CHAP. I.

AS there is nothing in nature so plain which may not be contradi­cted, neyther any thing so pure which may not be defiled, so nothing so euident in Gods Worde, which hath not beene opposed. Such is our nature after our fall, and such our daily most lamentable lapses, af­ter our first lapse, and originall Fall. Insomuch, that ignoring the cause of [Page 2] our infinite misery, we become despe­rately sicke, and of our selues and na­ture, without remedy. Wherfore my intent beeing chiefly to shew vs our end, and eternall felicity, I will first shew the place, and demonstrate the grace from which we fell; that there­by knowing the infelicity of our fall, and place from which we fel, we may be more thankfull vnto God for that felicity, place, and grace, vnto which we are exalted after our fall; and so come to a more perfect blessednes af­ter our fall, then that which wee pos­sessed before we fell, or should haue possessed in Paradise if wee had not falne. Now therefore as touching this place of our first happinesse, and from whence our misery was first de­riued, I will begin with a worthy Pre­late, who though hee was one of the chiefest Doctors of the Church of God, yet being to explicate these ve­ry difficulties of Paradise, Ambrosius de Parady­so, in prin­cipio capitis primi. was not a­shamed to acknowledge his igno­rance. De Paradiso adoriendus sermo, non mediocrem nobis oestum videtur in­cutere, [Page 3] quid nam sit Paradysus, et vbi sit, qualisue sit inuestigare & explanare cu­pientibus: maxime Apostolus siue in corpore, siue extra corpus nesciat, raptū se tamen dicat vs (que) ad tertiū coelū; 2 Cor. 12. idem­que testetur se ibi audiuisse arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Being to speake (saith this Father) of Paradise, it doth not a litle trouble me to search out and explane what Paradise is; where it is; & what manner of place it is; especially seeing the Apostle saith, that he was rapt thither into the third heauen, where hee heard such things as bee not lawfull for any mor­tall man to vtter.

By which words he signifieth two things; the first, that, that place was Paradise, vnto which S. Paul was car­ried (the which opinion in what sense it may bee verified, it shall afterward be explicated) the second thing there to be noted is, that it is impossible for man to declare, what kinde of place that was, vnto which the Apostle was carried, vnlesse peraduenture it might haue been by him, who had that spe­ciall [Page 4] priuiledge, to be carried thither.

Hence peraduenture it is that Ori­genes, Philo, the Hermetians and Seleu­cians were of opinion, that there was neuer any such place as Paradise, but rather that the scripture where it ma­keth mention of Paradise, is to be vn­derstood Metaphorically, Spiritually, or Allegorically.

First, because in other places of Scripture, where there is mention of Paradise, that word cannot be vnder­stood of any terrene place: therefore if one place of Scripture must bee the interpreter of the other, according to the common consent of the Fathers, it may not seem improbable, but that the like may be admitted in this histo­ry of Paradise.

Secondly, because those things which are said to haue beene in Para­dise, cannot be vnderstood literally: as that in the midst of Paradise there was a tree of knowledge of good and euill (a property not due vnto nature, much lesse agreeable or consequent to the nature of a tree). Secondly, that [Page 5] Adam heard the voyce of GOD, where as spirits of their owne nature haue no voyce, or sound, much lesse the purest of spirits. Thirdly, that hee heard God walking towards the South, whereas indeed God neither walketh, nor moueth, but is alwaies replenishing, working, and filling e­uery place, yea in euery place equally present, in essence equall, in power e­quall, in all his other infinit attributes equall.

Againe, how can it be vnderstood literally, that after the transgression, and expulsion of Adam out of Para­dise, there was placed a Cherub or Angell with a fiery sword, as necessa­ry for the custody of the said place: as though eyther the commaundement of God had not beene sufficient, or his will resistible without the assi­stance of the Angelicall power; or the Angell not sufficiently powerfull for the restraining of Adam, without the vse of a fiery sword; as though againe God in power were not omnipotent, neyther the Angell spirituall, but ei­ther [Page 6] that the creator had neede of his creature, or that which is a pure spirit had need in his operation of an im­pure, imperfect and corruptible bodie.

Moses Bar­sephas tra­ctatu de Paradyso. Moses Barsephas in his Treatise of Paradise saith, that there be two parts of Paradise, one corporall, another spi­rituall, one created for the pleasure of the body, another for to delight the soule: so that, as man is composed of two parts, the one spirituall, the other corporall, and yet but one onely man: so (saith hee) was Paradise partly cor­porall, and partly spirituall, yet one onely Paradise: his arguments bee these.

If Paradise were onely corporall (saith hee) then the body onely of A­dam was delighted there: because no corporall thing can delight the soule: wherefore if God had not created a­nother part of Paradise spirituall, hee might seem to haue dealt fraudulent­ly with man (which were blasphea­mous) who promised a Paradise for the whole man; and yet created such [Page 7] a one as could not delight the whole man.

Againe, that Paradise is not onely spirituall, he proueth with these argu­ments: For then it could not haue de­lighted the body, but onely the spirit. Yea all those things which Moses wri­teth as touching Paradise, might bee deemed false; seeing that hee so eui­dently insinuateth, that man was created in Paradise, as in some mate­riall place; and that God had planted Paradise in Eden from the beginning: that he put man there whom hee had created, that he created for him there all trees, hearbs, beasts, and all other things necessary, both for the delight and vse of man: That our first Fathers fell from Gods grace, by eating of the forbidden fruite; that they hid them­selues amongst the trees of Paradise, after their fall; and many other things which cannot be vnderstood, but of a reall and corporall place.

Thirdly, if Paradise were not a reall and corporall place, how could there flow out of it those foure riuers, which [Page 8] (as the Scripture witnesseth) com­passe the whole earth? How should Enoch and Elias be translated thither, and (as many writers affirme) be con­serued there both in body and soule? yea otherwise how should Adam and Eue haue liued there?

Which things, though all of them bee not so certaine, yet most of them are so euidently expressed in the scrip­ture, that they manifestly prooue the Garden of Paradise to haue beene a reall and corporall place, Chrysostom. hom. 13. in genesi [...]. August. in gen. l. 8. c. 1. & sequenti bus. & lib. 13. de ciuit. dei c. 21. & q. 27. in gen. Basil. hom. exameron. hom. 11. Hi­er epist. ad Pamachiū. Epiphanius. Damascen. Isiderus. Nicenus Cyrillus. Naz. and therfore S. Chrysostome in his 13. Homily vpon Genesis saith, Ideo Mosen descipsisse Pa­radisum, That Moses did therefore so manifestly describe Paradise, the riuers, the trees, the fruites, And all other things thereto appertaining, that the simple and ignorant should not be deceiued, by the fabulous Allegories, and doting dreames, which some would pretend to diuulge for sole truth, hidden in the figuratiue and materiall description of Paradise.

The like also may be seene in Saint Augustine in his eight booke vpon Ge­nesis cap. 1. & seq. and the 13. booke [Page 9] de ciuitate dei, cap. 21. & questione vige­sima septima in Gen. Basil. Hom. 11. vpon the Exameron. Likewise Hierome in his Epistle to Pamachius; Epiphanius epist. ad Iohannem Hieros. Damascenus in his fourth booke, de Orthodoxa fide, cap. 13. Isodorus libro quarto Etymologi­arum cap. 3. Gregorius Nicenus oratione quinta in orationem dominicam. Cyrill, Naz. Ephren, and others.

Lastly, S. Augustine in his 27. Aug. quaest. 27. in Gen. que­stion vpon Genesis giueth this reason as an euident demonstration, that Pa­radise was a true corporall place; be­cause the land of the Sodomites, and Gomorrhae ans before the destruction thereof, was compared in the thir­teenth chapter of Genesis, Genes. c. 13. to this plea­sant place of Paradise, in these words: Before the Lord destroyed Sodome, and Gomorrah, it was as the garden of the Lord, like the Land of Aegypt, as thou go­est vnto Zoar, Wherefore saith Saint Augustine in the place aboue allead­ged) if by the fruitfull trees described in Paradise, there were nothing else to bee vnderstood but onely the vertues of the [Page 10] minde, as some do hold, and if there were no true corporal Paradise, beautified with all kinde of trees, it would not haue beene said of that place, that it was as the Para­dise of God. Conticescant igitur (as Saint Hierome commenteth vpon Daniel, Hieronimus in Danie­lem cap. 10 cap. 10.) eorum deliramenta qui vmbras & imagines in veritate sequentes ipsam co­nantur euertere veritatem: vt Parady­sum & flumina & arbores putent Alle­goriae legibus se debere subruere. Because the aforesaid Allegories rather seeme deliramenta, dottages and dreames (as this Father tearmeth them) then ex­positions of learned Doctors, let them therefore in no wise be mentioned or vttered: not that there may not bee good vse of these and other the like Allegoricall expositions, but that they are not so to be vsed, that they be a meanes to ouerthrow the truth, or that they be taken for the sole trueth, which were no small iniury vnto the word of God, which oftentimes ad­mitteth as well the true historicall, as the litterall sense, together with the spirituall interpretation, if it be right­ly applied.

CHAP. II.

THIS may seeme as strange a ti­tle to some, as how to measure the latitude of the heauens, the depth of the Sea, or how to number the in­numerable starres of the firmament, yea much more; seeing that of these we haue some sight, some experience, some naturall ground; but of this of Paradise, we haue no view, no expe­rience, nor any naturall foundation sufficient to build such mighty ma­chinas of conceipts, as some doe more boldly, then soundly conceiue of Pa­radise.

But yet to this I answere; that as we ought, (according to prudence, and wisedome) to giue credit vnto such as are expert in any faculty, as long as we haue no sufficient ground to contra­dict: So much more vnto the Fathers and other learned Diuines, in points [Page 12] appertaining vnto Diuinity: and in particular of these of Patadise, which though they be not altogether so eui­dent in the Scripture; yet at least way, they are either euidently deduced, or prabably inferred out of the sacred text; such as Isidors description of Pa­radice is, who in the fourteenth book of his Aetimologies describeth it thus.

Isidorus lib. 14. aetimolo­giarum. The descrip­tion of Pa­radise. Paradyse is a place situated in the Ori­entall parts of the world, whose aetimology (the word beeing translated out of Greeke into Latin,) signifieth hortum a Garden. In Hebrew it is called Heden, which inter­preted in Latin is the same that deliciae, de­lights: wherefore both names being ioyned together, they signifie a Garden of all man­ner of delights, and pleasures, a place beset with all kinde of fruitfull, and beautifull trees: where there is neyther cold, nor heat, but a perpetuall temper of aire; fur­thermore out of this so pleasant a place there floweth in great aboundance, a faire fountaine, which watereth the whole Gar­den and trees thereof, which afterward is diuided into foure huge and great riuers, but the entrance of this place is alwayes [Page 13] shut vp, for the sinne of our first Fathers: yea it is alwaies enuironed and guarded on euery side with a fiery sword; so that the very flames doe alwaies almost touch euen the heauens themselues. In this place finally, are placed the Cherubins, to wit, a most vigilant custody, or centinell of An­gels, for the terror and expulsion of euill spirits. Insomuch that neyther man nor e­uill spirit may haue accesse thither, man being kept away by the fiery flame, the euil spirits by the watch of the Cherubins: thus farre Isodorus.

Which is the same in effect, which Alchinus expresseth in these few verses lib. 1. carminum de initio mundi. cap. 9. Alchinius his descrip­tiō of Para­dise lib. 1. ^o carminū de initio mun­di cap. 9.

To which description I adde that of Tertullian in his Apologie against the Gentiles, Tertullia­nus apol. cō ­tragentiles. where he saith, that Paradise is a place of diuine pleasure, destinated for the receiuing of the blessed spirits; segre­gated from the notice of the world by a fi­ery circle or girdle, which compasseth it about.

Basilius orat de Pa­radyso. Basil also in his oration of Paradise doth describe it thus. Paradise is a place flowing with all sorts of pleasure and de­lights, surpassing farre the beauty of all sensible creatures, which by reason of the height it hath, admitteth no obscurity of night, or darknesse by clouds, but rather is alwaies resplendent with the shining of the orientall starres: to which place also there can come no immoderate force of windes, no storme, no tempest, no horrour of win­ter, no inundation by waters, no burning of Sommer, no drought of Autumne, but a continuall and peaceble temperature of all times and seasons, insomuch that, that which may bee iustly thought the best and most pleasant of euery seuerall time of the yeare, that doth alwaies heere con­cur and abound, to wit, a continuall plea­sure [Page 15] of the spring, the aboundance of har­uest, the mirth and alacrity of Autumne, with the rest and quietnesse of the winter. To which Ephren (as hee is alleadged by Barsephas in his Treatise of Para­dise) addeth, that it is beyond the O­cean, in another world. And S. Au­stine ad Orosium, that is a place situa­ted in the East part of the world, rea­ching euen vp to the circle of the moone: and so as it was safe from the inundation of the flood; so also it is in­accessible to man after his first expul­sion thence.

Abulensis also seemeth in part to as­sent, saying, 2 Cap. in Gen q. 2 &c. 13. q. 107. that though Paradise toucheth not the Globe, or circle of the moone, yet (saith hee) it farre ex­ceedeth the limits of our turbulent, and darke aire; and that it is placed in the third region of the aire, higher at least by twenty cubits, then all the mountaines of the earth: so that the waters of Noahs flood, which transcē ­ded (according as the Scripture rela­teth) all the mountaines of the earth, fifteene cubits, could cause no dam­mage [Page 16] to so high a place, as that of Pa­radise.

Bonauent. lib. 2 sent. dist. 17.Finally Bonauenture in the second booke of the sentences, dist. 17. houl­deth Paradyse to be vnder the equino­ctiall line; because (as he and many o­thers haue imagined) there is alwaies a perpetuall temper of the Heauens and time, by reason of the perpetuall equality of the dayes and nights vn­der that line.

Eugubinus, Oleaster, & Vatablus in 2. cap. Gen. Eugubinus, Oleaster and Vatablus vp­pon the second chapter of Genesis think that Paradise was placed in Me­sopotamia, but that now it hath lost his beauty by the inundation of Noes flood: so that now beeing patent not onely vnto man, but also vnto the beasts themselues, it needeth no An­gelicall custody, or fiery sword.

These be the common opinions of the Fathers, & doctors in these points; to which euery man may assent as he findeth most agreeable with reason and true Philosophy, for seeing that in these poynts there is nothing reuealed or declared vnto vs in the holy Scrip­tures, [Page 17] nature must bee the best guide and mistresse, where supernaturall au­thority is wanting.

Out of which naturall principles that of the huge hight of Paradise, and reaching of it euen vnto the Spheare of the Moone, seemeth altogether im­probable; for if Paradise was made for the habitation, yea for the delight of man, why should it bee situated in so inconuenient a place, yea (speak­ing according to naturall reason) na­turally not inhabitable by reason of the neerenesse of the Sunne, and o­ther Planets, and stars.

To which (I cannot denie) but some shew of answere may be made as that neither Sunne, nor any of the Planets, are (as the Philosophers say) formal­ly but onely virtually hot; that is, though they haue the vertue to pro­duce heate in these inferiour things, yet that they be not in themselues hot, neither are they capable of heate: be­cause, as they neither agree in matter, nor forme (as many Philosophers hold) with these inferiour creatures; [Page 18] so neither can they haue the same kinde of qualities that our Elements haue.

But this answer is easily confuted, because as the virtuall heate of the sun is sufficient to make inhabitable some places of the world (as diuers graue Writers affirme) by reason of the neernesse vnto it, why might it not also cause the like effect in Paradise? vnlesse wee will flie vnto the omnipo­tence of God, and miracles, the onely refuge of ill grounded Philosophie and ignorance.

Or say (as some haue fondly fain­ed) that Paradise being of another kinde of matter then the rest of the earth, or of the same Species, and puri­ty, that the heauens are, as these bee incorruptible by reason of their most pure matter, or incorruptible vnion, so likewise Paradise, and the thinges there: onely man being of the same nature that now he is, was by the par­ticular prouidence of the omnipotent power, kept from mortalitie or cor­ruption as long as hee preserued him­selfe [Page 19] from the corruption of sin. But these and such like solutions, as they are forged without any ground, so they may easily be denied without a­ny more reason, this onely being ad­ded to the former proofe, that so high a place as the Spheare of the Moone, was altogether vnfit for the situation of Paradise, by reason of the perpetu­al agitation, and motion of that place, which is so continually rapt, and car­ried about with the most violent, and swift course of the heauen. Many o­ther reasons (I confesse) might bee giuen, but which rather appertain vn­to Mathematikes and longer discour­ses, then the breuity, which wee haue here taken vpon vs, will permit.

Now therefore onely remaineth that by the consideration of the excel­lencies of this place, wherein we were before our sinne, we gather the hatred God beareth to sinne; seeing that for the sinne of one, yea and that but one only, God, who is so good, yea infi­nite goodnesse and mercie, would pu­nish with so long a punishment, and [Page 20] with so great punishments, for so long a time, so infinite a number, as is, and shall be the whole posteritie of Adam, euen vnto the worlds end; And that sinne, certainly, hath a kinde of infi­nitie of malice which could deserue so infinite a punishment, yea so much prouoke the infinite goodnesse and mercy of him, who is infinitely good, and mercifull. And lastly we may in­ferre, what sinne iustly deserueth, if it should not be punished more accor­ding to the rule of mercy, then accor­ding to that, which the rigor of iustice requireth; seeing that no­thing was, or could bee sufficient, to blot, or wash it away, but onely the bloud of the lambe of God, which onely washeth away the sinnes of the world; by which, we are to be resto­red, not onely into a more high parti­cipation of God, and his grace, then we possessed before our fall; but also into a more perfect Paradise, then that was, from which we were banish­ed, for our first sinne, and fall: And this only by his merits, bloud, and [Page 21] passion, who could in no wise either slippe, or fall: So that wee may well exclaime with Saint Austine, August. in meditatio­nibus. O strange iudgement, ô vnspeakable disposi ion of the diuine mysteries; the sinner offendeth, the iust is punished: the guiltie transgres­seth, the innocent is beaten; the wicked sinneth, the godly is condemned; that which the euill deserueth, the good suffer­eth; the seruant doth amisse, the master maketh amends: man committeth sinne, God beareth the punishment. O Sonne of God how hast thou debased thy selfe? how hast thou burned in affection? How farre is thy mercie stretched? whither is thy com­passion come? Adam did wickedly, thou was punished; man sinned, thou wast af­flicted; Eue offended, thou wast tormen­ted; we were disobedient, but thou obedi­ently bearest the punishment of our disobe­dience; we serued our concupiscence, but thou enduredst hunger; the tree allured vs vnto an vnlawfull desire, but perfect cha­ritie ledde thee vnto the Crosse; wee tasted presumptuously the forbidden fruite, but thou sufferedst torments for our presump­tion, and momentarie delight. We enioy­ed [Page 22] the pleasure, but thou wast peirced with nailes; wee delighted in the sweetnesse of the apple, but thou therefore didst tast the bitternesse of the gall.

Here astonished I know not what to say, nay I am so amazed I knowe not what to thinke, onely I can exclaime with the Apostle, O altitudo sapientiae & scientiae Dei! O deapth of the wisedom of God! ô mercy of the omnipotent with­out measure! quid retribuam Domino pro omnibus quae tribuit mihi? What shall I giue vnto God again, who hath giuen himselfe so often for mee? vnto hunger for my riot; vnto nakednesse for my pride; vnto dishonour for my honour, vnto humilitie for my ambi­tion; vnto mortalitie for my immor­talitie: And finally vnto the ignomi­nious torments of a thorny crowne, and other of his sacred passion, and vi­tall death, for to crowne mee with an eternall crowne of glory, in the life to come, in that euerlasting Paradise, vn­to which no mutability, no mortality, and much lesse any impuritie can as­cend: vbi non est transmutatio, nec vicis­situdinis [Page 23] adumbratio: whither not euen the very shaddow of change can ap­proach.

CHAP. III.

WHere there is lesse certainty in the conclusion, there I meane to spend lesse time in the resolution, as in this of the compasse of Paradise: a question of more difficultie, then ne­cessitie: yet neuerthelesse because it is vrged by some, I will endeauour to giue some satisfaction in it, such as may be in so vncertaine a point, at least way as far, as other principles of Phi­losophy, or Diuinitie, or finally as the graue expositours of the sacred text will giue me any firme ground of discourse.

Amongst whom Ephren aboue al­ledged [Page 24] answereth to this question, that Paradise was greater then all the earth now inhabited. Ephren lib de Paradi­so. The reason may be, be­cause as the inhabitants were to bee more in number then the earthly, and more worthy; so their habitation, ac­cording to the wisdome, & bountie of their Creatour, should haue beene more magnificent, and far more capa­ble: of the beautie and magnificence no man can doubt, who doubteth not of the history of Genesis. Why then should we doubt of the other, seeing the same reason vrgeth in both? yea if we may discourse according to rea­son, in these things which depend on­ly vpon the free disposition of the sole independent cause; certainely, as this cause of causes hath created all o­ther things, pondere & mensura with due poise and measure of beauty, magnificence, and all other proprie­ties, according as the nature of the things required, and their finall ends, for which they were created, à fortiori, or much more, it ought likewise to bee inferred of the greatnesse and magni­ficence [Page 25] of Paradise; wherefore, see­ing that the seede of man, if he had not sinned, had beene more multiplied then now it is, because sinne (as true Philosophy teacheth) is no small im­pediment vnto generation; it must needes follow, that as the Inhabitants should haue beene more in number, & the place of their habitation more magnificent; so likewise the capacitie of the same place where all should haue dwelt, to wit, of Paradise, should haue beene greater then now the ha­bitation of man is, in all the world now inhabited.

I know well what is wont to be an­swered, to wit, that if Adam had not tasted of the forbidden fruite, there should haue beene none in Paradise, but onely those, which should haue supplied the seates of the lapsed An­gells; and consequently they should haue been but few in number: accor­ding to that of the Gospell, pauci electi, few be the chosen. To what end then should their habitation haue beene of so great compasse, as is the worlds now inhabited?

Againe, if we acknowledge God to be conscious of all future euents, and that this fore-knowledge, is as it were (according to our base maner of con­ceiuing so high mysteries) a direction vnto the free disposition of his Diuine will and prouidence, to what end should he create so mighty, huge, and so magnificent a place, for so few, and for so short a time, as hee knew our forefathers should be there?

The answere vnto both is easie, but first vnto the first. I grant that if wee had not sinned, onely the elect should haue beene created, and placed in pa­radise: whence without any subiecti­on to mortalitie, or other things, now necessarily annexed thereunto, they should haue been translated vnto their supernaturall felicity in heauen; but it followeth not hence that they could be so few in number, as might well be contained in so little a compasse, as Pa­radise is imagined to be.

Neither, because it is said, that small is the number of the elect, for though they be so in comparison of the repro­bate [Page 27] (in which sense the fathers inter­pret that place) yet absolutely they be many, yea without question more, then euer there were men liuing in the world together. For so it is euidently gathered out of the Apocalypse, where the beloued Apostle after that he had made mention of twelue thousand in euery Tribe, sealed, and signed, hee concludeth with these words [...]. And after these things I saw, Apoc. 7.9. and behold a great multitude which none could number of all nations, and Tribes, and people, and tongues, standing before the throne, and in the sight of the Lambe: couered with white stoles, and with pal­mes in their hands: Now if these be the elected (as without doubt they bee) how could they all haue dwelt toge­ther at one, and the same time in Pa­radise? how could they (I say) haue beene contained in so little a space or garden as Paradise is imagined to haue beene? True it is, that man was created to supply and replenish the seates of the fallen Angels: but hence, [Page 28] we are rather to inferre the contrary of that which was pretended in the ob­iection; because the badde Angels, as the Fathers say, and hath been proued in our Treatise of Angels, were almost innumerable, wherefore if the blessed men be to supply their places, as in­deede they bee, they must necessarily be more in number, then could con­ueniently inhabite so little a place as Paradise is imagined to haue beene: seeing that, if not all, yet infinite more should haue concurred together, then now possibly can after our exile out of Paradise; whence all occasions of mor­talitie should haue beene remooued, and where the tree of life should haue beene sufficient for the preseruation of mans life; if not for all eternitie (as many haue said) yet for many thou­sands of yeeres, or at least for a farre longer space, then now the life of man can naturally bee prolonged, for be­sides the naturall causes which then were more forcible, or of more ver­tue, for mans preseruation, and none nociue to man, as long as hee was not [Page 29] hurtfull vnto himselfe, the supernatu­rall cause of causes did particularly concurre in this, as well by his parti­cular prouidence, as by the vertue of the tree of life.

Now to the second obiection, which presumeth to demand a reason of Gods secret decrees, and iudge­ments, to wit, why God foreseeing mans sinne, and that from all eternity, would create for mans habitation, a place so spacious, excellent, and capa­ble, which he knew was to be enioyed for so short a time? I answere with the like obiection, why also did he create so infinite a number of Angells, with so many excellent gifts, as well of grace, as nature, and both gratis, yea and heauen so beautifull and admira­ble a place for them, whom hee knew would so soone praeuaricate and fall from that felicitie, into the other extreame of infelicitie? yea the like I aske of Adam, why would God so a­dorne him with all kinde of gifts both naturall and supernaturall, whom hee knew ab aeterno from all eternitie was [Page 30] presently to be so vngratefull, and wil­fully to fall from his grace? if these things be not vnbeseeming his good­nesse, neither contradict his proui­dence and fore-knowledge of future e­uent, neither doth this other of crea­ting Paradise so beautifull, spacious, and capable of so great a number, whereas God knew from all eternitie that Adam by his fall was to loose that place both for himselfe, and all his po­steritie. The onely reason of the que­stion propounded may bee (and the same may be applied with proportion vnto the rest) because, as we finde by ordinarie experience, that God doth not ordinarily deale with man accor­ding to future euents, and his diuine prescience thereof, but according to his owne science of things as present, Aquinas prima parte quaest. 14. Molina, Suarius, Valentia, Vasquez & alij schola­stici. which the Diuines call scientiam visio­nis or intuitiue knowledge. Hence it is, that God seeing man not vnworthy of that place persisting in the grace, in which he was created, according to the present estate hee had created him in, therefore (I say) not respecting [Page 31] mans future demerits, but his owne present grace, as he bestowed originall Iustice vpon him, to be translated vn­to his posteritie, so likewise hee gaue this so excellent and capable a place as a sufficient and apte habitation for him, and his posteritie, if they had not falne from his grace.

These bee the groundes of Ephrens opinion, which to mee is altogether improbable. Wherefore my iudge­ment in this so vncertaine a point, is, that though Paradise was not so am­ple, as the rest of the world inhabited, yet that it was of no small compasse, which I inferre of the greatnesse of the fountaine which sprung there, out of which foure mighty riuers were deri­ued. Secondly because there was no neede of any such extraordinary com­passe as Ephren imagined, seeing that it was but to containe the elect onely, which should haue beene but few in comparison of the multitude which now possesse the face of the earth. Neither was it necessary that all beasts should remaine there; because man [Page 32] in that happie estate had no such need of their seruice, as now he hath.

The length, bredth, and compasse of Paradise according to Abulensis vpon Gene­sis.Wherefore Abulensis is of opini­on, that the length of Paradise was a­bout twelue miles, and the compasse 36 or 40. But these are but vncertaine coniectures in things, which are not so manifest in Scripture.

That which seemeth most proba­ble in this matter, is, that seeing the Scripture calleth Paradise but a gar­den, that surely it cannot bee of any such compasse as some imagine. And secondly because it is said to be situa­ted in the Region of Heden in the Ea­sterne parts, which in no wise may be compared with the rest of the world for greatnesse.

Now to the other difficultie aboue insinuated, whether man persisting in the state of innocency, should haue dwelt in any other place, but onely in Paradise: I answere, that without all doubt hee should, because so small a circuit, as Paradise was, could not haue beene sufficient for the habitati­on of so great a multitude, as might [Page 33] very well in one mans age concurre together, for if after the fall of Adam some men liued all-most a thousand yeeres, certainely if Adam had kept his originall iustice, he should in all likeli­hood haue tripled the time (as Villal­pandus affirmeth) or liued much lon­ger then hee did after he sinned in which space there must needes haue been allmost an infinite number of in­habitants, and consequently the place of their habitation must needes haue beene of correspondent space, and ca­pacitie, wherefore seeing that Para­dise (as wee haue already showne) was of no such capacitie, as was apt for the cōtaining of such a multitude, it is not likely that man should haue beene confined there onely, vntill the time of his translation into a more happy estate, which should haue bin after his sufficient triall in the terrene Paradise, according to the free dis­position and decree of his Creator.

CHAP. IV.

Ephren de Paradiso.SOme with Ephren do hold the rea­son to bee the high situation of the place.

Others assigne three great impedi­ments of free accesse vnto Paradise. First, the hugenesse and insuperable height of the mountaines, which are betwixt vs and Paradise. Secondly, for that there be mightie wildernesses full of all kind of most venemous Ser­pents, and wilde beasts. Thirdly, be­cause there is no way but through large regions of most pestiferous aire, in which no man can liue. Others with Saint Chrysostome holde that at least, Chrysost. in Genes. before Noes flood the way vnto Paradise was knowne, and where it was; but that men durst neuer ad­uenture thither, for feare of the Cheru­bin, [Page 35] which did alwaies gard it with a fierie sword.

Wherefore I iudge with Saint Chrysostome that though then that was the chiefe impediment of free accesse vnto Paradise, yet that now at least way, that Paradise is not accessible, knowne, or seen as a Paradise, because it was destroyed with the Deluge, which passed all the highest places of the earth, and that many a cubite, which whether it be so or no shall bee discussed more largely in the Chap­ter following, because the resolution of diuers other curiosities depend thereupon.

CHAP. V.

SAint Basill, Abulensis, Basil. & Abul. supra cit. and others aboue alledged doe seeme to hold that Paradise was not destroied by [Page 36] the deluge, and consequently that it remaineth as yet. Iren. lib. 1. contra baer. Tertullian and the Master of the Sentences, yea and Ire­neus in his first booke against Here­tickes addeth, that it was the Paradise into which Paul was caried when he sawe such ineffable things which was not possible for man to vtter. More­ouer that this was the opinion of the auncient Asian priests the Apostles Disciples.

Iustin. in re­spon. ad. quaest. orth. quaest 75. 76. 85.Moreouer the famous Martyr Iu­stine in responsione ad Orthodoxorum quaestiones quaest. 75. 76. 85. Auerreth, that Paradise is extant as yet, and is to be euen to the worlds end, as the ha­bitation of the two Patriarkes Enoch and Elias, who shall come thence, to fight against Antichrist, not long be­fore the end of the world. Finally hee concludeth as a thing vndoubtable, that this is the place, whither the good and conuerted Thiefe was carried, to whom Christ said vpon the Crosse, this day shalt thou be with mee in Paradise, to wit this earthly, the first habitation of mankinde.

Lastly Saint Austine seemeth more peremptory for this opinion in his se­cond booke against Pelagius and Cele­stius where he saith, Aug. lib. 2. contra Pe­lagium & Caelestiam. that there be some questions in which wee may bee ignorant without any preiudice vnto our Christian faith, and the definitiue sentence may bee suspended, or in which all humane conie­ctures may easily be deceiued, as when it is inquired what maner of place is Paradise? or where that region is, where God crea­ted the first man of the dust of the earth? whereas notwithstanding our Christian faith doth not permit vs to doubt, but that there is such a place as Paradise, cum tamen esse illum Paradisum fides Christiana non dubitet. Wherefore, though we may be ignorant of the manner, qualities, situation, and the like circumstances of Paradise, yet if wee will not be Infi­dels we cannot be ignorant that there is such a place: And of this he giueth this example: Cum quaeritur vbi sit nunc Helias vel Henoch, an ibi vel alibi, quos tamen non dubitamus in quibus nati sunt corporibus viuere. As for example touching that question where Henoch or [Page 36] [...] [Page 37] [...] [Page 38] Helias be? whether they be there in Para­dise, or rather in some other place allotted them to liue in, as yet? without all doubt we may doubt about these particular curio­sities, which are not plainely expressed in the holy Scriptures, but wee neither can nor may doubt but that they liue, not ac­cording to the spirit onely, but corpo­rally also, their soules being really vni­ted vnto their bodies, as ours are: after the same manner we may doubt of the circumstances of Paradise, not of the reall existence or being of it.

And this the rather because in the 44 Chapter of Eccles. it is said that E­noch was translated into Paradise that he might be a patterne of penance vnto the Gentiles. Therefore if Henoch be there as yet, yea as a patterne of penance vnto the Gentiles, there must not on­ly bee an earthly Paradise, but also it seemeth that it must be a place habita­ble, or to which men may haue some accesse, in such sort, that they may see their patterne of repentance, for if ei­ther the place be destroyed, inaccessi­ble, or inuisible, how can it bee true [Page 39] that Henoch is there detained as a pat­terne of repentance? therefore if He­noch be as yet preserued aliue (as ma­ny doe hold) it followeth consequent­ly, that there is yet a terrene Paradise, not as yet destroyed by Noes flood.

These be the arguments of this opi­nion, and for which many doe not thinke it improbable: neuer the lesse (all the places of Scriptures and fa­thers, together with their reasons well pondered) it seemeth much more pro­bable, that Paradise, in which Adam was created is not now to bee found, but rather that it was destroyed by the generall deluge.

First, because the Scripture Gen. 7. Chap: saith, that all mountaines were couered with the waters of the flood, à fortiori therefore this pleasant Regi­on or Garden was therby ouer-flowne.

But peraduenture, this was a whole Region higher then any Mountaine, and consequently though all Moun­taines were couered, yet this place might be safe, as which was the habi­tation of that blessed man Henoch: or [Page 40] peraduenture though it was not so high, yet was it reserued for the said reason by Gods particular proui­dence.

I answere that neither, not the first, because as it is in the same place aboue alledged, the waters of the flood ouer­flowed the highest mountaines seuen cubits: neither the second, because such a great miracle was not necessary for the preseruing of Enoch; who whe­ther he bee yet aliue, or how he is, it shall be more at large discussed in an other place.

But supposing that the contrarie o­pinion is probable, to wit, that Para­dise is as yet extant, not onely accor­ding to the place it selfe, but also to the beauty and pleasure which the Scripture testifieth it had, at the first creation; it may well bee inquired, what should be the reason why it hath neuer been discouered of any amongst so many as haue compassed the world.

Some as I haue already touched, an­swere, that the reason is, because Al­mightie [Page 41] God offended with Adams transgression, hath inuironed it with huge Hills, mightie mountaines, swel­ling seas, fearefull rockes, and great wildernesses full of all kinde of terrible beasts, and venemous Serpents, so that it is impossible for any mortall man to passe thither.

Others againe answere that Paradise hath not beene discouered, neither sought for by Infidels, because they thought it to be but a fable, neither by the faithfull or Christians; because they know it to be inaccessible. But if I may interpose my opinion and freely speake what I iudge in this matter, I think that none of these reasons are so concludent and certaine as that the place of Paradise is as yet vnknowne by the particular disposition and pro­uidence of God; as part of our punish­ment, for that sinne, for which wee were banished thence, as not only vn­worthy to inhabite the place it selfe, but also of the notice where it was. Or secondly because it is not in any wise necessary to bee knowne, either [Page 42] as belonging to the furtherance of our felicity in this mortall life, or to the obtaining of the eternall happines in the other immortall. As in like manner this also was the reason, why though our Sauiour knew at least way by supernaturall meanes, and as he was the eternall wisedome of God, the time of the end of this world, and of his second comming to iudgement, yet because this was not necessary for man to know, therefore hee denied the reuelation thereof euen vnto his Apostles: insomuch that our Saui­our said Act. 1. cap. vers. 7. vnto his Apostles, that it was not for them to know the times or seasons which the Father hath put in his owne power. So neither is it for vs, too curiously to inquire after this place of Paradise, which God hath either destroyed, or hidden from vs, as part of our punishment for our first and originall offence in that place.

CHAP. VI.

CErtaine it is, as we read in the be­ginning of Genesis, that in the be­ginning of the world God produced omne lignum pulchrum visu, & ad vescendum suaue, Euery tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the Garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and euill.

Now the difficulty is, how these words are to be vnderstood? whether coniunctiuely, or disiunctiuely? to wit, whether all the trees of Paradise were as well beautifull to the sight, as sweete in tast: or rather some were on­ly delightfull to the sight, some plea­sant onely in tast, others both, as well beautifull in sight, as pleasant in tast?

Many (I know) answere, that all the trees of Paradise had both propri­ties, [Page 44] so that there was no one tree there vnfruitfull, neither any fruitfull, which was not also beautifull: inso­much that those vnfruitfull trees, which now, after our miserable exile out of Paradise, are necessary, were not planted in Paradise: Because Mo­ses saith that God planted euery tree beautifull in sight, and sweete in tast, to wit, coniunctiuely: which could not be true, if any tree wanted either sweetnesse, or beauty, or was not both beautifull, and fruitfull.

Yea, which is more, God himselfe also commanded Adam that he should eate of euery tree of Paradise, Gen. 2.16. excepting the tree of the know­ledge of good and euill: consequently euery tree of Paradise was fruitfull, if fruitfull, questionlesse then pleasant both to tast and sight.

I dare not condemne this opinion, because it hath authours of no small authority, neuerthelesse to me it is all­together vnprobable: seeing there be many fruitfull trees not very beauti­full: and many most beautifull, [Page 45] though not fruitefull.

It is therefore more conformable both to reason and the sacred text also, that it be vnderstood disiunctiuely: to wit, that there was trees of both sorts, some beautifull, some fruitfull, some both. Yea, this is plaine out of Eze­kiel 31, the 8. verse. where both the Ce­dar and Firre trees altogether vnfruitfull, are named as trees of Paradise, to whom the glory of the Assirian was thus compa­red, the Cedars in the Garden of God could not hide him, the Firre trees were not like his boughes, and the Chesnut trees were not like his branches, nor any tree in the garden of God was like vnto him in his beauty. I haue made him faire, by the mul­titude of his branches; So that all the trees of Eden, that were in the Garden of God, enuied him.

CHAP. VII.

SVch was the bounty of God to­wards man in the happy estate of Paradise, that he did not only giue vn­to him what was necessary or conue­nient for his naturall estate there, but also added other most extraordinarie meanes and helpes both naturall and supernaturall, conuenient and neces­sarie for both his estates of nature and grace; such was this of the tree of life, which (as some well note) according to the originall text, was called the tree or wood, not of life onely, in the sin­gular, but in the plurall, of liues, be­cause it was so to lengthen the life of e­uery man, that euery singular and par­ticular mans life, might well seame [Page 47] the life, not of one onely man, but of many.

Whereby we may first admire the power of Almighty God, secondly his goodnesse towards man: his power in the creating of such a fruite: his goodnesse, in bestowing it vpon him, whom he knew was in so short a time after, to be so vngratefull for that, and many other most excellent, as well na­turall, as supernaturall gifts.

The second reason, why it is tear­med the tree of liues, is, because as a man hath three liues, virtually: if not really distinct, the sensitiue, vegetatiue, and rationall; so this fruite of the tree of liues should haue had vertue to for­tified all three, in which also we may note the wisedome of God, but more againe his mercy: his wisedome in that hee knew to produce incorrupti­on, at least way for many yeares if not eternall (as many hold) by a continu­all repairing of nature by the eating of the said apple; but more againe (I say) may we admire his mercy, and boun­tie, by which he sought meanes to e­ternize [Page 48] him, whom he knew by his fall was to bee his owne death, yea the death of his most deare and eternall sonne which was the true tree of life, prefigured by this tree of life or liues, so also called because it was not to giue, or prolong the life of Adam on­ly, but also the liues of his posteritie; vntill such time, as it should please their Maker to translate them from that earthly beatitude, vnto a more perfect and supernaturall estate; Man. 17. where (as Saint Austine saith) they were to possesse in a more perfect measure, and that through all eternity ioy without sorrow, rest without labour, honour with­out feare, wealth without damage; health without sicknesse; aboundance without care; life with all security; immortalitie without corruption; all happinesse with no miserie at all. Where all perfection is in the highest degree, and all imperfections remote; where sight is face vnto face, where perfect knowledge, and nothing vnreuealed of which humane nature can be capable; where Gods soueraigne good­nesse raigneth super omnia aboue al things, [Page 49] and the light enlightening is glorified of the Saints; where the present maiestie of the Almightie is perpetually beholden, and the minde of the beholders eternally filled with this fruit of life.

Fourthly, it was called the tree of life, or liues; because it did after a double manner sustaine and renew the life of man: first in restoring our naturall moi­sture, by which wee liue, which consu­meth euery day more and more by our naturall heat, which was a proprietie common also to all other fruits of Pa­radise.

Secondly, in that which was proper to this tree only, and for which it was particularly tearmed the tree of life, be­cause it was of such qualities and excel­lent proprieties, that being eaten, it did renew our humidum radicale, our natu­rall humiditie and moisture, whereby wee should haue liued with the like or equall puritie and perfection, which had beene in man at his first creation; yea it should haue so fortified our naturall heat, that although it did naturally suf­fer some detriment and losse by conti­nuall [Page 50] action, yet should it haue beene so strengthned by that fruit of life, that it could neuer haue decaied or perished, and consequently man could neuer die corporally in that happy estate, vnlesse hee had first killed himselfe spiritually by being partaker of the forbidden fruit, insomuch that the disobedience of one brought in by concupiscence was the cause of all our misery and mor­talitie, that so God of his meere good­nesse through his infinite wisedome might thereby take occasion of shew­ing his mercy vpon those who after Adams fall were nothing but miserie, and by the obedience of his dearest Sonne might repaire and redeeme the disobedience of vs most accursed cai­tifes: so that wee participating of the fruit of the tree of life communicated vnto vs in the sacred communion by vertue of that tree of life prefigured in this Paradise, might thereby be reuiued from a temporall death to an eternitie of blessednesse, and perpetuitie of a most blessed life; yea so by occasion of our first sinne, gaine more then euer we [Page 51] had obtained if we had not sinned: see­ing hereby we obtained that fruit of life to be prepared for vs vpon the tree of the crosse, yea and thence communica­ted vnto vs in the sacred communion, and bread of life, which doubtlesse wee should not haue obtained, at leastway after that manner and measure, if wee had not transgressed. Or at leastway Christ prefigured in this tree of life, should not haue appeared passible as one of vs, if wee by our sinne had not needed his passion. Wherefore we be­ing astonished at so great mercy shewne vnto vs in so infinite miserie, and that so lamentable a losse should be an occa­sion of so ioyfull and infinite gaine, we may well exclaime with Gregory the great, O foelix culpa, quae talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem, O happy fall, and happy vnhappinesse, which was occasion of so great happinesse.

Lastly, the aforesaid tree was wor­thily called the tree of life, or liues; be­cause it did not only preserue our natu­rall being, by the repairing of our natu­rall forces, but also did so renew them [Page 52] by a supernaturall vertue proceeding thence, that thereby we might haue li­ued a life free from all kinde of feares of death, or of any griefes, vexations, or torments, now necessarily annexed to both deaths, corporall and spirituall, temporall and eternall: now I say an­nexed to both deaths, vnlesse wee haue applied vnto vs the vertue of another tree of life, by whole life all things be­ing haue their being, and by whose in­fluence all things liuing haue their life.

Hence it is that the former was a most perfect patterne or representation of the latter, but the latter a more perfect forme then could bee fully represented by the former, or by any other possible. Neuerthelesse the tree of life was crea­ted in the terrestriall Paradise, to the end that it might be a type, and in some sort represent that which should be fully re­presented or seene in the celestiall king­dome by the eternall light of glory, ac­cording to the diuine oracle, In lumine tuo videbimus lumen, in thy light wee shall see light; that is, by and through thy light of glory (which is a supernatu­rall [Page 53] habit infused into our vnderstan­dings) wee shall see the glorious light of thy essence, not comprehensiuely, which is impossible, but most perfectly and essentially, which is common to all the blessed Spirits and Saints of heauen, to euery one according to their degree of glory, correspondent vnto the mea­sure of their faith heard here in earth, or while they were in the way to this supernaturall blessednesse.

CHAP. VIII.

AS now in this deluge of miseries, which haue ouerflowne the world, there be many which in out­ward shew and words pretend so much spirit, that they leaue nothing for the in­ward [Page 54] but acts of carnalitie: so there wanted not these kindes of monsters in former ages, who though they were ne­uer so farre plunged in the depth of hell, as ours be, yet were they not farre infe­riour in the fictitious morallizing of Scripture, or rather wresting from the true sense the word of God; such were Origines and his fellowes Allegorici, so tearmed because they wrested the Scripture beyond all truth and sense, only to a spiritual and allegorical sense, especially those places which speake of Paradise and the tree of life: some thin­king it to bee our Sauiour Christ, or word of God incarnate, others the sole attribute of the eternall wisdome of God: some againe our euerlasting hap­pinesse in the kingdome of heauen, ac­cording to that of S. Iohn: Reu cha 2. vers. 2. To him that ouercommeth will I giue to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of my God: that is, as Eugobinus in his Cosmopoeia holdeth, not our essentiall blessednesse in the sight of God, as the former opinion is, but a proprietie ne­cessarily annexed thereunto, to wit im­mortalitie, [Page 55] which God had promised to Adam and his posteritie, if they had persisted in their first state of innocencie wherein Adam was first created.

Here be many fictitious propositions ill grounded, and which of themselues are sufficient to ouerthrow themselues: the truth and the common opinion, as well of Schoole Diuines, as of Exposi­tours of the holy Scriptures and Fathers is, that as the historie of the tree of life, and the rest of Paradise may well be in­terpreted in an Allegoricall sense, with­out any contradiction to the true mea­ning of the historie; so to vnderstand it only thus, excluding the historie, is a ma­nifest iniurie done to the Scripture. So S. Austine in his 13. booke of the city of God, chap. 21. saith, that we may vnder­stand by Paradise the blessed life of the Saints of God: likewise by the foure riuers of Paradise the foure cardinall vertues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, & iustice: by the trees all profitable Arts and disci­plines; by the fruit of the tree, the good workes of the godly; by the tree of life, wis­dome the mother of all goodnesse; finally by [Page 56] the tree of knowledge of good and euill, the experience of the commandement trans­gressed. These things likewise may be vn­derstood of the Church, as prophesies pro­per vnto her future estate. So that by Pa­radise wee may vnderstand the Church ac­cording to that which wee reade of her in the Canticles. Moreouer, by the foure flouds, the foure Gospels; by the fruitfull trees, the Saints, whose fruits bee their workes; by the tree of life, the Saint of Saints, Christ our Sauiour; lastly, by the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, our owne morall and ciuill actions, not the supernaturall, in which wee are more passiue then actiue.

These and the like of Origenes and others of the Fathers are questionlesse most excellent Allegories, yet not such as may be taken for sole verities, exclu­ding the plaine historie of Moses, and li­terall sense, which is the second part of my assertion, deduced also out of S. Au­stine in the place aboue alleaged, where he concludeth thus: Haec & siquae alia, These and the like may be spiritually applied vnto Paradise, so that the truth of the [Page 57] historie be faithfully kept, and no iniurie offered to the word of God: for if once we giue a sole and generall passage to this kinde of Allegoricall exposition, wee shall soone bee brought to many fond definitions in matters of faith.

CHAP. IX.

AS it is truly said of the bread of life, the Sacrament (I meane) of the Lords Supper, that it doth not con­curre physically with any real influence vnto the grace of God inherent in our soules in this life, or to the eternitie of blessednesse in the life to come, but that it is only a signe of the one, and a pawne and pledge of the other, to wit, of grace in this life, of an eternall poies of glory in the other: so many holding the tree of life to be a figure or type of the bread [Page 58] of life, haue with proportion held of them both, to wit, that neither of them were physicall and reall causes of their effects, but onely morall. Hence it is that Eugubinus aboue alleaged in his Cosmopoeia thinketh that it was called the tree of life, non effectiuè quòd vitam face­ret immortalem, not because it did re­ally cause or should haue caused im­mortalitie in man; sed significatiue tan­tùm, because it should haue beene a signe and token only of immortalitie, if he had not transgressed the comman­dement of his Creator: a probable opi­nion certainly, or which cannot easily bee refuted; for although all almost Writers and Fathers both of the Greeke and Latine Church doe agree, that the effect of this fruit was immortalitie, yet in the manner how, they doe not agree. So therefore if wee agree of the thing, it is not materiall how wee hold of the manner of concourse. As in like man­ner wee doubt not to say of the bread of life, the Sacrament of the Lords Sup­per, that certainly it containeth the cause of life Christ, but how it contai­neth [Page 59] him, who can expresse? This ex­ceedeth the naturall capacitie of An­gels, the other of the type also the reach of man. Agreeing therefore about the things, why should wee so contend to expresse the manner, which in no wise can be expressed, because it is not ex­pressed in the booke of life, and there­fore cannot be necessary to eternall life.

Neuerthelesse (if I may coniecture in things so hidden) I deeme the con­trary much more probable, to wit, that this tree of life was not onely a type or token of immortalitie, but that really it was a cause sufficient to haue produced immortalitie: my reason, or rather con­gruence (because no concludent reason can be giuen in this point) is, because it was the most perfect figure (as the Fathers affirme) of that most excellent tree, which for all eternitie is planted in the celestiall Paradise, to wit, of Christ, who saith of himselfe, Apoc. 2. cap. Vincenti dabo ede­re, to him that ouercommeth (to wit him­selfe) I will giue to eat, what will he giue? himselfe, to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of the eternall God, not [Page 60] carnally, as carnall men dreame, but spi­ritually in the bread of life, as hee him­selfe doth affirme of himselfe. As there­fore he who is the tree of life, or rather the author of life, or to speake more properly, life it selfe, euen as he is in the Sacrament of life, doth heere truly in this miserable life produce in vs the life of grace, as a present pawne of our fu­ture glory: so it seemeth most probable that the other tree of life (as a most per­fect figure of this) planted in the ter­rene Paradise, had the like inherent ver­tue, for to perpetuate, or at least to pro­long the liues of Adam and his posteri­tie, as long as they were to liue in that terrene Paradise.

But whether this fruit of the tree of life was sufficient to perpetuate our life, or only to prolong it for some determi­nate time, Abulensis super Genes. c. 13. quaest. 175. Scotus li. 2. sent. dist. 19 quaest. 1. Aquinas 1 p. q. 9.7. art 4 & Caiet. ibid. many dispute probably for both opinions.

Tostatus vpon the 13. chapter of Ge­nesis, q. 175. is most peremptorie for this perpetuitie; Scotus, Thomas, Caietan and Durand, for a very long time, but not for eternitie, because that is the na­turall [Page] measure of nature, this the super­naturall of him who is aboue all nature. Secondly, seeing the power of the tree of life was a naturall power and cause, the effect could not bee supernaturall: for though effects be often inferiour to their causes, yet neuer the causes vnto the effects; the reason, because no cause can giue that which it hath not, neither any effect haue any excellencie or perfe­ction not proceeding from the cause: wherefore if the tree of life was (as without question it was) a naturall tree, as the Laurell, Cypresse, and other trees be, it could not haue as connaturall, the supernaturall effect of making eternall the life of man.

Moreouer it is a principle euen in na­turall philosophie, that omne agens phy­sicum in agendo patitur & debilitatur, that euery naturall cause doth suffer some detriment euen in and by his owne acti­on: consequently therefore, though our naturall heat and vigour might bee very long conserued by the vertue of this excellent fruit, yet at length it should haue failed, and thence finally [Page 62] mortalitie should haue followed, as a necessary effect of so forcible a cause.

Lastly, it is not likely that God, who is the author and first rule of nature, doth produce any thing frustrate in na­ture: seeing therefore the fall of man was patent vnto him euen from all eter­nitie, to what end should he prouide an eternall cause for a temporary effect?

But if this argument had any force, it should force also our aduersaries to the like, if not a greater inconuenience; for who doubteth but that God knew also the little time that man was to per­sist in his grace? and yet neuerthelesse he gaue him that fruit, which was suffi­cient for the preseruation of his life for many a yeere, as our aduersaries hold, why then might hee not likewise for all eternitie? is it because of the impossibi­litie? at non impossibile Deo omne verbum, to God nothing is impossible, which doth not imply contradiction, but what contradiction is in this? is it, that here naturall philosophie is contradicted? omne agens in agendo patitur & debilita­tur, euery agent doth decay euen by his [Page 63] owne action; but seeing the author of nature is aboue nature, why might hee not here worke that which is aboue na­ture? or though in the compasse of na­ture, yet beyond our naturall capacitie, which is so small, that wee scarcely or very imperfectly vnderstand things of farre inferiour degree, yea such as are within our selues: why therefore shall wee deny vnto God that which we doe not vnderstand in our selues? My reso­lution therefore is that of Abulensis, Propterea dictam esse arborem vitae, quòd fructus eius vim haberet seruandi homi­nem à morte in omne tempus, & faciendi eum immortalem, that this tree was therefore called the tree of life, because it had vertue to perpetuate our naturall life, and the vnion of the body and soule for euer, if we had not lost the su­pernaturall grace, which was the vnion of our soules with God; but seeing wee wilfully separated our selues from our supernaturall life, it was most iust that wee should also be depriued of the na­turall: hence therefore is that which Paul so often preacheth, mortem in mun­dum [Page 64] intrasse propter peccatum, that death entred into the world by the doore of sinne, which doore if we had debarred to sinne, the grace of God should haue beene a perpetual vnion betweene God and vs, and the tree of life should haue caused the like betweene our bodies and soules; and this of his owne nature eternally, though de facto wee needed it but only temporally, both supposing our fall, as likewise not supposing any at all; for if we had not fallen or sinned in our first father, wee should certainly after some number of yeeres haue been translated from that terrene Paradise, which was our first though temporary habitation, vnto a more excellent and perpetuall in the kingdome of heauen; and this should haue heene without any assault of death, because we had alwaies liued in God, who as hee would then haue preserued vs by his grace from the corruption of sinne, would also haue preserued vs from this corruption, which was only the effect of sinne, ac­cording to that of the Apostle, The wa­ges of sinne is death: the wager being the [Page 65] deuill, our soules are bought and sold; sold away for nothing (sinne being no­thing but a priuation of being) but bought againe by the death of the most precious of mortall liues, which in no wise should haue beene necessary, if wee had not beene lost, or fallen from our first grace and innocencie.

But as that poeticall fiction of the Nectar and Ambrosia seemed to Aristo­tle of small ground, so this for the like reason may seeme to bee as fabulous: for as Aristotle argueth against the for­mer, either the Gods vsed this Ambro­sia and Nectar for pleasure only, or also for necessitie; if only for pleasure, how then could Ambrosia and Nectar be any necessary cause of their immortalitie? againe, if for necessitie, certainly the Gods then had not beene immortall by nature, and consequently no Gods, see­ing that, that which hath need of any thing for his preseruation must necessa­rily be mortall.

After the same manner we may argue against this fruit of this tree of life, which is said to be sufficient to cause an [Page 66] eternitie of life, à parte post, as the Phi­losophers speake: for if our immortali­tie was onely to be from the tree of life, then questionlesse without it wee had beene mortall, and subiect to death; contrary to that of the Apostle, Stipen­dium peccati mors, the wages of sinne is death: for whether wee had sinned, or persisted in our primatiue grace, all had beene one, wee should naturally haue tasted of death, if wee had not eaten of the tree of life. Againe, if it was onely ad melius esse, for a better preseruation of our immortalitie due vnto that estate, and not absolutely necessary for that effect; then consequently it was not the tree of life in the sense which the Scrip­ture insinuateth, but an antidote onely against death, and not a necessary cause of eternall life.

I answer, that though the argument of Nectar and Ambrosia doth euidently ouerthrow the deitie and immortalitie of the heathen gods, yet doth not the simile or comparison any thing im­peach the immortalitie and deitie of the true God, as neither the immortali­tie [Page 67] of our first parents, due onely vnto them in their estate of innocencie, and which did principally proceed from the true and only immortall God; because that immortalitie of life proceeding from the fruit of life, was to endure no longer with man then man perseuered in the grace of God, which was giuen him as a pawne of eternall life.

Neither doth this contradict that of the Apostle, the wages of sinne is death: for though death be due vnto man euen without sinne according to nature, yet this debt was to bee remitted by origi­nall grace, and the naturall pronenesse thereunto to be redressed by the fruit of life.

Wherefore though the immediate cause of our immortalitie in Paradise should haue beene the tree of life, yet the primarie and principall of all, to which the other was consequent, was originall grace, whose immediate effect was our spirituall life, and thereto se­condarily followed the freedome from any corporall harme, or death; yea and this for euer of his owne nature, though [Page 68] wee had not beene translated thence to a better life: for so it is said of Adam, that therefore hee was banished out of Paradise, and interdicted the entrance vnto the tree of life, lest eating of it hee should liue for euer, Genes. 3. chap. 22. v. And the Lord God said, behold, the man is become as one of vs to know good and euill; and now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and liue for euer, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken.

Hence I conclude with Abulensis and others, esum illius arboris sufficientem habuisse virtutem, vt vitam homini prae­staret aeternam: that this tree of life had sufficient vertue to prolong a mans life for all eternitie. The which also is the opinion of S. Austine, Aug. li. 13. de [...]iuitate Dei, cap. 20. & 23. Chrys. hom. [...]3. in Gen. Rupertus [...]ib. 3. de Trinitate, cap. 30. Chrysostome, and Rupertus lib. 3. de Trinitate cap. 30. where hee addeth this more then other Do­ctors, quòd semel sumptus vitam praesti­tisset immortalem, that this fruit of life had beene sufficient to haue caused im­mortalitie of its owne nature, though it had beene but once receiued; the which [Page 69] though it may seeme improbable to humane reason, yet considering the om­nipotence of God, and his infinite loue to man in that estate, it cannot at least­way appeare impossible.

CHAP. X.

LEst wee erre in the resolution of this question by any equiuocation of words, as it falleth out often in the like difficulties of naturall and supernaturall obiects; I will first declare how the Di­uines vse this distinction, and then how it is to be taken here.

Naturall (as farre forth as is necessa­rie for our present purpose) is that which floweth from the principles of nature, to wit, matter and forme, of which, as of their only compacts, all na­turall [Page 70] and corporal substances are com­posed.

Supernaturall is that which is aboue all nature, or rather cannot in any wise proceed from the principles of nature: but as it is aboue all nature, so it flow­eth from that sole principle which is aboue all nature, if not only, yet princi­pally.

Secondly, naturall oftentimes is ta­ken pro congenito, for that which is ori­ginally produced with any other thing, though it flow not in any wise from the principles of nature, or bee not due thereunto; so no doubt but if an An­gel were created with the light of glory, or beatificall vision of Gods essence, both the light of glory and the vision of God should be in that sense naturall, or rather connaturall vnto the Angell, be­cause it was produced together with his naturall substance or essence. And the same oftentimes is auerred by the Fa­thers, of man, in regard of his originall iustice, in which hee was created: for though this original iustice did not flow from the principles of nature, yet neuer­thelesse, [Page 71] because it was produced with nature by Almightie God, and infused into mans nature, as due vnto it in that happy estate, therefore it is, and may well be termed naturall, though in its owne essence it was supernaturall.

Now by these two distinctions of things naturall, wee may euidently in­ferre what is supernaturall, namely that which is aboue both these kindes of ac­ceptions, or distinctions of naturall ob­iects; that is, which neither floweth from the principles of nature, neither is any way due vnto nature: as originall iustice was due vnto vs in Adam before our fall and corruption of nature.

This distinction presupposed, the difficultie consisteth in this, whether the vertue of the tree of life for to preserue man from corruption, may bee called naturall, or rather is to bee deemed su­pernaturall?

Strabo answereth, Strab [...] in Gen. Lignum vitae hanc naturaliter habuisse virtutem, that the tree of life had naturally this vertue, that he who did eat of that fruit should be endued with perpetuall health, nei­ther [Page 72] should bee touched with any infir­mitie, wearinesse, or irksomenesse, which are wont to be the companions of age.

Hugo de Sancto Victore addeth, Lignum vitae habuisse in se naturam, vt perpetuaret homini vitam, si competentèr ederetur, that the tree of life had that vertue in it to perpetuate our life, if it were taken compe­tently. For man (saith he) was made mor­tall and immortall: immortall because hee could not die by reason of that immortall food: mortall, because he might haue died by outward violence. But God had so in­wardly fortified him by the tree of life, and outwardly by his diuine power, that hee could not die. Againe, because hee had shut vp within him the gate of negligence by the vigilance of humane reason, outwardly also the gate of violence by the diuine protecti­on, insomuch that vnlesse man abusing his reason should open the gate of negligence, neuer any harme should enter into him by the gate of violence. But because hee was not carefull to keepe the charge committed vnto him, God therefore forsooke the custo­die and care he had ouer him.

S. Austine on the contrary side think­eth [Page 73] that the vertue of this tree of life was supernaturall, for so he saith in his 8 booke de Gen: ad literam cap. 5. That though that meate was corporall, yet was it of such vertue, and nature that it did confirme man in perfect health: not as other meates, but by an occult vertue, pro­ceeding from aboue. And this he confir­meth by two examples, the first of Elias his cake, the second of the flower and oyle of the widow of Sarepta, which without all question were effected by supernaturall power.

Beda likewise affirmeth, that there­fore it was called the tree of life, because it hath receiued from the diuine power, that whosoeuer should eat thereof should be confirmed in perpetuall health.

Neither ought we to maruaile, Bonauen­ [...]ure 2. lib. sent. dist. 17 as Bo­nauenture well noteth, that a man might be disposed vnto immortalitie by the fruit of this tree, seeing there be many other things, as Myrrhe, and Balme, which doe preserue from corruption for a long time: therefore as our Sacraments doe not really concurre vnto grace; but the diuine power which alwaies is assistant vnto them: so [Page 74] the fruit of that tree did not of his owne nature produce immortality, but rather the diuine power did communicate it by the ea­ting of that fruit.

Here wee may see these so opposite opinions with their reasons and autho­rities, in which it may be free for euery one to follow as he liketh, seing there is nothing in this point plainely expressed in the Scripture; with me, both the au­thoritie of S. Austin and reason doth sway most for this latter opinion; be­cause it seemeth not so probable, that a naturall tree or fruit, should haue of his owne virtue and substance so superna­turall a virtue, and qualitie, as to cause immortalitie. But to conclude, whe­ther the virtue of this tree was naturall or supernaturall, all is one in regard of our losse, ingratitude, and sinne; our losse of both liues spirituall and corpo­rall, our ingratitude towards God, to vs wards so infinitely good, our sinne also being the same: seeing that though it had beene onely a naturall virtue which was in that fruit of life, yet it depriued vs not onely of our owne liues, but also [Page 75] of the author of life. What therefore remaineth, but that now being redee­med from this sinne, and raised againe from this death, we blesse him perpetu­ally, with all the powers of our soules, and all the daies of our liues, who is the onely giuer of life, and sole redeemer of our soules.

CHAP. XI.

NOthing can bee so plainely set downe in the holy scripture, but there will be some idle braine or other, who will so moralize, or so wrest it to a spirituall sense, though often-times without sense, that they will not sticke to deny the truth of the history, as it happeneth here in the first point of our question, in which some haue not fea­red [...] [Page 78] that name before, but afterwards of the euent: so that when God commanded our fore-fathers, that they should not eate of that tree, either he called it by some other name, or he demonstrated it vnto them, as it were with his finger.

Many other reasons do the Rabbins giue, of the name of this tree, but so farre from reason, that they be not wor­thy the repeating, I will onely touch one as most fabulous, by which we may coniecture of the rest. They say that our first Parents were created as infants in sense, and reason, though men in bo­dy, strength, and stature. Now because this tree had a virtue of ripening mans iudgment, witt, and discretion of good from euill; it was therefore called the tree of knowledge, of good and euill: because, to know good and euill, accor­ding to the Hebrue and scripture phrase is as much as to haue the vse of reason.

But this is not onely contrary to the text, but also to reason: for certaine it is, that as man was created perfect in all the parts of his body; so was hee no lesse in the powers of his soule. Yea [Page 79] how is it likely that he was without rea­son, who was created lord of all vnrea­sonable creatures? who gaue them their names proper to their natures, and was to gouerne all things according to their nature, by his owne rule of reason: yea with whom God the author of na­ture and chiefe rule of reason, had made this couenant most conformable to rea­son: that if he liued according to the law of nature, and instinct of reason, his reward should be aboue all nature, and exceed the capacitie of humane reason: wherefore who was both culpable in this pact, and punishable for his trans­gression, must in all reason, haue then had the vse of reason.

Iosephus in his first booke of his An­tiquities, perceiuing well the absurditie of this opinion, fell into another, which Lyra deemeth not much lesse absurd: to wit, that this tree was therefore cal­led the tree of knowledge of good and euill, because it had virtue to sharpen the wit, ripen the iudgment, and to giue prudence, and vnderstanding to all hu­mane affaires.

Lyra his refutation is this, because the fruit of that tree being corporall, how could it (saith he) haue any spiri­tuall effect? wherefore the minde, witt, and iudgment of man being spirituall, how could they be holpen by any cor­porall cause? For though the superior cause, and more perfect then his effect may haue influence into the inferiour and imperfect, yet neuer the inferiour into the superiour. Therefore though the spirituall causes be of such excellent perfection, that they haue influence in­to our bodies: yet neuer any corporall creature (saith he) is so perfect, that it can inflow in the spirituall. For what is that which any corporall thing may produce in the spirit? not any thing corporall, seeing that all, that is in the spirit, is spirituall: neither againe can it be spirituall, because nothing spirituall can bee contained in the vertue of a materiall or corporall cause.

It cannot be denied, but that this dis­course of Lyra might haue some force in those causes, which (as the Philoso­phers speake) doe worke directè & per [Page 81] se by themselues directly, yet in those, whose causaltie is altogether indirect, true philosophy teacheth the contrary. wherefore though it be most certaine that the body cannot directly haue any influence into the soule or spirit, yet bi­cause the spirit, whiles it is in this life dependeth in her operations of the bo­dy, and the dispositions thereof (ac­cording to the generally receiued phi­losophicall axiome) the manner of the working followeth the manner of being, it must necessarily follow, that accord­ingly as the dispositions of the body are better or worse, so may the opera­tions of the minde be also more or lesse perfect.

Yea Aristotle teacheth vs in his 7. booke of his Politikes, that though those men, who are borne, and brought vp in the Northerne parts of the world, bee stronger then others in corporall forces; yet that they bee of a much more slow, and duller capacity: con­trariwise, those who are borne in hotter climates of Affrica, Spaine, and Mauri­tania, and other more Southerne parts [Page 82] of the world, though they be weaker in body, and more debil of comple­xion, yet that ordinarily they be more quicke of apprehension, and more sut­tle in iudgment, then the other of the Northerne parts of the world be. Fi­nally, that those who liue neither in the extremitie of heate, nor piercing cold, doe commonly excell both the other.

A fortiori therefore may the qualities, and dispositions of our foode, especi­ally that of the tree of good and euill, haue had no small operation in the in­ward dispositions, and powers of our soules, for to make vs of a more ripe iudgment, and quicker apprehension. yea finally make vs more apt to dis­cerne both good and euill, at least way in morall and ciuill matters, if not in supernaturall, and things belonging vnto grace, for so it was said of the Messias, butyrum & mel comedet, vt sciat reprobare malum & eligere bonum, Isa 7.15. butter and hony shall he eate, that he may know to refuse the euill and chuse the good, the which though it be spoken more perad­uenture for the mysticall meaning, then [Page 83] for the literall or materiall, yet no doubt but that the mysticall sense hath some ground euen in the materiall comparison of butter and honie.

But because it seemeth not so pro­bable, that God would hinder our spi­rituall good (such as this was, of the knowledge of good and euill) who hath made vs perfect in all corporall powres, and perfections; therefore I deeme most probable in this point ei­ther the opinion of Rupertus aboue al­leadged; Aug. lib. 14 de ciuit. Dei cap. 17. & lib. 8. de Gen. ad li­teram cap. 6. & 15. Lombardus cum schola­sticis 2. lib. sen. dist. 17. or if that seeme to haue some inconvenience, then that of S. Austin may be rather followed, which now also is the common opinion of the schooles, with the master of the senten­ces, to wit, that this tree was called the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, ab euentu, from the euent, for that which presently followed in the eating thereof: which was, that Adam then knew by woe­full experience the difference betweene good and euill.

CHAP. XII.

NOw all things being created, and this inferiour world perfectly re­plenished, there wanted only one, who should be gouernour and lord ouer all other creatures, Gen. 1.26. 5.1. 9.6. 1. Cor. 11.7. Eph. 4.14. Col. 3.10. Faciamus therefore saith God hominem ad imaginem & similitudi­nem nostram, 1. cap. Gen. 26. let vs make man in our image, after our likenes, and let him haue dominion ouer the fish of the sea, and ouer the fowle of the aire, and ouer the cattell, and ouer all the earth, and ouer euery creeping thing, that creepeth vpon the earth.

But peraduenture some may de­maund why man was created last of all creatures? seeing that hee being the most perfect and modell of the rest, hee should consequently haue beene crea­ted as prototypon and first type of the rest, and therefore as he was the first in perfection, he should also haue beene [Page 85] first in his being and production.

I answer, that euen for the very same reason, he was created last, because in a certaine manner hee was the end and perfection of the rest: and thus beside other interpretations, this also may be admitted of the philosophicall axiome, quod est primum in intentione, est vltimū in executione: that which is first or chei­fest in the intention, is last in the execution, or production.

Secondly, man being to be lord of all the maine Machina of this world, it belonged vnto the diuine prouidence, first to prouide the habitation, and then to create him that was to inhabite.

Or thirdly, because man had neede of all these things, either for his cor­porall sustenance, or for his spirituall exercise.

Or fourthly, because it was conue­nient, first to create the great world, containing euery thing in his due and distinct order; then afterwards to con­summate, perfect, and as it were to crowne the end of all his workes, with one, who was to be the crowne, end, [Page 86] and perfection of all corporall crea­tures, yea containing in a more perfect manner and degree, the perfection of all, whatsoeuer he had created before.

Finally, hauing created both corpo­rall, and spirituall things each separate, and distinct in their proper natures, it remained only to conioyne them both in one: insomuch that, as in all things, whatsoeuer is composed of matter & forme, the parts haue their being, prio­ritate naturae, by prioritie of nature (as the Philosophers say) before the con­ioyning of both together, because the parts are for the whole, and not the whole ordained for the parts. In like manner it was no lesse conuenient, that man being composed of both corpo­rall and spirituall substance, hee should also be created after them both, as who was to be the secondarie end of all o­ther inferiour creatures.

CHAP. XIII.

THE manner of mans creation is described vnto vs in the aforesaid words. Gen. 1.16. Let vs make man in our image, after our likenes. Now there­fore it remaineth we explicate, what di­uine deliberation is this, what image is this, and in what likenes, and similitude of God, was man created. And first of the first.

This word faciamus, let vs make, may be taken in three senses, or significati­ons: for first, it may signifie, how the eternall wisdome of God, proceeding with a certaine deliberation and coun­sell with himselfe, the most holy Trini­tie, did goe about such an excellent worke, as was the creation of man: to the end, that by that manner of pro­ceeding, hee might manifest the excel­lencie of man, aboue all these inferiour [Page 88] creatures, partaker of reason, beautified with prudence, perfect in wisdome, and created to his owne image, and likenes.

Secondly▪ God is said to vse this manner of deliberation in the creation of man, to manifest the weight of the businesse, and worth of the worke which hee then intended; to shew (I say) what a worke it was to create man, with so great sanctitie, grace, and felici­tie, to conserue him in the same, and being lost to restore him againe. For God in his eternall wisdome, foreseeing the frailtie of man, did likewise foresee the act of his fall, and finally that hee would perish, he did likewise know be­fore the difficultie in conseruing, and restoring of man after his fall; and fi­nally how to bring him to the end, for which he was created before his fall.

Wherefore, if all these difficulties be duely considered in humane reason, it might iustly be doubted, according to our capacitie, whether it were conueni­ent, to create man, or no? wherefore the Scripture accommodating it selfe [Page 89] to humane sense and capacitie, doth de­scribe vnto vs God the Father, as it were consulting with the Sonne and the holy Ghost, of the creation of man. Then how it was concluded in that diuine Consistorie, how it was most conueni­ent to create such a creature, without which all the rest had beene imperfect, and as a body without a head, a com­mon-wealth without a ruler, or king­dome without a King, confused, imper­fect, without order or beautie. But see­ing that to bring man to this finall per­fection and end, many things were ne­cessary, each person of the blessed Tri­nitie did assume to himselfe diuers fun­ctions; the Father to create, because power and might doth especially ap­peare in the Father; the Sonne did as­sume the reparation of man after his fall (a worke of infinite wisdome) and ther­fore it is particularly ascribed to this person, and infinite wisdome: finally, the holy Ghost did particularly worke mans sanctification, this therefore is likewise accommodated to this person, together with all spirituall graces and [Page 90] finall glorification. Neuerthelesse these offices, operations, and workes, are so attributed to the three holy persons, not that any one of them was effected alone by any one person, for whatsoeuer is wrought out of the sacred Trinitie, in or by any creature whatsoeuer, is equally effected and wrought by all and euery person of the blessed Trinitie, but because something doth appeare in euery of these workes, which doth espe­cially manifest the Father, the Sonne, or the holy Ghost, the Fathers power, the Sonnes wisdome, the grace and sancti­fication of the holy Ghost, therefore these and other the like attributes are particularly applied and attributed to each person of the blessed Trinitie.

Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate & operibus [...]ius.This is the ground of Rupertus his discourse, and reason why God created man to his likenesse and image, why he changed his voice, and altered his man­ner of speaking: for whereas hee said in the creation of other creatures, Fiat, & factum est; Let it be done, and it was done; now, as though hee had beene weary with going about the earth, compassing the seas, [Page 91] and measuring the amplitude of the hea­uens, he sate him downe, and as it were taking his breath, hee called to minde that there was one thing as yet wanting, which was no lesse necessary then fitting to be made; then said he, let vs make man to our owne image and likenesse. Thus doest thou then thinke that a small matter, which was intended by these words? A great my­sterie without doubt it was, in that counsell of wisdome, in that counsell of such per­sons, the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost. Canst thou iudge that there was any thing wanting, any thing superfluous, ei­ther done or to be done in vs, or about vs, in that sacred Senate? There doubtlesse was all our cause considered, there our fall foreseene, there our death and perdition foreknowne, and determined vpon, to wit, that euery person should vndertake some part of the worke, that as it is said before, the Father should create, the Sonne should redeeme, and finally the holy Ghost should worke the remission of sinnes, and the re­surrection of the flesh.

But what should bee the reason why God deliberating about the creation of [Page 92] man, should say, Faciamus, let vs make? To whom did hee speake, speaking in the plurall, let vs make? Shall we say to the earth, as to a compart of man? or to the Angels, as the fellow-workers with God, as though God had need ei­ther of the cooperation of the Angels, or were so senselesse, as thus to conferre with that his creature void of all reason and sense?

Ambrose in his seuenth chapter of the sixt booke of the Exameron, answereth, that God spake not to himselfe, because hee speaketh not in the singular, but in the plurall, let vs make, neither yet to the Angels, as who are but his seruants; therefore though the Iewes and Arrians doe neuer so much repugne, these words without all question are spoken to his Sonne, as who is the true and liuely similitude and likenesse of God the Father. And this I deeme to be the truest opinion, seeing that the eternall Sonne of God, euen as hee is the Word and Sonne of God, is a liuely and ex­presse similitude and likenesse, not only of his eternall Father, but also a most [Page 93] perfect Idea and exemplar, according to which man was created.

Others not improbably doe inter­pret, that God therefore spake in the plurall, Faciamus, let vs make, as Prin­ces and great persons are wont to doe, to shew their authoritie and maiestie, saying, We will, We command, We decree, &c. yet of the two I deeme the first ex­position to bee best, and that the text may admit them both.

CHAP. XIIII.

FOr the vnderstanding of this, Sainctes Pagnines in the sauro linguae He­braae. wee must note the originall Hebrew words, Selem and Demuth; by Selem is properly signified a shadow or transito­rie similitude, Psalme 33. In imagine per­transit homo, man passeth away like vnto a shadow. Likewise Psalme 101. My dayes haue declined as a shadow. The other [Page 94] word Demuth signifieth to cut downe, to faile, to fade, to be silent, to recogi­tate, and to expect; but most properly to assimulate or liken: wherefore seeing euery similitude or likenesse is transito­rie, vanishing, and quickly passing away, the same word doth also signifie to va­nish, to passe away, to faile, and to fade.

Now therefore, when God said that man was made to his image and like­nesse, it was to giue vs to vnderstand, that such was the likenesse, and so per­fect the representation, as could be be­tweene an inferiour creature and his Creator: but because God is of infinite perfection, it must necessarily follow, that his similitude should bee infinitely inferiour and of lesse perfection then the prototypon or first type of his per­fection. Like as though the shadow be in some sort the similitude and repre­sentation of the body, yet is it obscure, and imperfect, yea nothing in it selfe, and in comparison of the body no­thing. Hence consequently wee may inferre a twofold interpretation of the said words, adimaginem & similitudinem [Page 95] nostram, to our image and likenesse, to wit, of that image or similitude which is in God his diuine nature, essence, being, or vnderstanding: insomuch that the nature of God, and his Ideall represen­tation of his vnderstanding bee the ex­emplar and first type, vnto whose simi­litude man was made. Or againe that [...]his be the meaning of Gods words, let vs make man such a one as wee are, or so like vnto vs, that he may bee such an image, forme, and similitude, as he may represent our nature, power, wisdome, and prouidence, yea and immortalitie in a body of its owne nature mortall.

For as S. Austine well noteth, Aug. li. 83. quaest. q. 51. diuers things doe diuersly represent Almighty God: some doe participate of vertue and wisdome, others only of life, others of existence and being, insomuch that those things which only haue existence, and neither liue, nor breathe, are coun­ted an imperfect similitude of God, be­cause they are good according to their kinde, and flow from that infinite Oce­an of goodnesse, from whence all other goodnesse doth proceed. Againe, those [Page 96] things which doe liue, and yet doe not vnderstand, doe more perfectly partici­pate the likenesse of God: but those things lastly which doe vnderstand, doe come so neere vnto the likenesse of God, that nothing created can come more neere. Wherefore seeing that man may participate of the wisdome of the diuine nature, yea euen according to hi [...] owne nature, hence it is, that hee is so framed to the image of God, that no­thing can be more like in his being and nature vnto God: he liueth, he breath­eth, he vnderstandeth, he hath existence and being, and is in all these, as a per­fect patterne of his Creator and God.

CHAP. XV.

SAint Austine in his questions vpon Deuteronomie thinketh it no lesse then blasphemie, to auerre any thing to [Page 97] be superfluous in the sacred text: where­fore lest we be enforced to contradict this so receiued a principle, Orig. lib. 3. Peri [...]rchon, cap. 6. Basil. hom 6. in Gen. in hunc locum Ambros. li. 6. Exame­ron. c. 6. & 8 Nicenus homil. de creat. hom. Eucher. li. 1. commen. in Gen. in hunc locum. Victorin. in disp [...]t. quam scripsit ad­uersus Ar­rium. Theodoret. in quaest in Gen. q. 20. Rupert. li. 2. de Trinitate & operibus eius, c. 3. et 5 Aquin. pri­ma parte quaest. 93. Magister sent. lib. 2. distinct 26. & ibidem Scholastici. and mani­fest truth, wee are to search what diffe­rence is betweene the image and like­nesse of God, according to which man was created.

Origenes, Basil, Nicenus, Eucherius, Victorinus, Theodoretus, Rupertus, Aqui­nas, the master of the sentences, with many others, both moderne and ancient Wri­ters, are of opinion, that man is said to be made to the image of God, according to his nature and properties consequent vnto nature, as vnderstanding, memo­rie, and free will, which he exerciseth in his naturall actions, and in which he ex­ceedeth all other inferiour creatures; the which image, though it may be, and is in some sort defaced by sinne, yet is it in no wise fully lost and blotted out, because as it is wholly of God, so it de­pendeth only of God, and therefore can be taken away only by God himselfe; nay not euen by God himselfe, man re­maining a reasonable creature or man. For though he may haue his senses and [Page 98] other spirituall powers depraued, yea though he may also be depriued of the exercise of them all, yet in no wise can they be vtterly extinguished, man (as I said) remaining man.

Now as touching the similitude of God according vnto which man was created, wee are to consider him, not according vnto the naturall gifts which are necessarily consequent vnto nature, but according vnto iustice, sanctitie, and innocencie, and grace, which are gifts infused into nature, though aboue na­ture, the which as they are independent of nature, so also may they bee and are separate from nature, according to the free disposition and order of God, the Author of nature: but this certainly is alway for some sinne, which in this sense may be said to be a deprauation of nature, seeing it depriueth nature not only of these supernaturall gifts, which are the chiefe ornaments and helpes of nature, but also because it depraueth nature herselfe euen in her selfe, and hindereth the due exercise of her natu­rall powers.

Rupertus in his second booke of the Trinitie, and second chapter, discour­seth very acutely of this point, of the difference betweene the image and si­militude, vnto which man was created, giuing also the reason why the word image is prefixed before the word simili­tude: in a word, his resolution is this, that the Sonne of God is signified by the word image, and the holy Ghost by the word similitude: for (saith he) the diffe­rence betweene similitude and image is this, that the image is in regard of one only, but a similitude is at least of two: now the eternall Sonne of the eternall Fa­ther is the image of God, according to that of the Apostle, 1. Coloss. who is the image of the inuisible God. The Sonne (I say) is the image of the inuisible God, equally in­uisible. For the vnderstanding of which, we must presuppose that there bee many kindes of images, as the image of man, of a horse, a picture in the wall, an image gra­uen in stone or wood, yea wee see euen the images of the Sunne and Moone in the wa­ter, yet wee may not thinke that the Sonne of God is so to be called the image of God, [Page 100] but rather, as the Apostle writeth in ano­ther place, Heb. 2. the figure of his substance; be­cause as euery substance is knowne by his figure or shape, so God the Father by his word. Againe, the image of man is said to be a propertie of his substance, in which sense the sacred text saith, that Adam be­gat his sonne to his image and likenesse, Gen. 5. and called his name Seth. Hence wee may vn­derstand how the eternall Sonne is the image of his eternall Father, and the holy Ghost the similitude and likenesse of the Father and Sonne, seeing the goodnesse and loue of the Father and Sonne is common to both Father, and Sonne. Hence it is, that it could not rightly be said in regard of the Sonne only, let vs make man to our image and likenesse; for as the Sonne is Sonne in regard only of the Father, not of the Father and the holy Ghost iointly, so also is hee not the image of the Father and of the holy Ghost iointly, but of the Father onely. But it is rightly said in regard of the holy Ghost, to our image and likenesse, because as the holy Ghost is the infinite goodnesse of the Father and Sonne, so is he likewise the in­finite similitude and likenesse common to [Page 101] both Father and Sonne. But this not by the force of his particular proceeding, as is the Sonne.

Others are of opinion, that this word ad imaginem, to our image, doth signifie vnto vs the second person of the blessed Trinitie, as he was to be incarnate, or to take our nature vpon him.

But if we marke the phrase of the sa­cred text, we shall easily finde that the Sonne of God was incarnate rather ac­cording to the similitude of man, then that man was created according to his similitude, Rom. 8. Philip. 1. Heb. 2.

Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia, and Ole­aster vpon the first of Genesis, are of opi­nion, that God therefore said, let vs make man to our image and likenesse, be­cause when hee created man, hee tooke vpon him the shape and forme of man, to the end that he might the better con­uerse with man.

But this seemeth rather to bee an in­uention of their owne, then grounded in Scripture, because it is most proba­ble (that which the Schoolemen doe commonly hold with Dionysius) that all [Page 102] those apparitions, which we reade in the old Testament, were not immediately of God, or by God himselfe, but by the mediation of Angels, who taking vpon them airie or other apparant bodies, appeared vnto men in the shape and forme of men; but so neuerthelesse, that they so appearing and speaking, did alwayes represent the maiestie of their maker, repeating for the most part Gods owne words, which hee had im­mediately infused into their vnderstan­ding.

Againe, if the aforesaid opinion of the assuming of our humane nature is to bee vnderstood by a personall vnion betweene God and man, then question­lesse God hath beene twice incarnate, and twice vnited to our humane nature, which is contrary to the holy Scrip­tures. Or if there was no reall vnion, or assumption of our humane nature, but only a shade or similitude of the same, as wee reade that Angels haue often­times assumed humane bodies, how then was it truly said, let vs make man to our image and likenesse, seeing that simi­litude [Page 103] of humane nature could not in any wise be the image of God? neither could it be truly said, that Adam was made to the image of God, if so be that we vnderstand by the image of God not any true humane nature, but the shade only and similitude of mans na­ture.

Hence I conclude the first opinion to be the best, as which is most groun­ded in the sacred text, and most follow­ed of the holy Fathers and other expo­sitours.

CHAP. XVI.

IT might seeme rashnesse to doubt of this, if S. Paul did not giue vs some ground, denying (as some thinke) that woman was made to the image and likenesse of God, auerring her onely to be the image of man, in that he contra­poseth [Page 104] woman, as the glory of man, to man as the image and glory of God. His words be these: 1. Cor. 11. & 6. Man ought not to couer his head, forasmuch as hee is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man; for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. The woman therefore is not the image and glory of God, but immediately only the glory of the man, otherwise there could be no difference in this, be­tweene the man and the woman, con­trary to the inference which S. Paul ma­keth in the precedent verse.

Neuerthelesse, euen the text it selfe doth clearly confute this opinion: for after that it had beene said, let vs make man to our owne image and likenesse, pre­sently it is added, hee made them, both man and woman. Wherefore as man was made to the image of God, so like­wise was the woman made to the same.

Aug li. 12. de trinitate cap 7. S. Austine is very large in giuing the reason of this conclusion; but briefly this is the answer: If wee consider the principall reason, why man is said to be the image of God, to wit, as hee is an [Page 105] intellectuall creature, and as he is indu­ed with the properties therevnto an­nexed; so is it euident, that this word image doth equally signifie, and may be equally attributed both to man, and woman: seeing that they both parti­cipate of reason, and vnderstanding, both bee indued with an immortall soule, both partakers of free will, both capable of supernaturall gifts, both of grace and glory.

But againe, if this word image be ta­ken in a more large, and improper sig­nification (as hath beene already expli­cated) we may well say, that man was made to the image of God, & woman framed to the image of man. Because, as God is the end to whom man is im­mediatly referred: so likewise man in some sort is in regard of the woman, because man is the head of the woman, by whom shee ought to be directed vn­to God. This explication seemeth to be grounded in the afore-said place of Paul, 1. to the Corin. 11. chap. for when hee had said, that man was the image of God, and woman the glory of the man, he [Page 106] presently giueth the reason. ver. 8. For man (saith he) is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. ver. 9. for the man was not created for the womans sake, but the woman for the mans sake.

Neuerthelesse, if the similitude of God in man and woman be conside­red, not according to their naturall gifts, but to the supernaturall of grace and glory, then questionlesse it hapneth often-times, that some women are more adorned with these supernaturall graces, and gifts, and consequently are more like vnto God then many men. As wee piously beleeue of the blessed Virgin, who as shee was pronounced by the Angell of God to bee blessed amongst all women, so no doubt, but shee hath receiued an eternall blessing aboue all Angells and men, our Sauiour only excepted both God and man.

CHAP. XVII.

THE subiect of this question is so certaine of it selfe, and without all coutrouersie, that for the resolution thereof, wee haue more neede of the subtlety of distinction, then of any profound diuinitie, or learning. For seeing that the diuine maiesty is a most pure spirit, as infinite in essence, as in all and euery of his diuine attributes infi­nite, how is it possible that there should be any comparison, similitude, or like­nes with him, in that, which is altoge­ther corporall, limited, and most base, such as is our humane natute according to the body.

Neuerthelesse seeing the body doth in some sort represent the soule, like as [Page 108] the soule also is the image of God; hence peraduenture it may be inferred, that the body may in some sort be said to be a representation or similitude of God; in as much as the body (if wee consider it in his full perfection) is an immediate glasse, similitude, or repre­sentation of the soule, the which most perfectly representeth Almighty God. Wherefore though in regard of our corporall substance, considered imme­diatly in it selfe, without any relation vnto the soule, wee be no better then bruite beasts: yet if we consider it, in regard of our soule, and as it is the re­ceptacle of the most excellent image of God, it may after a remote manner, and mediately be said to represent euen God himselfe.

Wherefore S. Austin propounding this question, August. lib. 6. de Gen. ad literam cap. 12. in what doth a man exceede the brute beasts, seeing they are both made of earth? he answereth, in nothing, but because he is made to the image of God, not in body, or corporall substance, but accord­ing to his soule, and spirituall powers. Though true it is also, that he hath euen [Page 109] in his body, a certaine property, which doth in some sort demonstrate the re­ctitude of his soule; as that he is made vpright, to the end, that hee might vn­derstand how hee ought not to abase himselfe to the terrene, vile, and base trash of the world, like vnto the bruite beasts, and other most base creatures, who as they are framed prone, and haue their bodies inclined towards the earth, can neuer erect themselues to any spiri­tuall, or heauenly thing.

Hence Bernard well noteth, that God made man vpright in stature, and ere­cted towards heauen, to the end that his corporall rectitude and vprightnes of his shape, might stirre him vp to pre­serue the spirituall rectitude, and righ­teousnes of the inward man, who was made to the image of God; and that the beauty of our corporall substance, and outward proportion, and right dis­position of the lineaments of our body might correct the inward deformitie of our soules, and the powers thereof. For what can be more vgly, deformed, and abominable in the eye of that all-seeing [Page 110] God, then a sinfull, and defiled soule in a beautifull body? Is it not a shame­full, and detestable thing, that an earth­ly and corrupt vessell, such as the body is, should contemplate the heauens, view the Planets, and be delighted with the aspect of the incorruptible spheares, and motions of the starres; and that on the contrary side, the spirituall and ce­lestiall creature, far more perfect, then all the celestiall globes, and heauens, the soule (I meane) of man, should alwaies haue her eyes, that is hir inward powers, and affections debased, and cast downe to the terrene trash, and basest creatures of this world.

Consider therefore (ô man) thy dig­nitie of nature, the perfection of thy powers, thy priuiledges of grace, the immortalitie of thy soule, the excellen­cie of thy creation, the nothing of thy selfe, and lastly the infinite price of thy redemption, by the most precious blood and death of the Lambe, thy Creator, and Redeemer, and let not this so base, and transitorie trash of this world, so alienate thy minde, and be­witch [Page 111] thy vnderstanding, that thou pre­ferre the filthy and base pleasures of the body, before the spirituall and eter­nall of thy spirituall and immortall soule.

CHAP. XVIII.

ORigenes, Epiphanius ep. ad Io­hannē Hie­rosel: Aug: lib. 2. contra A­damantiam Manich. & l. 83. quaest. q. 66. & lib. 6. de Gen. ad literam. cap. 27.28. and S. Austine do seeme to affirme that man lost the image of God, Epiphanius, and diuers other of the Fathers doe peremptorily deny it out of Gen: the Psalmes, and S. Paul: but I thinke this controuersie rather to arise, by reason of the diuers vnder­standing of the image of God, which is in man, then of any true difference in their opinions; for who can doubt, but if wee consider man according to the supernaturall gifts first infused into the soule of Adam, but that he lost the diuine similitude or likenesse of God, [Page 112] and that wholy, nothing remayning but onely the deformity of sinne, Gen. c 9. Psal. 38. 1. ad Cor. cap. 11. in the deformed, and sinfull soule; but if we consider him againe according to the naturall substance of the soule, and her naturall faculties consequent there­vnto, it is equally indubitable, that shee retained this likenesse of God, though not in the same perfection, which shee possessed before, but rather much defa­ced, blemished, and deformed.

My reason is, because there procee­ded a more excellent beauty, and per­fection vnto this naturall substance, by reason of the supernaturall qualitie of originall iustice; and consequently the depriuation of this supernaturall gift, which was also a sufficient cause of na­tures greater perfection, and more ad­mirable beauty, was a depriuation and defacing of the said beauty of nature, which otherwise had beene a perfect type, and portraiture of the diuine na­ture, and being.

CHAP. XIX.

MAny and most excellent reasons may be giuen of this, but which I must needs confesse, are rather morall congruencies, grounded in the infinite goodnesse of God, then in any other forcible convincing reason, plainely de­duced out of the sacred Text.

The first whereof may be this, that God therefore made man like vnto himselfe, that thence it might be mani­fest how much the infinite goodnesse of God exceedeth the malignitie, enuy, and malice of man: for God being in­finite in his goodnesse, yea in all other his attributes infinite; yet doth he not disdaine our of his infinite goodnesse, that, that, which in vs is limited and fi­nite should be compared and likened to that, which in him is infinite, and be­yond all comparison: he enuieth not [Page 114] the perfection of our nature, he maketh it more perfect by grace, and by a sa­cred league, and vnion, he combineth both, that by both we may be like vnto him in both, who is the author of both.

And this with such a degree of par­ticipated perfection, that man doth not only become like vnto God, but also may bee called, and is truly the adopted Sonne of God. So that all men may now participate of the grace, which one onely possessed by nature: insomuch that as he being the naturall Sonne of God, is a perfect patterne of his eternall Father by nature, so wee also be a participated likenes, and simi­litude in some degree by nature, but most perfectly by grace.

The second reason may be this (if so be that we may compare these infe­riour things of this world to those su­preme, and infinite of God) like as a temporall Prince (hauing for to shew his power, magnificence, and maiestie) built, furnished, beautified, adorned, and deck'd some excellent Citty, in [Page 115] which hee himselfe doth meane to re­maine, doth there erect, in some prin­cipall part thereof his owne image, or statue, in some precious porphire, mar­ble, or other more excellent matter: euen so Almighty God, hauing out of his infinite wisdome made this maine Machina, and beautifull Citty of the world, for the manifestation of his glo­ry, to the end that it might be knowne, and acknowledged, who was the only author and architect of all, hee was pleased to place in the midst thereof, in the garden of paradise his owne i­mage, and similitude, man (I meane) who by his soule, and the three princi­pall powers thereof should represent the vnitie and trinitie of his maker: yea and by his outward shape and forme in some sort likewise represent the in­ward, and consequently, though not immediately, euen God himselfe.

Insomuch that, as it is said of the portrature of Venus painted by Apelles, that none could perfect it, but onely Apelles who first began it: so likewise was it not possible that any should [Page 116] bring our soule to her first perfection, but only God, who was her first Crea­tor. Hence it is that like as he, who de­faceth the image or statua of an earth­ly Prince, is iustly condemned of high treason; so, a fortiori, who depraueth his owne nature, and by offending his maker depriueth it of grace, (the which is the seale, signe, and similitude of the diuine power, nature, and maiestie) is worthily condemned of high treason against the same power, and maiestie. The third motiue, why God created man to his image and similitude, may be this, to the end that all corporall things might be subiect, and each after their manner seruiceable to man, as who of all other creatures, was the expresse similitude of their lord and maker, vnto which it seemeth that God did allude, when he said vnto Noe, the feare of you and the dread of you shall be ouer euery beast of the earth, Gen: cap. 9. ver. 2. and ouer euery fowle in the heauen, and vpon all that moueth on the earth, and vpon all the fishes in the sea, &c.

And least those incorruptible crea­tures, [Page 117] the heauens, the planets, the starres, yea most of all the Angelicall powers, Cherubins or Seraphins should disdaine the seruice of man, or lest any other creature should rebell against him, who as yet had not rebelled a­gainst his God: or finally, lest the de­uils should of enuy dare against him, as who with his posteritie was to reple­nish those glorious thrones, from which those wicked spirits fell, it plea­sed therefore the diuine maiestie to beautifie, adorne, and fortifie man, with his owne likenes and similitude.

So that as it is said of Cain, Gen. 4. vers. 15. the Lord set a marke vpon Cain, lest any man finding him should kill him, so of the contrary side, it pleased our Creator, to impresse his similitude, and likenes, not only in our first father, but also in euery man, lest any man finding any other man, in whatsoeuer offence, not hauing the anthority, more then of man, should lay his hands vpon any other man. Not (I say) hauing the authoritie more then of man, such as I deeme to be in lawfull Magistrates, [Page 118] and such as are deputed by them for the execution of iustice. Because this is not onely by the instinct of nature, but also proceedeth from the author of nature, and is lastly confirmed by the giuer of grace. Insomuch that hee himselfe doth say to all his lawfull mi­nisters of iustice, and gouernours as well spirituall, as temporall, Luk. 10. ver. 16. who heareth you, heareth me, who despiseth you, despiseth me. Because as it is one and the same law, so likewise the contempt of the law is one, and the same; and consequently the punish­ment answerable therevnto must bee one, and the same: But this not onely as the law is onely from man, but as it participateth of the law of God, man being the immediate law-giuer, Gods law, and eternall wisdome being the first fountaine and rule, from whence all humane lawes are not only deriued, but also firmely established, and to bee conformed: for otherwise they be no lawes, but tyranies or depriuation of lawes, but as they be conformable to that diuine, and eternall law.

The fourth reason, or motiue that moued God Almighty to make man to his image, was, because he hauing crea­ted all these inferiour creatures, and subiected them to the rule, vse, and go­uernment of man, as to the most noble creature: so also he was pleased to or­daine him to a most noble end, the en­ioying of his Maker, that so man might be a meane to reduce other inferiour creatures, to their Creator, and end.

Wherefore to the end that this ex­cellent vnion of man with his Maker, might appeare more manifestly, he im­printed in him, his diuine image, with so liuely and firmely an impressed simi­litude, and character, that while man should remaine in his owne being, so long likewise, should he remaine, the type and image of the diuine nature and being. As it is said of the famous Phydias, that he did, with such rare Arte and cunning, ingraue his owne image in Mineruaes shield, that while the shield remained intire, his image likewise must remaine intire and vndefaced.

Another reason of the impression of [Page 120] this most excellent & beautifull image of God, in man, may bee, that man should be incited and moued thereby, to the knowledge, and loue of his Crea­tor. Wherefore as by the contempla­tion of other more imperfect creatures, he is brought in some sort to the know­ledge of God; so with much more perfection by the knowledge of him­selfe. Hence it is, that to the end, that he might be inexcusable, and not ouer­charged, in the curious searching of God in externall things, it pleased his Creator, to imprint in his soule, a most beautifull image, and cleare similitude of the diuine nature and being, the which should be a more perfect repre­sentation vnto him, of the diuine pro­perties, then he should finde in all other inferiour creatures. Man therefore, re­flecting vpon himselfe, and viewing his owne nature, may ascend vnto God, and perfectly view the diuine nature: Seeing the image, hee may also the pro­totypon: seeing himselfe, hee may as­cend by contemplation vnto God: for seeing his owne soule, he ought to con­ceiue [Page 121] it as the image of God; and what­soeuer perfection or shade of perfection he findeth in himselfe, that doubtlesse hee ought and may conceiue to bee in God, though in a more infinite degree of perfection. The soule vnderstandeth, God infinitely more; the soule freely disposeth, willeth, and determineth, much more God: the soule is capable of the diuine vertue, wisedome and grace, God is euen vertue, wisdome and grace it selfe, yea that infinite ocean of graces and gifts, from whence all other graces and gifts doe proceed: according to that of Iames chap. 1. vers. 17. Euery good giuing and euery perfect gift is from aboue, descending from the Father of lights.

CHAP. XX.

AS nothing doth more declare the loue of God towards man in this [Page 122] life, then that hee made him Lord and ruler ouer all his creatures: so nothing doth more declare the excellencie of mans nature, especially in the estate of his innocencie, then that he had power and dominion ouer all creatures, the which as they were made for his ser­uice, so were they alwayes ready at his becke in due obedience. No Lion so terrible, no Elephant so mighty, no Ti­ger so fierce, no Fowle so rauening, no Whale so monstrous, no not any crea­ture so indomite, but that it was sub­iect vnto mans dominion, while man was subiect to his, Lord and Maker. So God commanded, nature obeyed, (though now in some sort that be con­trary to nature) yea, all creatures did concurre vnto this subiection, while man was subiect vnto his Creator, who cloathed him (as the Preacher speaketh) with strength, and made him according to his owne image: yea made all flesh to feare him, so that hee had dominion ouer the beasts and fowles. Or as the Psalmist speaketh, Psal 8. v. 5. 6. 7. he made him a little lower then himselfe, crowned him with [Page 123] glory, and made him to haue dominion ouer the workes of his hands: and finally put all things vnder mans feet: all sheepe and oxen, yea and the beasts of the field, the fowles of the aire, the fish of the sea, and ouer all things which passe thorow the paths of the seas. And hence it was, that Adam as Lord of all gaue names vnto all creatures, and Eue though by nature timorous and fearfull, was not in any wise daunted at the presence and speech of the Serpent.

So that as we partly finde as yet by experience, and was much more in that happy state of Paradise, all creatures should haue beene subiect to man, while man was not disobedient to God: yea as all inferiour creatures are subiect to their superiour, according to their nature, order, perfection, and Gods decree, the imperfect to the more perfect, the matter for the formes, the corporall for the spirituall, the acci­dents for the substances, the elements for the mixts, yea euen the heauens, starres, and planets for man, man only for God, as subiect only to God, while [Page 124] he did not infringe this sacred order and chaine, where by him all things were to be reduced and linked to God.

Furthermore, this power and domi­nion of man ouer all other liuing crea­tures, proceeding from the excellencie of his nature, did remaine in him euen after his sinne, though not in the same act, or actuall exercise of his power and dominion. For albeit whatsoeuer was due vnto nature, was blemished, defa­ced, and corrupted by sinne; yet no­thing substantially belonging vnto na­ture, or necessarily consequent vnto the same, was wholly taken away. Wherefore this diuine image of God being engrauen in mans nature, mans nature remaining after sinne, the same image of God must needs remaine, at least way as much as was due vnto na­ture, or not aboue the spheare of na­ture; and consequently the aforesaid dominion must also continue, as hauing his beginning from this image: it must (I say) continue (as the Philosopher speaketh) non actu, sed potentia, not al­wayes according to the exercise of the [Page 125] act in all particulars, but according to the extent of the power in generall, as may be manifestly proued out of the 9. of Genesis: Gen. 9. v. 2. The feare of you and the dread of you shall be vpon euery beast of the earth, and vpon euery fowle of the heauen, vpon all that moueth on the earth, and vpon all the fishes of the sea; vnto your hand are they deliuered. Thus God said to Noe after the generall deluge, and consequently this dominion ouer all creatures doth remaine euen after sinne.

CHAP. XXI.

SAint Augustine answereth, that see­ing God had made man a reasona­ble creature, Aug. lib. de Ciu. c. 15. he would not haue him to domineere, but only ouer the vnreaso­nable. [Page 126] So that man should not haue had power ouer man, but onely ouer beasts, & other vnreasonable creatures. Hence it was, that our first Fathers and Patri­archs of the world were rather keepers of sheepe, and feeders of oxen, then gouernours of men; that thence wee might vnderstand, both what the right order of creatures did require, and what followed the disorder of man, and de­sert of sinne: seeing base bondage, vile slauerie, and ignominious subiection proceedeth of sinne, as rooted in sinne not springing from nature. Wherefore before the iust Noah reuenged the sinne, of his sonne, wee neuer reade in the Scripture the names of bondage, serui­tude, or slauish subiection, which there­fore must necessarily bee rather the de­sert of sinne then the effect of nature. Yea this may be confirmed, in that God giuing power vnto man ouer all inferi­our creatures, he maketh no mention of the power of man ouer man, because all men were equally made to the image of God, as likewise because in that estate all were equally to be borne both in [Page 127] perfection of nature, and adorned with grace, and consequently all were to bee equall in power and dominion, as con­sequent to the perfection of nature and height of grace, seeing this is equally grounded in nature, and with no lesse equalitie was to be confirmed by grace.

Now as it cannot be denied, but that this opinion of S. Augustine hath some probable reasons; yet I deeme the con­trary to be much more probable: to wit, that though there should haue beene no such dominion in Paradise, as which should then haue beene burdensome vnto nature, and is now necessarily fol­lowing our lapse and fall: yet question­lesse there should haue beene a kinde of order, subiection and subordination, of children, inferiours, and subiects, to their parents, superiours, and politicall gouernours: not by way of an imperi­ous command and absolute authoritie, but by a voluntary and sweet subiection flowing from nature, and confirmed by grace.

My reason is this, for as all should not haue beene equall in the gifts of na­ture, [Page 128] wisdome, knowledge, skill, mag­nanimitie, and prudence; neither could they haue beene all equally apt for poli­ticall gouernment: such as I suppose should haue beene in that most perfect place of Paradise, though in most per­fect manner. Neither may it be thought contrary to the happinesse of that estate of Paradise, that man should haue some kinde of subiection or subordination to man, seeing wee must necessarily admit the like in the blessed spirits and holy Angels: who as they are distinct in na­ture, indiuiduall, and specificall perfe­ctions; so are they no lesse in their sub­ordination, offices, and degrees. So Ierome saith, if there bee principalities, powers and vertues, it is necessary that they haue some subiect vnto them; who fearing and seruing them, are confirmed with their vertue and valour: which di­stribution of offices are not onely in this wicked world, but also are to bee in the world to come. A fortiori then, there might haue been the like subordination and order of gouernment amongst men euen in the state of innocencie.

So that as wee finde in Daniel and Za­charias, Daniel 8. Zachar. 2 that one Angell doth command another, notwithstanding the perfect blessednesse of both: so likewise it see­meth most certaine, that there might haue beene the like subordination a­mongst men, the like command and power ouer others, though wee had all remained in that pleasant place of Para­dise. The wife should haue beene sub­iect to her husband, the children to their parents, the youth to their elders, and finally all inferiours to their supe­riours.

But how then (may some say) was the subiection of the wife vnto her hus­band inflicted as a punishment due vn­to her sinne, according vnto the sen­tence of God, Genes. 4. vers. 16. thy desire shall bee subiect to thy husband, and he shall rule ouer thee? How could this be inflicted for sinne, if so be it was consequent to nature?

I answer briefly, that there is a two­fold subiection of the wife to her hus­band; the one voluntary, the other in­voluntary; the one of nature, the other of sinne; the one burdensome, the other [Page 130] gratefull; the one confirmed by grace, the other repugnant to nature: finally the one nothing repugnant to the state of innocencie, the other inflicted for originall sinne.

For certainly, though Eue had not fallen, and transgressed the commande­ment of God by tasting the forbidden fruit; yet because shee was the weaker vessell, therefore euen her owne nature would haue required subiection vnto her husband; subiection (I meane) vo­luntary, not constrained; naturall, not forced; yea free, and without any con­tradiction, which now euen the best of Eues descendents doe sometimes expe­riment in regard of their husbands, so that though the one subiection bee a propertie of nature, yet the other is a punishment of sinne, signified by these words, and he shall rule ouer thee.

CHAP. XXII.

THis doubt may be vnderstood of the seuerall parts of man, the body or the soule: first therefore as touching the soule, which as it was altogether of nothing, so it was not possible that it should be brought out of that nothing, but by the immediate power and parti­cular concourse of the Almighty: for as S. Austine saith lib. 9. de Gen. ad lit. cap. 15. as it is impossible for any Angell or creature to create it selfe, so is it no lesse that any other thing should bee produ­ced of nothing, but by him only which is aboue all things.

Wherefore the doubt onely is, whe­ther the Angels did in some sort con­curre to the creation of the body of man, seeing that (as S. Austine saith in his 8. booke de Gen. ad lit. cap. 24.) all ma­teriall and corporall creatures are subiect [Page 132] to the Angelicall powers: seeing also that their ordinary apparitions vnto men are by corporall shapes and formes, which they assume vnto themselues, it may seeme not improbable, that in like manner they may frame and depute vn­to euery soule her materiall substance, and corporall shape, yea and vnite the matter and forme together, and conse­quently that they may in some sense be said to create man.

Neuerthelesse, though I cannot de­nie, but that the Angels might in some sort concurre vnto the disposition of the materiall substance of man, and thereby instrumentally to the introdu­cing of the forme; yet they may not in any wise bee said to haue created either matter or forme, seeing both were im­mediately from Almighty God, as which were both produced of nothing.

Aug lib. 9. de Gen. ad lib. cap. 15.So (as S. Austine most fitly compa­reth) though the husbandman doe digge, plough, plant, manure and till the ground; and the Physitian by his medicines, potions and physicke doth prolong the life: yet neuerthelesse nei­ther [Page 133] of them may be said to create: euen so though the Angels might in some sort dispose to the creation or generati­on of man, yet may they not absolutely bee said to create, because this is a pro­duction of nothing presupposed, which only belongeth to an infinite power.

CHAP. XXIII.

SAint Austine answereth, Aug. lib. 6. de Gen. ad lib. cap. 13. that as it was proper only to Adam, not to be borne of parents, but framed immediately of the earth; so also was it peculiar vnto him alone, that hee was created in perfect age.

Neither may this kinde of producti­on (saith the master of the sentences) be said to be against nature, Magist. sent lib. 2. distinct. 17. vnlesse it be in regard of vs, to whom it may seeme to be beyond nature; for whatsoeuer God worketh, that in regard of God may be [Page 134] counted nature: yea this seemeth to haue some ground in the sacred text, seeing that God hauing newly created our first Fathers, he presently comman­ded them to increase and multiply: wherefore as hee created other things perfect, Gen. 1. ver. 22. & 24. and apt for to multiply each one in their seuerall kindes; so also did he create our first parents in the like per­fection both of stature and age, (as some say) as between 30. and 40. yeares of age, or (as others doe assigne) a­bout 50.

Now as concerning the dimension or greatnesse of his body, though some auerre that hee was the greatest of all men and Giants that euer were, dedu­cing it out of the 14. of Iosue, Iosue 14. Numb. 13. and the 13. of the Numbers; neuerthelesse this seemeth altogether vnprobable: if those places be vnderstood of Adam, they are rather to be interpreted so, that hee was the greatest of all men, not in quantitie, but in qualities; not in dimension of body, but in beautie both of body and soule; not in corporall extension, but in dignitie, prerogatiues, and all other [Page 135] excellencies, both corporall and spiri­tuall; because otherwise hee might ra­ther seeme a monster in regard of vs, then a man.

My opinion therefore in this point is, that as hee was created perfect in all other respects; so likewise in this of perfect corporall stature, greatnesse, and all other dimensions; and consequently that hee was created of the best stature, and proportion of all lineaments and members of his body, that euer man was, or shall be, our Sauiour onely ex­cepted.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Chrysost. in Gen. hom. 12. & 13. Eugub. in Cosmopaeia, & in Pen­tateu hum. Castro lib. 2. contra hae­reticos, vbi disputat de anima. Ferus in cap 2. Gen. Tostat. ibid. sicut & Ge­nadius ibid. CHrysostome, Eugubinus, Alphonsus de Castro, Ferus and Genadius de­nie, that the soule and the body were created in one and the same instant: yea this opinion seemeth to be grounded in the word of God, Gen. 2. vers. 7. where [Page 136] Moses saith, that the Lord God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, and the man was a liuing soule. Wherefore man (as these Doctors say) was first made according to his materiall part, afterward this mat­ter was disposed by God by the con­temperating of conuenient qualities; and lastly, after all this, was the soule infused, and vnited to the body thus disposed.

Gregorius Nicenus, Damascenus, Aqui­nas, and S. Austine are of the contrary opinion, to wit, that the soule of man was made and infused into the body in the very same instant and indiuisible point of time, in which the body was created by God.

Aquinas his reason is this, because such is the nature of parts, that while they are separate the one from the other, they are reputed to bee in an im­perfect estate: for why, the part being ordained for the whole, it cannot in any wise obtaine its due perfection, while it is a part from the whole: where­fore seeing all things were created in [Page 137] their perfect estate, in their first produ­ction: it is not likely, that either the soule was created without the body, or the body produced separate from the soule, as powerfull (I meane) and in potentia proxima (as the Philosophers speake) fully disposed for the receiuing of the soule.

CHAP. XXV.

EVsebius writeth of certaine Arabi­ans, who held, that though the soules of men should reviue in the ge­nerall resurrection vnto immortalitie, yet that now at the separation of the body, and soule, the soule perisheth with the body. Yea Tertullian also (as S. Austine writeth) doth seeme to hold no lesse. Augustin. de haer. nu: 86.

Neuerthelesse, the contrary is most [Page 138] certainely deduced, out of those places of Scripture, which do signifie that man was made to the image, and likenes of God. First, in his infinite capacity of minde, and will, which are satisfied by no created obiect. Secondly, in the liberty, which he hath vnto whatsoeuer particular good. Thirdly, in his na­turall propension vnto eternitie, and immortalitie, Plato in Alcib. & in Phaedone. Porph. l. 1. ad Boet. vide Euseb. lib. 11. de praepar: e­uangelica. the which euen Plato and Porphirius thought to be sufficient ar­guments of the soules immortalitie.

Yea the immortalitie of the soule is euidently proued, in that as Moyses saith, God constituted man supreme Lord ouer all inferiour creatures, yea in that he breathed into him a reasona­ble soule with full liberty ouer all his naturall actions, according vnto that of the fourth of Genesis, the 7. verse, where GOD saith thus vnto Cain, that his de­sire shall be subiect vnto him, and hee shall rule ouer it, but more particularly this is demonstrated out of the third of Exodus; where God saith vnto Moises, that he is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob, and [Page 139] this not of the dead, but of the liuing, as our Sauiour added in the gospell.

Finally, this may be deduced out of Deuteron: 4, where it is said, that God made the Sunne, the Moone, the starres, and the planets for the seruice of man, as for a more perfect creature, and conse­quently participating a more perfect immortalitie, then is the incorruption of those eternall globes, and starres.

CHAP. XXVI.

SOphronius, Ierome, Sophronius in his 11. ep. in the 6. Synode. Hierom. l. 2. con [...] Pae. lag. Damas. l. 2. de fide or­thod. c. 3. & 12. and Damascene are of opinion that the Angels and humane soules are not immortall of their owne nature, but only by Gods grace. To this also S. Paul in his first Epistle to Timothie, and his last chapter may seeme to incline, where hee saith, that God onely hath immortalitie. Plato [Page 140] plainely insinuateth the same of An­gells, much more then of humane spirits.

Neuerthelesse it is most certaine, that mans soule is immortall euen of its owne nature, for which reason our Sa­uiour commandeth vs Math: 10. not to feare them that kill the body, Math. 10. ver. 28. but are not able to kill the soule. Wherefore as the body is mortall, and corruptible, it fol­loweth by the antithesis, that the soule is immortall, and incorruptible.

Againe this is most plaine out of di­uers other places of scripture, Psalme 29, & 16. Ecclesiasticus 12, and the 9. Matth. 10. 2. Sam. 23. & 32. Phil. 1.23. 1. Pet. 3. & 19. Apoc. 9.6. & 7.9.

CHAP. XXVII.

AS touching the first point, that he was not created in Paradise, it is [Page 141] manifest, that though the woman was created in paradise, yet the man was not, for so it is said of him. Gen: 2. the 15. verse. Then the Lord tooke the man, and put him in the garden of Eden, that he might dresse it, and keepe it, there­fore he was not there before, at his first creation, though Eue was; for so it was conuenient, that shee should be produ­ced of Adam in his most perfect state, and being, according to both body, soule, and habitation, which is the opi­nion of Basil, Aquinas, Basil. homil. de paradyso. Aquinas 1. parte q. 102 ar. 4 & plu­res in 2. sen­tentiarum distinct. 18. and the most of the ancient Diuines against Tertullian, Iosephus, and Rupertus.

As touching the second point, that God tooke man, and put him into the gar­den of Eden. This may be vnderstood three wayes; first by inward inspira­tion, by which God might shew him, that it was his pleasure, that hee should haue that for his habitation, in which sense many vnderstand that of Math. 4. that our Sauiour was caried of the spirit into the wildernes, to wit, by the inward inspiration of the Holy Ghost, though he went also voluntarily of himselfe.

Secondly, we may vnderstand it, that he was caried by the spirit of God, or rather conveighed by the immediate power of the Almighty, as we read of Henoch, Habacuck, and Philip.

Or lastly, that he was transported by some Angell, in the shape and forme of man, who shewing him the way, did lead him into paradise, as wee read of the Angell Raphael, how he lead Tobias, and to this last I incline the rather, be­cause it is the opinion of S. Austine.

But now it may be demanded, why God would not create man in paradise? the reason may be, to the end that hee might more manifestly vnderstand his goodnes, and liberality towards him, and that, that place was rather giuen vnto him of meere grace, then any wise due by nature.

But why then (may some say) were the Angels created in heauen, yea all other liuing creatures created each in their owne place? I answer, that nei­ther the puritie of the empyreall hea­uen, did exceed the Angelicall puritie, neither the grosnesse of this inferiour [Page 143] globe of the earth, did exceed the na­ture of corporall creatures there liuing, and therefore these two places were most apt for the creation and habitati­on of Angels, and these inferiour crea­tures. But such was the perfection of paradise, that it was in no wise to bee deemed a conuenient place for humane habitation, mans nature (I meane) only considered, not the grace, and bounty of God thereby manifested.

CHAP. XXVIII.

MOyses answereth, Gen: 2. ver: 15. that the Lord tooke the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, that he might dresse it, and keepe it; or as the vulgar hath, that he might worke in it, to giue vs to vnderstand how much God abhor­reth idlenesse, seeing that euen in that place, where there was no neede of la­bour, [Page 144] God would not haue man idle: not an ill item for our lazie gallants, who thinke their gentilitie to consist in idlenes, and a point of honour to liue of other mens labour: but euen in this (I am of opinion) that God doth pun­ish them, that they haue more griefes, and more discontent in their idle plea­sures, then others in their most weari­some toiles, and labours, which though it be a most voluntary bondage, yet is it likewise the most base, and cruell sla­uerie to the base appetites; a tyranny of Satan, a double bondage to a dou­ble tyrant, to Satan, to sinne; for as S. Paul saith, who committeth sinne, is the slaue to sinne; so who subiecteth himselfe to the suggestions of Satan is a slaue to Satan; an intolerable slauery, and an infinite misery; the beginning miserable, the proceedings damnable, the end, as which hath no end, into­lerable.

Now therefore lest Adam or his po­steritie should by alluring idlenes, come to this endles paine; God of his mercy placed Adam in paradise, vt operaretur, [Page 145] & custodiret illum, that he might worke and keepe it, to wit, that hee working might keepe paradise, and paradise by the same worke might keepe him from idlenes, from sinne: because that is the ordinarie cause of sinne, for as it is true, that which the Poët saith, that labour blunteth the arrowes of Cupid, so doth it no lesse other darts of the deuill.

But hence peraduenture some patron of idlenes may inferre, that labour was contrary to that blessed state of Para­dise, as which required all quiet, rest, and content; no, rather I say that it was consequent, or necessarily pertaining to that blessed state, seeing that labour was not any toile, or paine, but rather a plea­sure, and a voluntary effect of his well disposed minde, as it is now likewise to men not so ill affected, quorum otium, as Seneca said, maximum negotium, so as S. Austine saith l. 8. de Gen: ad lit: cap. 8. non esset laboris afflictio, sed voluntatis exhilaratio, cùm ea, quae Deus creauerat humani generis adiutorium, laetius sera­ciú (que) provenirent, that it should not be a toile or affliction of the body, but a [Page 146] recreation, and reioycing of the will and minde.

CHAP. XXIX.

THe difficultie of this question pro­ceedeth of the diuers readings of the precept, because some with Greg. l. 35. moral. cap. 10. do read it according to the Greeke in the plurall; the He­brue, & Caldaean, with the vulgar Latin, and English are in the singular. Gen. 21.16. and the Lord God commanded the man, saying, thou shalt eat freely of euery tree of the garden, but of the tree of knowledge of good & euill, thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt dye the death. Whereby wee see that this commandement was directed to the man only, not to the woman, seeing [Page 147] shee as yet was not created, as is appa­rent out of the 18 verse, the 21, 22, & 23, where the creation of Eue is de­scribed.

Neuerthelesse it is manifest that the same commandment was extended to Eue also, for so shee answered the ser­pent according to the vulgar edition, de ligno quod est in medio paradysi, praece­pit nobis deus ne comederemus, but of the tree, which is in the midst of Paradise, God commanded vs, wee should not eat; wherfore though this precept was principally giuen to Adam, yet was it also to be obserued of Eue, for as they were conioyned in nature, so were they not to be separated in regard of their precept and grace.

But why then (may some say) was the name onely of Adam expressed? I an­swer with Rupertus lib. 2. de Trinitate, & operibus eius c. 32. because the precept was principally giuen vnto him, as vpon whose obedience or breach, his, and his posterities happinesse did solely depend, not vpon Eues.

CHAP. XXX.

TErtullian, in the beginning of his booke against the Iewes, saith, that this commandement was giuen to A­dam, as the first principall foundation and ground from whence all other lawes were deriued, and in which all the ten Commandments be virtually included: so that as Adam was the first beginning of mankinde, so this was the first ground of all other lawes. But though this cannot be reiected, as an improbable speculation, yet certainely it is not so firmely grounded in the sa­cred text, as Tertullian imagined.

The reasons therefore in my opini­on why God so strictly prohibited the eating of the aforesaid fruit, was, first, that thereby, as God had declared vnto vs, his power ouer vs: so wee should [Page 149] shew our obedience towards him: not that (as S. Austine noteth) God hath neede of our seruice; Augustin. l. 8. de Gen. ad literam cap. 11. but that wee haue neede of his power, protection, rule, and dominion ouer vs; according to that of the Psalmist, who speaking in the person of God, saith, constitue super eos legislatorem, vt sciant gentes quoniam homines sunt, Constitute a ruler ouer them, (as the vulgare translateth) that the heathen may know that they are but men: so that as it is a token of vassalage, and subiection to receiue lawes, so is it of power, dominion, and authority to command, constitute, ordaine, and set downe lawes to bee obserued. Yea secondly, God gaue this law vnto man, that thereby he might exercise his obe­dience towards God, a vertue as neces­sary to man, as acceptable in the sight of God, Aug. lib. 8. de Gen ad literā cap. 8. and therefore (as S. Austine well noteth) God gaue not this law in any obiect of it selfe otherwise euill, or of its owne nature good: to the end that the vertue of his obedience might be the more illustrious; because it de­riueth not his excellencie, from the ma­teriall [Page 150] obiect, but from the formall, the sole subiection to Almighty God.

It may seeme peraduenture not im­probable to some, that the law of na­ture, which God had infused into the nature of man, might haue sufficed to lay open, try, and manifest mans obe­dience towards God: to what end then should the second law of abstay­ning from the tree of the knowledge of good and euill be added, as a second tryall of that which otherwise might sufficiently bee manifest by the law of nature, and obedience therevnto? I answer, that the law of nature would not haue beene a sufficient tryall of A­dams obedience: because it is not alto­gether manifest by the law of nature, that God is sole and supreme Lord o­uer all mankinde: for some doe ima­gine that the law of nature is a proper­tie onely due vnto a reasonable crea­ture, as euery species, or kinde of liuing creatures hath their particular proper­tie agreeing to their nature.

Againe some are of opinion, that those things which are contained in the [Page 151] law of nature, are to be imbraced, or reiected in as much as they agree, or disagree with naturall reason: not as they are commanded, or forbidden by God, as supernaturall agent. So that although it be prescribed by God vnto all men, yet doth it not sufficiently ma­nifest his most ample & absolute power ouer all mankinde: seeing that by this law there is not any thing commanded, or forbidden, but onely that which is according to humane reason, either good, or euill, of its owne nature.

Wherefore Gods absolute domini­on, and extent of his diuine power, were not sufficiently knowne onely by this law of nature, but onely as it is a­greeable to the instinct of nature: the which as it was but onely in things within the spheare of nature, could not possible shew the extent of the abso­lute power of God in things both with in the compasse of nature, and aboue nature.

Hence Gregorie well noteth, Lib. 33 mo­ralium cap. 10. that the forbidden fruit was not euill of its owne nature, but was forbidden, to the end, that [Page 152] man being created vpright by nature, might increase in righteousnes by the sub­iection of his nature, and perfection of his obedience to the author of nature.

CHAP. XXXI.

THe answer is easie, to wit, that by the tryall of his obedience, in this one commandment, hee might subiect the whole man vnto himselfe in all things, and that man by the breach, or keeping of the said commandement, might know by wofull experience (as he truely did in his wofull fall) the dif­ference, betweene good and euill; so that whereas before hee knew it onely by contemplation, now he should find it by a lamentable experience: yea, in [Page 153] this, his sinne was the greater, in that the obiect of his obedience was so fa­cile, and the commandement so easie to be kept. Aug. li. 14. de ciu. Dei, cap. 15. For (as S. Austine saith) like as the obedience of Abraham is highly extol­led, because the slaying of his sonne with his owne hands was of such difficultie; euen so the disobedience of Adam in Paradise was the more hainous, by how much the precept which he had imposed was the more facile to haue beene fulfilled. Againe, as the obedience of the second Adam was so much the more admirable, because hee was obedient euen vnto death; so the dis­obedience of the first Adam was the more detestable, by which he became disobedient euen vnto death: for where the punishment of the disobedience is great, and the thing commanded easie, who can expresse how great an euill it is, not to obey, and how great an iniurie to so great a power, espe­cially threatning so great punishments?

Now as touching the second point, I answer, that therefore God as absolute in his will, science, and power, would create Adam, and giue him the aforesaid precept, which hee knew neuerthelesse [Page 154] hee would so presently violate; to the end that his vnhappy fall might bee an occasion of our most happy Redeemer: for as the Schooles commonly hold, if Adam had not sinned, the Sonne of God had not beene incarnated: so that (as Gregory saith) in regard of this it was a happy fall, which deserued, or rather re­quired to haue such a Redeemer: O foe­lix culpa, quae talem ac tantum habere me­ruit Redemptorem: in which I know not whether I should more admire the goodnesse of God in the creation and restauration of man, or the ingratitude of man towards God, in and after both his creation, redemption, and infinite offences and falles; but that as it is the nature of that infinite goodnesse to effe­ctuate the greatest good, of the greatest euill, so is it no lesse consequent to mans naturall propension, and of himselfe, as it were an infinite of euill, of the greatest good to worke the greatest euill: a thing not easily beleeued, if our daily and wo­full experience did not so manifestly proue it: for as God by our greatest and originall euill, did worke our greatest [Page 155] and originall good, and this onely out of his infinite goodnesse (the incarnati­on I meane of his eternall Sonne) so man out of his infinite malice, did by occasion of this so infinite a benefit, worke the most wicked outrage that could bee imagined, against his benefa­ctour, by seeking his dishonour and death, who so abased himselfe, to giue him life: so that I know not whether I should more admire God shedding his bloud for man, or man spilling the bloud of God; mans ingratitude to­wards God, or Gods infinite bountie towards man.

And hence it is, that as faith teach­eth vs, this euill and sinne of Adam was foreseene and permitted of God, so is it no lesse a blasphemous heresie, to auerre, that this or any other sinne is wrought by God, wrought I meane by his particular command or concourse; not by his vniuersall, which is due vnto all entitie and being, yet in some sense neither due vnto this of sinne, as which in it selfe hath neither entitie nor being: but rather (if wee speake formally) is a [Page 156] priuation of all rectitude, goodnesse, and being.

CHAP. XXXII.

AS it is certaine that the mortalitie of Adam, and consequently of all mankinde, did proceed of sinne; so it hath no small difficultie to declare what instant death that was, which God so instantly threatned should follow mans sinne, for so saith the text, Gen. 2. the 17. verse: In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death. What day is this? what death is this? seeing that he nei­ther first sinned the last day of his life, nor yet died the first day of his sinne: true it is, that as death was due at his last day, for his first sinne, so was it not in­flicted in the first houre, for his first dayes sinne. Was this death peraduen­ture [Page 157] the priuation of grace, by which his soule supernaturally liued? for as the body liueth by the soule, so Adams soule liued by grace, consequently as the body is said to die by the absence of the soule, so the soule spiritually by the priuation of grace: but yet though this be true, yet it cannot bee the sole meaning of the aforesaid words; so that then no other death should haue beene due vnto man, but only the death of the soule, the separation from God, who as he had sinned both in body and soule, was iustly to be punished in body and soule; which the effect afterward shewed, that God had before accor­dingly decreed: so that the sentence of his death, as it was executed both in bo­dy and soule, so it is to bee vnderstood to haue beene decreed as well in regard of the body, as of the soule; because the corporall death is a necessary con­sequent of the spirituall; now then the spirituall being inflicted in the very in­stant of mans sinne, how chanced it that the corporall also did not befall him in the day of his sinne? especially [Page 158] seeing that though God threatned not death in the instant of his sinne, for the instant of his sinne, yet at least God saith, that man shall die in the day of his sinne.

Is it peraduenture threatned, and not truly decreed? or if really decreed, how is it not absolutely performed? God threatned his death in the day of his eating; Adam eateth, and yet liueth long after his eating. Could Adam change the decree of God, or could God decree that hee meant not to per­forme? Hee performed not, therefore he decreed not; if he decreed not, how then was it said, In the day that thou ea­test thou shalt die the death; not of the soule only, for that was instantly, but of the body principally, seeing that is said to be in tempore, in the day, not in instanti, or momentarily. Was it a threat only, as wee reade of the Niniuites? but they changed their minde, they repen­ted their sinne; therfore as the sentence was conditionall, the condition being changed, the sentence of God (though eternall) is said to be reuoked, not chan­ged [Page 159] in act, but immuted in obiect, the act being immutable, the obiect muta­ble, according to the decree of the im­mutable act. But here in this of Adam, the cause is altered; God threatneth, the sinne is committed, why then is not the sentence presently executed? In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die the death.

Iustinus the Martyr, Iustinus in dialogo cum Triphone Iren. lib. 5. aduersus haereticos. in this more acute then Catholike, answereth, that euen the very same day that Adam was de­priued of the spirituall life of his soule, he was no lesse also of the other of his body: for though he died not the same day, according to the naturall reuoluti­on of the heauen, yet seeing that a thou­sand yeeres (as Dauid and Peter speake) are but as one day in regard of Gods eternitie, Adams death being within the compasse of the thousand yeeres, may well be said according to Gods and the Scriptures phrase, to haue died euen the same day that he was created.

But seeing true histories doe seldome admit any such subtilities, I rather in­cline to the interpretation of Ierome and [Page 160] S. Austine, who vnderstand that sentence of death, not of death then instantly in­flicted, but of the necessitie of death then forthwith contracted. Ierome therefore commendeth Symmacus, who for that which our translation hath, morieris, thou shalt die, translateth mor­talis eris, thou shalt become mortall: so that whereas hee had beene created to an eternitie of life, now he is made sub­iect to the penaltie of death; or as our interpretation seemeth to insinuate, euen to death it selfe, seeing that euen from thenceforth hee began to be mor­tall, who by grace before was altoge­ther immortall. So that, as according to true Philosophie, wee may say, that the alteration of qualities, or the dispo­sitions vnto generation, are in some sort generation; so likewise by this phrase of Scripture, that Adam should die in the day of his sinne, we may well vnderstand that he began to die, dispositiuè, by way of disposition, in the day of his sinne, seeing sinne was the immediate disposi­tion or cause of his mortalitie and death, sinne (I say) being the cause of [Page 161] his mortalitie, his mortalitie conse­quently prepared forthwith the way vnto death. For so it is said in the se­cond booke of the Kings; We all die, and slide away as water: for though at the present, while we liue, we be not iointly dead, yet because wee slide away to­wards death, as the flouds towards the Ocean, wee are all said to die instantly, because our life, euen from the first in­stant thereof, is nothing else but a swift sliding towards death: yea our tempo­rall life (as Gregory the great well no­teth) compared to the eternall, is rather to be called a present death, then a con­tinued life; seeing that our continuall corruption and declining towards death, may rather be tearmed a long or continuall death, then euen a very mo­mentarie life.

CHAP. XXXIII.

AS it is most certaine that the prin­cipal end of the creation of Adam was to serue, loue, honour and obey his Lord and maker; so the same likewise was the womans principal end. Againe, as Adams secondary end was to bee the father of mankinde, so was it also Eues to be the mother of all, and to bee a comfort and helpe vnto her husband, Gen. 2. vers. 18. It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an helper meet for him: good neither in regard of God, of man, nor of the world; of God for his seruice, of man for his helpe, of the world for procreation: for though this was not absolutely necessary, nei­ther in regard of God, man, or the world; yet supposing the decree of God, that hee would be preserued by the beautifull disposition and order of [Page 163] this world, it was not only most conue­nient, but in some sort necessary, that he should make man a helper, and a hel­per meet for him: for though hee could otherwise haue disposed of things by immediate creation, yet was it more agreeable to the nature of things, and for the sweeter disposition of the course of nature, that mankinde should rather be multiplied by naturall course of ge­neration, then by supernaturall power and immediate creation.

Hence peraduenture it may be infer­red, that seeing God saith, it is not good that the man should be himselfe alone, that consequently it must be euill if hee bee alone; and therefore as by this sentence lawfull matrimonie is confirmed, so vir­ginitie by the contrary consequence is condemned: for whatsoeuer is opposite to that which is good, must necessarily bee condemned as bad, as which is no­thing else but the priuation of good.

To this I answer, (as our Sauiour did to the Sadduces, in their obiection tou­ching mariage) Matth. the 22.29. verse, Yee are deceiued, not knowing the Scrip­tures: [Page 164] for as Christ is not against Moses, neither the new Testament contrary to the old, neither the greater perfection to the lesse; so neither is virginitie contrary to matrimonie; both are laudable, both in their degree excellent, but virginitie more laudable, more excellent, most admirable, as by which wee rather imi­tate the angelicall state and perfection, then follow our owne depraued nature and corruption. This is the definition of Paul, not any humane inuention; for thus doth Paul determine this con­trouersie, the 1. to the Corinthians, ch. 7. vers. 25. Now concerning virgins I haue no command of the Lord; but I giue mine aduice, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithfull. Loe here, virgi­nitie is not commanded, but commen­ded; not exacted by force, but commen­ded through grace; neither counselled to all, because it cannot be performed of all; counselled therefore onely to some, and those but few, seeing few can attaine to this perfection.

1. Cor. c 7. vers. 27.My counsell therefore is that of Saint Paul, Art thou bound vnto a wife? seeke [Page 165] not to be loosed, lest loosing the knot, which God hath knit, thou loose thy selfe. Art thou loosed from a wife? seeke not a wife: here Paul counselleth, hee commandeth not, neither is his coun­sell extended to all, seeing all cannot be capable of this counsell; not onely by nature, because this is not any gift of nature, but also euen by a lesser measure of grace: for though the Sunne of iustice doth shine ouer the iust and vniust, and send downe the dew of his grace vnto all, yet not with equalitie vnto all, but according vnto his good pleasure and will.

Wherefore as S. Paul prosecuteth, If thou takest a wife, thou sinnest not; and if a Virgin marie, she sinneth not: verse 37. He that standeth firme in his heart, that he hath not neede, but hath power ouer his owne will, and hath so decreed in his heart, that he will keepe his virgin, he doth well: so then hee that giueth her to mariage doth well, but he that giueth her not to mariage doth better: the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liueth; but if her husband be dead, she is at libertie to marie [Page 166] with whom she will, only in the Lord: but she is more blessed if she abide, in my iudge­ment; and I thinke that I haue also the spi­rit of God.

Neither is this the minde onely of S. Paul, but euen of his master our Lord and Sauiour: Matth. 10. Some there bee, which haue made themselues Eunuches for the kingdome of heauen: not that this is contrary to the first institution of ma­trimonie, but only a greater perfection, supposing a sufficient or superabundant multiplication of mankinde; so that (as Cyprian saith) the first decree of God was concerning generation, the second perswaded continencie; when the world was as yet void and rude, wee multiplied by generation; now that the world is filled, and fully replenished, those that can containe, spadonum more viuentes, castrantur ad regnum, by puritie of life doe dedicate themselues to the kingdome of heauen.

Now as touching the time and place of Eues creation, and first as concerning the time, it is euident out of the sacred text, that Adam was first created. Paul [Page 167] in the first of Timothie, chap. 2. saith, that Adam was first created, and then Eue. Furthermore, it is euidently deduced out of Moses, when he saith, Gen. 2. that after Adam was created, all the liuing creatures were brought before him, among all which no helpe meet for him being found, the Lord God caused an heauie sleepe to fall vp­on the man, and he slept, and he tooke one of his ribs, and closed vp the flesh in stead thereof, and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman.

Hence it is euident, that there was some time betweene the creation of the man, and the womans production: but it is not so easie to determine, how much that was, though certaine it bee, that this time did not exceed the com­passe of the first six dayes: for in the se­uenth day God ended his worke which hee made, and the seuenth day he rested from all his worke which he had made. Where­fore the creation of Eue could not bee the seuenth, as Catharinus and others presume to auerre.

As concerning the place, where Eue was created, though Iosephus, and Ter­tullian [Page 168] doe thinke, that shee was created out of Paradise: neuerthelesse the con­trary seemeth more agreeable to the written word: for there it is euident, that after Adam was brought into Para­dise, all liuing creatures were set before him: where God seeing the necessitie of the womans creation, to wit, that A­dam might haue an helpe meete for him, he framed her out of the side of Adam, for so saith the text, and the Lord God said, it is not good for man to be alone, I will make him an helpe meete for him. And the Lord God caused a deepe sleepe to fall vpon Adam, and he sleept; and he tooke one of his ribbs, Gen. 2.18.21. & 22. and closed vp the flesh in stead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from him, made he a woman. Wherefore it is not in any wise proba­ble (as some haue coniectured) that af­ter Adam had beene in Paradise, hee was caried out againe, and Eue then cre­ated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

THis difficultie doth principally a­rise out of the diuers translations of the fore-alleadged text. Gen: 2.21, where it is said, that the Lord caused an heauy sleepe to fall vpon man, and he slept, where in place of the Hebrue word Tar­demah, Aquila translateth [...], and Simachus [...], a profound sleepe.

But most of the Fathers following the translation of the seauenty two In­terpreters, translate an extasis, or an ex­cesse of minde.

My opinion is, that seeing the transla­tion permitteth both, that it is to giue vs to vnderstand, how it was both a sleepe, and an extasis, or an extaticall sleepe, or a sleepie extasis: a sleepe, be­cause the text in rigor doth signifie a [Page 170] sleepe: an extasis, or rapt, because hee had then his minde supernaturally illu­minated, and filled with a propheticall spirit, insomuch that presently awa­king, he said forth with, this now is bone of my bones, Gen. 2.23. and flesh of my flesh: shee shall be called woman, because shee was ta­ken out of man.

CHAP. XXXV.

THe master of the sentences, and di­uers other schoole Diuines say, that Eue was framed out of the side of Adam sleeping, for to signifie the my­sticall production of the Church, out of the sacred side of the second Adam dy­ing; but with this difference of pro­ductions, that the first sleepe was ioyfull [Page 171] to the first Adam, because hee had not transgressed as yet; the second, most ig­nominions and painefull vnto the se­cond, because he had taken vpon him the sinnes of the first. The first was de­priued of paine, by particular dispensa­tion of the author of nature; the se­cond was full of ignominie, and paine, by a supernaturall, and gracious dispen­sation of God, as author both of nature, and grace: to the end that nature being now depraued by sinne, might be rai­sed againe, and restored to her former estate by an omnipotent grace.

But now could this be, the Adam should haue a ribbe taken from him without any griefe?

For the vnderstanding of this wee must necessarily praesuppose that no griefe was agreeable to Adams estate be­fore his fall. Now then I answer, that as God could, and de facto, did suspend, or withdraw his concourse, and action from the Babilonian fire, for the preser­uation of the three children, Sidrach, Misach, and Abednego: so likewise here, for to shew the like power, did God [Page 172] withdraw his concurse from all natu­rall passion, which naturally should haue followed the extracting of the ribbe.

Now to the last, why the woman was not created immediatly of the earth, as well as the man, but of the mans side and ribbe? I answer, it was, to the end, that Adam acknowledging her to bee a part of his substance, and shee also knowing that shee proceeded thence, it might be an occasion of a more perfect loue: for that otherwise, he considering how shee was the cause of his misery, it might be an occasion of a perpetuall, and implacable hatred betweene them: or principally this was to signifie the mysticall vnion betweene the second Adam Christ, and his Church; accord­ing to that of Paul, Ephes. 3.32. this is a great myste­rie, but I speake concerning Christ, and con­cerning the Church, because the diuine vnion betweene Christ, and his spouse, was signified by the vnion of Adam, and Eue: so that as Eue was framed out of the first Adams ribbe, so was the Church out of the side of the second.

CHAP. XXXVI.

IT was not without the particular prouidence of the wisdome of God, that the woman was not made neither of the most principall, nor of the most base parts of man: not of the princi­pall, lest shee should be too impudent; neither of the baser, lest shee should be too much debased; shee was therefore created of the ribbe, and of that ribbe, which was next to the heart; the one to signifie the mediocritie of her condi­tion; the other to insinuate the esteeme, and respect, which both shee should haue towards Adam, and Adam towards her; as also to signifie the heart, loue, and fidelitie, which he should beare vn­to her, who had her being from so neere his heart.

Now the difficultie is, how Eue being of so perfect stature, as she was created, [Page 174] could be created out of a ribbe of so lit­tle quantitie, seeing either shee was e­quall in stature with the man, or not farre inferiour in greatnes vnto him, was there any matter added vnto the ribbe? or was the same matter of the ribbe multiplied? surely it might be, as Lombard, and Gabriel said, by the mul­tiplication of the same matter, or by rarefaction of the same ribbe; or rather, which I deeme more probable, by ad­dition of new matter, as the Diuines hold it happened in the multiplication of the fiue barly loaues (of which wee read in the gospell).

Neither may it be inferred hence, that then it should rather haue beene said, that the woman was framed of other matter, then of the ribbe of Adam, be­cause the more principall part beareth the name, not alwaies the greater; espe­cially, when the principall part, is not only the principall, but also the first of the whole compound or worke.

Wherefore, seeing the ribbe of Adam was the first, and principall matter, of which the woman was created, and vn­to [Page 175] the which the other was but an addi­tion: it is therefore rightly, and abso­lutely said, that Eue was made of the ribbe of Adam, without the expressing of any other matter; because, though the new assumed matter was the greater in quantitie, yet lesse in perfection: so likewise in the muitiplication of the fiue loaues, though that which was added was much more, then the precedent quantitie of bread; yet because it was but an addition vnto the former, there­fore the name was deriued of the more principall part, according to the com­mon axiome of the Philosophers, deno­minatio sequitur principaliorem partem, the name must follow the more princi­pall part.

CHAP. XXXVII.

BOth the Phisitians, and Philoso­phers doe agree in this, that euery [Page 174] [...] [Page 175] [...] [Page 176] man according to his naturall constitu­tion, and perfection hath 24 ribbes, twelue of each side; wherefore if our first father had thirteene on the leaft, it may bee thought that this was rather monstrous, then agreeable to nature, which neither admitteth want, nor su­perfluitie; either therefore this ribbe was super-abundant in him, and so he monstrous by super-abundance, or it is wanting in vs, and so we monstrous by defect.

I answer, that though it were mon­strous in any of vs to haue 13 ribbes, yet was it in no wise in respect of Adam: it were in regard of vs, because none is to be created of vs; but in regard of him the defect were rather monstrous, because Eue was to be created of it; so that neither was Adam a monster, when he had that, which we haue not, neither yet deficient, when he wanted that of which Eue was created: because the name of monster is not so much in re­gard of superabundance or want, as in regard of the ends, and purposes inten­ded by the author of nature, grounded [Page 177] in that, which is most connaturall.

Wherefore, though in regard of the particular nature of Adam, as hee was but one particular man, this ribbe was superfluous, and so consequently in an other person might be thought mon­strous, yet in regard of him, of whom the rest of mankinde was to proceed, it was most naturall.

Neither doe these two sorts of con­siderations imply contradiction: seeing that euen in nature we haue infinite ex­amples of this: for so the heauiest drosse, and massiest matter, hath a naturall, and particular inclination to descend to the center, which neuerthelesse will ascend for the preseruation of the course of na­ture: ne detur vacuum, when there is any danger of vacuitie of aire, or want of any other body, which naturally should fill all places; so that, as to des­cend is proper to heauy things, conside­ring their particular inclination, and na­ture; so to ascend is no lesse agreeable vnto their nature considering their vni­uersall propension for the preseruation of the vniuersall good of nature.

In like manner if we consider Adam, as one particular man, not as first parent of our humane nature, it were mon­strous, that hee should haue more ribbs on the leaft side, then on the right, or more then any of his posteritie haue: but if we consider him, as he was to be the first father of mankinde, after that particular manner that God hath deter­mined, it was most necessarie, and agree­able to his nature, that hee should haue more ribbs then any other of the same specificall nature, seeing, that our first mother Eue was to haue her being of this ribbe of his, and we all ours, by her.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

GRegory Nisene, Damascene, Chryso­stome, Procopius Gazeus, and diuers others were of opinion, that if Adam had not sinned, there should haue beene [Page 179] no such naturall generation of man­kinde, as is now, but rather an immedi­ate multiplication, and production of men by the immediate power of God. So that as we shall be like vnto the An­gels in the coelestiall Paradise through our vnion vnto Christ; so wee should not haue beene vnlike vnto them in the terrestriall by the immediate producti­on of God: wherefore as sinne was the cause of our dissimilitude from the An­gelicall life, so was it (according to these Fathers) the cause also of the dissimili­tude of our production; the Angells being by creation immediately from God, wee not immediately, but by mediate generation: and hence it is that Austine saith, that consanguinities, and affinities proceed of sinne, not of nature.

The ground peraduenture of these Doctors may be the impure, and cor­rupt manner of our generation, and the deformitie of lust together with the im­moderate pleasure thereof proceeding, the which our first fathers (as S. Austine saith) presently vpon their sinne expe­rimented, [Page 180] and thence were ashamed and couered themselues.

Neuerthelesse, I cannot but deeme it most certaine, but that so long, as mans superiour powers were subiect to God, so long also should mans inferiour powers haue beene obedient to man; wherefore whiles there was no defor­mitie by sin in the will, neither should there haue beene any filthines or abomi­nation in the actions of nature: But as our eyes, and other senses be as yet sub­iect to our will, so also, all other now re­belling inferiour powers, should haue beene subiect to their superiour: lastly, as all deformities and disorder should haue beene taken away; so all confor­mitie and order should haue beene left. The sensitiue appetite should haue been subiect to the reasonable, the reasonable to the spirit, the spirit to God. And as no disorder in nature could proceede from the author of nature; so no dis­order in the acts of nature, could haue beene found in the course of nature; and this, though euen in the very estate of innocencie there had beene genera­tion [Page 181] of mankinde, as now it is: as now (I meane) in the substance of the act, not in the manner of raigning, and ra­ging lust.

And this certainely was Gods intent in the creating of our first fathers male, and female; because, if it had not been for generations sake, they might haue beene both created males: because all things at their first creation were created in their greatest perfection: if therefore the man bee more per­fect then the woman, why should they not both haue been created male, if it had not beene for their multiplica­tion, by the ordinarie course of genera­tion, especially seeing God blessed them with these words, which signifie no lesse; increase, or (as the Hebrue hath) fructifie, and multiply, especially seeing (as the Philosopher saith) generation is the most naturall action of life; Aristotiles lib. 2. de a­nima, & lib. 4. meteor. yea then euery thing is in his perfect estate, when it is powerfull to bring forth another like to it selfe.

CHAP. XXXIX.

AS touching the first point, I thinke it most probable, that there should haue beene more men, then women, if so be that wee had persisted in the state of innocencie: my reason is, because nature then being in a full perfection, would for the most part haue produced the most perfect, which questionlesse is the male, for the most part I say, not al­waies, because the female also was ne­cessary for the naturall propagation of mankinde.

Againe it was necessarie for the most part, not altogether necessarie, but only most perfect, and therefore most agree­able to that most perfect estate.

As touching the second point of the multiplication of the female sexe, and how that could be connaturall and a­greable to that perfect estate of para­dise, seeing it belongeth to the perfe­ction of nature, to bring forth the most perfect, and consequently male not fe­male, as which is rather a declining from perfection, and argueth some weaknes in nature, or imperfection in the Parents; Aristotelis de genera­tione ani­malium lib. 4 cap. 2. & 6. yea as Aristotle saith is prae­ter intentionem agentis, and therefore seemeth rather a monstrous act of ge­neration, then a perfect issue, or patterne of the Parents, or nature.

And least this may seeme improba­ble, euen nature herselfe (as the Philo­sopher writeth) giueth sufficient tokens and signes of this, seeing that the female sex is begotten rather in tender and old age, then in the flourishing, and vigo­rous time of mans age: for as naturall heat hath not attained vnto his perfe­ction in the one, so hath it lost his for­mer vigour in the other. It is also ordi­narily seene that the moistest, and most feeble bodies doe beget females, by [Page 184] reason of the want of naturall heate.

Furthermore the same philosopher saith, that the female kinde being of their owne nature feeble, and cold, are to be deemed as a defect, errour, default, or declination of nature.

Neuerthelesse I answer briefely, (be­cause this matter more belongeth to Philosophy then to Diuinitie) that the production of the female, doth not pro­ceede only, or rather not alwaies of the defect of nature; but oftentimes also of the more remisse manner of con­curse of the power of generation, as also of the imagination thereto incli­ning, and other like naturall defects: whence it is, that though the generation of the female be in vs a signe of lesse vigor of nature; yet was it not so in Adam, but rather it proceeded of the afore-said causes of the imaginatiue ap­prehension, or particular disposition of the author of nature, for the multipli­cation of mankinde.

CHAP. XL.

IT is the common opinion of the Fa­thers, and other Diuines, that Adam had infused into his soule a most perfect knowledge of all naturall obiects, ac­cording to that of the Preacher, the 17. chapter, where thus hee describeth the creation of man, together with the pre­rogatiues wherewith he was first endu­ed, vers. 3. Ecclesiasti­cus cap. 17. v. 3.4 5.6.7 8 9.10.11. He endued them with strength by themselues, and made them according to his image, and put the feare of man vpon all flesh, and gaue them dominion ouer beasts and fowles. They receiued the vse of the fiue operations of the Lord, and in the sixt place he imparted them vnderstan­ding, and in the seuenth speech an interpre­ter of the cogitations thereof. Counsell, and [Page 186] a tongue, and eyes, eares, and a heart gaue he them to vnderstand Withall hee filled them with the knowledge of vnderstan­ding, and shewed them good and euill. Hee set his eye vpon their hearts, that he might shew them the greatnesse of his workes. He gaue them to glory in his maruellous acts for euer, that they might declare his works with vnderstanding. Besides this, hee gaue them knowledge, and the law of life, for an heritage.

And hence it was that Adam perfectly vnderstanding the nature of other infe­riour creatures, gaue each of them their names according to their natures; for so saith the text, Gen. 2.19. And out of the ground the Lord God formed euery beast of the field, and euery fowle of the aire, and brought them vnto Adam, to see what he would call them, and whatsoeuer Adam called euery liuing creature, that was the name thereof, and Adam gaue names to all cattle, and to the fowles of the aire, and to euery beast in the field. Now if Adam gaue to each liuing creature his name according to his nature, as questi­onlesse he did, it can be no lesse certaine, [Page 187] but that he had a perfect notice (if not comprehension) of their natures, accor­ding to which hee had giuen them their names.

But now the difficulitie is, how this is to bee vnderstood, that God brought the beasts and fowles vnto man; whe­ther only by an intellectuall representa­tion, bringing them or representing them as obiects of his minde and cogi­tation, as Caietan holdeth or corporally, truly, and really, in their owne nature, essence and being: and if thus, by what meanes? whether by naturall instinct, guiding them to performe this will of the author of nature, or that God him­selfe immediately by himselfe, or by the ministerie of his Angels did present them before Adam?

Though I finde no constant resoluti­on of this point, either in the Scripture, Fathers, or reason; neuerthelesse that which seemeth to me most probable, is, that as euery liuing creature hath his na­turall, peculiar, and proper instinct vnto diuers things, according vnto the diuer­sitie of their natures, varietie of disposi­tions [Page 188] and qualities; so likewise I thinke it most certaine, that they had in regard or this, a particular instinct by the extra­ordinary concourse of God: to the end that as they were all to acknowledge, Adam for their Lord and master, hee might according to his absolute power and dominion ouer them, giue them their names as a token both of their subiection, and of his absolute power and dominion.

And this may also bee the reason, why God presenting all other creatures to the presence of man, he did not like­wise bring him the fishes as well as the beasts of all species and kindes, because the beasts being domable, and easie to be tamed by man (at leastway whiles man was subiect to God) might serue for the vse of man, while man was not disobedient to God: or peraduenture this was, because the fishes could not naturally liue out of the water, as man cannot in any wise persist without God.

Moreouer, as touching his knowledge and perfect comprehension of the na­tures of these inferiour creatures, I [Page 189] doubt not, but that I may bee bold to pronounce that of him, which was said of Salomon in the booke of wisdome, 7. chap. vers. 15. to wit, that hee granted him to speake as hee would, and to conceiue as was meet for the things that were giuen him: because it is hee that leadeth vnto wisdome, and directeth the wise. Hee gaue him certaine knowledge of the things that are, namely to know how the world was made, and the operation of the ele­ments: the beginning, ending, and midst of the times: the alterations of the turning of the Sunne, and the change of seasons: the circuits of yeeres, and the positions of the starres: the natures of liuing creatures, and the furies of wilde beasts: the violence of windes, and the reasonings of men: the diuersities of plants, and the vertues of roots: and all such things, as are either se­cret, or manifest them he knew.

For if this be indubitable in respect of Salomon, it seemeth much more in regard of Adam: wherefore doubtlesse he was the wisest of all men, our Sauiour only excepted, the author of his and of all other wisdome.

Neither doth my position in any wise contradict that which is said vnto Salo­mon in the first booke of Kings, chap. 3. vers. 12. Loe I haue giuen thee a wife and vnderstanding heart, so that there hath beene none like thee before thee, neither af­ter thee shall arise the like vnto thee. For though the proposition bee vniuersall, yet such like oftentimes are not to bee vnderstood vniuersally, as S. Hierome well noteth, exemplifying in that of the Psalme, Hieron in comment, in cap. primum ad Ephesios. Euery man is a lier: againe if hee who speaketh it, lieth, neither can it be true which he speaketh, that euery man is a lier: wherefore if it bee a true saying, that all men are liers, wee must take this word all, not that absolutely nd vni­uersally all be liers, but that a great ma­ny are liers. So likewise although it bee said that Salomon exceeded all men in wisdome, yet this word all may be vn­derstood not absolutely all, but with some exception. For so argueth the same Father in another place: Hieron. in comment. in caput quin­tum ad Ro­manos. Scribit & alibi Apostolus; The Apostle writeth also in another place, how wee taught all men, and warned euery man, not that he taught [Page 191] all, for how many be there euen to this day, which neuer heard of the Apostolicall do­ctrine or name?

Or peraduenture this vniuersall pro­position, that Salomon was the wisest of all men, is to be vnderstood in respect of those, who had not their science, wis­dome, and knowledge infused: for who can thinke (who thinketh so diuinely, and iudgeth so supernaturally as hee ought of our Sauiour) that the wisdome of Salomon was in any wise to bee com­pared euen with the accidentall wise­dome infused into the soule of our Sa­uiour? Wherefore if that vniuersall pro­position be not vniuersall in all, and doe not conclude in regard of all, as questi­onlesse it doth not in regard of our Sa­uiour, I doe not see why Adam may not also be exempted, especially seeing hee was to haue beene our head, from whence all naturall and supernaturall gifts should haue beene deriued, if so be that hee had persisted in his originall grace.

CHAP. XLI.

AS it is most certaine that our first fathers were created perfect ac­cording to nature; so is it no lesse in re­gard of grace, and all other supernatu­rall acts and habits thereto annexed: wherefore as hee was endued with the perfection of all naturall knowledge, so was he no lesse perfect in the superna­turall; not in so high a degree as the soule of our Sauiour, nor yet as the least of the angelicall spirits, yet certainly more perfect then all other men, not only in regard of his faith, which was most perfect, but also in regard of other obiects more clearely reuealed.

And first as touching faith, it cannot be denied, but that he had this superna­turall gift infused into his soule, because this, Ad Heb. c. 11 v. 1. as S. Paul testifieth, is the substance or argument of things hoped for, the eui­dence, [Page 193] ground, or confidence of things not seene.

Againe, seeing he was created not so much for the obtaining of any naturall thing, as for the enioying of supernatu­rall blessednesse; it must needs follow, that as his nature and naturall end did necessarily inferre and bring with it the knowledge of the naturall meanes, by which it was to be obtained: so likewise the decree of God, by which hee was predestinated vnto a supernaturall ob­iect and end, did necessarily inferre and bring with it by a connaturall conse­quence, the notice of the supernaturall meanes necessary for the obtaining of that end, obiect, and felicitie, which was aboue nature. Insomuch that as the sub­stance of the matter and forme of things either corruptible or incorruptible, is in regard of the accidents: so likewise is Faith a necessary argument, of things not appearing; necessary (I say) in re­gard of the inference, not euident in re­gard of the conclusion, or that which is inferred. For, though the obiects bee sufficiently patent, and most cleere in [Page 194] themselues, and vnto those blessed spi­rits who haue the eyes of their vnder­standing already illuminated with the light of glory: yet is it obscure vnto vs, who as Paul speaketh, as yet see only in speculo & in aenigmate, in a glasse, and by species, obscure enigmaes, and other im­perfect representations of inferior crea­tures.

Hence the difficulty is, what things in particular were reuealed to Adam? I answere, that as the obiects of this su­pernaturall science may bee reduced to foure kindes: so likewise the sciences, and knowledge, may be sayd to haue beene fourefold. The first, of his reward, for though the perfectest loue bee not mercenarie, and so base, that it doe prin­cipally respect the reward: yet neuer­thelesse, the all-seeing and infinite good God doth neuer leaue the least loue of man without his reward. It is necessary (saith Paul) that hee who doth come vnto God, should beleeue, and especially beleeue that he is a rewarder. Wherefore as the first act of a regenerate person is faith, so the first obiect of this act is touching [Page 195] our end: for (as the Philosopher saith) quod est primum in intentione, est vltimum in executione; that which is first in inten­tion or speculation, is last in practise or execution: and contrariwise, that which is first in practise and execution, is last in intention and speculation. Where­fore as our supernaturall end and felici­tie is the last thing which wee are to en­ioy; so is it the first and principall which we ought to seeke and intend: and if this bee true in all our actions, it must needs bee much more in this of faith, which is (as Paul said) the substance, ground, or confidence of things hoped for, and of all our supernaturall actions.

By this it is manifest, that the mea­sure of the knowledge of the meanes of this supernaturall felicitie, was accor­ding to the perfection of the apprehen­sion and notice of this end, insomuch that as this end may be attained vnto by a threefold meane, so was man ordai­ned thereunto by the same meanes, to wit, faith, hope, and loue: faith for the discouerie of the obiect of our felicitie; hope, for the effectuating of the meanes [Page 196] of our happinesse; loue, for the combi­ning of both the meanes; a triple cord, with a triple knot, which not euen the power of Satan shall be able euer to dis­solue.

Againe, it seemeth most certaine, that he knew the fall of the damned spirits, because he might by the knowledge of this be much holpen in the obtaining of his end; as thereby inferring the seueri­tie of the diuine iudgement towards the Angels, and his infinite mercy towards men, by the one he might be moued to feare the like seueritie, if himselfe should fall, and hope to replenish the places of the fallen Angels if he should stand.

The third obiect reuealed vnto Adam was the mysterie of the blessed Trinitie, how God (I meane) was three in one, and one in three; three in distinction of persons, one in the indiuisibilitie of na­ture, being, and essence, and all his other infinite attributes: the which though distinguished for our capacitie accor­ding to their obiects, yet he well vnder­stood them to bee one and the same in nature, realitie, and simplicitie of es­sence. [Page 197] My reason why I thinke the re­uelation of this obiect vnto Adam to be certaine, is, seeing that the sight of it is to be the perfection of our blessednesse in the life to come, it must needs be also a beginning of it here: wherefore as it is there by a perfect sight face to face; so it must be likewise here in speculo & in aenigmate, with imperfection and obscu­ritie. Yea seeing Adam knew himselfe to be made to the image of God, three in one, and one in three, in his simple essence, and his three spirituall powers: so he must needs inferre the same of his prototypon and Creator. Lastly, hee had reuealed vnto him the incarnation of the Sonne of God, not as passible for his sinne (which certainly hee did not foresee) but as to bee vnited to our na­ture for the excellencie of the mysterie, and because he was to bee the head of mankinde.

CHAP. XLII.

THough it be out of all controuer­sie, that Adam was before his fall in the state of grace; yet many bee of opinion, that hee was not created so: this was the opinion of Alex. Hales, Sco­tus, Bonan, Marsilius, and Altisiodorensis, who though they grant that he was cre­ated in originall iustice, yet distinguish­ing these two, they deny that hee was created in state of grace; their reason is, because by grace there is contracted a spirituall kinde of wedlocke, league, and vnion, betweene God and our soules. Now then as matrimoniall vnion re­quireth the consent of both the parts; so likewise here, and the rather, that Adam thereby might the better know himselfe, and the weaknesse of his owne nature, by an after infusion of grace.

Neuerthelesse it seemeth much more [Page 199] probable, that though wee distinguish grace from originall iustice, or howsoe­uer, that Adam was created in grace; for (as S. Austine saith) God created the first man in that estate, in which if hee would haue kept himselfe, hee should haue beene transposed at his due time, without any death, vnto a better estate, and where, as he could haue committed no sinne, so could hee haue had no will vnto sinne: so that it was with Adam as the same Father saith in another place of the Angels, God did simul condere naturam, & largiri gratiam, ioyntly cre­ate his nature, and giue him grace: yea this, according to the opinion of Origen, Victorinus, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostome, Augustine, Beda, and Rupertus, is signifi­ed by these words, let vs make man ac­cording to our image and likenesse; image, to wit, in nature, and her proprieties, si­militude, according to grace, and her euer following vertues; yea this is insi­nuated by Paul himselfe, in his epistle to the Colossians, 3. chap. 9. and 10. verses, where he saith, that wee should not lie one to another, seeing that wee haue put off the [Page 200] old man with his works, & haue put on the new man, which is renewed with know­ledge after the image that created him.

CHAP. XLIII.

HVgo de sancto Victore answereth, that though Adam had begot chil­dren in his innocencie, yet that his chil­dren should not haue beene borne in­heritors of their fathers righteousnesse, because righteousnes proceedeth not of flesh and bloud, but of the meere grace of God: so though they had not beene borne in sinne, yet neither should they haue beene endued with originall iu­stice.

Neuerthelesse the common tenent of Diuines doth perswade the contrary: to wit, that as Adam by his sinne did transfuse into his posteritie the imputa­tion [Page 201] of sinne together with the crime it selfe: so likewise if hee had kept the same originall iustice, in which hee was created, he should also haue deriued the same vnto all his posteritie. And this in effect is the meaning of the Arauficane Counsell, where it defineth Adamum peccando sanctitatem & iustitiam perdi­disse, non sibi tantum, sed omnibus etiam posteris suis, that Adam lost both his san­ctitie, and righteousnes, by his originall sin and transgression, not only in regard of him selfe, but also to all his posteritie.

Neither may it bee inferred hence, that then grace were no grace (as Paul speaketh) seeing that it should be cōna­turall in the aforesaid cause: for though in some sense it should haue been con­naturall, that is, hauing her being toge­ther with nature; yet seeing it was not of nature, neither due vnto nature, it cannot be denied, but that it was grace, as which was not consequent vnto na­ture, but aboue all nature. Wherefore as now in the law of grace, all that are re­generated by baptisme in Christ, doe in and by baptisme (according to the opi­nion [Page 202] of many Diuines) receiue the grace of Christ: so likewise in the state of innocency all that should haue been borne of the loines of Adam, should in, and at the very instant of their naturall conception, and first moment of natu­rall life, haue receiued the first influence of their spirituall birth, and supernatu­rall life.

Now the difficultie is, whether if A­dam had persisted in the state of inno­cencie, all we his posteritie should then haue beene confirmed in grace: inso­much, that as wee should haue beene borne in the grace, and fauour of God; so wee should neuer haue fallen from the same.

Anselmus lib. 1. Cur Deus home. cap. 38. Gregorius lib. 4. Mo­raliū. c. 36. Anselmus, and Gregorie the great an­swer, that if Adam had not sinned, then all his posteritie should haue beene confirmed in the grace, and fauour of God: for who (saith Ansel­mus) dare presume to affirme plus valere iniustitiam? that iniustice should haue beene of more force to binde vnto bondage: in mans first perswasion: then his iustice to confirme him in liberty if he had persisted [Page 203] in his first temptation: for euen as all humane nature was ouercome by Adams sinne; so by him all should haue ouercome, if he had not sinned.

Neuerthelesse I resolue with S. Au­stine, that the posteritie of Adam should not, at least way in the instant of their generation, beene confirmed in grace, though Adam had persisted in his origi­nall iustice: for how is it credible, that they should haue receiued more abun­dant grace, then their first head, and fa­ther, at his first creation.

Wherefore like as Adam, though cre­ated in grace, could fall from that hap­py estate of grace; so it seemeth most probable, that his posteritie might also, seeing that wee read of no particular prouidence & grace promised to them, which was not profferd to their first fa­ther. For though Adam could (as ma­ny Diuines hold) haue increased in grace; yet none but Paelagians hold, that hee could merit vnto himselfe the infusion of the first grace, much lesse vnto others.

CHAP. XLIV.

SAint Austine in his 7. booke de Gen. ad lit. cap. 25. answereth most excel­lently that the body of Adam before his sinne was both mortall, and immor­tall; mortall because he could die; im­mortall beause hee could not haue died. For it is one thing not to be able to dye; another to be able not to dye: that belongeth only to the Angells, this is agreable euen vnto man; not by the constitution of his nature; but by the benefit of the tree of life; from which tree hee was banished, as soone as hee sinned, that hee might dye; who if he had not sinned, might not haue died. wherefore he was mortall by the nature of his corruptible body: but yet im­mortall by the benefit of his Creator, for if the body was mortall because it could dye, by the like reason it was [Page 205] immortall, because it could not haue died: for, that is not immortall onely, which cannot dye at all, vnlesse it be spirituall, which is promised to vs in our resurrection.

Now therefore the difficultie is, whe­ther this gift of immortalitie due to the perfect state of Paradise, was due also and connaturall vnto man persisting there.

Many of the best learned of this age are of opinion, that this originall iustice, which did bring with it a power of im­mortalitie, and a perfect subiection of the flesh, and senses vnto the rule of rea­son, was a gift due euen vnto nature, granted vnto man, as not only agreable, but likewise belonging, and consequent vnto his naturall integritie, and perfecti­on: insomuch, that mans nature being now depriued thereof, may iustly bee deemed in a manner maimed, imperfect, and monstrous, especially seeing it was to proceed of naturall causes, such as was the eating of the tree of life. Againe euen naturall reason doth require, that the minde, and reason should rule and [Page 206] gouerne the whole man, and consequently, that the flesh, and senses should be ruled by reason, and obey the supe­riour power: wherefore as it is without all question, that the rebellion of the flesh against reason is contrary to mans nature; so originall iustice, which did restraine the rebellion, did questionlesse pertaine to the naturall state, integritie and perfection of man; yea, how were it otherwise agreable to the diuine wis­dome to make a creature partly immor­tall, and incorruptible; partly againe mortall and corruptible.

Neuerthelesse vnlesse the question be more de nomine, then dere, I deeme it most certaine, and out of all question, that, that gift of immortalitie was su­pernaturall, as which was in no wise due or consequent to nature, for neither this immortalitie could proceed of the qua­lities proportionate to the body, seeing these tend rather to corruption, then immortalitie, as which are each contra­ry to other, and after a sort consuming one another, and these tending to the disvniting of the body and soule: nei­ther [Page 207] could this immortalitie be ab ex­terno agente, from some outward prin­ciple, and cause; for then, if it were so, it were rather to bee deemed in some sort opposite to the inclination of na­ture, the which of it selfe, as we haue al­ready said, tendeth to corruption; yet, as that which is congenitum, or produced ioyntly with nature, may in some sort be said to be naturall, or rather conna­turall, so I will not deny of this quality of immortalitie (though of it selfe it be altogether aboue nature) yet respectiue­ly, and in regard of the first infusion in­to nature, I will not (I say) deny, but that it may be deemed naturall.

CHAP. XLV.

IOsephus in his first booke of Antiq. & chap. 1, holdeth that, as it was a true, and naturall serpent, which temp­ted [Page 208] our first fathers: so it was naturall vnto it to speake, vnderstand, yea, and to goe vpright like vnto man: and that vnderstanding mans felicitie, moued with enuie, hee sought his ouerthrow; maliciose persuadens mulieri, vt de arbore scientiae gustaret, maliciously perswading the woman, that shee should taste of the tree of knowledge.

Ephraim the Syrian (as Barsalas rela­teth in his booke of Paradise the 27. chap.) held that the serpent which spake with Eue was a true corporall serpent, and that Satan had obtained of God the facultie of speech to be giuen vnto the serpent for a time; so that as in Ba­laams reprehension God gaue the vse of speach vnto the Asse, for his iust repre­hension and punishment; so likewise here, saith Ephraim, God gaue not only speach, but euen intellectuall power, and vnderstanding, vnto the serpent for a tryall of our first fathers obedience.

Cyrillus in his third booke against Iu­lian the apostata, and Eugubinus in his Cosmopoeia, are of opinion that this was not a true serpent, but that it was the [Page 209] deuill in the shape and likenes of a ser­pent, and therefore he was cursed vnder the name of a serpent.

Neuerthelesse this opinion seemeth not true, for if it had beene a deuill, then would he haue left the likenes of a ser­pent after the temptation: as when any Angell doth assume for any time a hu­mane shape, presently after hee hath performed his purpose, hee putteth of that corporall shape: but this serpent, euen after the temptation remained in his former shape, for after that Eue had beene so seuerely reprehended for eating the forbidden fruit, presently she excused her selfe, and said, the serpent deceiued me, then the Lord God said vnto the serpent, because thou hast done this, thou art cursed aboue all cattell, and aboue euery beast of the field, vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and dust shalt thou eat, all the dayes of thy life. So that the serpent re­tained his former shape, euen after Eue had eaten of the forbidden fruit, neither could this curse be fitly applied to a fai­ned serpent.

Caietan in his Commentaries vpon [Page 210] Gen. thinketh that here by this word serpent, is neither signified a true ser­pent, nor yet any thing that hath the re­semblance of a serpent, but onely the deuill in his owne likenes, who by rea­son of his subtiltie, and vehement de­sire of mans destruction, is often in the scripture termed a serpent, and there­fore he saith that this temptation was not externally, by proposing the for­bidden fruit in outward speach, and perswasion, but by the inward sugge­stion, mouing, and inclining her ap­petite.

Neuerthelesse, as this opinion is most improbable, so is it contrary to the common opinion of the Fathers, inter­preters of the Scriptures, and common sense of all Christians; who generally hold, that Eue was tempted of the de­uill in a corporall, and true serpent, who allured her by externall perswasion, and present view of the forbidden fruite.

Furthermore the whole text in this place is peruerted by this, and such like allegoricall expositions. Neither can [Page 211] there any sound reason bee alleadged, why this place may not be vnderstood historically, as the text soundeth, and is propounded vnto vs: or if not, why may not the same be said, and the like allegoricall exposition be onely admit­ted of Paradise, the trees of life, of good and euill, of the foure riuers, of the creation of Adam, and lastly of the framing of Eue out of Adams side.

The fift, and last opinion, Damascen. lib. 2 de fide Orthodoxa cap. 10. Augustinus de ciuit. Dei lib. 14 cap. 11. & lib. 11. de Gen. ad lit. c. 27. and which I hold to be the most true, is, that it was a true and naturall serpent, by which the deuill tempted and ouercame Eue, speaking with her in the shape and sub­stance of a serpent, not in his owne voice, as who hath none, neither by the hissing of a serpent, which was not suf­ficient for that purpose, but with hu­mane voice, sounding as some thinke like vnto a woman, as most accommo­date for to deceiue the woman; and this is the opinion of Basil, Austine, Da­mascene, Chrysostome, Theodoretus, Beda, and Rupertus. The deuill (saith S. Au­stine) spoke in the serpent, vsing him as his instrument, after that manner that [Page 212] the Deuill could moue, and be moued, to expresse the sound of the words, and corporall signes, by which the woman might vnderstand the will and intent of the tempter: though not so that the serpent could vnderstand the sound of the words, which were spoken vnto the woman: neither is it to be thought, that the soule of the serpent was transform­ed into a reasonable soule, seeing that neither those men, who are possessed do not know what they say, when the De­uill speaketh in them. For although it be the opinion of the vnlearned, that the serpents heare and vnderstand the words of the enchaunters, insomuch, that they leape out of their holes, and caues by the force, and vertue of the enchantments, yet that also is by co­operation with the Deuill. Yea it seem­eth to proceed by the particular proui­dence and permission of God, that ser­pents are moued more by verses, and enchauntments, then any other li­uing creature, which is no small signe and token of our first seduction by the serpent: yea euen the deuils reioyce, [Page 213] that as yet they haue this power permit­ted vnto them, by which they moue serpents by mens enchauntments: that after some sort they may deceiue, and ouercome man, who in some sort was occasion of their fall: the which is per­mitted vnto them, for a memorie of the first fact, by which the deuill seduced mankinde, vsing the serpent as an in­strument of their seduction, and vtter ouerthrow, vnlesse it had pleased God to haue redeemed vs by the blood of the Lambe.

CHAP. XLVI.

SAint Austine answereth, Augustin. lib. 11. de Gen. ad lit. cap. 29. that the ser­pent is said to be craftiest of all kinde of beasts, by reason of the craftinesse of the deuill, who vsed him as his instru­ment [Page 214] to deceiue mankinde: like as the tongue is said to bee prudent, subtile, wise, cunning, or craftie, moued by a subtle, prudent, or crafty man.

Neuerthelesse, this seemeth not pro­bable, that the serpent is called the craf­tiest of all beasts, by reason of the crafti­nesse of the deuill, for that either this was for the subtiltie, which the serpent had of himselfe; or for that which hee was to receiue of the deuil: not the first, because the craftinesse of the deuill was not inherent in him, neither could the deuill impart any such craftinesse vnto him, seeing the Serpent is not capable of any such craftinesse either rationall, or sensitiue remaining a serpent.

That therefore which seemeth more probable is, that the reason, why the Serpent is called the craftiest of all beasts, was not so much to signifie his naturall craftinesse, as to shew the order and conformitie of the diuine proui­dence in taking so apt an instrument for the fulfilling of his permissiue, will about the fall of Adam, for if we marke it, we shall finde, that such is the proui­dence [Page 215] of him qui attingit à fine vs (que) ad finem fortiter (as the Wise-man saith) disponens omnia suauitèr, that euen in workes most miraculous, and aboue na­ture, he vseth those instruments for the most part, which are most accommo­date by their owne nature: for although we admit that Wolues, Foxes and Ele­phants be more subtill, wise and craftie in their kinde, yet neuerthelesse we shall finde no creature so naturally bent by a malicious craftinesse to hurt man, as the serpent is: this therefore was the reason why God cursing the serpent, said, Gen. 3.15. verse: I will put enmitie be­tweene thee and the woman, and betweene thy seed and her seed: she shall breake thine head, and thou shalt bruise his heele. Yea questionlesse this naturall instinct of the serpent is signified in that Prophesie of the Patriarch Iacob, of the tribe of Dan, Ge. 39. ver. 17. Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder by the path, biting the horse heeles, so that the rider shall fall backward.

CHAP. XLVII.

Petr. Com ester in hi­storia l. Gen. cap. 21. Bonan. in 2. l senten. dist. 21. Dionysius Carth. in Gen. alle­gans Bedam authorem huius opini­onis. BOnauenture, Dionysius Carthusianus, Bede, and Peter Comestor doe an­swere (though not altogether appro­uing the opinion) that the reason why our first mother was not afraid to ap­proach and talke with the serpent, was, because the deuill had chosen such a serpent, as which (in face at leastway) represented a woman, yea and one most beautifull like vnto her selfe: for as or­dinarily in all his temptations hee doth craftily accommodate himselfe vnto the nature, complexions, and dispositi­ons of the persons tempted; so here hee deemed it most fit for the accomplish­ing of his desire in the temptation and fall of the woman, to accommodate himselfe, as much as possibly hee could, to the feature and naturall disposition of the woman.

Yea Basil in his Treatise of Paradise, and Ioseph in his first booke of Antiqui­ties, and first chapter, doe not much dis­agree; for so saith the first, the serpent then was not horrible to man, but gen­tle and tame; neither did he creepe vp­on the superficies of the earth, but did goe vpright vpon his feet, insomuch that, as Damascene saith, hee was more familiar vnto man then any other crea­ture, fawning often vpon him with plea­sant circumuolutions of his body: and this was the reason why the deuill tooke him for his instrument in the fall of our first parents.

Neuerthelesse it seemeth most agree­able to reason, that which Chrysostome saith in his 16. homilie on Genesis, to wit, that therefore Eue did not feare to see and conuerse with the serpent, be­cause before the fall of our first Fathers, all serpents and beasts were gentle, meeke, and subiect to mans command and gouernment, so that as they had no power to doe any harme to man, so nei­ther did they appeare horrible in their aspect.

Hence ariseth a new difficultie, for which though wee haue no authoritie out of the Scripture, yet somewhat we may say out of naturall reason, and dis­course, to wit, what kinde of serpent that was, that deceiued Eue; to which Eugubinus answereth, that it was the Ba­siliske, who as he is the most venomous, and king as it were of Serpents, so there­fore he may bee deemed to haue beene the most fit instrument of the Prince of darknesse, for the ouerthrow of our first fathers. But this seemeth not likely, see­ing that this serpent is so deformed, pe­stiferous, and noisome euen in the very aspect. If therefore I may coniecture in a thing so doubtfull, it seemeth more probable, that because Eue was so de­lighted with the company of the ser­pent, that it was that most beautifull serpent Scytile, the which (as Solinus in his 39. chapter saith) is so glistering with varietie of spots vpon her backe, that it maketh men stay to behold her beautie, insomuch that whom she cannot ouer­take by reason of her slow creeping, she taketh them as amazed at her wonder­full [Page 219] beautie; not vnlike vnto the com­mon and powerfull temptation of wo­men, to whom nature hath denied the force of the body, yet hath permitted her to ouercome by her beautie, those who are most powerfull and vigorous in body: whereby wee may see that which God doth so ordinarily execute by most iust prouidence; in quo quisque m [...] [...]nè excellit, & excellentia praesumit, praesumptione peccans, punitur maximè.

CHAP. XLVIII.

SAint Austine in his 11. booke super Gen. ad lit. cap. 3. answereth, that wee are not to thinke that it was in the de­uils choice, to chuse the instrument of the temptation, but that it was by Gods [Page 220] particular permission and designement, that he made choice of the serpent. Yet in his 4. booke de ciu. Dei, 11. chap. hee answereth more probably, that the rea­son was, because this is animal lubricum, & tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum; because the serpent was a most deceitfull, cunning, and craftie creature: for though, as the master of the sentences saith, l. 2 sent. dist. 21 [...]he deuill would haue come in the shape of a doue, that by her innocencie and sim­plicitie hee might more easily couer his owne craftinesse and subtiltie; yet God would not permit this, to the end that his malice might be detected with more facilitie, and Eues sinne be lesse excusa­ble. Neither againe was it conuenient, that this shape and type of puritie should be depraued by the impuritie of the deuill, seeing the holy Ghost was afterwards to appeare vnto the Apostles in the forme of a doue.

Now as touching the second point, why Moses made no mention of the de­uill; I answer, that he relateth only that which was done, not interpreting the [Page 221] meaning of the fact, and therefore de­scribed that which did appeare out­wardly to Eue. Like as in the 18. of Gen. the Scripture making mention of those three which Abraham did entertaine, he called them men, although they were not men, but Angels. As also in the 32. chapter, the Angell which wrestled with Iacob is called a man, because hee appeared in the likenesse of man. Yea Paul in the 11. chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, imputeth this deceit of the deuill to the serpent, and not to the deuill: But I feare (saith hee) lest as the serpent beguiled Eue through his subtiltie, so your mindes should be cor­rupt from the simplicitie that is in Christ.

CHAP. XLIX.

MOses Barcephas, Ephren, with di­uers other, thinke that this curse [Page 222] is laid vpon the serpent, although hee did not commit any crime at all: his reason is, because this narration of Moses being historicall, it is to bee vnderstood simply, as the words doe sound.

Now if it bee demanded how this standeth with naturall reason, and the iustice of God, which is neuer contrary to reason, but is rather the rule of all reason, that the serpent being innocent, and not capable of reason, neither con­sequently of sinne, that hee should haue inflicted so great a punishment and curse, as is denounced against him, Gen. 3. vers. 14. where God said to the serpent, because thou hast done this, thou art cursed aboue all cattell, and aboue euery beast of the field; vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and shalt eat dust all the dayes of thy life:

I answer with Barcephas and others aboue alledged, that God did this prin­cipally as a punishment, and in hatred of the principall agent, the old serpent the deuill; thereby to punish him not only in himselfe, but euen in his instrument, [Page 223] by which hee had committed that hai­nous offence against his God: like as he who breaketh the instrument in hatred of the Musitian who plaied vpon it. So likewise in the 20. chapter of Leuiticus, God commanded that the beast shall be stoned to death, with which any man hath offended; thereby to signifie how great the offence is in the sight of God, who doth punish it, not onely in the principall actor thereof, but euen in his instrument; thereby to signifie vnto vs how hatefull sinne is, seeing often hee doth punish it in his vnreasonable and insensible creatures, who are not capa­ble of the sinne it selfe.

Againe, he cursed the serpent for Sa­tans sake, as he did the earth for Adams sinne: yea and that which is most dread­full, he drowned the world with an vni­uersall deluge, not sparing the beasts, for their owners sinnes.

The like also we finde in Princes and other Potentates of this world, who take vengeance of the innocent for the nocents sake, of the sonnes for their fa­thers offences, of their subiects for their [Page 224] Princes outrages. So the Poet, not as a Poet saith: ‘Quic quid delirant Reges, plectuntur Achiui.’

The Chastillians bloud in France spilt at the massacre, was long after required of the Guis [...]an race. The Thracians did beat their wiues, because their forefa­thers had killed Orpheus. And Agatho­cles wasted the Iland Corsyra, because in ancient times it gaue entertainment to Vlysses.

But now the difficultie may be about these words aboue alleaged: Vpon thy belly shalt thou goe, and shalt eat dust all the dayes of thy life. For if it were a ser­pent before, euen the very name doth signifie, that it crept vpon its belly: if then it was the serpents nature, how was it a curse? or if a curse, how was it his naturall propertie?

I answer with Ephren and Barcephas in his booke of Paradise, that creeping rather proceeded of Gods curse, then of the serpents nature, who as we reade of other serpents, went vpon his feet, yea more vpright then any other ser­pent, [Page 225] but as Lucifer his principall mouer became by his sinne a most vgly deuill of a most beautifull Angell; so the ser­pent, who was the instrument of Lucifer in this action, became a most filthy, ve­nomous, and detestable creeping beast or worme, of a beautifull and vpright going creature.

Neuerthelesse, as I haue already be­fore insinuated, the curse pronounced against the serpent, is principally to bee vnderstood against the principall au­thor of the temptation, and mouer of the serpent, to wit, the deuill, according to the opinion of S. Austine, Beda, Ruper­tus, Hugo de sancto Victore, Caietan, and many others: so that the deuill (as hath beene touched already) is called a ser­pent, for his subtiltie and craft in decei­uing of mankinde. Againe, he is said to be cursed amongst all the beasts of the earth, because he is condemned to eter­nall punishment: and whatsoeuer is said to be obscene, filthy and abomina­ble in any whatsoeuer beast, or other most filthy creature; that spiritually is found in the deuill in a higher degree, [Page 226] and more detestable measure: hee goeth likewise vpon his breast and belly, because he tempteth principally in pride and le­cherie: and therefore most fit to tempt, attempt, and ouercome the woman, as most inclinable to these kinde of vices: he especially (I say) tempteth in pride, signified by the breast; in lust, by the belly. Or finally, hee goeth vpon his breast, which is the seat of the irascible power, anger, and wrath; and vpon his belly, because this is the fountaine of all filthy lust and concupiscences.

CHAP. L.

Moses Bar­cephas su­pra citatus. Philoxinus oratione de arbore vitae Ephren cō ­ment in Gen. Sabugensis oratione de passione Do­mini. Irenaeus, Cy­rii [...]us, & Diodorus Tharsensis.SOme thinke that Adam was created the first houre of the sixt artificiall day, without the compasse of Paradise, and was brought in thither at the third houre: afterwards about the sixt houre he eat of the forbidden fruit; and finally [Page 227] about the ninth being reprehended by God, he was cast out about Sunne set­ting. The reason of this opinion is taken from the words of the serpent vnto Eue: Why did God command you, that you should not eat of euery tree of Paradise? by which words wee may inferre that Adam and Eue had not eaten any thing till that time, and consequently that they were but newly brought into Pa­radise, yea that they were created but a little before.

Neuerthelesse I thinke it more pro­bable, Basil. homil. de Paradiso Damascen. l. 2. de fide Orthodexa, cap. 10. August. li. 11. de gen. ad lit. cap. 21. & l. 20 de ciuitate Dei, cap 26. Gregorius lib. 4. dial cap. 1. Tostatus Abulensis super 13. ca p [...]t Gen. Ioseph lib. 1. antiquitat. that our first parents persisted more then one day in Paradise, and that this was done by the particular proui­dence of God, to the end that they might the better perceiue the miserie in­to which they fell by sinne, by the knowledge and experience which they had of their former felicitie in Paradise. And this is the opinion of S. Basil, Da­mascene, Austine, Gregory, Abulensis, and Iosephus. Yea it seemeth most probable, that our first parents were not one only day in Paradise, for otherwise the ser­pent would not haue asked them, why [Page 228] they did not eat of euery tree of Paradise: for then it might easily be answered, be­cause their necessitie did not require it as yet.

Wherefore though many haue defi­ned the time of their abode in Paradise to haue beene so many yeeres as our Sa­uiour liued in this mortall life, others fortie dayes, according to the time of our Sauiours fast; yet if it be lawfull to coniecture in this matter so doubtfull and vncertaine, I would thinke that they were only eight dayes in Paradise, because this was sufficient for the expe­rience of that happy estate: so that as our Sauiour was conceiued (as many thinke) on the Friday, and died on the same day; so likewise (as some conie­cture) was the fall of Adam the cause of his death the same day: so that Adams fall, his creation, and redemption, was by the particular prouidence of Al­mighty God, wrought (as some con­template) vpon one and the same day. The which, though it be no conuincing reason, neither sufficiently grounded in the sacred text, yet can it not be denied [Page 229] but that it hath some congruitie and conueniencie in reason, that the wound and the remedie should bee in one and the same day appointed to be by God, who from eternitie foreseeth the end, together with the meanes, and decreeth of the end together with the meanes, to the end that the common course of time, and remembrance of the day, might put vs in minde both of our mi­serable fall by Adam, and our more hap­pie redemption by Christ: that so wee might continually bewaile our sinnes, proceeding from Adams, and giue hum­ble and hearty thankes for the infinite mercies receiued by Christ.

CHAP. LI.

THe Originists doe vnderstand this allegorically, so that by this kinde of custodie is meant nothing else but [Page 230] the particular prouidence of God, by which our first parents were depriued of all hope of returning to Paradise.

Others thinke that by the Cherubin and fiery sword is mystically vnder­stood a twofold impediment or means, by which we be now debarred from the celestiall Paradise: the first inuisible, of the inuisible spirits and deuils, accor­ding to that of Paul to the Ephesians, the last chapter, verse 12. For we wrestle not against flesh and bloud, but against prin­cipalities, against powers, and against the gouernours of this world, the Princes of darknesse, against spirituall wickednesses, which are in high places.

The second impediment (as these Authors say) mystically signified by the fiery sword, is the perpetuall fight of flesh and bloud in our spirituall battell, as well in prosperitie as aduersitie, ac­cording to our Sauiours words, Matth. 11. chap. 12. verse: The kingdome of hea­uen suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force: and that of Iob; Militia est vi­ta hominis super terram.

Or rather (as other doe interpret) we [Page 231] may vnderstand by these lets of accesse to Paradise, three principall hinderances of accesse to the celestiall Paradise: by the Cherubin, which is interpreted the fulnesse of science, wisdome and know­ledge, may be vnderstood too much cu­riositie of science, and spirituall pride oftentimes contained therein, much re­pugnant to the simplicitie and puritie of Christian faith. By the fiery sword may bee vnderstood (as some Authors doe allegorize) all enflaming lusts and vices proceeding from the sensitiue ap­petite; the which as it is twofold, con­cupiscible and irascible, so is it signified by the fire and sword, or fiery sword: the which being voluble, or as it were wheeling about, and alwayes in a per­petuall motion, doth plainly expresse the perpetuall inconstancie, volubilitie, and motion of humane matters.

Aquinas and Tertullian thinke, Aquinas 2. 2 ae quaest. 165. ar. vlt. that by the Cherubin and fierie sword, is vn­derstood the place and situation of Pa­radise, vnder the aequinoctiall line, or Torrida Zona, the firest Climate of the world.

But certainely, the heat of this place is naturall vnto it, and proceeding from the neerenesse of the Sunne (as the Ma­thematicians doe demonstrate) and therefore could not bee occasioned by the sinne of man, much lesse proceede thereof, as a naturall effect of sin, which in it selfe hath no reall being, but is ra­ther the priuation of goodnesse, accor­ding to its formall essence and being.

Lyra. in Genesim. Lyranus thinketh, that by the Cheru­bin and fiery sword, is vnderstood a mighty and flaming fire, issuing out of the mountaine of Paradise, defending and compassing it round about, in the manner of a wall.

Ambros of in Psalm. 118. Ambrose vpon the Psalme 118. thin­keth the fore-sayd flaming sword to be the fire of Purgatory, by which the soules that depart our of the world not altogether purified, are cleansed before their entrance into Heauen.

But (to omit the controuersie of Pur­gatory) this cannot bee, seeing that the sword and Cherubin were placed at the entrance of Paradise (as is manifest in the Text) lest Adam should enter into [Page 233] Paradise, and participate of the tree of life; for so saith the Text, Gen. 3, ver. 24. Thus he cast out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and the blade of a sword shaken, to keepe the way of the tree of life. That therefore which seemeth most probable in this poynt, is, that the words of the afore­sayd text are to be vnderstood literally, of a true Angelicall custody of Paradise and fiery swords; the first against the in­fernall spirits, the second for to terrifie man. The Diuels were repelled and kept from this place of Paradise, lest they should deceiue man by the tree of life, promising him thereby a perpetui­ty of life, such as he should haue enioy­ed, if he had not falne; man also was ba­nished out of the same place, not onely by the iust iudgment of Almighty God executed vpon him for his disobedi­ence, but also by a fatherly diuine pro­uidence and tender loue towards man­kinde, lest eating of the forbidden fruit, which was of immortality (a sufficient cause I meane to make him immortall) he should liue an immortall life in this [Page 234] vale of misery, and so become miserably immortall, and immortally miserable.

CHAP. LII.

TVrrianus in his Epistle to the Bi­shop of Towres alledgeth as an ancient opinion of diuers Doctors, that originall sinne was that, which the soule had cōmitted before it was infused into the body: which opinion seemeth first to haue beene taken from Origenes, who held that the soules of men being first created altogether in heauen, were cast downe thence, into this vale of misery, and ioyned vnto these materiall, and grosse substances of our bodies, in pu­nishment of their sinne committed in heauen, before their vnion to their bo­dies.

But this is euidently convinced as false, out of many places of Scripture: for if originall sinne was contracted in heauen, how was it contracted by Adam in Paradise, and if we did all contract it by one, how did wee all contract it in our selues, by our selues, according to that of Paul, Rom. 5. chap. vers. 12. By one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne, so death went ouer all men, forasmuch as all men haue sinned. vers. 16. Neither is the gift so, as that, which entred in by one, that sinned; for the fault came of one offence vnto condemnation, but the gift is of many offences to iustification. vers. 18, & 19. As by the offence of one the fault came on all men to condemnation; so by the iustifying of one, the benefit a­bounded toward all men, to the iustification of life. Where wee may manifestly see contraposed, death, and life; iustice, and iniustice; condemnation, and iustifica­tion; these as proceeding from the obedience of Christ; those as flowing from the disobedience of Adam.

The second opinion in this point, is, that our originall sinne doth not consist [Page 236] in any qualitie, or accident inherent in the substance of our bodies, or soules, or in any priuation of any excellencie, or good qualitie, which wee ought to haue retained in our soules, but euen in the substance of our corporall, and spi­rituall nature: the reason is, for what­soeuer is not conformable to the law of God is sinne; but all our nature is corrupt, and auerse from the law of God, therefore the whole nature of man both body and soule being thus corrupt, and become abominable in the sight of God, is sinne.

But thus it would follow, as S. Austin well vrgeth against the Manich [...]es, (who held some things to be euill, euen of their owne nature) it would follow (I say) that God were the author of sinne, seeing he is the author of nature. There­fore as S. Austine saith of the Angell, so I of man: Diabolus natura est Angelus, sed quod natura est, Dei opus est: quod verò diabolus est, vitio suo est, vtendo male naturae suae bono: opera verò eius mala, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res. The Deuill by nature is an Angel, [Page 237] and this is Gods worke: but that hee is a Deuill, commeth of his owne sinne, by the euill vse of his good nature: so that his euill workes which are called vices, are the actions of his nature, not nature it selfe or his Angelicall sub­stance.

After the same manner, God of his infinite goodnes created man good in substance, in nature excellent, in his powers perfect, and in essence of all in­feriour creatures the most eminent: but he by his will abusing Gods gifts, de­praued his powers, and depriued his nature of these supernaturall gifts, which were made connaturall vnto his first creation: not that either his nature be­came formally sinne; or that his sinne was transformed in substance, and na­ture: least that he, who is the author of nature, should also be iudged the au­thor of sinne: but that man freely sub­iecting himselfe, vnto the breach of Gods commandement, voluntarily de­priued himselfe of those supernaturall graces, which according to the former decree of God, were due vnto his hap­py [Page 238] estate of innocencie. Insomuch that all the goodnes, beauty, and graces, which before were connaturall vnto him, were bestowed by God: and all the euill which was preternaturall vnto him, and accidentary vnto his nature, was deriued from himselfe, according to that of the Prophet Hosea chap. 13. vers. 9. Thy perdition is of thy selfe, but in me is thy helpe.

Hence it is most euident, that our na­ture depraued with sinne, must needs be distinguished from that sinne, which depraueth nature, as the man infected with any maladie, or sicknesse, is distin­guished from the qualitie, or maladie infecting the man.

CHAP. LIII.

Lombard. 2. dist. 33. LOmbard the master of the sentences, Driedo, Ariminensis, Parisiensis, and [Page 239] Altisiodorensis, Greg. 2 dist. 30. q. 2. art. Gabr q. 2. ar: 1. & 2. Hen: quod l. 2. q. 11. Guliel. Pa­ris. tract. de vitijs & peccatis cap 2. & 4. Altisiod. lib. 2. tract. 27. cap. 1. & 2. Driedo lib. 1. de gratia, & libero arbitrio. p. 3 confider. 4. Holcottus q. de impu­tabilitato peccati ad primū prin­cipale. with diuers other schole Diuines, are of opinion, that the essence of originall sinne consisteth in morbida quadam qualitate, in a certaine infectious qualitie, not of the body, but of the soule, deriued from the corruption of the carnall appetite; yea S. Austine may seeme to allude vnto this in his first booke de nuptijs & concupiscentijs cap. 25 where he saith, that originall sinne doth not remaine substantially in vs as a body or spirit: but that it is a certaine affection of an ill qualitie, as a disease or languish­ing. and in his 13 chap. hee calleth it morbidum affectum, a sickly qualitie, affe­ction, or disposition, though more spi­rituall, then corporall.

Againe in his sixt booke against Iulian chap. 7. hee explicateth himselfe more plainely, oppugning others in this wise, some Philosophers said that it was the vi­tious part of the minde, by which the minde or any part of it becommeth vitious, that so all being healed, the whole substance may be conserued; so as it seemeth, the Philosophers by a figuratiue kind of speach called that vitious part of the minde, libi­dinem, [Page 240] lust, in which the vice, which is cal­led lust, is inherent after the manner that those who are contained in the house, are called the house.

Ambrosius in cap. 7. ad Romano [...]. M [...]gister sent: lib. 2. distinct. 31. cap. 8. S. Ambrose likewise, seemeth to bee of the same opinion, in the 7. chap. of the epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes, where propounding this question, how sinne doth dwell in the flesh, seeing it is not any substance, but the priuation of goodnes? he answereth, ecce primi ho­minis corpus corruptū est per peccatū, &c. Behold (saith this Father) the body of the first man was corrupted by sinne; and the corruption by reason of the offence, re­maineth in the body, retaining the force of Gods sentence, denounced against Adam; by whose fellowship, and society the soule is spotted with sinne.

But certainely, if wee duely ponder the aforesaid places, we shall easily find, that neither Austine, nor any other of the Fathers is of this opinion; where­fore the meaning of S. Austine in the places aboue alleadged, is, that concu­piscence is not any substance, or part of substance; but rather a qualitie, or affe­ction, [Page 241] or effect of an ill qualitie: and therefore it is most fitly compared to a disease, not because it is distinguished from the sensitiue appetite; but because it is the very appetite, and power it selfe now depraued, which is a qualitie, and (as the Diuines tearme it) affectio morbi­da, a sickly, corrupt, or infected affecti­on, or inclination.

First, because it doth preuent, or ouer­sway reason, which ought to bee the gouernesse, and rule ouer all humane actions.

Secondly, because it is depriued of originall iustice, which in our first Pa­rents, was a power aboue nature, yet connaturalized (if I may so tearme it) vnto their nature, as well for their dire­ction in matter of nature, as for their helpe, and furtherance in actions of grace: insomuch that while their wills were ruled by reason, they were alwaies subiect to their Creator: and likewise directed in all things belonging both to nature, and grace.

True it is (as S ^t. Austin doth often repeat) that the soule is corrupted by [Page 242] the flesh, as the liquour, by the corrupt and vncleane vessell: not because that there was any such quality, as the fore­mentioned, deriued into the soule by the sinne of Adam: but rather because the soule is infused into the body, which descended of the defiled seede of Adam, and therefore doth contract this sinne, by which it is truly said to be polluted.

And according to this interpretati­on, wee are also to vnderstand, that which the Master of the Sentences a­boue alleadged, doth falsely cite out of S ^t. Ambrose, being rather the words of the ordinary glosse vpon that of Rom. chap. 7. But that sinne which dwelleth in me: for the Author of the glosse addeth vnto the rest of Ambrose his word, cuius consortio anima maculatur peccato: by whose society the soule is defiled with sinne: which by no wise can bee vnder­stood, by reason of any infectious qua­lity deriued from the body, and thence transfused into the soule, but according­ly, as hath beene partly explicated alrea­dy, and shall bee heereafter more de­clared.

And this may be further demonstra­ted, euen by reason, for first, either this morbida qualitas, this infectious quality was naturally produced in our appe­tite, and thence transfused into our wils, or supernaturally: the first is impossi­ble, because sinne had no such naturall force or power in Adam, otherwise it should haue had the same effect likewise in all the posterity of Adam: which euen our aduersaries doe deny, seeing there is no reason, why it should bee so auer­red of one more then of all.

Or peraduenture this quality was not produced by naturall means, but by su­pernaturall, not by any naturall power of man, but by the supernaturall of Al­mighty God, and as some hath aduen­tured to pronounce, ex sola Dëi volun­tate, meerly by the will of him, to whom nothing is impossible, cui non est impossi­bile omne verbum, to whose will all doe obey.

But certainely if wee waigh this an­swer, either in the naturall principles of true philosophy, or supernaturall of grace, we shall finde the aforesayd posi­tion [Page 244] and solution to bee most dissonant to both, seeing that both doe euident­ly demonstrate vnto vs the repugnance and contradiction of this; that hee who is the fountaine of all goodnesse, or ra­ther goodnesse it selfe, should bee the particular and naturall efficient, or mo­rall cause of that which is summum ma­lum, the greatest euill, nothing more di­stant then summum bonum and summum malum, nothing so vnlike in their being, so nothing so improportionate in their causalities and effects. Wherfore, as it is impossible for goodnesse it selfe not to be good, so is it no lesse contradiction to the particular cause of euill, and con­sequently seeing that sinne is summum malum, the greatest euill possible, and seeing likewise of all sinnes, this in some sort is the greatest, as which is the o­riginall and fountaine of all other actual sinnes, as it doth imply contradiction, that God should be the particular cause of other actuall sinnes, so it doth à forti­ori imply the same, that he should be in any wise of this originall; yea, euen na­tural reason was a sufficient light of this [Page 245] vnto the very Heathen Philosophers. So Plato in his second booke De Repub­lica saith, Omnibus modis pugnandum est, ne Deus qui bonus est, dicatur esse malorum causa, alioqui secum Deus pugnaret, qui suis legibus contrarium fieri mandauit. Wee must by all meanes endeauour (saith this diuine Philosopher) lest God, who is altogether good, be said to be the cause of e­uill, otherwise God should bee contrary and repugnant vnto himselfe, seeing that hee hath commanded the contrary in his lawes: whose eyes (as Abacuc saith) are so dimme, Abacuc. 1. that they cannot see euill, neither can they behold any iniquity. Not that really, hee doth not perfectly view, and compre­hend with his all-knowing science, the secretest and most hidden, and abhomi­nable action, or most inward cogitation, and that from all eternity, euen before it bee conceiued or thought of by the sinner himselfe: but he is said not to see it, or not to know it, scientia approbatio­nis, that is, he doth not approoue it, but reprooue it: not allow it, but condemne it: and in this sense that is to be vnder­stood, which the Gospell saith, shall be [Page 246] pronounced vnto the vnrepenting sin­ners, nescio vos, I know you not, not that our Sauiour either according to his humanity, much lesse in his diuinity, was, or is ignorant of any good or bad action, according to which hee is to re­ward in his iudgement: but that he did not see or know them so, as that hee did deeme them as worthy of the diuine knowledge and approbation, or of any reward, but onely of eternall fire, pre­pared for the Diuell and his Angels.

Albertus, Pighius, & Catharinus de originali peccato. Albertus, Pighius, and Catharinus fly­ing the inconueniences of the aforesayd opinions, fell into another extreame: to wit, that there was no other originall sinne in Adams posterity, then the sinne of Adam, by which he first of all, then all his discendence were reputed sinners; hee inwardly, they outwardly; and as the Schooles terme it, by an outward denomination, to wit, by Adams sinne inward to Adam, imputed onely to them, as though it had been really their own, and actually committed by them, whereas in very deede they had none proper, or inherent, but Adams onely [Page 247] by imputation, not by reall appropria­tion.

Which opinion may fitly bee decla­red by the example of a man, who being adopted by a King, as his sonne and heire apparant to the Crowne, should haue granted vnto him and to his poste­rity, all the priuiledges annexed vnto his adoption and principality: but yet with this condition, that if this Prince so adopted should commit any treason against his father, both he and his poste­rity should not onely lose the aforesayd titles and priuiledges, but also should be accounted traytours vnto the Crowne. In which cause, although the posterity of this man had not committed any fault in themselues; yet were they to be reputed morally as traytours, and to haue committed high treason in their head and pregenitor.

After the same manner (as the Do­ctors of this opinion auerre) was the compact made betweene God, and our first father Adam; so that if hee had not transgressed the commandement of his Creator, eating of the forbidden fruit, [Page 248] he and his, should haue beene translated out of the terrene Paradise, vnto the kingdome of heauen. But this compact being broken by our first father, both he, and wee lost our right vnto the bles­sednesse, for which wee were created; he in himselfe, and we in him: Not that as he had inherent in him the spot and blemish of originall sin, wee also should haue it: but only by an externe denomi­nation (as the Diuines terme it) because we had really the effects thereof, & our first father, in whom we were all contai­ned, had really both the cause & effect, the sin (I meane) of disobedience and the priuatiō of originall iustice, together with all other effects therupon ensuing.

This opinion is gathered out of Paul, Rom. 5. In whom (to wit) in Adam all haue sinned, as who would say, wee had not sinned originally, but onely in A­dam: wee haue not therefore originally sinned in our selues, & consequently if wee haue not sinned in our selues, but only in Adam, our sin only is in Adam, as it is only by Adam, not in our selues, as it was not committed by our selues: in [Page 249] so much, that it may only bee tearmed ours by imputation from our fore-fa­thers, not by reall inhesion in our selues, seeing we neuer gaue any con­sent by our owne willes vnto the fore­said disobedience, but as wee were in­cluded in Adam, as in our head; wee are therefore said to be spotted with originall sinne, in as much only, as hee who was our head, and in whose loines we were contained, did really commit the said sinne, and consequently (as the foresaid Doctors inferre) originall sinne in vs, neither consisteth in any actuall or habituall transgression, nei­ther in concupiscence, or in the priua­tion of originall iustice: not in the first, Vide Augu­stinum li. 1. retract. cap. 15. & in e­pistola 3. ad Hillarium quae est 80. & in En­cherridio. cap. 36. seeing that was not ours, but Adams; not in the habit, because this should proceed only from the precedent act; and finally, neither in the two last, be­cause these are rather effects, procee­ding from our originall iustice, then the crime and sinne it selfe.

This may also seeme the opinion of S. Austine in his 3. booke de libero arbi­trio cap. 20. where he saith that we are all [Page 250] inquinati peccato primi parentis, defiled with the sinne of our first father, the which sinne could neither bee inherent in vs as actually proceeding from him, neither as habitually inherent in his soule, or priuatiuely adherent to his forme. It was therefore in vs by an ex­terne denomination, inwardly affecting him, but outwardly onely denomina­ting vs.

But if it bee so as Austine saith, that wee were all originally defiled with the sinne of our first father, if wee had also besides this some other inherent origi­nall sinne, wee should haue two kindes of originall sinnes, the one by imputa­tion, the other by inhesion; the one in­herent in Adam only, the other in vs de­riued from Adam, which is to speake without ground of Scripture, which onely maketh mention of one originall sinne, by which all bee truly called sin­ners, according to that of the Apostle, Omnes peccauerunt in Adamo, all haue sin­ned in Adam, in Adam hee saith, not in themselues, and consequently none such did truly possesse them.

By this wee may see what colour of truth may be giuen to falsitie, yea euen vnto heresie, such as this seemeth to be; for if originall sinne bee nothing else in our posteritie, but the punishment and sinne of our first father Adam, for which all his posteritie is punished, certainly after the same manner, the sonnes also of any other of his posteritie, who as the Scripture witnesseth, are iustly pu­nished for their fathers offences, might rightly be said to haue contracted so many originall sinnes, as bee sinnes pu­nishable in them by reason of their fa­thers transgressions: which without all question were most absurd, and yet the consequence seemeth most euident.

For if originall sinne (according to this last opinion) bee nothing else but the sinne of our first father Adam, as it is punishable in vs; no question, but by the same reason, as many sinnes of our fore-fathers as are punishable in vs, euen vnto the third or fourth generati­on, may as well bee called originall sinnes in vs, though they bee not really inherent in our soules, or powers there­of, [Page 252] but onely are said to be in vs by an externe denomination, or name procee­ding from our parents.

Moreouer, if our sinne bee nothing else but the sinne of our first parent, as it is imputed vnto vs from him as our head; certainly as that is blotted in him by his repentance, so it should also bee blotted in vs by the same repentance: for if his sinne could be sufficient for the condemnation of all, why should not his repentance be sufficient for all? espe­cially it being nothing in vs but an ex­terne denomination, or bare name ta­ken from his sinne, which now being washed away in him. should of necessi­tie be likewise blotted in vs, nulla siqui­dem forma, siue interna siue externa, po­test denominare, nisi eo modo quo est: for questionlesse no forme, being taken away, can denominate as when it was present. This forme therefore being an externe forme, which neuer had any vnion in our soules, or powers thereof, could neuer, euen when it was present, denominate our soules inwardly sinful, much lesse now, when it is altogether [Page 253] blotted out of the first subiect, wherein it was really inherent, but rather now it should giue no denomination at all, and consequently none of the sons of Adam should truly be said to bee borne in ori­ginall sinne, seeing that forme, from which they were said to bee borne in sinne, is quite abolished and blotted out euen in the first subiect, from whence it should proceed vnto all.

Finally, as Dauid witnesseth, wee are all borne in iniquitie, and our mother conceiued vs in sinne; and S. Paul, All haue sinned in Adam: but this could not be true, if so be that wee were onely to bee tearmed originally sinners, in that our first father Adam sinned; for his sinne being blotted out, the denomina­tion also proceeding from it, should be taken away, seeing that no forme can any longer denominate, then whiles it is present, and after the manner that it is so. Therefore as it could not really and intrinsecally denominate the posteritie of Adam, sinners, euen when it was pre­sent, according to the foresaid doctrine; so now when it is altogether taken away [Page 254] in his root and first origine, it cannot in any wise denominate vs sinners, which is euidently against the Scriptures, which repeat so often, that all mankinde was conceiued in sinne, and to haue sinned in Adam, hee onely excepted, who as goodnesse it selfe, in no wise could bee subiect to this so great euill; and as man, was hypostatically vnited with the se­cond person of the blessed Trinitie, and predestinated to bee the generall re­demption of the world, from this gene­rall deluge of sinne, and therefore could not be defiled with any sinne.

CHAP. LIIII.

MAny seeing the inconueniences of the former opinions, not fin­ding in what positiue act or habit they might constitute the essence of our ori­ginall iniustice, at length haue beene [Page 255] driuen to say, that it was not essentially and formally in any positiue act or ha­bit, but that it consisted rather in some priuation.

The reason of this may bee, because the essence of sinne according to his na­ture, common to all sinnes, both actu­all, habituall, and originall, is (as the Fa­thers doe often insinuate) non natura aliqua, sed negatio; not any nature, but a negation of nature, and consequently the same must be here in originall sinne.

So Dionysius 4. cap. de diuinis nomini­bus, speaking of the euill and malice of sinne, saith, neither this euill of sinne is the appetite it selfe, but the declination of the appetite from good to euill, and more plainly afterward calleth it a priuation, atque vt summatim dicam, malum quem­admodum saepe diximus, infirmitas imbe­cillitásque, ac priuatio est aut scientiae, aut fidei, aut appetitus, aut actionis bonae: Euill or sinne, as I haue often said, is a certaine infirmitie, and imbecillitie, and a priuation either of knowledge, or of faith, or of the appetite, or of the doing of that which is good. Iustine also in his [Page 256] booke of the questions which were pro­posed by the Gentiles vnto the Christi­ans, amongst other things, resolueth this difficultie, 46. q. & 73. that euill or sinne is nothing else but the corruption of goodnesse: so that it is not any positiue entitie or being, but rather a priuation of entitie or being; or as Basil describeth it, Basil. hom. 9. priuatio boni, the priuation of good: and Athanasius more plainly saith, Atha. ora­tione contra idola. that it is an ethnicall and hereticall opinion, to say, that sinne or euill hath any entitie or essence, seeing it is rather the priuation of entitie or essence.

And this is the reason why Nazian­zene compareth sinne vnto darknesse, Naz. orati­one 9. n. 39. not only because darknesse and obscu­ritie in matters of saluation, and the my­steries of our faith, is the effect of sin; but also, or rather, because as darknesse is opposite vnto light, and is nothing else but the priuation of light; so sinne is nothing else but the priuation of goodnesse: wherefore in his 40. orati­on in sanctum baptisma, he concludeth, that which Nisenus, Damascenus, and Nizetas tooke from him, nullam esse [Page 267] mali essentiam, that euill or sinne hath no essence; to wit, no reall or positiue es­sence or being, Augustin. l. 11. de civ. Dei. or as S ^t. Austin descri­beth it, natura nulla, sed boni amissio, no positiue nature, but the losse of good­nesse, which position Fulgentius in his booke of faith, the 21. chap. deemeth so certaine, that it ought, saith he, to be holden as a matter of faith, because all things that haue reall being or nature, are good: his words be these: Quia om­nis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est, sed quia & in ea bonum & augeri, & minui potest, in tantum mala dicitur, in quantum bonum eius minuitur: malum enim nihil aliud est, nisi boni priuatio; vn­de geminum constat esse rationalis creatu­rae malum; vnum quo voluntariè ipsa de­fecit à summo bono creatore suo; alterum quo in vita punietur: Euill (saith this Fa­ther) is nothing else but the priuation of good, and hence it is manifest, that the crea­tures endued with reason are subiect to two kinds of euils: one, by which they vo­luntarily fall from their cheefest good, the other, by which they are punished in this life.

Likewise S ^t. Austin in his first Trea­tise vpon S ^t. Iohn giueth this reason, why God being the Creator of all things, may not bee sayd to bee the au­thor of sinne, to wit, because sinne in his owne being, hath no entitie or being, but rather is a priuation of entitie and being. Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, vt manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, & nihil fiunt homines, cùm peccant: Sinne (saith he) was not made by God, be­cause sin of it selfe is no thing, but nothing, and men become nothing becomming sin­ners.

Now then if the essence of sinne in common, or of all sinne whatsoeuer be nothing, but that nothing which is the priuation of good, Turrianus in epistola ad Iacob [...]m Ami [...]tum episcopum Antisiodo­rensem. Corduba lib. 1. q. 10. opi­nione 6. qu [...]s etiam sequuntur plures recen­tiores. hence it must needs follow, that the essence of originall sin must also consist in some particular priuation of some particular good, the which wee are now particularly to search out.

In which poynt Turrian and Corduba are of opinion, that this priuation is sub­iectionis & coniunctionis cum Deo, in qua nati fuissemus, si primus parens non pec­casset: [Page 269] of the subiection and coniuncti­on with God, in which we should haue been borne, if our first father Adam had not falne.

This they prooue by impugning of the other opinions, for that as hath beene already prooued, it cannot con­sist in any positiue and reall thing, because God otherwise might in some sort haue beene sayd to concurre vnto it, and consequently after that maner to be the cause of it, which were blasphemous: neither can it consist in any other priuation of any other super­naturall gift, because all such priuations or depriuations, are rather effects con­sequent, as punishment due vnto the sinne it selfe; therefore as the heat can­not be sayd to bee the cause of the fire, from whence it doth proceede, nor the light cause of the Sunne: so neither the priuation of originall iustice, or of any other vertue or supernaturall gift, can be said to be the essence of originall sin: for certainely if wee vnderstand aright, wee shall finde that all such priuations are rather consequent vnto sinne, and so [Page 270] the effects, then the sinne it selfe, yea, ra­ther the punishments inflicted by Al­mighty God vpon man for his trans­gression, then the transgression it selfe.

And heereby also wee may easily de­monstrate the absurdities of that com­mon opinion of the Papists, that the es­sence of originall sinne in vs consisteth formally in the depriuation of originall iustice, which had beene due vnto vs all, if wee had not transgressed in our first father; which is the common opinion of the schooles and Papists, of Aquinas, Caietan, Conradus, Scotus, Taperus, Sotus, Marsilius, Ocamus, Buderius, Alexander, Bonaventure, Richardus de Medianilla, Maior: Vasquez, Zuares, Sumel, and al­most all other Papists of this age.

Anselm: lib. de conceptu virginali cap. 26.Yea Anselmus saith that hee cannot conceiue that originall sin is any other, then that which was committed by the inobedience of Adam, to wit, the depri­uation of the iustice in infants, which was otherwise due vnto them.

Arasicanū concilium 2. Can. 2.Finally the Arausican Councell 2. Can. 2. defineth it to be the death of the soule, wherefore if death (as is plaine [Page 271] out of Philosophy) be nothing else but the priuation of the life of the soule: seeing nothing else can be vnderstood to be the life of the soule, but onely the inward grace of God, by which onely the soule did liue that supernaturall life, which is possessed in Paradise: conse­quently the priuation of this originall grace, or iustice, wherewith the soule was adorned, and liued in Paradise, must needs be the priuation of the same gift.

As if our naturall life, here in this vale of misery doth consist in the presence of our soule, or vnion thereof with the body, consequently our death must ne­cessarily consist in the absence of the same soule, which gaue it life, or in the disvnion or separation of these two comparts, the soule, and the body: after the same manner, if the supernaturall life of our soule, consist in the presence of God dwelling in our soules by his grace, then certainely our spirituall death, whether it be considered here after our expulsion out of Paradise, or in the fall from that first happinesse, [Page 272] must necessarily consist in the departing of God from our soules, or (which is all one) in the absence or depriuation of his grace.

Neither can this want of originall iustice be rightly deemed a punishment of our originall sinne (as hath beene be­fore obiected) because no defect or want worthy of an other punishment, can be inflicted as a punishment: where­fore seeing that this maketh our soules worthy to be depriued of eternall blisse, which is the greatest punishment imagi­nable, that could be inflicted for origi­nall sinne; Aquin. 2. 2. q. 21. it can in no wise be the pun­ishment due vnto the fault, but rather it must be the sinne it selfe, because as the schoole Diuines well note, the fault as it is a fault deserueth punishment, so that the worthinesse or debt of the pu­nishment doth follow the fault, as a proper passion thereof, as intense heare followeth the fire, and light necessarily proceedeth from the Sunne.

CHAP. LV.

WE may easily perceiue by the o­pinions refuted in the precedent Chapters, how easie it is, euen for the greatest witts to erre in supernaturall matters, without the assistance of Gods supernaturall grace, and illumination, seeing that those who were accounted the very mirrours of wisdome in their time, haue beene so hoodwinked and blinded in the cause and first fountaine of their felicitie, insomuch that though they knew, that they were conceiued, as Dauid saith, in iniquitie and sinne, yet they were not able to declare sufficient­ly in what consisted that iniquitie, and originall sinne, much lesse to demon­strate with any certainety, that which [Page 274] S. Austine almost in one word doth de­clare so euidently, libro q ^o: de nuptijs, & concupiscentijs cap. 23, & 26. where hee expresly holdeth that our originall sin consisteth in concupiscence, which though it remaine in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed to them, in ijs ergo qui regene­rantur in Christo, in those therefore who are regenerated in Christ, when they re­ceiue the remission of all their sinnes, it is necessarie that the guiltinesse of this as yet remaining concupiscence, be remitted; So that (as I haue already said) it be not im­puted to sin for as the guiltinesse of those sinnes, which cannot remaine, because they passe, when they are committed, remaineth neuerthelesse; which if it be not remitted, will remaine for euer: so the guiltinesse of the foresaid concupiscence, when it is re­mitted, is quite taken away.

Calvin. lib. 2. Instit. c. 1. Melancth. in colloq [...]io Wormatien. & apologia confessionis A gustanae.So that here we see auerred and pro­ued, that which many learned late wri­ters doe auouch as a matter of faith, eui­dently deducing it out of the 6, 7, & 8. chap. of the Apostle to the Romanes, and the 11 to the Hebrues, to wit, that our originall iniustice consisteth in con­cupiscence, [Page 275] the which though it doth remaine in the regenerate, yet is it not imputed vnto them; so that as diuers learned men doe declare themselues in this matter, tegitur, non tollitur; raditur, non eradicatur: it is couered, not rooted out; it remaineth, but is not imputed.

For proofe of which, Rom. 7. verse 14. 15 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. & sequenti­bus. I will only pon­der the example of Paul, who no doubt was regenerate, at least after he was cal­led an Apostle; and yet he could finde this sinne of concupiscence within himselfe, striuing against the spirit, yea hee did acknowledge it to be his origi­nall sinne, the fountaine of all actuall sinnes, and therefore hee addeth, Wee know that the law is spirituall, but I am carnall, sold vnder sinne: for I allow not that which I doe; for what I would, that doe I not; but what I hate, that doe I: now then it is no more I that doth it, but sinne that dwelleth in mee. Now what sinne is this the Apostle speaketh of, but origi­nall, or concupiscence, remaining as yet euen after his regeneration, draw­ing him vnto that which he would not, and therefore afterward in the same [Page 276] chapter, opposing it to the right incli­nation of the minde, hee calleth it ano­ther law in his members, rebelling against the law of his minde, and leading him cap­tiue vnto the law of sinne, which was in his members: and hence he concludeth, O wretched man that I am, who shall deli­uer mee from the body of this death? that is, from originall sinne, the which as it is the death of the soule, so likewise it causeth the death of the body.

CHAP. LVI.

THe first heretickes, who after the preaching of the Gospell denied originall sinne, were Pelagius and Coele­stius, as S. Austine writeth lib. de peccato­rum meritis & remissione, cap. 1. 2. 3. 9. & 19. whom Iulian the Pelagian followed in his fourth booke which hee wrote against originall sinne; yea this is attri­buted [Page 277] vnto the Armenians, to Faber Stapulensis, and others.

The first argument of this heresie is that which Iulian the Pelagian vsed against S. Austine; because it is essentiall to all sinnes, to be voluntary; but no­thing can be voluntary vnto infants, be­fore the vse of reason, seeing that as the Philosophers say, and proue, nihil concu­pitum quin praecognitum, nothing is wil­led, desired, or sought after, which is not first knowne; infants therefore who haue no vse of reason, can haue no abuse of will by consent vnto a foreknowne euill; and where there can be no suffi­cient foreknowledge or distinction of good from euill, there questionlesse can be no sinne.

Yea this seemeth to be confirmed by S. Austine himselfe, lib. 3. de libero arbi­trio, cap. 13. where hee confesseth that sinne is so voluntary an euill, that nothing can be sinne, which is not voluntary: and in another place he auoucheth, that nei­ther any of the small number of the learned, nor of the multitude of the vn­learned, doe hold that a man can sinne [Page 278] without his consent. Wherefore Do­ctor Bishop against M. Perkins out of those words doubteth not to vpbraid the Church of Englands doctrine about this point, saying, What vnlearned lear­ned men are start vp in our miserable age, that make no bones to denie this, and grea­ter matters too?

To this argument of Iulian peraduen­ture some will say, that originall sinne is voluntary in the infants, not by their owne proper actuall will, as who can haue none such, but by the will of their first father Adam, which after a sort may be said to be the will of all his posteritie, seeing he was the head of them all, and therefore that by his voluntary trans­gression all Adams posteritie may bee said to haue sinned in him.

But this seemeth not to satisfie for originall sinne, if wee will consider well the nature of it: and as all the aduerse part doth hold, verè auertit à Deo par­vuli voluntatem, & cam conuertit ad bo­num mutabile; it doth truly auert the will of the infants from God, vnto an apparant and mutable good, yea euen [Page 279] to the deuill; therefore the will of our parent, and his sinne, is in no wise to cause originall sinne in vs. Secondly (as true Philosophie teacheth) no cause can produce that which it hath not in it selfe, either virtually, or formally, nei­ther doth any cause produce any thing, but after the manner that it containeth the thing which is to bee produced, ei­ther formally, if so bee that it hath the same forme, species, or kinde, which the effect hath; or virtually, if it containe it in a more perfect degree and measure. But certainly, neither our first parent Adam, neither our immediate parents now regenerated in Christ, haue in any wise the guiltinesse of originall sinne at the time of our generation; how can it therefore possibly come to passe, that any such guilt of originall sinne should proceed from them vnto vs? Certainly this could not proceed from any matri­moniall act, seeing that was and is law­full in all lawes, both of nature, Moses, and grace: how therefore could that which is a sinne, and consequently vn­lawfull, proceed from that which is al­together [Page 280] lawfull? Thirdly, the actions of our externall powers, as of seeing, smelling, tasting, and the like, are in no wise voluntary, or so tearmed, but out­wardly only, or (as the Philosophers tearme is) by an extrinsecall denomina­tion, or name deriued from our will; and this, because they haue no free­dome or libertie in themselues inward­ly, but only as they are directed from the inward facultie of the will: and therefore as they haue no libertie or free will, but only by an externe deno­mination; so neither haue they any sinne inwardly inherent, but onely as they are commanded, or proceed from the will. Therefore after the same man­ner, seeing the soules and willes of the infants haue no libertie, or freedome of choice, but only by an externe denomi­nation, outwardly deriued from the will of Adam, now altogether past, and of his sinne, now forgiuen; it must needs follow, that they cannot in any wise bee said to haue contracted any sin, but only by an externe denominati­on, proceeding from the sin of Adam.

Fourthly, that which in it selfe is ac­cording to Gods law, neither in any wise contradicting the same, cannot be the cause of that which is against the law of God: wherefore seeing that ma­trimonie, or the matrimoniall act, is ac­cording to Gods law, it cannot bee the cause or occasion of originall sinne in the infant, which is against Gods law.

Fiftly, originall sinne cannot pro­ceed from Adam vnto his posteritie, neither as from the morall cause there­of, neither as from a physicall, naturall, or reall cause: not morally, because as death did proceed from sinne; so life, if he had perseuered, should haue procee­ded from grace, and originall iustice, which was a gift giuen vnto all our na­ture in Adam, not per modum meriti, by way of merit, (as some haue dreamed) but gratis: otherwise (as the Apostle ar­gueth, Romans the 11. chapter) grace should haue been no grace. Now there­fore consequently, neither doth origi­nall sinne passe vnto vs his posteritie by way of demerit, or as a morall effect of sinne, seeing that the same reason which [Page 282] doth vrge for the transfusion of this de­merit or sinne vnto vs, doth also vrge for the transfusion of grace. Wherefore seeing he could not be the meritorious cause of our grace, because it doth im­plie contradiction, to be deserued, and yet to be grace, a free gift, and graciously giuen; neither can he be consequently the morall cause of our originall sinne. Neither finally can the sinne of Adam bee the reall or physicall cause of our sinne, seeing that his sinne, whereof ours should proceed, is now neither actuall, nor virtuall; not actuall, because it is forgiuen; not virtuall, for that then it should be latent in the generatiue pow­er or seed; which cannot possibly bee, because then it should be attributed to God, who is cause of the generatiue power; seeing (as the Philosophers say) causa causae est causa effectus illius secundae causae, the cause of any second cause is the cause of the effect proceeding from the second cause.

Lastly, there cannot bee assigned any time or moment, in which the sonnes of Adam doe or can contract this origi­nall [Page 283] sinne: therefore both according to true Diuinitie and Philosophie, it can­not be that we doe really and inwardly in our soules contract any such sinne, but rather wee are called sinners in Adam, and are said by the Apostle to haue sinned in Adam, by reason onely of his fall, who was our head. The an­tecedent seemeth certaine, because this sinne can neither infect our soules in the first instant of their creation or in­fusion, otherwise the soule should haue it from her creation, and consequently it might bee attributed to Almightie God, as to the author thereof, seeing that as true Philosophie teacheth, ope­ratio quae simul incipit cum esse rei, est illi ab agente, à quo habet esse; the action which beginneth iointly with the being of the effect, is from that cause, from which it hath being.

And hence Aquinas holdeth as im­possible, Aquinas 1 parte q. 63. art. 15 in corpore. Angelum in primo instante crea­tionis suae peccasse, quoniam peccatum illud tribueretur Deo: that Lucifer sinned in the first instant of his creation, because that sinne should haue beene attributed [Page 284] to God, which were blasphemous.

Neither could this sinne bee contra­cted by vs in the instant, in which our soules were infused into our bodies, seeing that the immediate subiect of sinne is not the body, but the soule, or some of the powers of the soule: seeing therefore no instant can be assigned, in which the sonnes of Adam are infected with this originall crime, it followeth necessarily, both according to the grounds of reason, and Scripture, that there is no such infection or corruption inherent in our soules.

For the better vnderstanding of this fundamentall point, so controuerted in all ages, we must note, first, that origi­nall sinne is called peccatum naturae, the sinne of nature, according to that of Paul, Ephesians 2. Wee were by nature the sonnes of wrath: because sinne did spot, defile, or rather corrupt the whole masse of humane nature in our first fa­ther Adam, from whom, as first head and fountaine, it hath beene and is de­riued.

Secondly, this sinne is called the [Page 285] sinne of the world, Iohn chap. 1. Behold the Lambe of God, which taketh away the sinne of the world; because all men were defiled with this, one onely excepted, God and man, by whom al others were redeemed.

Thirdly, it is also tearmed peccatum humanae conditionis, the sinne common to all humane nature; because there is not any (Christ only excepted) which doth not vndergoe this yoke. So Ierome explicating that of the 50. Psalme, Be­hold I am conceiued in iniquities, saith, Hieron. su­per cap. 4. Ezechiel. not in the iniquities of my mother, but in the iniquities of humane nature, which are generall to all humane nature, or which hath defiled all mankinde.

Fourthly, the sinne of Adam is called peccatum radicale, the radicall sinne, or root of sinne; because wee being now depriued by it of originall iustice, which as it was in Adam, so should it also haue beene in vs, an antidote against all inor­dinate desires: but now our inordinate appetite and concupiscence (which is the root of all euill) is let loose, to the ouerthrow of all true libertie.

Lastly, wee must note this difference betweene the originall and the actuall sinne of euery particular man besides Adam, that the actuall sinne is commit­ted by the actuall will and consent of euery sinner, but the originall commeth only by Adams sinne and transgression, and thereby is transfused and passed in­to vs. Wherefore God speaking not of the former, but of the latter, Ezechiel chap. 18. saith, The soule that hath sinned shall die: the sonne shall not beare the ini­quitie of the father, neither the father the sonnes iniquitie: the righteousnesse of the righteous shall be vpon him, and the impi­etie of the wicked vpon him.

On the contrary side, originall sinne being the sinne of nature, requireth only the free libertie of the first and principall head of nature, because his will is reputed as the vniuersall will of all: whence it is, that wee must not thinke, that when the childe is first con­ceiued, and the soule first infused into the body, that then (I say) it may bee deemed to sinne, but rather that then it is conceiued in sinne: so Dauid saith, [Page 287] that he was conceiued in sinne, not that he sinned in his conception. For though both insinuate a true sinne in vs, yet the one, that is, originall sinne, is thereby signified to be deriued from Adam vnto vs, yea also to be inherent in vs: the other, that is, actuall sinne, is from our selues, and of our selues; whence it is, that the person of Adam was first infe­cted with this originall contagion, and then his nature: but in vs contrariwise, first the nature is infected, then the per­son depraued.

These things presupposed, my first conclusion is, that it is a point of catho­like faith, that all those who descend of the seede of Adam by ordinary meanes, are infected with this generall maladie of originall sinne. Wherefore God threatneth, Gen. 13. that he whose flesh is not circumcised, shall be blotted out of the booke of God, Aug. lib. 3 de peccato originali, cap. 30. & 35. & li. [...] d [...] nupt ijs [...] concupiscen­tijs, cap. 17 because hee hath made frustrate his couenant: out of which te­stimonie S. Austine thus argueth against the Pelagians; The infants did not fru­strate this couenant made with God by any actuall sinne, seeing they could not [Page 288] commit any actually; therefore they contracted originally by originall sinne deriued from Adam.

The second testimonie, which pro­ueth this point, is out of the 51. Psalme, where Dauid saith, Behold I am conceiued in iniquities, and my mother conceiued mee in sinne. Out of which place almost all the Greeke and Latine Fathers doe in­ferre the foresaid conclusion, especially Origenes, Basil, and Chrysostome, who in his 3. booke in Leuiticum cap. 12. no­teth, that Dauid doth not by these words accuse any sinne of his mothers, but that he calleth nature his mother, signifying there­by, that the filth and impuritie of Adams sinne hath descended vpon all his posteritie. Yea this is also the exposition of Euti­mius, Hilarius, Ruffinus, Innocentius ter­tius, Beda, Gregory, Ambrose, and Hie­rome, who also alleage for the same con­clusion Eccles. cap. 4. a heauie yoake vpon the sonnes of Adam from the day of their birth vnto the day of their death: which place S. Austine thus explicateth; Quid est graue iugum, nisi peccatum? What is this heauie yoake, but sinne? And why is it [Page 289] called a yoake, but because it proceedeth from two, the male and the female, of the good, and of the bad; and because it is a yoake in both the sexes, therefore it is said to bee a heauie yoake vpon the children of Adam: therefore in that he said vpon the sonnes of Adam, he made no difference of ages, no distinction of sexes, and by the comparing of sinne vnto a yoake, hee made all men equall, Christ only excepted, who was not borne as others were of corruption and sinne.

Many of the Fathers, August lib. 6 contra Donatistas, cap. 12. & lib. 1 de pic­catorum me ritis & re­missione, cap. 17. & 20. 29. 30. & lib. 2. cap. 27. and principally S. Austine doth deduce this our conclu­sion out of the 3. of Iohn, where our Sauiour saith, that vnlesse a man be borne againe of water and of the holy Ghost, hee cannot enter into the kingdome of heauen: out of which place, though Bellarmine with most of the Doctors of the church of Rome, doe inferre an absolute necessi­tie of baptisme, by reason of the gene­rall exception made by our Sauiour, that vnlesse a man be borne of water he cannot be saued; yet neuerthelesse this is not so to bee vnderstood of the mate­riall water, but of the grace of God pur­ging [Page 290] and cleansing vs as water doth, as a reuerend Author of this age doth wel expound: Attersol in his 2 book of the sa­crament of baptisme, chap. 5. which interpretation may be gathered by conference of a like place, Matth. 3. vers. 11. hee shall baptise with the holy Ghost, and with fire, that is, by the spirit of God, which is as it were fire, lightning our hearts with the know­ledge of God, enflaming them with his loue, and purging them from all euill affections. So when wee are said to bee borne againe by water and the spirit, he meaneth by the spirit shewing forth in vs the force, power, and propertie of water; as if he should say, we are borne of water, which is the spirit, as Iohn 7.38.39. and 4.21. Againe, if it were meant of water in baptisme, it must bee vnderstood according to a like sentence Iohn 6.53. Vnlesse you eat the flesh of the sonne of man, and drinke his bloud, you shall not haue life in you: which must bee vnderstood of such as are of yeeres, ac­cording to the exposition of Innocentius 3. Decret. Gre­gor. lib. 3. tit. 42. cap. 3 Lumbardus lib 4. sent. distinct. 4. and Peter Lumbard the master of the sentences.

But to leaue the confirmation of this [Page 291] point as touching the saluation of in­fants vnbaptised, S. Chrysostome, Theodo­retus, S. Austine, with many other Do­ctors doe euidently deduce the foresaid conclusion out of the 5. to the Romans, Rom. 5. where Paul saith, that by one man sinne entred into the world, and by sinne death passed vnto all men, in which all haue sin­ned. Irencus l. 5. cap. 17. & 19. Athan. de i [...]carnatio­ne verbi. B [...]si [...]. super Psalmos 32. & 50. Concilium Milevitanū & Araust [...]anum. J [...]stinus Martir. Greg Nazian, oratione 42. in sanctum Pascha, & oratione 38 in Christi nattuttate. Chrys [...]stomus de Adamo & Eua. Cyrillus Alexandrinus lib. 1. in Gen. Theodoretus in Psalmum 50. Damascenus lib 2 f [...]le [...] Orthodoxae. Origines super episto­lam ad Romanos c. 6. Cyprian. epistola 59. Hilarius Pictariensis ad Psalmum 18. Ambros. l. de Tobia c. 9. & ad Psal. 48. & l. 1. de poeni­tentia c. 2. Hierom ad cap. 42. Zech: Fulgentius de gratia Jesu Chrsti, cap. 31. Bernard seria 4. hebdomadae paenosae de passione Domini. Yea this is plainely the opinion of the Milevitan and Arausican Councels; of Iustine Martyr, Ireneus, Athanasius, Cirillus, Nazianzen, Chrysostome, Cirillus Alexandrinus, Theodoretus, Damascenus, Origenes, Cyprianus, Hilarius Pictavien­sis, Ambrose, Ierome, Fulgentius, Bernard, and many others.

Now it remained, that I should haue answered to all and euery of the argu­ments of the contrary opinion, but see­ing they may be easily answered with [Page 292] one and the same distinction, I will one­ly expresse that, and so conclude this question, which hath so troubled the Church of God in former ages.

The distinction is this, that wee must vnderstand the difference, and distincti­on of a twofold sinne: the first is actu­all, the second originall: the first from our selues, the second from Adam, though in our selues: the first we grant could neuer be in the afore-said infants, as which neuer came to the vse of rea­son, and consequently neither could euer abuse it: the second, which is ori­ginall sinne, might be and was in them, as is manifest by the authorities and reasons aboue alleadged both of Scrip­ture, and Fathers: and by this distincti­on we may vnderstand all those autho­rities which seeme in any sort to fauour the Pelagians in this point; which there­fore I conclude with S. Austine serm: 7. de verbis Apostoli circa finem: Ecce infantes in suis vti (que) operibus innocentes sunt, nihil secum, nisi quod de primo homi­ne traxerunt habentes, quibus propterea est Christi gratia necessaria, vt in Christo vi­uificentur, [Page 293] qui in Adamo mortui sunt, vt quia inquinati sunt generatione, purgentur regeneratione: behold (saith he) the in­fants be innocent in their owne workes, hauing no sinne, but that which they haue by descent from their first father, to whom notwithstanding the grace of Christ is therefore necessarie, that they may be receiued in Christ, who died in Adam, to the end that being defiled by generation, they might be purged by regeneration, in his blood, who died for all.

CHAP. LVII.

MAny obiections are wont to bee made against the doctrine of the precedent Chapters, of which these fol­lowing are the principall, yea all may be reduced vnto them.

First, that if the concupiscence, or fo­mes [Page 294] peccati, which is left after our bap­tisme in vs, were sinne, it would follow, that God were the author of sinne, see­ing he is the author of our nature, and therefore hee must needs be the author of that, which necessarily followeth na­ture; as who is the cause of the fire, is also of the heat proceeding from the fire: wherefore seeing that God was the author of nature, hee must also be the author of this fomes peccati, and concupiscence, which necessarily flow­eth from the same nature, if therefore our originall sinne consist in this concu­piscence, which floweth from nature, he who is the author and cause of na­ture, must also be of the sinne, which floweth from nature, which both seeme no lesse blasphemous then absurd.

I answer, that this fomes peccati or concupiscence (with which Adam was created, and wee all borne) was first in him, and should also haue beene in vs, though we had persisted in originall iu­stice, yet had it not beene any sinne in any of vs, if Adam had not sinned, and we in him: because this was as it were [Page 295] extinguished and ouercome by original iustice in Adam, and should haue beene in vs also, by reason that the like grace and iustice which was infused into A­dam, should also haue beene deriued vn­to vs by Adam.

But seeing Adam lost this grace both for vs, and himselfe: both this priuation of grace is attributed vnto vs, as also the concupiscence reviued in vs by rea­son of Adams sinn: true it is that the guilt thereof is taken away in the rege­nerate by baptisme, and so it is not im­puted by reason of our regeneration.

But hence peraduenture it may bee further vrged, that though God be not the author of this concupiscence, as it hath the force, and malice of sinne, yet that he is the author of the same thing, that is originall sinne, to wit, of that fo­mes peccati, fewell of sinne, concupis­cence or inclination vnto sinne, which also is no small absurditie. I answer that this is no absurditie, but necessarie, no heresie, but catholique doctrine; so that it be not granted that he is author of it, as it is sinne, but of that materiall, [Page 296] or thing which by mans wickednesse is made sinne, yea which is good as pro­ceeding from God; though euill and wicked, as flowing from man, Gods concourse being altogether good, mans determination euill, as detorting it to euill; as the light of the Sunne of it self pure and good, is oftentimes vsed and abused to euill, yea of this we haue in­finite examples, in which our aduersa­ries are driuen to auerre the like.

For who doubteth, but that Almigh­ty God, ( qui operatur omnia in omnibus, who worketh all reall actions in all things whatsoeuer) is also the vniuersall cause of euery reall action, and habit of sinne? and yet neuerthelesse no man will be so blinde, and blasphemous, there­fore to attribute to his infinite goodnes, that which hath infinite malice in it, as it is against that infinite goodnes.

The reason therefore, why it is ra­ther to be attributed vnto man, as se­cond cause of it, then vnto God, who is the vniuersall cause of all, is, because man hauing the vniuersall concourse of God vnto good, determineth it, accord­ing [Page 297] to his euill inclination vnto naught, and so committeth that nothing which in it selfe is sin, and priuation of good.

Secondly, it may be obiected against originall sinne, that if that priuation of originall iustice which ought to haue beene in vs, and of which we were de­priued by Adams fall, were in any wise to be tearmed originall sinne, it would follow, that there were not one onely originall sinne in euery one of vs, but many: for seeing that there is not one onely culpable priuation of that origi­nall iustice, which Adam had in Paradise, but also of faith, hope, charitie, and of all other graces, consequent vnto the fore-said originall iustice, why should there not be by the like reason as many originall sinnes, as there bee priuations of supernaturall gifts, and graces?

The answer is easie, for that all these depriuations of graces are deriued of one, which is of our originall iustice, which should haue beene the roote, and fountaine of them all.

The third obiection may be, that see­ing that it is not in the power of any to [Page 298] attaine to the grace of God, being in ori­ginall sinne, consequently the formall of originall sinne cannot be any priua­tion of grace, but rather a negation. I answer, that because once it was in the power of Adam, supposing the coue­nant made by Almighty God with him, that the said supernaturall forme of ori­ginall iustice should haue beene by his perseuerance passed vnto his posteritie; hence it is that this absence of originall iustice in Adam and his posteritie, is ra­ther a priuation, then negation.

Fourthly, it may be obiected, that as in the opinion of Scotus, whensoeuer the act of sinne is past, the sinner may truly be called a sinner only by reason of the relation of the act past, which is not as yet forgiuen; so it seemeth, that the same might be said in originall sin, that though the act of Adam be past, yet that this might be imputed vnto vs his posteritie, onely by reason of the relati­on which we might haue from his act, and this without any other priuation, negation, or concupiscence remaining in vs.

I answer, that although this be the opinion of Albertus and Catharinus, yet that in no wise it may be admitted, for so we are not really, and internally sin­ners in Adam, but onely by an externe denomination of his sinne, which (as wee haue already showne) is most er­roneous.

CHAP. LVIII.

THere hath beene three distinct he­resies about this point: the first, which making no difference betweene the soules of men, and other liuing crea­tures, held, that as the soules of all other creatures compounded of matter and forme are produced with dependencie of their subiect, and materiall substance: so likewise, the soules of men. And that therefore they were infected and pollu­ted by the coniunction with the body.

The second opinion, no lesse absurd in Philosophy, then erroneous in Diui­nitie, is that one soule doth concurre vnto the generation of another, as the whole man, wholy to the production of another.

The third, and worst opinion of all doth attribute the production of origi­nall sinne in our soules vnto the abso­lute power of God, spotting thereby his infinite goodnesse by the too much extending of his omnipotence, euen vnto that, which rather argueth impo­tencie, then omnipotencie.

Now therefore the true cause of ori­ginall sinne in vs (as the Scripture often witnesseth) was our first father Adam, by reason of his transgression of the commandement of God, but this not by reall influx and concourse, but by morall: first because hee could not of himselfe, and by his owne nature passe vnto his posteritie any such effect, espe­cially, seeing that, that sinne now is alto­gether past; yea, at least way according to the guiltinesse thereof, it is washed away by the blood of Christ, but ac­cording [Page 301] to the decree of Almighty God, he was the morall cause, insomuch as the infusion of originall iustice into vs depended vpon his will, by not sin­ning, according to the compact made betweene him and God: hee therefore eating of the forbidden fruit, there fol­lowed necessarily priuation of originall iustice in our soules, and consequently originall sinne in it selfe.

CHAP. LIX.

CAtharinus aboue alleadged think­eth it altogether necessary, that there should bee such a pact betweene God and man, vt in posteros peccatum de­riuari possit, that so Adams sinne might be deriued vnto his posteritie, and that the said pact was included in these [Page 302] words, in quacun (que) hora comederis, morte morieris, in what houre soeuer thou shalt eat, thou shalt die. Gen. 2. & 3.

Sotus, on the contrary side in his first booke de natura & gratia cap. 10. think­eth it friuolous to admit any such pact: which opinion many more moderne writers doe the rather follow, because the law of nature did oblige man to the preseruing of iustice.

But certainely, no man can deny, but that originall grace and iustice should haue beene transfused to Adams poste­ritie, if hee who was our head, and had receiued it for vs all, had perseuered, and this by the sole will and ordinance of God; for certainely, this was not re­quired by the nature of originall iustice, and consequently it onely required the decree of God about this matter, which might haue beene otherwise.

But that there was the said pact be­tweene God and Adam himselfe for himselfe, it seemeth euident, out of the aforesaid text of Gen. as Athanasius well noteth.

CHAP. LX.

I Answer, that this infection is not be­cause the soule receiueth any reall in­flux from the body, for without questi­on the body can in no wise as an effici­ent cause maculate or spot the soule, but this is because as soone as euer the soule is created, and in the very same instant that shee is infused into the body, shee wanteth that gift of originall iustice, which shee ought to haue had, and therefore concupiscence is imputed vn­to her, as sinne, which should haue been healed, or not imputed by originall iu­stice, if Adam had not lost it for vs all; and this is the meaning of venerable Bede tomo 8. in lib. quaestionum 4. 14, a lit­tle before the end, where he saith, animā ex vnione cum carne peccato maculatā esse, that our soules are maculated by the vnion with the body.

CHAP. LXI.

THe reason of this doubt, is because (as the preacher saith) a muliere initium peccati, sinne had his beginning from the woman, and through her all doe die, it seemeth therfore that though shee onely had sinned, the same sinne should haue beene imputed vnto vs all; yea all should haue contracted that sin in her and by hers.

Secondly, S. Hierome & S. Ambrose explicating these words ad Rom: 5. per vnum hominem &c. through one man sinne entred into the world, in whom all haue sinned, doe vnderstand that one to be Eue, if therefore shee was the first cause of this sinne, it seemeth that though shee onely had sinned, ne­uerthelesse sinne should haue beene de­riued [Page 305] vnto her posteritie, though Adam had not sinned, seeing that these words, in whom all haue sinned, according to the interpretation of S. Hierome, and S. Am­brose, are to be applied vnto the wo­man, as who was the first cause of mans woe.

Although I can gather nothing alto­gether certaine about this point, either out of the holy Scriptures or Fathers, yet neuerthelesse it seemeth more pro­bable, that the whole cause of originall sinne in vs ought to bee reduced vnto Adam, so that by Adams consent onely, and not by Eues we were to be borne in originall iniustice.

The reason is, for that all the Fathers ( S. Hierome, and S. Ambrose only excep­ted) who doe interpret the aforesaid place, doe vnderstand it of Adam, and not of Eue; yea it seemeth that this may be gathered out of the words of S. Paul 1. Corinth. 15. As in Adam all do die, so all shall be reviued in Christ, wher­fore venerable Bede is plainely of this opinion in the 14 of his questions tomo 8, where he saith, originale peccatum tra­here [Page 306] originem ex Adamo non ex diabolo, quia ex diabolo non propagamur, non ab Eua, quia vir, id est Adam, non est à mu­liere, sed mulier a viro; ex quo sequitur, Adamo non peccante, etiamsi Eua peccasset, non futurum in nobis peccatum. That o­riginall sinne hath his beginning from Adam onely, not from the Deuill, be­cause wee are not begot by the Deuill, neither of Eue, because the man, to wit, Adam is not of the woman, but the wo­man of the man; wherevpon it follow­eth, that though Eue had sinned, if A­dam had not, we should not haue been borne in sinne.

Aquinas giueth another reason, quia mulier passiue se habet ad generationem prolis, because the woman doth onely concurre passiuely vnto generation, but whether this be true or no, quod medi­corum est curent medici, tractent fabrilia fabri; one thing seemeth most certaine that this dependeth more on the secret will of Almighty God, then of any na­turall reason and consequence, which may be deduced out of the principles of nature.

CHAP. LXII.

I Answer briefly, that the first punish­ment due vnto originall sinne, and which was first of all inflicted vpon man, was the priuation of originall iu­stice, as proceeding from God, and as it did subdue the inferiour portion of the soule vnto the superiour, and the su­periour vnto God.

The second punishment proceeding from the first, was in the soule and her powers, both vnderstanding and will: not that any thing essentiall either to the soule or her powers, is taken away, but that they are not so able to exercise their functions, as they should haue beene being endued with originall iu­stice.

The third punishment of originall sinne, was, that both Adam and his po­steritie became thereby subiect to all [Page 308] corporall infirmities, yea euen vnto death it selfe, and many other expressed in the third chapter of Genesis, vers. 16. I will greatly increase thy sorrowes and thy conceptions: in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; thy desire shall bee to thy husband, and hee shall haue the rule ouer thee. Verse 17. Vnto Adam hee said, be­cause thou hast hearkened vnto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, con­cerning the which I commanded, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the dayes of thy life. Verse 18. Thornes also and thistles shall it bring forth vnto thee, and thou shalt eat of the hearbes of the field Verse 19. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou bee turned againe to the ground; for out of it was thou taken, for dust thou art, and into dust shalt thou be turned againe.

Now seeing this naturall death could not naturally bee effectuated so long as Adam was in Paradise, because the tree of life retained his vertue, wherewith man might renew his age: therefore Al­mighty God addeth in the same chap­ter, [Page 309] verse 22. 23. and 24. And now lest peraduenture hee put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and liue for euer, therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden to dresse the ground, whence he was taken. And so he droue out man, and at the East side of the garden of Eden he set the Cherubins, and a flaming sword, which turned euery way to keepe the way of the tree of life.

CHAP. LXIII.

AL the difficultie of this point is wholly as concerning those who depart out of this world without bap­tisme, whereby the guilt of originall sinne (as many hold) should haue been taken away: wherefore the question is, what becommeth of these, or what pu­nishment is due vnto them for this sin, supposing that it be not taken away, as [Page 310] certainly it is not, at leastway in those that are not comprehended in the co­uenant of grace.

The common opinion of the schoole-Diuines in this point, is, that the inno­cents vnbaptised, either baptismo san­guinis, fluminis, or flaminis, either with the baptisme of bloud, to wit, of mar­tyrdome; or of the holy Ghost, by some supernaturall act or habit, sufficient to iustification; or finally by the ordinary baptisme of water, that such (I say) are punished with the losse of their super­naturall blessednesse, though not with any other sensible punishment.

This is expresly the opinion of S. Am­brose vpon that of the 5. chapter to the Romans, as by one man, where thus hee declareth his minde in this point: Death is the resolution of the body, when the soule is separated from the body: there is also another death, which is called the se­cond death vnto hell; which wee doe not suffer through Adams sinne, but this is gotten by our owne proper actuall sinne, though by the occasion of the other.

Yea if wee onely attend vnto the na­ture [Page 311] of originall sinne, contracted by the aforesaid innocents; we shall finde that they are altogether vncapable of the punishment of hell fire: for who will say that a man might iustly bee cast in prison, or beaten for his originall sin, seeing it was neuer in his power to auoid it? much lesse therefore were it iust, Lumbar. 2. dist. 33. Bonau. ibid. ar. 3. q. 1. Rich. ar. 3. q. 1. Dur. q. 3. Scotus q. vnica. Gal r. q. 1. ar. 2. concla. 1. & seq. Marsil. in 2 q. 19. ar. 5. post 2. con­clusionem. Alex. 1. par. q. 39. mem. 3 ar. 4. Dom. Sotus l. 1. de natu­ra & gra­tia, ar. 4. cap. 14. Cath. in o­pusc. pecu­liari de hac re. that any man should suffer the eternall torments of hell fire, for that sinne which hee neuer committed, nei­ther was euer in his power to auoid it. wherefore this is the most common opi­nion of the Schooles, that the infants, or others who die with originall sinne only, shall not suffer any sensible tor­ment of hell fire, though they bee eter­nally excluded from the company of the blessed in heauen, and the glorious sight of Almighty God: and this in particular is the opinion of the master of the sentences, Bonauenture, Richardus Durand, Scotus, Marsilius, Gabriel, Ale­xander, Sotus, and lastly of the Councell of Florence in the last session, in literis vnionis.

The second opinion of other schoole-Diuines [Page 312] is, that the said vnbaptised in­nocents are to bee punished in the other world, not only with the losse of the sight of God, their essentiall blisse, but also with other sensible torments, euen with hell fire it selfe.

This is plainly the opinion of S. Au­stine, l. 5. hypognosticon post medium, and in his booke de fide ad Petrum, c. 27. & 44. But if these be not so certainly Au­stines workes, the second at least is of the learned Bishop Fulgentius, and the other of some learned Author: yea whosoeuer be the authors of those, it is most certaine that Austine was of this opinion in his 14. sermon of the words of the Apostle, where he saith, infantes in peccato originali discedentes ex hac vita, deputandos esse ad sinistram, ad ignem aeternum: that the infants that depart out of this world in originall sinne, are to be deputed to the left hand vnto euerlasting fire.

Againe, in his fift booke against Iu­lian, the 8. chapter, a little after the midst, he auerreth, hanc poenamignis ser­uatam esse infantibus, quanta verò futura [Page 313] sit, non audet definire: that this punish­ment of fire is reserued for infants, though (as he saith) hee dare not define how great this punishment of fire shall be, in regard of them who depart with the guilt onely of originall sinne. The like also is not im­probably gathered out of Gregory the great, in his 9. booke of his morals, the 12. chapter, vpon those words, in turbi­ne conteret me, where he seemeth plainly to insinuate the said sensible punish­ment of the infants by fire; ac si apertè humani generis damna considerans dicat, as if considering the losses of mankinde he should plainly say, with what punishment will that most iust and rigorous Iudge pu­nish those who are condemned for their owne fault, if he also eternally smite those whom the guiltinesse of their owne will doth not condemne? by which word of smiting he seemeth to insinuate the pu­nishment of sense, which is by fire.

Again he declareth his mind himself touching this sensible punishment, vp­on those words of the same chap. multi­plicabit vulnera mea, hee shall multiplie my wounds; where speaking of the fore­said [Page 314] infants, he saith, that perpetua tor­menta percipiunt, qui nihil ex propria vo­luntate peecarunt; that those who haue sin­ned in nothing by their owne proper will, receiue perpetuall torments: which words of perpetuall torments must needs im­port a sensible punishment.

Yea this was the opinion of the Bi­shops of Africa in Fulgentius his time, as is plainly out of him aboue alleaged, and more plainly in his booke of the in­carnation, which booke hee wrote not onely by the approbation of all the Bi­shops of Africa, but also in their names, as may be euidently seene by the be­ginning of the first chapter of that booke.

Finally, this seemeth to be the sense of the Scripture, Matth. the third chap­ter, verse 12. and Marke also the third chapter, verse 14. where S. Iohn Baptist speaking of our Sauiour, saith, that he will come with his fanne in his hand, and will make cleane the floore, and gather his wheat into his garner, but will burne vp the chaffe with vnquenchable fire: where (as wee see) all mankinde is but onely [Page 315] of two sorts, the good and the bad, the wheat and the chaffe, wherof the wheat only is for the garner, that is, the good for heauen, the chaffe for the fire, the bad for those intolerable torments of hell: here is no meane; all is either good, or bad; all either for eternall blesse, both sensible and spirituall, or eternall curse and punishment, both sensible and spirituall; and consequent­ly, there is no other place or man­ner of punishment, for those who die with originall sinne, innocent in their owne actions, though eternally seque­stred from the sight of God, for Adams sinne and corruption.

Secondly, it is said in the same chap­ter, that euery tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be hewen downe, and cast in the fire. Wherefore seeing those that depart out of this world with the guilt only of originall sinne, are vnfruitfull trees, consequently they are to bee cast into euerlasting fire.

Thirdly, when our blessed Sauiour shall come to giue euery man accor­ding to his deeds, hee will only separate [Page 316] two sorts of people, one of the right hand, another of the left, the good of the right, the bad of the left, those for eternall blesse in the kingdome of hea­uen, these for an eternall curse in the vnquenchable fire of hell. Matth. 25. chap. vers. 31. And when the sonne of man commeth in his glory, and all the holy Angels with him, then shall he sit vpon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate one from another, as a shepheard separateth the sheepe from the goats, and hee shall set the sheepe on the right hand, and the goats on the left. Loe here bee two sorts of people signified by those two kindes of beasts, the sheepe and the goats, the good and the bad, the sheepe on the right hand, the goats on the left, accor­ding vnto the two sorts of sentences pronounced, vers 34. and 41. Then shall the King say to them on his right hand, come yee blessed of my Father, possesse the inheritance of the kingdome prepa­red for you from the foundation of the world. Againe to the cursed hee saith, vers. 41. Depart from me yee cursed vnto [Page 317] euerlasting fire, which is prepared for the Deuill and his angels.

Hence therefore it must needs fol­low, that seeing those who died in ori­ginall sinne imputed vnto them, as who were not in any wise ingraffed in the body of Christ, that these (I say) must needs according vnto the opinion of the aforesaid Fathers bee condemned vnto vnquenchable fire, though cer­taine it is (as God willing shall bee de­monstrated in another place) that those who are in any wise ingraffed in Christ, either by the baptisme of water, of bloud, or of the holy Ghost, by reason of originall sinne only, shall neuer taste of those eternall torments prepared for the deuill and his angels.

CHAP. LXIIII.

AS there is nothing so manifest vn­to reason, but hath beene oppug­ned by reason; so neither hath there beene any thing so euident in Scrip­ture, but hath beene oppugned with Scripture. So the Pharisees resisted the Messias, and Simon Magus the doctrine of Moses, especially about the crea­tion.

For either (saith hee) the God which created man was omnipotent, or not; if omnipotent, how is it that hee would that Adam should not fall, who neuer­thelesse did fall? if he was not omnipo­tent, how can he be God?

To this wee answer, that though Adam sinned, and by his sinne did con­trary [Page 319] to the will of God; neuerthelesse hee remained in some sort conformable to the will of God: for as hee created him, endued with vnderstanding, that thereby hee might discerne good from euill; so was hee also created with free will, whereby hee might embrace the good, and eschew the euill, obey or disobey his Lord and maker: this was the perfection in which he excelled the beasts of the earth, paulò minor factus Angelis, in this he resembled the purest Angels, yea in this hee is said to bee made to the image of God himselfe.

But God (saith Simon Magus) would not that Adam should haue eaten of the forbidden fruit, who neuerthelesse did eat of that fruit; it followeth therefore that hee remained not as his Creator would haue had him to haue remained; how then can God be omnipotent, or his will alwayes fulfilled?

It were necessary, if we should fully satisfie this argument, to intreat more largely of the will of God, then were conuenient for this place: wherefore, that wee may briefly answer this obie­ction, [Page 320] wee must presuppose with the Schoole-Diuines a threefold distincti­on of the will of God, Aquinas 1. n.i. te quae­stione 19. Ibidem Molina, VasqueZ, Suarius, Sumel, Bannesius, & alij plu­res. according to the diuersitie of their proper obiects: the first they call his efficient, effectu­all, or working will, by which God doth so effectually intend any thing, that hee performeth it actually by some externall operation and worke, either actually produced, or to be pro­duced.

The other kinde of will, which the Diuines distinguish in God, in regard of some obiects which he doth not re­ally produce, is called inefficax volun­tas, a kinde of propension or inclina­tion of his diuine will to the effectua­ting of any good effect, which might redound to the felicitie of man: yet for the attaining of the end, which out of his vnsearchable wisdome hee hath prefixed, hee oftentimes permitteth the contrary to this his diuine inclination and will; the which therefore is called Gods permissiue will. As for example, God would that all men should bee sa­ued, according to that of the Apostle, [Page 321] Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri; to wit, in his vniuersall grace, calling, and inspirations, and other generall meanes, offered to all, so that out of his infinite goodnesse hee wisheth and wil­leth in this sort all to bee saued, and that hee might the more manifest his infinite mercy by the efficacie of his working will, he actually saueth some, euen so to manifest his iustice by his other permissiue decree, he permitteth others to worke their owne ruine and eternall damnation.

So that according to this distinction, it may truly be said, that the transgres­sion of Adam was in some sort con­trary to the will of God, in some againe agreeable to the same: for first, in that it was permitted by God, it was for the further benefit vnto mankinde, and the greater glory of God, by which hee wrought that miraculous effect of the hypostaticall vnion betweene the se­cond person of the blessed Trinitie, and our nature, taking occasion of the grea­test euill to worke our greatest good: insomuch that it may well bee deemed [Page 322] (as Gregory tearmeth it) foelix culpa, quae talem & tantum habere meruit Re­demptorem; a happy fall in regard of the issue, not as it was a sinne, but as an occasion of a more perfect abolish­ing of sinne; neither as willed by God, but permitted; foreseene by Gods wisdome, effected by mans wicked­nesse, yea in some sort effected by God, to wit, by Gods vniuersall con­course, but determined by mans de­praued will, Gods action being indif­ferent, or rather of its owne nature, and as Gods, ordained to good, but by mans depraued will determined to euill; which yet againe by the infinite goodnesse of God is made an occasion of our greatest good. So that, if it bee demanded, whether God would that Adam should eat of the forbidden tree, or no? and if hee would, why did hee forbid it? if he would not, why did he not hinder it?

The answer is, that in some sort hee would it, and againe after some sort he would it not: hee would it not, as a sinne; hee would it neuerthelesse as a [Page 323] meane, or rather as an occasion of a greater good. Wherefore he forbad it as a sinne: he concurred with it, as vni­uersall cause of all things being, not as a particular cause, or agent in sinne, as it was sinne, though in some sense hee would it (as hath beene said) as a meane of an infinite greater good: and as the greatest occasion of shewing his infi­nite wisdome, and goodnesse; of his wisdome, because he knew to produce such an excellent effect, of so infinite an euill; of his goodnesse likewise, in that being moued onely by it, and for it, he was pleased to effect our greatest good, of the greatest euill: a worke so excellent and admirable, as which could onely proceede and flow from that onely infinite ocean of good­nesse.

Yea Adams eating of the forbidden fruit was an euident argument, that hee remained free to sinne, euen after his sinne: according to the pleasure and will of God: for such was his diuine will, that Adam should be endued with free will, that it might be in his power [Page 324] to chuse the good, and eschew the euill, not of himselfe, but by grace: so that thus sinning he shewed his power, and consequently by the same sinne hee shewed in some sort himself to remaine according to Gods diuine will and plea­sure with freedome to sinne: for seeing that no sinne can be committed with­out some actuall exercise of free will, and that by the same exercise the prece­dent power is manifested, it followeth, that by this exercise, and action of A­dams free will, I meane his transgressi­on, it was made manifest, that hee was created, and alwaies preserued accord­ing to his diuine will, in that he was en­dued, and afterward remained with free will sufficient to sinne, though insuf­ficient in it selfe to the actions of grace.

In this sense then wee see that al­though Adam sinned, yet remained he according to Gods will, because hee remained alwaies endued with free will.

Likewise, we may vnderstand in an other sense, how Adam remained ac­cording [Page 325] to Gods will, yea and this euen in regard of his sinne; I meane, accord­ing to his permissiue will: for Almigh­ty God (as we haue said before) out of his incomprehensible wisdome fore­seeing the infinite good, which might proceed from thence, to wit, the hypo­staticall vnion, and being determined by his absolute and secret will, to effe­ctuate the same, hee permitted this sinne of Adam, as a negatiue meanes, or rather occasion, of so excellent an end.

But God (saith this heretike) would haue had man to haue persi­sted in that blessed estate, from which neuerthelesse hee fell: how then was not Gods will more then his power, seeing hee obtained not, that which he would?

But here we may see both the malice and ignorance of this heretike, which both are the rootes and springs of all heresies: his malice, in that hee presu­med against God himselfe; his igno­rance, in that hee taxeth that hee vnder­standeth [Page 326] not: for if he had vnderstood either what belongeth to the free will of man, or rightly apprehended the power & wisdom of the omnipotent, he might easily haue perceiued, that the fall of our first father, did rather demonstrate the wisdome of God, then contradict his omnipotence, and will: for seeing it pleased his diuine maiestie to giue vs free will, and to place vs in such estate, in which by his grace we might persist, and which being rejected, we might fall of our selues: what can bee more eui­dent, but as that our perseuerance should haue beene attributed to God, and to the right use of his grace, so our fall onely vnto our selues, and the want of our concourse with his grace, the which in that estate was not onely suffi­cient, but very abundant. Seeing there­fore it was once in the power of our first father, to haue withstood the tem­ptation of Satan; and not to haue cast off so easie a yoke, as was imposed him, with so abundant grace; he deserued no doubt to bee depriued of that grace, [Page 327] thrust out of Paradise, yea finally to bee disrobed of the beautifull robe of im­mortalitie.

In the combination of which we may magnifie, and admire the omnipotent wisdome, and infinite wise power of God, in that hee knew and could so ex­cellently combine iustice, with mercy; the which two attributes, as they are to be found in all his workes, so without all question most admirable in this: his iustice, in not leauing vnpunished so foule a fact as originall sinne; his mercy, in the mercifull manner of the punish­ment: his iustice againe, in that he de­priued man of the vesture of immorta­litie; his mercy, euen in the same pe­nalty and depriuation of immortalitie, least as Moyses Barsephas doth most ex­cellently answer in this point, ne ipsius prauitas foret immortalis, qualis est dia­boli: least his wickednes should become immortall, such as the Diuels is, following the nature of the subiect, to which it is adherent.

Furthermore God therefore punish­eth [Page 328] man with this mercifull punishment of death, that thereby hee considering the effect, might eschew the cause: or lastly, because out of this mortalitie of man he would produce a more perfect immortalitie in the same man: for God fore-seeing that out of Adams posterity should come an infinite multitude of martyrs, the sentence of death was pro­nounced against Adam, to the end that many of his posteritie suffering death for the Redeemers sake, might supply the places of falne spirits.

But that we may returne from whence we digressed, if God were therefore to be counted deficient in power, because he created Adam with such liberty, that he could contradict the commandment of his Creator: after the same manner might likewise be inferred, that now also he hath the like defect, or impotencie; seeing that now also man hath the like liberty to transgresse: because as hee commanded Adam, that he should not touch the tree of the knowledge of good and euill: so likewise hath hee [Page 329] commanded vs his posteritie, that wee should follow the good, and eschew the contrary euill: now therefore if we do transgresse this law, it must needs bee God either allowing or contradicting this transgression: if it be by Gods ap­probation, why doth hee prohibite it? if contrary to his will, why doth he per­mit it? or if hee permit that which is a­gainst his will, how can such a God bee called omnipotent? or lastly, if he can hinder that which is euill, and doth not; how is he good, who consenteth, and concurreth so euill?

To these I answer out of the former principles, that euen this permission of sinne doth most manifestly demonstrate the infinite wisdome, power, and good­nesse of God; his wisdome, in that out of this in a manner so infinite euill, hee did worke such an infinite good, as is the manifestation of his glory, and the incarnation of his Sonne; his power, in that he could, his goodnesse in that hee would.

But why (saith the aduersarie) did God prohibite Adam the eating of the [Page 330] tree of the knowledge of good and e­uill? what else could bee his meaning, but least he should be able to iudge be­tweene good and euill, and consequent­ly least hee should eschew the euill, and prosecute the good? how then is not God enuious, or how can hee be God, who enuieth and prohibiteth that which is good?

I answer, that God did neither abso­lutely decree that Adam should eat of this fruit, neither that he should not eat, though he did command him, that hee should not eat, but left him to his owne free will to eat, or not eat: hee did for­bid him to eat, not because the fruit was morally, or of it selfe good or euill, but in the issue; good, if he had abstained; euill, if hee abstained not: good by obedience, euill by disobedience: where fore God did intend in this prohibition to try his obedience, and that only was respected in this commandement: so that if Adam had obeyed God, accord­ingly as was in his power by the grace of God, hee should for a time haue en­ioyed that terrene Paradise, in which he [Page 331] was created, and afterward haue beene partaker of the celestiall eternally with his Creator.

Hence wee see how impiously God is accused of wickednesse, and enuie in the forbidding of our first fathers the eating of the tree of good and euill; seeing that the eating of this fruit was indifferent of its owne nature, as out of which neither good nor euill could pro­ceed: but that which God did regard in this commandment, was our obedi­ence or disobedience: in respect of which hee was after a manner indiffe­rent, neither absolutely decreeing the one, neither effectually willing the o­ther: onely this wee may adde, that God did desire and will our first fathers abstinence, and therein required his obe­dience; but as this his diuine will had not his efficacie, so did hee and might permit the contrary for other respects worthy his diuine prouidence and infi­nite wisdome, which haue been already touched. Not of enuie (as some haue blasphemously imagined) least Adam become immortall, for if this blasphe­mie, [Page 332] were consequent to the fore-said prohibition; certainely, God, who fore­saw all future euents, either would not haue created man, or hauing created him, would not haue placed him in Pa­radise so neere vnto the tree of life; or at least way, hee might either haue hid­den, or not haue created the tree of life. Wherefore the true reason, why he for­bad him the tree of life, was (as Moyses Barsephas well noteth) ne perpetuò viue­ret in peccato, least he should liue in per­petuall death of sinne, as the Deuill doth, euer liuing, euer dying.

Lastly, the aduersarie obiecteth a­gainst the curse of the Serpent: for why (saith he) did God curse the Serpent? if hee cursed him as the author of the euill committed, why did he not hinder it, least it should be committed? but if he cursed him as author of that good, which was consequent vnto the euill, how is that God called good, and not rather enuious and wicked, who punish­eth, yea enuieth the author of such an excellent effect? Againe, if neither of these was the cause of the Serpents [Page 333] curse, how may God bee excused of wilfull maliciousnesse, or malicious foolishnes?

The answer to this blasphemy is pa­tent out of that, which hath beene al­ready said out of the former obiections, to wit, that God did therefore curse the Serpent as author of euill, neither did hinder him pretending the euill to the intent, that he might out of so infinite an euill, as was the transgression of the first Adam, worke that infinite good of the incarnation of his Sonne, and birth of the second Adam: for though it be an argument both of his power, and goodnesse; ex bono efficere melius, of good to make better: yet it seemeth much more excellent, and conuincing euen our naturall capacitie, that hee is infinitely potent, and good: who can ex nihilo perfectissimum producere effectū: vel ex pessimo efficere optimum; who can (I say) produce the most perfect, good, and most excellent effect, yea farre ex­ceeding all other created perfection and excellencie, of nothing; yea euen of that nothing which is most remote [Page 334] from any goodnesse, yea is the very priuation of all goodnesse and excel­lencie.

CHAP. LXV.

MAnes that wicked heretike, with the rest of his sect doe most blas­phemously accuse the wisdom of God, as touching the fore-said commande­ment of abstaining from the tree of good and euill: for (saith he) doubtles when God did giue this law, vnto our first fathers, hee thought, that they would obey it; which seeing they did not, God (as Manes obiecteth) was deceiued.

Secondly, he accuseth God of vniust wrath and indignation: in that he con­demned man for so small a matter, as [Page 335] the eating of an apple. Finally, he ac­cuseth him of ignorance, mutabilitie, and contradiction to himselfe; in that ignoring his future compassion to­wards man, hee did frustrate the law, which hee himselfe had made, yea and contradicted the sentence of death, as rashly pronounced by himselfe a­gainst Adam.

Here we may see, how (as Tertullian saith) God of his infinite goodnes and mercy suffereth himselfe to bee disho­noured in his other infinite attributes, and dietie: but that it may bee appa­rent, that these blasphemies haue not any ground, euen in naturall reason: we answer, that though all things, and consequently the disobedience of A­dam was perfectly fore-knowne by God Almighty, yet neuerthelesse it was conformable to reason, that Adam being a reasonable creature should haue this law of obedience prescribed vnto him, so conformable to reason: first, for to manifest the absolute power, do­minion, and authoritie of God the Creator ouer his creature; and the due [Page 336] subiection of the creature towards his Creator.

Secondly, this law of obedience was most profitable vnto man (though fore­knowne that it was to be violated by man) most profitable (I say) it was, both in regard of the manifestation of Gods iustice, and mercy: as also for the exercise and tryall of the good, and bad; righteous, and vnrighteous, a ne­cessarie obiect of the afore-said attri­butes.

Now if this law should therefore haue beene omitted, because God fore-knew the transgression thereof; by the same reason, or rather no reason, no other law should haue beene prescribed vnto man; seeing there is no law, ei­ther of nature or grace, which God in his fore-knowledge did not fore­see would be often-times violated by man.

Furthermore, as touching the blas­phemie against the wrath of God, I answer, that it is not to be attributed to God, as signifying any passion, or mu­tation in the immutable or impassible [Page 337] God; but that this shadow of change, or shew of mutabilitie, is attributed vnto him, who in his nature is altoge­ther immutable, because hee seeing the wickednesse of man, he worketh those effects, which in vs bee euident to­kens, and signes of mutabilitie and change.

Nay secondly, I adde, that after A­dam had transgressed the commande­ment of God, God pronounced against him the afore-said sentence of death, more moued by mercy, then of any anger or wrath: which wee may eui­dently see in that hee did not die the same day of his transgression, accord­ing as the sentence, which God pro­nounced against him, seemed to threa­ten; so that whether wee respect the sentence giuen before Adams disobe­dience, or the execution of the same after his sinne, we may admire the in­finite mercy of the Almighty in both, both in regard of Adam, and his po­steritie; as also in regard of the sen­tence threatned to be inflicted so im­mediatly after their sinne: so that euen [Page 338] in his iustice wee may magnifie his mercy, and say with the Psalmist, mi­sericordia eius super omnia opera eius, that his mercy aboundeth in all his workes, yea and is aboue all his works: because (as the Diuines say) remunerat vltra condignum, punit citra condignum, he rewardeth our workes farre beyond their worth, which is none at all, vn­lesse it bee in Christ; and punisheth our sinnes much lesse, then they de­serue.

To the other blasphemie, which Manes vseth against the Almighty God, in accusing him of repentance, and mutabilitie, I answer, that we must first suppose, what it is to repent, or to be sorry for any thing, which wee haue done: For repentance or sorrow sup­poseth ignorance in vs, of future euents, yea of such as are noxious or hurtfull to those who are affected with the afore-said passion; both which are farre vnfitting the all-seeing science, and omnipotent power of God: who did not remit the rigour of this sen­tence, moued by sorrow or repentance, [Page 339] as it happeneth in vs, but rather, as we haue said before, by his infinite mercy and clemencie, to the end that his in­finite goodnesse and mercy might bee the more manifest vnto vs.

In like manner wee may say, that when any sinner doth turne from his former being in sinne, God Almightie in some sort may bee said to remit the rigour of his sentence pronounced against him; and this not by reason of any ignorance, or mutable repenting himselfe of the former fact, or threat­ning (as Manes blasphemously obie­cteth) but rather hee remitteth out of his infinite clemencie, the sentence of damnation, which conditionally hee had decreed, to wit, if the sinner had not repented himselfe of his sinne: an example of which wee finde in the commination of doome and vtter de­struction threatned not absolutely, but conditionally against the Niuiuites, Ionae 3. that they should vtterly bee destroied with­in forty dayes, 4. Reg. 20. likewise against Ezechi­as, that hee should die for his sinnes, whom neuerthelesse God pardoned [Page 340] vpon their repentance: and the like al­so wee finde in others, most hainous offenders, against whom God hauing denounced his wrath, neuerthelesse pardoned vpon their sorrow, contrista­tion, and humiliation.

Now as touching the lie, which this hereticke obiecteth against God, in that hee threatned death vnto man in the day of his transgression, which ne­uerthelesse was not inflicted: I answer, that as man is composed of body and spirit, so likewise the death threatned against him was both corporall and spi­rituall; which both were in some sort inflicted euen in the very instant of his transgression: the spirituall in the sepa­ration of his spirit from God and his grace, wherein consisted his spirituall and supernaturall life: the corporall in the perturbation of his affections and powers both spirituall and corporall, which was a kinde of beginning of a neuer dying death, beginning in this life, and which according to the pre­sent iustice of God, if it had beene ex­ecuted, was to haue beene consumma­ted [Page 341] in the other life, or rather eternall death, if so be that this first lapse and fall had not been remitted, not of mans merit, but by Gods mercy.

CHAP. LXVI.

THeodorus Bishop of Laodicea, and Nestorius Patriarke of Constantino­ple, with diuers others of the Greeke Church, were of opinion, that sinne was not the occasion of death, but that man should haue died though hee had not sinned: because mortalitie is con­sequent to nature, as immortalitie pro­ceedeth only of grace. How then is it possible, vnlesse God can contradict and denie himselfe, or that one of the diuine decrees can be opposite to ano­ther, that God should first decree the [Page 342] immortalitie of man, then presently vpon his transgression, the obiect be­ing changed, God also should be chan­ged in his decree: for either God fore-knew mans fall, and his perseuerance in grace for so small a space, or hee fore-knew it not: if not, how was hee God? if hee fore-knew it, how is hee so pre­sently changed, and consequently also no God?

Againe, if we were depriued of the gift of immortalitie bestowed vpon Adam, and in him vpon all his posteri­tie, how may it stand with the iustice of God, and much more with his infi­nite mercy, that wee should be punish­ed for Adams iniustice, the innocent for the guiltie, the iust for the vniust? Yea how standeth this euen with the word of God, and his complaint by Ezechiel, chapter 18. verse 2. where God complaineth of this, as it seemeth, blasphemie of his people: What meane you, that you vse this prouerbe concer­ning the land of Israel, saying, The fa­thers haue eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge? which [Page 343] is as much, as to say, our fore-fathers haue sinned, and wee are punished for their sinnes. How may this stand with the iustice of God, seeing God him­selfe taxeth this as vniust, and as vn­iustly obiected against him, in the third verse of the same chapter, where con­testing against mans vnrighteousnesse, hee protesteth and proueth his owne righteousnesse and iust dealing, insinu­ating thereby, yea detesting the con­trary as iniustice, verse 3. As I liue, saith the Lord, yee shall not haue occasion any more to vse this prouerbe in Israel, to wit, that the fathers haue eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge; that is, that their fathers haue sinned, and they were punished: against which hee contesteth, and that by an oath, euen by himselfe, in the latter end of the fourth verse, The soule that sinneth, it shall die, that is, all that sinne shall die, and none shall die but those which sinne: hee giueth the reason in the beginning of the verse, and that with an ecce, behold, because he would haue all to acknowledge his iustice with [Page 344] man, and how hee vseth equalitie with all men; the father as the sonne, and the sonne as the father, euery one ac­cording to his deeds in Christ, because all are equally his, who saith, Behold, all soules are mine; as the soule of the father, so also the soule of the sonne is mine; the soule that sinneth, it shall die: as who would say, and none else shall die, but who sinneth; which may bee proued by the opposite iustice, and is exemplified euen by the Prophet, as that none shall bee rewarded for ano­thers righteousnesse, so none shall bee punished for anothers vnrighteous­nesse: for so the Prophet prosecuteth in the fift verse: But if a man bee iust, and doe that which is lawfull and right, and hath not eaten vpon the mountaines, neither lift vp his eyes vnto idols of the house of Israel, neither hath defiled his neighbours wife, neither hath come neere a menstruous woman, and hath not op­pressed any, but hath restored to the debter his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath giuen his bread to the hungrie, and hath couered the naked with [Page 345] a garment; he that hath not giuen forth vpon vsurie, neither hath taken any in­crease, that hath withdrawne his hand from iniquitie, hath executed true iudge­ment betweene man and man, hath walked in my statutes, and kept my iudgements to deale truly, he is iust, he shall surely liue, saith the Lord God.

How then can it bee true that Adams posteritie should bee punished for his sinne, or depriued of immortalitie, which God had decreed vnto them for Adams transgression? Or otherwise how can that bee true which the same Prophet prosecuteth in the twentieth verse? The soule that sinneth, it shall die: the sonne shall not beare the ini­quitie of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquitie of the sonne: the righteousnesse of the righteous shall be vpon him, and the wickednesse of the wicked shall bee vpon him. Where hee prosecuteth throughout all the chapter, prouing and approuing the iustice of God, together with the reproofe of mans vnrighteousnesse and iniustice, especially from the 29. verse to the end, [Page 346] where hee propoundeth and answereth the obiections of his people: Yet (saith the house of Israel) the way of the Lord is not equall: O house of Israel, are not my wayes equall? are not your wayes vn­equall? Therefore I will iudge you, O house of Israel, euery one according to his wayes, saith the Lord God: repent and turne your selues from all your transgres­sion, so iniquitie shall not bee your ruine; cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby you haue transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit: for why will you die, O house of Israel? for I haue no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turne your selues, and liue.

Now then if God haue no pleasure in the death of a sinner, how hath hee pleasure in his mortalitie, hauing crea­ted him immortall? or how hath hee not pleasure in his death, whom for so small a matter as the eating of an apple, or some other such like fruit, hee depri­ueth of immortalitie, yea contradicteth his owne decree for the fulfilling of the aforesaid reuenge of sinne?

Againe, though wee grant that Adam died for his sinne and iniustice, why should wee not likewise say, that Noe, Melchisedech, Abraham, and others of the Patriarkes and Prophets were re­stored vnto immortalitie for their iu­stice and righteousnesse? Wee know that God is alwayes more prone to shew his mercy, then to execute his iustice: how then may it bee said, that here he so withdraweth his mercy, and extendeth his iustice? Hee often par­doneth the wicked for the godly mens sake, and neuer punisheth the iust for the wickeds sinne: from whence then is this his crueltie and vniust dealing against those which neuer committed any iniustice?

Moreouer, the sonne of God was incarnate for Adams sinne: we ought to bee thankfull euen to the deuill, to our selues, and to sinne it selfe, as oc­casion of so great good, as was the re­storing of mankinde to a more blessed estate.

Lastly, if Adams sinne was cause of his death, why did not the deuils also [Page 348] die, seeing they sinned much more grieuously? If you say they died spiri­tually, in that they were depriued of the grace of God, why might not the like death suffice also for Adams sinne? the death (I meane) of the soule, his body remaining as it was created, not subiect to death? How did God iustly execute his iustice, inflicting a greater punishment vpon Adam for a smaller offence, then vpon the deuils for a greater, depriuing them only of their spirituall life, but Adam both of spiritu­all and corporall?

These are the arguments of these heretickes, against the iust punishment which God did inflict vpon our first fa­ther for his first offence of disobedi­ence; by which they would conclude, that whether Adam had sinned, or re­mained in his former righteousnesse, whether hee had eaten of the forbidden fruit, or abstained from it, hee had ne­uerthelesse beene subiect to death, be­cause hee was created of his owne na­ture mortall, which nature neither the eating of the forbidden fruit could [Page 349] make mortall, nor the abstinence from it immortall.

Hence therefore they are imboldned to affirme, that wheresoeuer the Scrip­ture maketh mention of Adams sinne, as cause of his corporall death, that it is to bee vnderstood figuratiuely, not that Adams sinne was properly the cause or the occasion of his death, but that the Scripture vseth this phrase, to the end, that when Adam should heare of so seuere a punishment, as the death of both body and soule, he might bee terrified thereby from the committing of sinne. The Scripture vseth the like manner of speech in diuers occasions, as in the 22. chapter of Genesis, God tempted or tried Abraham, which place must needs be vnderstood figuratiuely; for God who seeth all things, as well future, as present, or past, hath no need of any triall or experience. The like kinde of threatning wee haue in the fourth chapter of Exodus, where it is said, that God would haue slaine Moses, which places are not to bee in­terpreted literally as they sound, but [Page 350] figuratiuely, as all other places of Scrip­ture (according to the rule of S. Au­stine) when otherwise they signifie any absurditie, as this of the death of Adam doth, because it contradicteth the decree of God concerning his im­mortalitie.

Neuerthelesse the contrary exposi­tion is most firmly to bee holden as concerning the immortalitie of man before his fall, and mortalitie after and by his transgression: not that there was any mutation in God, but trans­gression in man: God predetermined according to his foresight, man sinned according to that foresight, not that the foresight was cause of mans fall, but rather mans fall was the obiect of Gods foresight: insomuch that God had not foreseene mans fall, if man had not beene to fall; neither man had fallen, if God had not foreseene his fall: so that though it bee necessary that God foresee that which is future, yet that is not necessarily future, which God doth foresee; for so seeth hee things future as they are future, not im­posing [Page 351] any necessitie in things not ne­cessarily future by his foresight: which as it is necessary in regard of things necessary, so is it contingent in regard of things contingent: contingent (I say) in respect of the obiect, though necessary in respect of his owne entitie and being; or as the Schoole-Diuines doe explicate it, ad intra necessary, ad extra contingent: insomuch that all the mutation is in the outward and cre­ated obiects, nothing at all can reflect or redound vnto God.

Wherefore though Almighty God had eternally decreed the immortalitie of man in his first creation; yet was there no mutation in God, because vp­on his transgression he made him mor­tall, and subiect to death: for as both the degrees were eternall, so the fore­sight of the euent of both was likewise eternall; the mutation issued onely from the obiect, and remained in the same: immutabilitie was alwayes, and remaineth in God, because as hee had foreseene, so he determined; and as he determined, so likewise he foresaw.

Lege ad Rom. cap. 5. & 7.Hence it is is, that seeing the Scrip­ture so often witnesseth, that death was the effect of sinne, and that if sinne had not raigned in our soules, neither should death haue destroied our mortall bodies; questionlesse, though man was created immortall by grace, yet is hee iustly depriued of that immortalitie, and become subiect to death through his transgression.

Now as touching the absurdities so ignorantly (if not blasphemously) in­ferred vpon the foresaid doctrine, I answer, that though God doe reproue that ancient prouerbe of the Iewes, and their comparison of the sowre grape, with other the like contestations of sillie wormes with their Creator, that these (I say) are principally to bee vnderstood in regard of actuall sinne, as is plaine out of the text it selfe, and not habituall or originall, of which the text speaketh not.

But if it bee referred (as some haue done) euen vnto originall sinne, yet neither can the iustice of God bee any whit impeached thereby: for though [Page 353] wee eat not the sowre grape, neither taste the forbidden fruit in our selues, yet did we both taste and eat in Adam, who was our head: yea though wee tasted not the fruit it selfe in our selues, yet we contracted the sowrenesse there­of, and the effect of the sinne, yea the sinne it selfe in our soules: for though the action was onely in our head, yet the passion, and effect was in all the members; as is more largely explica­ted aboue in the question of the man­ner, nature, and essence of this sinne, in which all the difficulties concer­ning this and the like points are an­swered.

Neither can it bee inferred hence, that God doth punish the iust for the vniust, or reuenge the fathers wicked­nesse in the sonnes: (which neuer­thelesse were no iniustice, seeing the sonnes are in some sort deemed as parts of the fathers, and consequently may iustly be punished for their fathers of­fences) but rather that euery man is punished for his owne originall sinne; which though it bee contracted from [Page 354] Adam, yet it is inherent in euery mans owne nature.

Againe, seeing Adam of his owne nature was created mortall, and by grace onely was to bee preserued im­mortall, there was no iniustice in God towards Adams posteritie in that they were depriued of originall iustice, but this proceeded from Adams demerit for himselfe, and his posteritie. Espe­cially seeing that the couenant was so concluded betweene GOD and Adam, that qua die comederet, moriretur, that his eating should be his death; his ab­stinence, life: with this difference that death should be onely from himselfe, as sinne had beene onely from his will, but life should haue beene onely from God, and the preseruation from sinne, from Gods grace onely.

Hence wee may vnderstand how there is no iniustice or vnrighteousnesse in God, that although Adam was crea­ted immortall, yet we should be borne of Adam mortall, and subiect to death: seeing hee was iustly depriued of im­mortalitie by his sin, and we by him.

Lastly, if we read the sacred text, we shall finde it neither to be iniustice, or any nouelty that the sonnes be punish­ed for their fathers offences; for so it is in the 1. of Samuel the 15. because I remember that which Amalech did vnto Israel, going out of Aegypt, goe thou Saul, and fight against Agag, and his people: and the 2. of Samuel 18, it is said, that the wiues of Dauid should be defiled for Dauids sinne. againe in the 2 of Samuel the 21 it is written, how Dauid hanged the sonnes of Resphe for the Gabaonites sake.

Moreouer, if it were true that which the Poet sang vnto his friend; delicta maiorum immeritus lues: thou shalt beare the offences of thy fore-fathers without thine owne deseruings, then certainely the question, B. King vp­on Ionas, cap. 1. v. 7. as a reuerend and learned Prelate well noteth, were more difficult, but who is able to say, my heart is cleane, though I came from an vncleane seede? though I were borne of a Morian, I haue not his sinne: though an Amorite were my father, and my mother a Hittite, I haue not [Page 356] their nature: though I haue touched pitch, I am not defiled: I can wash my hands in innocencie, and say with a cleare conscience, I haue not sinned? but if this be the cause of all, that there is not a soule in the whole cluster of mankinde, that hath not offended, though not as principall as Achan in ta­king the cursed thing, Choran in rebel­ling, Dauid in numbring the people, yet as accessarie in consenting and con­cealing; if neither principall nor acces­sarie in that one sinne, yet culpable in a thousand others committed in our life time, (perhaps not open to the world, but in the eyes of God as bright as the Sunne in the firmament; for the Scor­pion hath a sting, though hee hath not thrust it out to wound vs, and man hath malice, though hee hath not outwardly shewed it) it may be some sinnes to come which God fore-seeth; and some past, which he recounteth, shall we stand in argument with God, as man would plead with man, and charge the iudge of the quicke and the dead with iniuri­ous exactions? I haue paied the things, [Page 357] that I neuer tooke, I haue borne the price of sinne, which I neuer committed? You see already the ground of mine answere.

We haue all sinned father and sonne, rush and branch, and deseruedly are to expect that wages from the hands of God, which to our sinne appertaineth. Besides it cannot be denied, but those things, which we part in our conceipts, by reason that distance of time and place haue sundered them, some being done of old, some of late, some in one quarter of the world, some in another; those doth the God of knowledge v­nite, and view them at once, as if they were done together; out of all which conceiued together (as the all-vnder­standing wisdome of God doth con­ceiue and vnite them) we may well in­ferre that the iudgements of God bee as iust, and his waies as right as his mer­cy, and goodnesse, and prouidence ex­tended to all, that as there is no worke of man, not fully recompenced, or re­warded with ouerplus; so there is no sinne, whether actuall, or originall, not [Page 358] iustly punished, citra, as the Diuines hold, but neuer vltra condignum, lesse, I meane, then the sinne doth deserue, neuer more then the fact doth require, Gods mercy being (as the Scripture wit­nesseth) ouer all his workes; and al­waies in some sort more extended then his iustice: for though it be true, that as his iustice is included in his mercy, euen formally (as most Diuines hold) so like wise his mercy is included in his iustice, and so both equall in nature and being: yet such is the goodnes of our infinite good God, that in the execution, & ad extra, (as the Diuines tearme it) his mercy should alwaies be extended fur­ther then his iustice, and his iust iudge­ments alwaies in somewhat at least, de­teined, or after a sort restrained by his mercy. Wherefore as we are wont to say, of famous, worthy, and excellent men, in caeteris vicit omnes, in hoc se­ipsum, in other things hee exceeded all men; in this, hee ouercame him­selfe; The like wee may affirme of God; that hee is incomparable, in all attributes, and workes, but in this hee [Page 359] exceedeth himselfe. To him there­fore, as infinite, mercifull, and euer­liuing God, three persons and one indivisible deitie, bee ascribed all honor, power, maiestie, and do­minion, now and for euer­more. AMEN.