lies, that when anie man whoso­euer [Page]shall giue me a lie present, and without aduantage of weapons or of men, if then I do not answere him, to come afterward to publish a Cartell with the Lie, I can not hold my selfe satisfied: for not being charged with out anie supersticerie, and I not answering the same, & going about a farre of to answere him, I do in a manner confesse that I am not a man to stand face to face wyth him, and thus by my deeds consent that he is superiour to mee, howe shall I by writing equall my selfe to him, and my opinion is, that such a lye shall neuer be coun­ted lawfull. Truth it is, if I doo not aunswere presently the iniurious wordes, I am not of opinion that therfore another time I shal be barred to make my answer to the same, and to him that gaue them mee, onely this, that I must so holde the same, that thereby I take not any ad­uantage in the doing of it. And if one shall bee so lame or weake, that answering it is seene manifestlye that the other without anie paine may hurt or offend him: to this man it may bee lawfull to seeke assured meanes to aunswere. And so in all matters of iniurie which are committed with supersticerie, although they be spoken to a mannes face, it is a thing cleere, that aunswering by writing, and by the waie of publication, is an answering to one most legitiuely, and when the other with ano­ther supersticerie should aunswere him it, that answere shall also be lawfull.

After the defie it is not lawfull that the one Gentleman should offend the other, but in the steccata, which is the place of Combat.

AFter that the one hath called the other to the battel, as well in the requirer as the required, it is not lawful that either may of­fend his aduersarie anie more, for that that request or calling bindeth gentlemen to the ordi­narie waie: and although there shoulde arise amongest them questions or strife, they must obserue this rule, for whi­lest this question doth hang, no other thing is to be in­nouated. And if either of them should assault his aduer­sarie in this time, he is to bee esteemed, adiudged, and declared a breaker of faith, and amongest other Gentle­men from henceforth, in anie other quarrell to bee re­fused and put backe. And this censure is so vniuersally approued, that I neede not endeauour my selfe to con­firme it anie farther.

When one doth call another for an offence done vnto him by a third person.

IT happeneth sometimes that one of­fended with another mans words, or otherwise, maketh another strike him, or gaue him the bastonado, ought he that is striken to bee called Challen­ger, or else the striker? vnto which de­mand we haue a readie answere. That as the ciuill laws doo proceed as well against the one as the other, so in such case the combate beeing permitted, a Gentleman ought to proceede as well against the one as the other of them.

True it is, it is sayde, that when the one hath to en­dure, and the other endured, that when the thing is no more but manifest, hee that is offended ought not to leaue the certaine for the vncertaine. And beeing assu­red that he is oppressed of some body, his doubt or pre­sumption doeth not make him apte to require another person of estimation before he doo discharge himselfe of him that oppressed him, and be offended against him that hath with hand offended him, and ouercomming him, it is cleere that hee remaineth discharged. But to kill or ouercome him that required him as principall Challenger, I doo not see how hee is relieued or eased, for the other may alwaies saie that hee strake me, for his [Page]owne particular interest, that the proofe of Armes is an vncertaine proof, but the stroke is certain, in such case the blame or griefe will still remaine vpon him­selfe. Wherevpon I resolue to saie, that the manifest deed of the offence, and not the occult author of the same is to be called. And this assure againe, that al­though there are some shewes of them, a man maye also doubt whether they may be false, but there is no doubt of him that is the offender.

What is to be done if question rise vpon the quarrell, or vpon the person of the Challenger.

MAny times if falleth out, that one calleth another vnto the fielde, and therefore must accept the defie, but aunswereth the same with some ex­ception, obiecting either that he did not vnderstand the quarrell, or that it doth not touch him, or that the caller is infamous, or hath other charge, or is not of lyke condition, or such lyke. In which case there is nothing to say, but that it is necessarie before wee passe anie further, that such difficulties bee made cleere, and the meane to cleer them is, that the gentlemen submit themselues to the iudgement of some prince or noble man tru­sted [Page]on both partes, and chosen of both the parties, and accordingly as they do censure it, so the quarrell to be left or followed. And be it that the one wil not accept the proposed iudgment, the opinion of gen­tlemen shall bee of him, if he were Challenger, that the oppositions made were iustly made to him, and if he were Defendant, that hee had an vniust quarrell to defend. And when the Challenger should be the man that shoulde refuse the iudgement, to the De­fendant remaineth nought else to doo, but to stand vpon it firmely: truely yet when the Defendant shall auoid the determination, then it appertaineth to the Challenger to proceede further, hauing shewed or sent him the letters patents or of the fielde, hee hath more to do, he must send them him, & notifie them, requiring him that either hee accept the one, or send backe the others, or else let him choose one of them with protestation that if hee do not accept the same, or refuse to send, hee doeth cause him to vnderstand that she shall auoide it, and is to accept such an offer, specifieng one of his patents and letters, and that in conuenient time hee shall finde him in that place or field to make an end with his weapon of the quarrel if hee shall bee there, otherwise with all disdaine and contumacie hee shall proceede to his infamie, wyth those clauses which shall bee necessarie for such an effect. And this is both a Gentlemans course and reasonable order of proceeding, for if there were not such an order of proceeding founde out, for e­uerie one that woulde finde out meanes to auoyde all calling into the fieldes, most men would refuse all [Page]fighting, & iudgement, & the required shall remaine mocked without anie remedie. And this remedie is lawfull to be vsed when the Defendant doth flie the iudgement thereof, that the same shoulde be chosen of both the parties by cōmon accord: for when the quarrell is contested and cleere, no matter now stan­deth to be determined on, for there remaining anie one Article to be determined on, they cannot binde another to accept it, nor to send patents or letters of the fielde, for that hath his time and place when all controuersie is past, and that done, then there resteth nothing but to come to blowes.

Whether the subiecte ought to obey his Soueraigne, being by him for bidden to Combat.

THis doubt is often moued by them that write of this matter, concerning which Gentlemen are resolued, that for their Prince and Soueraigne they will glad­ly hazard their liues euen into greatest daungers, but their honour will they not in anie case suffer to be spotted with disgrace or cowardise, wher­by they are growen into this custome, that beeing challenged to the combate, or vnderstanding or perceiuing that others meane to challenge them, or else intending and resolued wyth themselues to [Page]challenge others, they will retire into some secrete place, where it shall not consist onely in theyr Prin­ces power, to forbidde, or staie them from it, and so laying aside all respect either of their Princes fauour or losse of goods, or bannishment from their Coun­trie, they take the combate in hande. And whosoe­uer shoulde doo otherwise amongst men professing Armes, shoulde bee iudged to haue greatly empay­red his credit and reputation, and dishonoured him selfe in high degree.

Also he should bee esteemed vnworthie to con­uerse with Gentlemen, and if chance he should chal­lenge anie man afterward, he might deseruedly bee repulsed, & lawfully. Which manner and order be­ing confirmed by long custome, and vniuersally ap­proued and helde for sterling among knightes and Gentlemen of all sortes, I thinke it needles heere to trouble my selfe with aunswering all such friuolous obiections as diuerse make that haue written of this subiect whereof some alleadge the ancient descrip­tion of warre, wherein it was not lawfull for anie souldier to combate against the commandement or without speciall leaue of the Generall: for they con­sider not the difference of the cases, which is greate, seeing it is another matter to be in an armie, where a man is bound to attend to especiall enterprises, and to bee idle at home. Besides this, there is also muche difference betweene the defiances vsed in auncient times, and oures, which being in no vse or custome, & scarse knowen vnto the Romanes, how could they make any lawes or take any order concerning them?

Furthermore, those Gentlemen or Souldiers that in ancient time challenged one another to the com­bate, beeing of contrarye armies, and enemie one to the other, (whom these writers alleadge against vs) were induced to seeke the tryall of armes, for one of these two causes: either for that the decision of the whole warre was agreed vpon by both parties, to be committed to some fewe of eche armie, as it fell out when the Horatij and Curatij tried their valour for the whole armies: and in this case it is most necessarye that the election of cōbatants should apertain to the superiors & cheefe gouernours: neither can it by any reason be lawful for eche one to take any such enter­prise in hand that is willing to doe it, or else for profe of their valour: in which case also no Souldier ought to goe to the combate without licence, neither doth any burthen or charge remaine vpon him, if he deny the combate, for that hee is to vse his valour in that warre not according to his owne pleasure, but his vnto whome hee hath sworne his seruice and obedi­ence, without any respect of particular interest: yet it may so fall out, that a Souldier being burdened with some especiall quarrell concerning his reputation, ought so much to regarde the same, that he ought to abandon both the armye, his countrie and naturall Prince, rather then to suffer it to passe vnanswered. Concerning which point, I will say as much as I can presently call to remembrance.

True it is, that if there rise any quarrell betweene two gentlemen of two aduersary armies, they ought not either to challenge, or answere a challenge with­out the authoritie of their Generall: for that with­out [Page]his leaue, it is not lawful for any man to haue any intelligence or dealings whatsoeuer, with any in the enemies Campe: but if that the quarrell were such, that either of the parties should be dishonored either by delaying the challenge, or not aunswering the same, then ought he whose honor and reputation is in danger of staine, to enlarge himselfe as much as in him lyeth, from that subiection hee is in, and bring himselfe into the waye whether the safegarde of his honor inuiteth him. Insomuch that among Gentle­men this opinion is currant, that if a man were in some Cittie besiedged by the enemie, and could not obtaine leaue of the Gouernour to come foorth, hee ought to leape ouer the walles, to goe and defend his honor. Yet will I not deny, but that if a mans country or naturall Prince should be interessed in the matter, he ought to haue a respect both of the one and the o­ther: and especially when a great parte of the quarrel should concerne either his Countrie or Prince: for that thē the maner of proceeding therin, ought to be platted by their counsaile and aduise. But in all other cases, when the matter onely concerneth a mans own interest, then ought not any gentleman be backward in challenging, or answering the challenger: and in no case either vpon commaundement, or vpon any penaunce whatsoeuer, refuse the combat.

Neither according to my simple conceite, ought any prince to look for any thing at his subiects hands that may empaire their reputation, or woorke their dishonour.

How Gentlemen ought to accept of any Quarrell, in such man­ner that they may combat lawfully.

THey that maintaine any quarrell, vse most commonly to vndertake the com­bate with such intent, that howbeit the cause of their quarrell be iust, yet they combate not iustly, that is, not in respect onely of iustice and equitie, but either for hatred, or for desire of reuenge, or for some other particular affection: whence it commeth to passe, that many howbeit they haue the right on their sides, yet come to be ouerthrowen: For that God whose eyes are fix­ed euen on the most secret and inner thoughts of our harts, and euer punisheth the euil intent of men, both in iust and vniust causes, reserueth his iust chastice­ments against all offenders, vntill such times as his in­comprehensible iudgement findeth to be most fit and seruing to his purpose.

Wherfore, no man ought to presume to punish a­nother, by the confidence and trust which hee repo­seth in his owne valour, but in iudgement and triall of armes, euery one ought to present himselfe before the sight of God, as an instrument which his eternall maiestie hath to woorke with, in the execution of iu­stice, and demonstration of his iudgement.

If therefore any man violate the [...] of my wife, sister, neece, or kinse-woman, I ought not or may not call him to [...] of the [...], to the end that I may be reuenged of him. Nor if any one should proue disloyall to his Prince or Countrie, ought I challenge him to the combate in respecte of the ha­tred that I beare him, or to obtaine fauour at the Princes handes, or to purchase honour in my Coun­trie, or if any of my kinsemen or freends were slain, maye I challenge the murderer to the fielde, in re­spect of the kinred or freendship I had with him, but my intent ought to be such, that howbeit I had not beene especially offended, and no particular affecti­on or respect should induce me thereunto, yet for loue of vertue, and regarde of the vniuersall good and publique profite, I was to vndertake such a com­bate. For I ought in all particular iniuries present vnto mine eyes, not the persons either offending or offended, but rather fall into cōsideration how much that offence displeaseth almightie God, and how much harme may ensue vnto humaine kinde there­by. And for adulterie ought a man to combate, not as to reuenge the wrong done to one particular per­son, but in regarde of all, considering how holye and religious a bond matrimonie is, being a lawfull con­iunction instituted and ordained by God, to the end that man and woman therein should not as two, but one person, liue together in such manner, that no­thing except death only might seperate and disioyn them. Wherfore perpending the dignitie and wor­thines hereof, and how that by adulterie this deuine ordinance and institution is violated, matrimonyall [Page]coniunction infringed, and lawfull procreation cor­rupted, euerye Gentleman ought to vndertake the combate, not so muche to reuenge himselfe, or his freends, or to thastice or punishe the offenders, as to preserue and keepe from violence a bond so sacred and inuiolable, with sure hope, that God, who (as S. Paul saith) will iudge the Adulterer, will by means thereof giue most seuere iudgement.

In like manner, if some man haue mis-behaued himselfe in any matter concerning his prince or cun­trie, each Gentleman ought to thinke, how that God hath ordained and authorised Princes to be aboue vs, to the ende that vnder him they may as his mini­sters and officers gouerne vs his humble flocke, how that nothing beeing move gratefull and acceptable vnto God, then good gouernment among men (who assembled together, and liuing vnder the same lawes, beare themselues orderly, gouerning their liues and manners aright) we are not so much bound in dutie towardes any, as towards them that are as it were lieutenantes vnto almightie God in earth, for so I call our princes and gouernors: and towards that assemblie & congregation of mankind, vnder whose lawes we are borne and bred, I meane our Countrie, and how that no greter wickednes can be committed than for a man to rebel against him whom God hath ordained Lord and gouernor ouer him, or to wrong him vnto whome he hath giuen his faith, or to betray that citie vnto which hee is both for his liuing, bring­ing vp, & many benefits besides infinitly beholding. In respecte whereof, I saie each Gentleman hauing [Page]considered and weighed all this, ought as a publique plague, and not as a particular enemie, to persecute him that committeth any of these odious excesses: calling him to the triall of the swoorde, confidentlye hoping and trusting with assured faith, that God will chastice and punish him that hath so greeuouslye of­fended both him and his people, violating his sacred ordinances and constitutions. And for the same rea­son, if some man haue committed murder, hee that will combate with him, must not doe it to this ende, onely to wreake the death of him that is murdered, in respect that he was his freend or kinseman, but he ought to call to minde what a noble and excellent creature man is, who being taken away and brought to naught by murder or slaughter, the fairest and no­tablest woorke which almightie God hath framed, is marred, and spoiled. Insomuch that whosoeuer com­mitteth murder, dooth dissolue and breake the most perfect peece of woorke that the creator of heauen and earth hath made, and defaceth the image and likenes of God. And for that God in his sacred law ordeined, that man-slayers should be carryed from his alter and put to death, the partie that will com­bate, knowing how greatly his diuine maiestie is of­fended with this sinne, ought not to vndertake the combate, because he would kill him, but because hee might be as it were, the minister to execute Gods de­uine pleasure, and most holy commaundement.

By these examples maye a Gentleman perceiue what ought to be doone in all other cases, so that it shall be needles for men to seeke examples for eache [Page]offence, troubling both my selfe and the Reader. In the meane time, take this by the way, that whatsoe­uer I haue heere saide of the Challenger, is also in the same manner to be vnderstoode of the Defen­dant: insomuch that both the one and the other ought to regarde the preseruation of their honour and innocencie by iust meanes: the one neuer chal­lenging but with iust cause and vpright meaning, and the other neuer accepting any challenge, vnlesse hee know himselfe to be guiltles: and in such sorte, that he may take it with a good conscience, as to doe or performe any action that concerneth his honor, to liue and dye in defence thereof. For, as it is shame­full to doe any dishonorable act, so is it more shame­full and opprobrious to maintain the same, and stand in defence of it.

And againe, a man finding himselfe innocent and wrongfully dishonored, ought not to feare any dan­ger, but to venter his life at all times, for the righting either of priuate or publique wronges: in all things, considerations, and circumstances, hauing a speciall regarde vnto iustice. For God giueth right vnto him that is iust, and ouerthroweth the vniust: whosoeuer therefore shall take armes for iustice to repell vniust iniuries, may be assured to preuaile, and with an vn­dismaied courage goe about what he vndertaketh.

For what causes Combats ought to bee graunted.

SO greatly different is our custome now a daies, from the orders & laws of the first institutors of Duello, as if a man shoulde go about to reduce them into particular cases, it were not onely a trouble to some, but a verie impossible thing: for which cause I will one­ly treate of that which I shall iudge meetest by a ge­nerall rule to bee obserued, and include all combats vnder two heads.

First then, The causes of Duello. I iudge it not meet that a man should hazard himselfe in the perill of death, but for such a cause as deserueth it, so as if a man be accused of such a defect, as deserue to bee punished with death, in this case Combate might bee graunted. Againe, be­cause that in an honourable person his honor ought to be preferred before his life, if it happē him to haue such a defect laid against him, as in respect thereof he [Page]were by lawe to be accounted dishonorable, and should therefore be disgraced before the tribunall seate: vpon such a quarrell my opinion is, that hee is not to be denied to iustifie himself by weapons, pro­uided alwaies, that hee be not able by lawe to cleere himselfe thereof, And except a quarrell be compre­hended vnder one of these two sortes, I doe not see how any man can by reason or with his honor, either graunt or accompanye an other to the fight.

Moreouer, The dutie of gentlemen [...] ▪ such Gentlemen as doe counsaile or accompany a man, ought to be iudges of the quar­rell, for vnto them it belongeth cheefely to knowe if the quarrell deserue triall by armes or no, if the per­son be suspected of the defect laide against him, and if there be presumption thereof. But if these thinges be not well iustified and proued, the combate ought not to be admitted, because that the profe by armes being ordained, as a meanes to sift out the truth, as in ciuile iudgement, where the proofe is reasonable and certaine, no man can be put to torture without due information, and sufficient witnes, much lesse ought it to be doone in the iudgement of weapons, which perhaps may fall out to be as little to reason, as very doubtfull.

Againe, those Gentlemen are to vnderstand if the quarrell haue been vndertaken heretofore by any of the parties to be proued by lawe, or otherwise: The quarrell [...] sayed at the ci­uile law. and then whether it be proued or no, it is not lawfull af­terward to bring it to combat: besides, they are dili­gently to consider, Ciuile Pro [...] if it may be iustified by any other meanes or no. And if in case it may be done by law, [Page]weapons are not to be allowed: for if by ciuile cause cōtrouersies are remitted from one iudge to another, as actions more belonging to one then to another, much rather is the like to bee doone, from the iudge­ment of armes, to ciuile law, seeing the inequality is much the greater: An oath re­quired. and vpon these two last articles these gentlemen ought to take oath of him that de­maundeth the fielde, and without iustification there­of, there is no reason to graunt it to any man: which thing is so muche the more to bee obserued, by how much it is a common case, that men are moued to fight vpon such quarrels as might be ended by ciuile law, and whosoeuer is once challenged the fielde, it is accompted a shame for him to refuse it in which case the vulgare opinion is, that it is not manlynes in a gentleman to stand vpon reasons.

Moreouer, if happilie in cartels there be any men­tion made, that not withstanding he could proue his intent by ciuile testimony, yet he inten deth to doe it by weapons, this I say is a very great abuse, and Gen­tlemen ought to take oath of infamy, that is, that they doe not require the fielde maliciouslye, or with a minde to infame another, but onely for proofe of the truth, and this oath hath beene ordeined and put in practise of men long agoe. And we must also adde, that those gentlemen ought fullye to bee satisfied by oath, from thē that demaund the fielde, if that which they pronounce, be their true quarrell, because many times some men will not stick to determine to them­selues one pretence of their fight, & yet make known to the world another, which abuses gentlemen ought diligently to take heed of, because many times such [Page]malice hath been discouered. Touching all such mat­ters whereon anye controuersie or dissencion maye growe, men ought specially to beware, not to be self-willed, but are rather to take counsail and aduise both of their freends and experienced men, and if there be cause to iudge this course necessarie in anye mat­ter, it ought cheefelye to bee in such cases, wherein a mans life and honour is touched, for we see that euen the wisest sorte to study and endeuour by all meanes possible to furnish themselues with men experienced and seene in chiualrye and armes, that they maye bee counsailed and aduised by them, and may in such sort wish them to the field, as may best stand with reason, which office may onely be executed by learned men and gentlemen, wherof the first are tearmed counsai­lors, and the second Padrini: Padrini, are those that are chosen by the combators on either side. but if happily one man be seen in both, hee maye very well suffice to execute both offices, but because the charge consisteth principally on the Padrini, we will speak somwhat of them.

First then my opinion is, that they were so called, either because such gentlemen as had remitted them­selues vnto them, ought to account of them as their fathers, or els that this mutation of letters is deriued from the latine, which termeth those patrones, Patrones, Padrini. Pattini. which take vpon them the defence of another: some also cal them not Padrini, but Pattini: which if we wil allow, it must be, for that they do make the matth of the cō ­bate: but howsoeuer they be called, or whencesoeuer their denomination be deriued, they are very neces­sary, and their very office is to defend, as aduocates do their clients: and as this is their duety, so me thinketh they deserue no lesse priuiledge then aduocates doe.

And therefore as in ciuile controuersies aduocates are not to satisfie or paye anye parte of that wherein their clyents are bound or condemned, There ought no controuersie to arise betwixt the Padrini. so in reason the other oght not to be charged to the field in those quarrels, wherein they are but as it were proctors, for the iniuries, the lyes, the cartels, and challenges, that are alreadie past betwixt the principalles, and the Pa­drini speake but as procurators, which is as much as if the principalles themselues spake: and if happilie the principals should haue any words together after the quarrell concluded, yet new charge or lies should be of no force, which if it be betwixt the principals grā ­ted, much more ought to be to them that speake for them, which as it is reasonable, so is it to be obserued for the better conseruation of the right vse of chiual­ry, and to the end euery man may freely execute his function, which thing I note, because it happeneth sometimes, that such men take vpon them to be Pa­drini, who doe it more to take holde of a newe quar­rell, then for the defence of their gentilitie. And this is a wonderfull abuse, as it hath been shewed before, as also for that the nature of Duello is rather to re­straine a man, than to giue him libertie, beeing verie vnmeete: then vpon one combate should still ensue another. In which respect gentlemen ought strictlye to obserue this rule before: and as oft as it happeneth to growe anye quarrell betwixt Padrini, gentlemen ought to condemne it as vnlawfull, The dutie of gentlemen. and seeke by all meanes possible to preuent such dishonest actions.

That men should not fight with­out weapons of de­fence.

THe opinion of our ancients is, that whē ­soeuer any man is licensed to the Com­bate, in al other cases, except for infide­litie, hee is to fight with a staffe and a Buckler, wherby I conclude, that duel­lo was not instituted for the honor of chiualrie, as our late combators haue wrested it, but onely for the sif­ting out of the truth, which was not doone with the weapons of a Gentleman, but with a staffe: and ther­fore to goe about to reduce our customes now a daies, to those of former ages, were more ridiculous then possible to be done: but I will onely treat of the weapons belonging to Gentlemen, which I thinke meetest for Combats.

Firste therefore it is to bee vnderstoode, that the wisedome and discretion of a man, is as great a ver­tue as his magnanimitie and courage, which are so much the greater vertues, by how much they are ac­companied with wisedome: for without them a man is not to be accounted valiant, but rather furious▪ nei­ther is hee valiant that rashly and without aduise ha­zardeth himselfe in great matters, or endaungereth himselfe most: but hee that aduisedly behaueth him­selfe in actions belonging to a gentleman, and where [Page]a publique benefite or his owne honor requireth it, doth not retire himselfe from danger: for (as a Philo­sopher well saith) neither is he valiant that is afraide of euery bugge, nor yet he that doth not temper his feares.

Againe, as the courage of the minde imboldeneth a man to assault his enemy, so wisedom teacheth him likewise how to defend himselfe: so as I will neuer holde him couragious, that will be led to fight with­out sufficient weapons of defence. And albeit the common sorte thinke the single Rapier in the shirte, or the poniard or such like weapons, wherein there is a manifest iudgement of death to one, most honora­ble, neuertheles I am not of that opinion, nor will I account them that enter the combate in such sorte more honorable, then wilde beastes that wilfullye run vpon their own death.

And touching such as think it an honorable thing not onely not to esteme their life, but voluntarilye to runne on their death, I will account their life at a very lowe and base price, seing they themselues set no greater reckoning on it.

It is helde a most shamefull matter, if when the custodie of a Castell shall be committed to a man, hee shall without licence forsake it: and shall wee that haue our liues lente vs in keeping from our cre­ator, haue no respect of so goodly a receptacle of our soules, but wilfully destroye it, making our selues as it were, rebels vnto God, and so bring both bodye and soule to perdition?

Moreouer, if a Gentleman goe to the warres, wee [Page]see him so esteemed of as hee is in shewe of his ar­mour▪ and therefore I see no cause at all that a man should in publique matters seeke to be well armed, and in priuate quarrelles come naked: and me thin­keth a man should at all times and in all places shewe him selfe valiant and desire the victorye: which if it be granted, they should likewise in al mat­ters of moment prepare themselues armed.

And if Gentlemen will haue this respect of curte­sie towarde their enemie, as to giue him weapons wherewith he may end the controuersie: I thinke it reason they should be such as may arm him, and not burden him.

The dutie of euerye Gentleman, is to temper his courage with wisedome, that it may be knowne, that neither he setteth so highlye by his life, that for safe­garde of it, he will commit any vile fact, nor yet that he so slightlye regardeth it, as that without iust cause he will depriue himselfe thereof: albeit I doe not ac­count it a dishonourable act, to come armed like a man at armes, if the weapons be such as belong to a Gentleman, and hurt not a man priuilie.

Again, I would that armes should incōtinently be vsed, and that a man should not then enter the com­bate, when the time is for him to leaue: and aboue al, that the weapons of defence, were both weapons of armes and warre: and if so be a man would fight with weapons only of defence, the gentlemen should in no case admit it, but that they should fight like gentlemen, as it hath been many times done.

Touching the choice of your weapons, and of the [Page]inequalitie of them, The aduantage of the Defen. dant. and the imperfections of the bo­die, the Defendant hath great aduantage, and it is not without iust cause, for seeing hee is both accused and constrained to fight, it is great reason that hee should haue all the honest fauour that might be, and it is no little honor to him that in case he onely be not ouer­come, hee is accounted the vanquisher: where con­trarily, the Challenger is to ouercome, vnles hee will altogither loose the quarrell, whereof there is great reason, because to the one it appertaineth to prooue, and to the other it is sufficient onely to defend.

Likewise, it is as great a fauour that hee hath to choose the weapons, which is also very meete, for if a man choose to call me to fight, the election of the weapons is mine.

In this choic it is certain, that there is not the liber­ty giuen, as is thought: for this parte also, as all other partes of duello is grounded vpon reason, and if wee will be nyce to see how a man is authorised to make the choyce, wise men are of opinion, that gentlemen should receiue their sentence of weapons from di­uine iudgement, if in case the iustification cannot by other meanes be made: How to ap­point the wea­pons. and if they will haue the be­nefite of that, it is necessary that they abandon all vi­olence and deceite, which (as Cicero saith) are the pro­perties of the Lyon and the Foxe, and farre from the nature of man.

Now if these things should in the whole course of our life be helde and perfourmed, much more should they be desired in the sifting out of a truth, and in the direction of iudgement.

And touching violence, me thinkes the law hath well prouided, by giuing the aduantage of the wea­pons to the Defendant, which if it were not so, eue­rie naughty man would embolden himselfe to make wrong accusations, and vrge euerie man of lesse strength to fight, perswading himselfe to be able to beate him downe to the ground. But seeing the law hath so well prouided against this, seeing that deceit (as the same Cicero likewise affirmeth) is worthie of much hatred, it is a commendable thing that it is so. For in the choise of weapons, it belongeth to vs to make some lawe for the Defend [...]nt, which should be such, as he should not vse anie deceit in, nor graunt such wepons as fit not with the disposition of a mans bodie. For albeit a man maie saie that wee are natu­ly apt in all exercises to vse both handes, yet it is ma­nifest, that vse dooth ouercome nature, to make vs right or left handed. And therfore if I shall be know­en to be right handed, I cannot force my aduersarie to fight with a weapon for the lefte hande, seeing the disposition of my bodie is not such. And if I haue no defect in my arme, or my thighe, or legge, I cannot come to fight with vambraces or such lyke harneis, for those partes, which hinder the bending of the el­bow, or of the knee, for this is an apparent deceit and ought to bee refused in the Combat, and the Padrini ought not to admit such weapons.

If in case I be lame or hurt in one of mine armes, or my hands, or want an eie, I may verie wel appoint my enemie such weapons as maie in lyke sorte bind his legge, his arme, or his hand, or that may hide one [Page]of his eies, but yet if he bee lame of one arme, I maye sure appoint him such armour as may hinder the o­ther that is sound.

And to conclude, if it be lawfull for me to appoint such weapon or armour to mine enemie as may hin­der him in the same sort that I am hindred, yet I must not hinder him vnlesse my selfe be also hindered: as thus, If I be blinde of my right eie, and he of his left, I must not therefore also hinder his right eie, for this is not to make equalitie of my wants, but to take his whole sight from him.

Likewise a right handed or left handed man, or a man weakned or maimed so of his hand as he cannot well close it, or that wanteth a finger, whereby hee is not able to holde his weapon in his hand, in my opi­nion, is not to be constrained to fight with his imper­fect hand, but may lawfully and iustly denie the chal­lenge, which is also to bee vnderstoode of all other members and lims, so as it is requisite that all things be guided with reason and iudgement for both par­ties, that it doo not appeare that that which is done, is done for reuenge or to infame another, but onely for the iustifieng of the truth.

Of the time for Duello.

THe time appointed for Du­ello hath alwaies bene twixt the rising and setting of the Sunne, & whosoeuer in that time doth not prooue his in­tent, can neuer after bee ad­mitted the Combat vppon that quarrell. And in case the day be spent without any combat, it cannot be remit­ed to the daie following without the consent of the Defendant, who being challenged for that daye, and appearing there, hath performed all partes of his ho­nour and dutie (vnlesse thorough anie default of his the combat was not attempted) and is farre from all matters touching that quarrell. But it is not sufficient for the Defendant onely to consent, except likewise the Lord that granteth the field do condescend ther­vnto: for hauing once admitted the field in a prefix­ed daie, that being past, he is discharged. Againe, such may the case be, as the first daie being gone, the com­bat may bee lawfull on the second daye, but without newe conditions, in ordinarie course wee are to ob­serue that which we sayd before.

Of accidents that happen in the Combat.

AS I haue alredie begun for to treate of Duel­lo , so I doo meane to prosecute it, according to our vse now a daies. First then after that the Combatters are ente­red the lists, if they haue no further agreement betwixt them, which of them so euer shall happen to touche the railes or bounds, or shall haue anie part of him out of the lists, is not to be accounted neither prisoner, or ought he to haue that member cut off, but the fight is to conti­nue to the death or flight, or til it be forbidden▪ But if any of them go out of the lists, he is become prisoner: if his horse be wounded or slaine, or if anie part of his armour breake, he is not to be supplied. And if he let fall his weapon out of his hand, it is lawfull for the o­ther to wound him vnarmed, I saie lawfull in this re­spect, that it is accounted an honour to the other to bid him take vp his weapon, and to staie from hurt­ing him til he haue recouered it again: albeit that in case the victorie should afterwarde happen to the o­ther, whereas hee might first safely haue ouercome, [Page]he shoulde bee accounted a foole, and verie well ser­ued.

These things I account ordinarily to be obserued vnlesse it were otherwise agreed vpon, which condi­tions are to bee helde inuiolable vnder the paine ap­pointed: and albeit no punishment were alotted, who so euer should doo contrarie to the agreement, were to be helde a traitor: which agreement lykewise is to bee with consent of both parties, wherein one man cannot binde another to accept anie condition that is without the limit of the lawe. I thinke it necessarie to set downe that the Chalenger is to giue the first as­sault, for whereas he is to proue, and the other but to defend, it is plain, that if he begin not, the other is not bound to stirre a foot, yea, and whatsoeuer he should attempt before hee should perceiue the Challenger comming to assault, were meere superfluous. Again, at the enterance of the Combatters within the listes, let it bee proclaymed, that no man vnder paine of death speake a word, nor make anie signe, which if it happen to bee done, ought seuerely without fauour to bee executed, as one that intermedleth in a matter of life and honor of other men.

If Gentlemen beeing in the Lists may repent them of the Combat.

ANother question is held, whether Gen­tlemen brought into the field may re­pent them of the combat, which I per­suade my selfe wil neuer happen twixt honorable persons: for howe canne a Challenger repent him of the ending his quarrell without perpetuall shame and dishonour, and neuer to be allowed to require battel of anie other, because he proued not that to be true for which he once vn­dertooke weapons. I woulde wishe euerie one that thought his quarrell vniust, not to take it vppon him, and rather than fight against a truth, make full satis­faction to the iniuried, which should bee doone in a zeale and loue of vertue: for the standing obstinate in his purpose vntil the time that he come to haue his weapons in his hand, and then recant, mee thinketh, it argueth a most vile and wicked mind. And I do not see how this repentance can come from the Defen­dant, except he bee content to giue ouer the quarrell and acknowledge himselfe such as hee was accused for. Which (as I sayde of the Challenger) hee might doo with lesse shame before hee tooke weapons than after. And whensoeuer without farther satisfaction [Page]they should come to agreement, doubtles the Chal­lenger should receiue the shame: so as I see not how such a case should happen: but if it should be, my opi­nion is, that if the quarrell were of a matter belong­ing to the Prince, or in another mans interest, the ho­nour ought to constraine them to fight, or to make manifest the truth of the fact: but if it were touching their particular causes, it might bee licensed without Combat, but not without shame.

Whether Gentlemen may in the Listes chaunge theyr Quarrell.

I Cannot passe ouer another doubt, which is this: Two men fighting to­gether, the one saith, Defend thy self traitor. And the other aunswereth, I grant thee the first quarrell, and I do now fight with thee vppon the se­cond. In which case I think it cleere, that he to whom the quarrell is refused, is the victor, & yet if the other ouercome in the second, he is lykewise to be account­ted victor. But notwithstanding, my opinion is, that [Page]neither of them can with honour depart the lists, but that they are both blame-worthie as dishonourable Gentlemen, taking vpon them to fight in vniust qua­rels, which must needes bee presumed by both their losses, for the victorie of one cannot take awaie the losse of the other: wherefore in this lyke case, hee that would take holde of a new quarrell, should not saye, I remit thee the first, but onely thou lyest in saying I am a traitour, and vpon this heereafter I will defende my selfe, and then if he chaunce to ouercome in this, it cannot bee saide that he hath lost the other, but the presumption shoulde bee fauourable on his side, for if his aduersarie haue had the worst in one, it is to bee presumed the like in the other: but he to whom it be­longeth better to fight on the first quarrell, shuld not condiscend to the second, but answere, that hee wyll make an end of the first, and afterwards speake of the rest. And where the other hath remitted him the first, he is to take aduantage therof, and to demand of the Lord of the field the patent of his victorie, and not to fight anie more, nor should the Lorde himselfe suffer him to fight againe. And this is as much as I thought good to speake of that which appertaineth to the Gentlemen.

Now will I come to the office of the Lordes of The fielde, who if after the Letters of the field are dis­patched, the gentlemen wil either in the field or with out it change their quarrell, may at their pleasure re­uoke those letters, & forbid them the battell, because they are not bound to grant the field but vppon that speciall quarrell which was referred vnto them, and [Page]whereupon they graunted their letters, whereby also for this cause it should not be, vnles the quarrel were expressed in the patents.

Againe I say, that if the Gentlemen change their quarrell in the listes, without assent of the Lords, and that one be slaine, the Lords ought to punish this fact in the slaier, as man-slaughter, hauing kilde a man in his iurisdiction, without the priuiledge of a free field, for the fielde is not to be accompted free and priui­ledged, but onely for that speciall quarrel wherupon it was graunted: except some men may saye, that the Lord perceiuing them to vndertake a newe quarrell, and not forbidding them, seemeth by his silence to consent: which I will neither affirme, nor deny.

Who is not to be admitted to the proofe of Armes.

FOrasmuch as Duello is a proofe by armes, which appertaine to gentle­men, and that gentry is an honoura­ble degree, it is not meet to admitte proofe by armes to any but to ho­norable persons, and therfore as be­fore ciuile iudges it is not permitted, that infamous persons can accuse anye other, so in the iudge­ment of gentrie, an honourable person cannot bee accused but by an honourable person: for how shal he be able to accuse another of any defect of ho­nour, [Page]that in the like is faultye himselfe: and whereas the vse of weapons hath been ordeined to an hono­rable end, for to punish the wicked, how can they be receiued to this office, that are worthy themselues of punishment?

Therefore it is to be concluded, that they are not to be admitted proofe by armes, who haue commit­ted any treason against their Prince or Countrie, or shall haue had conference with enemies, which may be preiudiciall to any of them, nor they who hauing been taken of the enemie, hauing meanes to returne doe not returne, or being sent as spyes, doe remayne with the enemy, or haue become spies on both sides, or such as hauing taken oath, or haue not serued out their full pay, do runne to the enemie, or not hauing taken oath, doe go to the enemie, at such time as both parties are in armes, for this fact is of the nature of treason, because that thou making semblance to bee in my fauour, and I trusting thee, when time is that I stand most in neede of thee, thou becommest a re­bell against me.

Moreouer, such are to be denyed the fielde, as in battaile haue abandoned their leaders or ensignes, or either by night or day shall haue forsaken the gard of the enemye or Prince, that was committed vn­to him.

To these we may also adde freebooters, and all such as for any military disorder are banished.

Likewise, all theeues, robbers, ruffians, tauerne hunters, excommunicate persons, hereticks, vsurers, and all other persons, not liuing as a Gentleman or a [Page]Souldier: and in conclusion, all such as are defamed for anye defecte, and are not allowed for witness­ses in Ciuile lawe, are comprehended in this num­ber.

And of these I saye that not onelye they are to bee refused vpon challenging another man, but all honourable persons or Gentlemen should aban­don their companye, and whosoeuer should fight with them, should iniurie himselfe, making himselfe equall with dishonourable persons.

But it is very meete that hee that will refuse ano­ther vpon his infamye, should be sure that the other is faultie thereof, or that it is so apparant, as hee can­not deny it: for otherwise he should turne the quar­rell vpon his owne backe, and then shalbe forced to proue it.

And as it is not lawfull for such manner of men a­boue recited, to challenge another, so if they be once challenged, aduantage cannot be taken against them of in famie: nor is it meete to accept a mans excuse, that should say, he knew it not before, for whosoeuer will challenge another, ought aduisedly to consider, that he bindeth himselfe to such matter as hee must not repent himselfe of.

But I do not include in this, that if after the chal­lenge, he should commit any infamous act, whether he were Challenger or Defendant, he should not yet be refused. Moreouer, if an honourable person, should challenge a defamed person, or contrarywise he being challenged by a base person, should accept of the challenge, which is not onely an act of priuate [Page]interest, but a preiudice to the degree of gentrye: in this case it is the office of the Lord of the field, not to suffer this combate to proceede, nor to graunt them letters of combat.

Touching those that doe not an­swere, or doe not appeare in the field.

WHen a man is challen­ged to the fielde, he is to answere by wepons and not by words, vn­les the challenger bee such as with reason he is to be refused, proui­ded alwaies that a man cannot by ciuile lawe defend himself, & that the quarrel deserue combate. But where these respects want, whosoeuer being challenged doth not answer, or without cause, dooth not accept the letters of the fielde, or accepting them, not hauing a sufficient ex­cuse, doth not appeare, is to be reputed dishonoura­ble in euerye man of woorths iudgement: and the challenger at a conuenient time is to appeare in the fielde, to vse the accustomed solemnities. For the day before the combat, the Padrino is to come before the [Page]Lord of the fielde, and tell him that his champion is come to proue his quarrell, and for that cause hee as his procurator doth appeare, to see if the contrarie party be come, and if he intend to capitulate or bring to passe, that they may be in the greater readines, a­gainst the next day protesting that his Champion is in readines, and is to beseeche the Lord of the fielde, to cause enquirye to bee made, if either hee or some bodye for him be present, and that if there be no no­tice of his comming, he will make open proclamati­on, that whosoeuer is there for the contrarye parte should appeare: for if hee doe not appeare, it shall proceede against him, as one contumacious, and that hath fayled of his dutye, which the Lord of the field is not to denye the other: and on the day appointed, hee is to appeare in the lists at a conuenient hower, where his Padrino offering him to the Lord, and shewing that his Champion is come to fight, is to make a newe instance, for a new proclamation tou­ching the quarrell, which hee is likewise to doe at noone and at the euening, and withall shall make shewe of his armour and of his horse, wherewith he came furnished to fight: whereby hee shall haue cause to accuse his aduersarye of contumacye, and to demaund that his Champion bee admitted to run the fielde, and to bee pronounced victor, and that the other bee condemned of contumacy, of failing, and vanquished in the quarrell.

And that hee pronounced vanquisher, maye vse such tearmes against him, as by the order of gentrye is permitted: all which thinges the Lord ought to [Page]graunt him: and the Gentleman shall go about the fielde three times, with an honourable pompe of his Horse and armour, and sound of Trumpet, and shall carrye with him the letters: which being done, hee maye likewise carrye the portraiture of his ad­uersarye.

And whatsoeuer hath beene saide of the Challen­ger, may the Defendant in like case doe.

What is to be doone vpon the al­leadging of any impediment, for not appearing in the fielde.

WE are now to consider what course is to be taken, if any gentleman do not appear in the fielde at the appointed time, nor doe not prooue a lawfull impediment that hindered him: in which case I affirme, that first [Page]if the impediment happen, at such time as notice might bee giuen thereof, before the contrarye party should appeare himselfe to the fielde, it is then to be admitted, vpon defraying the others charge and paines, and vpon the iustification to him of his law­full excuse, offering himselfe also at conuenient time to procure a new field, and to satisfie any losse which the contrarye party should suffer by meanes of pro­longing of time.

But if this let should fall out so suddenly, as in no sorte there could any knowledge be giuen of it, be­fore the very day appointed, yet is the excuse to bee approued, so as the impediment be lawfull, and then is hee likewise to defraie the charges of him that ap­peared: for if I make agreement with thee, to meete thee on such a daye at such a place, and for such a cause, and I be there present and thou bee hindered, whereby I am put to a new charge, there is no reason that thy commoditie should returne a discommode­tie and a losse to me. But excuses of lawfull impede­ment, should be great infirmities, tempestes, or waters that maye stoppe passage, the warre of a mans coun­trie, or Prince, or against infidels, and such like acci­dents, which any indifferent iudge may think lawful. Imprisonment also is a lawful excuse, vnles it be such as a man at all times may be freed of: for Gentlemen that are to goe into the field, ought by all meanes to auoyde euery occasion, that may hinder them from their intent, for whosoeuer in matters of honour dooth not seeke all that hee can to salue his ho­nour, or hath other respect at all than to his honour, [Page]maketh a great breach of his honour: and therefore whosoeuer should procure himselfe to bee com­maunded to staye by his Prince, is to bee adiudged as one that procureth his owne imprisonement.

Againe, I doe not allow it as a lawfull meanes to prolong time, if after a quarrell be once concluded, a man should take vpon him any newe charge of of­fice, for I would thinke this sought after to that end, and is not to be approued good, because that being bound in honor, hee is first to satisfie that, before hee goe about new matters.

And yet I graunt, that if in this meane time (be it by succession or good fortune) any lordship or great title should befall a man, by meanes whereof, his ad­uersarie that before was his equall, is now become farre his inferiour: in such case this accident is to be taken for a newe and iust impediment, not so much to winne time, as to fight in his owne person: for in this case the quarrell begunne, should bee perfour­med by a substitute or Champion, as wee tearme him.

In how many cases a man may ouercome in the Lists.

THe successe of fighting in the Listes may hap­pen diuerslie, for som­time it may be that the Combat enduring to the Sun set, the Chal­lenger may neither o­uercome the Defen­dant, nor yet bee ouer­come by him, in which case the Defendant is to bee adiudged the vanquish­er, and to be absolued of the blame obiected him by his aduersarie, and the Challenger shall bee accoun­ted the vanquished, and an ill Combatter, and maye be refused if afterward hee challenge anie man vpon anie other quarrell, but yet hee shall not bee the De­fendants prisoner, vnlesse hee shall ouercome him. And in this one case onely the Defendant fighting and not ouercome, doth ouercome the other Other cases are common both to the Challenger & Defen­dant, whereof one is in killing his aduersarie, another is, when a man yeeldeth, bee it in whatsoeuer kinde of wordes. A third is, when a man dooth expresselye disclaime from the quarrell, confessing himselfe ey­ther trulie accused, or to haue falselye accused: and [Page]last of all is the running out of the Listes. Of which sortes of loosing the fielde, euerye one is by so much the more shamefull, by howe much the mose I haue placed and set him downe in his lowest place or roome: and to bee slaine in the fielde, as it is lesse shamefull, so it is farre more daungerous and hurt­full.

It may also happen, that a man by strength maye ouercome his aduersarie or his enemie, and binde him, or in such sorte holde him in his owne power, as euerye one that seeth maye iudge, that if he will he may kill him, and thereby end the fielde: for holding him in such sorte, and requiring him to yeeld, and the other not agreeing, it is certain he may lawfully kill him: but if hee shoulde not kill him, and thereby the daie bee spent, it may bee doubted wha [...] iudgement should in this case bee giuen. But if the Defendant bee the better, there is no question to bee made, but hee is to bee pronounced vanquisher, although there coulde not bee so full a iudgement giuen of his ouercomming, as we haue spoken of be­fore. And if the Challenger shoulde bee hee that shoulde chaunce to haue the Defendant in his pow­er, the matter coulde hot so easily bee determined of. But in this case theyr Articles are chiefely to bee considered, which maye bee drawen in such man­ner, as without anie adoo at all the matter maye bee resolued. For if in them it bee expressed and sette downe, that the Challenger is not to bee helde van­quisher, vnlesse hee either kill, or make the Defen­dant denie his accusation, in this case hee cannot [Page]bee accounted vanquisher: but if it bee concluded, that the Defendant bee not accounted vanquished except hee bee slaine or denie his wordes, I woulde not then condemne him as vanquished: and yet I woulde saie that the Challenger had well dischar­ged his parte, beeing in his power to haue killed his enemie. And if the Defendant woulde renue this quarrell on anie other daie, I doo not thinke it in anie wise lawfull that it shoulde bee graunted him. And if in case there shoulde not bee anie wordes in their Articles touching this pointe, the one holding the other in his power, (as I haue sayde before) mee thinketh hee is lesse to bee adiudged and ta­ken to bee his prisoner than if hee had yeelded himselfe vnto him, and so voluntarilie to haue be­come his prisoner, but that hee shoulde bee sen­tenced to bee vanquished and ouercome, and the vanquisher were deuoutly and reuerently to bee e­steemed and honoured, as one that onely satisfieng and contenting himselfe wyth the victorie [...], dyd not seeke or desire cruelly to imbrue his handes in his enemies bloud.

Touching accidents that happen to the victorie of the Lists.

HEE that is ouercome in the Listes, is therevpon the others prisoner, and hee is to haue both his armor, gar­mentes, horse, and other furniture whatsoeuer, which hee brought with him into the Listes, as orna­ments for his fighting: and this is the right case in this matter, for the spoiles of the vanquished are the van­quishers Ensignes.

The person of the vanquished by an honourable custome hath ben giuen by the vanquisher either to the Lorde of the field, or to some other prince or no­ble man whome he serued or followed. Which cu­stome albeit I commend, and wish euerie one to fol­low it, yet I must confesse that the vauquisher maye if hee list, vse his owne discretion, and hold has priso­ner, which no man canne denie him, because hee is to serue him, but not in base offices, nor in anie other but such as belong to a gentleman: and the prisoners taken in the Lists may bee constrained to discharge the expences of the Combat, and they maye be ran­somed for money, euen as Gendemen taken in the warres.

The diuersitie of olde and new cu­stomes concerning the vanquished.

I Must not omit to tell you, that that which I haue before spoken of pri­soners, hath rather ben brought in by custome of Gentlemen since they began to enter quarrels vpon their honor, than by anie auncient institution of Duello. For by the lawe of the Lom­bards, he that was ouercome in fight, was hot geuen as prisoner, nor yet pronounced infamous for euer performing any after-quarrel, but diuersly sentenced for that fault whereof hee was accused. For, as it ap­peareth plainelye in writing, whosoeuer accused for manslaughter was ouercome, lost one of his handes: and whosoeuer was condemned of adultery, was ad­iudged to die. And touching the witnesses, who for consummation of their wordes did combat, the van­quished lost his hand, and his other companions dyd redeem their liues by mony: so seuerely did they ex­ecute the iudgement of their Duello. And our lear­ned men alleadge, that because this proofe is vncer­taine, albeit a man shoulde in the Listes bee founde in fault worthie to receiue punishment, yet hee were not to suffer death, but a mitigation ought to bee v­sed, [Page]giuing him some easier punishment. Which as they alleadge truelye and verie commendably, so is that custome of theirs to bee condemned, who in ca­se of Duello cause galowses to be set vp neere to the place, and doo immediatly hang vp the vanquished. But what greater punishment can there be, than that which our lawes do inflict vpon the vanquished, they doo not chasten them in the purse, nor in cutting off anie member, nor in theyr lyfe, but in that which to euerie wise man is more deare than all the rest, for they depriue him of his honour, for loue whereof there is no noble mind that will not spend his bloud. Those that issue vanquished out of the Lists, carrie a­waie so much the more shame, by howe much they came thether desirous of honour, and that not be­cause one man ouercame another, for of necessitie, two fighting together, one must be the victor, & (as I haue sayde before) the Challenger not loosing doth loose, so as hee is not dishonourable for beeing ouer­come, but because he is accounted a badde man that would take vpon him an vniust quarrell, and that hee would fight against the truth, which hee is chiefelye bound to maintaine. And therefore weighing and considering the greate daunger those men incurre that commit these things to the proofe of the sword, Gentlemen ought to bee more slowe in fighting, ex­cept great occasion vrge them, and vnlesse they bee certaine to fight vppon iustice, so as they may haue great hope to obtaine Gods fauour in it.

Touching the vanquished, and of the restoring of Honor.

AS I sayd before, so I will here again say, that the chalenger that doeth not ouercome his aduersarie in the Lists, doeth remaine the looser, not ha­uing proued so much as hee ought, and that hee may ne­uer after challenge anie: which is confirmed with this reason, that whosoe­uer prooueth not his woordes true, is to bee thought a false accuser, and consequently is regarded and e­steemed a badde man. And the lyke is also of euerie other man whether hee bee Challenger or Defen­dant, that is ouercome by force, or made to yeelde, or denie his wordes, or runne awaie, for hee can ne­uer after that time demaunde Combat nor bee al­lowed it.

But I knowe some that are of opinion, that if I ouercome one in the Listes, and afterwardes release him, if a newe quarrell or controuersie befall him wyth another, by my leaue hee maye challenge his aduersarie the Combate, whereto no man of anye reason or vnderstanding ought to consent. For if I ouercomming him shall haue condemned him [Page]as infamous, how can I allowe him fit to fight with a man as good as my selfe? And if hee challenge me, I shall refuse him. I cannot take awaie his fault that hath beene ouercome by mee, vnlesse that I confesse I ouercame him wrongfully, and so condemne my selfe of infamie: and if I cannot take awaie his blotte from him, I cannot make him equal with an honora­ble person: and therefore this opinion is wholye to be reproued of euerie Gentleman.

And as this restoring of a man to his honour, is by occasion giuen mee to speake of, it bringeth mee in remembraunce of the restoring which Princes were wont to make of treasons and rebellions doone against them, and such lyke faults. Wherein, to speak my opinion, I thinke well that albeit the Prince may after my treason committed, graunt mee fauour and pardon of my lyfe and goods, and giue mee ho­nour, and a thousande other fauours, yet shee can­not make, that that which is doone shoulde bee vn­doone, or that the ill fact past bee not an ill fact, or that I committed not anie treason, or that my soule is not defiled, and that I am not anie notorious vi­laine. And that Prince whatsouer that shall restore mee, ought neuer to trust mee, but shoulde rather still presume, that whereas I was once inueigled and drawen to betraye my maister, I will easilye be perswaded againe to the like: and euery honou­rable person should conceiue ill of me, and auoyde my company. And it ought rather to be saide, that I am restored to my goods, and the fauour of my Prince (if happilye she will take me into her fauour) [Page]than to my former honour, because that albeit my Prince restore me to all those degrees that she may, yet she cannot restore me to my firste innocencie: as for example: if I be good, she cannot make me bad, for it is not in her power to reforme my minde. Prin­ces cannot take from good men their goodnes, nor from the wicked their wickednes: for their power extendeth on their goods and person, but not on their mindes: my Prince may make me poor or rich, but not good or bad, for God onely hath power o­uer our affections. I conclude therefore, that if one that is restored from some notable and manifest villa­ny, would challenge another to combat, and that this other refuse him, I would iudge him to haue beha­ued himselfe honorably, and that in reason he might refuse him: for if (as I haue saide before) a Princes re­storing to honor is not lawfull, I will lesse think that a gentleman by licensing one ouercome by him in combate, can make him lawfull to fight with an ho­norable person.

But returning to the restoring which I spake of before vsed by Princes, my opinion is, that it ought to bee good in the children of traitours, and in the rest of their discent, as in those that ought not beare the punishment of others offences, especially seeing that those that are baptised, are by Gods lawes freed from the sinnes of their fathers.

Whether one once ouercome and afterward being vanquisher, may challenge ano­ther.

SOme men doubting whether one once ouercome in the listes, and af­terward challenged to fight, doe o­uercome, be to be saide that he hath recouered his honour, and if after that hee may challenge any man to the field: it hath been thought that by the honour of his second combating, he hath taken away the blotte of the first, but yet for the better conclusion, wee are to think that the first losse cannot be recouered by a­ny new combate.

And vpon this question I haue seene the iudge­ment of Alfonzo d' Auolos Marques of Vasto, which was this. The dutie of gentlemen is to preferre their honor before their life, and he whosoeuer goeth the looser out of the listes, sheweth that hee accounted more of his life than honor, and therefore albeit hee should afterward enter combate and ouercome, yet it is not to be saide that hee hath recouered his ho­nor, because it may be presumed, that hee came the­ther with an intent to trye his fortune if hee could o­uercome, and yet with a minde in all accidentes, to [Page]saue his life, because worse could not befall in honor then had done before, which hee had once lost. And whereas such presumption may be had of him, and that a man maye well thinke that hee came into the fielde with intent to do any thing, rather than dye, he is in no sorte to be saide, to haue reuiued his honour, that was before dead in the dust: but if afterward he would challenge any man, he ought to be refused.

This was the opinion of that gentleman, and this holde I for a gentlemanlike opinion, which euerye wise man ought to allow and follow: and this expo­sition is to be vnderstoode, not onelye of those who confesse themselues the loosers, or run away, but of those also who hauing had the charge of proouing, haue lost, by not satisfying the proofe: because that they being bespotted with blame of false accusers, by meanes of their losse, cannot be forced from fault of false accusation, for that they were afterward falselye accused: nor can they take away from themselues the presumption, to be accounted false accusers, if they should accuse any man, seeing they haue beene once before condemned in the same: so that in what sorte soeuer a man goe out of the lists looser, hee is subiect to the iudgement before giuen.

Againe, after that a man hath beene once ouer­come in the lists, euery honourable person ought to beware not to enter into proofe of weapons with him, as also with all other infamous persons: and the like is also to be obserued▪ albeit being challenged by an other the second time, hee should yet then ouer­come.

After the challenge, for some cau­ses the Combate may bee refused.

IF after an agreement of Combate betwixt two, one of thē should commit some de fault, which shoulde bring him into such infamy, as who soeuer were staind therwith, could not challenge another to the field, in this case he that had committed this fault, might bee refused by his aduersarie, as one that was growen worse in his condicion, and that had changed his nature from that which he was, when their quarrell was first be­gunne betwixt them.

But here is to be vnderstoode, that this new occa­sion for which a man may be refused the field, shuld be infamye, which a man by his owne faulte was fal­len into, as treason, false oath, or other notable mat­ter, and not any iniurie or charge done him by some other, which might require reuenge by weapons: for in such case, as the first which had a quarrell with him, might refuse him, as become worse in his con­dition, [Page]for the second should not refuse to come to combate with him with whom he entered into quar­rell, albeit he had receiued charge from any other. And there is no reason that a man should remaine charged of all handes, without any meanes to dis­charge himselfe. Therfore he is to take vpon him the second quarrell, and perfourming that with honour, he may and ought to follow the first.

But this is to benoted, that the refusal of a man for beeing become worse in condition, appertaineth to the Defendant, and not to the Challenger: for they that are charged ought to seeke to discharge them­selues, and not suffer that another man doe in any sorte take from them such occasion: and to be able to do this the better, let them follow this rule of reason, that whosoeuer is first in time, is also to be preferred in way of reason. And because that many times one contrary is to be gouerned by an other, I will also af­firme, that if a quarrell depending betwixt two, or the challenge being seene, and the letters of the field succeeding, if the on of them shuld come to such de­gree of estate & signorie, that the other were now no longer his equal, then might he refuse to be brought to the profe by weapons in his own person amongst the other: but yet hee is to perfourme that by his Champion, for the inequality of condition, is no oc­casion to break of the definition of the quarrell.

Of the inequalitie of noble men, and cheefely of commaun­ding Lords.

FOrasmuch as this subiect of challen­ging and defending, and of refusing and not refusing the fielde, is very large, and hath need of much con­sideration, I doe not see how a man may truly and fully determine of it, without speaking of the degrees of nobilitie, wherin I will not call in question what true nobilitie is, be­cause I holde it vndoubtedly to be vertue, and that he is truly noble that is vertuous, be he borne either of great or meane parentage, and that whosoeuer hath not this nobilitie of vertue, of whatsoeuer stock hee proceede, by how much hee descendeth from a more noble kinred, by so much will I account him the more base, not being able to maintaine and keep the honor left vnto him by his ancestours: for nobi­litie is seated in the mind, and by the mind it is shew­en. But (as I saide before) I intende not to dispute hereof, for hauing alreadie before shewen, that such as are defiled with infamie, maye bee refused from proofe by weapons: it is alwaies to be vnderstoode, that nobility is not without vertue, and my discourse is to be in this subiect, that I speake now of Duello, [Page]what the degrees of nobilitie are that maye exercise weapons, by which knights come to be equall or vn­equall: for albeit that vnder the title of Knightes, Kinges and Emperours, Gentlemen and Souldiers, be comprehended, yet there is such an euident ine­qualitie betwixt them, as euery man knoweth that a Gentleman cannot compare with a King, nor a soul­dier with an Emperour: and albeit this matter hath been diuerslie handled by manye, yet I purpose to speake now thereof after a mew and particular man­ner, according to the custome of degrees and wor­ship of our present time. First then I alleadge, that there are many waies, whereby we may consider the diuersitie of degrees: for concerning the place of dignitie, I will firste place those Princes that are not subiect to any other, which I will call soueraigne Princes: next to them feodatory Kings, and them I will call most excellent: thirdly, men right honou­rable, and after them such as are titled noble men, vn­der which title I will comprehend all the degrees of worship. These then we are vndoubtedly to account superiours to priuate Knights, and therefore as they are superiours to them, so are they twixt themselues vnequall: for both noble men are to giue place to the right honourable, and the right honourable to the most excellent, and the most excellent to the free and absolute Princes. Besides that, betwixt them of one and the same title, there may also be great inequali­tye, forasmuch as there is a great difference, for one right honorable or noble, to depend on a free Prince or a Prince feodatorie.

And the like consideration is to bee had of feoda­tory nobility, forasmuch as one man may assume vn­to himselfe the absolute power of a Prince, and ano­ther man can haue no greater authoritie, than as an ordinary iudge.

Besides, it is not the least regarde that wee are to haue, to their other qualities and mightines of signo­rie, as, if they haue vassales noblemen, or no: if they hold Citties, and multitudes of subiects, and great port, for all these thinges are to be respected, whether they be free Princes or feodatorye: whether they be moste excellent, or right honourable, or noblemen: whether they haue this honour of free Princes or of feodatory Princes: if they haue noble and honorable men feodatories, and if they possesse noble and great state: and if wee finde them not in some of these di­stinctions to be much different, wee are rather in the controuersie of armes, to esteeme them equall, then to admit one of them, to refuse the other. And be­cause there can be no greater difference, than one to be free, and the other subiect: and for that soueraign Princes are onely truely free, and all the rest in some sorte subiect, we must conclude, that as a soueraigne cannot be challenged the fielde by any man of ano­prince ther degree, likewise, those which wee haue tearmed moste excellent, are not to refuse combate with those that are tearmed right honorable: if they be equall in feodatory nobility, and not vnequall in other qualities.

The like is also to be held betwixt right honoura­ble and noblemen, so as their condition, as the great­nes [Page]and nobilitie of state, be not too much different: for I see no cause to except against any man in con­trouersie of chiualrie, not to be his equall, because one onely degree is different betwixt them. And as I affirme that one degree onely maketh no inequality, so I doe not allowe that one vnder the title of most excellent, may be challenged by one right honoura­ble, of like feodatorye nobility, but that concerning his degree, he is so farre inferiour vnto him: that in a­nother case he would not disdaine to receiue penci­on and pay of him. Neither yet will I saye, that one right honourable should fight with a noble man, al­though his estate be most noble: nor that one right honourable of great state, may be challenged by one noble, of small iurisdiction: albeit their feodatorye nobilitie be equall.

But I will say, that a noble man feadatory to a so­ueraigne Prince, albeit he be of lesse degree, may not­withstanding challenge one right honourable, that is feodatorie to one feodatorie, and hath greater signo­ries, for his feodatorie nobilitie doth satisfie the other inequalities.

And therfore I conclude in this point, that the in­equalitie of persons, is to bee considered from their titles, from their feodatory nobilitie, and from their states, and according as they are found to haue grea­ter or lesse partes equall, so are they to bee iudged e­quall or vnequall.

Heereunto I will adde one other thing, which is this, that albeit their other qualities were either equal or not much different, yet the quarrell might make [Page]great inequality: as if a prince albeit soueraign, would fight with an Emperour, for some thing that belon­geth to the Empire, in such case he might lawfully be denied, forasmuch as the Emperour by the condition of the quarrel, is true iudge therof, and consequently also without comparison of any superiour.

Of the inequalitie of priuate Noble men.

GEntlemen that are nobly borne, are either without any degree, or else beare office or dignitie, as gouern­ment of cities, embassages, or com­maundement in the warre: and tou­ching those that haue authority, ei­ther their office is for tearme, or for life: if for tearme, then vpon any quarrell to bee decided by armes, it may stay the execution of their office: if for life, and that his degree is such as maketh him superiour to the other, he may fight by his Champion. But if his office be not of such qualitie, he that hath the charge of it, is to endeuour the good fauour of his Lord, to graunt him without loosing his office, to satisfie his honor: and if he cannot obtaine it, hee is to abandon all things, and to resorte thither whether hee is chal­lenged, or whether his honour vrgeth him to chal­lenge another: for as a man is not bound to any thing more strictly than to his honor, so is the lesser to giue [Page]place to the greater.

Now in that a man is borne noble, he is equall to all Knights, that are of priuate condition: and albe­it that one man were borne of a noble house, or right honourable, being without iurisdiction, or successi­on of signorie, hee maye be challenged the fielde by any priuate Knight.

Moreouer, forasmuch as the art of warre is a no­ble exercise, and because manye meane men haue greatly aduaunced their houses by it, he that shal [...]x­ercise the arte of weapon, if he be without infamie, or doe exercise it without abuse, is to bee reckoned and accounted amongst noble men and Knights.

But I would not that any man should vpon this thinke himselfe made honourable, for hauing beene once in the warre, and for hauing taken pay, and ser­ued two or three moneths without euer drawing swoorde, or seeing enemy, or hearing sound of trum­pet, for this were as much as to dreame vpon the hyll Parnassus that he is a Poet, & the morning not finde himselfe so. It is expedient for any man that of vnno­ble would become noble, to get this nobilitie by armes, and it is meet for him that would be accoun­ted amongst Knights, to doe the act of a Knight: and it is required of a man to make honourable proofe of his person more than once, and to continue long in the warres, and to be knowne for a good Souldi­er, and to liue as well in time of warre as of peace honestlye, and in such sorte that it may be perceiued he intendeth onelye to bee a Souldier, and to make that his principall butte and drift.

And if in the studie of letters a man doe not attaine vnto any degree of honour or nobilitie, but with paines and watchinges of many yeeres, let him then thinke likewise that hopeth to innoble himselfe by armes, to sweate often, to endure manye heates of Summer, and cold of winter, to watch many nights, and to sleepe manye times in his armour vpon the hard ground, and to spend his blood, and by many hazardes of life, to manifest his prowes to the world: and when he shall haue perfourmed all these thinges, then he may thinke himselfe truelye noble (for those are noble that deserue to be known for their deeds) and that he cannot be refused for want of nobilitye. Now amongst Souldiers, a Souldier may fight with all sortes of men, as the heads of the squadrons, ser­iants, and others vnder the degree of their Captain, for his authoritie representeth signorie, and they maye also challenge them, and they are to answere them, being about any enterprise, and hauing degree by a Champion, but being returned to their priuate condition, I see no cause why they should not an­swere in person. And one Captaine maye challenge combate of another, except they be in place so vne­quall, as one may commaund the other.

And this is to be saide of all sortes of Souldiers, as well foote as horse, adding moreouer, that man of armes hauing beene in honorable and continuall exercise of warre, and liuing in all pointes as besee­meth a man of armes, challenging a particular Cap­taine of foote, is not to be refused, nor may he refuse any souldier seruing on foote.

And I am of opinion, that a Captaine of foote might challenge a Captaine of horse, but onelye that for the most parte those places are bestowed on no­ble personages, and the conducting of men of armes is also bestowed on right honourable men: and ther­fore in this case all conditions are to be considered, and the qualitie of the enterprises that they haue, for a Captaine of foot may haue so honorable a degree, or be of so honorable familye, that there could be no cause to refuse him.

And this which I haue spoken touching captains of foote, of horse, and of men of armes, of also to bee vnderstood of footmen twixt themselues, and horse­men also, be they either men of armes, or light horse. For besides their degrees of greatnes in warre, their degrees of nobilitie which wee haue spoken to be­fore in our treatise of noble men (if any they haue) are to be considered, and according to their greater or lesse inequalitye, they are equall or vnequall: which rule beeing generall giuen, may by men of vnderstanding easilye bee applyed vnto particular cases.

With what persons a Knight ought to enter Combate, and with what he ought not.

WE haue long waded through this spaci­ous discourse of chiualrie, seeking to set downe who ought to be denyed Com­bate, which matter is so large and copi­ous, as if a man would particularlye to euery mite discourse thereof, it would containe a greater volume then I intend to make, in the whole subiect of Duello, but it sufficeth me to haue pointed at the fountaine where water may bee fetcht: and to conclude with my opinion touching the dutie of a Knight, I haue in the beginning of this chapter tou­ched two principall heads: that is, who they are that ought to be cleane thrust from combate, and who are onelye to be refused, for in those two almost all con­trouersie of persons that enter or not enter Duello, are as it were conteined, forasmuch as the wicked and infamus persons ought to be refelled by knights: and they may be refused who for condition are vne­quall, and if a man would aske why we haue not said that in these two heads all are contained, but almost all, it is for that which we haue before spoken, of lear­ned men, and cleargye men, who are farre from the [Page]lists, not as refelled, nor as refused, but as priuiledgd, and as such to the qualitie and estimation of whose condition it is not meete, neither to challenge nor be challenged to proofe by armes, because their studie and exercise is far from the valour of the minde.

And to returne to our heads before propounded, I say, that to refel the infamous and wicked, is the du­tie and band of chiualrye, for a knight is bound to do so that he doe not bring in to the exercise of armes persons vnworthye to appeare amongst honourable persons, whereof by their own fault they haue made themselues vnworthye. Nor is there any credite to be giuen them in the proofe of armes, who are not receiued in ciuile testimonie: neither are dishonou­rable persons to enter into battailes, that are vnder­taken for honour sake.

And if any Knight should make a quarrell with any person vncapable of Duello, the Lords (as I haue said before) as well in right of chiualrie, as not for to suffer the field to be dishonored, ought not to graunt the combate.

The refusall is not of band of chiualrie, but of will of Knights, because that if a man will not enter com­bate with one of lesse condition then himselfe, hee may lawfully doe it, appointing a meane champion to decide the quarrel. But if a man would not respect degree, but would in person fight with one who for his condition or other defect were not his equall, he could not be said to do wrong to chiualry, but rather to honour it: forasmuch as chiualrie is not the ac­count of condition, but of valour.

And in the disputations of artes and more nob [...]e sciences, no mans linnage is respected but his worth, and therefore a man of base or high degree may bee valorous, and the honour of the listes, is not so much for ouercomming one borne of noble familie, as one that is knowne for a valiant man.

Againe, as great men account it no shame to bee called Knights with meaner men, so they ought not be ashamed to come together, to doe the oath of chi­ualrie: and if a man borne of a great familie, haue no respect to iniury another, I know not why by reason of his noblenes in blood, he may refuse to defend the same, and to maintaine it against him whom he iniu­red: and in case that combat were to follow vpon it, my iudgement is, that the iniurer or offender, how­soeuer we terme him, is to answere the other in per­son. And therefore as I thinke it a discommendable thing for an honorable person, to agree to make him­selfe equall to a person that for his vices were odious, albeit he descended of a noble race: so I repute it a knightly course, not to bee too curious in the diffe­rences of conditions, especially when they are not so diuers as may seeme, that the frog striues to be equall with the Oxe, (according to the tale.)

Again, I will adde another case, that as I wil com­mend him that should not so much respect the con­dition as the valour of him with whom he had quar­rell, so I would blame him, that being of a base estate would compare himselfe with euery great man, and would not acknowledge nor content himselfe with his owne condition.

And this I speak, not onely of those that are borne me [...]nely, but of those also that being borne of noble blood, are yet of a priuate condition, and in question of honour, would be equall with right honourable personages: for if they esteeme so much of them­selues for hauing blood, and being in their families of great Lords, they are to consider, that those Lords haue innobled those houses and that they haue re­ceiued their nobilitie from Lords, and if they haue receiued it from them, they are by so much lesse then they, by how much hee is greater that giueth ano­ther man nobilitie, than he that receiueth it.

Touching the appointing of Champions.

WE haue shewen great inequalitie of no­ble men, wherby the lesse cannot binde the greater to answere him in person▪ but because no mans greatnes can make it lawfull for him vniustlye to oppresse the lesser, without leauing him sufficient meanes to reuenge himself, and no man ought to make the sha­dowe of his nobilitie a pretence to be able secretlye to commit defectes, without yeelding reason for them. It is very necessarye, that as in them there is re­spect for the degree of nobilitie, so also it should bee of honour and iustice, to prouide a meet remedy for euerye priuate person, and that the lawe of chiualry [Page]should be inuiolably kept as well of great as of small. And therefore all such as by reason of some excel­lent degree of nobilitie, shall be found not bound to come in person into the lists with another, are also to know, that in question of armes which they shal hap­pen to haue with persons albeit priuate, that they shall be bound to appoint a Champion, who beeing lawfully ouercome or yeelding, he is likewise to be saide ouercome, that apointed him for his Cham­pion.

And in this pointe I will deliuer the opinion of Doctors, that in case where combate is to be doone by a Champion, such as doe present him, ought also to be present themselues, and bee helde vnder safe­garde, to the end that a mockery be not made of Du­ello, and that if their Champion loose the field, they doe not escape the iudgement.

The like also is to bee doone, when the quarrell is such, as the looser should be condemned in corporall punishment: but where other punishment is not re­quisite, then to be the vanquishers prisoner, it may sufficientlye suffice, that securitye bee giuen of the charges, and conuenient raunsome.

The lawes of giuing a Champion, are these: such ought to bee giuen as are not infamous, and are e­quall to them against whome they are to fight, and when one party should intend to appointe a Cham­pion, the other may likewise appoint one: But it is meete that he that will take benefite heereof, should vse such course in his writing, that hee loose not his prerogatiue or iurisdiction as we will terme it; for if [Page]a man by his writing should say that hee will defend the quarrell in his own person, and afterward would appoint a Champion, the contrary parte might with reason refuse it.

Againe, it is to be vnderstoode, that the Champi­ons on either side are to sweare, that they thinke to fight in a iust quarrell, and that they will doe their vt­most, as if themselues were interessed in the quarrell: and whatsoeuer Champion shall willinglye suffer himselfe to be ouercome, is to haue one of his hands cut off, and the aduersarye hath not ouercome, but the combate may be renued: and after that a Cham­pion hath been ouercome, he may not after that fight for any other, but for himselfe he may.

But I will not heere omit, that albeit that nobilitie doth priuiledge the greaters to appoint Champions, such yet may the cases be, that not onely a great man with an inferiour, but a maister with his seruant, and a Prince with his subiect is bound to fight in person: for seeing that promise is a band which equally bin­deth the Prince and subiect, so no greater or lesse band hath the one than the other: and whensoeuer one man shall oppose vnto another, any defect of promise and faith, he cannot vse his Champion, but the accuser is to trye the quarrell in person with the accused. And therfore when a Lord shall accuse his subiect or his seruant, of whatsoeuer condition hee be of violating his faith, or of women, or of treason a­gainst the state, he is to proue it in his proper person: and the like is also to bee obserued, when the subiect or seruant shall accuse his Lord.

But manye Lords haue no care nor consider not the oath and obligation of faith which they haue to­ward their subiects, but rechles of their faith, doe in­cessantly euery day commit newe defectes, and per­haps they think that their greatnes doth couer their defects, and do not perceiue, that by how much they are exalted aboue other men, by so much their faults appeare the greater: for wheareas they both by their example and lawes ought to instructs others in their life, they opposing themselues against lawes, do giue other men example of wicked liuing: and therefore seeing that the defect of faith is a defect so great in Lords, it is great reason that they should haue no pri­uiledge in quarrell of faith: and if it bee not to be graunted to Lords, much lesse is it to be graunted to persons of other qualitie or condition.

And further it is to be vnderstoode, that besides the inequalitie of nobilitie, there are also such man­ner of cases, that in respect of persons it is lawfull to appointe Champions, as if a man shall not bee of eighteene yeeres, or if he be decrepite, or sicke, or in such forte hindered in his bodye, as hee is not fitte to fight.