The first discourse from whence Counsels doe proceede, and of the execution of that which is deter­mined in counsels.

THE holie ghost, who is light vnto them that follow him, mercie vnto them that feare him, ioy vnto them that loue him, visiteth our soules, (as the Prophet E­say Esay. 11. 2. saith) with seuen diuine gifts, which are: The spirit of wisedom: of vnder­standing: of counsell: of fortitude: of knowledge: of pietie: and of the feare of the Lord. These seuen gifts of the ho­lie Ghost, are the seuen eyes, which the Prophet Zacharie saw Zacharie. 3. 9. set vpon a stone. The stone whereon Zacharie sawe the seuen eyes placed, is our Redéemer, and Lord Jesus Christ, as the glorious Saint Ierome declareth. For in the holie Scripture, the stone signifieth our Redéemer and Lord, as he himselfe Matth. 21. 42 taught, when he declared that which king Dauid said: That Psalme. 118. 22. the stone which the builders refused, is become the head stone of the corner: which closeth all the whole worke, and giueth perfection to the building. Saint Paule following this inter­pretation, 1. Corin. 10. 4. Exodus. 17. saith: That the stone out of the which the Water did spring, of the which the people of Israell did drinke in the desert, signified our Redéemer and Lord. The Prophet Zacha­rie Zacharie. 3. saith, that he saw seuen eyes placed in a stone, for to shew, that the blessed soule of our Redéemer and Lord Jesus Christ, was most perfectlie indued with the seuen gifts of the holie Ghost, as well in the morrall vertues as intellectuall, and in all the other graces, which through the vnion with the diuine Nic. de lira. supra. 3. Zacha. essence, are communicated with the soule of our Redéemer and Lord, as I more at large haue shewed in the Treatise which I wrote vpon the Créede of the Apostles.

2 Among those gifts with which the holie Ghost doth ligh­ten our soules, the Prophet Esay putteth the spirit of Counsell and Fortitude. The spirit of Counsell (as Saint Thomas [...] [Page] [...] [Page 1] [Page 2] declareth it) is a certaine light, wherewith the holie ghost illu­minateth our vnderstanding, that so we may be able to choose that which we ought to doo in humane affaires. For the wise­dome of man faileth in manie things, which it cannot reache nor attaine vnto: especially if they be particular things, which in sundrie places, & at diuers times may fall out diuerslie; and when we folow our own humane wisdom, we run into great danger of our life. And therefore Salomon saith: That the dis­courses of men are weake, and their prouidence verie vncer­taine, Wisdom. 9. and that to assure our selues in this life wherein we liue so full of danger and darknes, we ought in no case to trust vnto our owne wisedome, but desire God to lighten our vnderstan­ding. For (as the Prophet Esay saith) GOD is a meruailous Esay, 3. Prouerb. 3. Counseller. This dooth king Salomon teach vs when he saith: Trust in the Lord with all thy hart, and trust not to thine own wisedome: and set God before thee in all thy waies, and he wil direct thy steps, &c. And because the wisedom of man is not suf­ficient, to attaine to the truth of each thing in matters concer­ning counsell, it is commonlie said that God is he which shew­eth that which is to be doone.

3 Well did king Dauid vnderstand this, when in the war which he waged against his sonne Absolon, he praied to God, that the counsell of Achitophel might not be beléeued. Achito­phel 2. Regum. 15. was so wise in those counsels which he gaue, (as wel whē he serued Dauid as when he folowed Absolon) that they rather séemed to be prophecies reuealed by GOD then humane coun­sels. And for this cause, king Dauid much more feared the counsels of Achitophel, then the battails and ambushes of Ab­solon. [...]. Regum. 16. And to the end he might make frustrate the coūsel which Achitophel gaue to Absolon, he said vnto Chusai the Archite (who came to serue him) that he should folow Absolon, and say vnto him: I will be thy seruant O king, and I will serue thée as in times past I haue serued thy father: that if Absolon did admit him to his counsaile, he should crosse all that euer A­chitophel counsailed Absolon. By the meanes of the Priestes who were called Sadoch and Abiathar, Chusai did the same which king Dauid commaunded him, and presented himselfe before Absolon, who asking him why he folowed not his friend Dauid: he answered, Lord I folow thée, and will serue thee, [Page 3] because GOD and the people haue chosen thée to be the King. Absolon beléeued that to be true which Chusai said. And wher­as Achitophel counselled that he might be suffered to choose out twelue thousand men, and so set vpon king Dauid, and easilie ouercome him, and those who folowed him, because they were all of them very wearie and full of feare: Chusai crossed his counsel, and vrged Absolon to the contrarie. So that Absolon and those that were with him, liked and approoued Chusai his counsell. Then Achitophel séeing that Absolon would not fol­low the counsell that he gaue him, hanged himselfe. Héerein is it manifestlie séene, that it is an ordinarie rule of Gods proui­dence, alwaies when through his secret iudgments, he will pu­nish the faults and sinnes of men: that first they loose their vn­derstanding, to the end that they may not vnderstand nor iudge of the truth: and besides (to make those whom he will correct and punish, the more miserable and wretched) he suffereth (as Velleyus Paterculus saith) the ill successe of the matter, to be attributed and imputed vnto the fault and error of those whom he will punish: and he blindeth the vnderstanding of men, to the end they should not oppose themselues against him: and sée­keth all meanes that are necessarilie required, to bring that to passe which he will haue. And as it is commonlie said, to shun that which fortune and chance will haue, is the readie waie to Gene. 41. find it: as it is séene in that which hapened to Ioseph and his brethren.

4 The Prophet Esay did not without great cause ioyne the spirit of Fortitude, with the spirit of Counsel: for litle pro­fiteth counsell, if vertue and strength be wanting, to execute that which by counsell is determined. And because of those that neither can, nor know how to execute, Cornelius Tacitus saith: That when matters goe to wracke, euerie man commaunds, but no man taketh in hand to bring that to effect which is com­maunded. Polienus s [...]ra­tage. 19. Iphicrates béeing asked why he would not encoun­ter with the enemie: he answered, because he saw many com­maund, but few obey. And because of these that cannot tel how to bring such matters to effect, as is by counsell concluded: the holie Scripture saith: That the time of child-bedde draweth néere, and the▪ mother hath no strength to be brought to bedde. And this is vnderstood by the Fable of the Rats, which were [Page 4] in counsell, which of them should hang the bell on the Cat. And by our Spanish prouerbe.

Salust saith, that first we ought to consult of matters, and af­terward In proaemio Catelin. execute y ^e same, which is decréed with a sesonable and ripe haste. He would haue that those things which are coun­sailed, should be executed after such an order, that the execution be done in due time and place. And this is it that Salust calleth Mature facere, to wit: that it be neither greene nor rotten. And after this order, doo Aulus Gellius and Macrobius declare that Lib. 10. cap. 11. Saturnal. lib. 6 Lib. 1. Aeneid. of Virgil, Maturate fugam: as if Neptune had said to y ^e winds, that they should so get them gone: that neither rushing awaie with too much haste, nor with too much slownes, staying on the Seas too long, they should not hurt or indomage the Troyan ships. The Emperour Charles the fift vsed to say, that the af­faires of Princes, did consist in two things: in counsell and ex­ecution. Sansouinus de dictis & fac. Imprat. Car. 5. Whereof the first required good iudgment, but the lat­ter, great fidelitie: and that slownes was the soule of counsell, and haste the soule of execution: and that both of thē together, were the Quintessence of wise Princes. And that counsell requi­red a singuler wit and rare iudgment, and the putting of mat­ters in execution, demaunded fit oportunitie, with occasion proportionable, and much fidelitie.

5 It chanceth verie seldome, that both wit to discourse of those things which are in counsell, & iudgment to put the same in execution which is decréed, doo both together concurre in one person. Captaine Picinino was of verie weak & smal iudgment Garim prob. 99. in counselling, but verie readie in executing of those things which in the counsels were determined: and seemed rather to be caried with force and furie, then moued by reason or iudg­ment. He was also most fortunate in all things which he tooke in hand. Frauncis the first of that name, king of Fraunce, in counsailing went beyond all his Counsellers, especially in mat­ters touching warre: but in executing was nothing compara­ble vnto them. Clement the seuenth Pope, excéeded euerie one in counsel, but in execution was inferior to al those that were of his Counsell. The holie Scripture mentioneth, that king Da­uid [...]. Regum. [...]. was wise in that he spake, and strong in that which he did, [Page 5] and that he was faire, and that God fauoured him. To be able to discourse well vpon matters which are in counsell, and not to know how to put the same in execution, procéedeth from a braue wit, but simple wisedom. And execution without coun­sell Garim. prob. 99. or iudgment, commeth of great wisedom and smal wit: be­cause he that putteth any thing in execution, ought to be indu­ed with singuler wisedom, to execute the same wel which is de­termined. There haue béene manie Princes, who (as I haue written more at large in the Treatise which I intituled, Of the institution of Princes.) were verie apt and wittie, in all Artes and Sciences, but yet of small iudgment in gouerning their kingdoms: and albeit they were verie ingenious and prompt, yet were they nothing wise. And many because they cannot tell how to resolue thēselues in such things as they con­sult vppon: they conclude not, but (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) Lib. 5. con [...]ilium cui impar est, [...]a­to permittere. they leaue such things as they cannot nor know not how to re­solue themselues in, vnto Fortune, staying and expecting the successe and euent of them.

6 Because the holie Ghost is he that guideth and helpeth vs in our counsels, God saith by the Prophet Esay, meaning to Cap. 3. punish the people of Israell, that they should haue no Coun­sellers to counsell them. When Iudith went about to deliuer the Cittie of Bethulia from the imminent danger in which it was when Olophernes besieged it, she said vnto those y ^t were Iudith. 8. besieged, that they should humbly with praying & fasting, de­sire of God that it wold please him to confirme the same which she had resolued and determined. Tobias said vnto his Sonne, Tob. 3. that his counsell was not in the power of men, but of God. And the Captaine Nehemias saith, that God destroyeth the counsell Esdras. 4. of men: and the Prophet Dauid, that God ouerthroweth the P [...]l [...]. 32. counsell of the Heathen, and reprooueth that which the people imagineth, and the counsels of Princes. After the same man­ner, as God deuideth the waters, so enclineth he the harts of Pro [...]rb. 21. kings to doo the same which he will haue, & bringeth to naught the counsels of the wicked. And because counsels depend vpon Esay▪ 8. [...]b. 5▪ Tob. 4. Psalme▪ 54. the diuine prouidence, it is necessarilie required, that we should guide and direct them vnto the seruice of God, as Tobias coun­selled his Son: because God maintaineth and vpholdeth them, that put all their trust in him. We ought also not to trust to [Page 6] that litle which we know and vnderstand, that we commit not an infinite number of faults, falling out of one rigor into ano­ther, and so at the length into extreame miserie: and (as the holie Scripture mentioneth) till the measure of the Amorites Genesis. 15. be filled.

7 They that consult vpon anie matter, must put that coun­sell Franciscus Lo­timus. Consi­derat. 319. in execution, which seemeth to be lesse dangerous, and to haue fewer inconueniences: for it is well néere a thing impos­sible, to be deliuered from all the inconueniences and dangers which hap to fall out in the execution of matters, and especial­lie in great enterprises. And therfore it is commonly said, that Cornelius Tacit. Lib. 18. Publius Mimius: nunquam peri­culum sine peri­culo vincitur. he that ventureth not, neither looseth nor winneth. And one danger is saued by the other, and after the danger commeth the profit. If any man thinke that he can put anie thing which in counsell is concluded, in execution without aduenture, he shall neuer be able to bring that to passe which he wisheth. For it is the propertie of Fortune, to crosse, not onelie great and heroi­call enterprises, but also small and particular things. They ought not then to linger, but straight-waies to put the same which in the counsell is concluded, in practise, though there be danger in the execution of it: if so be that the profit which is to folow the execution, be greater then the danger which is incur­red in not executing it.

8 It is the propertie of wise men, to consult vpon all mat­ters which they take in hand, with great deliberation: and Salust in Ca­telin. then (as Salust saith) spéedilie with a proportioned diligence, to execute the same which is concluded: and not imitate y ^t which is said of the Maquedana, who spake without consideration of the time and place, where and with whom she spake. There­fore it is conuenient to consider well of euery thing: for by how much the more things be déepelie pondered, by so much the more profitable are the counsels vnto the Common wealth, not onely in matters of peace, but also of war. And therfore in an­cient Polidorus Vir­gilius in adagiis. times past, it was wont to be said, that the Romaines did ouercome sitting: and that counsell is taken on the pillow, and that many counsels amend all matters.

9 It falleth out very sildome, that they which haue deter­mined to doo any thing, leaue and giue ouer the dooing of it, Prouerb. 11. though the execution thereof be difficult and dangerous: and [Page 7] manie because they would not be hindered, and kept from put­ting the same in execution which they purpose to doe, wil aske no aduise, nor admit any one to counsell them: who (as they know) will not allow that which they will haue. For it see­meth Lotimus con­siderat. 330. vnto them, that their minds that should helpe them to ex­ecute the same which they pretend, saint: and they feare, that if they should consult with them, vpon that which they haue before alreadie determined, it would be an occasion to thē, not to execute the same which they wish. Such men are very hurt­ful vnto the Common-wealth. And if that before they had de­termined with themselues to folow theyr pretences, they had consulted vpon that which they ought to doe: they might easily be brought from dooing that, which they pretended: dashing (as the royall Prophet saith) the children of Babilon on the stones, not suffering naughty and peruerse pretences to grow. These be the children of Babilon, which the kingly Prophet saith, that Psalme. 136. they ought to be broken on the stone. The stone whereon they should be broken, is our Redéemer and Lord Jesus Christ, by whose fauour and grace, all naughtie and wicked imaginations are broken.

10 After that the same is begun to be executed, which in Lotimus consi­derat. 331. the counsell was determined, the Counsellers must not re­member or think of that counsell, which they forsooke, that the execution of the same be not hindered, which is already deter­mined. For they must hold that firme and stable, which in coun­sell is agréed vpon, and thinke it to be most profitable to the Common-wealth: for it is very hurtfull to the execution, to thinke that those counsels which they would not folow, were better then those which they approoued. And indéed it is the propertie of vnfortunate persons, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) Cornelius Ta­citus. Lib. 1. to thinke that, that counsell which they folowed not, was bet­ter and safer then that which they alowed and approoued.

11 When the matters which are in counsell, are of such condition and qualitie, that they may be redressed at all times, then may the Counsellers spend much time in deliberating what may be doone: for that thing is not said to be doone out of time, which may be doone in any time. But contrariwise, if the matters require hast, and a spéedie conclusion, then ought the Counsellers to make much of the time, and with as great [Page 8] celeritie and spéed as may be, conclude and determine. For it is very hurtfull to those things which the Counsellers sit vp­on, Lucan. Lib. 1. Cor. Tacitus. Liber. 17. to wast time: and sit long in consultation, when the danger is at hand. For whilst the Counsellers are consulting what is to be doone, the occasion passeth which was offered, to put the same in execution which was determined. Titus Liuius saith, Dec. 3. lib. 3. that in meane space, while the Romaines consulted what succor they should send, to the Towne Saguntia beeing besieged with Hanibals Armie: it might haue béene taken, destroied, and ra­sed to the ground. And in a certaine Cittie in Spaine, whilst they were long consulting, what super-scription they should write on a Letter, which they sent vnto those of whō they asked aide: the Cittie was taken by the enemies, and spoyled. In ancient Frasmus in adag [...]s. times past, the Image of opportunitie was set vp in many pla­ces, that men might remember to let no occasion slip, which might be to their commoditie when opportunitie was offered. And that all men might vnderstand, of how great importance it was, to let occasion passe, they painted her on a whéele, be­cause she neuer standeth still, nor remaineth in one place, with wings on her féete, because she passeth away swiftly, her face couered with the haire of her fore-head, because she lets none know her, but such as be verie attentine to looke on her: with a raser in her hande, because shee cuts of their hope that take no heede of her but let her passe: with the hinder part of her head balde, because if she once be gone, no man can catth hold on her, and with a Maid that waits vpon her which is cal­led Poenitentia, for repentance doth accompanie them that can­not tell how to reape profit by occasion. This which we say of execution holds, vnlesse the matters are such as require no hast, but may rather be delaid without danger then done. For in the dispatch of them, they may be done with deliberation, & though they be deferred, yet they may be doone to good purpose: and Hernam. de Pulga. Epist. 2. therefore in such things much is doone, though some thing be left vndoone. For time it selfe healeth many diseases without any medicines, whereas the Phisition with a medicine often times cannot. And many things in mans life are mard, not for that they ought not to be doone, but because they be not doone in Antonius de Gauara. 1. part. Epistol. time and place. Therefore euery thing should be throughly sif­ted, that in due season it may be dispatched, as the Garden [Page 9] which is to be sowed.

12 They therfore that giue not their resolutions in euery thing at the first, are not to be found fault with all, if the mat­rers which are in consultation be harde & difficult and require long deliberation. But if they deferre their resolution, because they will not aduenture a little, to obtaine a great deale, or be­cause by the sharpnes of their wits, they can alledge and bring reasons to contrarie euerie thing that is proposed: then may Franciscus Loti­nus 336. consi­deratione. they wel be blamed: for such fellowes wil neuer conclude, vn­lesse they be forced vnto it. Because they haue no hart, to doe according to the reasons which they inuent: and yet they ne­uer want reasons, to hide and cloake their naturall weakenes, which at all times preuaileth more with them, then reason or experience. Which neuerthelesse oftentimes she weth thr̄, that they had no cause to feare. Heereby may cléerelie he séene [...] that subtiltie and wit make not a valiant man, neither is he to be thought so well of, that can see farre into a matter, but rather he that hath a hart to execute the same, which the subtitle of his wit sheweth vnto him. Yet because men most commonlie folow their owne inclmacion▪ it is conuenient that he which is to giue counsell vnto others, haue wit to inuent, and iudgment to dispose, as wel as hart, to performe that which is counselled. And for because that these thrée things, are verie seldome found together in one person, there ought to be many Counsellers, and so some to supply the same which is wanting in others. This ment Homer, when he said that Vlisses and Diomedes In illiad. Ouid. in Metamorph. Libro. 1. A [...]ncid. went together to do that which king A gamemnon cōmaunded them. And Virgil when he said, that Achates accompanied Ae­neas, vnderstanding by Achates counsel, & by Aeneas execution.

The second discourse what counsell is and vpon what matters men ought to consult.

COunsell (as the priuate Lawes of Spayne say) is Lib. 1. & [...]. tit. 2. p [...]ti. 3. good aduise, which a man taketh vpon doubtfull things, to the end he might not fall into any er­ror. Besides, this ought to be considered, what he is of whom men aske counsell, whether he be a man sufficient to giue counsell to the purpose, and such as he [Page 10] néedeth who demaundeth it: lastly, counsell ought so be asked before the thing be done. [...]lerious Furius saith; that the coun­sell In tractatu de [...] princi­p [...]. Cap. 1. of Princes, is a congregation, or an assemblie of elected and chosen persons, to consult vpon all accidents both of peace and warre. By which meanes, they better and more easily remem­ber the same which is pa [...], vnderstand that which is present, and prouide for that which is to come: and so in all their enter­prises, obtaine good successe, and shunne all inconueniences, or at least wise if they cannot, yet they find meanes whereby the danger is made lesse. And this assembly is of manie called the counsell, taking the name of the ende for which it was inuen­ted. And the companie or congregation of the Counsellers, is [...] the councell. Where [...]ent difference betwixt counsell and councell as Fran [...] saith for counsell is where Eth. 3. & m [...]g­norum morah­um. Lib. 2. Lib. 5. cap. 13. Histor. Rom. honorable men, and the chéese of the Realme méete together, to treate of matters [...] and the councell is, whē men of meane condition make [...]n assembly. This difference be­twixt councell, and councell; is not commonly obserued (as Bruides saith. In annotationi­bus add. cap. 13.

2 Counsell is taken (saith Aristotle) vpon things which are not in mans power, but may fall out [...]. And not vp­pon matters which are not doubted o [...], whether they ought to be doone or no▪ for these haue more neéd to be put in execution, then to be had in counsell. Neither is counsell to be demaunded for things which are most certaine, as whether the Sun will Plat [...]r. de vir­tut. mor. rise to morow, or no▪ nor for things that are impossible, nor for things belonging to al the world, nor for things present, nor for things past, for such things cannot be amended: because those things y ^t are present, or already past, stand vpon no aduise, as I In tract [...] con­ditionum im­possibilium, [...]at quasi. declare more at large in another place. And if happily coūsel be taken vpō some matter which is present or past, that is done, to séeke some remedie, least it should doe harme hereafter in time to come. Iodocus Clichtoreus saith, that these be the proper­ties In tract. Epit. mor. Iacob. Fabr. i [...] [...] Arist. lib. in cap. de pradentia. of Counsellers. First, they ought to haue iudgment & vn­derstanding: Secondly, when they assemble & méet together to consult, they ought to premeditate vpon that, of which they are to consult: as they that trauell cast with themselues, which way thy will take to come to their iourneyes end. For vnlesse they doo premeditate, their counsell shall be in vaine. Thirdly, [Page 11] they ought not to consult vpon matters y ^t are present. Fourth­ly, Arist. bb. 1. Rhet. & 3. Eth. lodoc. Cli. vbi sup. Arist vbis [...]p. that they ought not to consult vpon matters that are im­possible. Sixtly, they ought not to consult vpon such thinges, which necessarily must happen, and cannot be shunned or de­clined. Seuenthly, they ought in theyr counsels, to seeke cut meanes, how to bring the same to passe which they pretende. Eightly, they ought to consult of things which are limitted, and are not infinite. Ninthly, vpon things that both may be, and may not be. Tenthly, vpon things that be doubtfull, and may fall out diuersly. Those things which concerne the Common­wealth, Arist. Eth. 3. Author 40. can­tronum ponit [...]o. regulas quas se­qui debet qui sit futurus prudens. P. 2. cant. 4. are to be considered of with long deliberation: because there lieth more vpon the venturing of them, then of priuate and particular matters, which euerie one can more easily, and with lesse hurt iudge of, and choose that which he best liketh.

The third discourse, how needfull and necessary it is, that Prin­ces should, haue in their seruice, such Counsellers, as freelie would tell them what they thinke to be profitable to the Common­wealth.

OF how great importance it is vnto all Common wealths that are, that Princes should haue such Counsellers, who freely would let them vnder­stand what they thinke to be most conuenient: the Poets in their works sufficientlie declare vnto vs. Who (as Plato. saith) write, that Princes are vn­d [...]one, Plato. Epist. 1. because they want faithfull freends to counsell them. Cornelius Tacitus agréeing with them, saith: that a Prince Lib. 20. [...] can haue no greater, better, nor fitter instrument, to kéepe and conserue his estate, then good freends. The Emperour Augu­stus Seneca de bene­ficiis. lib. 6. ca. 13 Caesar, said: into these troubles had I not fallen, if Moece­nas and Agrippa had liued, whose counsell I was went to en­ioy. Augustus Caesar did much misse them, and marked that he bad no fréends to counsell him. For Princes haue néede of no­thing more, then of freends that may giue them counsell. The greatest and best guarde that a Prince can haue (as Aristeus Lib. 10. interpre. saith) is to be accompanied with a great number of iust and [Page 12] expart Counselle who through [...], sefting their own commodity aside, regard the profit and welfare of the Common wealth. For no Armies, no battailes, no squadrons of fighting men, and no treasures that a Prince hath, can so wel conserue and defend the Prince his estate, as good and loyall Freends, who would fréely shew him, what they take to be most profita­ble for the Common wealth. And as a certaine Poet saith: Plutarchus in libro, quo pacto possis adulato­rem ab amito cognoseere.

Merope in the Tragedie doth admonish vs, saying.

2 For Princes loose not their authoritie at all, in folowing that which their Counsellers aduise them, but rather increase and augment it: for if Counsellers deminished it, then would no Princes haue any Counsellers, of whom they might learne what were most profitable for y ^e Common-wealth. In the war which the Grecians waged against the Troyans, the counsels of Nestor and Vlisses, were farre more profitable then the forces of Achilles and Aiax: as Agamemnon shewed, when he sayd, that if he had had tenne Nestors to haue giuen him counsel, the siege of Troy should not haue continued so long. Henrie y ^e third Gariuai. lib. 15. Capit. 4. of that name, king of Castile, said: that the counsels of wise men, did the Princes more good then the Armes of valiant soldiers, Because brauer and more notable acts are wrought by men of counsell then by Armes. He was also wont to alledge y ^t which Tullie said, to this purpose: to wit, that the counsels of Solon Lib. 1. Officio. had béene no lesse profitable vnto the Cittie of Athens, then the victorie of Themissocles. Salust assirmeth; that counsell is not Salust in princi­pio Catelin. onely profitable for the consernation and maintenance of peace, but also for the atchiuing of victory: because good counsel alway preuaileth much in warre.

[Page 13]3 And Princes to the ende they may be well counselled, should commaund their Counsellers to speake freelie in theyr consultations, and shew their minds what they thinke ought to be determined to doo the Common-wealth good. For (as Ar­tabanus said to king Xerxes) if there be not diuers minds and Herodorus. lib. 7. opinions in their consultations, how can the Prince choose that which is best. After the same order as we know which is the better gold, by laying of one péece of gold to the other: euen so, comparing one counsell with the other, the Princes discerne which of them is most profitable for the Common-wealth. And (as Paulus de Castro saith) euen as persumes, the better they Consilio 13. lib. 1 Consilio. be beaten, the sweeter they smell: so likewise, the sentences, minds, and opinions of Counsellers, the more they be debated and discussed, the surer and better they be. True it is, that the rarest and greatest wits, béeing of singular iudgment, are able to enter déeper into matters, then they that are not so wittie, but of the simple sort. And they that are fullie experienced, can better discerne what is necessaire in euery matter, then they which haue no skill in it. Yet neuerthelesse, it is the dutie of e­nerie wise man, to heare the minds of many, for one man one­lie, cannot see and know all things. And oftentimes one of sim­ple Saepe est olitor opportuna lo­quutus. Lib. 3. de insti­tut. princip. learning and small knowledge, aduiseth a wiser person, of such things which he neuer did heare or sée before. Dion saith, that a Prince séeth with as manie eyes, and heareth with as many eares, as he hath freends that counsell him sincerelie.

4 It is a thing very hurtfull to the Common-wealth, that the Counsellers before hand should knowe their Princes incli­nation, for then they séeke all means possible how to find out reasons, which may iustifie and prooue that which their King or Prince desireth. And for this cause, of all hurtfull Counsel­lers, Franciscus San­souinus. de dictis & fact. Car. v. looper. learned men are most noyous to the Common-wealth, if they abuse their learning. The Emperor Charles the fift, was wont to say, that it became Princes very well, to be accompa­nied with learned men: and that the societie and vse of learned men, was very expedient and profitable vnto vertuous Prin­ces: and contrarilie, very dangerous and hurtful to wicked and lewde Princes. For to euevy thing which the Prince will doo, they find either n Law or an History to allow and approoue the same. And if so be that the Prince be of weake iudgment, he [Page 14] will not be able to determine and choose, what is most profita­ble to the Common-wealth. It is manifest, that the Emperor said true, séeing that there neuer wanted men of great learning, who contrarie to all reason and iustice, iustified and approoued that which their Prince purposed and appointed to doo. As also the Emperors which persecuted our Christian Religion, wan­ted not learned Counsellers to allow and approoue their wic­ked enterprises. Vlpian the Lawyer, wrote the manner how Lactantius Tir­mianus lib. 5. cap. 10. they should torment and punish the Christians. Neither wan­ted the Emperor Frederick, & the other Emperors which per­secuted Baldouinus ad edicta principi­um de Christi­anis. the Catholicke Church, learned men to iustifie theyr pretences, though they were vniust and erronious. Moreouer, many learned men did iustifie vnto Don Pedro king of Castile, that he might marrie with Ladie Marie of Castro, though not­withstanding Marsilius Pata­uinus & alii qui­bus respondit Albertus Tigu­rius lib. Hierar. Ecclesiast. his lawfull wife and Quéene, Ladie Blanch was yet liuing. Such Counsellers are not to be termed Iurisperiti, and Jurisconsulti, but rather Jureperditi, and Iurestulti. Certes, they that glorie, and vant that they be Christians, ought to be ashamed to doe that which Papinian being a Pagan would not Cagnolus in procemio diga­storum, 9, Itaque. in 131. doe, although he was commaunded by the Emperor Caracalla, (whose Steward and familiar he was) to doo it: which was, to defend an vniust cause. Wherefore by the Emperours com­maund, he was slaine and put to death. Rather would he die, Aelius Spattianꝰ in vita Antoni. (though he was not a Christian) then defend an vniust cause. And he esteemed more (as our Lord and Sauiour Christ Jesus Matth. 10. teacheth vs) not to offend God, then he did of those that kil the bodie, but not the soule. Those learned men that iustifie false things vnto their Princes, discharge not their dueties as they are bound to doe: for they perswade them to doo many thinges that redound to the Common-wealths vtter destruction.

5 A Prince then ought to select such Counsellers, as doe not approoue all that which be saith: for that is the cheefe and principall tricke of flatterie, to allow all that is said, and still to sing, Et cum spiritu tuo. Such men (as the Italians say) iourney still betwixt Lodi & Placentia: they neuer goe to Ʋerona. They rehearse continually the Psalme of Placebo Domino, but they Psalme. 114. reach not (as Gerson saith) to the verse In regione vi [...]orum! be­cause their sinne is deadlie, in deceiuing their Princes with flatterie: counterfeyting and masking those counsails which [Page 15] they giue, with a false shew of Religion and iustice, regarding more their owne particular profit, then the common welfare. These counsels haue no iustice at all in them, but onely the name of iustice, which they giue them to colour and maske the vniustice and wickednes which in them lurketh. And when such Counsellers come with shew of iustice and Religion, the harme which they doe vnto the Common-wealth, cannot be re­paired: because in their owne defence they make a shew of iu­stice, with which otherwise they might haue béene suppressed. Capi. 4. de inre in [...]ando. These are rather (as Innocentius the third Pope saith) cosen­ners then Counsellers of Princes.

6 That Counsellers may freelie speake their mindes in their consultations, Princes ought to imitate the Emperour Augustus Caesar, who (as Seneca saith) béeing desired by Taci­tus Lib. 1. de Cle­mentia. cap. 16. to come to his house, to iudge of the offence which one of his Sonnes had committed, did as Tacitus requested him: and be­cause he should not mooue them that shold heare the matter de­bated to folow that which he said, and say as Princes Counsel­lers commonly doo, Et cum spiritu tuo: he commaunded that e­uerie one that was to determine of the matter, should set down his mind in writing, and when as euery man had said what he thought best to be doone, the Emperour told them his opinion and liking. The Emperor Caesar Augustus neuer asked hys Suetonius Tran. in vita Augusti. Counsellers after the order as they sate, but here one, and there another, that they should all of them be attentiue and readie to answer, and shew their mindes what they thought was to be done, without addicting themselues vnto that which the others said. In ancient times past, when they proposed Lawes vnto the people of Rome, concerning the Common-wealth: they be­gan Dion. Lib. 3. to propose the ordinances to them which bare no Offices, to the end that they might boldly shew their minds, what they thought to be most profitable to the Common-wealth: and not kéep back their opinions, for feare least they should offend those that bare office in the Common-wealth, if they earst had said to the contrary. Aulus Gellius saith, that in y ^e Senate house some­times Aulus Gellius lib. 4. cap. 11. In titulo de con­trouersia [...]e [...]h apud par. cap. 1. Eccle. cap. 3 [...]. they asked him that was chosen to be the head of the Se­nate, & somtimes those y ^t were elected to be Consuls. And Bal­dus saith, that the most ancient men, ought to be asked first, con­formable to y ^e which king Salomon saith: speak the elder first.

The fourth discourse, what counsels are expedient for the gouernment of a Common-wealth that is well instituted.

THE counsels are the foundation, whereon all Common-wealths be grounded. For whatsoe­uer is conuenient to be doone for the profit of the Common-wealth, is decided in them. And accor­ding to Aristotle, there be fiue counsels which e­uerie Rhet. lib. 1. Common-wealth that is well gouerned ought to haue. The first is of reuenewes: in this counsell they consult vpon rents, as well ordinary as extraordinarie: and vpon superflu­ous expences, how the rents are spent and consumed. This counsell is very necessarie in a Common-wealth, for substance is the Quintessence as wel in publike as priuate affaires, with­out which, neither men nor Common-wealths can fitly be maintained. For little profit the foure Elements, and al other mixtures whatsoeuer, if men haue not wherwithal to buy such things, as are necessarie to their maintenance and sustentati­on: as I wrote more at large, in the Treatise which I made, of the crafts and fetches wherwith men attaine to riches. The second counsell is of peace: and this commonly is called the counsell of estate, on which the whole gouernment of the Com­mon-wealth is grounded: as I write more at large beneath. The third counsell is of warre: vnto this counsell it belongeth to looke to the fortifying of places, and maintenance of men, and what Souldiers are necessary for warres, and the defence of the Common-wealth, and manie other matters concerning the same. The fourth counsell is, of such prouision and maynte­naunce as is necessary to the Common-wealth. This hath charge to prouide & furnish the Common-wealth, with mainte­nance and other thinges necessarie to life, in time of peace or warre. The fift counsell is for the Lawes and iustice. In this counsell all things are handled that pertaine and belong to the Prince, as well in ciuill as in criminall matters: that y ^e same may be there determined, which the Prince according to right In tractatu de consilio & con­siliariis princi­pum. and iustice, (if he were present) should ordaine by what order of iustice soeuer. Fredericus Furius calleth this the counsell of punishments: vnto this is that referred which is determined [Page 17] in the Chaunceries: if the parties pleading complaine, that the Judges of the Chaunceries doo not iudge well and confor­mable vnto iustice. To which also, it belongeth to haue a re­gard, what Offices, charges, Magistrates and Gouernours are necessary for the gouernment of the Common-wealth: and what, and how much authority and power they ought to haue: this counsell shall adde such Officers as are wanting, and put downe such as are superfluous. It pertaineth also vnto this, to declare and expound such Lawes as haue a doubtful sence, and take away such as are hurtfull to the Common-wealth, and make such newe as are necessarie.

2 Unto these fiue counsels which Aristotle sets down, Fre­dericus Furius addeth the sixth: of gifts and rewards. This counsell hath charge to heare, and learne, the merits & deserts generally of all: béeing enformed of the life, manners, and abi­litie and déeds of those, that not asking any reward, deserue to be rewarded for their vertues. And particularly of those that aske some rewards. A reward is properly called that, which is giuen to doo good vnto him to whom it is giuen. For that which is giuen, to get and obtaine some thing of him, vnto whom it Seneca lib. 1. de benefici. cap. 6. is giuen, is not properlie a reward, but a contract or bargaine: séeing it is betwéene two parties that haue to doo with debt and receit. And such reward, is rather to be set in reckoning bookes, which Merchants call bookes of account, then in the booke of rewards. The Common-wealth that is well gouerned, hath great néede of this counsell of rewards: that each one may la­bour and doo his best, to conserue and augment it: for the re­ward inticeth, and stirreth vp men to labour, whereas no man (as Salust saith) wold be good, if he hoped not for some reward. Nemo gratis bonus est. King Nabuchadnezzor had bookes, in which he commaunded the seruice that was doone him to be written, to reward them that serued him.

3 Although Aristotle and Fredericus Furius set down the counsels which are necessarie in a Common-wealth, after that order as we haue said: yet it séemeth that the principall coun­sell, and on which the Common-wealth doth chéefly depend, is the counsell of estate. For in that counsell, that, is appointed and ordayned, which is to be doone in all the other counsels. This did the Senate of Rome commend vnto the Consuls, that [Page 18] they should haue a regard that the Common-wealth shold take no harme. The power which the Dictator had, differed from the power which was giuen to the Consuls: in this, that the Dictator, was superiour to all the Magistrates, and as long as Salust in Catelin Videant Consu­les, nequid detri­menti respub. capiat: et potes­tas per Senatum more Romano magistratui max ima permittitur. his dictatorship continued, he was absolute King. But the Con­suls could not commaund any Cittizen to be put to death, vn­lesse the Senate approued it. Besides also these counsels, which Aristotle and Fredericus Furius set downe, two others are ne­cessarie to haue the Common-wealth well gouerned. The one of Censure or Manners, as the Romaines had, that none might be suffered in the Common-wealth to offend publiquelie, and so disquiet and slaunder her: and that all such as doo commit anie offence openly, might not remaine vnpunished: as I wrote more at large in the Treatise of decrées concerning manners. The other of Religion, or Inquisition: for no Common-welth can be maintained or augmented, if there be not a speciall re­gard of Religion and worshipping of God had in it, to maintain and uphold it: as I shew more at large in the small discourse of this booke.

4 All these Counsels are reduced (as Phillippus de la Tor­re saith) vnto flue: viz. The first, vnto the counsell of warre. Cap. 9. de Insti­tutione Christi­ani principis. The second, vnto the counsell of iustice. The third, vnto the counsell of estate. The fourth, vnto the counsell of mechani­call or handicrafts Officers: and the fift, to the counsell of Re­ligion. This is gathered out of that, which the Prophet Esay saith: That God might punish the people of Israel for the sins which they committed, by taking away the valiant and hardie men, that are experienced in matters concerning warre: the Judges that minister iustice: the Prophets and Elders, that haue authoritie to giue counsell: the handicrafts men, that are skilfull in that which they professe: and the learned men that can declare the misteries of God. In this, God sheweth vnto vs, how necessary these coūsels are to euery Common-wealth. For if they haue not these counsels, & be not gouerned as they ought, great confusion and discord must necessarily folow after. It is therefore required, that the Counsellers of Princes, vse all the diligence they possibly can, in looking to the publique and common profit: séeing that they be the verie gates and doores, through which all good & ill entereth into the Common-wealth.

The fift discourse, how that in all Counsels, the meanes and ends of those things which are in counsell, ought to be required and examined.

IN all Counsels (as Aristotle saith) ought not Rhet. Lib. 1. onely to be examined and enquired, whither that which is in consultation, be necessary and profita­ble to the Common-wealth: but also the means and ends of that which is in deliberation ought to be considered. The meanes are the waies, by which y ^t which in the counsels is determined, may and ought to be put in exe­cution. The end is, that which chéeflie is inquired and sought: if the meanes be naught, the counsell must be naught: if they be good, the counsell is good also. The Greekes call good counsell Lib. 6. Moral. Lib. 6. capit. 31. Antiq. lect. [...] and naughtie counsell [...] Aristotle dooth finelie han­dle, and Celius Rodiginus declare, wherein [...] doth differ from science, opinion, and [...] which is to diuine and coniec­ture out of hand what may be doone, without spending much time in discoursing vpon that which is consulted. But I meane not heare to repeate it, seeing that such subtilties are fitter to be disputed of in Schooles, then to be treated of, in counsels of Princes.

2 Those counsels are naught, in which is consulted, howe to bring wicked and vnlawfull things to passe: and those are bad counsels also, in which vnlawfull meanes are sought, to put that in practise which is lawfull and honest. Therfore it is méet and conuenient, that they who deliberate and consult vp­on matters, doo enquire, not onely whether the beginning and meanes, wherwith they will accomplish that which in y ^e coun­sell is determined, but also, whether the end of it be good and lawfull. Folowing this rule: they that goe about some mat­ter, which of it selfe is contentious and slaunderous, ought not to regard the present occasion which is offered to aduaunce it, but to consider, whether the ende be like to be good or naught. Besides, they ought not to allow anie bad and dishonest thing, though of it come good and lawfull things. According to that, Non sunt procuranda mala, vt eueniant bona. King Salomon sayth: Ecclesiast. 19. That he that is hastie to giue credit, is lightly minded, and shal [Page 20] neuer prosper. For he that rashly takes a thing in hand, before he haue throughly considered it, is an enemie to good counsell. The glorious Apostle S. Iohn, doth exhort vs, that we should not beléeue euery spirit, nor be mooued with euery winde: but 1. Iohn. 4. try the spirit whether it be of God. This is known eyther by the end vnto which it tendeth, or by the meanes by which it is aduaunced, or by the affections which mooue vs to doo it. If it be cléere, that neither the glory of God, nor the edifying of the Dempst. Epist. 1. Praeferri debet consilium quod cum Dei volun­tate congruit. holy Catholicke Church, nor the spirituall profit of our next Neighbor, but some humane pretence be in it respected and re­garded: then is it not the counsell of God, séeing it is not direc­ted vnto the seruice of the Lord. For (as Saint Ierome saith) that voice that perswadeth any thing that offendeth God, is the Super. Math. 4. voice of the deuill. As it is séene by the temptations wherwith he tempted our Redéemer & Lord Jesus Christ in the Deserts, saying: that he should worshippe him, and cast himselfe downe from the Pinacle. But the voice of God is that, which encou­rageth and perswadeth vs to the same which he commaundeth vs.

3 Although sometimes those things, which with great pru­dence are deliberated and consulted vpon, and in which lawful meanes are vsed to put them in practise, haue not the same suc­cesse and euent which was hoped for, (for the counsails of For­tune as Latinus Paccatus saith, are very secrete: or rather, to say better, because the iudgments of God as S. Paule sayth: are vnsearchable, & no man knoweth nor vnderstandeth them.) Roma. 11. Psalme. 35. Yet many things happen well which neuer were had in coun­sell: and though they are practised by naughty meanes, yet the euent and end of them is good. As Atheneus saith of the Athe­nians: whose counsels and iudgments, voide of al prudence and wisedome, fell out very prosperously vnto them: and they o­uercame their enemies, making election of Captaines for the warres, which no man would choose to make readie a banquet. Good counsell (as Artabanus said to King Xerxes) is not to be He [...]odot. lib. 7. lesse valued and estéemed, though it be ouercome by Fortune: wheras contrariwise, though ill counsell haue good successe, yet doth the counsell remaine ill. When Phocion sawe that the matter fell out contrary to that which he had counsailed, he said Erasmus in A­pothek [...]a. that he was hartily glad, that it happened well, but that hys [Page 21] counsell was neuer thelesse very good. Giuing thereby to under­stand, that for a matter to fall out well, is but a chance, but to counsell well, commeth by reason that he who giueth the coun­sell, is endued with iudgment and wisedome.

4 Wise men ought not to trust to the prosperous successe of things: for Fortune often fauoureth (as Valerius Maximꝰ Ple [...]umque om­nium temireta­ti. &c. saith) to hurt thē the more that trust to fortunate euents. The Carthagineans commaunded their Captaines to be hanged, that got the victory without consulting, but punished them not, that Titus Liui [...]s. Lib. 38. In o [...]a [...]. Ma. hauing consulted were ouercome. For they thought that to o­uercome without counsell, was a good turne that God would doo thē, (for as Amianus Marcellinus saith, the euents of things are not in mans power:) and that not to consult, was the neg­ligence and fault of the Captaines. Cleanges the Philosopher compareth them whose busines fal out happily without consul­ting, Seneca de bene­ficiis. lib. 6. Capitulo. 11. vnto a Gentleman that sent two Pages to find out one of his fréends, one of the Pages went to play, and by a chaunce, he, whom he went to looke for, happened to passe by the place where the boy was playing: the other Page went about al day to séeke, and at length returned home without finding of him. Nowe he that did his endeuour to finde out the man, whom his Maister sent him to call, deserued praise, and he that by chance as he plaied, met with the partie, ought to haue béene puni­shed. Tullius in o [...]t. pro Rabit. p [...]sth. & in Epistl. ad Lentul. Boaetius quem citat. Accuitius, in L. sed an vl [...]ra in sine [...].

5 Men commonlie iudge of euery counsaile by the euent of it, and according as it fals out, they account it good or bad. The diuine prouidence (as Boaetius saith) to the greater punish­ment & misery of men, suffereth counsels commonly to be iudg­ed of, according as they spéede, and that the counsels of the pru­dent be not beléeued, as it chanced vnto Achitophel w ^t Abso­lon. These, say the Greekes, are crossed with the destiny of Cas­sandra, in y ^t they be neuer beléeued when they counsell. There be many examples of wise men, who if they had béen beléeued, many publique and priuate harmes and dangers, might haue béen shunned: which because I haue set downe in my booke of craftie and prudent counsails, I meane not to repeat. GOD doth oftentimes permit (as Boaetius saith) that their affayres that doo account themselues very wise, happen quite contrarie to their imagination, to the end that they may vnderstand and [Page 22] know, that all thinges must fall out according to his pleasure. For except the Lord kéepe the Cittie (as the kinglie Prophet saith) the Kéeper watcheth in vaine. And oftentimes humans Psalm. 126. prudence serueth them that thinke themselues to be wise, to no other vse, than to perceiue the miseries and calamities, which they neither can nor know how to remedie, neither when they chance, nor yet before or after they happen: that the mis-for­tunes may haue, (as the prouerbe in Spayne is vsed) Bysperas y octauas.

The sixt discourse, what qualities Counsellers ought to haue.

THE qualities which king Salomon wold haue Counsellers to haue, are these: The first, that Ecclesiast. 18. they should be prudent, not rash and headdie, as following their owne fancie, for such men thinke nothing to be well, but that which they like: and for this cause no man ought to haue conference with an impatient or furious mā about any secrets, no nor yet trust him with anie thing y ^t is secrete, for such a one in giuing counsell, is obstmate, and in secrets, wide-mouthed. To be wise, consisteth in consideration both of things past, and of things to come, and (as Seneca saith) he that is prudent, con­sidereth In libro. 4. Virtut. that which may folow afterward, disposeth that which is present, fore-seeth that which is to come, and remembreth that which is past: and if he forget that which is past, he looseth Aristo. lib. 1. cap. 8. magn. moral. his life: and if he thinke not of that which is to come, he falleth vnawares into many dangers. Therefore Prudence is called Discretio mater est omnium vir­tutum. Aristo. Eth. Libro. 6. the guide and mother of all other vertues: and as ( Aristotle saith, Rectarerum agibilium ratio: that is to say, the straight and ready rule of all things that may be doone. Without her, no man can counsell well, and she is the most excellent & surest path to heauen. Prudence is diuided into fiue parts: which are, Seneca. lib. 9. Epistl. 68. Seneca. lib. 1. Epistol. 86. Prudentia particularis, which concerneth euery particular man. Prudentia Oeconomica, which belongeth to house-keeping. Pru­dentia politica, which pertaineth to the gouernment of Citties and Common-weales. Prudentia quae in ratione regendi est sita, which belongeth to Kings, and to the gouernment of Realmes. [Page 23] And Prudentia militaris, touching warlike policie, as Antoni­nus Anton. in sum. part. 4. tit. cap. 14 the Bishop of Florence declareth. All these kinds of pru­dence, as much as they concerne counselling, consist: First in fore-casting the end of that which is consulted, after that order Iodoc. Clichto­uc' in Introduc. tionc. Iacob. Fabii. in Ethic. Arist. as he that trauaileth, fore-casteth the place whether he is go­ing. Secondlie, in séeking out means, how to attaine to the end of that which is consulted: as a trauailer enquireth the way to the place whether he trauaileth. Thirdly, in choosing out the best, among all the meanes which he findeth: and in picking out that in which there is least danger. As for example, if some King consulted to conclude vpon peace with his enemie, whe­ther it were best to doo it, by rendering of some place or Cittie in his Realme, or by paying money, or by way of marriage: euen as he that trauaileth, when he commeth to a place where be many waies, taketh the best. Fourthly, in considering how to execute the same which is determined in the counsell, with lesse trouble and charges: as he that taketh a iourney in hand, prouideth for that which he shall haue néed of by the way.

2 The second qualitie which King Salomon would haue Ecclesiast. 21. Counsellers for to haue, is that they should be wise: for the counsaile of the wise remaineth for euer, and is like a pure Capitulo. 4. Fountaine of life. Tobias counselleth his sonne, alwaies to de­maund counsell of the wisest: and that with great reason: for no doubt he that will doo all according to his owne liking, and without taking counsell of them that know more than himself, doth goe most astray. And for this cause said king Salomon: My Ecclesiast. 33. Sonne, doo nothing of importance without aduisement, so shall it not repent thee after the déed. That men might vnderstande Claud. Cotor. Lib, 1. cap 2. de disciplin. milit. how necessary it is vnto a Prince to be counselled of wise men, the Poets fained that Iupiter tooke counsel of Prometheus. For they that gouerne Common-wealths, cannot rule them wel, if they take not aduisement with persons, that know and vnder­stande what is conuenient to be doone, for the welfare of the Common-wealth. Howe much men ought to esteeme of that which wise men say, Aristotle sufficiently sheweth, affirming In 6. Ethic. al [...] ­isque in cocis. that we ought not to aske account of the sayings of wise men: for the eyes of their vnderstanding are cleane, pure, and cléere, by reason of their knowledge and learning, and they discerne the truth in euery matter which we cannot sée: for as Eustacius [Page 24] saith, the Sciences take away the rust from the eyes of the soule, the sences and the bodie: as Uineger scoureth the rust from the stéele, being rubbed til it be cleane and shining. Clau­dius Cottereus makes mention of certain Princes that gouer­ned Vbi supra. their Common-wealths well by the counsell of wise men.

3 The third qualitie that a Counseller ought to haue, is age: that he be of ancient yeeres, because olde men haue seene much. The Lawes of Statuts say, that in tract of time, pru­dence, Tit. 3. Lib. 2. in prolo. statut. Politic. Lib. 5. Capitul. 8. In tractatu de constlio & con­siliariis princip. authoritie, and experience of all thinges that are to be doone, is gotten. Aristotle saith, boyes are not able and suffici­ent to giue counsell, because their wit and iudgment beginneth to take force and vigour. Fredericus Furius will haue that the Counsellers of Princes be not vnder thirtie yeeres of age, nor aboue threescore, for from the thirtith yeere downwards, mens vnderstanding is not yet setled, their experience is small, their presumption much, their heate great, their thoughts lostie, their naturall weakenes much, neither can they keepe due grauitie: and besides all this, the people trusteth them not, but murmu­reth against them. Let them lie at Schooles, let them trauaile to see Countries, manners and gouernments, let them learne tongues, let them folow the Campe and haunt the Court, let them take paines in learning: all such thinges are conuenient to be knowne vnto the Counseller of a Prince. Though young men commonly be not endewed with perfect iudgment, and for this cause the Law graunteth them the benefite Derestitutione Ff. de minorib. 25. annis. in integrum: the Lacedemonians would not admit them to sit in publique counsell: neither came they to common places where Courts were kept, and the Senators assembled together: nor Plutarchus in vita Licurgi. yet were they present in the Congregation of the Elders, tyll they were thirtie yeeres old: and what euer they had to doo in such assemblies, they folowed it by their▪ Freendes and Kinse­men. Fredericus Furius denieth not, that many yong men haue better iudgment & cleerer vnderstanding then many olde men, and that the abilitie and wisedome ought more to be regarded then the age. As may be seene by Papirius Praetextatus, vnto whom (being but a youth) it was granted, that he might were the garment, which men of full yeeres did were, and was cal­led Aulus Gellius. Lib. 1. cap. 23 Praetexta or togapraetexta, the Robe which the cheefe Offi­cers and Senators wore. And this honor was doone vnto the [Page 25] youth, because comming with his Father into the Senate, he would not discouer and reueale those matters, that he hearde there discussed.

4 As touching olde men, Fredericus Furius would haue, Vbi supra. that those which are aboue thréescore yéeres of age, should re­turne home vnto their houses, liue in rest & quietnes, discharge their consciences, and thinke how they may die well. He wold also haue, that the Princes should according to the custome of Rome, giue them honors, priuiledges, preferments, prehemi­nences, pensions, and rents, according to euery ones deserts: as vnto them that are discharged from publique affaires, not admitting them to their counsels. For when they be once past the sixtith yere, their memory faileth, their vnderstanding wa­uereth, their experience turneth into stubbornnes and obstina­cie, their naturall heate is but little, and therefore they let oc­casions slip béeing offered, their thoughts be wearied, they can­not trauel, and to conclude, such men are an impediment and charge to the Court. But to returne to the purpose, séeing that the vertue and gift of counselling well, commeth not from age, but from wit, iudgment, and wisedom that euery one hath: we ought not so much to respect the age of men, as their abilitie, which is knowne by their words and déeds. For the words (as our Redéemer and Lord Jesus Christ saith) represent y ^t which Luke. 6. is in the hart. Socrates béeing asked what he thought of a cer­taine Erasmus in A­pothegma. 1. Co [...]nt. 13 man, answered, that after he had hearde him speake, he would tell his minde of him. S. Paule calleth them that speake without iudgment, tingling bels. When Iohn de Mena would praise Don Aluara de luna, high Constable of Castile, he sayde: Tentalo, Tenta lo, ex platica alguna. Try him, try him, with some talke or communication: and that with great reason. For words (saith Aristotle) shew that which is in the minde. And In Libro. [...] [...]. though old men be aboue thréescore yeres of age, yet want they not vnderstanding, & they be more wise then yong men. This Homer sheweth, where he saith: that King Agamemnon wi­shed rather for tenne ancient men as Nestor was, to be his Counsellers at the winning of Troy, then ten yong men like to Achilles. And that Agamemnon said true, it is séene by the most excellent Don Hernando de Toledo, Duke Dalua, who in wisedome & experience of many affaires, supplied the turnes [Page 26] of tenne Nestors, in counselling the great Monarch of Spayne▪ the Catholick king Phillip.

5 We may see how necessarie olde men are to giue coun­sell, by this that y ^e Lawes of Greece ordained: that those should be admitted to be Counsellers that were past fiftie yéeres of age. Solon seeing that the flatterie of Pisistratus, wherwith he abused the people of Athens, was openly discouered and known, to pretende no other thing then to vsurpe the Empire, and to Plutarch num seni gerenda sit Respublica. bring the gouernment of the Common-wealth vnto the rule of one man, onely himselfe: and that no man durst take vppon him to resist and hinder him: he himselfe fetching his weapons out, and laying them in the streete before his doore, called all the Citizens to helpe him. And Pisistratus sending vnto him to know vpō what assurance he durst be so bold to doo such things, he aunswered, vpon olde age: which alwaies is most readie to giue counsaile in matters of waight and importance. For it is frée (as Plato saith) from those affections and passions, which trouble and molest youth. King Agis béeing in Archadia with his Armie, and readio to pitch the field with his enemies, there was an ancient Lacedemonian that cryed out a loude; that he should consider that one sore, was not to be cured by another. Signifying by this, that he might haue gone away from the Argiues and saued himselfe, without putting himselfe to the worst, by that his determined boldnes out of time and season. Agis hearing this, did according to the olde mans words, and altering his minde, went from the Argiues, and afterward o­uerc [...]me them without danger. For this old man, euerie daie they did set a Chayre at the doore of the Senate-house (thys was a custome among them) and many times, the chéefest Se­nators arose and came vnto him, to aske him, and consulte with him about hard and difficult matters of importance.

6▪ That men might vnderstand, that to counsell wel, con­sisteth rather in the vigor of the mind, then in the forces of the bodie: in ancient times past, they painted the Image of Mer­curie in the disposition and forme of an old man, without hands and feete, his members béeing onely stretched out. For force, strength, and those parts that mooue the bodie, are nothing ne­cessary, so that their reason and vnderstanding be fruitfull and fertile. Plutarch by many other examples, prooueth that it is Vbi supra. [Page 27] conuenient for an old man to gouerne, because it is proper vnto Iacobus Gracia­nus in prologo & declaratione omniū Plutar­chi operum Mo­ral. Cicero in Cato­ne Maiore. old men to giue good counsell. It is a common saying in Spayne, Con mal esta, [...]l corral a do boye vieio non corse: with the Oxehouse it goeth ill inough, where the old Oxe doth not cough. Againe, Quādo el perro vieio ladra, a conseia. When the old dog barketh, he counselleth. Againe,

Iob saith, that wisedome is in olde men. And Ecclesiasticus, that wisedome becommeth old men well, and theyr counsails ought to be had in account. Plato counselleth, that olde men of approoued experience, prudence, wisedome, and loue towards their Country▪ shold be chosen to gouerne the Common-welth. In Homer, ancient Nestors speech is praised as the most wor­thiest of all: and Nestor speaking of himselfe, saith:

And the same Homer in his Odissea, praiseth Aegiptius the ancient, because he alwaies spake first, saying this vearse of him.

Euripides in his Tragedies bringeth in Iocasta an ancient Matrone, speaking to her Sonne after this manner.

Seneca saith, that it is the duetie of yong men to obey: and of old men to counsell and commaund. Aristotle affirmeth, that In Menalipe ve­tus hoc dictum est▪ opera quidē juniorum consi­lia autem senio [...]ū vim habert. we ought not to commend the affaires of the Common-wealth to all manner of men, but according to euery ones age and pru­dence. For young men by the law of Nature, haue strength to execute, and olde men wisedome to counsell. Euripides saith: That we ought to commit the execution of matters to young [Page 28] men, and the consultation vnto old men, because it is giuen vn­to Diuus Ambro­sius officiorum. Lib. 2. cap. 2. Seniores consi­lio praeualeu [...], iuniores mini­sterio. Phillippus de la Torre. in Libro. de institutione regis Christiani. 1. Regum. 18. olde men to counsaile well: the houses in which they assem­ble to consult, are in Latine called Senatus, but if young men commonly méete together in them, then they ought not to be called Senatus, but Iuuenatus: as Boaetius saith.

7 Euery Prince ought to consider, that there happened much harme, & great tumults arose among the Isralites, because Roboam their king, leauing the counsell of old and expert men in the gouernment of the Common-wealth, folowed the minds of young and vnskilfull Counsellers. And straight after that o­uer-thwart counsell, followed the seperation of the twelue Tribes, the deuision of the people, the destruction of the Com­mon-wealth of Israell, and contempt of God. Then began I­dolatrie, and the condemnation of the tenne Tribes, for with­drawing themselues from the vnion and true worshipping of the Lord. All these heauie and greeuous harmes befel vnto Is­raell, because the King knewe not what counsels he should choose, and because he would not ioyne with the counsell of the wisest, and most experienced men, which in his dayes and with his owne eyes he saw. On the otherside may we sée and consi­der, how prosperously those kings gouerned, that were guided and ledde by the counsels of wise men, and especially of such as feared God. We may behold how well king Pharao gouerned, Genesis, 14, when Ioseph was with him: and king Saul when he folowed the counsell of Samuel. And the king of Syria when he had Na­aman 1. Regum. 13. 4. Regum. 5. 4. Regum, 12. at his elbow: and Ioas when he did according to Ioyadas his mind: and Nabuchadnezzor when he did as the Prophet Daniell counselled him: and Nehemias, when he did according 2. Esdras, 8. to the counsell of Esdras. Happie are those Common-weales, which God blesseth with such Priests as Esdras, to shewe and teach them, how they ought to serue our Redéemer and Lorde Jesus Christ: and vpon which he bestoweth such Princes as Nehemias, to bind those that are committed to his charge, to do 2 [...]sdras, 5. according to Gods commaundements: and ioyntly of his owne liberallitie, to succor and reléeue the people that is afflicted, de­stroied, and impouerished, through warre, pestilence & famine, Luke. 10. Nicolaus de Lo­ra in caput. 10. Lucae. ioyning mercy with iustice, as our Lord and Sauiour Jesus Christ teacheth in the Parable of the Samaritane, that cured him that was hurt, with Oyle and Wine: signifying mercy [Page 29] by the Oyle, and iustice by the Wine.

8 The fourth qualitie which King Salomon would haue a Ecclesiast. 30. Counseller to haue, is, that when he counselleth he should not be sorrowfull: for a troubled and greeued minde, drieth the bones (as king Salomon saith) and therefore much more the Prouerb, 17. flesh, and the blood. And a mans mind béeing vexed with gréefe, is obfuscated and darkned with the passions which he suffereth, so that he cannot vnderstande and iudge well of that which is counselled. The people of Parthia, to shunne this inconueni­ence, did consult of that they had to doo, in banquets. For sor­row bindeth mans vnderstanding, and for this cause this is v­sed in Spayne for a common prouerbe: Mal se cura de suentura contristura: that is, sorrow cannot launce away our mischance. For after that some mis-fortune is happened, all the sorrowe that a man can haue will not remedie it.

9 The fift qualitie is, that the counsell ought to be well Prouerb, 11. thought of, and as it is said, vpon the pillow. For that counsell Seneca in Libro de benefi. velox consilium sequi­tur paenitentia. which is not well tossed and tumbled in our minde, bringeth re­pentance with it: for the more matters are considered & way­ed, the better they be vnderstood: and both haste and anger, are contrarie to deliberation and consultation. And therefore it is Secundae curae sapientiores. Nouerca consilij praecipitatio. Lib. 22. Festina­tio improuida est. & caeca. said, that haste is a Mother in lawe vnto counsell. Titus Liui­us termeth hastines, blind and without prouidence. The natu­rall Philosophers say, that dogges be borne blinde, because the damme maketh haste to whelpe them. It falleth out somtimes that men aske counsell of their freendes, concerning matters which require such speed, that it lieth vpon their liues, credite, Canis festinans caecos parit ca­tulos Erasmus in Adagijs. Anton. de Gue­uara. in Episto. and substance, yea and their conscience also, to haue some coun­sell or other: and that the freend of whom counsell is demaun­ded, ought without any delay at all, so readily shew his minde what he thinketh ought to be doone in this case, as if he founde it readie in the holy Scripture. King Salomon counsaileth vs, to let our eyes behold the right, and let our eye lids direct our Prouer. 4, 25 way before vs: and so shall we not goe vnaduisedly about that which we doo, before we haue consulted and deliberated vpon In lib. cui titul▪ Dux itinerant. it. And vnto this (as the reuerend Father Ludouicus Grana­tensis saith) fiue things are necessarilie required. First, to com­mit all matters vnto our Lord and Sauiour Christ Jesus. Se­condlie, to perpend them with great attention and discretion, [Page 30] not onely marking the substance of the matter, but also conside­ring all the circumstances that belong vnto it. For if onely one thing be wanting, that one thing is sufficient to marre all: and though it be throughly pondered, fully concluded, and altoge­ther perfect: yet onely the dooing of it out of time, is inough to make a foule blemish in it. Thirdly, to take counsell. For those things that are doone without counsell, very seld [...]me haue good successe: also to talke and conferre with others about it, but not with manie, onely with such as be of sufficient wisedom and ex­perience. For though it be profitable to heare the opinion and mindes of manie, to knowe the matter throughly: yet it ought to be committed but to sewe, and those very select and chosen men, to be determined and concluded. For if there were too manie, they might easily erre by reason of the diuersitie of opi­nions. Fourthly, to take time in deliberating vpon the matter, and let the counsaile ripen a few daies. For as by continuance of time we are better acquainted with mens manners, so are we also with counsels and determinations: and that which at the beginning liked vs very well, afterward beeing well consi­dered, is altogether misliked. Fiftly and lastlie, to take heede of foure Mothers in Lawe which the vertue Prudence hath. Which are, ouermuch rashnes, affection, obstinacie or stifnes in opinion, and shewe of vanitie: for ouermuch rashnes blin­deth: obstinacie, shutteth the doore against good counsaile: and shew of vanitie, doth soyle and spotte each thing that commeth neere it. Franciscus de Vallalobos saith, that into the Chamber In problemat. of mans vnderstanding, foure perturbations enter to counsail. First Pride, which sheweth and presenteth matters of honor. Then Couetousnes, which doth fore-cast what may be gotten by the victory, and what profit may be reap [...]d thereby. After­ward Anger and hatred. And by reason of the opinions and thoughts of these foure perturbations, reason is not heard, and if it be heard, yet it is not beléeued.

10 The sixth qualitie which king Salomon would haue [...]ouerb. 12. Counsellers to haue, is, that they ought not to be wicked and vicious: for the counsels of the wicked are full of deceite. And séeing that the holy Ghost dooth lighten the vnderstanding of men in their counsels, it is a thing to be beléeued, that he assi­steth and helpeth vertuous and good men, shewing them what [Page 31] they ought to doo. Counsellers (saith S. Ambrose) to be men Lib. 2. capit, 2. de officijs. of such doctrine and life, that they might be an example to all them that take counsell of them: for so, they may haue autho­ritie and credite in the Common-wealth, and their life & man­ners will agrée with the counsels which they giue. For no man will take the water which he meaneth to drinke, out of an vn­cleane vessell. And hardly can he giue good counsell to others, that taketh none for himselfe: and whereas he might be ver­tuous and honest, he is vicious and wicked.

11 The seuenth qualitie that a Counseller ought to haue, Ecclesiast. 8. Prouerb. 27. is, that he be no Stranger but a Friende, and one that is well known. Alcibiades, willing to know who was his freend, that Polienus libro 1. stratage. he might confer with him about his affaires, caused an Image to be made of stone, or some other thing, and set it in his cham­ber: but it was made in such order, that one wold haue thought it had beene some dead bodie. And then he called vnto him those that professed themselues to be his Friends, and told them each one a part in secrecie, that he had killed a man, and that he had him at home in his house, and bringing them vnto the Cham­ber where the Image was, he shewed it vnto them, requesting them to fauour him so much, as to take away the dead body and to hide it in their houses: that if he had béene suspected for kil­ling of the man, and the Officers had come to make search for the dead bodie, it might not be found in his house: but they all excused themselues, and refused to do that which Alcibiades re­quested of them▪ fearing least if the dead bodie had béen founde in their houses, they should haue béene brought in trouble, as accessaries in that offence vnto Alcibiades. Onely Callias said vnto him, that he would take the dead body, and kéepe it secret­lie in some part of his house, and that for his sake, he would ad­uenture what danger soeuer. And from that time forward, Al­cibiades tooke Callias for a right true Friende, and said vnto him, that the same which he thought to be a deade bodie, was but an Image which he had commaunded to be made to try his friends. In aduersitie, a man may easily know who be his true and loyall friends. Iulius Caesar said, that a mans friends be­come Libro. [...]. enemies, if Fortune pursue him. And Iustine said, that where Fortune doth fauour, there men doe fancie.

12 The eight qualitie that a Counseller ought to haue, is, [Page 32] to be faithfull in counselling, & not to counsell any thing which Ecclesiast. 27 is not good. Fredericus Furius saith, that a Prince may learn Fredericus Furi▪ vb [...] supra. Erasm. in Pane­gir, ad Phil. Reg. whether y ^t his Counsellers be faithfull or no, if he faine to aske counsell in things that are quite contrarie to the welfare of the Common-wealth, saying that though they were such, yet for certain causes it concerned his person to haue them put in prac­tise. As for example: if he would haue them to break some im­portant Lawe, or to weaken and diminish the libertie of some Priuiledge: or to ordain some excessiue tributs or toles, or som such other like things. And by their answer and determination, may he in some sort gather howe they be affected towardes the Common-wealth. The Emperour Constantine, desirous to know whether his Noble men and Counsellers were faithfull, Tripe [...]tit. libro 1. cap. 7. he published, that all those that wold leaue the Christian faith, and turne againe to the worshipping of Idoles, they might frée­lie doo it, and that he would neuerthelesse maintain them in his Court, and make account of them, as of his freends. Heerupon, some of them did forsake the faith of our Redéemer, and Lorde Jesus Christ, and of Christians became Idolators: which the Emperour Constantine perceiuing, would not any longer suf­fer them to remaine in his Court that turned from the Christi­an Tullius. lib. 2. de officijs. Paulus [...]ouius Libro, 43. faith, saying: That sith they were not faithfull vnto God, much lesse they would prooue faithful vnto him. Paul the third, Pope, vsed the same diligence, to knowe the affection and incli­nation of men, & many times proposed matters vnto his Car­dinals, (no necessity at all vrging him vnto it) which might of­fer them occasion to striue and contend in opinions, and wylled them to tell him theyr mindes, and by their alteration, learned what answer he should giue to the Embassadors that were sent vnto him from other Countreyes.

13 There are many other pollicies, whereby a Prince Frederie▪ Furius vbi supra. Erasm. in Pane­gir, ad Phil. Reg. may know whether his Counsellers respect theyr priuat com­moditie more, then the welfare of the Common-wealth: for if there be any that be hypocrites and couetous persons: if there be any that say all is the Kings, and that the King may doo hys will and pleasure, or that the King may ordaine as many toles and tributes as he will, or that the King cannot doo amisse, or that all which the King will haue is a Lawe, and ought to be kept as a Law, or that a King is not bounde to giue account of [Page 33] that which he commaundeth: all such Coūsellers are enemies to the welfare of the Common-wealth, for the King neither ought, nor may doo any thing, that may doo the Common-welth any notable harme. No Prince yet euen vntil this present day, attained to great forces, and defended himselfe there withall, but through meanes of men, that estéemed more the publique profit then their own priuat commoditie. And contrariwise, when-soeuer it shall happen that the Princes be counselled of those, that little regard the welfare of the Common-wealth, so they loose nothing themselues: euen at that time shall y ^e Prin­ces begin to decay, and nothing shall be brought to effect, that may redound to the welfare and profit of the Common-welth. After that Solon had determined to moderate the debts which Plutarch in vita Solon. the Cittie was owing, and to bring in an equalitie, which was a certaine diminution of the debts, and publique acquittaunce which was giuen to the Cittie, that no man might come and aske that which was owing them there: he communicated his intent with some of his néere fréends. They hearing of it, pre­sently tooke vp great summes of money, and indebted th [...]selues before the Law was proclaimed: and within a little while af­ter that the Lawe was published, they had bought them great houses, and purchased large possessions with that mony which they had borrowed.

14 The ninth qualitie, that King Salomon saith a Coun­seller Prouerb, 1. ought to haue, is, to keepe close and secret that which is consulted, and not to disclose or open it vnto any man. Seneca saith, that a Counseller ought to talke much with himselfe, but very little with others: for in speaking much with others, he incurreth daunger to disclose that which is in secrete. There is nothing that destroieth and spoileth all publique and priuat af­fayres more▪ then to haue that known, which is consulted and In 4. par. in ser­mon. ad r [...]gem. Franciae, consi­deratione, 2. determined in the Counsel. Iohn Gerson saith, that in his time all the Kings affaires went to wrack, because some vile & base persons that serued the King, published all whatsoeuer was de­termined in his counsell. The very same befell vnto Henrie King of Portugall, vnto whō (because he was somwhat deafe, and could not heare very well) his Counsellers were fayne to speake very loude: in so much that euery one knew what was saide vnto him, this is very dangerous and hurtfull to the [Page 34] Common-welth. For to be deliuered from dangers and aduer­sities, which many times happen to chaunce in publique mat­ters: Valerius maxim de institut. antiq. it is very necessary to kéepe the same close & secret, which is consulted, as the Romaines did.

15 The Signorie of Ʋenice, in their counsell vse great se­cricie, wherby they haue magnificently augmented & maintai­ned their estate, and brought it to that perfection and great­nes as all men knowe. And cheefly, because they admit not a­ny Garimbertus problem. 117. base men of the Comminaltie into their counsell. And the Noble men are so bridled, that they cannot possible exercise a­ny tyrannie vpon the Common-wealth: and all men doo theyr endeuour to procure the publique commoditie. The great secre­cie that is vsed among the Ʋenecians, may cléerely be seene, in that they being informed, that Carmignola their general Cap­taine Bartol. discuss. S. Petrꝰ Iustinia. in histor▪ venet. discharged not his Office according to his duetie, deter­mined to sende for him, as if they would haue communicated with him about certaine affaires touching the warre at that time: that after he was come, they might haue executed due punishment on him, according to that he had deserued. Thys thing béeing concluded amongst them, and determined in the Senate: was kept secrete eyght moneths long, whereas not­withstanding, there were two hundred persons present at the conclusion of the same matter. And though that Captaine had many friendes in Venice that fauoured him: yet was not thys counsell disclosed in all that space. But Carmignola at y ^t length came to Venice, and was most honourablie receiued. But when he had béene presented to the Senate, they ledde him fainedlie to a certaine place, as if he should haue there rested, where bee­ing come, he remained prisoner, & after thirtie daies (in which space they consulted vpon his cause) they commaunded him to be beheaded with a gag in his mouth. Paulus Iouius saith, that they condemned him, to confiscate and seise, as forfaite vnto them, three hundreth thousande Duckets which he had: as I wrote more at large, in my Booke of the Office and duetie of the Captaine Generall. But to turne backe to our latter pur­pose. Because there be many (as I said) that when they see the Counsellers assembled together, beginne to imagine what it might be that they consult of, and many times they coniecture what the Counsellers goe about to determine: in Venice it was [Page 35] ordained, that they which were of the Counsell, should vppon certaine daies euery month, méete together in the Chamber of Lect [...]us Bemb [...]s in histor, venet. Counsell: but the day and howre of their assembly, should not be limitted or set downe, and that though there were no mat­ters to consult of, yet they should spend the time (at which the Counsellers are wont to be there) in matters concerning the Common-wealth, and by this they procured, that the Common people did not any more enquire, why they assembled together. The Ʋenetians in this, and many other policies concerning the Contarenus de repub▪ veneto [...]ū. gouernment of their Common-wealth, did imitate the Lacedae­monians, who when they gathered themselues together, to con­sult vpon matters which belonged to the Common-wealth, if Plutarchus in vita Licurgj. it happened so, that they had no publique affaires to imploy themselues in: then they spent the time in praising the good sayings, and worthie déedes of the Cittizens, exhorting and en­couraging them, still to continue in laudable exercises, and in rebuking and blaming the vices of others. The Signorie of Quomodo ve­net [...] suffragia fe­ [...]ant in eligendis magistrat [...]bus prosequitur po­st [...]llus. Ʋenice, ordained also, that those who gaue their voices in elec­tion, should cast them in a boxe that had a partition in the mid­dle, which was so couered, that no man could perceiue in which place of the boxe the voices were cast, because they would not haue any one to know, to whom they gaue their voices in elec­tion of Officers.

16 Plutarch asketh why Pythagoras did forbid, that any In opusculo de notis Pythag. man should kéepe Swallowes in his house: and he answereth, because they be very vnthankfull byrdes, and will not become tame, howe much soeuer a man maketh of them. But Pi [...]rius Libro 2. Hyero­gliphic. Valerius saith, because they bring no profit at all vnto those houses in which they build their nests. And the Author Ad He­rennium Dum fueris fae­lix multos nube­ [...]abis amicos. affirmeth, because after the same order as fayned and false Friends in time of aduersitie, forsake them, whose fréends they professed themselues to be in time of prosperitie: so the Swallowes come in the beginning of the Sommer, & as soone as the Winter draweth on, they leaue vs, and flie vnto other Countreyes. But I thinke that the same which Pythagoras said, may be vnderstood as Aristotle tooke it: because it is good for no man to haue talkitiue persons in his house. Many other examples could I shew both of men and women, that smothe­red in silence, such things as were committed to their secrecie: [Page 36] but because they be knowne vnto all men, and I haue set them down in the Booke which I wrote of wise and craftie counsels, I will not heare stand vpon them.

17 The tenth qualitie which king Salomon would haue Ecclesiast. 37 a Counseller to haue, is, that he be not enuious, or owe any man ill will: for how is it possible that he shold giue good coun­sell to a man, whom he hateth and cannot abide? Of the enui­ous, this prouerbe in Spayne is vsed:

for the conuersation of the enuious is so contagious and infecti­ous, that the Spanyards vsed this old saying,

And to be bréefe, hatred is a vice that came foorth of hell, and it was the cause wherefore the deuill deceiued Adam and Eue, Gen. 3. de fruc­tu ligni. councelling them to eate of the fruite of that Trée, which God forbad them to touch. King Salomon saith, that we ought to choose one Counseller out of a thousand: he would haue only to Ecclesiast, 6. take counsell but of one man, for that among a thousande wee should choose one. For that is farre better vnderstood, which is Gloss. in libro. 1. de legat. 3. enquired of by many, then by a few: and in déede it is thought, that foure are many.

It lyeth and dependeth vpon euery Prince his pleasure, to Elius Lampridiꝰ in vita Alexan. Se [...]er. imper. haue more or fewer Counsellers. The Emperour Alexander Seuerus, (as we haue said) before he published or proclaimed a­ny Lawes, which he had ordained to be kept, he deliuered them to twenty most learned Lawyers, and fifty most excellent men, to consult of them. This cannot in any case be denied, that it is safer to consult with a great many, then with a few: for (as A­ristotle saith) when many gather together, (if they be not rude and grosse felowes) the one doth confer with the other, and that Polit 3. & Eth. [...]tiam saepe. which one knoweth, is ioyned with that which the other know­eth. For GOD did put a light in euery mans vnderstanding, whereby he might know the trueth. Psalm. 4.

The seauenth discourse, of the Priuiledges, prerogatiues, and exemptions, which the Law and right doth graunt to the Counsellers of Princes.

SEeing that the counsels procéede (as we haue said) from the holy Ghost, not onely the coun­sels, In Theage. dici­tur, consultorum [...]em esse sacrum. but also the Counsellers (as Plato saith) are an holy thing. Plato termeth Counsellers an holy thing, because if they counsell well, they be ministers of God: who (as the Pro­phet Cap. 9. Plin▪ li, [...], cap, 7. Matth. 5. Esay saith) is a meruailous counsell, and in giuing good counsell, they imitate God, who doth good vnto all men. For [Page 58] good counsell profiteth the partie much vnto whom it is giuen, and it hurteth him nought at all that giueth it. Ignoraunt and vnskilfull persons say, Giue vs money, kéepe your counsaile to your selfe. But they that so say, perceiue not (as S. Ambrose Lib. 2. cap. 2. de Officijs. affirmeth) that money is spent and consumed, wheras counsell lasteth for euer: and that money, the more it is giuen, and a­mong the more persons it is distributed, the lesse he hath that giueth it: but counsels, the more they be giuen and communi­cated, the more good doo they do, both vnto him that counselleth, and vnto them also that take aduice: and lastlie, that a little wise and faithfull counsell in matters of importance, ought to be bought (as Demosthenes saith) with a great summe of mo­ney. In Olynthiaca. 1, If they that counsell well, be ministers of God, no doubt the Counsellers of Princes (who regard the welfare of y ^e Com­mon Cicero in som. Scip. wealth) doe one of the most notable seruices vnto GOD, that men in this life can doo, and therefore dooth God rewarde Cap. bon. 2. q. 2. them that giue good counsell, both in this life, and in the life to come.

1 The Counsellers of Princes (whom the Lawes call Si­lentiarij, 1. Priuilegium. Titulus de silen­tiarijs & de curi­onibus. lib. 12. codicis. Cagnolus in L. diom functo ff. de officio asses­soris, n. 16. either because the Princes communicate their secrets vnto them, or because they ought to conceale that which theyr Princes trust them withal) enioy those Priuiledges which the Law granteth to the assistants of Magistrates who shew them what they ought to doo for to iudge well, and are called Asses­sores.

2 They doo also enioy those Priuiledges, which the Lawe graunteth to Rulers of Townes and Citties, which in Latine 2. Priuilegium. Martinus Laudē. in tractatu de cōsilia [...]ijs prin­cipum. Martinꝰ Gronin. in Epist. ad max­imilianū. Quod si hoc [...]decurio­nibus, idest con­filiari [...]s ciuitatū st [...]t [...]i [...]ur, quanto magi [...] sibilo cū in so [...]ni prin­cipis consiliario vindi [...]abit. are called Decuriones; who be the Counsellers, Aldermen, and Senators that rule and gouerne them: and that stands vppon great reason. For it is a thing more important to the Common­wealth, to giue the Prince good counsel (who is the head of the Common-wealth) then to rule and gouerne some Cittie well: for they that counsel the Prince, haue a care of the profit of the whole Common-welth, and of all those that liue in the same, but they that beare rule ouer some Towne or Cittie, regard no other thing than the commoditie of the same place which they gouerne. By reason of the necessity that Princes haue of coun­sell in all matters concerning the Common-wealth, the lawes graunt many Priuiledges and exemptions to all Counsellers [Page 59] of Princes: to the end the Common-wealth might be wel go­uerned by their counsell, as well in time of peace as of warre. Libr. 1. officio. For little (as Tullie saith) profit Armes, if they vnto whom the gouernment of the Common-wealth is committed, consult not what ought to be doone.

3 The Counsellers of Princes, are in great honor and dig­nitie, 3. P [...]iuilegium. Cagnolus, vbi supra. n. 17. 4. Priuilegium. L. Quisquis co­dic. ad legē. Iu­lian, [...]ecius tam [...] L. 1. n. 15. ff. de officio eius, ne­gat. Petrus vero Cal [...]actus, ind. L. 1. n. 35. dicit procedere dictā legem, quisquis & in consilia [...]ijs supremi consilij. 5. Priuilegium. 6 Priuilegium. Filius Famil. In­stitu. quot (que) mo­dis ius patrae po­testatis soluatur. & Iohan. Mo­nactus in cap v­nic. de scis. Li. 6. L. 3. ff. de adop­tionibꝰ. L. honor 9. Plebei, ff. de inumeri. &c. L. 1. cod. de conl [...]li. et nouella const. iust [...]iani. 81. L. Ius senatorum cod. de dignita­tibus Libro. 11. et in. L. 1. cod. de prepas. labo­rum, Lib, 1, 2, though they haue no iurisdiction which ministreth any dignitie vnto them.

4 They be noble, & enioy those Priuiledges which be gran­ted vnto Noble personages: which are, to defende and pleade for themselues in criminall causes, by a Proctor or Solicitour: and also to commaund the sentences which they doo giue, to be recited by others.

5 The Coūsellers of Princes be Patritij, and Senators, and they be exemted a patria potestate; but not because they be Pa­tritij, or Senators, but by reason of the Office which they bear.

6 And those Sonnes that be Counsellers of Princes, By­shops, chéefe Officers, Presidents of some Chauncerie, or Ge­nerals of some Armie, though they be exempte á patria potesta­te because of their Office, yet they enioy those rights and Pri­uiledges which appertaine vnto those that are as yet sub patria potestate.

The Prince is placed in the number of his Counsellers, and they be as members of the Prince (who is the head of the Common-welth) and ( Gigas de cri­mine lesae maie­statis, Libro, 1. Capit, 14, L. quisquis cod. ad L. Iulian. L, 6. 1. de institutione principis. as Dion saith) the Counsellers be the eyes and eares with which the Prince doth sée and heare. And for this cause ought euery Prince to take good héede, and to en­quire and examine very diligently, what men he maketh choise of to be his Counsellers: and they ought not to admit any one vnto their counsel, that hath no wit or iudgment: for this were also (as we haue before said of base & common persons) to take the eyes from the head, & place them in the féete, as the snake, &c. Furthermore, a Prince ought not to admit any Idiots and vnlearned men, who know not how a Common-wealth ought to be gouerned, vnto the Counsel: for this were no lesse to take the eyes out of the head, and place them in the féete then the o­ther. And the Counsellers of Princes, séeing they be the eies of the Common-wealth, ought to procure the publique benefit of [Page 60] the same, and loue those that liue in it, as their owne naturall sonnes and bretheren.

7 The Ciuill Lawes ordaine, that the Counsellers of Prin­ces 7 P [...]iuilegium L. defens. cap. de defensorib. ciuit. shall be guarded, and had in great account of euery one, to the ende that no iniurie may be offered vnto them: for other­wise, they dare not to shew their mindes fréely, & counsell that which they déeme to be most profitable for the Common-welth.

8 They that kill Counsellers of Princes, yea they that but 8 Priuilegium intend to slea them, though they kill them not, committe high treason against the maiestie of the Prince, and their goods are Gigas vbi supra lib, 1, cap, 4, Boetius in addit. ad tractatum de authoritate mag [...] consilij, n, 2. Grauit, consi. 6. n, 79. Gigas vbi supra, n, 9. 9 Priuilegium L. seueram, cod, de dignit. Martin, Laud. in tractat, de consi. principum. 10 Priuilegium. Martin Laud. v­bi supra, q. 24. 11 Priuilegium. L. 1. & ibidem Bald. ff. de colleg. illicit, Martin. Laud. vbi su. q. 18 12 Priuilegium. Guido Papa. dis. 37 per, L. can. cod, de excusat, muner, lib, 10. confiscate. And this is to be vnderstood if they kill them for some cause pertaining to their O [...]ce, for if they kill them vpon some other priuate grudge, they commit no treason: but in the king­dome of Naples, they commit high treason vpon what occasion soeuer they kill them. And this Law was ordained by the La­die Iane, Quéene of Naples, because one of her Counsell called Andreas de Isernia was slaine.

9 The Counsellers of Princes may not be put to any tor­ment, but the Councellers of Citties, are commonly racked, and otherwise tormented.

10 The Counsellers of the Prince, may not procure any Office out of the Court, without the Prince his leaue.

11 If the Colledge of y ^• Prince his Counsellers be dissolued, the goods which the Colledge hath, are to be giuen to the Coun­sellers: and this is vnderstood, of those goods that are giuen by them that founded y ^• Colledge, and not of those which the Col­ledge had of the Prince: for such goods, (the Colledge beeing broke vppe) returne againe to the Prince who gaue them.

12 If the Counsellers of the Prince giue ouer their Office, either because the Prince doth licence them to doo it, or because he chooseth other Counsellers in their stéede, yet whilst they liue, they doo not loose their Priuiledges, exemptions and prero­gatiues which the Lawe graunteth to Counsellers of Princes. This Priuiledge is graunted vnto them by reason of their dig­nitie, and Office which they haue borne: for which cause ma­ny things are permitted in Law. But if the Prince expel them out of his counsell, because they be vicious and wicked, not con­tent with such rewards and pensions which are allowed them, but augmenting their stipend by bryberie and other vnlawfull [Page 61] meanes, and so (as Iohannes Andreas a famous Lawyer coun­selleth) be put beside their Office, that the Prince may make In cap, quanto jure jurando. choise of vertuous, iust, and vpright men, which will regarde the publique commoditie more then they, then they that are so put out of theyr Office, enioy not any of the Priuiledges or ox­emptions, which the Law graunteth vnto the Counsellers of Princes.

13 The Counsellers of Princes are not bound to bring that 13 Priuilegium. Martin, Laud. v­bi sup. q, 22. money (wherewith their Fathers bought them that dignitie) in account, at the distribution of the Childrens portions: for that mony which was giuen for their Office, is of the same na­ture as goods gotten in war, termed Bonacastrentia, which are not reckened (as the Lawyers say) In legitima, that is, as part of the Childes portion.

14 If any Counseller die without an heire, his goods shal not 14 Priuilegium Doctores in li. 1, cod, vnde vir & vxor. Martin, Laud, v­bi supra, q, 5, 15 Priuilegium. Bartol. ind, L, 2, per seg. Si quis presbiter, cod, de Epis, & cler. L, 1, cod, in col. li, 10, Martin Laud, vb, su. q, 28. L. Si quis decur. cod, decurionibꝰ Lib, 10. L, hac leg, vers, vt qui liberam, cod, de prox, li, 11, vt qui liberam profi­ciscendi licentiā, pronunciatione commeactus a­dopti fuerint, si­ne qualibet sti­peudiorum aut emolumentorū de ductione peregre degerit. L, Reipub, ff, ex quibus ausis m [...]res, Reip. causa abesse cos intelligimus, qui non sui commodi causa sed coacti ab sunt. accrew fisco, that is, vnto the Kings Treasurie, but vnto the Colledge of the Counsellers: and not onely the Colledge, but also the Counsellers wiues exclude the Kings Treasurie.

15 Although Counsellers ordinarily may not renownce the habitation of their birth, yet the Counsellers of Princes may, because they haue their house and abiding place in the Courte, neither may they depart thence without they get leaue of the Prince. And if so be they doo leaue the Court, without licence from the Prince, then ought they to be rebuked, and the sti­pend to be paid vnto them, is to be kept backe for the time that they be, or haue béen so absent. For he cannot be said: to be from the Court in the behalfe of the Common-welth, who is not sent by the Prince, but departeth without leaue▪ This (as Iohn Igneus In lib. 3 9, de his. n, 24. ff. de Senatꝰ consul, Silhan. 16, Priuilegium. saith) belongeth to the honistie of a Counseller, and seruire of the Prince, not to depart. from the Court, or cease to counsell the Prince, according as in duety he is bound to doo.

16 If the Prince cōmaund any thing centrary to that which the Law ordaineth, his Counsellers are not bounde to put the same in execution, and they ought to let the Prince vnderstand why they obey not his commaund. The Ciuill Lawes ordaine L. vindicarj. cod, de penis, c. apud [...]h [...]ssal. 11, q, 3, that the Prince his seruants and ministers; shall not execute any thing which their Prince willeth thē to do, if it be contrary [Page 62] to Law and iustice, and that they shal let thirtie daies passe be­fore they goe in hand with the execution of it: that in the mean time, the Prince his anger or passion may cease, which mooued him to enioyne that which was vniust. For all delaying, all lingring, and all prolonging of time, which is doone to saue a mans life, cannot thoose but be good, as Iuuenall saith: Iu [...]enalis.

Nulla vnquam de morte hominis cunctatio sera est.

Athenodorus the Philosopher, counselled Augustus Caesar, Erasm, in Apoth, that he should neuer say nor doo any thing when he was angry, vnlesse he had first rehearsed the Gréeke Alphabet, α. β. γ. &c. King Erasm. in pane­gyrico ad regem Phil: et Gigas de crimine lesae maiest: in titulo qualiter in cri­mine lesae mai [...]statis, proceda­ [...]ur, q, 16, n. 16. Antiochus wrote vnto all the Citties of his kingdom, that they should not execute any of his commaunds, which were against the right of the Lawes, so they did make him acquainted why they delaied the execution therof. I his which we say of Coun­sellers of Princes, that they be not bounde to put any of theyr Prince his Commissions in practise, if they agrée not with the sence of the Law, taketh place, except (as some Doctors write) this clause Motu proprio be added thereunto: for that séemeth Gigas vbi supra q, 16, n, 16 to be as forcible, as if he should commaunde it againe. Neuer­thelesse, because these clauses, Motu proprio, de certa scientia, & plennitudine potestatis, are so ordinarily, and that without the Princes commaund, specified and set downe in all rescripts and Letters of Princes: they prooue not that it is the Princes will and pleasure, that that thing should be executed, which is repugnant to the Law, especiallie if it [...]end to the hurt of some other. For such clauses are to be vnderstoode, according to that which the Lawes dispose and ordeine. And though such [...] [...]ses are of as great vertue, as if the Prince should iterate his for­mer commaund: yet are they not sufficient to prooue, that the Prince at y ^e writing of those his Letters was not (as it might haue béene) angrie, or troubled with some other affection, or L. digna vox, cod. de legibus. mooued with some passion, or ill informed. For it is supposed and thought, that it is the Princes will & pleasure, that lawes should be duely obserued and executed. And for this cause, if a Bald▪ in lege ad dictos, cod, de Episco. audi. Cap, resist, 11, q, 2 da veniā ò im­perator, tu car­cerem ille Gehē ­nam minatur. Tulli [...]ib, Episto­larum vlt, Epist. T [...]bi persuade praeter culpam, et peccatū homi­ni nihil auidere posse, quod sit horribile aut pertimessendū. 17. Priuilegium L, final cod, de rescin, vendit. Mart. laud. vbi supra, q, 4. L, principal ff, si certum petatur. In verrem acti, 6. L, 7. c. 7. cōmen­ta: juris cibilis. D. L. principali. L, non licet ff. de contrahe. Epist. & L, 1, cod, de contract, Indi. Prince commaund or will any thing to be doone which is noto­riouslie vniust, or against Gods commaundements, his Coun­sellers ought not to obey him, nor conceale that which he wil­leth, answering him as the Christian Souldiers did Iulius A­postata, when he commaunded them to doo a thing that was [Page 63] contrarie to Gods commandements: Lord, your maiestie may commaund vs to prison, but our Sauiour & Lord Jesus Christ, whom we serue, will sende vs to hell if in this we fulfill your pleasure.

17 The Counsellers of Princes, may not buy any clothes, golde, siluer, or bond-men that belong to the Prince his Sub­iects. This (as Baldus & the Doctors say) holds in those Coun­sellers of Princes that gouerne and rule Citties. For it is sup­posed, that by reason of the Office which they beare, they will not giue as much as the things are worth: and (as Tullie saith) they had rather take them without paying for them, thē to buy them. Franciscus Conomus affirmeth, that the Lawe which forbiddeth to buy gold, siluer, clothes or bond-men, toucheth not those Officers and Magistrates, whom the Ciuill Lawes for­bid to buy any thing in the Prouinces which they gouerne, for these haue a greater punishment appointed them, and the Law which we speake of, doth onely require, that the price which was paid for things bought, shold be giuen to the kings Trea­sure: and because he for whose cause the Lawe was made and ordained, had charge of certaine particular things of y ^e Prince, (as we may gather by the Title and superscription of the same Lawe,) and because it forbiddeth to buy clothes, golde, siluer or bond-men, it speaketh of thinges particular belonging to the Ind. L. final. vbi. á priuatis nostrisea contige [...]it ve­nundare. Prince. So that vnderstanding that which the Law ordaineth after this manner, it holdeth not in those which gouerne any prouinces, but in those that accompany them: and it holdeth in all the Palatines or Courtiers, whither they dwel within the Princes Pallace, or whither they attend vpon him onely. Al­ciatus In L. serinis cod. de palatin. sacr. largitionū li. 12. saith, that those which dwell within the Prince his Pal­lace, be called Comitatenses, & Palatinj: (for those be the Cour­tiers that accompanie the Prince) and they that goe to rule or gouerne some place, are called Mittendarijs. According to that which Alciat affirmeth: that which the Law ordaineth, holds in those Courtiers that dwell in the Princes Pallace, and at­tende vpon him. And béeing so that the Lawe was written of those that dwelled within the Princes Pallace, the Law is to be vnderstood, of those Courtiers which dwel within the Court, and not of al other Courtiers: for it is thought, that those that dwel within the Kings Pallace, wil buy such things as belong [Page 64] to the Prince, for a lesser price then they be worth. The Lawe may also be vnderstoode, of those which buy things, which espe­cially belong to the Prince himselfe, and not of those which buy things that appertaine to Fisco, that is, to his Treasurie. If it be so that the Prince haue his wealth seperated from the goods of the Treasurie, as the Emperors of Rome had in times past. The substance of the Emperour was termed Aerarium, and L, 1. 9. hoc inter dictum ib [...]res e­nim fiscales quasi propriae & priuatae prin­cipis sunt, ff, nc­qaid in loco publico. L, ibid, habitis, bostis cod, de fi­dej i [...]stru. the Common-wealths substance was called Fiscus. But after that the Emperours tooke the goods of the Common-wealth to themselues, the same which was disposed of the Emperours goods doth also holde in the goods that belong to the Common­wealth, and that the goods of the. Treasurie may be sold, if they be brought to a publique place where they may be bought. For béeing solde after this manner, euery one may without danger of the Lawe buy thereof.

18 The Counsellers of Princes, may licence any one, wil­ling 18 Priuilegium to build in publique place, for to doo it. And this is vnder­stoode, of those Counsellers that are present in the counsaile of rewards [...] for this béeing one of the speciall rewardes that the Prince giueth, it appertaineth vnto no other Counsell.

19 The whole yéeres wages or stipende, is due vnto the 19 Priuilegium Cagnolus in L, diem functo. n. 17, ff, de officio assesso. Rebufus in con­cordam, in titu­lo de electione egregj aduocat. 20 Priuilegium Martin, Laud. vbi sup. q, 3, Cagno. & Mai­nerius in L. con. sil. n, 19, ff, de regulis juris. 21 Priuilegium. Martin, Laud. vbi sup. q, 23, 22 Priuilegium Martin, Laud, v­bi supra q, 25. Counsellers of Princes, if the Prince die before the yeres end. The same is to be vnderstood, of the Prince his Atturnies, if he die before they doo serue out their yéere. And it taketh place, if the Prince which succéedeth, retaine the same Counsellers and Atturnies in his seruice.

20 Prelats and Ecclesiasticall persons, that be Counsellers of Princes, are not irregular, if they counsell their Prince to make or constitute Lawes which may punish those that offend, with paine of death.

21 The Counsellers of Princes, cannot neither in iudge­ment, or out of iudgment, pleade one for another.

22 The Counsellers of Princes, may not sell any goods im­mooueable, without the leaue of the Judge: before whom they ought to iustifie, what necessitie compelleth or vrgeth them to sell such goods: albeit that Counsellers of Princes, enioy the very same Priuiledges, dignities and preheminences, which the Law giueth to those Gouernours of Townes and Citties, which in Latine are called Decuriones. For the tenth man of [Page 65] those that were sent to inhabite some place, was chosen to go­uerne and rule it. These Decurions, are called Counsellers and Cap. statuimus 11, q, 1, & á cap. qui in §. quo. 51, d. defenders of those Countries which they rule. The other De­curions, are called Decuriones Curiales: because they were bound to serue in that Court or Session, where the Judges that gouerned the place which they inhabited did frequent & assem­ble, and where the Priestes or Curats did sacrifice to theyr I­doles. These are the Courts of which the Cannon-lawe ma­keth Wolfangus Ia­zius, lib, 3, de Repub. Roma. often mention. And those that were called Decuriones Curiales, might not sell or doo away their goods immoueable, neither might they leaue those Countries wherein they ser­ued. And because they were bounde to gather and recouer the publique reuenewes, it was their charge to prouide mainte­nance for the Citties and Townes, and to appoint Tutors and Ouerséers to all pupils, that should guide and looke vnto them. And moreouer, ordaine such as should kéepe & maintaine theyr portions▪ and if those men, whom they had ordained to defend and kéepe Orphanes goods, dealt not well, they were bounde thēselues to pay for them. They then béeing oftentimes much troubled, and verie hardlie dealt withall, refuse their Office, and are vnwilling to serue the Common-wealth any longer: and these be the Decurions which may not sell their goods. So that it is manifest, that this cannot be fitlie concluded of the Counsellers of Princes, because the Decurions are bound vnto it: for the Counsellers of Princes haue no iurisdiction, in such manner as the Decurions haue, and are not bounde to be resi­dent in those Townes and places which they gouerne.

23 The Counsellers of Princes which stande their Prince 23 Priuilegium in great stéed, may enioy the fruits of their liuings, though they Boetius decisi­one, 17. be not resident in thē, for then they be absent for the Common­wealths sake. This holds not in Counsellers that haue nothing but the title and name of Counsellers, and serue not the Prince in giuing him counsell.

24 The Gouernours of the Cittie of Norimberge in Ger­manie, 24 Priuilegium. Antonius Gerar. in Repub. Norimb. haue this Priuiledge, that those wils and Testaments in which two of them be witnesses, are of force. For it is sup­posed that those men which are chosen out of the whole Com­mon-wealth, and elected to be the Rulers of it, are persons of such credite, reputation and authoritie, that the testimonie of [Page 66] two of them is sufficient in all such acts as the Lawes ordaine to be made in presence of a great many witnesses. Xenocrates Cicero in orati­one pro Lucio Cornelio Baldo. et Diogenes La­ertius, lib. 4. in vita Xenocratis. Cap, cum esses dist. de testam. the Philosopher, was of such credite and reputation in Athens, that when he was brought before the Judges to witnesse any thing, they would not let him sweare. And this séemeth to be the reason, why Pope Alexander the third, commaunded that those wils and Testaments of the Parishioners, in which the Priest that had the cure ouer their parish was a witnes, with two or thée more, should be forcible in lawe. For it is to be thought, that he who hath a cure ouer the whole Parrish, and vnto whose charge all the parishioners commit their conscien­ces, ought to be had in such account, and of such credit and au­thoritie, that his testimonie should be as forcible in any act, as Lib, 8, cap, 4, cō ­mēt, iuris ciuilis, the witnesse of a great many others. In so much, that Francis­cus Conanus did greatlie erre, when he saide, that Pope A­lexander ordained this, because he thought the Priests by this meanes should easilie obtaine part of y ^e parishioners substance, and it séemeth rather to be as I haue said, then as the interpre­tations Didacꝰ de Couas Ruuias in d, cap. Cum esses. 25 Priuilegium. Brumellꝰ in trac­ta, de potestat, legat, conclu. 3. Vbi supra. q, 20 shew which the Doctors make, vpon that which Pope Alexander ordained concerning this matter.

25 Princes may not doo any thing of importance touching the Common-wealth, vnlesse they first consult about it with their Counsellers. For as Martinus Laudensis affirmeth, what­soeuer the Prince commaundeth, without taking aduice of his Counsellers, is not accounted to be iust & lawfull. This which the Doctors saie, holds not in such Princes as acknowledge no superiour or higher power aboue them, but in such onely as be not supreme Princes. As in ancient times past, the Emperors of Rome acknowledged the Senate to be in authoritie aboue them, and tooke counsell in the Senate about all such things as they were to ordaine and commaunde: and if they did not rule and gouerne the Common-wealth as they should doo, then they In rubric, de cō ­stitut. n. 20. In cap, super eo: n, 37, de haere­ti [...]s, lib, 6. were punished. Neither doth it holde (as Ripa and Phillippus Probus say) in those Princes which ordaine and constitute any thing concerning that which dependeth vpon the Positiue law. For the Prince himselfe onely, without taking any counsell of his Counsellers, may ordaine and commaund any thing, what­soeuer séemeth vnto him to be profitable vnto the Common­wealth. But if he commaunde any thing, which appertaineth [Page 67] vnto the Law of God and nature, he may not doo it vnlesse he do first take aduice of those that be of his Counsell. But because L, 1, ff, de con­stitu. princip. ibi populus ei & in eum omne im­perium suum cō ­tulit. such a Prince as doth not acknowledge any superiour, hath all that power which the Senate in olde times past was wont to haue, whatsoeuer he commaundeth, is of force, and ought to be obserued, whether it be pertaining vnto the Positiue Lawe, or vnto the Lawe of God and nature: which the Prince may ex­pound. For it is supposed to be commaunded by him, séeing that he hath all the power to commaund, and ordains that the Com­mon-wealth had. This dooth not hold, if that which the Prince commaundeth be notoriously wicked and vniust. For in such Acts. 5. matters, we ought rather to obey GOD, then men. Further, more, although supreme Princes may enioyne any thing to bée doone, which they suppose to be most profitable for the Com­mon-welth, & yet not make their Counsellers acquainted with Iacobatius vbi supra. it: neuerthelesse, to the end they may alwaies be obeyed, and that which they commaund, continually put in practise by their Counsellers, they ought neuer to doo any thing of importance, except they take aduice of their Counsellers about it. And it was an ancient custome in Spayne, that the Counsellers of the Prince, should be witnesses in those contracts and wils which the Prince made.

26 The Counsellers of Princes, in those contracts, testa­ments, 26 Priuilegium L. Curialis. cod. de decuri. lib. 10. and wils which they make, ought to haue a respect vn­to that which the Lawes ordaine, though they be exemted in those cases in which they be especiallie priuiledged. According Mar. Lau. vb. sup. q, 9, per leg. fi ha bitatio. §. 1. ff. de vsu & habitat. ibi si vtilitas habita­tionis sit relicta. 27 Priuilegium L, 1, cod. de of­ficio viccarij. D, L. 1. ibi indi­cationis nostrae soleat represen­tare reuerentiā. Wolfangus Ja­zius, lib, 1, cap, 12 Decad, 3, lib. 3. to this: if a Prince grant any of his Counsellers the profit of the habitation in any of his houses, the vse and fruite or proper­tie of the house is not due vnto him, but onelie leaue is giuen him to dwell in it.

27 The Counsellers of the counsell of the estate, are to be preferred before Counsellers of other counsels, when counsell is taken vpon matters concerning that counsell: for they haue a care ouer the whole Common-wealth, and doo more particu­larly represent the person of the Prince. But if counsell be ta­ken vpon matters touching warre, then they that sitte in the counsell of warre, are to be preferred aboue the others. For (as Titus Liuius saith) one Colledge or Senate is preferred before the other, but not mē some before others. And it seemeth that by [Page 68] this which we haue said, that Question is decided and discussed, about which In tractatu de authoritate magni concilij. Iohannes Montagnus, In additionibꝰ ad tractatum de authorita. mag­ni concilij. Nicolaus Bocrius, and In Catalogo gloriae mundi, p. 7. conside. 14 Bartholomeus de Cassameus striue and contend. To wit, that the Counsellers of Princes, ought to be some preferred before others: and in what places they which more especially repre­sent the person of the Prince, ought to be preferred, as mem­bers more particular of the Prince. For euē as they that come néerest to the fire, warme themselues most, because they feele most heate, so the Counsellers that be most familiar with the Prince, are most estéemed of in all places. Esope the Historio­grapher, saide vnto Solon, that those which were to be conuer­sant with Kings, should either talke verie little with them, or very familiarly. Solon answered, y ^t it was a great deale more safer for them, not to be in their company at all: and that if so be they were, it was necessary for them to be very prudent and warie. For Princes are like to fire, and they that be néerest vn­to them, incurre most danger.

The eyght discourse, what punishment they deserue, that doe not couusell their Princes sincerely and faithfully without deceite.

EVen as they that counsell well and giue sincere aduice, are Ministers of God, and be rewarded by him, both in this life and in the next: so they Cap. bonae, 12, q. 2, bonae rej. Cap. nequitiae distin, 86. that counsel maliciously and deceitfullie, are mi­nisters of the deuill, and God doth punish them, both in this life and in the life to come, and if they doo giue ma­liciouslie their Prince naughtie and wicked counsell, they cast venim and poyson (as Plutarch saith) into the common Foun­taine, In opusculo, cum princip ^• maximè philosophum disputare debere. which runneth through all the Cittie, and euerie man doth vse it: and by howe much the more harme the Common­wealth taketh by their double counsell, by so much the more de­serue they to be punished. And that they be ministers and ser­uaunts to the deuill, may easilie be prooued, séeing that the Of­fice Iohan. 8. Quia mendax est & pater eius. 1. Peter. 5. of the deuill, is to deceiue, to lye, to cosin, and vse a thou­sand setches and crafts to doo men harme: for this is his onelie intent, and his ginnes and snares, which he vseth to entangle men, are such and so many, that men can verie hardly escape Apoc cap. 12. [Page 69] them, and with great difficultie be deliuered out of them if they be once snared in his nets. Furthermore, the deuill (as the ho­lie 3. Regum. 22. Ero spiritus mē ­dax in ore omni­um propheta [...]ū. Scripture saith) is euen in their mouthes that giue counsell with malice and deceit. And not onely the deuill, but also the world and flesh giue those persons ill counsell, that take aduice of them. For the world (as the famous Doctor Azpilcoeta saith) In repetitj. cap. inter ver. 11. q. 3 dooth counsell those that serue Princes, to please their Lordes and Kings, though it redownde to the manifest danger of theyr soules, and vtter ruine of the whole Common-wealth. For so dooing, they shall obtaine honour, quietnes and profit: not to themselues onely, but to their friends also: if they doo the con­trarie, they shall displease both their Prince and those Peeres also which be fauoured of the Prince, because they please him, and follow that counsell which the world giueth them. The glo­rious Cap, Nemo, peri. q, 3, cap, Nolite q, 3. Nolite ti­mere eos qui oc­cidunt corpus, ne forté propter ti­morem non di­catis libere quod verum est. Matth, 10, Iohn, 8, Math, 16, 17. S. Austen saith, that it is better to suffer torment for speaking the trueth, then to receiue rewards for flatterie. And S. Chrisostome saith. Feare not them that kill the bodie, least for feare of them, thou speake not the trueth fréely. The verie same doth our Sauiour Christ teach vs, saying. And feare yee not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soule, but rather feare him which is able to destroy both soule and bo­die in hell. Furthermore, against them that folow the counsell of the flesh, our Sauior saith: Ye iudge after the flesh, and prai­sing S. Peter, he saith: Blessed art thou Simon the Sonne of Ionas, for flesh and blood hath not reuealed it vnto thée, but my Libro, 1, de le­gibus. Father which is in heauen. Plato affirmeth, that euery man carieth two Counsellers about him, that be contrary one to an­other, and bothe of them voide of reason: to wit, Pleasure and Greefe, for delight and passion giue ill counsell. And Iulius Cae­sar, in a certaine Oration which he made in the Senate, saide, Omnes homines. P. C. qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ami­citia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet, that is. It becommeth all men that consult vppon matters which are vncertaine and Cap. magnae de voto quid liceat secundum aequi­tatē, quid deceat secundum hone­statem, quid ex­pediat secundum vtilitatem. doubtfull, to haue their minds frée from hatred, freendshippe, anger, and mercie. Therefore Counsellers of Princes, to coun­sell well and sincerely, without mallice or deceit, they ought to consider (as Innocentiꝰ the third Pope said) thrée things. First, whether that which is in consultation, be lawfull according to iustice: then whether it be comely according to honestie: and [Page 70] lastly, whether it be expedient, according to profit. And Inno­cent (as the famous Doctor Azpilcoeta saith) did first put down In cap, inter ver­ba, [...], 64, 11, q, 3, that which is lawful, honest, and comelie, and afterwards that which is expedient for the profit of the Cōmon-welth, to shew, that though that which is consulted, be lawfull according to the world, yet if it doo comprehend any sinne in it, mortall or veni­all, it ought in no case to be put in execution: nor also if it be not approoued of wise and graue men, although it were neuer so profitable: after the example of the Athenians, who because Plutarchus in vita Themisto. the counsell which Themistocles gaue them, was vniust, wold not follow it, when as notwithstanding it was verie profita­ble.

2 If the Counsellers of Princes freelie vtter that, which they déeme to be most profitable for the Common-wealth, they are not to be blamed howsoeuer the matter falleth out: for the successe (as we haue said) and euents of things, consist not in the Discursu, 1, §. 6, power of man: and (as Vlpian the Lawyer saith) he that coun­selleth L, Consilij, ff, de regulis juris con silij non fraudu­lenti nulla est obligatio, cap. nullus de regulis juris. L. tua §. final. without mallice or deceite, deserueth no punishment, seeing that he vnto whom the counsell is giuen (as the Empe­rour Iustinian affirmeth) may choose whether he will put the counsell in practise or not.

They that giue counsell without mallice or falshood, (accor­ding to the Lawyers) differ frō them that vse guile and fraude in giuing counsell, in this: that they which counsell vprightlie and sincerelie, are not bound to make satis-faction for y ^e domage or losse which any man doth get by folowing their counsel, whi­ther he that asketh the counsell, be determined to followe the counsell which they giue, or be not: and, whether he vnto whō the counsel was giuen, would not haue doone according vnto it, vnlesse it had béene giuen him: or would haue doone it, though Cagnolus, in d, l. consilij. no such counsell had béene giuen him: and, whether they giue counsell to such as aske aduice of them, or to such as aske none: Hyeronimus Francus, in d, l. consilij. and lastlie, whether they shew any reason, why they think that counsell to be good which they giue, or shewe not any reason at all. Againe, they that counsell a man to doo any thing, and doo onely shew him a reason why they counsell him to doo so, differ from them that commaund and perswade a man to doo a thing, in this: that they which giue a man counsell, and make him acquainted with the reasons which mooue them to giue such [Page 71] counsell, which the Lawyers terme Exhortari, doo [...]ot bind, or Arg, L, ad hae [...] verba, lbi non [...] ­nim qui exhor­tantur mādato­ris opera fungi­tur, ff. de his qui notantur infami. L, Cum, pater, §, Mando siliae, 14 q. L. 1. §. persua­dere, ff, deseruo corrupto. In dialogo de oratore. In Gorgia. Lib, 1, cap, 5, by any necessitie force him to whom the counsell is giuen, to fo­low their counsell: but they that commaund, will haue y ^t doone which they commaund: and they that perswade, vrge the exe­cution of that which they perswade. And therfore Vlpian saith, that it is more to perswade one to commit some offence, then to compell or constraine him to doo it: for mens mindes are more mooued by perswasion, then by compulsion or commandement. And therefore Cornelius Tacitus and Plato saie, that the Arte which teacheth men to perswade, is the most excellent and no­ble Arte of al Artes: for that which by mans force could not be atchiued, hath oftentimes béene obtained by eloquence: as I writt more at large in my bookes of Militarie discipline.

3 Though they that giue counsel without malice or fraud, be not bound to make satis-faction for the domage or harme that commeth by their counsell, yet they that professe any Arte, or take any Office vpon them, are bounde in the Court of consci­ence, Cagnolus in d, L. consilij, n, 4. to make satis-faction for the losse and harme that the par­ties take by folowing the counsel which they giue: for they are bounde to open the trueth vnto those that aske aduisement of them, in such things as appertaine vnto their Arte: as also As­sessors, Aduocats, interpreters of Lawes, Proctors, Solicitors, Phisitions, & all others are, y ^e being ignorant of the Arte which In L, quidā exis­timauerunt, ff. si cert petatur, á. In titulo de re­quirendis consi­lijs §. 1. versicu­lo consilia [...]ij. L. in peritia, ff, de regulis juris In L, ex malesi­cijs. §, si index ff. de actiombus & obligationibꝰ L. in te stipulan­tem, §. 1. ff. de verbo obligat. D. L. imperitia culpae enumera­tur, §. Imperitia instituta, de lege Aquilia. they professe, vse it to the great hurt and domage of their neigh­bours, and of those y ^t take their counsell: and (as Socinus saith) Aduocates and Counsellers in Law, are bound in the Court of conscience, to make satis-faction for al the losse and domage that ensueth by their counsell, in those causes which they defende. Speculator will haue, that Aduocates or Patrons that defende the poore, or them that be falselie accused, shal not be bound to make satis-faction of the domage that commeth by their coun­saile, so they vse no couine or deceite therein: albeit that igno­rance is counted a fault. For this doth hold, as Bartholus saith, in Judges, w [...]ose dutie is of necessitie, and not in Counsellers, whose duetie is voluntarie.

Against this opinion of Bartholus, doo they make, which af­firme, that the ignorance or want of skill in the Phisition, is counted a fault, and that they which professe that Arte wherof they haue no skill, are fault-worthy: for they deceiue thē that [Page 72] aske counsell of them, as of men that be learned and skilfull in I., si quis domū §. Celsus ff. lo­catim culpā. &c In L. quod nerua ff, deposi. in in­tellectibus. their profession: and this opinion follow Zasius, Alciatus, Alex­ander de Imola, Iohannes Montalonius, and Baldouinus.

4 The Emperour L, rem nō no­uam, §, patroni. Iustinian ordained, that euery Aduo­cate shold swear, he wil not defend any vniust cause, which can not be defended, but with false allegatiens, and with a bad con­science: and which no Aduocate will defende: for it were not good, that they should be more estéemed of, which defende vn­iust causes, then they which will not defende them. This (if I Iohan. Eckius in tractatu de ma­teria Iuramenti ad finem. Probus in cap, vt commissi. n 2. de haereticis, li. 6. per le. 3, §. magis ff, de testibus. L. debetur. be not deceiued) doth hold in those causes, which are manifestlie knowne to be vniust: for in those causes which depende vppon proofes and witnesses, (which onely conclude to the Judge) and in those causes which depend vpon expositions of Texts, vpon opinions of Doctors, and vpon the will and arbitrement of the Judges: (which is as frée, that though the causes be iust, yet it is verie vncertaine what sentence the Judges will giue,) Pa­trons and Aduocates are not forbidden to defende such causes, (séeing they be not manifestly known to be vniust) but yet they be bound to open the truth vnto their Clyants, and procure that the strifes and sutes in Lawe, be not immortall, & euerlasting, vsing malicious and craftie fetches to deceiue the Cliants or parties pleading. That which we haue said of Patrons & Aduo­cates, L. [...]i calu [...]niatur ff, de verborum significatione. Ouid [...]us. Nō est in med [...]o sem­per releuetur vt [...]ger, interdum docta plus valet arte malum. doth also hold in Phisitions, for they are not in fault, if they minister to the sick according to the rules of phisick: for it is not in the power of the Phisition to giue life vnto them that be sick: albeit that they are faultie, if they be ignorant in theyr profession, and vnderstande not the Arte which they professe. For this holdeth in those Phisitions that be ignorant of those things, which they commonlie ought to knowe, which professe the Arte of curing: and this is the ignorance that is counted a L, labeo, ff, de verbor, signifi­catione. fault, for they vse deceite and crast in professing that wherein they haue no skill. And if the Patient die, through the igno­raunce of the Phisition that vndertooke his cure, he is bound to make satis-faction for the coste and charges of the Patient. And Mainerius in L. imperitia. ff. de regulis iuris. Al­bericus in d. §. sicut [...]. as concerning corporall punishment, it lieth in the Judge his pleasure, either to appoint him a moderate and extraordinarie punishment, or to punish him according to the offence commit­ted. That which we haue said of Patrons and Aduocates hol­deth, whether they take money for theyr counsell or no: albeit [Page 73] this holdeth not in those that say without consultation, what in such a matter ought to be doone. For those that answere questi­ons Angelus in d. §. praeterea si medicus per leg, idē juris ff, ad legē Aquiliā, quem sequitur Maine­tius in d, L. Im­peritia. demaunded of them, are not bound without rewards to re­solue doubts which they aske of them in the Arte which they professe. And many loth to spend monie, propose their doubts to some learned men: who, though they answere conformable to the rules of the Law, which they remember at the time y ^t theyr counsaile is asked: and albeit they answere according to their conscience, yet be they not bound to call to remēbrance al which both diuine and humane law disposeth and intreateth, in mat­ters that may fal out: for this (as the Emperor Iustinian saith) is a thing more diuine then humane: and the fault lyeth in the L. 2. §. si quid. Clyents, who because they should not pay fée vnto the learned, are contented with the answer which their Counsel giue, with­out studie vpon the case. For such answers and counsails, are by the Lawyers termed, Consilia et responsa volatilia; such as are lightly passed, and are not considered and examined, but lightly giuen, and are like fethers carried away with the wind, hauing nothing in them like to counsaile, but the name onelie: for it is giuen without meditation or studie, onelie to satisfie their im­portunitie that aske. Furthermore, if he that giueth a man coū ­saile, perswade the partie to followe his aduice, because of the profit which he himselfe may get thereby, and not for that he vnto whom he giueth aduice, should be the better by it: then is he bound to make satis-faction for the losse which the partie ta­keth by folowing his counsaile. As for example. One knowing Hieronimus Francus, in d, [...], Consilij. that a certaine Merchant which owed him a summe of money, was altogether behind hand, and readie (as they saie) to make a banck-route; to recouer his money, affirmed to another Mer­chaunt (to whom the banck-route made sute to lend him some money,) and assured him, that the banck-route who would bo­row money of him, was a welthie man, well monied, and suffi­cient to be trusted with any summes of money that were lent him. This man is bound to paie for him, whose sufficiencie he assured to the Merchaunt that lent the money; for vnlesse he had warranted the banck-routs abilitie, the Merchant had not trusted him with his goods. Againe. One burst not take a Ser­uant, because he doubted of his trueth; another told, him that [Page 74] he might trust him with all that euer he cōmitted to his charge Franciscus Co­nanus, lib. 7. ca. 14. Commenta. Iuris Ciuilis, & Hieroni Francus in d, l. consilij. or custodie. This man is bound to answere for all what soeuer the seruaunt stole: because his Maister woulde not haue taken him into his seruice, vnlesse he had assured him of his truth.

5 The prouidence of God, (in whose power the counsailes of men be) doth often permitte, that those counsailes which are giuen fraudulently and maliciouslie, become hurtful vnto those that giue them: according to that of Salomon. Who so diggeth Ecclus. 27. 26, a pit, shall fall therein, and he that laieth a stone in his neigh­bours way, shall stumble theron: and he that laieth a snare for another, shall be taken in it himselfe. And for this cause sayth Hesiodus the Greeke Poet,

As it hapned to the Woolfe, that when he counsailed the Ly­on to kil the Foxe, he himselfe was killed by the Lyon: and ma­ny others are so serued, and hurt with their own counsailes, as I writt more at large in my bookes De consilijs astutis et pru­dentibus. Besides, the diuine maiestie of God, doth not onelie permit, that counsailes giuen through malice and deceit, turne to the Counsellers hurt, but they be also bound in the Court of Angelus de Cla­uaso in summa in verbo consiliū D, l, Consilij, si dolꝰ & fraus in­tercesserit, de dolo actio com­petit. conscience, to make satis-faction for all the domage men receiue by folowing their counsails: notwithstanding that the successe of that which is consulted be not in the power of men: and hu­mane lawes also punish and chastice all such as counsaile with malice and deceite. Euripides saith.

6 The Counsellers of Princes, are bound to conceale that which is consulted with them: for all that which is said to one in secrete, and committed vnto him as a thing to be concealed, ought both by the lawes of God and man, to be kept secrete by him. Therefore, if Counsellers of Princes discouer those coun­sels [Page 75] which by the Prince are committed to their secrecie, they be periured: for they doo contrarie to their oathe, which is, to In titulo de for­ma fidelj. keepe secrete all what soeuer their Princes communicate vn­to them. Yet notwithstanding, this oath dooth not binde them to conceale any thing that is contrarie to the commaundement Archidiac [...]in cap. de forma 22. q § Filin. in cap. 2. de n [...]a. et obedi. of God: or notoriously hurtfull to the Common-wealth: for it is a more gréeuous thing to performe such oathes as be vnlaw­full, then to breake them. Therefore they that sweare, are not bound to conceale any thing which is said vnto them if it be vn­lawfull, and hurtfull to the Common wealth. As for example. If any man tell his seruaunt, that he will kill some bodie, the seruant ought to diswade him from so dooing: and if he cannot alter his mind, or remedie his purpose any other way, he ought to discouer it: but so, that the discouering of the enterprise, be profitable to the one, and not hurtfull to the other; & he ought Martin, ab A [...] ­pilcoeta, vbi su­pra, num. 805. not to let his Maisters purpose be further knowne, then may suffice to remedie it. Nay, nor to open his intent at all, if his Maister be like to take more hurt and losse by the discouering of it, thē the other partie, if the enterprise were not made known at all.

Furthermore, those Counsellers of Princes, that disco­uer their Prince his counsaile, be not onely forsworne, but they Diuus Thomas in 4, destinct, 1, q. 2, art. 3. be also falsifiers, and they deserue punishment according to the offence which they commit, and the hurt which the Prince and the Common-wealth take, by the discouering of that counsaile Gigas lib, 1, q. 21 n, 8, de crimi [...]e laesae maiest. Bo­ecius vbi supra. L. aliud in princ. ff, de paenis ibi. Bart. et Boecius vbi supra, 155. Gigas vbi sup. n, 10, per leg, 1, §, 15 qui deposita ff, ad leg. Cornel. de fa sis. which they disclosed. Againe. If the Counsellers discouer theyr Prince his secrets not to hurt the Prince, but to harme some other person: and if the Prince doo take any losse by the disclo­sing of his secrets, the Counsellers loose their fees which they receiue of the Prince; for they do not performe that which they swore, to wit, that they would help and aide the Prince both in word and déed. They aide and assist the Prince in words, in giuing of him faithfull and sincere counsaile, without malice or deceite: and they assist him, in déed, by executing that which he commaundeth.

Moreouer, if they that discouer their Prince his secrets, be neither Counsellers nor Secretaries vnto the Prince, they ought to be put to death, if any hurt befall vnto the Prince by [Page 76] the discouerie of his secrets: but if they discouer it, not inten­ding to hurt the Prince, but commending him for some thing, Hippolitus de Marsiliis cōsil, 1. wherewith they doo him harme: then they ought to be extraor­dinarilie and moderatlie punished: for they intended not to L. cuius dolo ff, ad l, Iuli, maiest, & leg, si quis a­liquid, §. trans­fugae. ff, de pae­nis, ibi, trans­fugae ad hostes vel nostrorum consiliorum re­nunciatore, aut viui exurantur aut furca suspen­dantur. hurt the Prince, and that offence which is committed without malice or deceit, ought not to be punished. But if they wittingly discouer any of the Prince his secrets, the disclosing of which, may doo the enemie good, they ought either to be burned quick, or to be hanged.

7 The ancient Poets, because men shold know how neces­sarie it is for Princes, to haue such Counsellers, as conceale those secrets which are committed vnto them, fained that Tan­talus was in hell, and had bothe water and pleasant fruites by him, but though he greatly desired to drinke of the water, and taste of the Apples, yet hee could not: for when hee stooped to Lotinus conside­ratione. 460. drink, or reached to the fruite, both the water and the trée did mooue from him; and this torment was appointed him, because he did disclose that which the Gods had in their counsaile deter­mined.

They fained also, that Sisiphus was tormented in hell, Bocacius de ge­nialogia Deorū. lib, 13. cap. 56. Erasmus in ada. Saxum voluere. for discouering the counsaile of the Gods: and that this punish­ment was allotted him, that he should turne a stone vp to the toppe of an huge and mightie Hill, on his shoulders, but when it was at the toppe, it should fall downe againe and renew his labour. These punishments were fitte rewards for their offen­ces: for as the counsailes of the Gods tooke no effect, because they were disclosed by Tantalus and Sisyphus, so it was verie well appointed, that Tantalus should neuer eate nor drink whē he gréedilie desired: and that Sisyphus should continually labor carrying the stone on his shoulders, without bringing that to passe which he so earnestly endeuoured. The Kings of Persia, Quintus Curti­us, lib. 4, lingua apud Persas gra­ [...]s castigatur, qu [...] vllū pro­b [...]m. did punish them with paine of death, that disclosed any thing, which in their counsaile was concluded. For they thought that hee, which would not bridle so small a member as the tongue, could much lesse refraine the other greater members. And in déed, greater secrecie ought to be vsed in the counsailes of Prin­ces, then in any other thing, and great care ought to be taken, that no man vnderstand what is consulted, or know what is at [Page 77] the Counsell-table determined.

King Lysimachus demaunded of the Poet Philipides, of Plutarchus in tractatu de curi­ositate, which of his matters hee shoulde make him partaker: he aun­swered, that of which he pleased, vppon condition it were not of his secrets: because of the daunger which they incurre, that discouer the secrets of Princes.

Iohn the second of that name, King of Portugall, was verie Chronica regis Iohannis. warie in concealing such thinges as were tolde him: whereby hee deliuered himselfe out of many great daungers, which because they be knowne vnto all men, I will not make men­tion of them.

8 The Doctors aske what punishment they deserue, which counsaile one to commit some offence: and some affirme, In d, l. consilij & in cap, 1. de officio de legat. Filin, & Mant. in d, cap, 1. that if the offence be greeuous and outragious, as Treason a­gainst GOD or theyr Prince, then they that giue the coun­sayle, and they that committe the offence, are to be punished with the like punishment. Thys holdes not, when he that gi­ueth counsayle to haue any offence committed, dooth nothing els but counsayle, and shew the reasons which mooue him ther­vnto: for then hee that giueth the counsaile, and he that com­mitteth the offence, are not to be punished a like: for hee that Iuxta cap, Solitae In versiculo. Nō causam sed occa­sionē de maio­ritate & obedi­entia. L. 5. §. Persua­dereff, deserui. Persuadere plus est quam com­pelli & cogi. D. §. Pesuadere, N [...] enim op [...]r­tet laudamdo au­geri malitiam. Lotiotus et Hie­ron. Francus in d, l, consilij. Maine. in d l cō ­silij, [...] in summa in ver­bo consilij, Emanuel Xua­rez in thesauro communium o­piniorū in the­sauro cōmuniū opinionū in ver­bo. consi. Et Iu­lius Clarus in commun. opin. In verb. consil. Et promptuarium iuris in verb. consil [...]t Glos, in cap, Nullus, de regulis iuris. n 6. Laurentius▪ Sil­ [...]nus. in tracta­tu de recogniti­one feudi, ca. 109 Loriotus in d, l. consilij. Et Deci­us in d, ca, 1, n, 9 de officio legat▪ Erancisc, Cona­nus, li, 7, cap, 14. Commentariorū Iuris Ciuilis. Maineri. in d, l. consilij. n, 7. giueth the counsaile, is not the cause of the offence, though hée gaue counsayle to committe it: but hee that perswadeth to of­fende, deserueth the like punishment as is due to the offender. For it is a greater matter (as Vlpian the Lawyer saith) to per­swade one to committe some offence, then to force or compell him to doo it. For it is not tollerable, (as the same Vlpian af­firmeth) that an ill deede shoulde be either praysed or approo­ued.

Others distinguish, that each offence eyther is of such qua­litie, that it is not punished, vnlesse it be committed, or it is pn­nished after the same manner, as if it had béene committed, though he that dooth intend to offende, doo not committe the of­fence: and in such kinde of faults, that holdes not, which wee haue before saide, of him that dooth onelie giue the counsaile. For in such causes, the attempt is punished as much, as if it had beene committed. Others distinguish, that either those coun­sailes which be giuen with malice & deceit, are about contracts, [Page 78] and neere contracts, or about offences. Others distinguish of them that giue counsaile vnto those, which vnlesse they had beene counsailed, would not haue committed it: and of thē that giue counsaile vnto those, that would haue committed it though they had not béene counsailed. Others distinguish, of those counsails that be giuen, to doo him good vnto whom they be gi­uen, or to profit others. Others distinguish, of those that giue counsaile before the offence is committed, and those that giue counsaile after it is committed: counsayling and exhorting the offendour, to perseuere and goe forward in the execution of the offence. According to that which we in Spayne doo commonlie vse to say.

that is,

Others distinguish betweene those that counsaile malicious­lie, for loue of the profit and gaine which they hope to gette by their fraudulent counsaile, and those which neuer looke for a­ny profit or commoditie by they coūsaile which the giue. Others distinguish those offences that are committed concerning sub­staunce, and those that are committed concerning persons.

But leauing aside the distinctions of Doctors, and theyr ampliacions, faliacies, and additions, which Decius Filinus, Cagnolus, Hieronimus Francus, Loriotus, and other Inter­pretours of the Lawe assigne, conformable to the distinctions which they sette downe: all which I haue largely written in my Booke, intituled Rapsodia &c. two rules onely (which Vlpian giueth) suffise. In verbo consili­orum.

The first is, that hee which counsaileth without mallice, deserueth no punishment. For it is supposed, that he who so gi­ueth D▪ l, consil. con­silij non fraudu­lenti nulla est obligatio. counsaile, is a good man: and by reason of this suppositi­on, he that chargeth him that he counsailed fraudulently, is to prooue it: and to reduce his intent ad actum. L. merito, ff, pro socio cap, final. de praesumptionibus. Et Alciatus in tractatu de praesump. regula 3, Iason in rubric. cod. qui admit. Et Filin. in cap▪ In presentia de probat. Which acte, to be an offence or crime, requireth that it should haue béen doone [Page 79] with malice, & according to the rule of Lawe, he that intendeth to charge a man with any qualitie or circumstance, is to prooue Bart. in l. Non solum sed vt probari, [...], non a­per. nunc [...]. lason vbi supra. Ber­nardus Diaz. in tractatu doctri­natū doctrina, 208. Incipient. probati. quando. Cap, 1, de prae­sumptiombus. Matth, 4, Vox diabolj, quae semper homines cadere deoisum desiderat, sic Christū his ver­bis. Mittete in­quit deorsum. Persuadere potest at precipitate non potest. In l. quēadmodū cod, de Agricolis, et censit. l. 11. L. Quisquis & ibi Bart. ff. de furtis. Lauren. Sylu. vbi supra. L. qua actione §. Celsus ff, ad l. Aquiliam, L, qui occidit, §. Penult. ff, ad L. Corneliam de sicarijs. it. And thys which we haue said, holds, when counsaile is gi­uen concerning acts that are indifferent or good. But if coun­saile be giuen to commit any offence, or to execute any unlaw­full acte, or to put any thing in practise which is contrarie to the Lawes of GOD or man: then is he supposed and thought to be faultie, that in such a case giueth counsaile. For it is the voyce of the deuill (as Saint Ierome wryteth) which doth per­swade men to doo such things, as be cleene contrarie to the di­uine and humane Lawes, and which offend God.

Vnto this rule, Lucas de Pena reduceth two hundreth and twentie three cases.

The other rule which Vlpian giueth, is; That if hee vnto whom counsaile is giuen to committe any offence, may not be punished, by reason of some priuiledge, by which he is exemp­ted: then he which giueth the counsaile, ought to be punished in such sort, as he that putteth a weapon into the hand of a mad man to kill some bodie with it.

The ninth discourse, whether it be better for the Common­wealth, that the Counsellers of the Prince should be learned, or vnlearned.

THey that affirme, that it is more profi­table for the Common-wealth, that the Counsellers of the Prince, shoulde be learned then vnlearned, alleage that which Agesilaus King of the Lacedaemo­nians saide: that it did not become the Lotinus conside­ratione, 74 estate and royall dignitie of a Prince, to haue vnlearned men to his Counsellers: for though rude and ignoraunt men are subtile and watchfull, and looke to the publique commoditie: yet much greater is the harme which the Prince taketh, for want of learned mens companie, then the profit which com­meth [Page 80] by the craftinesse and subtiltie of the vnlearned: for no man maketh account of that profit, which is not accompanied with honestie and vertue. For, this is it, for which all Princes be estéemed, honoured, and reuerenced.

Elius Lampridius saith, that the Emperour Alexander Se­uerus, In vita Alexan. Seueri. had many excellent Lawyers in his Counsell, with whom he consulted vpon all matters concerning the Common­wealth. And because he ruled himselfe, by the counsaile of wise and learned men, which did not onelie regarde the Emperours seruice, but also the publique commoditie of the whole Em­pire: hee commaunded nothing, but that which was most iust and lawfull.

Hernando the thirde of that name, King of Castile, imita­ting Gariuai, lib, [...]. cap. 4, de com­pendio Histori. the example of the Emperor Alexander, did choose twelue men singularlie well learned, to gouerne his Countrey. These men beganne in theyr time, to establish the Lawes, called Lasleyes de siete partidas; which were so termed, because they were deuided into seauen partes: and afterwarde they were a­bolished in the time of King Alonso. The priuate Lawes of L, 5, Tit, 9, par­tit. 2. Spayne say, that Kinges ought to make choyse of such Counsel­sels, as were freends, learned, &c.

2 They that affirme it to be better, that the Counsellers of a Prince shoulde be vnlearned, subtile, craftie, wittie, and watchfull then learned: say, that subtiltie and watchfulnesse, are verie necessarie for them that gouerne Common-weales: for all they that deale with Princes, goe about to deceiue and cosin them. The Emperour Dioclesian, sayde, that Princes coulde verie hardlie hitte the marke in that which they doo, and Flauius Vopis­cus in vita Aure­lij. imperatoris. commaunde; because all they that be conuersant with them, doo theyr best to deceiue them, who beeing alwaies occupied, knowe no more of matters then they are informed, by them with whom they speake. Apelles, in the portraiture of Prin­ces, Lucianus de Ca­lumnia. which hee presented to King Prolomie, paynted a Prince sitting in a Chayre of estate, with great hands and large eares, and by him were two Damosels, the one called Ignoraunce, the other Suspition: and Calumnia accempanied with her Si­ster Ladie Flatterie. As I haue written more at large, in my Treatise of the institution of a Christian Prince.

[Page 81]3 Séeing that Princes must necessarililie vse the conuer­sation of many men, and verie diuers persons, it is no lesse ne­cessarie for them, to reape profit by the subtiltie and craftines of the vnlearned; then by the skill and learning of those that be highlie learned. For as they saie, halfe the yéere men liue by arte and deceit, and the other part of the yéere▪ by deceit & arte. The learned striue for matters concerning conscience and iu­stice: and the craftie vnlearned, to recouer Rents, and to dis­patch such busines as pertaine to the substance of the Common­wealth: neither (as Plato saith) doo subtile vnskilfull men suf­fice Dialogo, 7▪ de repub. to gouerne the Common-wealth well, nor they that spend their life time in studie. And experience teacheth, that Princes further their estate no lesse with the subtiltie of the vnlearned, then with the learning of Schollers: for they that apply them­selues to learning, are but little skilled in action and practice, and knowe not howe to contriue the affaires of the Common­wealth. And (as Quintilian and Plinie say) more profiteth prac­tise Lib. 12 cap. 6. without science, thē science without practise. Learned men be verie doubtfull, and perplext in giuing their resolutions of those matters vpon which they cōsult: for they find many dif­ficulties and ambiguities, and many inconueniences, which make them to stand in great perplexitie, full of imaginations, and respects which doo not profit at all. Homer going about to describe a wise, prudent, expert, and an absolute Prince, (such an one as he fained Vlysses to be) saith not that he deliuered himselfe out of so many troubles and dangers, in which he oft found himselfe: because he was learned, or brought vppe in good literature at schooles, or because he had spent much time in haunting those Vniuersities that florished in his time: but for that he was verie wittie, watchfull and subtile, & could quick­lie and readilie perceiue and fore-sée how things would fall out.

4 The Gouernours of the Cittie of Norimberge, admit no Antoni. Gerard. in gubernatione ci [...]tatis Norim­berg. learned men to enter in the counsell, to consult vppon matters concerning the Common-wealth: but they haue som excellent men, that be verie well learned, and great Schollers, of whom they take aduise, vpon such matters as are mooued in the coun­sell. And the Ʋrsins in Italie, doo not permit that any learned men should gouerne the Common-wealth. This statute (as Papa Pius in de­scriptione As [...] minoris, cap▪ [...] Pope Pius saith) is like to that statute in the Cittie Ephesus, [Page 82] which did not consent, that any vertuous man brought vppe in learning should liue there, and for this cause they banished Her­modorus Strabo. libro. 14. the Philosopher, who béeing sent into exile, left E­phesus and came to Rome, and caused the Romans to establish the Lawes of the twelue Tables. And Pope Pius saith, that those L, 2, §. Exactis. ff. de Origine iuris. Princes that expell learned men from their counsels, resemble the Gouernours of Ephesus. To be short, no man can denie, but that Princes haue great necessitie to vse the seruice of learned men and Schollers, to helpe and assist them in the gouernment of the people which is committed to their charge, as Iethro counselled Moses to do: for by reason of the great and manifold Exodus. 18. busines which they haue, they are not able to minister iustice themselues vnto their Subiects, without the helpe and seruice of wise and learned men, that vnderstande and knowe what is profitable and necessarie for the Common-wealth, conformable to the Lawes & ordinances by which it is gouerned. And that the Counsellers of Princes may performe their duetie accor­dinglie, it is conuenient they shold giue themselues to the rea­ding of many Histories and Chronicles, that when they con­sult, they may turn that to their profit, which hath in like mat­ters succéeded and fallen out at diuers times, and in sundry pla­ces. For they that haue séene little, and know no more thē they Cicero in Ora­tore ad Brutum. Cap. 8. haue séene, are but children in respect of them that haue read much, and (as Iob saith) they that haue onely experience of thē ­selues, & are not confirmed by the example of others that went before them, are but of yesterdaie. Plato reporteth, that a cer­taine In Timaeo. Egiptian Philosopher saide vnto Solon, that the Philoso­phers of Greece, were as children in comparison to thē of Egipt, because the Egiptian Philosophers were verie ancient, and had long time before, giuen themselues to the contemplation & con­sideration of diuine and naturall things.

The difference betwéene them that haue séene, and also read and heard many things, and those that know no more then they haue séene (which for the most part is but little) is this: that they which haue séene, read, and heard many things, may frée­lie speake in all places, concerning all matters. And for this cause it is commonlie said, that three sorts of men may discourse fréelie; Old men at home: young mē abroad: and men of great reading euery where.

[Page 83]5 My intent is not to prooue, that it is not necessarie for Princes to haue learned men to giue them counsell, séeing that they haue such great néed of men, that can examine and waigh, whether that which is consulted be conformable to iustice and reason, but that which I say, tendeth to this end, that men may well enough be learned, without haunting many Uniuersities, or continuing long in Schooles to take degrées, & become Mai­sters, Licentiats, Bachelers and Doctors: for there haue béene many men in the worlde, that haue béene excellent fine Schol­lers, and wonderfull well learned, that were not either Ba­chelers, Licentiats, Maisters, or Doctors, created in the Vni­uersities of their time: for the degrees which nowe a daies are giuen in Vniuersities, vnto them that studie in them, tooke be­ginning but seuen hundred yéeres agoe: and in déede, many la­bour more to be Doctors and Graduats, then learned: as I writt more at large in my treatise of Schooles and Readers.

Therefore men may verie well become learned, and be good Schollers, without béeing Bachelers, Maisters, Licentiates, or Doctors▪ if in stéed of spending the time in such exercises and passetemps, as be but little profitable to the Common-welth, they did read Histories and Treatises concerning Princes and Common-weales: but especially such Bookes and discourses that treate of things touching the Princes of their own Coun­trey, and those Princes whom they serue: séeing they ought to counsel them according to that which they find and read in such discourses, Histories, and Chronicles: for neither Acurtius nor Bernard teach them any such thing. Men may also be learned, (as Euripides and Plato say) by béeing conuersant with men of In fine Dialogi. 8. de Republica. vnderstanding and literature: for thereby of rude and vnlear­ned men, they become skilfull and prudent, and by this meanes they come to be acquainted with the Lawes, by which y ^e Com­mon-wealth is ruled, & to giue counsel according as the Lawes ordaine and commaund, in so much, that though men be subtile craftie, and watchful, yet be they no whit the better for that to rule Countries: for gouernment doth not procéed from wilines and subtiltie, but from vertue and iustice.

6 Isocrates counselleth Princes to enquire, whether the In parenesi. Counsellers of whom they take aduice, were good Husbands, and had the wit and wisedome how to vse their thrift, and how [Page 84] to bestow their own substance: for he that cannot rule and go­uerne matters pertaining to his owne substance, will neuer be able well to rule other mens things. There was once a certain Gentleman, which being very vnthriftie, yet thinking his de­serts great, requested the Emperour Charles the fift, to plea­sure him with an Office in his Treasurie, that he might haue the ouersight & gouernment of such matters as did belong vnto the rents, reuenewes and substance of his Maiestie. The Em­perour answered, that he knewe he well deserued to haue him doo him a pleasure, but yet neuerthelesse, if he should grant him that request, he should giue all the world occasion to talke: for séeing he knew not how to vse his own substāce, he shold much lesse know howe to rule & gouerne the store of the whole Com­mon-wealth. But to return to the purpose: that the Counsel­lers of Princes may according to their duetie, serue their Prin­ces well and faithfully: it is conuenient, that as wel those▪ that be learned and lettered, as they that be craftie & subtile, should haue a good, a pure, a sound, and a sincere conscience, and that they should be (as our Lord and Sauior Jesus Christ teacheth) Math, 10. wise as Serpents, and innocent as Dooues: for it is not profi­table for the Common-wealth, that Princes should haue such men to their Counsellers, as be subtile & malicious. And if this be manifest, that all Common weales be conserued by Religion and true worshipping of God, no doubt but they will be better conserued (as Laurentius Grimaldus saith) if Princes admit Lib. 1. de opti­mo senatore. learned and vertuous Prelats to their counsels, vnto whō our Lord and Sauior Jesus Christ committed the charge of Chri­stian soules, the administration of his holy Sacraments, and the deliuering and preaching of his word, that they might with their zealous prayers, and supplications, continually request and beséech the Lord, to augment and conserue the Common­weale publique. And if the Romans, Grecians, Egiptians, and all other Nations, which serued the deuill and worshipped Idols, did admit their Priestes vnto their counsels, and gouernment of their▪ Common-weales: by what great reason then, ought Christian Princes in the gouernment of the Common-wealth, to take counsell and aduise of the Priests of God, and the Mi­nisters Sansouinus de dict [...]s & [...]actis, Caroli. v. of his holy word. The Emperour Charles the fift said, that learned and vertuous Prelats séemed very well in the [Page 85] counsels of Princes, because they did represent the Ecclesiasti­call estate, which was the foundation of all Common-weales: and because that (the Prelats being in the counsels of Princes) all matters which in them were handled, might be dispatched to the seruice and glory of God.

The tenth discourse, whether it be more profitable to the Common-wealth, to haue a good Prince, and ill Counsellers, or an ill Prince, and good Counsellers.

ELius Lampridius affirmeth, that it is better for the Common-wealth, that the Prince should be naught, & the Counsellers good, then the Prince good, and the Counsellers naught. For a great deale sooner is one changed by the example and counsel of a great many, then a great many by the example and counsell of one. And for this cause the Counsellers of Princes ought to be vertuous, of good behauiour, honest in life, and e­stranged from all couetousnesse, and humane pretences: louing the Common-wealth and their King, whose authoritie and e­stimation they ought to make account of, aboue all other world­lie things. This which Elius Lampridius saith, holds in those Princes, that folow that, which their Counsellers aduise them to doo: and not in those, who will haue that their Counsellers shal approoue and allow all whatsoeuer they say, o [...] like, though the same be manifestlie hurtfull, and preiudiciall to the Com­mon-wealth. These (as King Antiochus said) are so nice, wan­ton, arrogant, and proude, that they will neuer heare any true tale, nor take any counsell: but will haue, that all men shall like with their actions, and allow all their sayings [...] and by ge­stures, demeanures, and moouing of their bodies, their subtil­tie of wit, and greatnes of iudgment, were meruallous, & that euerie one should saie, Et cum spiritu tuo.

Demetrius Phalerius to shunne this inconueniente, counsel­leth Erasmus in A­pothegmatis. Ptolemey the King of Egipt, that he should reade Bookes which treated of Kings and Common-weales. For in reading of such bookes, he should find many things, which his Counsel­lers and familiars durst not tell him. Isocrates exhorteth and De regno. [Page 86] counselleth Kings to choose vertuous and faithfull Coūsellers, and that they should many times request them, not to fauour or praise that which they said, but to tell them the truth, and free­ly shewe them what they ought to doo, concerning that about which they consult. And by this meanes, euerie Prince should haue Counsellers, that would haue a regarde of his estate, and publique profit of the Common-wealth. Iohn the second, King of Portugall, would not bestow a certaine dignitie, vnto some Garcia de resen­de in Chronica regis Iohan. that requested it of him, saying: that he would giue it vnto one of his Subiects, that neuer spake any thing vnto him in all his life which pleased his humour, but that which he knewe to be profitable, both vnto him, and to the Common-wealth. Don Gariuai lib, 14 cap. 15. de com­pendio Historia. Alonso the twelfth of that name, King of Castile, entering into the house of counsell, sate in his Chayre of estate, holding in his right hand the sword wherewith he was dubbed Knight, and in his left hand the royall crowne: and beeing thus set, he reque­sted those of his Counsell, that they should freely tell him what they thought, and in such order counsell him, that the maiestie and honour of his crowne, might euer remaine inuiolable: and the power of his sword, might daily rather increase then dimi­nish.

2 Don Francisco de Almeida, Viceroy of the Eastern In­dies, Iohan. de Bay­ros decad, 2, lib. 3. cap. 5. (béeing informed that some of his Captaines which he ad­mitted to his counsell, had giuen foorth spéeches, how that they did not fréely open their minds vnto him, because they feared, least if they shold haue vttered any thing cōtrary to his humor, he would haue béen offended with them) tooke occasion to talk with those of his Counsell, & among many other things which he mentioned vnto them, tolde them that one of the greatest sins which men might commit against God, and their Prince, was▪ not to make him acquainted with their opinions, and not freely to shewe him what they thinke concerning that, about which they consult. For so, they offend the Lorde, in that they denie the iudgment and vnderstanding, wherewith it pleased his diuine maiestie, to endue & enrich them: and against their Prince vndoubtedly they commit a kind of treason. And because men erre more often through mallice then ignoraunce: those cleane, vnspotted, and free counsails, which God inspireth, are better, safer, and surer, then those that are giuen vnto hope of [Page 87] gaine, or some other vngodly pretence, and respect of feare, loue, or anger. For men commonly, by reason of some perturbation, or indignation and wrath, wherewith they be mooued against others, knowe not what they doo, and like men distracted and rauished of all their sences, doo all things ouer-thwartlie, and o­therwise then they ought. Isocrates counselleth those that will In [...]. take aduise about some thing, to breake the matter vnto those of whom they take counsel, as if it were concerning some other body, and not pertaining vnto them themselues. For so by thys meanes, they shal vnderstand, what is best and safest for them to doo, and that secret which they would not haue to be discoue­red, shall be concealed. This which Isocrates counselleth ought to be done by those that are noted & reprehended in some thing, if the qualitie of the matter so permit: proposing it vnto them that find fault with them, as if they asked counsell of thē about Iohan, de Bay­ros decad. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. it. This coūsell was vsed by Don Francisco de Almeida, know­ing that his Gentlemen▪ found fault with him, because he wold not assault the Cittie of Aden, after that he had ouercome the Armies of Camori, of Calecut, and Melique ayas.

3 Of this which we haue breefelie noted, foloweth neces­sarily, that it is farre better and more profitable for the Com­mon-wealth, that the Prince should be good, and the Counsel­lers naught, then that the Counsellers should be good, and the Prince wicked. For all men endeuour to imitate the Prince. Plato with great iudgment and prudence (as Tullie saith) wri­teth, Dialog, 4. de legibus. Lib. 1. Epist. fam. that as the Princes be, so the Subiects proue. If y ^e Prince be vertuous, euery man doth his best to become vertuous, and if the Prince be vicious, they be all vicious. If the Prince be an hypocrite and superstitious, they [...]e all hypocrites, and super­stitious. Cap, finali. de consilio & con­siliarijs princi­pum. Fredericus Furius saith, that when the Prince is gi­uen to Poetry, all his Courtiers fall to versifying: and when the Prince taketh pleasure in Musicke, they be all busie wyth des [...]anting, and tuning their Instruments: when he is a war­riour, they all exercise themselues in feates of Chiualrie: when he is delighted with iests, then euery one playeth the Jester. And when he is a freend vnto Astronomers, and those that stu­die the speculations of Astrologie, then euery one disputeth of S [...]heres. If, because the Musick altereth (as Plato saith) the Dialogo, 4. de Republica. customs of the Cittie be changed: much more easily will they [Page 88] be changed by imitating the Princes, who hurte all them that folow their example, with which they d [...] a great deale more harme, then they doo with the sinne which they commit, for no man dareth to tell them the trueth. For which thing, we are much beholding to Dame Flatterie, who preuaileth so greatlie with Princes, that the same which out of all question is good, is misliked, and the same which is notoriously knowne to be naught and wicked, is allowed and approoued.

Princes are now of long time accustomed to heare false tales, and to be flattered, and to haue all, whatsoeuer they say and doo, allowed and praised: that the greatest Monster which can be shewed to a Prince, is to tell him some true thing which offen­deth him, as if he had neuer seene or heard any such thing. And this is the cause wherfore Monsters offend, for if they had béen séene, they had neuer offended.

4 Princes then, seeing howe necessarie it is, that they should haue vertuous and learned men in their seruice, which might counsell and shew them, how they ought to rule and go­uerne the people which is committed to their charge: ought to consider, that both the credite and discredite of their owne per­son, and of all their Subiects also, dependeth vpon the election of their Counsellers. We sée commonly that men iudge of the Prince & his abilitie, according to the reputation of his Coun­sell. For if his Counsellers be wise, and in all points sufficient men, then is he alwaies accounted wise. For it is no small ar­gument of wisedome in a Prince, to be able to knowe and dis­cerne wise and sufficient men from others, and to choose them that are faithfull & loyall, to be his Counsellers, leauing those that be vnskilfull and rude. But when the Counsellers are not learned, prudent, and rare men, it is impossible that y ^e Prince haue a good reputation. For he erreth in the principall point, if he choose insufficient and bad men to be his Counsellers. And it is in a manner necessary, that he who erreth in a matter of most great importance, must also erre in all other things what­soeuer. For if the Fountaine be infected, all the water must ne­cessarily be also infected: euen so, if the counsell be corrupted, all the gouernment of the Common-wealth goeth to wrack. If a Prince haue good Counsellers, though he doo amisse, yet will no man beléeue it: but if his Counsell be not good, though we [Page 89] sée the Prince doo well, yet can we not beléeue it, or we thinke that it was doone by chaunce. By this may we perceiue, that a Prince who hath trustie and loyall Counsellers, doth thereby not onely obtaine good successe in his enterprises, but also great credit and reputation, both among his owne Subiects, and also among strangers. His own Subiects loue and obey him, stran­gers feare him, and all men ioyntlie with one voice singularlie commend him.

5 Euery Prince ought to thinke, that a learned Counsel is more necessarie for him, then the bread which he eateth: to the end he may heare the trueth. For Princes cannot abide to heare the simple and naked truth, by reason of the multitude of flatterers, which compasse & enuiron them on euerie side. Nei­ther is it good that euery man should be so bolde as to tell the Prince the trueth: for so they might incurre danger, to loose their kingdoms and authoritie, and be had in no account.

The royall Prophet Dauid, to shewe that all men honoured Psalme. 17. and reuerenced him, said, that they all lyed vnto him. For they that are of power and authoritie, no man dareth to tel them the trueth: but to poore men that are of small power, euerie one speaketh fréely and boldly.

If a Prince haue many Prouinces vnder his gouernment, he ought (as we haue said) to choose Counsellers out of euery one of the places that are vnder his subiection, and not out of one or two onely: for the people taketh it very impatiently, to sée that they be, as it were excluded, and cast off from the administra­tion and gouernment of the Common-wealth, seeing not one of their Countrimen to be of the Counsell: and they think (and that with great reason) that the Prince maketh but small ac­count of them: or that he taketh them to be slaues & bond-men, or that he thinketh them not woorthy to be trusted. The first ingendreth hatred. The seconde séeketh libertie, and therefore they conspire against the Prince, and confederate with strange Kings. The thirde emboldeneth them to admitte any kinde of treason against their natural Prince.

When a Prince chooseth a Counseller, he ought not to be contented with those onelie that dwell in his Pallace or Court, nor of those that are his owne Countrimen, nor of those which he knoweth by sight or by hearesaie, although they be neuer so [Page 90] wise and prudent: but he ought to be well enformed of all such as liue in any of those Prouinces which he ruleth, and among them all, to make election of him that is well known, and suffi­ciently prooued to be the best of thē all. Neither ought a Prince to make too much haste in choosing of his Counsellers, but to take leysure and time enough, in considering and learning the sufficiencie of all such as shall be named vnto him. Willinglie hearing, and attentiuely waying all informations giuen vnto him: some fauoring those that are named, some making against thē. To conclude, he ought not to elect or choose any one Coun­seller, before he haue throughlie examined his abilitie and suf­ficiencie: making choise of singular Lawyers to gouerne the Cuj at obseruat. lib, 7. cap. 12. Common-wealth, as the Emperours of Rome were accustomed to doe.

The eleuenth discourse, of the Counsell house, and of that which the Counsellers ought to doe, before they beginne to consult.

WHen the Romans serued and worshipped Idoles, and Images of Heathen Gods, they built the Temple which they consecrated to the God of counsell: in such order, that they which went to worship him, should goe downe a certaine payre of staires, to desire him that it would please him to vouchsafe and set them in their waie, and guide them in that they would doo. And this was doone after this manner, to let men knowe, how necessarie it is for him that asketh counsell, to submit him­selfe vnto the iudgment and opinion of those, of whom he de­maundeth counsell. The Church was not verie cléere, to shew that counsell ought to be kept very secret: and y ^t no man ought to knowe what is handled or treated of in it. For oftentimes men coniecture what is determined in the Counsell, if they know about what the Counsellers consulted. So that men com­monlie vse to saie: tell me what Counsellers there were, and vpon what matters they sate, and I will tell thée what was concluded.

2 Lycurgus would not haue, that the houses wherein they Plutarchus in vita Lycurgj. of the Counsell entred to consult within Lacedaemonia, should be [Page 91] magnificentlie and sumptuouslie builded. For he thought, that these exteriour and outwarde shewes of magnificence and bra­uerie, were nothing necessarie vnto Counsellers for to vse pru­dence and iudgment: but that they did rather hurt & endomage the most excellent gifts of the mind, making men either abiecte and effeminate, debasing their courage, or els proude and arro­gant, and mooued with such vaine and superfluous buildings. For continuall experience teacheth vs, that when men méet or assemble together in some gorgious place or statelie Hall, most sumptuouslie and costlie built and set foorth: then they spende the time in looking vpon the comelie building, or in beholding the Images engrauen and carued in the walles, the cunning pictures artificiallie painted on the entries and doores, the statelie Pillers erected vp a meruailous height, and of wonder­full thicknes, and in viewing the curious workmanship of the Roofe. And so, as well they that come into such stately places to giue counsell, as they that come to take counsell, busie theyr braines, and employ all their sences in those friuolous thinges, loosing that which is woorth a great deale, for that which is worth little or nothing.

This which Lycurgus ordained in Lacedamonia, (which Plato in Alcy­biade, 1. Common-welth was not adorned and decked with many mag­nificent ornaments, and gorgeous furniture, though it was ve­rie welthie and puissant,) taketh no place in those famous and Xenophon de Cyri minoris expendi, lib, 6. rich Common-welths, in which such magnificence is vsed. For it beséemeth such Common-wealths, that the houses in which the Senators and cheefe Gouernours enter, to consult vpon matters concerning the estate of the Realme, be answe­rable to the magnificence and greatnes of the same Common­wealths.

They that cause Schooles to be builded for those that learn, ought to follow Lycurgus his saying: erecting them in places that be not delightfull or pleasant, so that there be nothing in them, to allure and withdrawe the eyes of the Schollers from their Bookes, which maketh them nothing attentiue to heare that which their Maisters read vnto them.

Plato (as S. Ierome and S. Basil affirmeth) did choose out Maisilius Fisci­nus in vita Pla­tonis. a place in Athens to teach, which was neither delectable nor wholesome: because he béeing hard, & of a strong temperature, [Page 92] the place shoulde not hinder his imaginations and thoughts, which necessarily ought to be frée, and not occupied in such re­creations, delights and pastimes, which would haue hindered him from contemplation and studie. The great Turke hath a window couered with a greene vaile, or Curtaine of silk, forth of which window, he séeth and heareth all that the Bassaes saie and doo, when they assemble together in the house of Counsell. And thus béeing neither seene nor heard of the Bassaes, he har­keneth to all what they speake, and heareth the mones of those that complaine. And the Bassaes and Turkish Counsellers, not knowing whether the Turke be harkning behind the window, or no, dare not but deale iustlie with those that come thether for iustice, or spend the time in vaine talke, which tendeth not to the seruice of their Lord. Some Counsellers were woont to commaunde, that the doore of the Counsell-chamber should be left open, because no man shold stand behind the doore and har­ken what they said.

3 In old times past, no man might in Fraunce speake any­thing Tamara. lib, 1. cap, 7. de mori­bus gentium. which concerned the Common-wealth, vnlesse he pro­nounced it publiquelie, and he that came last into the place of counsell, was put to death. So did the Cranes (as Plinie saith) in Asia, when they assembled together in the night time in the Lib. 1, cap. 23. place from which they should depart, out of that Countrey into another, killing the Crane that came last of all. In Fraunce al­so Idem Tamara vbi supra. in ancient times past, if any man made any stur in the place of counsel, there came incontinently a Sergeant vnto him, with a naked sword in his hand readie drawne, who menaced him to strike if he helde not his peace. And if he left not talking at the third threatning, the Sergeant cut his cloake in such order, that the rest that was left did him but little seruice.

4 As often as the Emperour Fredericke called his Coun­sellers, Papa Pius lib. 3 de dictis et factis Alfonsi regis. to conferre with them about matters concerning the Common-wealth, he vsed to say. I would to God that it would please him to doo me so good a turne, that whē my Counsellers enter into the Counsell house, they should cast of counterfaiting and dissimulation, and all fained pretenses at the very gates and doores of the Chamber, in which they enter to counsel. And if I am not deceiued, it is sufficient if they leaue but onely one thing, to wit, their owne priuate commoditie: for this is it [Page 93] which ouerthroweth and destroyeth all counsels: and for looue of this, men faine and dissemble: which deceitful practises, vn­doubtedly L, 30. Tantū ni­mirū ex publicis malis sentimus quantum ad pri­vatas res pertinet, nec. in eis quic­quam acrius quā pecuniae damnū stimulat. they would not so much vse, if they more regarded the publique commoditie and welfare of the Common-wealth, then their owne particular profit. But (as Titus Liuius saith) the losse of the Common-wealth neuer gréeueth vs, but so farre as it toucheth the hurt and domage of our owne goods and sub­stance.

5 When the men of Galacia would consult vpon matters of great waight and importance, they vsed a most abhominable cruell, and deuillish sacrifice. They ripped vp some one mans Idem Tamara, vbi supra. breast with a sharpe sword, and by the spilling of the bloode, or the tearing and vnlacing of his members, they gessed and diui­ned of that which should happen, concerning those things about which they consulted. In a certaine part of the kingdome of Persia, they vse this. When they that dwell in that Countrey goe to aske counsell of the Priestes, vpon that which they deter­mine to doo: the Priests hold in their hands the booke, which is commonly called the booke of Lots or Fortune, and according to that which they find written in that booke, they answer them that come to consult with them. It séemeth that the Booke of Lots or Fortune, wherewith they deceiue the ignorant Com­minaltie, was brought out of Persia: wherefore the Inquisi­tors did with great reason forbid the same Booke of Fortunes to be read, that they which are of little vnderstanding, might not be deceiued by it.

6 Séeing that counsels, and the successe of those thinges which are consulted, proceede, (as we haue saide) from the ho­lie Ghost: it is conuenient, that all Counsellers before they beginne to consult, should humblie request and beséeche the holie Ghost, with great deuotion and humilitie, to direct them in their way, and leade them in their consultations, saying that seruice which is properlie belonging vnto the holie Ghost. And if the shortnes of the time permit it not, they ought to sing the Himne of the holy Ghost, as it is rehearsed in the Church, Come holie? Ghost &c. And unitating King Dauid, Veni Creator spiritus. &c. Psalme, 24. Psalme. 123. saie, Lord mine eyes looke vp and trust in thee, thou shalt de­liuer me out of the snares &c. King Dauid saith not, that he loo­ked to his féete, to deliuer them from the snares, but that he [Page 94] lifted his eyes vp to the Lorde, that he should deliuer him, and found himselfe not deceiued, as he afterwarde mentioneth. O Lord, my soule hath escaped as the byrd out of the snares of the Hunters, and the snares were broken in péeces. Plato dooth Marsilius Fisci­nus in argum. Dialog. Plato. qui in­scribitur Theag. counsel vs, that we should continuallie beséech God, that it wold please him to direct that which we shall doo, vnto his holie ser­uice. For it is he, that by the means of the Angels, sheweth vnto vs what we ought to doo. For this is an euerlasting truth, con­firmed with perpetuall experience, that in the most harde and difficult things of all mans life, where the wit of man is most blind, and doth most want counsell and forces: there dooth the diuine wisedome of the Lord, shew it selfe most cléerely & won­derfullie. That great Iudith, with a noble and excellent mind, said vnto those that were besieged in the Cittie of Bethulia. And now who are you that haue tempted GOD this day, and will Capitulo, 8. bind the counsels of the Lord our God? And so she rebuked the faintnes of the Gouerners of Bethulia. For it is a token & signe of great weakenes and ignorance in a man, to doo all matters according to his own wisdome and humane counsels. It were better and safer, to desire the Lord that he wold be our guide in all our actions and counsels: for he will direct vs in the readie path, & shew vs which waie is best, séeing that he neuer fayleth to aide those y ^t powre forth their praiers vnto him. Those An­gels, that by the commaundement of God, aide and helpe men in their waies, and rule the actions of vertuous Princes, are comprehended vnder those companies, which are called Domi­nions Marsil. Fiscinus vbi supra. and Principalities, as Dionysius Arcopagita saith.

7 And the better to bring this to passe which we saie, we ought to doo according to the commaundements of our Sauiour and Lord Jesus Christ, who neither deceiueth himselfe nor can not deceiue them vnto whom he giueth counsell. For from him floweth the spring of vnderstanding and knowledge, and he is the author and cause of all goodnes. From him doth it proceede that Counsellers be good, & he is the cause why Kings gouerne their kingdoms well, and minister iustice. And this did King Prouerb, 8. Salomon, aske of the Lord, saying: Lord send me thy wisdome downe out of thy holie heauens, and sende her from the throne of thy Maiestie, that she may be with me, and labour, that I may know what is acceptable in thy sight. If those that in olde [Page 95] times past worshipped Idols, asked counsell of them, and the deuil to deceiue them used many kinds of Oracles and prophe­cies, (as I wrote more at large in my Bookes of pollicies and Common-wealths) it is more thē reason, that we, which serue and worship Christ the redéemer of the worlde, should humblie offer our prayers to his holines, and request him, that it wold please him of his goodnes, to fauour & helpe vs in all our coun­sels. And no doubt, seeing the holie Ghost is he that beadeth vs in all our actions: he will choose that for vs, which shall best please his holines. And that counsell which we choose through his inspiration, is the best, and which most appertaineth vnto vs.

8 The night time is very fit to consult. And for this cause did the Grecians call it [...]. that is to be wise. For Plutar. in lib. de curiositate. when the Counsellers assemble together, to confer about mat­ters in the night time, those things in which men be commonly occupied by day, doo not hinder or trouble them: and with the stilnes of the night (as Virgil saith) all things are quiet. Ho­mere, Aeneid, lib, 4. Cum tacet om­nis ager pecudes, pictae (que) volucres. Iliad. Lib. 2. to she we that the silent night time was most commodi­ous to consult, said, that it did not become Princes to sléepe all the night, who ought to consult vpon matters concerning the Common-wealth. And for because y ^t when a man is not with­drawne from his booke, neither by his busines, nor by any o­ther meanes, it greatly confirmeth his memorie, and profiteth him much for the inuention and contemplation of that which he searcheth and learneth: no doubt, but the quiet & still night, which cutteth of all occasions that may hinder a man, is the fit­test, and best time to studie in: especially, because the minde at that tune is more frée, and readier to muse and consider of eue­rie thing.

9 First of all before the Counsellers beginne to consult, they ought to sée that no man be in place, that may heare that which is spoken off in their consultations. After that the Am­bassadors of King Tarquinius, had conspired with the Sonnes Plutarchus in [...] ­ta Romulj. of Brutus and other young Gentlemen, to restore Tarquinius to his kingdome, they solemnized their conspiration with the death of a man, whose bloode they dranke, and touched his en­entrailes: that they might by that ceremonie, binde thēselues to keepe counsell, and helpe one another. And to doo this, they [Page 96] assembled together in a desert house, where no body did dwell. But as it fell out by chaunce, a certaine. Seruant called Vin­dicius, was in the same house, who séeing them enter in on the suddaine in great haste, could not gette [...]ut: but spying a large Larget in one of the corners of the Chamber, presentlie fell to the ground, and couered himselfe with its and so he lay verie secretlie, and saw all what passed betwéene them? and hearde how they determined to slay both the Consuls, and cast downe the Cittie gates for the Tarquinians to enter; and take possessi­on of the kingdom, which he presently reuealed vnto Publicola béeing one of the Consuls.

Don Alfonso King of Castile, béeing in the Courte of Al­menon Gariuai, lib, 11. cap, 12, de com­pend. histo. King of Tolido, Went into the Kings Orchard, and espy­ing the King comming thether to walke and enjoy the pleasure of the Garden, beeing accompanied with his Noble men and Counsellers, he hid himselfe behind the Arbour where the king was woont to walke in, that he might heare what talke there shold be had between the King and his Counsellers. The king being come, and hauing his Counsellers by him, he asked them whether they thought, that the same Cittie of Toledo beeing so great, and so strongly built, might be taken of the Christians, or no. All of them answered, that it was impossible, that such a strong Cittie should be ouercome by Christians: except one, that was of opinion that it might be taken, if the Christians should burne their Corne, and barre them from receiuing any fruite of the lands about them, for the space of seuen yeres: and so they should be compelled to render vppe their Cittie into the handes of the Christians, vnlesse they would sustaine hunger and famine. And after the King of Tole do had ended his talke, he chaunced to looke on the other side of the Arbour, where he espied Don Alfonso the King of Castile, lying▪ on the grasse, as if he had beene a sléepe. Which thing he tooke verie gréeuously, fearing leaft he had hearde all their talke: and to try whether he slept, they cast melted lead in his hand, which pearced quite through: and for this cause he was called, El de lamano horada­da, that is, he of the hand-bored through. He was also called so, because he was verie francke and liberall.

Many other examples might I alledge, of counsels that were discouered by such as were secretly in place, where the [Page 97] matter was handled, and heard all what was said: but because they be all well night known vnto all men, I mean not to stand vpon them. This may suffice, that it is a common prouerbe with vs in Castile. Tras parred o soto, no digas tu secreto a otro:

The twelfth discourse, what Counsellers of Princes ought to doe, when they be assembled to consult.

PAulus Iurisconsultus saith: that those con­tracts L. Naturalis ff. de praesc [...]ip. ver. which are called Contractus immomi­nati, depend vpon giuing and dooing. After the same manner may we saie, that all hu­mane affaires, depend vpon saying and do­ing. These are the two ballances of deede and word, which S. Isidorus saith that all C. omnis, 45. d. men carrie about them. This, (as Homer writeth) did Phae­nix Maister to Achilles, teach his Scholler. Our Sauiour and Act. cap, r. caepit Iesus sacere et do [...]re. Lord Jesus Christ, (as S. Luke saith) began to doo and teache his most holy doctrine. Therefore if those matters which are in consultation, depende vppon dooing and saying: it is necessaire that all Counsellers before they determine, consider that s [...]me things ought to be said and doone, and some ought neither to be said nor doone: other some ought to be said, but not doone: and some ought to be doone, but not said.

Metrodorus said vnto Sextus Pompeius, that if he would be Plutarchus in vita Mar. Anto. Lord, not onelie ouer all Sicil, but ouer the whole worlde also: he should let him cut the gables of the Ankers of that shippe, in which he himselfe was, & Mar. Anthonius. Pompey answered, thou mightest haue doone this without I had known of it. But now since I know it, I am content with y ^t which I haue, and I wil not breake my oath & promise made vnto Anthonie, that he should come safe to my shippe without any danger.

2 Those Counsellers whom Princes take to giue them counsell, ought to doo as Aristotle counselled Valeriꝰ Max. li. 7. de sapienter dict. & fact. mo­nuit vt cum co, aut quā [...]a [...]ssi­mé loqueretur quo scilicet apud regias au [...]es vel siletio tutior vel sermoue esset ac­ceptior. Calisthenes his Cosin to doo, viz. that when he spake to great Alexander, he should be short, and speake to the Kinges contentment. But [Page 98] Calisthenes not regarding his counsell, openlie rebuked Alex­ander for his follie, in embracing the pride of the Persians, and Plutarch in vita Alexan. Mag. & Iustinus. lib, 15. commaunding the Macedons to worship and honour him, and to call him the sonne of Iupiter. Wherefore Alexander béeing incensed with anger against Calisthenes, because he reprehen­ded him in the face of all the world, and thereby incited & styr­red vp others to despise him, and sette nothing by him: and because he prouoked many to kill him, he commaunded his hands and feete to be cut off, and his eares, nose, and lips also, and to be throwne into a Dungion, where euery one might looke vp­pon him: whose gréeuous paines and deform [...]tie, one Lysima­chus a valiant Gentleman pittying, sent a cup of poyson vnto him, that he might drink of it and die. Which thing béeing told vnto Alexander, he cōmaunded that Lysimachus should be cast without a weapon, to be deuoured of a fierce Lyon. But he like a noble and couragious Knight, wrapped his cloake about his arme, and without any feare at all stepped to the Lyon, and thrusting his hand into his mouth, caught holde of his tongue, and pulling it out of the roring Lyons heade, killed him. For which acte, Alexander estéemed much of him, and did not onlie pardon him, but also largely rewarded him, aduauncing him to great honour.

3 Out of that which happened to Calisthenes, may cléere­ly be séene, that the same is true which Euripides the Greeke Poet saith. I set little by that wise man, that hath no wit for himselfe. These be they that take vpon them to giue counsaile to euerie one, and can giue themselues none: not much vnlike Horatius Fun­gar vice cotis acutum redere quae ferrū valet, expers ipsa se­candj. Hernan. Nunes. the Signes of Innes, which shew the waie into the house vnto all men, but they neuer enter themselues: and Whetstones which sharpen kniues, but remaine blunt themselues and can­not cut: and the Hearneshawe that can giue counsell to euerie one, and for himselfe he can giue none.

This is said of the Hearneshaw, because the Pigion hauing built her nest vppon a tree, and béeing threatned by the subtile Foxe that he would eate her, if shée woulde not consent to giue him part of her young ones, the Hearneshawe tooke pittie on her, and counselled her to giue the Foxe none, saying: that she should not discourage herselfe, nor feare the Foxe, for he could not clime vppe to the trée where she was. So that the Pygeon [Page 99] after that time, wold giue the Foxe nothing: who asking why? she answered, because y ^e Hearnshaw had told her, that he could not clime vp to the Trée, and therefore counselled her to giue him no more. The Foxe vnderstanding this, went to y ^t Hearn­shawe, and began to praise his wisedome, saying, that of all byrds, none could gouerne their liues, and liue so wisely as he: and among other matters, he asked him how he was woont to doo when he would sléepe? The Hearneshaw answered, that he laid his heade close to his bodie, and couered it with his wing, and saying so, shewed him the manner how, and put his heade vnder his wing: then the Foxe stept neere, and on the sudden tooke him, and did eate him. And so the Foxe did verilie accor­ding to Euripides the Greeke Poet, his saying:

that is,

4 That which Aristotle taught his Cosin and Scholler Calisthenes, ought to be obserued of al such as be conuersant with kings, speaking vnto them & giuing them counsel: which was, that they should be very warie, in all their spéeches and actions: imitating and following the example of the Prophet Nathan, who though he was sent from GOD, to rebuke king 2. Regum, 12. Dauid for his sinne committed with Bethsaba, commaunding her husband to be slaine: yet would he not tell it him plainely, but vsed a figuratiue kind of spéech, and proposed the matter so vnto him, that he could not choose but confesse his fault, and re­pent himselfe of his offence committed against the Lorde. Ioab 2, Regum, 14. vsed the same slynes and subtiltie, sending a subtile Woman, which fayned herselfe to mourne, and putting on mourning ap­parrell, went to King Dauid, and falling downe to the ground on her face, said, that she was a widow, and her husbande was dead, and that shée had two Sonnes, and that they two stroue in the field, and none béeing there to part them, the one smote the other and slewe him. And that the whole familie was risen against her, and wold haue her deliuer him that smote his bro­ther, to destroy the heyre also: and so they should quench her sparkle that was left, and should not leaue to her husband nei­ther name, nor posteritie vpon the earth. And the King know­ing that the hande of Ioab was with the widowe in all thys, he [Page 100] pardoned his son Absolon, and commaunded him to be brought again. Erisistratus, Phisition to King Antiochus, vsed the same Lucianus in Dea [...]yria. policie: and because the King shold not be offended, he said vn­to him, Lord your sonne is sicke for loue, and she whom he lo­ueth, is my wife: then the King requested him, to let his wife do according to his sonnes desire: affirming, that if he had béen in looue with his own wife, he would suffer her to deliuer him out of the daunger of his disease. Then Erisistratus aunswered. Lord, it is thyne owne wife whom thy sonne loueth. The Ca­tholicke King, Don Hernando the fift, King of Castile, in like manner, because he woulde not haue the Ladie Blanche hys Ga [...]iuai. lib, 19 capit. 6. de com­pend. Histor. Queene gréeued, for the death of the young Prince, Don Iuan her sonne, commaunded his Gentlemen to tell her, that he was dead himselfe, and that the young Prince liued: and anon after he entred in vnto her, and comforted her with his presence.

5 Manie subtilties and craftie pollicies must be vsed by them that will saie the trueth, vnto one that is not willing to heare it. And as the Phisitions prepare their purgations with sirrops, and gild their pilles, least the Patient should be moo­ued and offended with the bitternes of them, euen so it is ne­cessarie, that his mind should be prepared vnto whom we mean to tell the truth. For the trueth dooth no lesse mooue and offend where it is told, if he vnto whom it is told be not prepared, thē any medicine whatsoeuer, if it be giuen out of time and season. And therefore the truth may not be told vnto all men, nor at all times, nor in euerie place. And when the trueth is tolde, we Hypocrat, Apho­rism. ought to consider, who, where, when, how, and vnto whom he telleth it: (as the Phisitions regard & perpende all the circum­staunces of the disease, to cure their Patients,) and if it be not so doone, in stéede of dooing them good vnto whom it is tolde, it maketh them worse, and causeth them to abhorre and detest those that tell it.

The trueth ought to be told vnto Princes, with due honour and reuerence, as the Prophet Nathan did vnto King Dauid: and the Prophet Daniel, when he declared the Dreame of the Cap. 4. Trée vnto King Nabuchadnezzar, saying vnto him: My Lord, the Dreame be to them that hate thee, and the interpretation thereof vnto thine enemies. Iohannes Franciscus Lotinus (whō Considera. 319. we followe in this discourse) saith: that when Counsellers [Page 101] doubt vpon any thing, and their opinions be diuers, they ought not to crosse or gain-say them that are of a contrarie mind, least they shold séeme more curious in defending theyr own opinion, then carefull for the common profit. It is therefore conuenient for Counsellers to accustome themselues, patiently to heare all that which in the Consell is saide or spoken: and not to spende the time in declaring and expounding their own opinions, and contrarying that which other Counsellers alledge. For manie men in consultations, are more like to Maisters, that read and dispute in Schooles, then Counsellers that consult what ought to be doone.

6 If the counsell which is giuen, be manifestly knowne to be good, no man ought to care whether he that giueth it be vertuous or vicious: for that counsell which without doubt is prooued to be good, ought alwaies to be preferred. But this ought in all counsels to be considered, whether he that giueth the counsell, regard more his owne particular profit, then the commoditie of the Common-welth: for by how much the more counsels are frée from all respects of priuate commoditie, by so much the more are they profitable vnto the Common-wealth.

Niceas, to make the Athenians to assent vnto him, when he perswaded them that they should not wage warre against Si [...]il, told them that he should reape no profit by it, if they did as hée counselled. For he well knewe, that if they enioyed peace and liued in quietnes, there were a great many that woulde take vpon them to gouerne the Common-wealth: but if they war­red, there was not one Cittizen, that might either be his su­periour or equall.

7 If it happen that in counsels, some Counsellers gaine­saie that which others say, and alledge the contrarie, then they whose opinions are crossed, ought not to thinke y ^t they doe it be­cause they hate them, or make no account of them: but because L. Item [...]inus §. principaliter ibi preter naturalem hominū ad dis­sentiendum faci­litatem, ff, de re­ceptis arbitr. they thinke their owne opinions to be the best. For (as Vlpian the Lawyer saith) men be naturallie enclined to be contrarie in opinions, and not to agrée one with another. And (as the Em­perour Iustinian saith) there is nothing in all humane affaires so iust, nothing so cleere, and nothing so manifest, which is not called in question, and of which there be not sundrie and diuers opinions: and, (as it is commonlie saide) men differ far [Page 102] more in vnderstanding and iudgment, then they doo in fauour. Horat, lib, 2, ser­mon, Saty. 1. Quot capita, tot sententiae, so many heads, so many mindes.

8 Many Counsellers regarde not what is spoken in the counsell, concerning that vpon which they consult, but rather what he is that speaketh, and if he be their fréende, they allowe all what he saith: and if he be their fo [...], they disalow it, though it be neuer so profitable for the Common-wealth▪ and though they know not or vnderstand not, what he saith, nor what they gaine-saie. As one did who chaunced to sléepe in the Counsaile­house, Bal [...]az [...] Cossa in Aulico. when the Counsellers should giue their voices: and bée­ing awaked by the other Counsellers, & asked what he thought of that vpon which they consulted: rose vp béeing halfe a sléepe, and not knowing what he said, vttered these words. My Lords, I say the contrarie vnto all what soeuer Alimani hath sayde, (for he was his aduersarie.) But Alimani answered, I haue said nothing. Why then replyed the other, I gaine-say al what euer thou shalt say. Such men are very hurtfull to the Com­mon-wealth.

9 Though in witnesses, the person that beareth witnes, is more regarded then the testimonie which he giueth, yet in L. 3▪ §. Eiusdem ibi de testibꝰ nō testimonijs cre­ditorum ff, de testibus. counsaile, we ought not so much to regarde the Counseller, as his counsaile: for the persons be in authoritie by reason of the counsails, and not the counsails by reason of the persons. And though it be true, that they which are more experienced, know better what is necessarie in euery thing, then they which haue no skill at all: yet ought euery prudent and wise man to heare the opinion and liking of manie. For no one man (as we haue said) can know al that is required: and oftentimes a simple fel­low his aduice, is as good as euer any was heard. As I writt more at large, in my booke of craftie & prudent counsails. And for this cause it is said of olde among vs in Spayne:

that is,

And Athenaeus sayth:

[Page 103]There was a certaine Prince, that deuised how he might enter into Italie to make war, and a Foole said vnto him, Lord I beseech your maiestie, to looke how you shall get out againe, if neede force you to come backe out of the Countrey; for there be many waies to get into it. If Charles king of Fraunce, had considered this, he had not béen so troubled in fléeing out of Italie, when his Armie was ouerthrown in the Riuer of Tarro. The counsaile which the Foole gaue, was like vnto that of the Foxe, who would not enter into the Lyons Denne, because he sawe the steppes of many that went in, but of none that came forth againe: Horace

10 The Lacedaemonians consulting vpon a matter of great Plutarchus in Politiis. importaunce, a certaine Cittizen called Demosthenes, béeing a wicked and vicious man, gaue an aduice which was very con­uenient and much to the purpose: but they reiected it, and elec­ted one of the Elders to pronounce the same opinion in the ve­rie same wordes, (as if one should powre out the liquour that was in a foule vessell, into a pure and cleane vessell) because it Aulus Gelliu [...], 18, cap. 3. should be the better liked of the people. And that they which were to giue their voices after him, should allow and approoue that counsell, séeing it was giuen by a sage and vertuous man.

11 Counsellers ought to shew their mindes freely, con­cerning that which is consulted, though they know that the o­ther Counsellers wil not approoue y ^e counsaile which they giue, for (as Tullie saith) counsails ought not to be rebuked for the Phillippica, 2. successe, but for the reasons which are alledged to haue them fo­lowed. And they ought not to excuse themselues, saying: that they shall loose their credite, if they counsell anie thing which will not be approoued: so that it is more profitable, and better for the Common-wealth, to haue them accounted prudent and wise, then mightie and puissant: and they that wil haue theyr counsels followed, seeme not so much to counsaile as to com­maund.

12 Many thinges, though they doo no harme at the [Page 104] beginning, neuerthelesse at the end they become very hurtfull and dangerous to the Common-wealth, if they be suffered to take roote, (as Ca [...]o Censorius saide) in one of his Orations Tit, Liu. Lib. 34 which he made in the Senate, against the superfluous expen­ses of the women of Rome. For there is no estate of men, who if they be suffered to assemble and consult together secretly, but they will shr [...]wdlie endomage the Common-wealth. And (as the same Ca [...]o said in an Oration, which he pronounced against those that were assembled together in Rome, to celebrate the Feastes which they called Bac [...]hanalia,) those secrete méetings Nullas ad huc vires coniuratio, cae [...]e [...]m incre­mentum ingens virium habe [...], quod ind [...]es plu­ [...]s [...]iunt. and congregations, which when they beginne haue no forces, and are very weake, if they be dissembled and not looked to in time, increase and growe in strength more and more, and in such order augment dailie, that it is a very difficult and harde matter [...] repaire the harme which they doo, especially in mat­ters concerning Religion. This is manifestlie séene in those which bring in newe sects: which if they be not ex [...]inguished and quenched at the first beginning, as the fire when it begin­neth to burne: in time will gather so great forces, that they quite disturbe and disquiet the whole Common-wealth. Ther­fore it is necessary, that before they take roote, great care and diligence be taken to ra [...] them out quite, and not suffer them to take roote. For they be easily remedied when they beginne, but with much adoe when they grow dailie, and encrease. As Ouid affirmeth, saying.

13 Young men, because theyr naturall complexion is hote, and haue had but small experience of Fortunes gutles (as Hanniball said to Scipio) in consultation [...]asilie incline to that which is more magnificent then sure, not regarding what may succéede and follow. But olde men, because theyr naturall com­plexion is cold, and haue oftentimes béene crossed with euents Tit. Liu. lib. 2. decad, 3. caeteris omnibꝰ in con­silio salutaria magis quam specio­ [...]a suadentibus. contrary to theyr expectation, follow surer counsels then mag­nificent or honourable. We ought therefore to temperate the vehemencie of youth, with the wisedome of olde men, and con­sider and examine what is said both of olde and young, choosing [Page 105] that counsell which is safest, and most profitable for the Com­wealth: and when there is any doubt, which counsell ought to be allowed, then ought the olde mens aduice be approoued and put in practice. Roboam King of Ierusalem, lost the kingdome 3. Regum. 12. and dominion which he had ouer the twelue Tribes of Israell, and onely two of them obeyed him, the Tribe of Iuda, and the Tribe of Beniamin, and that, because he had refused y ^e counsaile of the ancient. Francis the King of Fraunce, because he folowed the counsell of his Admirall, (who was a young man) refusing Ma [...]bri [...]us [...]o­seus parte, 3, cap. 2, historiae mu [...]. the aduice which his aged Counsellers gaue him, was ouer­throwne and taken prisoner, in the battell of Pauia, by the soul­diours of the Emperour Charles the fift his Armie.

14 They which consult about any matter, ought to fol­low that counsell which is least hurtful to the Common-welth. for it is impossible in great enterprises to be deliuered from all dangers that are like to fall. And for this cause it is commonly said:

One danger is wonne by the other. As wee haue in the beginning of this Treatise in more ample manner declared. And he that neuer dooth aduenture, can neuer loose nor gaine. For after the danger commeth the profit: and cowards because they greatly feare the euents of matters, neuer atchiue haughtie enterprises. If a man thinke that he may execute a thing without aduenturing, he shall neuer bring any thing to passe. For many times the successe faileth, not onely of those things which we confidently, and not without good reason hope for: but also of those things which we thinke to haue wel pro­uided for, as well in great and honorable enterprises, as in smal and particular actions. They therfore that cōsult, ought not to delay the execution of the same which is cōcluded, because there is danger in it: if the profit be greater then the danger which is like to follow after the execution thereof.

15 The Persians vsed to consult vpon all matters in theyr Tamara de mo­ribus gentium. banquets, when they did ca [...]e and drinke: and after they had ended theyr banquet, they determined what they would haue put in execution. And this they did because the Counsellers should freely shew their minds, concerning that whereon they consulted. For wine causeth men to speake the truth, according [Page 106] to that, In Ʋino veritas. Alexander the great, commaunded Plin. lib, 14, cap, 22. that those Ambassadors which came vnto him, should be wel­commed with great banquets, & made drunk, because he might learne or sift out the right cause of their comming, and about what matters they were sent vnto him.

The Germans assemble together to consult béeing all Armed, Cornel. Tacitus de moribꝰ Ger­manorū, de pace atque de bello plaerum (que) in conuiuijs, consul­tant. and if they approoue that which was determined, they shaked their Pykes and Launces: (for this was a token of agréement and consent,) and contrariwise, if that which was consulted li­ked them not, then they murmured and made a noyse, and a confused cry. Besides, they consulted in banquets vpon matters concerning peace and warre: because they thought that at such times they were not troubled with other cares, & they thought that at such times, they were hotter and readier to take any en­terprise in hande. The people were not craftie nor malicious, and the next day after they turned againe to consult vpon their affaires, that they might conclude and determine what they should doe, when as they could not faine or inuent.

They that liue in the Country of Phrigia, eate and drink to­gether Tamara vbi supr. Bernardꝰ mende de Sale, libro. 3. §, 17. vpon the cost and charges of the Common-wealth, be­fore they begin to consult: for they are of opinion, that eating and drinking in publique assemblies, dooth reconcile them toge­ther, that are at discord one with another, and that it doth take away seueritie, pride, arrogancie, and melancholie, as things Caelius Rodo­ginus li, 15, ca. 18 estranged from the ende for which banquets and feastes were ordained. The Countie Ribadeo answered a certain Captain, Hernādo de pul­ga in lib. de viris illustribus. (which came vnto him from his enemies, to entreate him that they might eate and drinke together, before the day which was appointed for the fielde) that if he did eate and drink with him, the desire which he had to buckle with him, wold he taken from him.

16 They that thinke that men ought in consultation, to deliberate vpon on onely matter, are greatly deceiued. For of­ten-times, matters be of this qualitie, that the one dependeth vpon the other: and it is necessarie to consider, the inconueni­ences which may follow that which is determined in the coun­sel: and if they that consult know what is past, and vnderstand what is present, they may the better coniecture & diuine what may fail out▪ Demades saide, that the Athenians resembled [Page 107] those that make no account of their health before they be sicke. Demades saide this, because the Athenians in their deliberati­ons, alwaies varied about that which was past, not endeuou­ring to prooue what was necessarie to be doone. It is said that they of Genoa in their counsels, dispute vpon that which is past: and the Florentines vpon that which is past, and that which is present: and the Venetians both vppon that which is past, pre­sent, and to come.

17 It chaunceth many times when men consult, that that thing which seemeth to be profitable for the Common-wealth, doth happen to be very hurtfull & preiudiciall. As for example: The Emperors of Greece called the Turks to ayde, who after­ward destroyed them, and tooke the Empire from them. In the yeere of our Lorde GOD 1513. foure Monarches entred Petrus Bembus Lib, 8, Historiae Venetae. league against the Ʋenetians, viz. Iulius Secundus Pope, the Emperour Maximilian, the Catholicke King Don Hernando, and Lewes King of Fraunce. And the Ʋenecians, though they were driuen to great necessitie, yet would they neuer accept of the helpe and ayde, which Selim the King of the Turks offered them: who had sent them worde, that he would defende them with all the power that he had. But they feared least if he had once entred into Ʋenice, he would haue doone, as his predeces­sours dealt with the Emperors of Constantinople. Francis King of Fraunce, in those warres which he made against the Empe­rour Charles the fift, (who, as he often protested, pretended no other thing, then to conserue those estates & patrimonies which by right and iustice were his owne) tooke a great companie of Germains to helpe him, and payed wages to all such as woulde come to helpe him against the Emperour, which Souldiers af­terward did him wonderfull much harme. The same King of Fraunce, brought the Armie of Soliman King of the Turkes to helpe him in those warres, which he made against the Empe­rour Charles the fift, and thereby did Christendome farre more harme, then he did good to the kingdome of Fraunce.

Don Alonso King of Naples said, that men were so hote to be reuenged on their enemies, that they were like to the birds, which for fighting one with another, sawe not them that came to take them.

18 The Counsellers of Princes, ought in such manner to [Page 108] say their minds, that they séeme not to contende in wordes, but ought to séeke and pick out waies and meanes, which they sup­pose to be more fitte, and better to perswade that, which they thinke to be profitable for the Common-wealth. Some vppon subtiltie, though they knowe what ought to be doone, and what is best and most profitable: yet they propose it after such a ma­ner, as if they doubted of it, to the ende that they which heare them, should not cease to enquire and examine what were con­uenient to be doone, and that if they happilie say any thing, they might contrarie them, and crosse that which they alledge.

Plinie counselleth them that would willinglie perswade any Lib. 1. Episto. thing, to imitate the Phisitions, who with fine speeches, swéet words, and pleasant reasons, perswade their Patients to take those medicines which they giue them. Quintilian admonisheth them that consult, to be curteous, fréendlie, and tractable, and not to speake too hastilie. For those counsels are well giuen, that are vttered with leysure and iudgment.

Theophrastus saith, that they which giue coūsaile, ought not to vse garnished and adorned reasons, but such as be to the pur­pose, and applied vnto that which they goe about to perswade, alledging some examples of matters, that are like vnto those things vpon which they consult. For it is commonlie said. Wilt thou know what shall be? then consider what hath béene. And for this cause men say, that experience is a certaine kinde of proofe.

19 Manie when they giue counsaile, vtter it after such an intricate and obscure manner, that no man can plainely vnder­stand what they saie: and this they doo to make that which they saie, to agrée with that which afterwards dooth happen and fal out. This guile and subtiltie the deuill vsed in olde times past, when he answered them by Oracles, that came to aske coun­saile of him, answering them after such a manner, that howso­euer the matter fell out, yet his Oracle might haue béene ap­plied vnto the euent: and with such aunswers did he deceiue men, and dooth yet daily more and more. Those Counsellers Cap, 16, Con­solatores onero­ [...]omnes vos estis. which shew not their minds cléerelie (as Iob saith) are trouble­some and miserable: and after they sée the successe and euent of the matter, if it be not good, then they cast the fault vpon them that would not follow their counsell, saying: I tolde you well [Page 109] enough what would come of it: but you would giue no eare to my words: whereas indéede, their words were such, as coulde not be vnderstoode, and might rather haue béene termed Ora­cles thē counsails: and so they heape one mis-fortune vpon an­other, not without their great harme whom they counsailed: Lucanus. Erro­ribꝰ addere cul­pam. blaming them, and laying the fault in them, when they sée that they haue had ill successe in their affaires: this is to heape on [...] mis-fortune on another; to blame men after they haue erred. For they find fault with them whereas they be blameles: and counsails (as we haue said) ought to be iudged whither they be good or bad, by the reasons which are in them alledged, & not by the successe & euents, which many times are out of all iudg­ment and humane vnderstanding: neither is any man bounde to diuine of that which shall come to passe.

20 If the Counsellers of Princes cannot perswade theyr Lords, to doo that which is profitable for the Common-wealth, yet shall they not cease to doo what they can, that the Common­wealth sustaine no losse, alwaies hauing more regarde of hone­stie Lib, 1. cod. de caducis tollēdis. De prohibita feudi alienatio­ne. &c. and vertue, and the profit of the Common-wealth, then of their Princes. And they ought (as the two Emperors Iustinian and Lotharius saie) to esteeme and sette more by the publique commoditie, then by the priuate profit of their Princes. And this becommeth Princes best: for the office and dutie of a good Prince is, to procure that his Subiects liue in peace, & be well gouerned. And therfore Counsellers shall doo better and safer, to present their Princes with that sentence of the two Empe­rours, L. princeps, ff. de legibꝰ. Prin­ceps legibus so­lutus est. Iustinian and Lotharius: then to tell them that Princes are not subiect to the Lawes, and that they may vse their au­thoritie, and doo what they will, according to those clauses, De plenitudine potestatis, ex certa scientia & motu proprio. They which vse these spéeches to their Princes, are deadly enemies, not Restaulus Ca­staldus in trac­tatu de Impera­tore. q. 111. onelie to the people, whō they hurt with their detestable coun­sails, but also to the Princes whom they serue. For they being heere on earth, as Images or portratures of God, (whom they ought to imitate in godlines, authoritie and wisedome,) these Counsellers, not regarding the welfare of the Common-weale Aristoteles. Po­lit. 5. cap. 10. so much as their priuate commoditie: counsaile them to imi­tate the deuill, and to be his Ministers, exercising tyrannie and all kinde of crueltie, vppon those Nations which GOD hath [Page 110] committed to their gouernment. Whereas notwithstanding, L. digna vox est maiestate reg­nantis legibus alligitū [...]e prin­cipem profiteij. Quintinus in ca [...] Nouit de indici [...] §, Fin. Institut. de iustitia et iure Iuris praecepta sunt haec, honeste viuere, altrū non laedere: ius suum cuique tribuere. Math. 7. that which most belongeth to the maiestie of a Prince (as the Emperour Theodosius saith) is to be subiect vnto that which the Lawes ordaine. The King Antigonus saide, that no disho­nest & vnlawful thing, might be lawful and honest to a Prince: for though he be a Prince, yet is he not dispenced withall, but [...]ht to behaue himselfe according to y ^t lawes of nature, which shew how men ought to liue honestlie one with another, with­out hurting their neighbors, contenting themselues with their owne, and not offering any iniurie vnto another, which they would not haue others to offer vnto them. And within this di­uine precept (as our Sauiour and Lord Jesus Christ teacheth vs) be the Lawes and Prophets included. This rule & doctrine which our Lord and Redéemer gaue vs, is so plaine and cléere, that it needeth not any glosse or exposition at all.

21 They that consult vpon any matters, iudge better of that which others counsell, then they doo of that which they counsell themselues. For euerie man is ledde by nature, to like well of his owne opinion and sentence: because his iudgment is not so free to iudge of his owne matters, as of a strangers af­faires. And for this cause, ought euerie one that writeth bookes and pamphlets, to shew them to their freends before they com­mit them to the presse: that they may fréely shew their minds, what they thinke ought to be chaunged, and what to be correc­ted: for no man can iudge aright of those works which he ma­keth himselfe, because the loue which he beareth to himselfe, and all what he dooth, doth blind him, and suffereth him not to mislike with any thing that is of his owne dooing. And therfore it is commonlie said, that the first thing which a Child dooth af­ter it is borne, is that it maketh the father fonde: for it doth in such manner blind his eyes and iudgment, that he thinketh his child to be a great deale fairer then all other children. As the Ape béeing asked of the Fore, how he might knowe her young ones if he should chaunce to méete them, that he might spare them, answered: that they were the fairest that he could find. Who going into the fielde, found them, and did eate them, for they séemed not so faire vnto him, because he looked not on thē with the same affectiō which their mother did beare vnto them.

22 When one giueth counsaile to men of simple vnder­standing, [Page 111] vpon a matter concerning the Common-wealth: he ought not to alledge many reasons, which may bring them into some confusion, and stay them from giuing their resolutions. For when they be (as it were) dulled, with the confusion and multitude of reasons: they be hindred frō executing that, vnto which their naturall inclination doth pricke and entice them.

The Emperour Charles the fift, said, that the Counsellers of Princes, were spectacles to that Prince that lacked wit & vn­derstanding, to iudge of such reasons as were alledged vnto him: he said furthermore, that those Princes which could not sée without those spectacles were not very wel: but they were worse, that could not sée neither without them nor with them. And the Counsellers of Princes, are not onely the spectacles through which they sée, but also y ^e looking glasses in which Prin­ces behold what is doone in theyr absence. Euery Prince ther­fore, ought to knowe and vnderstande, whether they represent the right and true Image of that which they shewe: for there be certaine hollowe looking glasses, which shewe a thing quite contrarie, and otherwise then it is in deede: for some glasses make a little thing seeme bigge, and some make a great thing séeme little: and againe, some glasses make one thing to shewe as if there were a great many. All these differences and many more, which the perspectiue Arte teacheth vs concerning loo­king glasses, are found in Counsellers of Princes, who informe not their Princes truelie of all that is doone. And therefore it is most necessarie for a Prince, to enquire and learne, whether his Counsellers of whō he taketh counsaile vpon matters con­cerning the Common-wealth, be pure and cléere looking glas­ses, or whether they be false glasses representing a thing other­wise then it is, and whether they séeke colours, to make that which is blacke seeme white, and white to shewe as if it were blacke. For thus Painters doo, and those Counsellers that imi­tate them.

23 There be some Counsellers, that are so proude and arrogant, and that take such delight in their own sayings, and in hearing themselues speake, that they knowe not howe they shall conclude, or with what periode they will shut vppe theyr speech: often repeating that which they haue said: not because they might be the better vnderstoode, but to féede their humour [Page 112] with the pleasure which they conceiue in their owne wordes, and as S. Gregorie saith, to be accounted men of singular elo­quence. Lib. 26, cap. 18 In Iob. But Ecclesiasticus teacheth the contrarie, saying, make not many wordes, when thou art among the Elders, neither repeate a thing often. And King Salomon counselleth vs, to cō ­prehend Eccle. cap. 10. many matters in few words, and not to spend a great companie of words in vttering a fewe thinges.

Phocion one of the chéefe Gouernours of Athens, said, that that was the best kind of speech, which in few words contained much matter: for words are like money, which is accounted so much more precious, as in smal quantitie it containeth greater price and value. And some men are so enamoured with theyr owne words, that wen they thinke they haue spoken brauelie, they aske, whether they haue not spoken out of the purpose, not because they doubt whether they haue or no, but because they would be praised. The best and surest thing that one may doe Sanct. Grego. lib. 10. cap. 1. Iu Iob. in consultations, is to come with all speede to the verie point of the matter it selfe, and straight waies to resolue what ought to be doone, without spending much time, in alledging reasons, which serue to no other purpose, then to shewe that they be elo­quent. It is an easie matter (saith Titus Liuius) for one to find Libro. 8. out wordes and reasons, after he knoweth what ought to be doone.

24 They that in consultations consider and forecast but few things▪ shall easilie be resolued: and they that reuolue ma­ny things, shall neuer be able to determine. We haue of olde had this prouerbe in Castile.

which is to saie,

So that they which consider all doubts, forecast all euents, and thinke vpon all the inconueniences that may happen, are neuer like to conclude and determine: and though they doo de­termine, yet doo they very seldome put the same in execution which they haue agreed vpon. But they that are nothing scru­pulous, and passe euery thing ouer lightlie, hauing no regarde what inconueniences may fall out, they doo easily conclude ma­ny matters, but put few in practise. And to shunne these two [Page 113] inconueniences, Counsellers ought to choose that, which they thinke to be most profitable for the Common-wealth: and not, as it is commonly saide, of two inconueniences, to choose the least; for there is no choise of good, in ill thinges: and often­times, Hieronimus de an▪ in moralib▪ when a man shunneth the greater inconuenience, he a­uoideth both.

25 The time ought not to be spent in counsailing, vppon that matter which is alreadie dispatched; vnlesse some thing happen concerning the same, which doth require, that y ^e Coun­sellers should consult vpon it againe. Cato Vticensis (as Plu­tarch In politicis. saith) when he knewe, that that thing which was hand­led in the Counsell, would be hurtfull to the Common-wealth, he did driue out the time in declaiming: and once prolonged his Oration so long, till that Iulius Caesar, (who was Consull at that time) asked him when he would make an ende, and shewe what he thought, concerning that about which they consulted. But he spent the time without concluding any thing, touching that which Iulius Caesar demaunded of him. Then Iulius Cae­sar commaunded him to be put in prison, because he would not make an end, and let him vnderstand his minde & opinion, con­cerning that which he asked of him; and all the Senatours a­rose out of their places, and accompanied Cato, till he came to the prison. Which thing Iulius Caesar séeing, caused him to be set at libertie. Manie alleage all the inconueniences that may happen, concerning that matter which is consulted: to the end, that while they deliberate vpon it, the oportunitie may passe, which was offered to haue it put in execution. The Emperour Charles the fift, said, that the Parliaments in which the Ger­mans Ludouicus dul­cis de dictis et factis imperat. Caron. [...]. consulted, vppon matters concerning the Empire, were like Vipers: for as the young Vipers kil their mothers, so that which was concluded in one Parliament, was recalled and made frustrate in the next.

26 Prosperous euents, cause men oftentimes to iudge ill of a thing: for when it hath succeeded prosperouslie once, or twise, they thinke that it will alwaies fall out after the same manner. The same happeneth vnto them, that to reuenge some Liuius, lib. 30. little iniurie, or to shunne some small danger which they feare, they are so blinded, that without considering the perrils which may folow, by dooing that which they determine to do, although [Page 114] they be tolde what were better, yet they will not heare those which counsaile thē: and one little affection can preuaile more with them, then all the reasons that may be offered, be they neuer so forcible. So that we commonlie vse this Castilian pro­uerbe.

that is,

They therefore that consult, ought to be frée from affections, that they might fréelie without any passion, sée and coniecture what may fall out, as if they had it present before them: and if they doo this, they shal sée whether they haue any reason in that which they pretend. Cato Vticensis said, that those men were to be accounted valiant, who séeing the daungers before theyr eyes, were not any thing molested at all, with any perturbati­on, or passion of feare. Lucan.

And Martial.

27 When they that are of a contrarie faction or partiali­tie, giue anie counsaile worthy of reprehension, their aduersa­ries ought not to rebuke them, least they which heare them, thinke they doo it more for ill will which they beare them, then for loue or affection towards the Common-weale. Moreouer, Counsellers, if a matter fall not out according to their expecta­tion, they ought not to reprehend the Princes whō they serue, because they folowed the worst counsaile; for so dooing, they should gréeue them worse: and in déede the Princes are blame­lesse; for they doo but follow the counsaile which their Counsel­lers Plutarch. in trac-tatu quo pacto. possis adulatorē ab amico dig­noscere. giue them. Anctus and Eulus (being two of the King Per­seus his verie familiar freenos) as long as he liued in prosperi­tie, vsed no crosse spéeches against him, but such wordes as

[Page 115]28 They that giue counsaile, (as the reuerende Father In Lib. cui titu­lus Dux pecca­torum. Lewes de Grauado saith) ought to be constant in mind: for as grauitie and waightines in matters accompanie prudence, so facilitie and lightnes betoken follie: and therefore euery one ought to take great héede, he be not too easie and light in these sixe things: to wit, in beléeuing, in graunting, in promising, in determining or concluding, in being easilie & lightly conuersant among men, and in béeing angrie. For in all these consist mani­fest danger, if men be ouer light and easie in them: for he that beléeueth easilie, is light of hart: he that promiseth easily, loo­seth his libertie: he that doth grant easilie, doth often repent: he that doth lightlie determine and conclude, putteth himselfe in danger to erre and doo amisse: (as King Dauid did in Me­phibosheth, 2. Regu [...]. 4. his cause) but he that is light in cōuersation, is lit­tle accounted of: and he that is soone angrie, sheweth a mani­fest token of foolishnes: for he that is patient, knoweth how to behaue himselfe, and how to leade his life: but he that cannot bridle his anger, cannot choose but commit much follie.

29 Plato exhorteth them that goe about to perswade any In Politicis. thing, which is necessarie or profitable for the Common-welth, to imitate the Musitions, who when they finger the strings of their Lutes, to make some harmonie or musick, they doo it soft­lie and smoothlie, without any force or violence: he exhorteth them also, not to vse cunning & artificious spéeches, nor speake sharplie or craftilie, but sincerelie and truelie, and that theyr words be agréeable to honestie and iustice, vsing graue senten­ces fitte to perswade.

30 Such men as haue alwaies had prosperous lucke, and good successe in their affaires, can verie seldome giue good coun­saile, as Hanniball tolde Scipio, in the parlie which they had, Tit. Liu. lib. 30. cōcerning y ^e peace which the Carthagineans were about to make with the Romans: & to perswade him to it, Hanniball alleaged, [Page 116] that Scipio was a young man, and had alwaies had good lucke, and that they which had neuer béen crossed with ill fortune, did verie seldome consider, and forecast all vnfortunate euents which might fall out. For the vertue of counsailing well, pro­ceedeth from experience: and they that haue tryed aduersitie as wel as prosperitie, are better able to iudge of both, then they which neuer haue béene vnfortunate: and they which haue no experience, cannot giue counsaile so well, as they that haue de­liuered themselues out of trouble and aduersitie.

31 Many though they be olde in age, yet in manners, be­hauiour, and prudente, they be but young: and such men are Esay, 65. Puerj [...]ētum annorū. called in the Scriptures, boyes of an hundred yéeres old. Who though their age be sufficient, yet they be not fitt to giue coun­saile in matters which require wit & iudgment: and we ought more to regard how they liue, and what they doo, then of what age they be. They that be young in gouernment of life, lightlie I [...]uenis moribus change their minds, and easilie passe from one opinion to ano­ther: for this tricke is proper vnto them that want iudgment and vnderstanding to examine that which ought to be determi­ned in the Counsell.

32 They that counsaile Princes, ought not to vse words and reasons, which beare a greater shew then they be of force: for he that goeth about to perswade a Prince, must thinke that he taketh another matter in hande, then if he should perswade the people: for they that perswade the people, séeke all means, arguments, and reasons, (though they be neuer so false) to prooue that which they goe about, and they vse all the figures that Rethorick teacheth. But to perswade one man (as Quin­tilian Lib, 1, cap. 3. saith) eloquence little auaileth. Antigonus king of Ma­cedon, said vnto one y ^e went about to perswade a certaine thing Erasmus in Apo. libro. 4. vnto him, with painted words and sophistical reasons: thinkest thou to talke vnto me, as if thou spakest with the people? Le­onides Psutarch in vita Lycurgj. King of Lacedaemonia, saide vnto another that spake too much of a waightie matter: freend, thou speakest of a good pur­pose, but to no purpose.

33 Counsellers ought to doo like the Phisitions, and giue no counsaile, before they know vppon what thing counsaile is demaunded, and what ought to be doone concerning the same. For as it is not enough for the Phisition to know the disease, [Page 117] vnlesse he also knowe what medicine ought to be giuen: so the Counseller, though he knowe what is consulted, that sufficeth not, vnlesse he also vnderstand what ought to be doone therein. So that it is a thing most necessarie for a Counseller, to haue notice of that which is handled in the counsell. For no man can giue counsell in any matter, concerning mans life, vnlesse he haue both science and experience, touching that which is con­sulted. But when Counsellers are acquainted with y ^e substance of the matter, and vnderstand it throughlie, then may they ea­silie Facile erit expli­catis cōsilijs ac­commodare re­bus verb a. Matth. cap. 1. Aphorismo, 1. Quintil. li. 2. c. 14 giue their resolutions: and (as Ti [...]s Liu [...]us saith) find fitt words to deliuer their minds: contrariwise, if they vnderstand not the matter which is consulted, they are (as our Lorde and Redéemer Jesus Christ saith) like blinde men that leade the blinde. Neither is it sufficient (as Hippocrates saith) for the Phisitions to be acquainted with the infirmities, and knowe what remedies ought to be applied, but also the time, and other more circumstances ought to be considered. And no lesse ought Counsellers to regard and consider, that all circumstaunces of time, place, &c. be accomodated and fitted, to execute the same which shall be determined. Moreouer, séeing that all thinges vpon which counsaile is taken, are vncertaine, and voyde of all firmnes and stablenes: counsails ought to be baried and chan­ged, conformable to the time and place, not onely euery day, but euery howre also, and euery minute, when necessitie shall re­quire it. And for this cause it is said, Sapientis est mutare consili­um: it is the point of a wise man to chaunge his counsaile. Se­neca faith, that counsaile ought to be taken whilst the matter is handled. And Ouid saith:

34 Some Counsellers are so ambitious, that they will not consent to any counsaile but their owne: and wil not suffer any other mans counsaile to be put in practice, though it be ne­uer so profitable for the Common-wealth, staying and delaying the execution thereof by all meanes possible. And whereas they might atchiue both honour and glory, by bringing the same to passe which is concluded, they will not: onely because it was not doone according to their own counsaile and liking. But such [Page 118] men knowe not, that the true glorie of heroycall enterprises, dooth not onelie consist in knowing what ought to be doone, but also in executing that which is determined.

35 They that consult vpon matters concerning the Com­mon-wealth, ought not to forgoe any profit that may be gotten: no not so much as that cōmoditie which may be gotten by such men, as haue greatly endomaged the Common-wealth. Cha­brias a Cittizen of Messala, saide vnto one Euridanus, (a man cheefe & principall in the gouernment of the Common-welth, but very sullen and rigorous in nature. O Euridanus, thou art a necessary euill in the Common-wealth: for they that liue in it cannot choose but be conuersant with thée, and yet because of thy frowning and lowring countenaunce, they cannot abide to continue with thee.

36 Plutarch counselleth them that goe about to perswade the people to any thing, that they shoulde not all of the at once, sing one note, but that there should be diuersitie of iudgments at the first, but afterwards (as if they were ouercome by them that shewed better reasons) they should agrée all in one opini­on, and all iumpe, as it were, into one mind. For so the people, thinking that they were forced vnto that vnitie of consent, will soone be perswaded, that that which they say, is most profita­ble for the Common-wealth. But in smal matters, and such as cannot greatlie endomage the Common-wealth, it were good that the Counsellers should in earnest differ in their censures, one from the other, euery one vsing his own reasons and argu­ments, that they might afterwards in greater matters of more waight and importance, seeme to agree, and be all of one mind. This pollicie did many Hereticks vse, suborning some of theyr freends that shoulde gainesaie that which they saide, and after­wards when they did dispute with them, they shoulde confesse that they had erred in misliking their doctrine, séeing they had with such forcible arguments and necessary conclusions proued and confirmed it vnto them.

37 There is much difference betwixt those that in coun­sailes enquire what ought to be doone, and those that contrarie and crosse other men, to shew that they onely vnderstande all themselues, and that no man els is so fine headed as they be. For they that enquire of all circumstances, concerning that [Page 119] thing about which they consult, consider and sift the matter throughlie without affection, and their iudgment is not incum­bred with any thing that may hinder them from diuining and coniecturing such accidents, as may happen in those matters vppon which they deliberate: and these men are very good and necessarie in a Common-wealth; for they oftentimes shew vn­to them that gouerne it, some thinges, which before that time haue laine hidden and secrete from them. But contrarilie, they that contrarie those that propose any thing in counsell, loue not the Common-wealth, but hinder and ouerthrowe all affayres both publique and priuate: for whilst they alterate & contende, Nimis altercan­do veritas amit­titur, & Plato, Dialogo, 1. de legibus. Oportet autem non con­tentiose sed qui­eté rem inqui­rere. they cannot finde out the trueth of any matter, but rather (as Boaecius saith) they goe farther from the trueth: for it is the propertie of those that gaine-saie euery thing which others al­leage, to defend and maintaine their own opinion and conceit, thought it be neuer so false and hereticall. Otherwise if men dis­puted, minding to sift out the trueth, and not to ouerthwart o­ther men in their reasons, they might easilie perceiue and vn­derstande the veritie of each matter. And to this ende were the Sanctorum Pa­trum disputatio­nes non erant contentiones sed collationes. disputations of the holie Fathers called, not contentions or differencies, but collations and conferencies. For their intent was not to shewe which of them was wisest, and knewe most, but to search out the trueth of that which was in question.

39 The Counsellers of Don Iohn Prince of Auis, (who Chronica Duci [...] Nunaluares Pe­reira, cap, 20. afterward was crowned king of Portugal) perceiuing that their Lord alwaies folowed the counsaile of Don Nunaluares de Pe­reira, determined all of them ioyntlie together, to stande stiflie against Don Nunaluares, & gaine-saie all whatsoeuer he should saie. And on a time, as the Prince consulted with his Counsel­lers vpon a matter of great waight, all they that were of hys Counsell, misliked that which Don Nunaluares alleaged, con­cerning that which was proposed, which thing, whē Don Nu­naluares perceiued, and marked to what intent they did it, be laughed: and the cause of his laughter being asked of y ^e Prince, he answered: because they haue all of them agréed, to disagree from me, and to withstande and contrarie what soeuer I saie. But the Prince liking that counsaile which Don Nunaluares gaue, folowed it, nothing respecting y ^t all his other Counsellers were of a contray iudgment. This thing ought to be shunned▪ [Page 120] which is so hurtful and preiudiciall to the Common-wealth, as nothing can be more: for what can be worse, then to set more by his owne opinion, then the welfare of the Common-welth▪ Those that assemble together to cōsult, ought to imitate Aristi­des, who beeing wont to contend with Themistocles, whē they were both of them sent by the Athenians in Embassage, saide: Plutarch, in A­pothegma. howe nowe Themistocles, shall we leaue our emnities héere? and when we returne to Athens, we may doo as we did before.

39 Some men easilie varie and change, when they sitte in counsaile: others be very obstinate and stiffe, and will not varie at all. Certes it were good that a Counseller shoulde be grounded and setled in his opinion, and follow that which sée­meth vnto him, to be most profitable for the Common-wealth. But he that will not change his mind, when as his counsaile, if it were folowed, would doo the Common-wealth much harme, is obstinate, selfe-willed, and stubborne: and is not to be ad­mitted to giue aduice vpon matters concerning the estate of a­ny Common-weale. For wisedome consisteth not in being self­conceited and selfe-willed, but in knowing how to make choyse of that which is best and most profitable: for it is the propertie of the deuill, to perseuere still in dooing ill: and therefore we vse to say.

that is,

Tullie saith, that he doth not change nor alter his counsaile, Episto. famil. li. 1. Episto. no. that changeth it to choose a better: and as the Pilot that gui­deth the shippe, mooueth the sayles from one side to the other side of the shippe, to saile the better, and will rather obey the Winde thē loose the Shippe; so they that consult, ought to va­rie and change their mindes, rather then to endemage or hurt the Common-wealth. And indéede, the ende for which counsaile was inuented, is to haue both a great many to shew theyr ad­uice, and each one of them to be of diuers opinions, that the best of them all, may be picked out amongst them.

40 Tullie affirmeth also, that they which seperate, that which is Lib. 3. officior. Atticae leges Cyrsillū quen­dam vtilia hone stati preferentem lapidibus cū v­niuersa familia obrui volebant. honest, frō that which is profitable, ( honestum ab v­tili) doo the world great harme: for euery one nowe respecteth [Page 121] commoditie, nothing regarding vertue. And the same Tullie In lib, partit. Consideratio. 355. saith, that in all counsailes, that ought to be chosen, which is most profitable for the Common-wealth. This opinion dooth Iohannis Franciscus Lotini folow, because he thinketh y ^t Tullie followed it, when he was olde, after he had séene the euent of manie publique affaires: and because Aristotle concluded the end of counsaile, to be the vitilitie and profit of the Common­wealth. This opinion of Tullie, is confirmed with that which the Lawes of the twelue Tables ordaine, to wit, y ^t the cheefe ende of all Lawe, tendeth to the conseruation of the Common­wealth. The vttermost end and issue of the Law is, the preser­uation of the Common-wealth. When men deliberate vppon the safetie of the Common-wealth, they ought not to regarde honestie, but setting aside all respects, they ought to folow that which is profitable. They which defende the maiestie of theyr Kings and Lords, wil not suffer anie one to saie, that any thing which the King hath graunted or allowed, is ignominious, in­famous, or vnhonest. For they say, that no insamie, reproche, or dishonour, can fall into any determination which the King approoueth. But I take that opinion, to be of more waight and moment, which holdeth, that wee ought to make more ac­count of honestie, then of vtilitie: but if that which is honest, depend vpon the Ciuill and positiue Lawes, and not vppon the naturall and diuine Lawes, let all the Ciuil lawes cease, when as the necessitie of the Common-wealth is so great, that it can not be remedied vnlesse they be broken. This holdes in those Common-weales, which acknowledge no superiour: and in those also which do acknowledge one, if they onely violate those Lawes which they may break, without the hurt or hinderance of their Superiour: for all the humane and positiue Lawes, which are instituted and ordained for the conseruation of the Common-wealth, cease, if they be hurtfull and domageable to the Common-welth. Titus Liuius termeth thē mortal Lawes, for warres change those that were made for peace, and peace breaketh those that were made for warre.

41 Themistocles, in a certaine consultation, said, that he Plutarchus in vi­ta Th [...]m [...]stoclis. had thought vpon a thing, which would be verie profitable for the Common-wealth, but it was such as might not be pronoū ­ced openlie, nor knowne vnto all men. They that were of the [Page 122] Counsell, answered, that he should make Aristides acquainted with it, and if he approoued it, they would euery one like of it: vpon this, he shewed vnto Aristides, how that he had determi­ned to fire their enemies Shippes, that they béeing consumed with vnlooked-for flames, the Athenians might be absolute Lordes ouer all Greece. Aristides hearing this, tolde the other Counsellers, that Themistocles his counsaile, was very profi­table, but very vniust; whereupon they woulde haue no more mention made about it, and that with great reason. For when­soeuer any question is mooued concerning the soule & substance, or riches and authoritie: it is most manifest, that the soule is better then the whole compasse of all the world: and it ought not in any case to be permitted, that learned flatterers should Franciscus Vil­lalobos in prob. be admitted to such counsels. For these men are they that vse to iustifie both parts, & by reason of these, each side thinketh that he doth according to iustice. Frauncis King of Fraunce, did owe vnto the Emperour Charles the sift, two Millions of crownes, and the learned men of his Counsell told him that he ought not to paie them: which counsaile the King no doubt had folowed, if the Emperour had not had his two sonnes as pledges for his assuraunce. On the otherside, the learned men of the Emperors Counsell, said, that the King of Fraunce ought to paie those two Millions of crownes, because he had waged warre against him vniustlie, and was taken prisoner in the same conflict: and all those crownes were in comparison nothing, to the losse and do­mage which the Emperour had receiued by those warres. But the King of Fraunce coulde not be perswaded, but that hee had right according to his Counsellers mindes, and forthwith, sent a strong and mightie Armie towards Naples, where he lost out of his own treasure, aboue sire millions of crownes, and al the treasure of Fraunce, with all the youth of his Nobilitie, and all theyr Captaines: and at the ende neuerthelesse, hee was con­strained to paie the two millions of crownes.

42 Silence at all times, and in all places (as Plutarch [...]n libro de offi­ [...] auditoris. saith) is a great Ornament vnto a Counseller: especially whē he heareth another speak, he ought not to interrupt his spéech, and at euery word which he faith, to cut him off and hinder his discourse, but patiently to suffer him that speaketh, to saie his minde, and make an end of his spéech, though it doe ouerflowe [Page 123] with many words which be not very acceptable vnto him. And when he hath made an end, then ought not the other too hasti­lie beginne, to gain-say or crosse that which he hath saide: but staie a while (as Eschines saith) and sée whether he will recall that which he hath saide, or correct it, or adde any thing more vnto it, or detract some thing frō it. They which incontinent­lie interrupt and breake another mans discourse, and doo so loose their patience, that they cannot stay y ^e hearing of foure or fiue reasons alleaged by another, but beginne to speake before the other hath doone, they doo both trouble others, and yet cannot be heard themselues. But they that be accustomed to heare an other giue his verdict, patientlie with sufferaunce, and a quiet moderation of mind, admit and allow those words and reasons, that are good, profitable, necessary, and expedient, and kéepe thē in remembrance: but those that are vaine, foolish, & false, they seuer and discerne thē from the other: and so they shew them­selues to be more desirous to search out the trueth, then to con­tend and striue, whereby they be known not to be men without consideration, or ouer-rashe and headlong hastie, not contenti­ous, or wranglers. Therefore he that will atchiue honour and credite, ought to heare him that speaketh, attentiuely, méekely, willinglie, pleasantlie, & with great tolleration, as if hee were at some religious and sacred banquet.

43 Xenophon said, that euen as they that be thriftie and Plutarchua [...]i supra. good husbandmen, vse to buy as well of theyr enemies as of their freends: so they that heare others, ought with great vi­gilancie and watchfulnes, alwaies to be attentiue to reape pro­fitte by that which they heare, whether it be good or bad: and consider whether they that speake, say any thing which tendeth to the matter, or whether they be deceiued, and are wide from that which they aime at, whether they alleage forcible reasons, or clatter out a heape of vaine arguments; and whether they vse any good figure or laudable forme of spéech, ending their pe­riods with some gracious clause, or commit some great absur­ditie, whereby they thought to get some credit or vaine-glorie: or some such other like thing. And this ought to be noted by the hearers, to the ende that they may consider with themselues, and examine their owne defects: for they cannot so wel marke faults in thēselues, as they can easilie correct in others: which [Page 124] when they find in others, they ought to consider whether they iarre not in that string themselues, before they finde it a faulte with others. For certes it is an easie matter to rebuke, but a very vaine thing, and ignominious vnto vs, if wee be faultie our selues, and take not heede frō falling into the same errors: wherefore when we rebuke any one, we ought to thinke con­tinually vpon that saying of Plato, haue not I perhaps commit­ted any such thing? and euen as in the eyes of other men, wes sée the representation of our owne Image: so ought we to ima­gine our owne words in the words of other men, to the end we should not ouer-rashlie dispise others, and that we should take more héede and diligence when we speake our selues. Moreo­uer, it were very profitable and expedient, that Counsellers should compare that which they heare others say, vnto y ^t which they saie themselues: and attentiuelie consider, whether they heare any thing that is not wel solowed by him that reasoneth. And if he declare and expound it not, as wel and sufficientlie as the matter requireth, then they shold themselues endeuour to expound, and explane the same more cléerely and exactly, or de­clare it after some other order or manner, or take the same ar­gument, and quite change it from the beginning to the end, vt­tering and pronouncing it in better words and fitter phrases.

44 They that assemble together to consult, ought not to be proude, and puffed vp with vaine glorie, nor leane vppon a­ny thing, bending their bodies on neither side, nor hang theyr heads, but sitte bolt vpright, hauing ther bodies erected in com­lie order, and giuing eare vnto him that speaketh, in so much that hee may perceiue them which heare him to be attentiue: They ought moreouer to be constant, sincere, pure, vncorrup­ted, simple, without dissimulation, not puffed vppe with pride, hatred, or any other thing: in so much that they ought alwaies to be in a readines, and not to seeke what they shoulde say con­cerning those things whereof they consult. For as many things are required to make a man perfectlie vertuous, like as in Mu­sicke to make a consorte, manie notes are requisite which con­curre altogether in one tyme within their limitted compasse: so contrarilie, if any one thing be wanting, the whole is blemi­shed: as also in Musicke one iarre brings all out of tune. And therefore Counsellers ought to take great heede, howe they [Page 125] behaue thēselues in consultations, especiallie when they heare any other to discourse: for then ought they not only, not to knit or hang the browes, nor to cast their countenaunce downe­wards, giuing shew of sorrowe, nor to gaze about, nor to turne their bodies, nor to hold their féete vndecentlie: but also, not to make signes, not to whisper with another, not to laugh, not to yaune, not to nodde as they that be drowsie, and not to be rude in behauiour: for all such like things are worthy of correction, and require great care & diligence. And note this; that all that which we haue saide of those that heare, ought also to be obser­ued by those that speake. Furthermore, as in Tennice play, hée that receiueth the ball, ought to mooue and bend his bodie, cun­ninglie to bandie it backe againe to him that sent it, so in reaso­ning and discoursing, as well he that speaketh, as hee that hea­reth, must do his part & duetie, and dilligentlie obserue what he ought to doo. So that Counsellers ought, whether they heare or speake, to behaue themselues orderlie in all respects; and take heede when they begin to speake or discourse of any thing, that they be not too tedious; for many, when they once beginne to talke, they neuer make an end.

45 The Counsellers of Princes are subiect vnto two great inconueniences, The first is, that if they counsaile not theyr Princes to doo that which they thinke to be most profitable for the Common-wealth, without hauing any respect vnto theyr owne profit, or any other thing; then they discharge not their dutie. The second is, that if they doo counsaile their Princes, to doo that which they will not doo, then they incurre daunger of their liues. And to shunne these inconueniences, the best and safest way for them is, to beware of both extreames, and folow a mean in euery thing: shewing their minds vnto their Prince with great modestie, concerning euery matter, (as that which toucheth nothing their own persons) in such order, that if the Prince follow their aduice, he may doo it willingly of his own accorde, that it séeme not that he is drawne or forced to doo it, by the importunitie of him that giueth the counsaile. And if the Counseller doo thus, there is no reason why the Prince should beare him ill will, or be highly offended with him: and so the Counseller may auoide that danger, which els he should incur, if in any thing hee withstoode the Prince his pleasure: or the [Page 126] selfe-liking and opinion of the other Counsellers. For if the suc­cesse be infortunate, euery one endeuoureth to dispatch him which gaue the counsaile. So that in this case, when Counsel­lers counsaile their Princes modestlie (after the maner which we haue shewed) though they gette not that glorie which they obtaine when the counsaile falleth out prosperously: yet they haue two commodities, the one, that they be not subiect to anie daunger, the other, that though their counsaile haue no prospe­rous euent, yet they gette no discredite by it, but be rather in more account. And contrarilie, they that will be chéefe & princi­pall in the Counsell, and wil suffer no counsaile to be preferred before their owne, if their counsaile fall out vnhappilie, & haue but had successe, then they are rebuked, & beare all the blame: and though it fall out well, yet the discredite and infamie which they procure when the matter dooth fall out infortunatelie, is greater then the credite or glory which they get whē al things succeede prosperouslie.

46 As they that are inuited to some banquet, must be con­tent Plutarch. de offi­cio auditoris. with that whith is sette on the Table before them, with­out asking any thing els: euen so in counsels, they that heare another man speake, ought to heare him with great attention: and not to mooue any doubts, or interrupt his speech with vain questions: for all the profit that commeth thereof, is onelie to trouble him that speaketh, and cause him to erre, and digresse from the purpose. And therefore they ought not to be trouble­some vnto them that are in the Counsaile, asking them often about one and the selfe same thing: for such (as Plutarch sayth) Vbi supra. are like those little byrdes, that cannot yet flie, and yet be al­waies gaping at other birds bils, to receiue theyr foode alreadie champed and chewed by them. To conclude, it is the point of foolish and simple fellowes, and such as haue no witte, to be as­king of questions at euery word, and to be still enformed vpon euery point.

47 They that consult vpon matters of great importaunce, ought to consider, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) whether that Lib, 18, which they determine vpon, be profitable vnto their Princes, and whether it may be put in execution, without harming or endomaging the Common-wealth. They ought also to consi­der; whether they that giue the counsaile, are like to come into [Page 127] into trouble if it fall not out prosperouslie: and who shall gaine the credit and honour if all thinges succéede happily. And aboue all, they ought to haue a regarde, what the people talke, if the Prince doo as they counsaile him; for though all other men vse to follow those counsailes, which are most profitable for them, though they be not altogether iust: yet Princes ought to doo nothing (as the Emperour Tiberius saith) that passeth the boundes of iustice: greatly regarding their fame & reputation: and what would be saide of them, if they should followe coun­sailes that were hurtfull to the Common-wealth.

The thirteenth discourse. Of the Counsell of estate, and of the ordinaunces and lawes that appertaine to the same Counsell.

THe Counsell of estate (as Plato saith) is the an­ker Dialogo, 12; whereon dependeth the safetie or losse of all the Common-wealth. For this Counsell looketh to the whole Common-welth: and (as Isocrates saith) it is the soule thereof: and it is In Areopagitico. like to prudence in man, which hath a care of the estate of the whole bodie. All other counsailes depend vpon this one Counsell: and it is called the Counsel of peace, because the cheefe and principall intent of this Counsell is, to procure that euery one may liue in peace and quietnes: for this is the ende for which the Counsell of estate was ordeined. For (as Plato saith) warres are not made for any other cause, then to Dialog. 1. de le­gibus. procure peace. This Counsell of estate, doth oftentimes change the gouernments into tyrannies, and quite destroy the Com­mon-weales: and, (as Hesiodus saith) one ill counsaile giuen by some wicked man, causeth the decay and ruine of many Cit­ties: and therefore it is commonly said, that all the welfare of the Common-wealth, lyeth all in all in the counsaile of estate. And because in my Bookes of Common-weales, I writte of al the other Counsels in their proper places; I mean in this place to entreate of the Counsell of estate, which is (as the Emperor Adrianus Iunius animad vers. lib. 3, cap, 9. Charles the fift saide) the knowledge, power, and vnderstan­ding, yea, the verie eyes, handes and féete of euery Prince.

[Page 128]2 Fredecicus Furius saith, that the charge of the Counsell of estate, is Ciuill (as the Lawes terme it) and whether the In libro de con­silio & confilia­rijs principum. kingdomes be gotten by force of Armes, or by inheritaunce, it is pertaining to the Counsell of estate, to sée what Viceroyes, Gouernours, and Generals be created, as well for peace as for warre: what mariages be contracted, and what Embassadors be sent into strange Countries, and whither all other Officers discharge their duetie or no: and what prouision ought to be made and not made. The Counsell of estate ought also to take heede, that no prouisions, voyages, and expeditions be made by stealth, to the domage of the Common-wealth, and commoditie of the enemie. It appertaineth also to the Counsell of estate, to sée that all ordinarie expences & charges, be discharged in due time, as well in peace as in warre, and to giue bils for the re­ceite of the money out of the Counsell of substaunce and Reue­newes: which Counsell ought to be as a Cosfer to keepe the money, which is to be distributed and deliuered out, by y ^e Com­mission and authoritie of those that are belonging to the Coun­sell of estate. It is also belonging vnto this Counsel, to sée with what Nations they ought to make peace, and against what Na­tions to wage warre: with what people they cught to be confe­derated, and with whom to vse faire wordes and large promi­ses, but accomplish nothing, and such other like thinges, pub­lique or priuate. This holdes in that which generallie pertai­neth to the other counsels: for if this Counsell of estate, should meddle with euery particular thing that belongeth to the other Counsels, it should vsurpe the Office of them all.

3 The Counsell of estate, hath all iurisdiction both Ciuill and Criminall. And what euer is determined in it, ought to be put in execution, as if the Prince himselfe had commaunded it. For this counsaile aboue all others, dooth chéefely represent the person of the Prince: and for this cause the Prince ought to be Lib. 1. cod. de officio Vicarij. personally in those consultations which are made in the Coun­sell of estate, to the ende, that nothing be ordained, which may harme the Common-wealth. So that euery Prince ought to consult with his Counsellers, and with the learned men of his Realme, whether such ordinaunces as he meaneth to publishe be good and profitable for the Commen-wealth. For there is nothing that is more contrarie to a good Prince; and proper to [Page 129] a Tyrant, than to saie, Sic volo sic i [...]beo; stat proratione voluntas.

4 Séeing that in the Counsell of estate, it is cheefly con­sulted what ought to be doone, for the preseruing and maintay­ning of the Common-wealth it is necessarie that the Counsel­lers of that Counsell, be well practised and experienced in Mi­litarie discipline, and very skilfull and prudent in ruling Com­mon-wealths: so that they ought to knowe howe to enquire, examine, and iudge all things concerning pollicie and gouern­ment, both in peace and warre. Further more, they that consult vpon peace, whither it he profitable, it should be established or no: ought to know what is belonging to war, seeing peace and warre he two contraries: and the nature of contraries is such, that the one is knowne by the other. In auncient times past, many Senators entred into the Senate of Rome to consult, and they that had triumphed for victorie ouer their enemies, sate with the Crownes on their heads (which they wore whē they triumphed) as tokens and shewes of their vertue and excellen­cie. And this did Cyneas the Ambassadour of Pyrrhus declare, whē he béeing asked of Pyrrhus what he thought of the Senate Plutarchus in vita Pyrrhj. of Rome, he answered, that it séemed vnto him to be a counsell of many Kings, that were assembled together to consult. Liuie reporteth, that Cyneas in this aunswere, shewed the greatnes and excellencie of the Senate of Rome, for in it were not onelie manie noble and famous Captaines, with those Crownes on their heads, with which they triumphed, because they had va­liantlie ouercome their enemies, and subdued manie Princes to the Empire of Rome: but also many ancient persons of great authoritie & estimation, wonderfullie exercised in the gouern­ment of the Common-wealth.

5 Those ordinaunces and Lawes, that were made at the Macchiauellus in discursibus. first beginning of the Common-wealthy, when men were good, afterwards whēanen became wicked, serued to no purpose: for the Lawes varie according to the accidents that happen in the Citties, but the ordinaunces are verie seldom altered. And thys is the cause that good Lawes suffise not, because the ordinaun­ces remaining stable and inuiolable, doo disanull them. There was in Rome, the ordinance of gouernment, or rather of estate; [Page 130] and after wards the Lawes and Offices with which they brid­led the Cittizens. The ordinaunce of the ostate, was the au­thoritie of the people of the Senate of the Tribunes (for so the Protectors of the Commons were called in Rome) and of the Consuls: and it was the manner and order howe the Lawes should be ordained. Which ordinaunce is not change or al [...]eb by reason of any accidents that may chaunce, but she Lawes which keepe the Cittizens in obedience, they be altered: as the Lawes which were made for the constraint of adulterie, of ex­cessiue expences, and ambition, and many other Lawes aceor­ding as the people dailie grewe to be more & more wiched and vicious. But because the ordinaunces of the estate, which the people béeing corrupted) were not good, did remaine inuiola­ble: those Lawes which were renued, did not suffice to keepe the people from wickednes: but they might haue doone-much good, if the ordinaunces had béene renued with the Lawes.

6 We may easilie perceiue, that it is not good, to haue the ordinaunces remaine stable and inuiolable, when as the Citti­zens ware wicked, by two principall things: the one touching the election of Officers, and ordeining of Magistrates: the other touching the establishing of Lawes. There was an ordinaunce in Rome, that none might be Consuls, or beare any other great Office in the Cittie, sauing those Cittizens that did stande for the Office, and made sute for it. This ordinaunce at the begin­ning was verie good, for then no Cittizens sued or sought to beare Office, but such as thought that they did deserue to be in authoritie, and they tooke it for a great diseredit to haue the re­pulse, and therefore euerie one, because they woulde be iudged and accounted worthy of that dignitie, endeuoured to be vertu­ous. But after ward, this ordinaunce became very harmfull and pernicious: for they that were most mightie, not most vertu­ous, sued for the dignitie, & they that were not mightie, though vertuous, for fear durst not stand for the Offices. To this incō ­uenience came it, though not in a moment, yet in continuance and tract of time, as all other inconueniences vse to happen. For the Romans hauing subdued all Affrick and Asia, and brought almost all Greece vnder their subiection, assured themselues of libertie, and thought not that they had any enemies whom they needed to feare. Whith securitie of theirs, and weake­nesse [Page 131] of their enemies, caused the people of Rome in the elec­tion of their Consuls, not to respect vertue, but fauour: so that those were placed in that dignitie, that wist better howe to en­tertaine their fréendes, then to encounter with their enemies. And after that, they which were most gracious had a prettie while borne the Offices, then they which were mightiest, and coulde preuaile most, were elected to be heade Officers, so that honest and vertuous men, by the defect of such an ordi­naunce, were altogether excluded from the dignities, and pre­beminences which chéefely appertained vnto them.

7 Therefore to the ende that a Common-wealth may be maintained in her wonted libertie, it is necessarie that newe ordinaunces be made, to remedie that which the mallice of mē bath corrupted: for little profit the Lawes, when the whole subiect and bodie (as it were) of the Common-weale is so much disordered, that they cannot possiblie sette it in order againe. Some say it is well nigh impossible, that all ordinances should be changed: for if they would disanull them by little and little, it is necessarie that it shoulde be doone by some wise man that foreseeth and perceiueth, what inconueniences might happen by reason of such like ordinaunces, and those men that are accu­stomed to liue after one manner and order will not alter that ordinaunce, especially, because they perceiue not the discommo­ditie thereof, vnlesse it be shewed vnto them by apparent con­iectures. Moreouer, if they woulde goe about to repaire the or­dinaunces all in a moment, yet albeit euerie one esteemed thē to be naught that yet would it be very hardlie brought to passe. For to vse ordinarie meanes, (séeing they be naught) is not e­nough: but it is necessaire, that he should come at last to extra­ordinarie meanes, to witte, violence and Armes: and before a­ny other thing, to make himselfe cheefe of that Cittie, that hee may chaunge all thinges at his will and pleasure: and to esta­blish his Lawes and ordinaunces, it is necessarie he shold haue authoritie to suppresse them, that through enuie propose them­selues to gainesaie & contrarie them: for no man can hope that tract of time may confirme them, and his vertue and honestie that bringeth them in, sufficeth not: and as for the fauoure of the people, that is variable: and wickednes and mischiefe will not be appeased by any gifts or good turns, according to that.

Moses slew many men, which for enuie and hatred rose vp Num. cap. 25. against him, and would not haue that the Lawes and ordinan­ces which he published should goe Forwardes. To conclude, be­cause it is necessarilie required in the mutation, or rather re­formation of a Common-wealth, that it shoulde be doone by a good man, and because it is presupposed, that he which maketh himselfe Prince by force & violence, is a wicked man, it chaun­ceth very seldome, that a good man will make himselfe Prince by ill meanes, though his intent be good, or that a naughtie and Cornel. Tacit. lib. 27. Nemo enim vnquā im­perium stagitio quesitum bonis attibus exercuit. wicked man, after he is made Prince, will vse that authoritie well, which he hath obtained by ill uteanes: and therfore it is necessarie that the Common-weale be reduced to the estate of a kingdome.

8 All this discourse (which is taken out of Machiauell) is grounded vpon this, that in those Common-weales that be ru­led and gouerned by many, they that rule and gouerne them, doo verie hardlie agrée one with another, in keeping and alte­ring the old and auncient custonies: and it seemeth that thys holdes in those Common-weales, that are weake and gouer­ned by the counsaile of manie: who, though the inconuenien­ces be most manifest and notorious: yet through their naturall imbecillitie, they knowe not, nor cannot tell howe to repayre them: But those Common-weales that can renewe the olde rites and customes, can as well annihilate and disanull those Galen in lib. ar­tis medicae, ca. 89 that be both bad and hurtfull, and as Phisitions when they be acquainted with the causes of the diseases, they take them a­way first, and afterward very easily cure their Patients, so it is conuenient, that they which gonerne Common-weales, shold as a necessary remedie, execute punishment on offenders, when men liue so corruptlie and wickedlie, that those ordinaunces which at the first were good & holie, cannot be innouated with­out bloodshed and fire: which are the remedies with which God dooth cure the vices of men [...] as Phisitions, when purging and letting of blood suffice not, vse searing to cure the diseases. They therefore that gouerne Common-weales, ought dilligentlie to search out, whether the dissolutnes of mens maners springeth [Page 133] heereof, that the accustomed Lawes are not good and profita­ble for the Common-wealth. And it is a great deale better to repaire them, by adding, chaunging, or diminishing, then by altogether destroying thē. But if humane mallice haue so cor­rupted them, that they cannot be bettered, but by banishment, confiscations of goods, killing or burning, then must the verte Hyppocrates. lib, 1. aphor. 6. vttermost and last remedies take place. As the Phisitions doe in those diseases that cannot be otherwise cured. As I hane de­clared more at large, in my Bookes of pollicies or Common­weales.

9. A Uenotian Gentleman nanted Bernardus Campellus, Francis. Lotious Considerat. 45. would haue had a Lawe published and proclaimed, that none should haue béen chosen to beare Office in the Common-weale, which had béen in Office the yeere immediatly before, but that some yeeres should haue beene interiected before hee should be elected againe: he was mooued no doubt to think vppon such a Law, because he saw that the same persons, remaining so ma­ny yeres together in their Office, many other Gentlemen that might as well haue beene seruiceable for the Common-welth, were excluded from the gouernment: and hee imagined it not expedient for the safetie and commoditie thereof, that the Offi­ces belonging thereunto, should be bestowed but vppon a fewe Cittizens, which might stand her in steede. But these reasons whith Bernard Campellus alleaged to perswade the Lordes of Uenice, to bring in the Law which permitted none to continue in Office, séened not to be so requisite, as that the former ordi­nauncés shoulde be cancelled by reason of them: and they that were of the Counsell of tenne, woulde not consent, that such a Lawe should be proposed in y ^e Senate: for they thought it wold be hurtfull for the Common-welth, to alter and abrogate those Lawes, whereby their predecessors, béeing men of great pru­dence and singular wisedome, had long time before gouerned and maintained it: and that it was not expedient to innouate those ordinaunces which are belonging to the estate: because men béeing naturally giuen to innouations, and oftentimes doo choose the warst: if that they shold once permit the ancient or­dinances, to be altred & innouated: the Common-wealth shold neuer be frée from factions and dissentions: and because albeit it be daungerous to haue the Offices continue still with the [Page 134] selfe-same persons: yet it is not so when there be many men in the Common-wealth, that are in as great power and authori­tie as those fewe that beare Office: and for this cause, though they would hurt and endomage the Common-wealth, they can not: and though they that▪ be chosen be but fewe, yet they be chosen out of many, and the greater companie, may more easily withstand the lesse.

10 Though the Counsell of tenne in Ʋenice, permitted not this Lawe to be proposed in the Senate, which Bernarde Campello would faine haue brought in, yet can no man denie, but that it is more profitable for the Common-wealth, to haue Aristot. lib. 4. Politicorū. ca. 15. many to beare such Offices, and enioy such dignities as are in the Common-wealth, then but a few: for when a few haue all the authoritie, and they onely are in power and dignitie, those fewe if they continue in Office, may easily tyrannise ouer the Common-wealth: and there remaine many men which doo the Common-wealth no seruice, whereas they might stand her in great steed: so that it were a great deale more expedient, that the Common-wealth should be gouerned by many, and that e­uerie one vpon hope to be admitted to the gouernment, should endeuour to be vertuous, and liue honestly and decently▪ not­withstanding the danger that may ensue by beginning to in [...]o­uate and abroagate the Lawes of the estate: for when as the profit which is to follow, is manifestly and surely knowne to be greater then the hurt which is feared that will en [...]ue: then the Gouernours of the Common-weale, ought to [...]brogate them; and place others in their stéede, for the end for which al Lawes are made (as we haue said) is the publique commoditie & profit of the Common-wealth: according to the Lawe of the twelue Tables:

And they that doo not so, are like vnto the Gouernours in a 1. in rebus ff. de constitut. princi­pum in rebꝰ no­uis constituendis euidens esse vti­litas debet vt re­cedatur ab eo iu­re. quod diu ae­quum visum est. certaine place in Spayne, who consulting whether they shoulde wall a certaine Well about, in which many children had béen drowned, the Elders of the Counsell would not consent vnto it: because their predecessors had many yeres vsed to fetch water out of that Well, though it was not walled about. Therefore the Counsellers of Princes, ought to consider whether it be better for them to change the ordinaunces, or to let thē remaine [Page 135] as they be, or altogether to disanull thē. And if they do change Seneca. labora­mus magis opi­nione quam [...]. Et Plato. Plu [...] nos tenent [...]u [...] pre [...]t. and alter them, they shall▪ doo well to attribute the name of the olde vnto the newe, for the people oftentimes, is more mooued with the names of thinges, then with the thinges themselues. And therefore they that alter, and reforme auncient ordinaun­ces, ought to kéepe stil the names, shadow and similitude of the olde ordinaunces, that y ^e people perceiue not that they be chan­ged, though the new be altogether different from thé olde. For men are deceiued with the shew of things, and thinke it to be s [...] in deede. And many times they be more mooued with that which onely séemeth to be, then with the thing it selfe. Final­lie, as the Phisitions when they cure any disease, they varie and change the diet and phisicke which they minister vnto the sicke, according as it doth them good or harme: so they vnto whō the gouernment of Common-weales is committed, ought to leaue o [...] change the ordinances and lawes, according as they be profitable or hurtfull to the Common-wealth. And as the Phisitions applie their medicines & remedies to the diseases: so they that gouerne Cōmon-weales, ought▪ to punish and chastice the offenders and transgressors of the Lawes, both with mony and corporall paines.

And for to remedie the inconueniences and harmes that are in a Common-wealth, it is not enough to chaunge the Gouer­nours of it, and choose others, if the fault procéed not frō them: and as the Ague is not driuen away by changing of the Phisiti­ons onely: vnlesse others be founde that are more skilfull, and know better how to cure it then the first: so the vices & harmes of the Common-wealth, are not taken away by chaunging the Officers and Magistrates, vnlesse such persons succeede in the Offices, that know how a Common-wealth ought to be gouer­ned.

11 If any man obtaine the principallitie in a Cittie or e­state, and become cheefe of the place, when his foundation is weake, and he thinketh that hee shall not be able to kéepe the Common-wealth long in the same estate into which hee hath brought it: thē that it may not returne into the former estate, his best remedie were to change and alter all things: to make newe gouernments, new ordinaunces, and newe Lawes, and call them all by newe termes and new names: and to take the [Page 136] authoritie from thē that were in dignitie, and giue it to others: to make new Officers, newe Magistrates, and new men, and to make them that were poore, rich: and them that were rich poore: and in a worde, to alter and turno all things t [...]psie tur­uie: by killing y ^e greatest heads, & those that haue most power, Arist. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 10. Peri­and [...] ad Thrasi­bulum. Lu [...]ius Florus, lib. 1. Gestorum Romano. cap. 7. as Periander coūselled Thrasibulus; and Tarqu [...]us the pr [...]ud [...] counselled his sonne, when he tooke the Cittie of the Gabians. Besides this, he ought to build vp new Citties, and pul downe some old Citties: and remoue the inhabitants of one Cittie in­to another, and finally, not to leaue any thing in that prouince which is not chaunged and altered: and that in it there be no degree, no order, no estate, or dignitie, which he that hath it do not acknowledge, that he doth enioy it by the graunt or gift of him that made himselfe Prince. And thus did Phillip King of Macedon, Father to Alexander the great, make him selfe Lord ouer all Greece, placing the men of one Prouince into another, as Sheepheards driue▪ a flocke of Sheepe out of one f [...]lde into another. But this pollicie and manner of conseruation of arre­state, is properly vsed by them that tyrannise ouer the Com­mon-wealth. For hauing not wherewithall to satis [...]fie them that follow them, and to keepe them to their freendes that fa­uour them: they robbe, spoyle, burne, kill; murther, destroy, ransacke, and pull downe all thinges, vsing most cruell reme­dies, altogether contrarie to the puritie and sinceritie of Chri­stian Religion: which permitteth not that any man shold make himselfe, by endomaging his neighbour, and so commit mortall sinne: wherefore euery one ought rather to be contented with a priuate life, then desire a kingdome, by destroying and vndoo­ing so many men.

12 If the gouernment of any Common-weale be altered out of one estate into another: as for example out of a Demo­cracie into an Oligarchie, or out of an Oligarchie into a Mo­narchie, it is expedient, that the Lawes and ordinaunces of the estate be altered also. As Brutus did, when he cast the kings out of Rome, and brought in the gouernment of the Consuls, chan­ging the kingdome into a Consulshippe: and so the Common­wealth was gouerned by two Consuls, and the choyse and elec­tion of the Magistrates was giuen to the people. So like wise the Romaine Emperors, after they became Lords ouer y ^e whole [Page 137] Empire, by little and little altered and changed all the Lawes and ordinances by which the Common-wealth was gouerned, during the Consulshippe: accomodating and fitting the Lawes conformable to the estate which they woulde bring in: and vse the Lawes as Phisitions vse medicines; for it properly concer­neth Cap [...] rex pacifi­cus in proaemio decietalium. Lawes to cure the vices, naughtie customs; and dissolute manners, which disquiet and molest the Common-wealth. And as the Phisitions vse not to cure al diseases with one medicine, and apply not the same medicine at all times: but according to the strength or féeblenes of the sicke, and other circumstaunces considered, varie and alter their remedies and phisicke which they minister, and in many sicknesses they deferre the cure till some other time, rather then they woulde remedie them with manifest danger of life: so it is a great deale better, and more conuenient in gouernment, to dissemble some thinges, then to goe about to mende them with the losse & damage of the whole Common-wealth.

This counsaile did Pompey the great thinke to vse, in the warre which Iulius Caesar waged against the Common-welth, and to maintaine that warre as Fabius Maximus maintained, the warre which Hanniball made against Italie. For in such en­terprises, and many other affaires, the time doth dissolue and o­uerthrow them: and to goe about to dispatch and destroy them in haste, were to spoile the Common-wealth.

13 They erre greatly, that thinke that the mixed bodies Machiauell' lib. 3. in prohemio discursuum. of Common-weales be cured, by reducing them into their first originall: for séeing that the mixed bodies, are like to mens bo­dies, (which because they increase and decrease, Children and babes ought to be cured one way, young folkes another waie, and olde men after another manner, conformable to their age and compl [...]rion: for as the Phisitions say, euerie daie some Quotidie ag­gregatur ali­quid in nobis quod indiget curatione. humour is ingendered in mans bodie, which must be cured no lesse with preseruatiue medicines then curatiue;) that which ought to be considered in the rule and gouernment of a Cōmon­weale, is, that great care be had of the publique commoditie, and welfare of the whole bodie of the Common-wealth: as the Phisitions haue of the soundnes & wholesomnes of mans whole bodie, when they cure and heale the sicke. It is therefore expe­dient, that they which gouerne Common-weales, change and [Page 138] alter the Lawes and ordinances, by which the Cōmon-weales were ruled when they began, and square them to the times in which the Common-weales increase, and become greater and larger. For a great Common-wealth cannot be conuenientlie maintained; with the selfe same Lawes and ordinaunces, with which it was maintained and gouerned, when it was but lit­tle, though notwithstanding that it be saide, that Princes goe about to spoile and marre the estate, when they begin to break the old lawes and rites, and auncient customes, vnder which men▪ liued many yeeres: for this holds not, when necessitie re­quireth that the gouernment should be changed, and squared to the present estate of the Common-wealth. And as the Phisiti­ons cutte or burne off one member of the bodie, to saue the sicke mans life: and as the skilfull Pilot, casteth the wares & Mer­chandise ouer-boorde, to helpe the shippe out of the imminent danger: and as the Sheepeheard hath the charge ouer y ^e whole flocke to cure it: euen so it is conuenient, that they which go­uerne the Common-wealth; should consider what vices and dis­orders, disquiet and trouble it. And euen as the dilligent and careful Labourer, taketh great pains in weeding his Gardens, and rooting out those hearbes which are rather hurtfull then wholesome vnto his groundes: so they that rule and gouerne Common-weales, ought to labour, clensing them from all per­nitious weedes of wickednes and naughtines, which hurt thē: for there is nothing more hurtfull, and lesse profitable to the Common-wealth, then to suffer dissolutnes of manners, and pernitious customs to encrease and augment dailie; which af­terwards, molest and vexe the Common-wealth. And, to bind euery man to liue politicklie, and according to reason, as wel by rewards as by punishment, in euery Common-wealth. Parli­aments be holden: in which the Estates being assembled toge­ther, consult vpon all things that necessarily ought to be doone, for the commoditie, profit, and conseruation of the whole Com­mon-wealth.

14 Aristotle is of this minde, that such Lawes and ordi­naunces Politicor. lib. 2. cap. 6. as are profitable to the Common-wealth, shoulde not be altered, and that those that are not very harmfull, shold not be abrogated: for if they shoulde still be chaunged, altered, and renued, and haue no stablenes or firmitie in them, they be but [Page 139] little accounted and esteemed of by the people: for they thinke, that as some of them be changed, so they wil al be altered. And therfore they obey not the Lawes with such reuerence and du­tie as they ought to doo. This which Aristotle saith, ought to be obserued▪ in the election of Officers and Magistrates, and all o­ther things pertaining to the Common-wealth: not changing or renuing any Law or ordinaunce, which endomageth not the D. L. in rebus ff. de constitut. princip. Common-wealth: for the lesse they be chaunged or reformed, the lesse they be transgressed. As I writte more at large in my Bookes of pollicies and Common-weales, in the Treatise of Lawes and Law-makers. But if the Gouernours of the Com­mon-weales, chaunge and alter one manner of gouernment in­to another, they ought to forecast and consider with themselues, whether that people, whose gouernment they goe about to abo­lish, are wonted and accustomed to liue in libertie, and whether they be priuiledged, and haue gotten the gouernment by suc­cession, or by lawe of Armes: for those Princes find the people more louing and willing to obey, that continue in succession of some estate, then they that newlie beginne the inheritaunce. Cornelius Tacitus saith, that it is expedient, that they which Libro, 20. newlie obtaine some estate, should vse great liberalitie & mer­cie, especially, if the people be accustomed to be mercifully and curteously dealt withall. So that if Princes followe that coun­saile which the Elders gaue vnto Roboam, despising the ad­uice 3. Reg. 12. which the young men gaue him, then they shall gouerne their people (as Phillip de la Torre saith) with loue of brother­hood In tractatu d [...] Institut. princi­pis Christian [...]. and Christian charitie, to the end that the people, with the same loue and charitie may obey them. For there is no better way for a Prince to be beloued, honoured, reuerenced, and ob [...]i­ed of his Subiects, then to loue thē first: which, Princes would soone doo, if they did enter into themselues, and consider y ^t they are Sheepheards, Pastors, and fathers of the multitude, which God hath committed and commended vnto them to maintaine and defend them, and to ayde, releeue, and succour them, when they be wearied with labours, consumed with pestilence, and wasted with warres. But those subiects that be welthy & well able, ought to ayde their Prince in the defence of the Cōmon­wealth, and releefe of the poore and needie people, that haue beene oppressed with the gréeuous tyrannie of war. For, séeing [Page 140] that, parte of the commoditie that is gotten by defending the Common-wealth; falleth to their share, it is great reason they should assist their Prince to ayde the Common-wealth, and de­liuer it from out the hands of the enemie, putting him to flight and driuing him from their borders: and they ought not to ex­cuse themselues, either because they be exempted or priuiled­ged: for no such excuses are to be admitted in time of necessitie. But the Prince on the otherside, must so moderately, and after such order vse them, that he doo not (as the Emperour Tiberius Suetonius in Tyberio. saith) flea them, but shaue thē: and séeing that the causes wher­fore we be chastised, ill dealt withal, destroyed, and vexed with warres, famine, dissentions and plagues, are common: (for we are all sinners, and in many things we greatly offende against the Lord: and perchaunce they that thinke themselues blame­lesse, are most faultie) it is great reason that euery one shoulde ioyne with the King, and beare a part of all the troubles and charges with him: séeing that not so much as our Kedéemer and Lord Jesus Christ, nor all the Apostles, denied to pay their Matth. 17. part vnto the Magistrates: if not for right, and because it is due, yet bothe because the Common-wealth shoulde not be dis­quieted, and also with their example, to encourage and stir vp others that be better able to doo the same.

15 Very small faults, and such as are not seene at the first, are more dangerous then greate faults: for that danger which Lotinus in con­siderationibus. is knowne, causeth men to séeke meanes to auoide it: but that which is not knowne, groweth so much by little and litle, that when it is knowne, it cannot be remedied: and it is like vnto the disease called Febris ethica, which when it beginneth, a man feeleth or perceiueth not any harme: but when it is come so farre that he knoweth it, no medicine can cure it. And thys doth proceede, by reason that men commonly consider, only that which they sée: and that which at the beginning seemeth to bee but a small thing, and altogether vnlike to become anie thing hurtfull: growing by little and little, at length waxeth verie domagable to the Common-wealth: which may be easily séene in those assemblies and congregations where many meete to­gether in secret, which at the beginning seeme not to threaten any great harme: and yet at the length, when they are fullie growne and augmented, they wonderfullie disquiet the Com­mon-weales, [Page 141] and cause many hurlie-burlies. The Romaines Ff. de collegijs et corporibus il­licitis late per Brisonium lib. 1. selecta [...]ū. ca. 14. would not permitte any great assemblies or companies, to ga­ther together, without they had licence of the Prince, and they ordayned, that euery companie or congregation, shoulde haue a President, whom (because of the authoritie that was giuen him by the Prince) all they that were of those congregations or as­semblies, should obey. And those Presidents shold enquire and examine, what men gathered into those companies. For the people beeing like to the Sea, which by any wind is soone moo­ued, they that assemble together whē oportunitie serueth, they disquiet the Cōmon-wealth. And as it doth a man much harme to haue any one of all his members, to growe bigger then the Aristo. Polit. 5. cap. 3. rest, and to excéede the proportion of all his other members: so great care ought to be had, that no assemblie or congregation be suffered to growe so long, that it may bring harme vnto the Common-wealth.

The Emperour Traianus, wrote vnto Plinie, when he go­uerned Plin. in Episto. ad Traianum. the prouince of Bethynia, that he should not let the com­panie of those that made the Armour & Instruments for war, to encrease so much, that they might hurte or endomage the Common-wealth.

16 When the gouernment beginneth to be deminished, because there be more that gouerne naughtilie, then well: thē a small thing sufficeth to hinder the execution of that which is determined in the Counsell, and though some counsaile well, yet it is to no end, séeing that the greater part beareth it away: and their béeing in the Counsell, is to no other purpose, then to be partakers of the fault which they commit that counsaile ill: these men are very vnfortunate: for if they contrarie and gain­say that which the other say, they incur manifest daunger, that the other ill Counsellers will spoile them and vndoe them. And if they consent and agrée with them, then they lay all the faulte of ill gouernment in them: so that their liues, honour, credite and estimation, is subiect to the will and pleasure of those, that rule naughtilie. And they that gouerne, béeing men of small wisedom, and knowing not what is belonging to the Common­wealth, meruaile greatlie how the matter shoulde fall out in­fortunatlie, whereas they might with greater reason maruell; how it should fall out prosperously.

[Page 142]The people of Rome was so great and mightie, that the Batani, (a fierce and hardie people) though they were greatlie bur­thened and ouercharged by the Romans, yet they durst not re­bell. But they that were in authoritie, and did beare rule ouer, them: séeing that the Romaine Captaines offered thē great in­iurie, in ouercharging them with too much tole and tribute (in the time that the forces of the Romaine Empire were deuided, by reason that the Emperors of Rome waged wars against di­uers Nations) and whereas they ought to haue béene contented with the vnreasonable tributes, which according to theyr owne pleasure were paid vnto them: they were so vnwise, and dealt so vnaduisedlie, that they did not onelie more and more conti­nually ouercharge them, but also gaue them occasion to assem­ble together, and séeke meanes to reuenge the iniuries which they offered vnto them, by choosing olde and feeble men to be Souldiers, that they might pay money to be dismissed, and pressing faire boyes to satis-fie their execrable beastlines by a­busing them: whereuppon the Bataui determined to rebell a­gainst the Romans, and deliuer thēselues from the iniuries and mischieues that the Romaine Captaines did them: and choosing a famous Captaine to be their Generall, they fought against the Romans and did them much harme: and so they did cast off that troublesome yoke of subiection, and recouered their for­mer libertie. The Iewes had not forces enough to withstand the Lotinus vbi sup. Ioseph. lib. 1. de bello Iudaico, & Egesippus de ex­cidio Hyeroso­lymitano. lib. 2. cap. 9. Romans, as king Agrippa shewed in his Oratiō which he made vnto them, to perswade them that they shoulde not rebell. But they, not able to suffer the tyrannie & greedines of the Romaine Captaines, rebelled, and so Ierusalem was destroied: wherein God shewed his iust iudgment vpon the Iewes, that they should receiue the punishment deserued by crucifying the Redéemer of the wolrd.

17 Many thinke that the estate of the gouernment, consi­steth in hauing many Townes, Places, and Citties, and ther­fore to reserue and keepe some place of their kingdome, when their enemies sette vpon them, they agrée to most vnreasonable conditions, which are very harmefull and preiudiciall vnto them: which they would not doo, if they knew that the preser­uation of their estate, consisted in the gouernment, authoritie, and reputatiō that they haue: and that, though they loose some [Page 143] Fortresse, Towne, or Castle, they may easilie recouer them a­gaine from their enemies, if they can tell how to defend them­selues: as the Romans did, when they did driue Hanniball out of Italie, notwithstanding that hee had possessed the Countrey, and had béene Lorde ouer it sixteene yeeres long. And they did not onely driue him out of Italie, but also waged warre against Carthage, and sent fresh Souldiers to their Arme which they had in Spayne, and denounced newe warres against King Anti­ochus. And they bought and sold those grounds, lands, and pos­sessions which Hanniball had taken, for the selfe-same pryce that they were rated at before. So Charles King of Fraunce, re­couered Gaginus et Pau­lus Emilius de rebus Franco [...]ū in vita Caroli septimj Gal­lorum regis. Petrus Bembus hist. Venaetae, lib. 8. Caelius Rhodoginus in prohemio. lib, 3. antiquar. lectio. his Countrey from the Englishmen, who had almost ta­ken his whole Kingdome from him. The Ʋenetians defended themselues against Iulius Secundꝰ Pope, Maximilian the Em­perour, Lewes King of Fraunce, and Hernando King of Castile. They therefore that gouerne estates, ought to imitate thē that playing at Chesse, loose some one man or other, thereby to win the Game, and take the check to giue the mate. This is to be vnderstood, if the estate haue sufficient forces to defend it selfe; for if it haue not, it is better to make some honest agréement, (as our Lord and Sauiour Jesus Christ teacheth vs) then to be quite destroied, and loose all: as it happened to the renowned Cittie Ierusalem, and other famous Citties, which by reason that their Gouernours did not knowe their weakenes, were o­uerthrowne, and leuied with the ground.

18 If they that gouerne any Common-wealth, think that to defend themselues from their enemies, least they should be subdued by them, consisteth more in the forces that the Cōmon­wealth hath, then in the particular and priuate goods of those that liue in it, they are farre deceiued. For the goods haue their foundation in the Common-wealth, and if they doo not help it, both the goods and Common-wealth also goeth to wrack: euen as that bodie, in which each member onely procureth the con­seruation of it selfe. Therefore it is conuenient, that as eache member doth put it selfe into danger to saue the head: so those that liue in a Common-wealth, should aduenture both life and goods to defend her, séeing she is the head of all them that liue in her. They ought moreouer to consider, that many times Cō ­mon-weales be ouerthrowne & subdued by the enemie, because [Page 144] the Cittizens béeing rich, and the Common-wealth poore, they will not succour and ayde her with their substaunce: and (as Titus Liuius saith) nothing greeueth them, but as farre as it toucheth their owne particular interest: for that is it that all Iuuenalis plora­tur lachrimis amissa pecunia veris. men most regard, and we find by experience, that men commō ­lie set more by their substaunce, then by their credit and repu­tation: as may be seene in y ^e Noble men of Rome, who alwaies (without any extraordinarie displeasure) suffered the profite of the Common-wealth to be preferred before their owne honour and credite; but concerning their wealth; they did with great vehemencie and stiffnes, resist against the Lawe Agraria, (for the distribution of the Landes among the people) and wold not by any meanes permit, that it shoulde be established: whereby they wrought the ruine and destruction of Rome: which began from the sons of Gracchus, and continued thrée hundred yeres, till Iulius Caesar tyrannised.

Some holde opinion, that Common-weales, to the ende they might be well gouerned, ought to be rich and welthy, but Salu, in Catili. in oratione Ca­tonis publicé o­pulentiā et pri­uatim aegesta­ [...]em, et Diuus Aug, lib, 5, ca, 12 de ciuitate Dej. Vt aerarium eseet opulentum, ten­ues res priuatae. the Cittizens and people that liue in them, poore. The Mar­quis of Pescara, going about to perswade the Emperor Charles the fift, to take vppon him to be Lorde ouer all Italie, tolde him that he had the King of Fraunce in his power, and because the Common-weales of Italie, were but poore, he might easilie sub­due it, because they that liued in it, would not spend theyr sub­staunce to defend their Countrey. But the Emperour woulde not doo that which the Marquis requested of him, because he al­waies did more respect the peace of all Christendome, then his owne profit: whereof he shewed a most liuely example in that he rendered the Dukedome of Milan vnto Frauncis Sforcia. To the ende that Common-weales may be maintained & de­fended: they that liue in them, must consider, that they cannot be saued, if the Common-wealth perrish: and that it were bet­ter for them to spend their wealth, to maintaine the Common­wealth, then to be ouercome, and brought into captiuitie by the enemie. If they that liued in Constantinople when Mahomet the king of Turks tooke the Cittie, had ayded the Cittie with pay­ing money for thinges necessarie for the defence of it: that fa­mous Cittie had not beene taken of the Infidels, to such great losse of Christendome. Also many other excellent Citties haue [Page 145] béene ouerthrowne, through the execrable couetousnes of such miserable Cittizens, which deserue to be abhorred and detested of all men, and to be spoyled themselues only, without y ^e harme of others: séeing they care for no man but themselues, and are In vita Pauli Acmilij. (as Plutarch saith) their enemies Treasurers.

19 When some youth of noble bloode, in a Cōmon-weale beginneth to be had in account, that is, endued with some ex­traordinarie vertues: all the Cittizens honour him, and haue him in great estimation: in so much, that if he be neuer so litle stirred with ambition, among those gifts which nature bestow­eth vppon him, in short space hee dooth so clime, that when the Cittizens perceiue that they haue erred in aduauncing of him: though they would set him downe againe, yet they cannot hin­der him: and to goe about any such matter, were onely to ha­sten their owne ruine and destruction. Cosme de Medicis, (by whom the House of the Medicis came to that excellencie and In discursibus, & in histor [...]is re [...]si Florent. lib. 14. greatnes), attained to such credit and reputation by his owne prudence, and by the ignorance of the other Cittizens: that he beganne to put the whole estate in such feare of him, that ma­nie Cittizens thought it dangerous to offende him, and a great deale more daungerous to suffer him longer. But Nicolas de Cussano, (who béeing a man singularlie well seene in Ciuil af­faires, liued at that time) séeing that the first fault was cōmit­ted, in not fore-séeing the dangers that might follow, by honou­ring and estéeming of Cosme de Medicis, hee woulde not suffer (whilst he liued) the second also to be committed; to wit, that the Cittizens should intend, to take awaie the honor from Cos­me vnto which they had aduaunced him: iudging that such an intent, would be the cause of the destruction and ouerthrowe of the whole estate, as it afterwardes fell out: for the Cittizens that remained after he was deade, would not follow the coun­saile which he had before giuen them, but gathered forces a­gainst Cosme de Medicis, and expelled him out of the Cittie, but what folowed? A while after, those of the Cittie that were of his side, sent for him, and made him Prince ouer the whole Common-welth: vnto which state he had neuer reached, if the Cittizens had not publiquelie opposed themselues against him. The same happened in Rome with Iulius Caesar, who being fa­uoured of Pompey, and the other Romans for his vertue: after­wardes [Page 146] became the destruction of the Romaine Common­wealth: of which thing Tullie beareth witnesse, saying, that Pompey beganne to feare Caesar too late: which feare vrged him to procure a remedie, and the remedy hastened the destruc­tion of the Common-wealth.

20 The Athenians, Argiues, Milesians and Megarens, v­sed Adrianus Iunius animaduersion. Lib. 5. cap. 18. Aristo. Polit. 5. cap. 11. Ostracismus idē valet ac efficit quodammodo, quod p [...]ohibere superio [...]ē atque in exilium mit­tere. the Ostracisine; which was a kind of banishment of the ex­cellentest man of all the Cittie, for tenne yéeres space: that by his authoritie he shoulde not hurt the Common-wealth. They of Sicilie vsed the same remedie, to the selfe same effect, and cal­led it Petalismus. This banishment continued tenne yeeres: and their goods were not confiscate, nor the fruites of theyr possessions were not gathered by any of the other Cittizens, whilst they were absent. And this kinde of banishment was v­sed, because such men as were most rare and excellent among them, should not tyrannise ouer the Common-wealth, & trans­late the gouernment vnto themselues. We reade in the Histo­ries of Ʋenice, that the Gallies which had beene abroad, beeing returned to Venice, and certaine contention arysing betwéene the people, and the men of the Gallies, the contention did con­tinue so long, till they fell to blowes: which hurlie-burlie, nei­ther the force of the Officers, nor the reuerence of the Citizens, nor the feare of those that ministred iustice, could appease, vn­till a certaine noble Cittizen, that had the yeere before beene Captaine ouer those Marriners came in presence: whom as soone as they had espied, they all of thē gaue ouer fighting, and Machiauellus in discursibus. so parted thēselues: which obedience of the Gallie-men, bred such suspicion in the Senate concerning the Gentleman, that in short time they made themselues sure from all euil y ^t might ensue by reason of his authoritie.

21 They that gouerne Common-weales, ought to haue one speciall care, that no newes be published, which may doe harme to the Common-wealth: for such thinges disquiet the people which (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) loueth stil to heare Libro, 17. Petrus Iustinia. in histo. Vene. Tamara de mo­ribus gentiū. li. 1. cap. 7. nouelties. The Ʋenecians caused a certaine man to be put to death, because he had spread false rumours & new lyes through the Cittie, which greatly perturbed and disquieted the Citti­zens of Venice. It was an ancient custome in Fraunce, (in times past) that euery one that had heard any thing, which was either [Page 147] profitable or hurtfull to the Common-wealth, was bounde in­centinently to make the Magistrates acquainted therewith, who did publish it, if they thought it would be profitable for the Common-wealth. To be bréefe, it belongeth to the Counsellers of the Counsell of estate, to see that no seditions, contentions, and hurli-burlies arise in the Common-wealth: as the Coun­sellers of Cayphas admonished, whē they did consult how they Matth. 26. might take our Sauiour and Lord Jesus Christ.

The fourteenth discourse, touching warre.

BEcause the duetie, whereby a Prince is bound to rule and maintaine the people, which God hath committed to his gouernment, consisteth chéeflie in two things; to wit, in gouerning his subiects, according to the Lawes and ordinaunces of the Realme: and in defending them from their enemies, that they may liue in peace: and seeing that I haue in y ^e former discourse entreated of the Lawes and ordinaunces of the estate: I mean in this to say some thing concerning the Counsell of warre.

1 They that follow warres (as all men know) are alwaies in great daunger and troubles, and at no lesse charges. And for this cause, no Prince ought to make warre, vnlesse hee cannot otherwise choose: and vnlesse hee cannot enioy peace with­out the harme of the Common-wealth, the losse of his estate, and impayring of his reputation. Otherwise, if a Prince can obtaine an honest peace of his enemie, vpon reasonable and iust conditions, he ought not to wage war, but conclude that peace, to shunne bloodie battels, slaughters, spoyles, pillings, sacri­leges, and all such other wicked actions, which are practised in time of warre. And if those Princes that consult, whether they shall wage warre or no, considered all the domages and harms that may succéede by waging warre, they would neuer be resol­ued to make warre: whereby they shoulde increase theyr ene­mies forces, and weaken their owne. Therefore incontinently after that they that are of the counsel of estate, haue concluded, that it is expedient for the profit of the Common-wealth, and safetie of the Prince, that warre shoulde be made against the [Page 148] enemie. Euery one ought to determine fullie, either to ouer­come, or to die in the enterprise: as a Woman of Lacedaemo­nia saide to her Sonne, when she gaue him a Target to goe to warres: returne my son either with this Target, or els with­in it.

2 Euery Prince that goeth about to make war, ought first to consider whether he be able, and if he be: then whether the profit that is like to ensue, be greater thē the harme which may succéede: for if the losse should be greater then the commoditie, that would be (as Augustus Caesar saide) as if one should fishe Suetonius Tran­quillus in vita August. Caesaris cap. 25. Imperatorem de bello consulta­turum, non ig­norare opertet quam magnae sint exercitus facultates &c. with a golden hooke. He ought furthermore, dilligentlie & ear­nestly to enquire, what forces his enemy hath, and whether his own power and strength be sufficient to vanquish the Armie of his enemie, and ouerthrow it. And if he stand in doubt, and can not certainly be informed, whether his enemies forces or hys owne be the greater: hee ought to thinke, that his aduersaries are better prouided, and more stronglie garded: that he may be the more dilligent, and the more carefull in persecuting his e­nemies, and infirming their forces and powers: for many Cap­taines, because they respected not their enemies, and made no account of them, were ouercome and put to flight. Further­more, to examine, both his enemies forces, and his owne: he ought to knowe whether of them bothe, hath the greater store of money, hée or his enemie: and howe long the warres are like to continue, and howe much money is necessarie to main­taine them.

In this, great care and dilligence must be taken: for mo­ney Claudius Coto­reus de iure mi­litum in prohe­mio, libro, 2. (as it is commonlie saide) is the sinnewe of warre: which beginneth and endeth it: and for this cause, the Counsellers of Princes ought to enquire, whence prouision of money may be had: and howe they may bring to passe, that their enemies shoulde want. And howe needefull and necessarie this is, wee may manifestlie perceiue by this, that many enterprises haue beene giuen ouer for lacke of money to supply the charges of warre, as happened to Cleomenes, King of Lacedaemonia, with Antigonus King of Macedon.

3 Princes ought to consider what Captaines they choose for the warres: for if the Captaine, who is the guide to leade and conduct the Souldiours, be not valiant and prudent, then [Page 149] must all needes goe to wracke. Tullie in his Oration, pro le­ge Manilia, setteth downe the perfect patterne of a good and In oratione pro lege Manilia. valiant Captaine, shewing what quallities a good Captayne ought to be endued withall, to become famous; of which mat­ter, I haue written verie largelie, in my Booke of the Office of Captaines and Generals.

That the warre may in all points haue prosperous and good successe, all men knowe howe important and necessarie it is, that the Captaines should be hardie, valiant, couragious, and faithfull: for nothing can be more hurtfull in warres, then fearefull, cowardlie, faithles, and vnskilfull Captaines. There ought also great care to be had in the pressing of Souldiours, what men be chosen to serue their Prince in warre. For the Souldiours be they that must fight, and gette the victorie: and therefore, though the Captaines, Generals, and all other Of­ficers, be neuer so perfectlie adorned, and endued with all he­roicall vertues: if the Souldiours be base and cowardlike fel­lowes, the warres cannot be fortunatelie finished.

When Iulius Caesar went to fight with Perreyus in Spayne, he saide that he went to seeke an Armie without a Generall: and when hee went to meete with Pompey, he said: that hee Suetonius Tran­quillus, in vita Iulij Caesaris. cap. 34. sought a Generall without an Armie. And therfore in the mu­stering and training vppe of Souldiers, great dilligence ought to be taken in examining and enquiring, whether those Soul­diours that be pressed for the Prince his seruice, be faithful, or Traytours to their Countrey and Prince, whether they be constant, or inconstant and variable: whether they be newe and fresh-water Souldiours, or olde and experienced Soul­diours, that haue long time beene practised and trained vppe in warres: whether they come of their own accord with a wil­ling mind to serue their Prince, or be forced thereunto by com­pulsion: and whether they come for the loue they beare theyr Countrey, and obedience they owne vnto the Prince, or bee­ing base and rascall fellowes, fetcht out of Innes, Tiplinghou­ses, and other such like places, they come to serue the Prince onelie for paye: besides these, there are manie other thinges which ought to be carefullie considered in the pressing of Soul­diours: as I haue written more at large in my Bookes of Mi­litarie discipline.

[Page 150]Furthermore, Princes that determine to sette vpon theyr enemies, ought to enquire, what Harnes those Souldiers haue, that are gathered for seruice in warres. For Souldiers that be well weaponed, fight with a more valiant mind, then they that are vnweaponed and lacke their harnesse. And when souldiers are throughly well fenced with Armour of proofe, they be the more emboldened to set vpon their enemies, to assault Fortres­ses, & to vndertake any kind of seruice. And many times some kind of weapons, are not so good and so apt to obtaine the victo­rie, as others: as may be séene by the difference of weapons, which the Lacedaemonians, Romans, and Parthians vsed. The Ro­mans often vanquished their enemies: not because they were more valiant, & more strong or couragious then their enemies. but by reason of the oddes in fighting with better weapons. Therefore Princes ought also to enquire what weapons theyr enemies vse in warre, and with what weapons they ought to Arme their owne Souldiers, to defend themselues, and endo­mage their enemies. And also, what places are most fitte and conuenient to assault their enemies, and surest for theyr owne safetie.

4 They that mean to wage war with any Country, ought to knowe what freendes they haue to helpe and assist them, es­peciallie, if they haue no Countries, Townes, or Prouinces, in that Land which they meane to inuade. And it is very good in such enterprises, to haue some one naturall borne man in that Countrey to their freende, to be holpen by him, and informed of the humors, interest, pretences, conditions and customes of the enemies: and whether y ^e places which they inhabite, be plaine, or hillie, and full of Mountaines: and of what thinges the In­habitants of that Countrey stand in neede of, and what things would be most acceptable vnto them, to entice them to come to ayde and helpe them: and so they shall diminish their enemies forces, and augment and increase their own. It were very good also to learne, whether the people of that Countrey which they meane to assault, make much of their King, or els hate him, for it chaunceth oftentimes, that the people rebell against theyr King, and take part with the enemies, because they hate their King, and would willinglie be reuenged of him, or because they loue the other, and desire greatlie to haue him to be their King. [Page 151] Certaine Cities in Asia did rebell, by reason of y ^e hatred which they bore against Laodice and his sonne Seleucus, and because of the affection with which they loued Bernice and his Sonne. This pollicie Fernandus Cortes vsed in the Conquest of the Kingdome of Mexico, making warre against King Motesuma, with his owne Subiects that could not abide him.

5 Many Princes haue atchiued many famous and excel­lent victories, through the estimation, credit, and reputation of their own persons. Alexander the great, published that he was Titus Liuius de­cad. 3. lib, 6. Sonne vnto Iupiter, (though he knew it was not so) that those Nations vpon whō he made warre, should yeeld and giue ouer their Countries vnto him. If the Captaines and Generals of Armies be valiant and renowned, they procure and obtayne freends and alliance, and easilie atchiue victorie: but if they be not famous, they can hardly attaine good successe in theyr en­terprises, & they are alwaies crossed with vnfortunate euents. Some coūsaile Princes to see, whether those Captaines which they choose for their warres, be fortunate in those Martial en­terprises which they vndertake, for it is thought that Fortune (as Salust saith) preuaileth much in warfare. But seeing that In Catilina. For­tuna in omni redominatur. the people commonly call that fortune, which by chaunce hap­peneth well or ill, for which no reason can be giuen, and this is vncertaine and variable: no man can perswade himselfe that he shall alwaies haue prosperous lucke: and for this cause was Fortune painted vpon a wheele which is euer turning. Manie times. Captains haue excellent good luck in one thing, and ve­rie Tit. Liui. No [...] temere incerta casuum reputat, quem Fortuna nunquam dece­pit. badde fortune in another, as Hanniball tolde Scipio, and as Hanniball himselfe had tryed by experience.

Seeing that the euents of warres are so vncertain and va­riable, wise and valiant Captaines, ought to encrease the fame which is bruted abroade of their good lucke and prosperitie, in theyr Martiall endeuours, that they may encourage their soul­diers to fight, and they that are not fortunate, ought to shewe vnto their Souldiers, how inconstant and variable Fortune is, and to perswade them that thence-forwarde, all matters wyll 2, Reg. 11. succéede more happilie, for the aduenture of war is vncertaine.

6 The first thing that all Princes which make war ought to doo, is to iustifie that warre which they take in hand, that all men may knowe, that they are bounde to fight, by the necessitie [Page 152] which compelleth them to defende themselues: and although their cause be good, and grownded vppon reason and iustice, yet they ought to accept any honest and lawfull condition of peace, which their enemies doo offer them. Againe, Princes ought to consider, that warres are commonly made, either to recouer that which hath béene taken from them, or to reuenge some in­iurie that hath beene offered vnto them, or because they desire to atchiue glorie and renowne, or for ambition: the first and se­conde causes are iust, the thirde is vniust, and the fourth is ty­rannie.

The Romans were alwaies verie carefull, in iustifying the warres which they made, with all dilligence possible. which may be seene by this, that the Embassadour of the Ile of Rhodes, when he went about to praise the people of Rome, saide in a certaine Oration which he made to the Senate, that the Romans did not so much esteeme the conquest, as the equitie of their cause: and because in my booke of Militarie discipline, I haue largely writtē how Princes ought to iustifie their wars, I meane not heere to stand vpon it.

7 They that consult vpon Martiall affaires, ought to en­quire, when they be ouercome with their enemies, whether the faulte was in the Captaines, or in the common Souldiers, or because it pleased God, that though euery man did his due­tie, yet they shoulde be put to the worse: and after the cause is knowne, they ought to thinke vpon the remedie, and to doe all things that are expedient to atchiue victorie of their enemies. And if they vnderstande y ^t their enemies are stronger, and that they must continue their warres, it is better for them, to defer the field (as Fabius Maximus did) then to enter battell to the manifest daunger of their whole Armie. For, with delaying the time, they may ouercome, and with giuing a rash onsette, they shall be put to flight, and as we of olde say in Castile: Diez au­nos de guerra, y no vn dia de pelea, that is;

And because no Captaine howe wise soeuer he be, can ima­gine and forecast all inconueniences which may fall out in war, it is conuenient, that euery Captain take counsaile with faith­full, prudent, and wise men, and well experienced in warfare, [Page 153] which may tell him the trueth without any deceite. The Car­thagenians Liuius. Apud Carthaginense [...] in crucem tolli imperato [...]es di­cuntur, si pros­pero euentu p [...]auo cum con­silio [...]em ge [...]se­rint. did estéeme so much of counsaile in Militarie actions, that they hanged those Captaines and Generals, which ouer; came their enemies without taking aduise. The Venetians did not permitte their. Generals to pitch a fielde with their ene­mies, vnlesse the Prouisors which were sent to the wars with them, did consent vnto it.

8 Captaines and Generals shall obtaine the fauour and good will of the people, if they minister iustice vnto them, and permit not any one to offer them any iniurie, or to take awaie their substance vniustly, or to dishonor and discredit thē wrong­fullie. And as for the good will of the Souldiers, the Captains may obtaine that, by béeing valiant and liberall, for these two vertues make a Captaine to be beloued. And though it seeme a thing impossible, that a Captaine shoulde be fauoured, bothe of the people and his Souldiers also: because the people wishe to keepe their goods and substaunce, and the Souldiers desire to pill and robbe, yet notwithstanding this hindereth not, for they may well enough deale vprightlie with the people, that are their owne freends and alliance; and the Souldiours may rob pill, slay, and spoyle those that dwell in their enemies Coun­tries. Furthermore, if by chaunce the Captaine be compelled by necessitie, to aske some newe tribute, to pay the charges of the warre, he ought with moeke wordes and good reasons, first to shew (as Tullie saith) the necessitie which at that instant vr­geth him to demaunde it, and then he ought to let them vnder­stand, that it concerneth the whole Common-wealth: and whē oportunitie serued, he woulde repay that which they doe lende him. Generals and Captaines of Armies, ought to see that no idle persons, and such as are vnapt for warre, doo loyter in the Campe, & that each souldier imploy himselfe in all such things, as are thought to be necessarie for the atchiuing of victorie.

9 The Counsellers of Princes, ought to examine, whe­ther it be more profitable for the Common-wealth, to stay till Lotinus con [...]i­deratione, 500. the enemie come to make warre vppon them at home, or whe­ther it be better to assaile them in their Countrey. This beeing disputed vppon in the Senate of Rome, Fabius Maximus affir­med, that it was better for them to desend thēselues at home, then to inuade their enemies Countrey. But Scipio said, that [Page 154] it was more conuenient for the Common-wealth, to warre in Carthage then in Italie. Furthermore, they that consult ere they determine to maintaine warre, either at home or abroad, ought to consider, whether it be profitable for the estate of the Coun­trey to make war at all. For though it lie in the power of men to beginne warre, yet cannot they obtain victorie at their plea­sure: and y ^t commonly many thinges fall out in warfare, which men can neither sée nor imagine: and yet the warre it selfe, the enemies and the successe, shew & teach what ought to be doone: and for this cause it is said, that counsaile is taken in the field. And though the matters that concerne warre, may be commu­nicated and talked of among many, yet they ought to be deli­berated vpon but by a fewe: for els they would be discouered, before they were determined. Also, they that consult vpon mat­ters touching warre, ought to consider, whether it be profita­ble for the Common-wealth, that their Generals & Souldiers should be strangers, or naturall borne Subiects. The Cartha­gineans did not onely take strange Souldiers into their seruice, Strabo magno­pere pe [...]are pu­tat populos qui externis du [...]bus vtuntur in bello. &c. Petrus victorius, variarum lect. lib, 8, cap. 17. Lotinus consi­deratione, 485. but did also elect strange Captaines, as they did in the warres which they waged against the Romans, choosing Xantippus a Lacedaemonian to be the Generall of their Armie. Many Com­mon-weales, after that their Captaines were ouercome, they vanquished their enemies by the seruice of strange Captaines: as the Chalcedonians did with Brasidas, the Sicilians with Gy­lippus, the Asians with Lysander, Callicratides, and Agatho­cles, Captaines of Lacedaemonia. And if it chaunce y ^t any strange Captains doo tyrannise ouer the Common-weales which they ayde (as they of the house of Othoman did) that happeneth héer­of, that they which requested them to helpe them, are not able to withstand their forces, and to defend themselues against thē. The Romans to shunne this inconuenience, would not consent, that they which came to succour or helpe them, should be migh­tier then themselues.

10 Princes ought not to committe the administration of the warre vnto any person whom they haue offended: for such a one, to reuenge the inturie offered vnto him, wold cast away the Armie. Marius had after such order compassed Hasdruball Titus Liu. de­cad, 3. lib. 6. a noble Captain of Carthage, that he was driuen either to fight with disaduantage, or die for hunger: but Hasdruball did hold [Page 155] him so cunninglie, with certaine parleyes of agréement, that he gotte out of his reache, and so Marius was frustrated of the oc­casion which was offered him to ouerthrow his enemie: which thing when it was knowne in Rome, did redownd to his great discredit, both with the Senate and the people, and euery one through all the Cittie, spake verie much euill of him. Within a while after, Marius béeing made Consull, and going to make warre vpon the enemie, Fabius Maximus saide vnto him, that Titus. Liu. de­cad, 3, lib. 7. before he came to the day appointed for the field, he shoulde see what forces the enemies had, and that he should not rashlie ha­zard the Armie, and aduenture the libertie of Rome. Vnto whō Marius answered, that as soone as he came by the enemie, hee had fullie determined to encounter with him, and béeing asked Liuius vbi sup. why? he said, because he knew, that if he ouercame the enemy, he should recouer the glorie which he had lost in Spayne, and if that his owne Armie were ouerthrowne, dispersed and put to flight, he shoulde be reuenged of the iniurie which was offered him by that Cittie and those Cittizens which so vnthankfullie had offended him.

Princes ought also to consider the necesitie which they haue to make warre, and to vnderstande what prouision they ought to make, against occasion be offered them to make warre, that if any strangers goe about to molest them, they may defend thē ­selues by force of Armes, and not be vanquished: for there is no Prince so great, mightie and strong, but some or other may set vpon him. And as our olde Castilian prouerbe goeth, Muchas vezes chicas piedras aballam grandes carreras.

And if a Prince be of so little vnderstanding, that he must be ruled by that which the Captaines say, he is their seruaunt, and putteth himselfe into daunger, either that the Captaines know not what they doo, or that they doo not so faithfully & dil­ligently as they ought.

11 Those Princes that determine to make warre, ought to imitate the Catholicke King Don Hernando, the first of that name, King of Castile, who as it were standing on hie in his Towre a farre of, espied and watched the successe and euent of the wars which the Christian Princes made among thēselues, [Page 156] to succour and ayde them that were weakest, and not to suffer their power to increase in Italie, that pretended to make them­selues Lordes ouer it: neither did hee enter league with those Princes that were confederated together, if he could reape no profit thereby: and for this cause he would not wage war with Lewes King of Fraunce, when Pope Iulius, the Emperour, and the Zwitcers warred against him: for he thought that he should receiue no profit by weakning the Kingdome of Fraunce, with the augmentation of those that did persecute it. But when hée saw, that the King of Fraunce would increase his estate, and in­large his kingdome by making warre against the kingdome of Mambrinus Ro­seus, lib. 1. Hi­storiae mundi. Naples, he entered league with the Emperour and the King of England, against the King of Fraunce. Finally, such Princes as enter league with other Kings, ought to consider whether it be better for them, to maintaine that peace which they enioy, or to wage warres: (as King Mithridates wrote to King Arsa­ces) and whether the warres be iust, and such as thereby they may haue profit, and atchiue honour, glory, and renowne. The In Epistola ad­dita operibus Salustij. Romans (as Appian reporteth) woulde not accept many Sub­iects that offered themselues vnto thē: because they were pore, and if could not any way redounde vnto their profit to haue thē vnder their subiection. Many other examples, precepts, rules, considerations and instructions coulde I giue and aleage, but because I writte of them in my bookes of Militarie discipline, I willinglie heere omitte them.

The fifteenth discourse, concerning peace.

WE haue said that the Counsell of estate is called the Counsell of peace, because their principall in­tent that assemble in that Counsell, is to pro­cure that y ^e people may liue in peace, and if they make warre, if is to defend themselues from the iniurie of those that trouble & molest them. And to signifie this, the Romans accustomed to were the Millitarie ring on the left Plin. li. 33. cap. 1. hand, in which they did beare their shielde: and not on y ^e right hand in which they held their sworde: for they thought it more necessarie for a well instituted Common-wealth, to defende themselues then to offend others. The Spartans demaunded of [Page 157] those that returned from warres, whether they had lost theyr shielde: for they thought it more, not to loose their shield, then to saue all their other weapons. Epaminondas a noble Cap­taine of Thebes, béeing gréeuously wounded and readie to die, Valeri. li. 3, c [...]. 2. Traiectus h [...] ­sta sanguine et spiritu deficien [...] recreare se con [...] ­tes primum a [...] clipeus suus sal vus esset, dein [...]e an fusi hostes paenitus fo [...]ent interrogauit. commaunded his shielde to be brought vnto him, which whē he had ombraced, gaue vppe the Ghost: thereby to signifie, that if euer he had warred against his enemie, he did it rather to de­fend his Countrey, then to offend them.

That it is the duetie of euerie Prince, to defend his subiects from the enemie, and gouerne them in peace & quietnesse, may be seene in this, that when he taketh his oath at his Corrona­tion, hee holdeth his Scepter, with which he is to rule his peo­ple in time of peace, in his right hand, and his sworde is borne before him, with which he is to defend his Countrey, if neede be he should make warre for the conseruation of peace. Séeing therefore that the cheefe Office of a Prince is, to maintain his Subiects in peace, I meane to treate in this discourse of such things as be belonging to the Counsell of peace.

1 Counsellers of Princes that consult vpon the establi­shing of peace, ought humbly to request God, that it wil please him, that the peace may be concluded to his honour and▪ [...]ie, Sempiterne De­us, Da propitus pa [...]ē in Diebus nostris. for he onelie can giue peace, and through him cease all warres, with which God chastiseth the stanes of men. And when they doo agrée vppon any peace, they ought to consider what causes hindered, that the peace which before was established, did not firmely remaine vnbroken: and they shall cléerely sée, y ^e Prin­ces make peace, either because they be wasted & destroied with wars, or because one Prince is subdued by y ^e other, & cannot a­ny longer defend thēselues, or because they desire to be fréends, and to ouercome one another in curtesie: & this last cause is the best to establish a firme and continuall peace, if it be doone with true amitie & perfect loue. For if the Princes wils be different that make the peace, then is their peace (as the Prophet Eze­kiell Capit. 13. saith) like vnto the wall that was built vp & daubed with vntempered Morter, which peace may with small violence bée ouerthrowne: for because the loue and conformitie is wanting, it cannot last long or continue. The Senate of Rome asked the men of Pri [...]ernum, howe long the peace which they demaunded should endure: and they answered, that it should be continual, [Page 158] if they would graunt it vpon good and honest conditions, other­wise, it shoulde be but very short. They that will establishe a firme & stable peace, that may continue for euer, ought to pro­cure that God be not angrie or displeased, but fauourable, pro­pice and mercifull vnto them: that, he béeing the right author of al peace and true concord, may prosper the peace which they make. And they may easilie please and reconcile God, with sup­plication and earnest prayers, if they humbly with all theyr hart beseech his holines to giue them iudgment and vnderstan­ding to execute iustice: for the worke of iustice shall be peace: euen the worke of iustice shall be quietnes and assurance for e­uer, Esay, 32, 17. as Esay the Prophet saith.

2 If they that consult vppon the making and establishing of peace, cannot conclude, they ought to make a truce for a cer­taine time, that they may haue some space to deliberate vppon it, and to examine the conditions vpon which the peace is to be concluded, and to sée and cōsider, whether it be better for them to prosecute the warre, or to giue it ouer, and many times a truce béeing made for a time, the peace is established, whereas there had none béene concluded, if no league had beene made for some daies. They ought also to perpend & waigh, whether it be better for thē to procure peace, by rēdering some Castle, towne, or Cittie, or by paying a summe of money, or by allowing some tribute, or by concluding some marriage, or by making of alli­ance or affinitie, as we haue before shewed. They ought also to consider, whether they that demaunde peace, are persons that vse to accomplish that which they promise (as Hanniball tolde Scipio, when he demaunded of him, that he woulde stablishe a Liuius decad, 3. Libro. 30. peace with the Carthagineans) and whether it be better for thē to make the peace, when their enemies be victorious, and may sette the conditions according to their pleasure, (as Hannon Liuius. decad. 3, lib, 23. couns [...]led the Carthagineans) or to stay till necessitie compel, thē to come and intreate a peace.

3 Séeing that the augmentation of the Common-wealth, dependeth vpon peace, and the ende for which men take Armes in a Common-wealth well instituted, is to conserue the good estate thereof in peace, it is conuenient, that the Counsellers of Princes shoulde perswade their Prince, that it is better to ac­cept an honest peace, then to make a daungerous warre. The [Page 159] Lacedemonians and Athenians made so great account of peace, and desired so earnestly, that no occasion might be offered them to make warre, that they continually saide in their banquets, would to God our weapons were hanged ouer with copwebs. In that peace which the Romans concluded with King Porsen­na, they allowed it with this condition, that they should not vse anie yron sauing in tilling of the grounde. And because often­times, the estate of the whole Common-wealth, dependeth vp­pon the conditions vpon which the peace is established, and men cannot in any other thing erre so greatlie to the hurt & domage of the Common-wealth, it is conuenient that they which con­clude Valerius Max­imus. lib. 7. tit. 3. the peace, should be both wise and warie. Titus Labeo, béeing vrged to make a peace with King Antiochus, at the same Kings demaund, said that hee was contented vppon condition, that halfe of King Antiochus shyps should be for the behalfe of the people of Rome, which béeing graunted by the King, Titus Labeo commaunded halfe the part of euery shippe to be cutte away: because all the shyps should remaine for the Romans. A­gaine, the Consuls of Rome agreed to make peace with y ^e Car­thagineans, so they would yeelde and render all the ships which they had; ouer vnto them: which as soone as the Carthagineans had doone: the Romans commaunded all the shyps to be sette on Lucius Florus de gestis Roma. lib, 2, cap. 5. Et Paulus Horo­sius, lib. 4. ca. 22. fire, and tolde the Carthagineans that the Senate of Rome com­maunded that they should come foorth of Carthage, and builde a newe Cittie in some other place where they woulde, so it were tenne Italian myles distant from the sea.

Many other examples very pregnant for this our purpose might I heere alleage. But séeing I haue sette them downe in my Treatise De Iuriiurando & promissis, I will not heere re­peate them.

4 Though all Common-weales labor to maintain peace, and auoide occasions of warre: yet the ambition and mallice of men is so great, that no man ought to trust to the peace that is established betwixt him and his enemies. For vnder the colour of peace, they oftentimes practice many subtill deuices, where­by they obtaine that, which vnlesse some peace had béene con­cluded, they coulde neuer haue attained vnto. Those Princes that are not molested with warres, but rule their Subiects in peace, ought not to suffer their people so to giue themselues to [Page 160] ease, that they neuer be exercised, or trained vppe in Armes, for an vnarmed peace is very weake. Gelon King of Sicilie, be­ing Robertus Brit­taunus in Enco­mio Agricul­turae. perswaded that those Common-weales in which the peo­ple were not exercised in Militarie practises could not long con­tinue (for peace, vacation from labours, and idlenes, spoyle and consume them) hee commaunded that it shoulde be published through all his Countrey, that great necessitie vrged him to make warre, and there withall commaunded, that the people should presently be mustered, and taught how to vse their wea­pons: and after they had béene trained and some thing exerci­sed in handling them, he commaunded, that they shoulde all of them be placed in order, that they might goe with him to seeke the enemie, but when they were all gone, and asked where the enimies were with whem they should fight: the King shewed the fieldes, hils, and valleys vnto thē, saying that if they wold atchiue victory ouer their enemies, they should labour in those groundes, felling downe the Trées, and digging out the stones that were in them: for so dooing, they shoulde vanquishe those deadly enimies, Sloth and Idlenes, which woulde ouerthrowe and destroy the whole Common-wealth, if they were not in time expelled: and no Nation durst make war vpon them see­ing that they were practised in exercises of warre, and accusto­med to labour. For (as Titus Liuius saith) the enemies them­selues Decad, 3. lib. 30. doo not the Common-wealth so much harme, as delight and wantonnes.

Anncient olde men in their time, painted the Goddesse Pal­las Bocatius de ge­nealogia Deo­rum, lib, 5. ca. 48 Cicero pro Mu­rena. Artes ilico no­strae conticescunt In proaemio in­stitutionum. in Compleate harnesse, because they would haue men to vn­derstand, that the Artes and Sciences which florish in peace, little profit vnlesse they be defended by Armes.

The Emperour Iustinian saith, that Princes ought to be adorned with Armes, and armed with Lawes, that they may well gouerne the people that is committed vnto them.

The sixteenth discourse. Howe and wherewith Com­mon-Weales be augmented, and where­with they doe decay.

COunsellers of Princes, especially they of the Counsell of the estate, ought to vnderstande and know, wherwith Common-weales be augmen­ted, and by what means they decaie again. The famous S. Augustine saith, that as the Phisiti­ons Lib. 1. de ciui­tate Dej. cap. 3. cure sicke bodies, by purging, letting of blood, and searing: so God cureth the sinnes and vices of men, with famine as dy­ets: with plagues as purgations: and with wars as letting of blood and searing. The Prophet Esay saith, God will chastice Cap. 3. the people of Ierusalem, with taking away the staie of bread, and the staie of water. The strong man, and the man of warre, the Judge, and the Prophet: the prudent and the aged, the Cap­taines of fiftie, and the honourable, and the Counseller, and the cunning Artificer and the eloquent man: and hee will appoint children to be their Princes, and babes shall rule ouer them, and the people shal be oppressed one by an other, and euery one by his neighbour: the children shall presume against the aun­cient, and those that are contemptible, against those that are honourable. God dooth also chastice Cōmon-weales, and bring­eth them to decay, by suffering Pharaoes, Nabuchadnezers, Ose. cap. [...]. Da­bo regem in fu­rore meo. Caligulaes, Neroes, Dyoclesians, to gouerne, because of the sins of the people, and they stand him in stéede of Tormentors. At­tila was called the rod of God, and Tamberlaine the wrath of God. Those Princes which God will haue to serue him in stéed of Tormentors, to punish the people, who with their haynous sins offend him, are (as Cardinall Reginald Poole saith, in the Oration which he made vnto Charles the fift, concerning peace) those that persecute the Church of God. For GOD placeth not Christian Princes in authoritie, to the ende they shoulde serue him in steede of Tormentors, but that they should minister iu­stice equallie vnto al men, and be (as S. Paule saith) Ministers 2. Cor. [...]. of God, imitating him, and following him, in vsing clemencie, and béeing mercifull, to the consolation and comfort of all the people: but because the people repent not themselues of theyr Gene. 1 [...]. sinnes, and leaue not their wickednes, and because (as the holie [Page 162] Scriptures saie) the measure of the Amorites is filled: GOD sendeth them Princes that stand thē in steede of Tormentors: but if they amēded their liues, and enclined their harts to re­pentaunce, as Niniuie did, he wold pardon them. For it is the Ionae. cap. 3. propertie of his diuine Maiestie, to pardon and shewe mercie vnto those, that from the bottome of their hart doo cal vnto him, and repent themselues of their sinnes. And vnto those people which are iust and vertuous, God giueth good Kings, and such as doo the Common-wealth much good, and are as Angels sent from heauen, to conserue and defend her. Therfore those Prin­ces that doo not this, accomplish not their dutie, and cannot be properlie called Princes, but equiuocally as a painted man is called a man. The holie Scriptures call those Princes that doo Iob. 34. not minister iustice, vnto euery man according to the comman­dement of God, hypocrites: for they haue no princely thing in them, but onely the name of Princes, and béeing most cruell Wolues, they be masked and disguised with tokens onelie, and shewes of most mercifull Princes.

2 God doth oftentimes permit, that Princes should suffer many troubles and aduersities, to turne them from their wic­ked liues, and to shewe them that God dooth punish & chastice Princes, Kings, Monarches, and Emperours, when they go­uerne not their people as they ought, according to the will and pleasure of the highest Monarch of the world. After this man­ner, Cap. 4. saith the Prophet Daniel, that God did shew vnto Nabu­chadnezzar King of Babilon; how that God is Lord of all king­domes, & giueth them vnto whom he will: and euen as School­maisters correct their Schollers, to make them to applie theyr bookes, and duelie come to schoole: so GOD dooth chastice the Princes of the earth, that they may performe their duetie, and vnderstand that the true beginning to gouerne well, as well in time of peace as war, consisteth in knowing that God Almigh­tic is the Lord of all kingdomes, and that the beginning of all Prouer. 1. knowledge and wisedome (as King Salomon saith) is the feare of the Lord: and this is y ^e first lesson which they ought to learn that will follow him, and the first shewe and token which they make in the schoole of his doctrine. The feare of the Lorde is glorie and gladnes, and reioycing, and a ioyfall crowne. And the feare of the Lord maketh a merrie hart, and giueth gladnes [Page 163] and ioy, and long life, and who so feareth the Lord, it shall goe well with him at the last, and hee shall finde fauour in the day of his death. The Prophet Dauid beeing taught by the holie Psalm. 2. Ghost, saith. Be wise now therefore ye Kinges: be learned ye Judges of the earth, serue the Lord in feare, & reioyce in trem­bling. Kisse the Sonne least he be angry, and ye perrish in the way, when his wrath shall suddainlie burne, blessed are al they that put their trust in him. And those that follow not this doc­trine, God visiteth with calamities and aduersities, which hee sendeth vnto them to cause them to turne frō their wickednes, and to obey his commandements. That which we say of Chri­stian Princes, is also to be vnderstoode of those iust and vertu­ous Princes, whom God doth crosse with mis-fortunes & trou­bles, that they may be suffering them patientlie, deserue that glorie which God giueth vnto thē that serue him. To be pres­sed with miserie, plague, famine, fire and warre, is common both to good and wicked men: but onely good & vertuous men die in the seruice of our Lorde and Sauiour Jesus Christ, bea­ring his crosse on their shoulders: for (as the kingly Prophet Psalm, 115. saith) precious in y ^e sight of the Lord is the death of his Saints.

3 God also destroieth Cōmon-weales by appointing chil­dren to rule ouer them as the Prophet Esay saith, and I will appoint children to be their Princes, and babes shal rule ouer­them. Cap. 3. For sorrowfull (as King Salomon saith) is that King­dome, Ecclesi. 10. in which the Prince that ruleth it is a Childe, and they that giue him counsaile and gouerne him, are giuen to theyr lustes and pleasures▪ and also the Prophet Hoseas saith, that when God is angrie, and will punish the people for their sinnes Cap, 2. which they commit, he appointeth children to be their Princes. The Romans in theyr processions, beséeched God continuallie, that it would please him to be so fauourable vnto them, as not Auertant superi a nobis reges pueros quorum manus tutor re­gat. Ecclesi. cap. 4. Esay. 5. Esay. 5. 2. Reg 3. to appoint Children that shoulde be gouerned by Tutors and Protectors, to rule ouer them. But yet (as King Salomon saith) better is a poore and wise Childe, then an olde and foolish King which will be no more admonished: for olde fooles are in the Scriptures called children of an hundred yeeres of age. GOD doth also chastice the Common-weales, giuing them base and vile persons, that shall put their hands to the wherue, (as the Scriptures say) & handle the spyndle. Which thing is properly [Page 164] belonging vnto women as Homer doth giue vs to vnderstand, when be bringeth Telemachus speaking thus to his Mother.

And therefore in warres, they were wont to put spyndles and distaues in those Souldiers hands, that were cowards and da­stards, for such men are rather to be termed women then men. Vt dicitur. lib. 19. de disciplina militarj. GOD doth also chastice Common-weales, giuing them rashe Prelats, learned men without harts, and without courage, vn­skilfull Phisitions, vnconscionable and vnlearned Judges, and vnprofitable people that stand the Common-welth in no stéed, but to eate and to drinke the foode and the sustenance which the earth bringeth foorth, as the idle and wandering persons doe, which waste and spoile the Common-welth more then the Fly called Locusta, which burneth Corne with touching, and de­noureth the residue, and they doo the Common-wealth no good at all, and be lesse profitable then the labouring beastes, that with drawing and bearing, helpe to maintaine the Common­wealth, and for this cause doth Plato safe, that no Cittie can be Lib. 8. de Re­pub. termed happie, in which many poore, idle, and loytering per­sons liue, who béeing able to worke, will rather begge, and so committe all kind of wickednes to maintain themselues. Fur­thermore, God chastiseth Common-weales, if those that liue in them vse to deceiue one another, and for loue of money com­mit Ecclesiast, 10. iniquitie, by reason whereof, God translateth the kingdom from one people to another. Againe, God dooth chastice Com­mon-weales, if they that gouerne & beare rule ouer them, per­mitte men to sinne publiquelie, for that were to bring the peo­ple Deut. 17. Nec reducet populum in Egiptum. againe to Egipt, and for this cause dooth God punish Com­mon-weales, with all those cursses & plagues, which the Scrip­ture saith shall come on them that will not obey the voyce of the Lorde, and keepe his commaundements and ordinaunces. Be­sides, Common-weales perrish and decay, if any factions and diuisions raigne in them: for factious and dissentions persons, disquiet the Common-wealth: and taking aduauntage by the [Page 165] malice of a few, and the ignoraunce of manie, disturbe and en­domage the Common-wealth, to encrease and augment theyr owne commoditie, for as our Spanish prouerbe saith:

Factions and diuisions were cause of the destruction of the Em­pire of Rome, as may be seene in the dissentions which grew in Tulli. officior [...]. Libro. 1. Rome, because of the Lawes Agraria, which caused great alte­rations at euerie time that the people of Rome did intend to e­stablish it in that Cittie: this Lawe Agraria had two especiall clauses; the one ordained, that no Cittizen might possesse more then a certaine number of Akers of lande: the other, that all what soeuer was gotten from the enemies, should be equallie deuided among the people of Rome: and this Lawe was verie hurtfull to the Noble men, for it depriued them of their goods, and hindered them from increasing their welth and riches. But the Noble men opposing themselues, sought one remedie or o­ther to put down this Law: and either they brought an Armie of man out of the Cittie, or they caused that when one Tribune did propose the Lawe, another shoulde contrarie him: or they graunted part of the Lawe: or they sent people to inhabit that place which should haue beene distributed among the people of Rome: to be short, howe hurtfull it is to fauour and maintaine scismes and partialities in a Common-wealth, may be seene, in that many Common weales haue béene therby destroied and ouerthrowne: and therefore Plato calleth dissentions and facti­ons, In dialogo, 1, & 5. de legibus. poyson, that spoyleth and destroyeth Common-weales. To make an end, those Common-weales that are gouerned by the people, perrish and decay, if one man continue long in the go­uernment, and this was the cause of the destruction of Rome, as may be noted in Iulius Caesar who tyrannised, though notwith­standing Cato Vticensis (wiselie diuining and coniecturing the euent of the matter) contraried the people of Rome, in that they did appoint Iulius Caesar to continue in the generallship, long­ger then his day before prefixed: saying, that they gaue the Armes and weapons vnto him, that with them should destroy them, Unto which, Pompey (who at that time fauoured Iulius Caesar) answered, that Cato by saying so, did nothingels, but [Page 166] giue thē occasion to suspect, that he owed Iulius Caesar a grudg: and that which he said himselfe, did procéed of freendshippe. A­gaine, the people of Rome hauing appointed the Trybunes or Protectors of the Commons, to continue in their Office the se­cond yeere, because they thought that they were very sufficient to withstand the ambition of the Noble men: and to maintain the libertie and benefite of the Common people, against theyr power: the Senate, because they would not serme to haue lesse power and authoritie then the people, would haue had Lucius Quintius (who at that time was to giue ouer his Consulship to some other) to continue in his Office, and be Consull an other yeeere: but Lucius Quintius contraried the Senate in that, saying, that naughtie examples ought to be shunned, & not mul­tiplied and increased with another farre worse example: and Lybanus in ar­gumento ad O­lynthiacam pri­mam Demost­henis. would haue them to choose newe Consuls. Lastly, Common­weales perrish and decay, if they that beare rule ouer them, be young men, little experienced in gouernment: and the people that liue in them is verie riche, for it is naturall vnto them to be carelesse, negligent, and vicious if they be welthie: and vn­lesse necessitie vrge them to labor, they will neuer take paines. Finallie, Counsellers of Princes ought to consider, that com­monly Chronica Petri. Lussitani regis Lib, 18. cap. 23. sixe things cause Common-weales to decay. The first and cheefe cause of the destruction of a Common-welth, is con­tempt, when men are little accounted or esteemed of. The se­cond is couetousnes, or inordinate desire of other mens goods. The third is, inordinate delectation in worldlie thinges, when men will fulfill their pleasure, and doo all thinges according to their owne will. The fourth is disobedience, when men trans­gresse the Lawes wilfullie. The fift is crueltie, when they Plato Epist. 1. Salust in Iugur­tham. that beare rule, exercise tyrannie. And the sixt and last, is want of freends, when men haue not freends to giue them counsaile.

The seuenteenth discourse. How and wherewith Common-weales be increased.

COmmon weales are made bigger and greater, thrée ma­ner Machiauellus, Lib, 1. cap. 4. discurs. of waies. The first is, by manner of league, or alli­ance, to be in league with diuers other Cōmon-weales, which all of them be one as rich, as mightie, and as great [Page 167] as an other, and in all points equall, so that none of them haue any aduantage of the other: and when any of them conquer a­ny place, they make the rest partakers of the conquest, as the Suicers do in Heluecia, and as the Aguei and Ethoti did in Greece. The seconde manner to augment Common-weales, is, also by way of alliance: but in such sorte, that they haue the chéefe au­thoritie, rule, and gouernment, and the tytle of all the enter­prises: this maner is the best, and was vsed of the Romans: for they kéeping the emperial seate, and tytle of commaund to them selues, theyr alliants depriued of all power and authoritie, of themselues by their owne sweat and blood, became subiect vn­to them, seeing they were compassed about, and oppressed on the suddaine by such a mightie Cittie as Rome was: and of alli­ants and companions, became subiects and bond-men, not bée­ing able to defende themselues, by reason that they had increa­sed, augmented, and aduaunced the Romaine Empire with their owne forces. The third and last manner, for Common-weales to be augmented and enlarged, is, to make them whom they o­uercome, not fellowes, but subiects, as the Spartans did: but of all thrée, this is least profitable, if they be not able to keepe and gouerne those Citties which they conquer. For it is common­lie sayd, that he that conquereth an Empire and forces withal, becommeth mightie: but hee that atchiueth an Empire with­out forces, must néedes decay. The Romans to augment theyr Common-wealth, did imitate them that prune Trees, who to make a Tree grow and bring forth fruite in time, doo cut off the first boughes, that the vertue of that plant may remaine in the stemme, and by reason thereof, greener and more fruitfull boughes may spring out of it. And that this manner to enlarge an Empire or dominion is good and necessaire, may be prooued by the example of Sparta and Athens, which beeing two Com­mon-weales very strong, mightie, well Armed, and established with most excellent and perfect Lawes, could neuer reache or attaine to that greatnes, vnto which the Empire of Rome was aduaunced. And yet did Rome séeme to be more ful of disordered and seditsous troubles and contentions: yea and nothing setled in such good order and fashion, as those two other Common­weales, Sparta and Athens: whereof no other reason can be al­leaged, then that which is alreadie giuen: for Rome, (because it [Page 168] had augmented the body of the Citty by those two waies which we haue shewed) could gather together eyght & twentie thou­sand men for their defence, and Sparta and Athens, neuer coulde goe beyond the number of twentie thousand each of them. And this came not because Rome was scituated in a better place then Sparta or Athens, but by reason that a different kinde of procéeding was vsed, in the erecting and establishing of those Common-weales: for Lycurgus the first founder of the Spar­tane Common-wealth, thinking that nothing coulde so easilie innouate or abrogate his Lawes, as the mixture and confusion of newe Inhabitants, he bethought himselfe all meanes possi­ble, howe he might bring to passe, that no Straungers shoulde come to dwell in Sparta, or be conuersant in it: and therefore he ordained, that in his Common-weale, no money should be vsed but of Copper, because no man should haue any mind to come and dwel in that Cittie, or to bring any Merchandize or wares thether from fortaine Countries. And for this cause the com­panie of the Cittizens could neuer be increased. And because al our actions imitate nature, and it is impossible that a little thin stocke should support or holde vp a great thicke branche, there­fore a small and weake Common-welth, cannot ouercome and vanquish great and mightie Citties and kingdomes, that are more puissaunt and stronger then it is: and if it doe conquer a­ny, then it fareth with it, as it doth with thin and smal siemms, that haue grosse boughes & braunches, so that the smallest wind that is, doth blowe them downe and ouerturne them, as it hap­ned with Sparta, which hauing taken all the Citties of Grecce by force, Thebes no sooner rebelled, but all the other Citties did rise with them against her: and so the stocke remained without braunches, which thing could not befall on Rome, because the stocke was so grosse, that it was able to beare vppe and to sup­port the waight of any braunche.

5 Common-weales be also augmented, by fauouring the Inhabitans: for when they that dwell in them, may liue fréelie out of bondage, and be Maisters and Lordes of their owne sub­staunce, and such goods as they get by their labor and trauaile, they multiply and increase their riches, as well in husbandrie and tillage, as in Artes, handicrafts, trades, and Merchandize, for euery one doth with a good will, increase and heape vppe [Page 169] those goods which hee hopeth that hee may enioy after he hath got them. And by this it commeth to passe, that men so earnest­lie striue and contend one with an other who may best regarde, both his owne commoditie & the publique profit also. But con­trarilie, in those Countries and Prouinces, that are oppressed with ouer many tributes, and ouercharged with excessiue tols: the people thinke vpon nothing but how they may liue idle, and Franciscus Alu [...] ­res in historia 1. Ethiopiae. fol. 205. make good cheere vppon the Kinges cost. The Ethiopians haue much fruitfull lande, which might bring foorth a wonderfull deale of excellent fruite: but by reason of the excessiue tols, and vnreasonable tribute which they pay, they will not take pains to labour and husband more ground, then may suffice for theyr sustenaunce. And because the King of China, in the Prouince of Gaspar de Crus. Chapan, taketh away the substaunce of the Crafts men if they be rich: and if they will not giue it, he doth commaunde them to be imprisoned; none of those Prouinces will labour, nor take paines to get more then they need for their maintainance. And on the otherside, because they that liue in China, pay but small tribute, they be very industrious, and take wonderfull paines to heape vppe riches, and loose nothing wherby they may reape any profit: in so much, that of the bones of dogges and other beastes, they make little trifles for Children to play with, and pay money for the ordure of the necessaries, to dung and fatten their grounds.

Furthermore, Common-weales be augmented and increa­sed, by ministring iustice equallie vnto all men, not suffering a­ny notorious offences to escape vnpunished: and by hauing an especial regard of Religion. For iustice & Religion, are the two principal pillers y ^t support al weales publicke, without which, no Cōmon-wealth can dure long, or continue: and with which, little Common-weales be enlarged & made bigger, and great ones continue in their bignes, as I writte more at large in my bookes De Politijs et rebus publicis. Lastly, Common-weales be increased and amplified, by not suffering any one of thē that prouide them of maintenaunce and Merchandize, to engrosse thinges, that no man may sell or gaine but they: for these men cause the Common-wealth neuer to be without famine and dearth. Dionisius King of Sicilie, banished a certaine Merchant, Aristo. Pol. lib, 2. cap. 7. because hee had bought vppe all the yron that was brought to [Page 170] Sicilie, that he might sel it onelie, and haue al the gaines to him selfe. Finallie, Common-weales he augmented and amplified, by the carefulnes of Princes, if they prouide all things necessa­rie for their Subiects: euen as Sheepheards procure pasturing Xenophon lib. 8 Cyropaediae. and folds for their shéepe, shearing them (as the Emperor Ti­berius said) and not fleaing them. For (as Socrates saide) he is not a good Sheepheard that diminisheth his sheepe, and dooth Eras. in Apoth. Xenophon. lib. 1 de dictis & factis Socratis. L. cum ratio. §. si pluribus. ff. de bonis dam. not let them waxe fatte. Neither is he a good King, who dooth not procure that his subiects and vassals liue in peace, and be­come rich and wealthy: and this is the amplification and aug­mentation, which the Emperour Adrian saith, that Princes ought to procure in those Common-weales which they go­uerne.

6 Euen as nature worketh in humane bodies, and when it hath gathered much superfluous matter, yet notwithstāding by purging restoreth them to their health againe: so in mixed Machiauellꝰ lib. 2. cap. 8. discurs. bodies, when all Prouinces are full of Inhabitants, in such ma­ner that they cannot commodiously liue so many together, nor goe to any other place, because they be all inhabited and posses­sed: although the Citties & Countries be purged and clensed, by plagues, famine, dearth, and warres &c. yet alwaies there remaine people enough to inhabit them againe.

The Britans report of their Countrey, that it is so fruitful, and their soile so fertile, that vnlesse the plague did visite them sometimes, they would eate one another. To be shorte, least Common-weales shoulde consume and decay, by reason of the multitude of people that liue in them, all the Nations of the worlde accustoined to scoure as it were, and make them cleane, sending forth some men to inhabite voide places, and such Coū ­tries as they had taken from their enemies by warre. And so they that did remaine in the Common-wealth, might liue ve­rie commodiduflie, and the idle poore people and straying vaga­bunds had wherein to employ thēselues, and where with to be sufficientlie maintained, as I writte more copiouslie in my Bookes De Policijs siue Rebuspublicis, in tractatibus de Con­lonijs & de pauperibus otiosis ae vagabundis.

The eighteenth discourse. From whence it doth proceede that the Common-weales are changed, out of one estate of gouernment into an other.

THe alteration of gouernment in a Cōmon-welth (as Plato saith) procéedeth from those y ^t gouerne Lib. 8. de Repub. Aristo Polit. 5. Sebastian Friz­zo in discursu de administratione ciuili. Bartholo­mens Caualcan­te 4. discursu. de Republica. it. For séeing that these inferiour thinges, are in perpetuall alteration, they cannot be euerla­sting, but are changed out of one gouernment in­to another, after men haue had experience of those inconueni­ences, which were in the gouernment which they had at first, To wit, if the Common-wealth were gouerned by the people, (which estate of gouernment is called Democracia) after they haue made tryall of those inconueniences which are in the Democratie, or popular estate, they bring in Aristocratia, (which is, when the Common-wealth is gouerned by the No­ble men or cheefe persons) and after that they haue tried the Aristocracie, they choose some principall person, that may de­fend, gouerne and protect them: who oftentimes exerciseth ty­rannie vppon them. And because the ende of euery Common­wealth Plato. Vbi sup. Arist. Polit. 5. cap. 5. Nā maxi­ma sete ex parte veteres tyranni extribunis plebis ex [...]iterunt. is to be well gouerned, the gouernment thereof would be perpetuall, if they that gouerne it were iust and vertuous, and if all men wished to be ruled according to reason & instice. But because they who haue all the authoritie of the Commen-wealth, exercise tyrannie vpon the people, the Noble men and cheefe of the Realme rise against them, and either kill them, or cast them downe from theyr soueraigntie, translating y ^e whole gouernment of the Common-wealth vnto themselues, and v­surping all the authoritie which the Monarch had, who ruled a­lone without péere. And if chaunce these cheefe Noble men go­uerne tyrannouslie, then the people, they arise against them, and dispossesse them of the gouernment, and will rather be ru­led by one King, then by many Peeres. And this is the alteration which Common-weales commonlie sustaine, returning to the beginning from whence they first beganne. For Democra­cie, chaungeth into Oligarchie, (which is, when a few persons haue all the authoritie) & Oligarchie changeth into Monarchie [Page 172] or kingdome, and the gouernment of the Kingdome or Monar­chie decaying, it turneth againe to the Oligarchie or Democra­cie: and because the Democracie or popular estate, hath assay­ed the inconueniences of the Oligarchie, it runneth oftentimes into the vttermost of the Monarchie, to be deliuered from the Oligarchie or gouernment of a fewe persons that haue all the authoritie. Plato saith, that the Common-wealthes are verie 4. Delegibus. hardly brought out of tyrannie vnto a Kingdome, and out of a Kingdom into the Democracie: and out of the Democracie in­to the Oligarchie, but to change the gouernment out of the O­ligarchie into some other estate, is most harde and difficult, for they which hinder and let it, are many and preuaile much.

2 The most difficult reformation of all, is to restore a Cō ­mon-wealth which is in subiection, into a frée estate: for the e­state Machiauellus li. 1. cap. 16. de dis­curs. of the Common-wealth is soone altered, but very hardlie reformed, and restored to the former gouernment: because peo­ple vpon small cause arise, but are not so soone appeased, especi­allie if they once be giuen to liue dissoloutlie, as it was séene in Antonius de Ga­uara in Epistolis. Rome, when Brutus and Cassius went about to restore the Cit­tie vnto fréedome: and though they were fauoured by manie, both of the noblest and cheefest of the Cittie, yet they could not bring it to passe, for the Cittie was quite alreadie marred and spilt, by reason of the dissentions and warres of Sylla and Ma­rius, and of Caesar and Pompey, and the Romans were now as it were accustomed to liue in bondage. Besides this, they that labour or endeuour to set any Common-wealth at libertie, find partiall enemies, but no partiall freendes; for all they become to be their partiall enemies, that were the better by y ^e Prince his estate, and reaped great profite by him and his substaunce. For they will be loth to haue the Prince depriued of his king­dome, least they should fare the worse by it: or if by happe the Prince be deposed of his gouernment, they séeing the Kings au­thoritie to be decaied, by reason whereof they are depriued of the commodity which they were wont to haue, cannot liue con­tentedlie, but continuallie seeke meanes to attaine to the au­thoritie and fauoure which they enioyed before. And on the o­therside, they that endeuour to sette any Common-wealth at libertie, finde no partiall freendes: because to liue at libertie, seemeth to be nothing els, then to aspire to honor & rewardes, [Page 173] by meanes of some honest and lawfull causes, for otherwise no man is either honoured and rewarded. And when any person receiueth those preheminences, profits, and cōmodities, which he thinketh that he deserueth, then he confesseth not that hée is bound to him that honoureth and rewardeth him. Moreouer, the common profit which is gotten by liuing in a frée Common wealth, is not knowne by any one, as long as he dooth not en­joy it: which is, to enioy the vse and commoditie of hys owne substance, and to dispose of it at his pleasure. And they that will goe about to remedie & redresse these inconueniences, and dys­orders, ought to doo as Brutus did, killing all those that oppose themselues against that newe gouernment which they wyll bring in to the Common-wealth. Which, Brutus well might doo, for when he expelled the Kinges, the people of Rome were not so vicious, nor so full of dissolute manners, nor so wickedlie giuen, as when Brutus & Cassius slew Iulius Caesar. And when Lib. 1. Quotus quisquis reliquus erat, qui rem­pub. vidisset. Augustus Caesar vsurped the Monarchie of the Romaine Em­pire, there was not one in Rome, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) that knewe what it was to liue in a free Common-wealth.

3 Those Princes vnto whom the Common-weales are committed, as vnto Protectors which should defend them, and yet exercise crueltie vpon them, destroying, killing, and seysing vpon theyr goods, that hinder them from béeing absolut Lords, haue much adoe, and incurre great daunger to maintaine the tyrannie or kingdome which they vsurpe. For they must de­stroy all those which may resist them: which they may easilie doo, Arming thēselues with the lawes to iustify their intention, as all those haue doone, which haue tyrannized ouer those Com­mon-weales Ari. li. 4. Pol. ca. 3, Sed duae esse maxime vidētu [...]: vtenim ventus dicituralius A­quilonaris, a ius Australis, ab [...]e­orum mutat [...] ­nes: sic Respub. secundae, sunt ea­quae est i [...]popu­li et eaquae est [...] pancoi [...] po­cestate. which were committed vnto them.

The popular Regiment is reformed vnto the gouernment of a fewe, and that gouernment in which a few haue all the au­thoritie, is chaunged into the Monarchie: and the Monarchie into the tyrannie: or out of one extreame into the other, with­out passing by the meane gouernments. Euen as betwixt the North and the South there be many windes, which take part with the chéefe and vttermost winds, and as betwirt black and white there be many diuersities of colours: so betwixt the De­mocracie and the Tyrannie, (which is a cruell or violent rule or gouernment for a priuate commoditie, and not a publique [Page 174] weale) there be many diuersities of gouernmēts, which are mix­ed with both y ^e two extreames: & to passe out of y ^e one extreame into the other, they neede not passe through those gouernmēts which haue the place in a meane betwéene them. Albeit in na­turall things, no transinutation can be made out of the one ex­treame into the other; without passing through y ^e means which are betwixt both the extreames. Yet this doth not hold in those things which depend vpon mans will, which easily passe out of Auerrois, in pa­raph. ad li. Pla­tonis de Repub. Et Melchior ca­nꝰ in tractatu de Sacramentis. one extreame into the other, without passing through y ^e means which are betwixt both the extreames.

4 It were needles to dispute of all the alterations of go­uernments in the Common-wealth, and howe easily they be chaunged out of one forme into another. They that are desirous to vnderstande this matter more exactly, let them reade Bar­tholomew In tractatu de Politijs discursu. 4. Caualeante, who handleto it verie largelie, exami­ning and sifting the opinions of Plato, Aristotle, and Polibius, concerning the trans-formations of Common-weales, which somtimes alter & quite change that kind of gouernment which they had before, sometimes enlarge it, and sometimes diminish it. These alterations are made as Aristotle saith, either out of Pol. lib. 5. ill gouernments into good, or out of good gouernments into bet­ter, or out of ill gouernments into worse. This is verified in the Democracie, Oligarchie, Aristocracie, & Monarchie, which (béeing in themselues good gouernments if they be ruled accor­ding to reason and iustice) may be chaunged thus. The Demo­cracie into the Oligarchie, and the Oligarchie into the Aristo­cracie, and y ^e Aristocracie into the Monarchie: and so, one good gouernment, into another gouernment, as good or better. Also a good gouernment is chaunged into an ill, and that ill gouern­ment, either into one of the same kind, or into one of an other kind. As for example, into the same kind, as the kingdome in­to the tyrannie: the Democracie and Aristocracie, into a good or bad administration: and out of one kind into another, as the Aristocracie and Democracie, into any one of the other cōtrary kinds of gouernments. Notwithstanding that which some say, Bartholom. Ca­ualcante vbi sup. that the badde and good gouernments are contraries, which is prooued, because those things are contrarie, which béeing of the selfe same kind, doo much differ the one from the other, and yet are apt and disposed to be produced out of the selfe same subiect [Page 175] according to the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle: but that the Plat. In Phaedo­ne. Ari. In post predicamētis. & 1. physicorom. contrarie gouernments are vnder the selfe same kinde, conside­ring them according as they be good and badde, and are in dys­position to be produced in the same subiect, may manifestlie be seene in the Monarchie or tyrannie, and in all other gouern­ments, whose subiect is the people in which they be produced, and therfore if such gouernments be cōtraries, it seemeth that no trans-formation or alteration can be made, out of a good go­uernment into an ill gouernment, without passing through the meane gouernments that are indifferently betwixt bothe the extreames.

5 Vnto this obiection some answer, that contraries are not very distant one from the other, and doo not much differ, for they be very neere ioyned, both in the kind vnder which they be, and in y ^e subiect in which they be produced. And those things which any way whatsoeuer are differing (which are called opposita, diuersa, & differentia) are far more distant one from the other, then those thinges which are contrarie: and seeing contraries are ioyned very neere together, the one contrarie may easily be changed into the other: hence it followeth that y ^e Monarchie is more easily altered into the tirannie, then into the Democra­cie or Oligarchie, though Aristotle notwithstanding say, that Lib. 3. Politico­rum cap. vlt. Cū presertim saepius in cōtrarias mu­tentur respub. omnes, quam in finitimas atque vicinas. Aristo. lib. 2. de generat. & cor­rup. facilis est transitus in sym­bolizantibus. the gouernment passeth more easilie out of the Aristocracie into the Democracie, then foorth of the Monarchie into the Tyrannie: his reason is, because the Tyrannie is contrarie to the Monarchie, but the Aristocracie is ioyned neere vnto the Democracie. And those thinges which are like one to ano­ther, and doo (as the Philosophers say) symbolizare, be easilie trans-formed and chaunged out of one into another. But thys hindereth not: for it holdes in necessarie and naturall, but not in morrall agents, which depend vpon the free will, as I haue written more at large in my bookes De amore Diuino, huma­no et casto. Thence it foloweth that the people trans-form and chaunge the gouernments one into the other, as they think wil be better and more profitable for them, without following the Vbi supra. order of the naturall trans-formations and alterations. Bartho­lomewe Caualcante giueth other solutions for this obiection, which are rather to be disputed of in Schooles, thē to be handled of those which intreate of the gouernment of Common-weales. [Page 167] Polibius affirmeth, that the Monarchies be commonly refor­med Libro. 6. with the Aristocracies, and the Aristocracies with the O­ligarchies, and the Oligarchies with the Democracies. Aristo­tle 5. Politicorum. examineth and sifteth this matter better thē Polibius, who could not reade Aristotles bookes, for his heyres hid them, and they were founde and brought to Rome in the time of Sylla the Dictator, who was long after Polibius: for Polibiꝰ was in the Strabo. lib. 13. time of Scipio the Affricane. This which Aristotle and Poli­bius dispute of, concerning the reformation of Cōmon-weales, which are more easily reformed into the contraries, then into those which are next vnto them: is to be vnderstoode according In lib. 5. Polit. cap. vlt. to that which S. Thomas saith: to wit, that Plato will not haue, that the gouernment of Common-weales shall be onelie changed vnto that which is next vnto each of them, but y ^t they be trans-formed and chaunged, after that manner as we haue said, that those things were to be trans-formed, which doo sym­bolize one with another. And séeing that Plato vnderstādeth it after this manner, there is no reason why Aristotle should re­prehend him: for Aristotle himselfe saith, that those things are easily trans-formed that doo (as y ^e Naturall Philosophers terme it) symbolize one with the other.

6 Plato affirmeth, that Common-weales are altered out of Dialogo. 8. de Repub. one kind of gouernment into another, because they that gouern them, regard their owne particular profit, more then the pub­lique commoditie of the Common-wealth. For because of their own priuate commoditie, they marrie Noble men with some of the Comminaltie, and will haue that some children in the Cō ­mon-wealth, should not follow the estimation and nobilitie of their fathers. Plato prooueth this, saying, that Nature whē she bringeth forth men, she communicateth the properties of Met­tals vnto them: and giueth the propertie of Golde vnto those which are apt to gouerne Nations: and to those that are vali­ant and hardie, she communicateth the propertie of siluer, that they may defend the Common-wealth: because shee giueth the noblest place in the Common-wealth vnto them that gouerne it. And for this cause, euen as Gold is the most excellent of all Mettals, so the Arte of gouerning a Common-wealth, is the most excellent and worthiest Arte of all. And as siluer is estée­med Aristo. lib. 1. cap. 2. Ethico. most worthie of all Mettals next vnto gold: so they which [Page 177] defend the Common-weale are cheefe, and pessesse the seconde place next to them that gouerne it. But I doo not beléeue that they which followe warre, will consent vnto that which Plato saith. But séeing that Armes little profit or auaile without the counsaile of those which gouerne the Cōmon-wealth, & though Armes be necessarilie required for the defence of the same: yet notwithstanding, the science or arte of gouerning & ruling Na­tions & Countries, is very necessarie in a well instituted Com­mon-weale, as I writt more at large in my Bookes of Mili­tarie discipline. But to return to Plato, he attributeth the pro­pertie of Yron and Copper, vnto y ^e Mechanicall Artificers and handicrafts men: and hee saith furthermore, that they which mingle theyr progenies and linages, marrying those that are of noble blood, with those that are of the Comminaltie, are like vnto those which mingle Gold with Siluer, Yron, or Copper: and that hence it procéedeth, that the Nobilitie of th [...]se which gouerne the Common-wealth diminish: and that the Nobili­tie diminishing, one gouernment is changed into another. And because they which gouerne the Common-wealth, shoulde not mingle the propertie of Golde, with the propertie of Syluer or Yron, Plato would haue, that euery one shold marrie with one of his owne estate and qualitie: they that are of Noble blood, with Noble women, and the Common-people with the Com­minaltie, labouring men with labourers, &c.

The Romans did not suffer any of the nobilitie to marie with any of the Comminaltie. And certaine of the people of the East Indies, obserue this order, that euery one marieth an other that is of the same trade.

Plato affirmeth also, that the Common-weales change theyr Dialo. 8 de re­pub. [...]. 1. Con­stat ergo in ciui­tate vbi mendi­cos vides▪ messe fures latrones sacrilegos, om­nium (que) scelerum authores. gouernment, when they be full of poore creatures. For those Common-weales in which many poore people liue, are full of theeues and wicked persons, maisters and authors of all mys­chiefe and ribaldrie. That we might shun this inconuenience so hurtfull and preiudiciall to the Common-wealth, Plato coū ­saileth vs, that as the Bées suffer not the Drones which helpe not to make honey, to eate of it: so ought they which gouerne the Common-wealth, not to permitte idle and vagabund poore folke to corrupt and spoile the Common-wealth, maintayning their idle beggerie with the painfull Cittizens thrift. For such [Page 178] people loue new reformations, because they haue hope through them, to find some remedie for their pouertie & miserie. They Liuius decad. 3. lib. 3. Plebs no­uarum, vt solet, rerum auida. desire to haue seditious lawes published of distribution of lands, from the Cittizens, portion meale, among all them that are in the Cittie: as Tiberius and Caius sons vnto Gracchus woulde doo in Rome, to winne the harts of the Common-people. Indéed Plato, to the end that the gouernment of the Common-weales might not be altered by reason of pouertie, woulde haue (that according to the lawes of Nature) all goods immoouable should be common: and that those which gouerne the Cōmon-weales should deuide and parte those goods, conformable to euerie one his necessitie. This Common-wealth which Plato instituteth, is as it were an Idaea of all other Common-weales, as I writt more at large, in my booke of ciuill and politique gouernments of Common▪weales, in the Treatise of lawfull and honest as­semblies.

8 Aristotle affirmeth, that rich men doo alter and destroy Li. 4. Poli. ca. 13 Nā seditiosi non solēt esse paupe­res, ijque omnes qui ad honores nō conscendunt, nisi quis cos vio­let aut aliquam partem facultatū detrahat. Common-weales more then poore men, because they that are wealthie and ambitious, can preuaile much, and they will not, nor know not how to obey the Lawes, whereas poore men are constrained-to doo otherwise. And heerein Aristotle is not a­gainst that which Plato saith: for Plato speaketh not of those poore men that can maintain themselues, with that which they gette by their owne labour, and haue wherewithall to succour and help themselues: for these men are not able to change the estate of the Common-weale in which they liue, and béeing ac­customed to maintain themselues with a little, and alwaies be occupied and imploied in their busines, they haue no time nor leysure to take so great a matter in hande. But if the people be oppressed, and ouercharged with too many tributs, or cannot maintaine themselues with that which they gette: then they finde that which they cannot of themselues doo, for want of for­ces to execute it, in those which are able to disquiet the Cōmon­wealth, and chaunge the gouernment, and so with the helpe of the welthy and ambitious people, séeing that they haue more forces then their enemies, they hope that they shall easily ouer­come them, and be deliuered from those troubles wherewith they be oppressed. So that the rich and ambitious men disquiet the Common-wealth, because they are able, and the poore men [Page 179] are compelled to alter the gouernment, through the ignorance and smal policie of those that gouerne them. Who because they kéepe them not still imploied, or because they prouide not such things for them as be néedfull to their sustenaunce, or charge them with ouer many toles, giue them occasion to assemble to­gether, and seeke meanes by which they may chaunge the go­gernment and disquiet the Common-wealth. This néedeth not to be declared by examples, seeing it is knowne vnto all men. Moreouer, the gouernment is soone changed in that Common­wealth, in whith many idle and careles fellowes liue, though they be not poore. For such fellowes disquiet the Cōmon welth, and suffer none to liue quietlie that dwell in it. And séeing they be neuer occupied in lawful practises, and honest exercises, they are alwaies readie to fauour and assist all factions and part-ta­kings, that arise in the Common-wealth: they goe vppe and downe the streetes in all corners of the Towne, perswading and alluring mens children and seruants, not to obey their fa­thers and maisters, and disquieting married folkes, and those that liue with that which they gaine with the sweat of theyr browes: lastlie, they are instruments of all vices, wickednes, and mischiefes that are committed in the Common-welth. And for this cause is this Spanish prouerbe vsed.

that is, Otiosus semper viuit in deside [...]

Not much vnlike vnto the English prouerbe.

Plato saith also, that those Common-weales cannot continue long without alteration of gouernment, in which manie lyue, that spend ouermuch in banquets, brauerie, and other kinde of pleasures and pastimes: for such people suffer not those which gouerne, to minister iustice equallie to all men, and make anie mention concerning the reformation of dissolute maners Hence it doth procéede, that Ciuill gouernments are changed into Ti­rannies, and the Tyrannies into Aristocracies or Democra­cies, according as the state is disposed, to be brought into that gouernment into which it dooth change: vnto which the people doth easilie agrée. For as sicke bodies take no rest in any place, [Page 180] because they haue the disease and sicknes which troubleth and disquieteth them, within themselues; so those people which liue spending more then they gaine, in riotousnes and supers [...]uities▪ without regarding what is belonging to honestie & vertue, and what is most agréeable to their estate and calling, cannot conti­nue without altering and changing the gouernment.

9 Plato following the opinion of Pythagoras, attributeth the mutation of the gouernments vnto numbers, and he saith: Lib, 8. de Repu. that the consonancie and proportion which is in Musicke, dooth cause the gouernment of the Common-wealth, to change out of one estate into another. Aristotle, because he will not leaue his olde custome in reprehending his Maister Plato, saith, that the Pol. 5. cap. 12. In Platonis autem Politia disseritur quidem de mu­tation▪ bus Rerū ­pub. á Socrate. Sed nō recte dis­putatur [...]ū pre­sertim optimae reipub. (quae ea­dem prima est) non tradit quae sit proptié mu­tatio. Marsilius Fisci­nus in argum. D [...]alogi. 4. alteration of gouernment, doth not depend vpon harmonie: for the gouernment at diuers times and for diuers causes, is alte­red without respecting y ^e proportions of Musick: vnto this ar­gument some answer, that Plato did not intend to attribute the chaunge of Regiments, to accords and consorts in Musick, but, euen as in Musicke, if the consent of the Diatessaron, and the consent of the Diapente, be ioyned together, they make the Di­apason; so in Common-weales and Empires, after that the principles, beginnings and meanes, be ioyned together with the ende, (which are the Diatessaron, and Diapente, with the Diapason) they are losed and dissolued. And although Plato following the opinion of Pythagoras, say, that one may knowe and diuine of things to come by numbers, which (the Greekes cal [...], for as they that studie the speculations of Astrologie, deuine and foretell by the aspects of the Planets and signes of the Zodiacke: so the Pythagorians attributing vnto euery Pla­net and Signe, his proper number, doo gesse & iudge of thinges to come. And this Pythagoricall doctrine, doth Plato follow in his Timaeus, and in his Dialogues De republica, as In somnio sci­pionis. Macro­bius, In somnio sci­pionis. Ludouicus Viues, In libro de cō ­ [...]ribenda histo. Iohannes Bodimus, and In libro. de Diuinatione. Gas­per Pencerus declare) yet neuertheles, Plato his intention is not, to apply the alteration of the gouernment vnto numbers, but to the fertilitie or sterilite of the bodies: and for this cause, hee will haue, that they which gouerne the Common-wealth, shall ordaine and declare of what age men ought to be when they marrie, respecting the proportion which is betweene the beginning, middle, and ende, for by respecting or not respecting [Page 181] this, dooth the want and superfluitie of wits and bodies pro­céede. Plato. Dia. 4. de Repub. In Argu­ment. 4. Dialo. Platonis de Re­publica.

Marsilius Fiscinus saith, that Plato following Pythagoras, applieth the number of two and the number of eight vnto iu­stice: for as the number of two beeing reduced in it selfe, to witt, two times twise two, dooth make the number of eyght, which on euerie side is equall: so iustice ought to be equal vnto all men. The alteration of gouernments, commeth not by rea­son of numbers, but of the causes interior and exterior, and which be neere and farre of: for the numbers neither essenti­allie nor accidentiallie, haue anie power or propertie at all, whereby men may knowe or diuine what shall come to passe. But Pythagoras imitating the Astrologians, would perswade those y ^t folowed him, that he tolde of thinges to come by nūbers. The same may be said of Arithmantia, and Geomantia, which in deuiding are holpen by Astrologie. To conclude, no man can August. de ciui­tate Dei. lib. 11. cap. 30. denie, but that numbers are very fit and apt, by them not onely to signifie humane, but also diuine things.

10 Moreouer, the gouernment of the Common-wealth, is also altered out of one estate into auother, if the people be not exercised in warlike exploits: for y ^e estate of Common-weale▪ in which the subiects be not brought vp in Militarie discipline, is subiect to be ouercome by euery enemie who will take it, and Plato. Dialo. 1. de legibus. Om­nia bona eorum qui victi sunt▪ ad victores ilico transeunt. it must stand at the wil and pleasure of him who ouercommeth it. A certaine Philosopher respecting this, said, that he shoulde wish that our enemies were rich, healthfull and faire, and that they had no forces to defend themselues: for if they be not able to withstand our forces, then their substance and riches should serue vs, and may be turned to our owne vses.

After that King Xerxes had taken the great Cittie of Ba­bilon, he brought it not into captiuitie, nor commaunded them Arist. lib. 3. cap. 2. Politic. Quae cum capta esset, fama est, tertio die, quandā par­tem v [...] is non sensisse. that liued in it to be slaine: but to be reuenged of them hee or­dained and commaunded, that they shoulde not exercise them­selues in feates of Armes, or practise any Martiall affaires, but that they should employ themselues in playing vppon Instru­ments, singing and dauncing: and that they should be Jesters, Tauerners, vitlers and pot-companions: and that they should giue themselues to all kind of sportes & pleasant pastimes, that they coulde deuise: and by this meanes he made the people of [Page 182] that Cittie, which had béene so famous and renowned through out all the world, in short time to become weake, and of no ac­count.

11 Plato affirmeth, that the Lawes and ordinances of the Quem eitat Cae­lius Rhodoginus [...], [...], cap, [...]. anti­qua [...] lectionū. Tibiae in discipli­n [...] recipiendae nō sunt, nec aliud artificiosum instrumentū, vt est ci­thara, verum quae auditores effici­ [...]ot bones. Pla. Dialo. 2. de legibꝰ. In Egipto iuuenes bonis figuris & bonis cantibus assues­cunt, quae vero & qualiasint huius­modi, in sacris ab eis est institutū. 1. Reg. 10. Ha­bebis giegē prophetar [...] descendē [...]ium de excelso, & ante eos Psal­terium & timpa­num et [...]biam et citaram ipsosque prophetantes. Psalm, 7. 4. Reg. 3. Quin. lib. 1. cap. 17. vt iidem mu­sici & vates & sa­pientes iudicarē ­tur. Vbi supra. Mu­sicam Natura ip­sa videtur ad to­lerandos facilius labores velut mune [...]i nobis de­disse. Caelius Rhodo­ginus lib. 5. cap. 22. antiqu. lec­tionum. Bartholomeus de Albornos in proaemio lib. de contractibus. Common-wealth change and alter, if that the musick which is vsed in them be changed: and that, to shun so dangerous a losse and detriment, they that gouerne Common-wealths, ought not to suffer any new kind of Musicke to be brought into them: for the manners and customes of the people change when Mu­sick altereth. Aristotle counselleth those that are desirous to be vertuous, not to vse any kind of Musick or Instruments, which may allure and intice them to wickednes. The Lawes of Egipt suffered not, as Plato saith, any thing to be sung within Egipt, vnlesse they which gouerned the Common-wealth, had first ex­amined the thing to be sung, and with what Musick they shold sing it. It is likelie that it woulde be very profitable for euerie Common-wealth, not to allow songs and ballads or Musick to be sung in the Cittie, which may intice men to dishonestie, and it were very good that, that diligence which Magistrates take in suffering no bookes to be printed, or pictures to be drawne, that may endomage or hurte the state of the Realme, were also had, in examining those kinds of Musick and ditties, which are vsed in the Common-wealth: for Musicke béeing a diuine gift, which easilie mooueth mortall harts, if men were accustomed to sing holie Psalmes and honest Sonets, it woulde no doubt, draw men from folowing of vanity and wickednes, to embrace vertue and honestie. In auncient times past, the Priestes and Prophets, to applie themselues the better to diuine thinges, v­sed Musick, as King Dauid did, and the Prophet Elizeus, and among the Gentiles, Prophets and Philosophers were Musi­tions. How forcible Musicke is to mooue the harts of men, may be séene in children, who when they crie, are appeased and qui­eted with Musick: and in men also vpon whom God bestowed (as Quintilian saith) the benefit of Musick, with it the more ea­sily to forget their labors, and by it to be perswaded to doo that which is sung vnto them. And for this cause diuers kindes of Musicke applied to that which is sung, is vsed in feasts, playes, banquets, wars, solemnities and funerals. The Poets fayned that Amphion and Orpheus, two great Musitions of Thracia, [Page 183] with the sweete harmonie of their Musick, builded the walles of their Countrey, drawing after them stones, trees, & beastes. These fained fables (which ordinarilie betoken some thing mi­sticallie contained in them) giue vs to vnderstande, that the Philosophers which first established the liberall Sciences, pol­licies and precepts for ciuill behauiour, and learning in theyr Countries, did with their sweete voice and learned tongues, perswade the rude & rusticall people, (which did not much dyf­fer from stones, plants, and beastes) to leaue their sauage kinde of life, and reforme their wilde & brutish customs: & so brought them vnder Lawes and pollitique gouernment. But not to wade too farre from the purpose, let vs return vnto Plato, who though he affirme that it is a thing very dangerous for the go­uernment of each estate, that Musicke should be altered in the Common-wealth, (for by it the customs be altered, which bée­ing altered, the gouernment is soone changed.) Neuerthelesse, Lib. 2. de legi­bus. Ego autem nec tam valde id timendum, nec plane contēnen­dum puto. & lib. 3. Plato ait Mu­sicorum canti­b ^• mutatis, mu­tati ciuitatum status. Dialogo. 2. De­legibus. Vt in ci­uitate iuuenes bonis figuris & bonis cantibus assueseant. Plato. Dialo. 8. de Repub. Arist. Poli. 5. Plutarch. In vi­ta Romulj. Dialogo. 5. de legibus. Lucanus. In sua victrices conuer­tunt visce [...]a dex­tias. Politic. 3. Tullie affirmeth, that this needeth not to be so much feared, (but yet not contemned.) But we must vnderstand, that which Plato saith, after the same order as Aristotle dooth, to witte, of that Musicke which enticeth men to dishonest and vicious acti­ons: as may be gathered out of that which Plato saith, that the Gouernours and Priestes of Egipt, did examine those pictures and Poemes, which in Egipt were painted and sung, to the end that honestie and vertue should be greatly regarded in them.

12 The gouernment of a Common-wealth is also chaun­ged by factions, diuisions of people in sundry opinions, scismes, and partialities: and euen as terrestriall bodies grow and pe­rish: and when there is no outward thing that corrupteth thē, they consume of themselues by reason of some inward corrup­tion: euen so Common-weales, when they haue no forraine enemies, they Arme and prepare enemies among themselues at home, to destroy one another. The Emperour Charles the fift, said, that as the rust doth eate vp the yron, and the wormes the fruite of the earth, so diuisions doo disquiet and destroy the whole Common-wealth, and alter the gouernment. And thys manner of alteration of gouernments, is the most daungerous of all: for as Plato saith, it is a most greeuous sicknes, which destroieth and maketh many fameus Citties desolate, which with their owne weapons wage warre against themselues. [Page 184] factions and deuisions grewe, as Aristotle saith, either because there are but fewe, that be partakers of the gouernment & ho­nors Aristo. vbi supra. Cum multitudo animos sustulit quod pari virtute sit praedita. Non nulli mag­ni viti neque in­feriores virtute &c. A [...]j nimium te­nues sant, a [...]j locupletes. Si quis magnus sit, possitque cresce­re, aut cum ali­quis vi [...]i nomine digous, non adi­piscitar honores. in the Common-wealth, whereas there be many that de­serue to be admitted to the gouernmēt, or because they that are honest and vertuous, and deserue to be esteemed, be nothing set by, nor admitted to beare anie Office: or because seme be ouer rich, and other very poore: or because there is seme man in the Common-wealth who is greatlie fauoured of the people, and hath great authoritie, whereby hee pretendeth to rule and go­uerne all. This manner of changing the gouernment, is com­monly seene in those Cōmon-weales, in which there are migh­tie persons, that take occasion to profit thēselues by the weake­nes of those Princes which be cowards and faint harted, or but children vnder protection and custodie of Tutors & Gouerners: for such men procure that place which is néerest to the Princes to vsurpe their power, and commaund all.

The same manner of alteration is also seene in Common­weales, wherein be many ambitions persons, who against all reason and iustice disquiet them, either because they will not pay that which they owe, as Iulius Caesar did, when he tyran­nized ouer the Monarchie of Rome, or because they intende to robbe the Common-wealth, whilst the tirannie of those which disquiet it dooth continue, as they of Roane did in the time of Guaginus in vita caroli sexti Frā ­corem regis. Charles the sixt of that name, King of Fraunce, choosing a Citti­zen to be a King, that vnder y ^e colour and pretence they might fréelie robbe and spotle: or because the desire of rule (as Corne­lius Tacitus saith) is the greatest desire of all. And it maketh Lib, 15. Cupido Dominādi cunc­tis affectibus fla­grantior est. them that pretende to be Kinges (as Euripides saith) not to re­gard any thing that either the diuine or humane Lawes com­maund: affirming that to obtaine a Kingdome, they may vio­late any Lawe, according to the Castilian prouerbe.

Not much vnlike vnto that which Euripides saith, Si violan­dum est ius, imperii causa violandū est. If the Law may he trans­gressed, it may be trans-gressed for a kingdom. Which sentence of Euripides liked Iulius Caesar so well, that hee repeated it of­tentimes, and in tirannizing the Common-weale did folow it.

[Page 185]13 The ambitious which pretende to gouerne against rea­son and iustice, doo commonlie imitate Absolon, when he con­spired Phillippus. de la Torre, in insti­tutione principis Christiant. 2 Regum, 1. 2. Regum, 15. against his father Dauid. Which Absolon, to bring that to passe which he desired, founde no better meanes nor readyer way then to heare the complaints of the people, & to prouide for their necessities. Hee receiued and entertained them very cur­teoustie that came to speake with him and salute him: and hee asked them whence they were, yea he embraced and kissed thē. And to reconcile them vnto him, and alienate them frō his Fa­ther, he said vnto them, your cause is iust, but my Father is so negligent and carelesse in gouerning his people, that hee hath not yet appointed any man to heare you: he said also, if it plea­sed God that I should raigne in Israell, I would heare al your causes, and decide your controuersies, and I woulde doo iustice vnto euery man. Such men take aduantage by the ignorance and small skill of the rude people, who are alwaies readie and prompt (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) to followe the worst, and Lib, 15. Vulgus ad dete [...]ora promptum. Matth, 27. Quē vultis vobis de duob' dimitti, il­li dixetrunt, Bar­rabam. wish that he shold liue, who goeth about to kill them; and that he should die, that meaneth to saue their liues, as the Jewes did, when they cried to Pilat that he shoulde crucifie our Lorde and Sauiour Jesus Christ, and deliuer Barabas vnto them.

These and such like pollicies are vsed by the ambitious, when they tirannouslie vsurpe any kingdome, with which wicked sleight they winne the fauour and harts of the Common peo­ple, that with their helpe, they may execute that which they wickedlie pretend & gréedilie wish for: for the malice of a fewe and the ignoraunce of many, haue alwaies disquieted the Com­mon-weales.

14 There is no reason, why Aristotle should reprehend his Maister Plato, because in writing howe gouernments are changed, he sette not downe the especiall and particular cause, for the best gouernment of all, is changed into another, and the reason which Plato vseth, (to wit, that all created thinges doe alter in time) doth not proue the especiall & proper cause of the alteration of the best gouernmēt into an other. That Aristotle hath no reason in this, may be manifestly séene, in y ^t it was not Plato his intent, in his bookes De repub. to entreate of y ^e par­ticular and especiall causes why gouernments alter: but of the vniuersal and common causes: for as strong & healthful bodies [Page 186] fall sicke for common causes: so Common-weales (which are mixed bodies) are trans-formed and changed by common cau­ses. The reuolutions of the heauens, suffer nothing to continue still without corruption that are vnder the Orde of the Moone, but all are subiect to alteration and corruption: especiallie be­cause those that rule and gouerne Common-weales are frée a­gents, though notwithstanding some saie, that séeing that those which gouerne the Common-wealth, are not necessary but frée Agents, the naturall Agents ought not to be respected: for this doth not hinder that some gouernments are more easily trans­formed & changed into others, because they be more readie and more disposed to be trans-formed into some, then into others, whether the causes for which they be trans-formed and chaun­ged be vniuersall or particular. And that Plato in his Bookes De Repub did not set downe the particuler causes why Com­mon-weales were changed: it was, because hee imagining and sayning a certaine Common-wealth (the Idea whereof is that, which he writte in his bookes De Repub.) he needed not to sette downe the particuler causes why Common-weales doe alter, seeing that the vniuersall cause suffiseth. So that as in healthfull and sound bodies, the generall causes suffice to alter their health and soundnes: so in a perfect Common-welth, the reuolutions of the heauens doo suffise to alter and change them: and Plato, seeing he intreated not particularlie of one especiall kind of gouernment, but generally of the Idaea or example of all Common-weales: he needed not to sette downe the especiall and particular causes, why the gouernments change and alter: for seeing, as we haue said, that those which change them are free Agents, it suffised to sette downe the generall and common causes for to shew how they are chaunged, because the particu­lar & speciall causes of the alteration of gouernments, though they procéede from frée Agents, yet they be reduced vnto com­mon and vniuersall causes. By this is concluded, that though the Kingdome and Tyrannie be contraries, and (as Aristotle saith) differ greatlie, yet neuerthelesse, a kingdome is sooner Lib. 8. Ethicor. trans-formed and changed into a Tyrannie, then into an Ari­stocracie, or Democracie, for they are more distant and sepera­ted from the kingdome, then the Tyrannie which is vnder the same kinde, in which the kingdom is. Héereby may we cléerlie [Page 187] perceiue, that Aristotle would rather find sault with his Ma­ster Arist ad Plato. accestit annos natus quindecim mansitque in e­ius schola annos viginti, hoc est vsque ad Platonis mortem: teste Ludouico V [...]ue in Commentar. ad August. de ciuitate Dei lib. 8. cap. 12. Plato, (as he doth in many other things) then to solow and declare that which hee learned of him in the space of twentie yeres, in which time he was his Scholler.

15 And that all men may vnderstande, that there was no cause why Aristotle should reprehende his Maister Plato, tou­ching the kinds and diuersities of Common-weales; they ought to presuppose, that Plato in his Bookes De republica, setteth down the Idaea and forme of a well instituted Cōmon-wealth, and in his Dialogue De regno, he setteth down an Idaea or ex­ample of a good and iust King: and conformable vnto y ^t which he treateth, he doth distinguish the kindes or diuersities of the Common-weales: respecting both the subiect and the intent of those that gouerne them. The subiect is, that those which go­uerne be one, a few, or manie: the end is, that the Common­wealth should be well gouerned: and the intent is, that thing which they which rule them doo principallie pretend. And the more these kindes of Common-weales doe imitate the Idaea which Plato setteth downe, the better they be, and the lesse Bartholo. Ca­ualcante discursu 4. In tractatu de Republica. they imitate them, the worse they be. Plato saith, that they be the worse, because he speaketh not of corrupt Common-weales, and naughtie gouernments, but of good Common-weales, and those which imitate the Idaea which he setteth down: & respec­ting those Common-weales which are well gouerned, of which be spake, he erred not, in saying, that those Common-weales which were most like to his Idaea, were the best: and that those which did lesse resemble it were not so good, though Aristotle 4. Polite. 2. Nec populare genus aliud alio melius esse recté dici­tur, sed minus malum dicendū est. reprehending him, saith, that the corrupted Common-weales are not better, some then other, but that they are lesse naught some then others. But Plato saith well, for he maketh no com­parison of corrupted Common-weales (for hee accounteth not that a Common-weale, which is corrupted) but of good Com­mon-weales of which hee speaketh: and because the kingdome Plato. in Dialo. ciuili vel de reg. or Monarchie is most like vnto his Idaea of good gouernmēt, he saith, that it is the best politie of all, and that the Democracie because it is most seperated from his Idaea of good gouernment, then all the other, it is the worst politie of all: and that of all Plato. vbisupra. Common-weales that are well gouerned, the Democracie is the worst: and of all Common-weales that are naughtilie [Page 188] gouerned it is the best. Plato saith this, because séeing that all Common-weales are ill gouerned, they which liue in that Cō ­mon-wealth which is gouerned by the people, are more free, Aristo. Polit lib, 5. cap. 9. Lib. 3, 4, & 5, Politicorum. Plat. In dialo. de Republica, de le­gibus et in ciuili vel de regno, et Arist, Polit. lib 3 cap. 5. Mutatur potestas in tyrā ­nidem, ea quae est in optimatū po­testate in eam cui p [...]uci praesunt, et ea quae á populo g [...]ritur, in eam quam communi omnium nomi­ne R [...]mpublicā appell [...]ri diximꝰ. Idē asserit Plu­tarchꝰ, in lib. detribus generibꝰ Reipublicae. Pro Planctio. Plutar. in vita Demosthenis. Lib. 8. de Re­publica. Polit. lib, 5. cap. 6, vt supra, huius eiusdē discursus §. 12. Ex quo A­ristote. loco Se­b [...]sti [...]nes E [...]zzo hae [...]ded [...]cit, in tractatu de dis­curs. ciuilibus. and lesse oppressed by those that rule and gouerne them. And vnderstanding that which Plato saith after this manner, all A­ristotles arguments and obiections which hee bringeth against him, concerning the gouernments, & trans-formations of Com­mon-weales, are vaine: and in effect, Plato said the same which Aristotle, to wit, that the most principall and chéefest kinds or diuersities of gouernment are three, the Monarchie, Oligar­chie, and Democracie: and that the Monarchie is the best go­uernment, and the Democracie the worst, by reason of the vn­constancie and small skil of the people. Tullie affirmeth, that the Sea hath not so many tempests, daungers & troubles, as the peoples election hath, in which they choose, ordaine and establish Officers and Magistrates to rule and gouerne them. Demost­henes said, that if he had known the malicious defractions, for­ged crimes, and craftie inuentions, vnto which they that beare Office in the Common-weales, which are ruled by the people, are subiect: and that two waies had béene shewed him, the one, to be an Officer and Partaker of the gouernment, and y ^e other, to incurre present death: that hee wold rather haue chosen that way in which there was danger of death, then to be in Office, in a Democracie or Common-wealth gouerned by the people.

16 The regiments are trans-formed and chaunged, some into others according to the opinion of Plato, the Monarchie and Kingdome, into the Aristocracie, (which hee calleth the ambitious gouernment, because they that gouerne, desire and couet honours:) the Aristocracie, is translated into the Oligar­chie, which is when a few gouerne, whose principall intent is, to be rich: this estate is not so good as the ambitious gouern­ment, for honor and glory is preferred before riches: and the Oligarchie is changed into the Democracie. Aristotle sayth, that gouernments are altered, either because they which pre­uaile most, and are of greatest power, oppresse the people, or because they which are rich and of greatest authoritie, will not suffer others, though they be rich and honoured, to gouerne the Common-wealth: or because there are factions & partialities among those that gouerne, which of them shall be the chéefest: [Page 189] or because they that gouerne, will expell others that do gouern, from the gouernment: or because some of those that gouerne, take aduantage by the fauour of the people, for to tyrannize o­uer the Common-wealth. Polibius is of that opinion, that mē after they assembled together, liued polliticklie in ciuill go­uernment, and choose some that had most credit and authority Plat. vbi supra. EX quo patet ty­rannum ex radi­ce tutoris nasci, & Arist. Polit. 5. cap. 5. maxima feré ex parte ve­teres tyranni &c. vt supra. among them, to rule and defend them. And these afterwards of Tutors and defenders, became Traytors and Tyrants, and the cheefest of thē not being able to suffer the tyrannie of those their naughtie Gouernours, dispossessed thē of the gouernment, and translated it vnto themselues, making it an Aristocracie, which kinde of gouernment was after the same order in time trans-formed into an Oligarchie. This discourse of Polibius, concerning the alteration & transmutation of Common weales, is like to that which some men say of riches and pouertie, affir­ming that pouertie maketh men laborious, industrius, & glad to trauaile and take paines, by which diligence and industrie, they attaine to riches, by them they become vicious & wicked, and so by reason of their wickednes, at length they fall into po­uertie againe: which constraineth them to take paines and be industrius as they were before. The change of y ^e gouernment, Polit. 5. cap. 6. (as Aristotle saith) commeth by reason that they which go­uerne are very absolute in commaunding, nothing regarding Iuuenalis, Sic volo, sic [...]ubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. reason or iustice: but altogether tendering their own particu­lar and priuate commoditie, and herein differ Kings from Ty­rants, and a good regiment from a bad.

17 And to conclude, the gouernment in Common-weales Cor. Tacit. lib. 21, honor sacer­dotij firmamen­tum potentiae assumebatur. are also changed and altered, by sects and newe Religions: for nothing doth more maintaine the estate of the Common-welth then Religion, and for this cause they that will vsurpe any Kingdome or Monarchie, take aduantage by Religion, for with it they draw the people to obey them, wherewith they disquiet the Common-weales, and all customs are broken, and factions, seismes, partialities, and dissentions are brought in: as may be seene in those that haue brought in newe sects, and altered good customs into badde, vnder pretence of Religion. As Mahomet, Sabel. Aenead. 8. lib. 6. Idem Aennead. 11. lib. 6. who with his wicked sect infected all the Arabians, the Xequi Ismael, with interpreting the Alcoran after a newe manner, brought in the Empire, which the Kings of Persia nowe holde.

[Page 190]In the time of the Emperour Alonso King of Castile, a cer­taine Valerius Histo­riarum scholast. lib. 3. tit. 4. man in Affrick called Aldemon, son vnto a Gentleman, did rebell, because an other Moore, that was one of his compa­nions, and a great Astrologian, verie well skilled in his Arte, had told him that he should once become a mightie man, so that this same Astrologian began throughout all Affrick, to preache and declare the Alcoran, praysing his fellowe and companion Aldemon, and making all the people to beleeue, that he shold be a great Lord, and thereby he gathered such a company toge­ther which followed Aldemon, that it was a wonderfull mat­ter to beholde them: and at length the matter was brought to that passe, that Aldemon with all them that followed him, fought a battaile with Alboachi King of Arabia, (who at that time was Lord ouer Affricke,) and ouerthrewe him, and slewe him in the conflict: and so Aldemon was made King of Arabia, and Lord of Affricke. The Anabaptistes and such other pesti­lentiall Lambertus 3. Hort [...] nsius in li. tumultuum An­abaptistarum. Heretickes, by misconstruing the holy Scripture, and sophisticallie expounding Gods word, haue infected many pla­ces with their pernicious sect, and caused many alterations and hurlie-burlies in diuers Countries, not without the great hurt and losse of many Christians. King Ieroboam builded a Tem­ple, and in it sette vppe a golden Calfe, making himselfe high Priest of Idolatrie: which he did, because by his own example 3. Regum. 12. he should drawe the people to commit Idolatry, that commit­ting Idolatrie, the ten Tribes which had rebelled against Ro­boam King of Ierusalem, should not returne againe vnto theyr Lord to serue him. That newe sects and herisies might not dis­quiet Dion. lib. 54. Religionis nouae praetextu multi res nouas moli­untur. 10. De legibus. the Common-welth, Mecenas counsailed Augustus Cae­sar, that he should not permit any new Religion to be brought into the Common-wealth: and Plato said, that they which goe about to alter any thing concerning Religion, and thinke not well of it, ought to be put in prison and seuerely punished, and no man ought to be suffered to communicate with them.

18 Lastly King Salomon saith, that Common-weales are translated from one people to another, because of vnrighteous Ecclesiast. 10. dealing and wrongs, and riches gotten by deceit. He saith also, Prouerb. 29. that when the righteous are in authoritie, the people reioyce, but when the wicked beareth rule, the people sigh, and when Prouerb. 28. the wicked rise vp, men hide themselues, but when they perish [Page 191] the righteous increase. And in the prosperitie of the righteous, Prouerb. 11. the Cittie reioyceth, and when the wicked perrish, there is ioy. If therfore many Princes succéede in the Kingdome either be­cause of the sins of the people, or because they that beare rule, are slowe and negligent in ministering iustice: that Prince which doth iustice equallie vnto all men, without exception of Deut. 1. Nulla erit distinctio personarum, & actuum. cap. 10. Deus non est ac­ceptor persona­rum. persons, shall make his inheritance perpetuall: for iustice is the foundation of euerie Kings throne and royall seate. Final­lie, GOD doth often permitte, that kingdomes be translated out of one gouernment into another by lawfull succession, bothe for his owne glorie, and augmentation of his holie seruice, and also for the reparation and amplification of Christian Religion.