Essayes.
Religious Meditations.
Places of perswasion and disswasion.
Seene and allowed.
AT LONDON, Printed for Humfrey Hooper, and are to be sold at the blacke Beare in Chauncery Lane. 1597.
To M. Anthony Bacon his deare Brother.
LOuing and beloued Brother, I doe nowe like some that haue an Orcharde ill neighbored, that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to preuent stealing. These fragments of my conceites were going to print [...] To labour the staie of them had bin troublesome, and subiect to interpretation; to let them passe had beene to aduēture the wrong they mought [Page] receiue by vntrue Coppies, or by some garnishment, which it mought please any that should set them forth to bestow vpon them. Therefore I helde it best discreation to publish them my selfe as they passed long agoe from my pen, without any further disgrace, then the weaknesse of the Author. And as I did euer hold, there mought be as great a vanitie in retiring and withdrawing mens conceites (except they bee of some nature) from the world, as in obtruding them: So in these particulars I haue played my selfe the Inquisitor, and find nothing to my vnderstanding in them contrarie or infectious to the state of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I suppose) medicinable. Only I disliked now to put them out because they will bee like the late new halfe-pence, which though the Siluer were good, yet the peeces were [Page] small. But since they would not stay with their Master, but would needes trauaile abroade, I haue preferred them to you that are next my selfe, Dedicating them, such as they are, to our loue, in the depth whereof (I [...]ssure you) I sometimes wish your infirmities translated vppon my selfe, that her Maiestie mought haue the seruice of so actiue and able a mind, & I mought be with excuse confined to these contemplations & Studies for which I am fittest, so commend I you to the preseruation of the diuine Maiestie. From my Chamber at Graies Inne this 30. of Ianuarie. 1597.
Essaies.
- 1. Of studie.
- 2. Of discourse.
- 3. Of Ceremonies and respects.
- 4. Of followers and friends.
- 5. Sutors.
- 6. Of expence.
- 7. Of Regiment of healt [...].
- 8. Of Honour and reputation.
- 9. Of Faction.
- 10. Of Negociating.
ESSAIES.
Of Studies.
STudies serue for pa [...] times, for ornaments & for abilities. Their chiefe vse for pastime is in priuatenes and retiring; for ornamente is in discourse, and for abilitie is in iudgement. For expert men can execute, but learned men are [...]ittest to iudge or censure.
¶ To spend too much time in them is slouth, to v [...]e them too much for ornament [Page] is affectation: to make iudgement wholly by their rules, is the humour of a Scholler. ¶ They perfect Nature, and are perfected by experience. ¶ Craftie men continue them, simple men admire them, wise men vse them: For they teach not their owne vse, but that is a wisedome without them: and aboue them wonne by obseruation. ¶ Reade not to contradict, nor to belieue, but to waigh and consider. ¶ Some bookes are to bee tasted, others to bee swallowed, and some few to bee chewed and disgested: That is, some bookes are to be read only in partes; others to be read, but cursorily, and some few to be read wholly and with diligence and attention. ¶ Reading maketh a full man, conference a readye man, and writing an exacte man. And therefore if a man write little, he had neede haue a great memorie, if he conferre little, he had neede haue a present wit, and if he reade little, he had neede haue much cunning, to seeme to know that he doth not. ¶ Histories [Page 2] make men wise, Poets wittie: the Mathematickes subtle, naturall Phylosophie deepe: Morall graue, Logicke and Rhetoricke able to contend.
Of discourse.
SOme in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit in being able to holde all arguments, then of iudgement in discerning what is true, as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what shoulde bee thought. Some haue certaine Common places and Theames wherein they are good; and want varietie, which kinde of pouertie is for the most part tedious, and nowe [Page] and then ridiculous. ¶ The honourablest part of talke, is to guide the occasion, and againe to moderate & passe to somewhat else. ¶ It is good to varie and mixe speech of the present occasion with argument, tales with reasons, asking of questions, with telling of opinions, and iest with earnest. ¶ But some thinges are priuiledged from iest, namely Religion, matters of state, great persons, any mans present businesse of importance, and any case that deserueth pittie. ¶ He that questioneth much shall learne much, and content much, specially if hee applie his questions to the skill of the person of whome he asketh, for he shal giue them occasion to please themselues in speaking, and himselfe shall continually gather knowledge. ¶ If you dissemble sometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to knowe, you shall bee thought another time to know that you know not. ¶ Speech of a mans selfe is not good often, and there is but one case, wherin a man may commend himselfe [Page 3] with good grace, and that is in commending vertue in another, especially if it be such a vertue, as whereunto himselfe pretendeth. ¶ Discretion of speech is more then eloquence, and to speake agreably to him, with whome we deale is more thē to speake in good wordes or in good order. ¶ A good continued speech without a good speech of interlocution sheweth slownesse: and a good reply or second speech, without a good set speech sheweth shallownesse and weaknes, as wee see in beastes that those that are weakest in the course are yet nimblest in the turne. ¶ To vse too many circumstances ere one come to the matter is wearisome, to vse none at all is blunt.
Of Ceremonies and Respectes.
HE that is onely reall had need haue exceeding great parts of vertue, as the stone had neede bee rich that is set without foyle. ¶ But commonly it is in praise as it is in gaine. For as the prouerbe is true, That light gaines make heauie Purses: Because they come thicke, whereas great come but now and then, so it is as true that smal matters winne great commendation: because they are continually in vse and in note, whereas the occasion of any great vertue commeth but on holy-daies. ¶ To attaine good formes, it sufficeth not to despise them, for so shal a man obserue them in others [Page 4] and let him trust himselfe with the rest: for if he care to expresse them hee shall leese their grace, which is to be naturall and vnaffected. Some mens behauiour is like a verse wherein euery sillable is measured. How can a man comprehend great matters that breaketh his minde too much to small obseruations; ¶ Not to vse Ceremonies [...]t all, is to teach others not to vse them againe, and so diminish his respect; especially they be not to bee omitted to straungers and strange natures: ¶ Amongst a mans Peires a man shall be sure of familiaritie, and therefore it is a good title to keepe state; amongst a mans inferiours one shall be sure of reuerence, and therefore it is good a little to be familiar. ¶ Hee that is too much in any thing, so that he giue an other occasion of sati [...]ti [...], maketh himselfe cheape. ¶ To appli [...] ones selfe to others is good, so it be with demonstration that a man doth it vpon regard, and not vpon facilitie. ¶ It is a good precept generally in seconding another: yet to adde somewhat of [Page] ones owne; as if you will graunt his opinion, let it be with some distinction, if you wil follow his motion, let it be with condition; if you allow his counsell, let it be with alleadging further reason.
Of followers and friends.
COstly followers are not to be liked, least while a man maketh his traine longer, hee make his wings shorter, I reckon to be costly not them alone which charge the purse, but which are wearysome and importune in sutes. Ordinary following ought to challenge no higher conditions then countenance, recommendation and protection from wrong.
¶ Factious followers are worse to be liked, which follow not vpon affection [Page 5] to him with whome they raunge themselues, but vpon discontentment conceiued against some other, whereupon commonly insueth that ill intelligence that we many times see between great personages. ¶ The following by certaine States answereable to that which a great person [...]imselfe professeth, as of Souldiers to him that hath beene imployed in the warres, and the like hath euer beene a thing ciuile, and well taken euen in Monarchies, so it be without too much pompe or popularitie. ¶ But the most honorable kind of following is to bee followed, as one that apprehendeth to aduance vertue & desert in all sortes of persons, and yet where there is no eminent oddes in sufficiencie, it is better to take with the more passable, then with the more able. In gouernment it is good to vse men of one rancke equally, for, to countenance some extraordinarily, is to make them insolente, and the rest discontent, because they may claime a due. But in fauours to vse men with much difference [Page] and election is good, for it maketh the persons preferred more thankefull, and the rest more officious, because all is of fauour. ¶ It is good not to make too much of any man at first, because one cannot holde out that proportion.
¶ To be gouerned by one is not good, and to be distracted with many is worse; but to take aduise of friends is euer honorable: For lookers on many times see more then gamesters, And the vale best discouereth the hill. ¶ There is little friendship in the worlde, and least of all betweene equals, which was wont to bee magnified. That that is, is betweene superiour and inferiour, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other.
Of Sutes.
MAnie ill matters are vndertaken, and many good matters with ill mindes. Some embrace Sutes which neuer meane to deale effectually in them. But if they see there may be life in the matter by some other meane, they will be content to winne a thanke or take a second reward. Some take holde of Sutes onely for an occasion to crosse some other, or to make an information wherof they could not otherwise haue an apt precept, without care what become of the Sute, when that turne is serued. Nay some vndertake Sutes with a full purpose to let them fall, to the endè to [Page] gratifie the aduerse partie or competitor. ¶ Surely there is in sorte a right in euerie Sute, either a right of equitie, if it be a Sute of controuersie; or a right of desert, if it bee a Sute of petition. If affection leade a man to fauor the wrong side in iustice, let him rather vse his countenance to compound the matter then to carrie it. If affection lead a man to fauour the lesse worthy in desert, let him doe it, without deprauing or disabling the better deseruer. ¶ In Sutes a man doth not well vnderstand, it is good to referre them to some friend of trust and iudgement, that may reporte whether he may deale in them with honor. ¶ Suters are so distasted with delaies and abuses, that plaine dealing in denying to deale in Sutes at first, and reporting the successe barely, and in challendging no more thankes then one hath deserued, is growen not onely honourable but also gracious. ¶ In Sutes of fauour the first comming ought to take little place, so far forth consideration may bee had of his trust, that if intelligence [Page 7] of the matter coulde not otherwise haue beene had but by him, aduantage be not taken of the note. ¶ To be ignorant of the value of a Sute is simplicitie, as well as to be ignorant of the right thereof is want of conscience. ¶ Secrecie in Sutes is a great meane of obtaining, for voicing them to bee in forwardnes may discourage some kinde of suters, but doth quicken and awake others. ¶ But tyming of the Sutes is the principall, tyming I saye not onely in respect of the person that shoulde graunt it, but in respect of those which are like to crosse it. ¶ Nothing is thought so easie a request to a great person as his letter, and yet if it bee not in a good cause, it is so much out of his reputation.
Of Expence.
RIches are for spending, and spending for honour & good actions. Therefore extraordinarie Expence must bee limited by the worth of the occasion; for voluntarie vndoing may bee as well for a mans countrie, as for the kingdome of heauen. But ordinarie expence ought to bee limited by a mans estate, and gouerned with such regard, as it be within his compasse, and not subiect to deceite and abuse of seruants, and ordered to the best shew, that the Bils maye be lesse then the estimation abroad. ¶ It is no basenes for the greatest to descend and looke into their owne estate. Some forbeare it not vpon negligence [Page 8] alone, but doubting to bring themselues into Melancholy in respect they shall finde it broken. But Woundes cannot be [...] cured without searching. ¶ Hee that cannot looke into his owne estate, had neede both choose well those whom he imployeth, yea and change them after. For new ar [...] more timerous and lesse subtle. ¶ In clearing of a mans estate, hee may as well hurt himselfe in being too suddaine, as in letting it runne on too long, for hastie selling is commonly as disaduantageable as interest. ¶ He that hath a state to repaire may not despise small things; and commonly it is lesse dishonourable to abridge pettie charges then to stoupe to pettie gettings. ¶ A man ought warily to begin charges, which once begunne must continue. But in matters that returne not, he may be more magnificent.
Of Regiment of health.
THere is a wisdome in this beyond the rules of Phisicke. A mans owne obseruation what he finds good of, and what he findes hurt of, is the best Physicke to preserue health. But it is a safer conclusion to say, This agreeth well with me, therefore I will continue it, then this I finde no offence, of this therefore I may vse it. For strength of nature in youth pas [...]eth ouer many excesses, which are owing a man till his age. ¶ Discerne of the comming on of yeares, and thinke not to doe the same things still. ¶ Beware of any suddain change in any great [Page 9] point of diet, and if necessitie inforce it, fit the rest to it. ¶ To be free minded, and chearefully disposed at howers of meate, and of sleepe, and of exercise, is the best precept of long lasting. ¶ If you flie Physicke in health altogether, it will be too strange to your body, whē you shall neede it, if you make it too familiar, it will worke no extraordinarie effect when sicknesse commeth, ¶ Despise no new accident in the body, but aske opinion of it. ¶ In sickenesse respect health principally, and in health action. For those that put their bodies to indure in health, may in most sickenesses which are not very sharpe, be cured onelye with diet and tendring [...]
¶ Physitians are some of them so pleasing and conformable to the humours of the patient, as they presse not the true cure of the disease; and some other are so regular in proceeding according to Arte for the disease, as they respect not sufficiently the cōdition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or if it may not bee found in one man, [...]
Of Honour and reputation.
THe winning of Honour is but the reuealing of a mans vertue and worth without disaduantage, for some in their actions doe affect Honour and reputation, which sort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired: and some darken their vertue in the shew of i [...], so as they be vnder-valewed in opinion. ¶ If a man performe that which hath not beene attempted before, or attempted and giuen ouer, or hath beene atchieued, but not with so good circumstance, he shall purchase more Honour then by effecting a matter of greater [Page 10] difficultie or vertue, wherein he is but a follower. ¶ If a man so temper his actions as in some one of them hee doe content euerie faction or combination of people, the Musicke will be the fuller. ¶ A man is an ill husband of his Honour that entereth into any action, the failing wherein may disgrace him more then the carrying of it through can Honour him. ¶ Discreete follo [...]ers helpe much to reputation. ¶ Enuie which is the canker of Honour, is best extinguished by declaring a mans selfe in his ends, rather to seeke merite then fame, and by attributing a mans s [...]ccesses rather to diuine prouidence & felicitie then to his vertue or pollicie. ¶ The true Marshalling of the degrees of Soueraigne honour are these. In the first place are Conditores, founders of states. In the second place are Legislatores Lawgiuers, which are also called second founders, or Perpetui principes, because they gouerne by their ordinances af [...]er they are go [...]e. In the third place are Liberatores, such as compound the [Page] long miseries of ciuill warres, or deliuer their Countries from seruitude of strangers or tyrants. In the fourth place are Propagatores or Propugnatores imperii, such as in honourable warres enlarge their territories, or make noble defence against Inuaders. And in the last place are Patres patriae, which raigne iustly and make the times good wherein they liue. Degrees of honour in subiects are first Participes curarum, those vpon whome Princes doe discharge the greatest waight of their affaires, their Right handes (as wee call them.) The next are Du [...]es belli, great leaders, such as are Princes, Lieutenants, & do them notable seruices in the wars. The third are Gratiosi, fauorites, such as exceede not this scantling to bee sollace to the Soueraigne, and harmelesse to the people. And the fourth Negotiis pares, such as haue great place vnder Princes, and execute their places with sufficiencie.
Of Faction.
MAnie haue a newe wisedome, indeed, a fond opinion; That for a Prince to gouerne his estate, or for a great person to gouerne his proceedings according to the respects of Factions, is the principal part of pollicie. Whereas contrariwise, the chiefest wisedome is either in ordering those things which are generall, and wherein men of seuerall Factions doe neuerthelesse agree, or in dealing with correspondence to particular persons one by one, But I say not that the consideration of Factions is to be neglected.
¶ Meane men must adheare, but great men that haue strength in themselues [Page] were better to maintaine themselues indifferent and neutrall; yet euen in beginners to adheare so moderatly, as he be a man of the one Faction, which is passablest with the other, commonly giueth best way. ¶ The lower and weaker Faction is the firmer in coniunction. ¶ When one of the Factions is extinguished, the remaining subdiuideth which is good for a second Faction. It is commonly seene that men once placed, take in with the contrarie faction to that by which they enter. ¶ The Traitor in Factions lightly goeth away with it, for when matters haue stucke long in ballancing, the winning of some one man casteth them, and hee getteth all the thankes,
Of Negociating.
IT is generally better to deale by speech then by letter, and by the mediation of a thirde then by a mans selfe. Letters are good when a man woulde draw an answere by letter backe againe, or whē it may serue for a mans iustification afterwards to produce his owne letter. To deale in person is good when a mans face breedes regard, as commonly with inferiours. ¶ In choyce of instrumēts it is better to choose men of a plainer sorte that are like to doe that that is committed to them; and to reporte backe againe faithfully the success, [Page] then those that are cunning to contriue out of other mens businesse somewhat to grace themselues, and will helpe the matter in reporte for satisfactions sake.
¶ It is better to sound a person with whome one deales a farre off, then to fal vppon the pointe at first, except you meane to surprise him by some shorte question. ¶ It is better dealing with men in appetite then with those which are where they would be. ¶ If a man deale with an other vppon conditions, the starte or first performance is all, which a man can not reasonably demaunde, except either the nature of the thing be such which must goe before, or else a man can perswade the other partie that he shall still neede him in some other thing, or else that he bee counted the honester man. ¶ All practise is to discouer or to worke: men discouer themselues in trust, in passion, at vnwares & of necessitie, when they would hau [...] somewhat donne, and cannot find an apt precept. If you would worke any man, you must either know his nature, [Page 13] and fashions and so leade him, or his ends, and so winne him, or his weakenesses or disaduantages, and so awe him, or those that haue interest in him and so gouerne him. ¶ In dealing with cunning persons, we must euer consider their endes to interpret their speeches, and it is good to say little to them, and that which they least looke for.
- 1 De operibus Dei, & hominis
- 2 De miraculis Seruatoris
- 3 De columbina innocentia, & serpentina prudentia
- 4 De exaltatione Charitatis
- 5 De mensura curarum
- 6 De Spe terrestri
- 7 De Hypocritis [...]
- 8 De impostoribus.
- 9 De generibus Imposturae.
- 10 De Atheismo.
- 11 De Haeresibus.
- 12 De Ecclesia, & Scripturis
MEDITATIONES SACRAE.
De operibus Dei & hominis.
VIdit Deus omnia quae fecerant manus eius, & erant bona nimis: homo autem conuersus, vt videret opera quae fecerunt manus eius, inuenit quòd omnia [...]rant vanitas, & vexatio spiritus.
Quare si opera Dei operaberis, sudor tuus vt vnguentum aromatum, & feriatio tua vt Sabathum Dei. Laborabis in sudore bonae conscientiae, & feriabere in otio suauissimae contemplationis. Si autem [Page] post magnalia hominum persequêris, erit tibi in operando stimulus & angustia, & in recordando fastidium, & exprobratio. Et meritò tibi euenit (ô homo) vt cùm tu qui es opus Dei, non retribuas ei beneplace [...]tiam; etiam opera tua reddant tibi fructum similem amaritudinis.
De miraculis Seruatoris. Bene omnia fecit.
VErus plausus; Deus cùm vniuersa crearet, vidit quòd singula, & omnia erant bona nimis. Deus verbum in miraculis quae edidit (omne autem miraculum est noua creatio, & non ex lege primae creationis) nil facere voluit, quod non gratiam, & beneficentiam omninò spiraret. Moses edidit [Page 2] miracula, & profligauit AEgiptios pestibus multis; Elias edidit, & occlusit caelum ne plureret super terram; & rursus eduxit decaelo ignem dei super duces, & c [...]hortes; Elizeus edidit, & euocauit vrsas è deserto quae laniarent impuberes; Petrus Ananiam sacrilegum hypocritam morte; Paulus Elimam magum coecitate percussit: Sed nihil huiusmodi fecit Iesus. Descendit super eum spiritus in forma columbae, de quo dixit, Nescitis cuius spiritus sitis, spiritus Iesu, spiritus columbinus, fuerunt illi serui dei, tanquam boues dei triturantes granum, & conculcantes paleam: sed Iesus Agnus dei sine ira, & iudicijs. Omnia eius miracula circa corpus humanum, & doctrina eius circa animam humanam. Indiget corpus hominis alimento, de [...]ensione ab externis, & curâ. Ille multitudinem piscium in retibus congregauit, vt vberiorem victum hominibus preberet, ille alimentum aquae in dignius alimentum vini ad exhilar andum [Page] cor hominis conuertit. Ille ficum, quòd officio suo ad quod destinatum fuit, ad cibum hominis videlicet non fungeretur, arefieri i [...]ssit. Ille penuriam piscium, & panum ad alendum exercitum populi dilatauit: Ille ventos quòd nauigantibus minarentur corripuit: Ille claudis motum coecis lumen, mutis sermonem, languidis sanitatem, leprosis carnem mundam, demoniacis animum integrum, mortuis vitam restituit. Nullum miraculum i [...]dicij, omnia beneficentiae, & circa corpus humanum, nam circa diuitias non est dignatus edere miracula; nisi hoc vnicum, vt tributum daretur Caesari.
De Columbina innocentia, & Serpentina prudentia. Non accipit stultus verba prudentiae, nisi ea dixeris quae versantur in corde eius.
IVdicio hominis deprauato & corrupto, omnis quae adhibetur eruditio & persuasio irrita est, & despectui quae non ducit exordium a detectione, & representatione malae complexionis animi sanandi, quemadmodum inutiliter adhibetur medicina non pertentato vulnere. Nam homines malitiosi, qui nihil sa [...]i cogitant, praeoccupant hoc sibi, vt putent bonitatem ex simplicitate morum, ac inscitia quadam, & imperitia rerum humanarum [Page] gigni. Quare nisi perspexerint ea quae versantur in corde suo, id est, penitissi [...]as latebras malitiae suae perlustratas esse, ei qui suasum molitur, de ridiculo habent verba prudentiae; Ita (que) ei qui ad bonitatem aspirat, non solitariam, & particularem, sed seminalem, & genitiuam quae alios trahat, d [...]bent esse omninò nota, quae ille vocat Profunda Satanae; vt loquatur cum auctoritate & insinu [...]tione vera: Hinc est illud, Omnia probate, quod bonum est tenete. Inducens electionem iudiciosam ex generali examinatione: Ex [...]odem fonte est illud; Esto [...]e prudentes sicut serpētes, innocētes sicut columbae. Non est deus serpentis, nec venenum nec aculeus, quae non probata debeant esse, nec pollutionē quis timeat, nam & sol ingreditur latrinas, nec inquinatur, nec quis se deum tentare credat, nam ex praecepto est, Et sufficiens est Deus vt vos immaculatos custodiat.
De exaltatione Charitatis. Si gauisus sum ad ruinam eius qui oderat me, & exaltaui quòd inuenisset eum malum.
DEtestatio Iob; amicos redamare, est charitas publicanorum ex faedere vtilitatis, versus inimicos autem bene animatos esse, est ex apicibus iuris Christiani, & imitatio diuinitatis. Rursus tamen huius charitatis complures sunt gradus, quorum primus est inimicis resipiscentibus ignoscere, ac huius quidem charitatis etiam apud generosas feras vmbra quaedam, & imago reperitur; nam & leones in se submittentes, & prosternentes non vlteriùs saeuire perhibentur. Secundus gradus est inimicis [Page] ignoscere, licet sint duriores, & abs (que) reconciliationum piaculis. Tertius gradus est non tantum veniam, & gratiam inimicis largiri, sed etiam merita, & beneficia in eos conferre. Sed habent hi gradus, aut habere possunt, nescio quid potius ex ostentatione, aut saltem animi magnitudine quàm ex charita [...]e pura. Nam cùm quis virtutem ex se emanare, & effluere sentit, fieri potest vt is efferatur, & potiùs virtutis suae fructu quàm salute, & bono proximi delectetur. Sed si aliunde malū aliquod inimicum tuum deprehendat, & tu in interioribus cellulis cordis graueris, & angus [...]ieris, nec, quasi dies vltionis, & vindictae tuae aduenisset, laeteris; hoc ego fastigium, & exaltationem charitatis esse pono.
De mensura curarum. Sufficit diei malitia sua.
MOdus esse in curis humanis debet, alioqui & inutiles sunt, vt quae animum opprimant, & iudicium confundant, & profanae, vt quae sapiant animum, qui perpetuitatem quandam in rebus mundanis sibi spo [...]deat. Hodierni enim debemus esse ob breuitatem aeui, & non crastini, sed vt ille ait, Carpentes diem, Erunt enim futura praesentia vice sua; Quare sufficit sollicitudo praesentium. Ne (que) tamen curae moderatae, siue sint oeconomicae, siue publicae, siue rerum mandatarum notantur. Sed hic duplex est excessus. Primus cùm curarum series in Longitudinem nimiam, & tempora remotiora extendimus, ac si prouidentiam diuinam apparatu nostro ligare [Page] possemus, quod semper etiam apud Ethnicos infaus [...]um & insolens fuit. Fere enim qui Fortunae multum tribuerunt, & ad occasiones praesentes alacres, & praestò fuerunt, [...]aelicitate magna vsi sunt. Qui autem a [...]tum sapientes, omnia curata & meditata habere confisi sunt, infortunia sub [...]erunt. Secundus excessus est, cùm in curis immoramur diutiùs quàm opus est ad iustam deliberationem, & ad decretum faciendum. Quis enim nostrûm est, qui tantum curet, quantum sufficit, vt se explicet, vel sese explicare non posse iudicet, & non eadem saepe retractet, & in eodem cogitationum circuitu inutiliter haereat, & deni (que) euanes [...]at? Quod genus curarum, & diuinis & humanis rationibus aduersissimum est.
De Spe terrestri. Melior est oculorum visio, quàm animi progressio.
SEnsus purus in singula meliorem reddit conditionem, & politiam mentis, quàm istae imaginationes & progressiones animi. Natura enim animi humani etiam in ingenijs grauissimis est, vt á sensu singulorum statim progrediatur, & saliat, & omnia auguretur fore talia, quale illud est quod praesentem sensum incutit, si boni est sensus facilis est ad spem indefinitam, si mali est sensus, ad metum: vnde illud, Fallitur augurio spes bona saepe suo, & contra illud, Pessimus in dubijs augur. S [...]d tamen timoris est aliquis fructus, praeparat enim tolerantiam, & acuit industriam; Non vlla laborum ô virgo noua [Page] mî facies inopauè surgit. Omnia praecepi, at (que) animo mecum ante peregi. Spes vero inutile quiddā videtur. Quorsùm enim ista anticipatio boni? Attende, si minùs cucniat bonum quàm speres, bonum licet sit, tamen quia minùs sit, videtur damnum potiùs quàm lucrum ob excessum spei. Si par & tantum sit, & euentus sit spei aequalis, tamen flos boni per spem decerpi [...]ur, & videtur ferè obsoletum, & fastidio magis finitimum. Si maior sit successus spe, videtur aliquid lucri factum, verum est; sed annon melius fuisset sortem lucrifecisse nihil sperando quàm vsuram minùs sperando? At (que) in rebus secundis ita operatur spes; in malis autem robur verum animi soluit. Nam ne (que) semper spei materia suppetit, & destitutione aliqua vel minima spei, vniuersa fere firmitudo animi corruit, & minorem efficit dignitatem mentis, cùm mala tolleramus alienatione quadam, & errore mentis, non fortitudine & iudicio. Quare satis leuiter [Page 7] finxêre Poetae spem antidotum humanorum morborum esse, quòd dolores eorum mitiget, cùm sit re [...]era incensio potiùs, & exasperatio, quae eos multiplicari, & recrudescere faciat. Nihilominùs fit, vt plaeri (que) hominum imaginationibus spei & progressionibus istis mentis omninò se dedant, ingrati (que) in praeterita obliti ferè praesentium semper iuuenes, tantùm futuris immineant. Vidi vniuersos ambulantes sub sole cum adolescente secundo, qui cō [...]urget post eum; quod pessimus morbus est, & status mentis insanissimus. Quaeras fortasse annon melius sit, cùm res in dubia expectatione positae sint, bene diuinare, & potiùs sperare quàm diffidere, cùm spes maiorem tranquillitatem animi conciliet. Ego sane in omni mora, & expectatione tranquillum, & non fluctuantem animi statum ex bona mentis politia, & compositione, summum humanae vitae firmamentum iudico. Sedeam tranquillitatem, quae ex [Page] spe pendeat, vt leuem & infirmam recuso. Non quia non conueniat tam bona quàm mala ex sana & sobria coniectura praeuidere, & praesupponere, vt actiones ad probabilitatem euentuum magis accommodemus; modò sit hoc officium intellectus ac iudicij cum iusta inclinatione affectus. Sed quem ita spes coercuit; vt cùm ex vigilanti & firmo mentis discursu meliora, vt magis probabilia sibi praedixerit, non in ipsa boni anticipatione immoratus sit, & huiusmodi cogitationi, vt somnio placido indulserit? At (que) hoc est quod reddit animum leuem, tumidum, inaequalem, peregrinantem. Quare omnis spes in futuram vitam coelestem consumenda est. Hic autem quanto purior sit praesentium sensus abs (que) infectione, & tinctura imaginationis, tanto prudent [...]or & melior anima vitae summae breuis spem nos vetat meliorare longam.
De Hypocritis. Misericordiam volo, & non Sacrificium.
OMnis iactatio Hypocritarum est in operibus primae tabulae legis, quae est de venerationi [...]us Deo debitis. Ratio duplex est, tum quòd huiusmodi opera maiorem habent pompam Sanctitatis, tum quòd cupiditatibus eorum minùs aduersentur. Ita (que) redargutio hypocritarum est, vt ab operibus sacrificij remittantur ad opera misericordiae, vnde illud, Religio munda & immaculata apud Deum & patrem haec est, visitare pupillos & viduas intribulatione eorum, & illud, Qui non diligit fratrem suum quem vidit, Deum quem non vidit quomodo potest diligere? Quidam autem altioris [Page] & inflatioris Hypocrisiae seipsos decipientes, & existimantes se arctiore cum Deo con [...]ers [...]tione dignos, officia charitatis in proximum vt minora negligunt. Qui error monasticae vitae non principium quidem dedit, (nam initia bonafuerunt,) sed excessum addidit. Rectè enim dictum est, Orandi munus magnum esse munus in ecclesia, & ex vsu ecclesiae est, vt sint caetus hominum â mundanis curis soluti, qui assiduis & deuotis precibus Deum pro ecclesiae statu sollicitent. Sed huic ordinationi illa hypocrisia sinitima est, nec vniuersa institutio reprobatur, sed spiritus illi se efferentes cohibentur: nam & Enoch qui ambulauit cum Deo, prophetizauit, vt est apud Iudam, at (que) [...]ructum suae prophetiae ecclesiam do [...]auit. Et Iohannes Bapt. quem Principem quidam vitae monas [...]icae volunt, multo ministerio sunctus est tum prophetizationis, tum Baptizationis. Nam ad alios istos in deum officiosos refertur illa interrogatio, [Page 9] Si iustè egeris, quid donabis Deo, a [...]t quid de manu tua accipiet. Qu [...]re opera miserecordiae sunt opera discr [...]tionis hypocritarum. Contr [...] autem [...]it cum haereticis, nam vt hypocritae simulata su [...] sanctitate versus Deum, iniurias suaes versus homines obducunt; ita haeretici moralitate quadam versus homines, blasphemias suas contra Deum insinuant [...]
De Impostoribus. Siue m [...]nte excedimus Deo, siue sobrii sumus vobis.
VEra est ista effigies, & verum temperamentum viri, cui Religio p [...]nitùs in praecordijs insedit, & veri operarij Dei. Conuersatio ei quae cum Deo est, plena excessus, & zeli, & extasis. Hinc gemitus ineffabiles, & exultationes, & raptus spiritus, [Page] & agones. At quae cum hominibus est, ple [...]a mansuetudinis, & sobrietatis, & morigerationis; Hinc Omnia omnibus factus sum, & huiusmodi. Contra fit in hypocritis & impos [...]oribus: Ii enim in populo & ecclesia incendunt se & excedunt, & veluti sacris furoribus afflati omnia miscent. Si quis [...]utem eorum solitudines, & separatas meditationes, & cum Deo conuersationes introspiciat, deprehendet eas non tantum frigidas, & sine motu, sed plenas malitiae & fermenti, sobrij Deo, mente excedentes populo.
De generibus imposturae.
TRes sunt sermones, & veluti stili imposturae. Primum genus est eorum qui statim vt aliquā materiam nacti sunt, artem conficiunt, vocabula artis imponūt, omnia in distinctiones redigun [...], inde posita vel themata educunt, & ex quaestionibus, & responsionibus oppositiones consiciunt; Hinc Scholasticorum quisquiliae & turbae. Secundum genus est eorum, qui vanitate inge [...]ij, [Page] vt sacri quidem Poetae, omnem exemplorum varietatem ad mentes hominum tractandas confingunt, vnde vitae patrum, & antiquorum haereticorum figmenta innumera. Tertium genus eorum, qui mysterijs, & grandiloquijs, allegorijs, & allusionibus omnia implet: quod genus mysticum & gnosticum complures haeretici sibi delegerunt. Primum genus sensum & captum hominis illaqueat, secundum allicit, tertium stupefacit, seducunt vero omnia.
De Atheismo. Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus.
PRimum dixit in corde, non ait, cogitauit in corde; hoc est, non tam ita sentit penitùs, sed vult hoc credere, quoniam expedire [Page 11] sibi videt, vt non sit Deus omni ratione sibi hoc suadere, & in animum inducere conatur; & tanquàm thema aliquod, vel positum, vel placitum asserere, & astruere, & firmare studet. Manet tamen ille igniculus luminis primi, quo Diuinitatem agnoscimus, quem prorsus extinguere, & stimulum illum ex corde euellere frustrà nititur. Quare ex malitia voluntatis suae, & non ex natiuo sensu, & iudicio hoc supponit, vt ait comicus Poeta. Tunc animus meus accessit ad meam sententiam, quasi ipse alter esset ab animo suo. Ita (que) Atheista magis dixit in corde, quàm sentit in corde, quòd non sit Deus. Secundò, dixit in corde, non ore locutus est, sed notandum est hoc metu legis & famaefieri, Nam vt ait ille, Negare Deos difficile est in concione populi, sed in concessu familiari expeditum. Nam si hoc vinculum tollatur ê medio, non est haeresis quae maiore studio se pandere, & spargere, & multiplicare nitatur [Page] quàm Atheismus. Nec videas eos qui in hanc mentis insaniam imm [...]rsi sunt aliud ferè spirare, & importunè inculcare, quàm verba atheismi, vt in Lucretio Epicurco, qui ferè sua [...] in Religionem inuectiuam s [...]ngulis alijs subiectis interc [...]larem sacit. Ratio videtur esse, quòd A [...]he [...]sta cum sibi non satis [...]cqui [...]scat aestuans, nec sibi satiscredens, & crebra suae opinionis deliquia in interioribus pati [...]ns ab aliorum assensu refocillari cupit. Nam recte dictum est. Qui alteri opinionem approbare sedulò cupit, ipse diffidit. Tertiò insipiens est, qui hoc in corde dixit, quod verissimum est, non tantum quòd diuina non sapiat, sed etiam secundum hominem. Primò [...]nim ingenia, quae sunt in Atheismum proniora, videas ferè leuia, & dicacia, & audacula, & insolentia: eius deni (que) compositionis, quae prudentiae, & grauitati morum aduersissima est. Secundò inter viros politicos, qui altioris ingenij & latioris cordis fuerunt, Religionem [Page 12] non arte quadam ad populum adhibuerunt, sed interiore dogmate coluêre, vt qui prouidentiae & fortunae plurimū tribu erint. C [...] ̄tra qui artibus suis, & industrijs, & causis proximis, & apparentibus omnia ascripserunt, & vt ait Propheta, Retibus suis immolarunt, pusillifuerunt politici, & circumforanei, & magnitudinis actionum incapaces. Tertiò, in physicis & illud affirmo parùm Philosophiae naturalis, & in ea progressum liminarem ad Atheismum opiniones inclinare. Contra mul [...]ùm Philosophiae naturalis, & progressum in ea penetrantem ad Religionem animos circumferre. Quare atheismus stultitiae & inscitiae vbi (que) conuictus esse videtur, vt meritò sit dictum, Insipientium non est Deus.
De Haeresibus. Erratis nescientes scripturas, neque potestatem Dei.
CAnon iste mater omnium canonum aduersus haereses. Duplex erroris causa, ignoratio voluntatis Dei, & ignoratio, vel leuior contemplatio potestatis dei. Voluntas dei reuelatur magis per scripturas scrutamini, potestas magis per creaturas contemplamini. Ita asserenda plenitudo potestatis Dei, ne maculemus voluntatem. Ita ass [...]renda bonitas voluntatis, ne minuamus potestatem. Ita (que) Religio vera sita est in mediocritate inter superstitionem cum haeresibus superstisiosis ex vna parte, & Atheismum cum haeresibus prophanis ex altera. Superstitio repudiata luce scripturarum, se (que) dedens traditionibus [Page 13] prauis vel apocryphis, & nouis reuelationibus, vel falsis interpretationibus scripturarum multa de voluntate Dei fingit, & somniat, á scripturis deuia & aliena. Atheismus autem & Theomachia contra potestatem Dei insurgit, & tumultuatur, verbo dei non credens, quod voluntatem eius reuelat ob incredulitatem potestatis eius, cui omnia sunt possibilia. Haereses autem quae ex isto fonte emanant, grauiores videntur caeteris. Nam & in politijs atrocius est potestatem & maiestatem minuere, quàm [...]amam principis notare. Haeresium autem quae potestatem Dei minunt, praeter Atheismum purum tres sunt gradus, habent (que) vnum & idem mysterium: (Nam omnis antichristianismus operatur in mysterio, id est sub imagine boni) hoc ipsum, vt voluntatem dei ab omni aspersione malitiae liberet. Primus gradus est eorum, qui duo principia constituunt paria, ac inter se pugnantia, & contraria, vnum boni, alterum mali [...] Secundus [Page] gradus est eorum, quibus nimiùm l [...] sa videtur maiestas Dei in constituendo aduersus eum principio affirmatiuo & actiuo. Quare extu [...]bata tali [...]udacia, nihilo minùs inducunt contra deum principium negatiuum & priuatiuum. N [...]m vol [...]nt esse opus ipsius materiae & creaturae internum, & natiuum, & substantiuum, vt ex se vergat & relabatur ad confusionem, & ad nihilum, nescien [...]es eiusdem esse omnipotentiae ex aliquo nihil facere, cuius ex nihilo aliquid. Tertius gradus est eorum, qui arctant & restringunt opinionem, priorem tantùm ad actiones humanas, quae participant ex peccato, quas volunt substantiuè, abs (que) nexu aliquo causarum, ex interna voluntate & arbitrio humano pendere, statuunt (que) latiores terminos scientiae Dei, quàm potestatis, vel potius eius partis potestatis Dei, (nam & ipsa scientia potestas est) qua scit quàm eius, quâ mouet, & agit, vt praesciat quaedam otiose, quae non praedestinet & [Page 14] praeordinet. Et non absimile est figmento, quod Epicurus introduxit in Democritismum, v [...] fatum [...]olleret, & fortunae locum dar [...]t, declinationem videlice [...] atomi, quod semper à prudentioribus ina [...]issimum commentum habitum est. Sed quiequid a deo non pendet, vt autore, & principio, per nexus & gradus subordinatos id loco Dei erit, & nouum principium, & Deaster quidem. Quare merito illa opinio respuitur, vt laesio & diminutio maiestatis & potestatis Dei. Et tamen admodum rectè dicitur, quòd Deus non sit author mali, non quia non author, sed quia non mali.
De ecclesia & Scripturis. Proteges eos in tabernaculo tuo à contradictione linguarum.
COntradictiones linguarum vbi (que) occurrunt extra tabernaculum Dei. Quare quocun (que) te verteris, exitum controuersiarum non reperies nisi huc te receperis. Dices, verum est, nempe in vnitatem ecclesiae. Sed aduerte. Erat in tabernaculo Arca, & in Arca Testimonium vel tabulae legis. Quid mihi narras corticem Tabernaculi, sine nucleo testimonij? Tabernaculum ad custodiendum & tradendum [...]estimonium erat ordinatum. Eodem modo [Page 15] & ecclesiae custodia, & traditio per manus scripturarum demandata est, sed anima Tabernaculi est testimonium.
- 1 CVi c [...]tera partes vel secta secundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum singul [...] principatum sibi vindicent melior reliquis videtur. Nam prim [...] quaeque ex zelo videtur sumere; secundas au [...]em ex vero tribuere.
- 2 Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior id toto genere melius.
- 3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem, & probatio [...]iu [...] quod ad opinionem pertinet h [...]c est. Quod quis si [...]lam putaret fore facturus non esset.
- 4 Quod rem integram seruat bonum quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentia genus est, potentia autem bonum.
- 5 Quod ex pluribus consta [...], & diuisibilius est maius quàm quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur; quare & pluralita [...] partium magnitudinem praese fert, fortiùs autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem.
- 6 Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala bonum.
- 7 Quod bono, vicinum bonum, quod a bono remotum malum.
- 8 Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitu [...] minus malum.
- 9 Quod opera, & virtute nostra partum est, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunae delatum est, minus bonum.
- 10 Gradus priuationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quàm gradus incrementi.
IN deliberatiues the point is what is good and what is euill, and of good what is greater, and of euill what is the lesse.
So that the perswaders labor is to make things appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may be perfourmed by t [...]ue and solide reasons, so it may be represented also by coulers, popularities and circumstances, which are of such force, as they sway the ordinarie iudgement either of a weake man, or of a wise man, not fully and considerately attending and pondering the matter. Besides their power to alter the nature of the subiect in appearance, and so to leade to error, [Page] they are of no lesse vse to quicken and strengthen the opinions and perswasions which are true: for reasons plainely deliuered, and alwaies after one manner especially with fine and fastidious mindes, enter but heauily and dully; whereas if they be varyed and haue more life and vigor put into them by these fourmes and insinuations, they cause a stronger apprehension, and many times suddainely win the minde to a resolution. Lastly, to make a true and safe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vse and defence to the minde, then the discouering and reprehension of these coulers, shewing in what cases they hold, and in what they deceiue: which as it cannot be done, but out of a very vniue [...]sall knowledge of the nature of things, so being perfourmed, it so cleareth mans iudgement and election, as it is the lesse apt to slide into any error.
A Table of Coulers, or apparances of good and euill, and their degrees as places of perswasion and disswasion; and their seuerall fallaxes, and the elenches of them.
Cui ceterae partes vel sectae secundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum singulae principatum sibi vendicent melior reliquis videtur, nam primas quaeque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.
SO Cicero went about to proue the Secte of Academiques which suspended all as [...]eueration, for [...]o be the best, for sayth he, aske a Stoicke which Philosophie is true, he will preferre his owne: Then aske him which approcheth next the truth, he will confesse the Academiques. So deale with the Epicure [Page] that will scant indure the Stoicke to be in sight of him, as soone as he hath placed himselfe, he will place the Academiques next him.
So if a Prince tooke diuers competitors to a place, and examined them seuerallie whome next themselues they would rathest commend, it were like the ablest man should haue the most second votes.
The fallax of this couler hapneth oft in respect of enuy, for men are accustomed after themselues and their owne faction to incline to them which are softest, and are least in their way in despite and derogation of them that hold them hardest to it. So that this couler of melioritie and preheminence is oft a signe of eneruation and weakenesse.
2 Cuius excellen [...]ia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.
APpertaining to this are the fourmes; Let vs not wander in generalities: Let vs compare particular with particular, &c. [Page 18] This appearance though it seeme of strength and rather Logicall then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a fallax.
Sometimes because some things are in kinde very casuall, which if they escape, proue excellent, so that the kinde is inferior, because it is so subiect to perill, but that which is excellent being proued is superior, as the blossome of March and the blossome of May, whereof the French verse goeth.
So that the blos [...]ome of May is generally better then the blossome of March; and yet the best blossome of March is better then the best blossome of May.
Sometimes, because the nature of some kindes is to be more equall and more indifferent, and not to haue very distant degrees, as hath bene noted in the warmer clymates, the people are generally more wise, but in the Northerne climate the wits of chiefe are greater. So in many Armies, if the matter [Page] should be tryed by duell betweene two Champions, th [...] victory should go on one side, and yet if it be tryed by the grosse, it would go of the other side; for excellēcies go as it were by chance, but kindes go by a more certaine nature, as by discipline in warre.
Lastly, many kindes haue much refuse which counteruale that which they haue excellent; and therefore generally mettall is more precious then stone, and yet a dyamond is more precious then gould.
3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet, haec est, quod quis si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset.
SO the Epicures say of the Stoicks felicitie placed in vertue, That it is like the felicitie of a Player, who if he were left of his Auditorie and their applause, he would streight be out of hart and countenance, and therefore they [Page 19] call vertue Bonum theatrale. But of Riches the Poet sayth:
And of pleasure.
The fallax of this couler is somewhat subtile, though the aunswere to the example be readie, for vertue is not chosen propter auram popularem. But contrariwise, Maxime omnium teipsum reuerere, So as a vertuous man will be vertuous in solitudine, and not onely in theatro, though percase it will be more strong by glory and fame, as an heate which is doubled by reflexion; But that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax whereof the reprehension is a low, that vertue (such as is ioyned with labor and conflict) would not be chosen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chiefe motiue of the election should [Page] not be reall and for it selfe, for fame may be onely causa impulsiua, and not causa constituens, or efficiens. As if there were two horses, and the one would doo better without the spurre then the other: but agayne, the other with the spurre woulde farre exceede the doing of the former, giuing him the spurre also; yet the latter will be iudged to be the better horse, and the fourme as to say, Tush, the life of this horse is but in the spurre, will not serue as to a wise iudgemente: For since the ordinary ins [...]rument of horsemanship is the spurre, and that it is no manner of impediment nor burden, the horse is not to bee accounted the lesse of, which will not do well without the spurre, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacie then a vertue, so glory and honor are as spurres to vertue: and although vertue would languish without them, yet since they be alwayes at hand to attend vertue, vertue is not to be sayd the les [...]e, chosen for it selfe, [Page 20] because it needeth the spurre of fame and reputation: and therefore that position, Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatem eligitur, haec est quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non ess [...]t is reprehended.
4 Quod rem integram seruat bonum, quod sine r [...]ceptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentiae genus est, potentia autem bonum.
HEreof Aesope framed the Fable of the two Frogs that consulted together in time of drowth (when many plashes that they had repayred to were dry) what was to be done, and the one propounded to goe downe into a deepe Well, because it was like the water woulde not fayle there, but the other aunswered, yea but if it do faile how shall we get vp againe? And the reason is, that humane actions are so vncertayne and subiecte to perills, as that seemeth the best [Page] course which hath most passages out of it.
Appertaining to this perswasion the fourmes are, you shall ingage your selfe [...] On the other [...]ide, Tantum quantum voles sumes ex fortuna, you shall keepe the matter in your owne hands. The reprehension of it is, That proceeding and resoluing in all actions is necessarie: for as he sayth well, Not to resolue, is to resolue, and many times it breedes as many necessities, and ingageth as farre in some other sort as to resolue.
So it is but the couetous mans disease translated into power, for the couetous man will enioy nothing because he will haue his full store and possibilitie to enioy the more, so by this reason a man shoulde execute nothing because hee should be still indifferent and at libertie to execute any thing. Besides necessitie and this same iacta est alea hath many times an aduantage, because it awaketh the powers of the minde, and strengtheneth indeuor. Caeteris pares necessi [...]at [...] c [...]rte superiores estis.
5 Quod ex pluribus constat et diuisibilius est maius quam quod ex paucioribus et magis vnum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur; quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem prae se fert; fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti et impedit comprehensionem.
THis couler seemeth palpable, for it is not pluralitie of partes without maioritie of partes that maketh the totall greater, yet neuerthelesse it often carries the minde away, yea, it deceyueth the sence, as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way if it be all dead and continued, then if it haue trees or buildings or any other markes whereby the eye may deuide it. So when a great moneyed man hath deuided his chests and coines and bags, hee seemeth to himselfe richer then hee was, and therefore a way to amplifie any thing, is to breake it, and to make [Page] an anatomie of it in seuerall partes, and to examine it according to seuerall circumstances, And this maketh the greater shew if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more, and besides what is set downe by order and diuision, doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there; whereas if it be without order, both the minde comprehendeth lesse that which is set downe, and besides it leaueth a suspition, as if more might be sayde then is expressed.
This couler deceyueth, if the minde of him that is to be perswaded, do of it selfe ouer-conceiue or preiudge of the greatnesse of any thing, for then the breaking of it will make it seeme lesse, because it maketh it appeare more according to the truth, and therefore if a man be in sicknes or payne, the time will seeme longer without a clocke or howre-glasse then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the howre doth rather [Page 22] summe vp the moments then deuide the day. So in a dead playne, the way seemeth the longer, because the eye hath preconceyued it shorter then the truth: and the frustrating of that maketh it seeme longer then the truth. Therefore if any man haue an ouergreat opinion of any thing, then if an other thinke by breaking it into seuerall considerations, he [...]hall make it seeme greater to him, he will be deceyued, and therefore in such cases it is not safe to deuide, but to extoll the entire still in generall.
An other case wherein this couler deceyueth, is, when the matter broken or deuided is not comprehended by the sence or minde at once in respect of the distracting or scattering of it, and being intire and not deuided, is comprehended, as a hundred poundes in heapes of fiue poundes will shewe more, then in one gros [...]e heape, so as the heapes be all vppon one table to be seene at once, otherwise not, or flowers growing scattered in diuers [Page] beds will shewe, more then if they did grow in one bed, so as all those beds be within a plot that they be obiect to view at once, otherwise not; and therefore men whose liuing lieth together in one Shire, are commonly counted greater landed then those whose liuings are dispersed though it be more, because of the notice and comprehension.
A third case wherein this couler deceiueth, and it is not so properly a case or reprehension as it is a counter couler being in e [...]fect as large as the couler it selfe, and that is, Omnis compositio indigentiae cuiusdam videtur esse particeps, because if one thing would serue the turne it were euer best, but the defect and imperfections of things hath brought in that help to piece them vp as it is sayd, Martha Martha attendis ad plurima, vnum sufficit. So likewise hereupon A [...]sope framed the Fable of the Fox and the Cat, whereas the Fox bragged what a number of shifts and deuises he had to get from the houndes, and [Page 23] the Catte saide she had but one, which was to clime a tree, which in proofe was better worth then all the rest, whereof the prouerbe grew, Multa nouit Vulpes sed Felis vnum magnum. And in the morall of this fable it comes likewise to passe: That a good sure friend is a better helpe at a pinch, then all the stratagems and pollicies of a mans owne wit. So it falleth out to bee a common errour in negociating, whereas men haue many reasons to induce or persuade, they striue commonly to vtter and vse them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth as was said, a needines in euery of the reasons by it selfe, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himselfe onely with that. Et quae non prosunt singula multa iuuant. Indeed in a set speech in an assemblie it is expected a man shoulde vse all his reasons in the case hee handleth, but in priuate perswasions it is alwayes a great errour.
A fourth case wherein this colour may bee reprehended is in respecte of [Page] that same vis vnita fortior, according to the tale of the French King, that when the Emperours Amb. had reci [...]ed his maysters stile at large which consisteth of many countries and dominions: the French King willed his Chauncellor or other minister to repeate and say ouer Fraunce as many times as the other had recited the seuerall dominions, intending it was equiualent with them all, & beside more compacted and vnited.
There is also appertayning to this couler an other point, why breaking of a thing doth helpe it, not by way of adding a shew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellency and raritie; whereof the fourmes are, Where shall you finde such a concurrence? Great but not compleat, for it seemes a lesse worke of nature or fortune to make any thing in his kinde greater then ordinarie, then to make a straunge composition.
Yet if it bee narrowly considered, this colour will bee reprehended or incountred by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kind of pouertie [Page 24] or at least a casualty or ieopardy, for frō that which is excellent in greatnes somwhat may be taken, or there may be decay; and yet sufficiencie left, but from that which hath his price in composition if you take away any thing, or any part doe fayle all is disgraced.
6. Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.
THe formes to make it conceyued that that was euill which is chaunged for the better are, He that is in hell thinkes there is no other heauen. Satis quercus, A cornes were good till bread was found &c. And of the other side the formes to make it conceyued that that was good which was chaunged for the worse are, Bona magis carendo quàm fru [...]ndo sentimus, Bona à tergo formosissima, Good things neuer appear in their full beautie, till they turne their backe and be going away, &c. The reprehension of this colour is, that the good or euil which is [Page] remoued may be esteemed good or euil cōparatiuely and not positiuely or simply. So that if the priuation bee good, it follows not the former condition was euil, but lesse good, for the flower or blossome is a positiue good, although the remoue of it to giue place to the fruite be a comparatiue good. So in the tale of AEsope; when the olde fainting man in the heat of the day cast downe his burthen & called for death, & when death came to know his will with him, said it was for nothing but to helpe him vppe with his burthen agayne: it doth not follow that because death which was the priuation of the burthen was ill, therefore the burthen was good. And in this parte the ordinarie forme of Malum necessarium aptly reprehendeth this colour, for Priuatio mali necessarij est mala, and yet that doth not conuert the nature of the necessarie euil, but it is euill.
Againe it commeth sometimes to passe, that there is an equalitie in the chaunge or priuation, and as it were a Dil [...]mma boni or a Dilemma mali, so that [Page 25] the corruption of the one good is a generation of the other, Sorti pater aequus vtrique est: And contrarie the remedy of the one euill is the occasion and cō mencement of an other, as in Scilla and Charibdis.
7. Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod a bono remotum malum.
SVch is the nature of thinges, that thinges contrarie and distant in nature and qualitie are also seuered and disioyned in place, and thinges like and consenting in qualitie are placed, and as it were quartered together, for partly in regarde of the nature to spredde, multiplie and infect in similitude, and partly in regard of the nature to break, expell and alter that which is disagreeable and contrarie, most thinges do [...]yther associate and draw neere to themselues the like, or at least assimulate to themselues that which approcheth neer them, and doe also d [...]iue away, chase [Page] and exterminate their contraries, And that is the reason commonly yeelded why the middle region of the aire shold be coldest, because the Sunne and stars are eyther hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct beames heate the vpper region, the re [...]lected beames from the earth and seas heate the lower Region. That which is in the middest being furthest distant in place from these two Regions of heate are most distant in nature that is coldest, which is that they tearme colde or hot, per antiperistasin, that is inuironing by contraries, which was pleasantly taken holde of by him that said that an honest man in these daies must needes be more honest then in ages heretofore, propter antiperistasin because the shutting of him in the middest of contraries must needs make the honesty stronger and more compact in it selfe.
The reprehension of this colour is, first many things of amplitude in their kind doe as it were ingrosse to themselues all, and leaue that which is next [Page 26] them most destitute, as the shootes or vnderwood that grow neare a great and spread tree, is the most pyned & shrubbie wood of the field, because the great tree doth depriue and deceiue them of sappe and nourishment. So he saith wel, Diuitis serui maxime serui: And the comparison was pleasant of him that comp [...]red courtiers attendant in the courtes of princes, without great place or office, to fasting dayes, which were next the holy daies, but otherwise were the leanest dayes in all the weeke.
An other reprehension is, that things of greatnes and predominancie, though they doe not extenuate the thinges adioyning in substance; yet they drowne them and obscure them in shew and appearance. And therefore the Astronomers say, that whereas in all other planets coniunction is the pe [...]fecte [...]t amitie: the Sunne contrariwise is good by aspect, but euill by coniunction.
A third reprehension is because euill approcheth to good sometimes for concealement, sometimes for protection, [Page] and good to euill for conuersion and reformation. So hipocrisie draweth neer to religion for couert & hyding it selfe: Saepe latet vitium procinitate boni, & Sanctuary men which were cōmonly inordinate men & malefactors, were wont to be neerest to pries [...]es and Prelates and holy men, for the maiestie of good thinges is such, as the confines of them are reuered. On the other side our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicanes and rioters said, The Phisitian approcheth the sicke, rather then the whole.
8. Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum; quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.
THe reason is because the sting and remorse of the mind accusing it selfe doubleth all aduersitie, contrarywise the considering and recording inwardly that a man is cleare and free from fault, and iust imputation, doth attemper outward calamities: For if the euill bee in [Page 27] the sence and in the conscience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euill be in the one and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compensation. So the Poets in tragedies doe make the mo [...] passionate lamentations, and those that forerunne final dispaire, to be accusing, questioning and torturing of a mans [...]elfe.
& contrariwise the extremities of worthie persons haue beene annihilated in the consideration of their owne good deseruing. Besides when the euill commeth from without, there is left a kinde of euaporation of griefe, if it come by humane iniurie, eyther by indignation and meditating of reuenge from our selues, or by expecting or foreconceyuing that Nemesis and retribution will take holde of the authours of our hart, or if it bee by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kinde of expostulation against the diuine powers.
But where the euill is deriued from a [Page] mans own fault there all strikes deadly inwardes and suffocateth.
The reprehension of this colour is first in respect of hope, for reformation of our faultes is in nostra potestate, but amendment of our fortune simplie is not. Therefore Demosthenes in many of his orations sayth thus to the people of Athens. That which hauing regarde to the time past is the worst pointe and circumstance of all the rest, that as to the time to come is the best: What is that? Euen this, that by your sloth, irresolution, and misgouernement, your affaires are growne to this declination and decay. For had you vsed and ordered your meanes and forces to the best, and done your partes euery way to the full, and notwithstanding your matters should haue gone backwards in this manner as they doe, there had beene no hope left of recouerie or reparation, but since it hath beene onely by your owne errours &c. So Epictetus in his degrees saith, The worst state of man is to accuse externe things, better then that to accuse a mans selfe, and best of all to accuse neyther.
[Page]An other reprehension of this colour is in respect of the wel bearing of euils, wherewith a man can charge no bodie but himselfe, which maketh them the lesse.
Leue fit quod bene fertur onus. And therefore many natures, that are eyther ex [...]reamely proude and will take no fault to themselues, or els very true, and cleauing to themselues (when they see the blame of any thing that falles out ill must light vpon themselues) haue no other shift but to beare it out wel, and to make the least of it, for as wee see when sometimes a fault is committed, & before it be known who is to blame, much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to be done by a sonne, or by a wife, or by a neere friend, then it is light made of. So much more when a man must take it vpon himselfe. And therefore it is commonly seene that women that marrie husbandes of their owne choosing against their friends consents, if they be neuer so ill vsed, yet you shall seldome see them complaine but to set [Page] a good face on it.
9. Quod opera & virtute nostra partum est maius bonum; quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunae delatum est minus bonum.
THe reasons are first the future hope, because in the fauours of others or the good windes of fortune we haue no state or certainty, in our endeuours or abilities we haue. So as when they haue purchased vs one good fortune, we haue them as ready and better edged and inured to procure another.
The formes be, you haue wonne this by play, you haue not onely the water, but you haue the receit, you can make it againe if it be lost &c.
Next because these properties which we inioy by the benefite of others carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kinde of burthen, whereas the other which deriue f [...]ō ou [...] selues, are like the freest patents abs (que) aliquo inde reddendo, [Page] and if they proceede from fortune or prouidence, yet they seeme to touch vs secreatly with the reuerence of the diuine powers whose fauours we tast, and therfore worke a kind of religious fear [...] and restraint, whereas in the other kind, that come to passe which the Prophet speaketh, Laetantur & exultant, immolant plagis suis, & sacrificant reti suo.
Thirdely because that which commeth vnto vs without our owne virtue, yeeldeth not that commendation and reputation, for actions of great felicitie may drawe wonder, but prayselesse, as Cicero said to Cesar: Quae miremur habemus, quae laudemus expectamus.
Fourthly because the purchases of our own industrie are ioyned commonly with labour and strife which giues an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our desire more pleasant, Suauis cibus a venatu.
On the other side the [...]e bee fowre counter colours to this colour rather then reprehensions, because they be as large as the colour it selfe, first because [Page] felicitie seemeth to bee a character of the fauour and loue of the diuine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in our selues and respecte and authoritie from others. And this felicitie extendeth to many casuall thinges, whereunto the care or virtue of man cannot extend, and therefore seemeth to be a larger go [...]d, as when Caesar sayd to the sayler, Caesarem portas & fortunam [...]ius, if he had [...]aide, & virtutem eius, it had beene small comfort against a tempest otherwise then if it might seeme vpon merite to induce fortune.
Next, whatsoeuer is done by vertue and industrie, seemes to be done by a kinde of habite and arte, and therefore open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicitie is imitable: So wee generally see, that things of nature seeme more excellent then things of arte, because they be imitable, for quod imitabile est potentia quada [...] vulgatum est.
Thirdly, felicitie commendeth those things which commeth without our [Page 30] owne labor, for they seeme gifts, and the other seemes penyworths: whereupon Plutarch sayth elegantly of the actes of Timoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the actes of Agesilaus and Epamin [...]ndas, That they were like Homers verses they [...]anne so ea [...]ily and so well, and therefore it is the word we giue vnto poesi [...], terming it a happi [...] vaine, because facilitie seemeth euer to come from happines.
Fourthly, this same praeter spem, vel praeter expectatum, doth increase the price and pleasure of many things, and this cannot be incident to those things that proceede from our owne care, and compasse.
10 Gradus priuationi [...] maior vide [...]ur quàm gradus diminutionis; & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quàm gradus incrementi.
IT is a position in the Mathematiques that there is no proportion betweene [Page] somewhat and nothing, therefore the degree of nullitie and quidditie or act, seemeth larger then the degrees of increase and decrease, as to a monoculos it is more to loose one eye, then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue lost diuers children, it is more griefe to him to loose the last then all the rest, because he is spes gregis. And therefore Sybilla when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had bin gradus priuationis, and not diminutionis. This couler is reprehended first in those things, the vse and seruice whereof resteth in sufficiencie, competencie, or determinate quantitie, as if a man be to pay one hundreth poundes vpon a penaltie, it is more for him to want xii pence, then after that xii pence supposed to be wanting, to want ten shillings more: So the decay of a mans estate seemes to be most touched in the degree when he first growes behinde, more then afterwards when he proues [Page 31] nothing worth. And hereof the common fourmes are, S [...]ra in fundo parsimonia, and as good neuer awhit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, Corruptio vnius, generatio vlterius, so that graedus priuationis, is many times lesse matter, because it giues the cause, and motiue to some new course, As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for harkning to the conditions offered by King Phillip, being not honorable nor equall, he [...]aith they were but elements of their sloth and weakenes, which if they were taken away, neces [...]itie woulde teach them stronger resolutions, So Doctor Hector was wont to Dames of London, when they complayned they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any medicine, he would tell them, Their way was onely to be sicke, for then they would be glad to take any medicine.
Thirdly, this couler may be reprehended, in respect that the degree of [Page] decrease is more sensitiue, then the degree of priuation; for in the minde of man, gradus diminutionis may worke a wauering betweene hope and feare, and so keepe the minde in suspence from setling and accommodating in patiēce, and resolution; hereof the common fourmes are, Better eye out, then alwayes ake, make or marre, &c.
For the second braunch of this couler, it depends vpon the same generall reason: hence grew the common place of extolling the beginning of euery thing, Dimidiū qui bene coepit habet. This made the A [...]trologers so idle as to iudge of a mans nature and destiny by the constellation of the moment of his natiuitie, or conception. This couler is reprehended, because many inceptions are but as Epicurus te [...]meth them, tentamentae, that is, imperfect offers, and essayes, which vanish and come to no substance without an iteration, so as in such cases the second degree seemes the worthyest, as the body-horse in the [Page 32] Cart, that draweth more then the fore-horse, hereof the common fourmes are, The second blow makes the fray, The second word makes the bargaine, Alter principium dedit, alter abstulit, &c. Another reprehension of this couler is in respect of def [...]tigation, which makes perseue [...]āce of greater dignitie then inception, but setled affection or iudgement maketh the continuance.
Thirdly, this couler is reprehended in such things which haue a naturall course, and inclination contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no start, but there behoueth perpetua inceptio, as in the common fourme. Non progredi, est regredi [...] Qui non proficit, deficit: Running against the hill: Rowing against the streame, &c. For if it be with the streame or with the hill, then the degree of inception is more then al the rest.
Fourthly, this couler is to be vnderstoode of gradus inceptionis à potentia, [Page] ad actum comparatus; cum gradu ab act [...] ad incrementum: For other, maior videtur gradus ab impotentia ad potentiam quàm a potentia ad actum.
Printed at London by Iohn Winde [...] for Humfrey Hooper. 1597.