The Manuell of Epictetus, Translated out of Greeke into French, and now into English, conferred with two Latine Translations.

Herevnto are annexed Annotations, and also the Apothegs of the same Author. By Ia. Sanford.

‘OMNIA TEMPVS HABENT’

Imprinted at London by H. Bynneman for Leonard Maylard. ANNO. 1567.

Tetrasticon ad Reginam.

Scilicet exiguū (Princeps mitissima) quicquid
Expromit liber hic, non tamen exiguum
Si te respicias, magni non muneris instar
Si libri sensum non erit exiguum.

To the most high and vertuous Princesse, ELIZABETH by the grace of God, of England, Fraunce and Ireland Queene, defender of the faith, long health and perpetuall felicitie.

ALthoughe I haue not attained (most soueraign Lady) to that ripenesse in knoweledge and pro­foundnesse in lerning, as they haue, who bothe in reding and writing haue spente almost the whole course of their age. Yet forasmuch as paynefull practize ioyned with diligent studie, bringeth to effect some thing worth the labour, I toke in hand this little Boke, as a triall in the true trade of interpreting. Which done, I thought not my trauaile mysspent, but worthie to be published abrode for a common vse and commoditie, and meete that of all estates he be vsually read, dayly to be had in hande, and continually to be had in remembraunce: for if a man reade this, and in reading consider it with a quiet minde voide of all care and solicitude, and being attentiue vpon one thing wherin he is conuersant, he shal find (as I suppose) nothing more excellent, nothing more commodious, nothing more godly to be taughte and shewed vs, than the summe of thys [Page] Boke, and the principal pointes herein compre­hended and contained, which are these:

Hurt no man. Obey God and nature. Suffer iniuries. Deserue wel of al men as nigh as thou mayst. Take in good parte whatsoeuer chaunce without thy default. Vse such things as are giuē for the neces­sitie of life, as if thou didst not vse them, and gladly to restore the same when God or Fortune (as we commonly say) requi­reth the same. Repose and accompt feli­citie in an vpright and quiet minde. Fi­nally recreate and content thy self in the diuine administration of worldly things, as very iust and wise, and to vs auaile­able, althoughe sometimes it seeme very grieuous.

These things so great, so profitable, so needefull to be knowen, so auaileable for well framing of life, if we shut it within the chest of our mind, it is far from that we should be void of all per­turbatiōs and troblesome motions of the mind, that we should be in felicitie, and leade our life both well and wealthilie. You may coiecture (most gracious and soueraigne Lady) that in de­dicating this Boke vnto your highnesse, I mene to instruct one better learned than my selfe, and as the Prouerbe is SVS MINERVAM, the [Page] which doubtlesse is farthest off from my cogi­tations: for it is the signe of a man bereft of his witte, and not of a sounde and perfecte minde, to carrie wood into the Wood, and to cast wa­ter into the Sea. What shoulde I speake of the goodly vertues wherewith you are adorned?

What shoulde I set forth and with prayses extol your excellent endowments both of minde and bodie, which cause in all men an admiration?

For the Greeke tong you are to be compared to ZENOBIA Queene of the Palmirians, who was very skilfull in the Greeke language, and in the Latin not ignorant. For Eloquence you may be likened to CORNELIA mother of the Gracchi. For the embracing of the holy and sa­cred scripture you are to be numbred with FA­BIOLA and MARCELLA women wel ler­ned and studious of the heauēly veritie. In brief▪ you may be reconed as EVSTOCHIVM was, who in hir time bicause of hir litterature and profoundnesse in knowledge, was called Nouū orbis prodigiū. Your knowledge in the French, Spanish and Italian tong I nede not declare, for vertue nedeth no commendation, nor delighteth to be ennobled with gay glossing communica­tion: for where the sunne casteth his glistering beames, the light of the candell is diminished and obscured. This Stoick Philosopher EPIC­TETVS wrote this worke in a large Volume, in his mother tong, and was abbreuiated by one [Page] ARRIANVS a Grecian into this forme, and entituled it Enchyridion, than the which there can be no Booke to the wel framing of our life more profitable and necessary. The Authoure whereof although he were an Ethnicke, yet he wrote very godly & christianly, and as he spea­keth in other tongs, so nowe he shall speake in the Englishe language, and vnder your Graces protection shalbe published to the commoditie of many. Most humbly beseeching your high­nesse, to accepte and take in good parte this little Booke, offring it as a pledge of my bounden dutie towards your highnesse, & af­fection towardes my countrie. ❧ ❧

Your highnesse most hum­ble and loyall subiect Iames Sanforde.

To the Reader.

THis booke (gentle Rea­der) is entituled a Ma­nuell, which is deriued of the Latin word Ma­nuale, and in Gréeke is called Enchyridion, bicause he may be contained [...] that is, in the hand. It is a diminutiue of Manus, as it were a storehouse, & which ought always to be had in hād, as the hādle in the sword. This word Enchyridion doeth not onely signifie a Manuel, but also a short dagger, which is vsed in the warres, or a Poineado. Wherefore some do entitle this boke Enchyridion, y t is, a short Dagger: for like as y e Dagger defēdeth a mā from his enimie, euē so this little booke doth defend one in perfectnesse of minde, & saueth him frō the filthy fogge of wic­ked vices. The title of eyther of these may be wel applied to the boke, y e one respecting the quantitie, the other the matter in the booke comprehended.

The wordes contained in him, are of [Page] greate force and full of efficacie, to moue mennes myndes, for euery man may knowe his affections in him, and to the amending of them, he is stirred as it were with a pricke. His stile or maner of wordes is brief, and voyd of all elegancie in wordes, very much like the Pithagorean Precepts, which they call Diathecae.

Fare wel gentle Reder, and accept in good part these my la­bours.

In Sanfordi Epictetum Anglum. E. L.

IMpiger extremis rediens Mercator ab Indis
Has inquit merces India fusca tulit.
Et silet, & vendit, satis & laudasse putatur
Et precium nummi nobile pondus habet,
India fusca tulit: quid tum si Graecia ferret?
Quid si Roma tulit? Gallia siue tulit?
Graecia, Roma, suis pretiū num mercibus addūt?
Gallia si quid habet, nū quo (que) pondus habet?
Si modo pondus habet, pōdus feret iste libellus,
Qui nunc est Anglus, qui modo Gallus erat,
Graecia quem vidit Graecū, quē Roma Latinum,
Quem (que) nouos docuit lingua Britanna sonos:
Impiger ad nostras quem tu Mercator ad oras
Attuleras SANFORD, sic quo (que) sanctus eras.
Sic quo (que) sanctus erit labor hic tuus, & liber idē
Et si sanctus erit nobile pondus habet.
Nobile pondus habet suauissimus ore Britānus,
At magis ore sacer nobile pondus habet.

Eiusdem Edmundi Lewkener Libri ad Lectorem Prosopopeia.

VErba libri (que) docent sacrae munimina vitae,
Virtus est clarae nobilitatis iter,
Elisij Campi vitae sunt munera sacrae,
At comes est magnae nobilitatis honos.
In me diuinae lucet virtutis Imago,
Atque ego sum vitae dux sine labe tuae.
Ergo si coelos, si non contemnis honores,
Tu face quod iubeo munus vtrumque feres.

Against curious Carpers.

CArp not ye cankred zoiles al, the men
Whose labour spente in paynfull toyle hath ben
To blase the badge and banner braue di­splay
Of noble vertues force and craggie way.
The byting Theon & Daphitas bolde
VVith all the railing rable manifolde
Of zoilus sect cease biting chaps to vse
Against such, who on learnings lore doe muse.
The learned Homer, and Praxitiles,
To taūting talk, & misreports wer these
Subiect. Therfore should I esteme my self
T'escape the iarring iawes of zoilus elfe?

The life of Epictetus.

EPictetus a noble Phi­losopher in the Stoick profession was born of seruile parents in Hie­ropolis a Citie of Phri­gia, who albeit he was a bond man, lame, and in extreme pe­nurie, yet he doubted not earnestely to affirme that he was a friend to the Gods, in two verses very well kno­wen among the Gréekes, whiche are cited both of Macrobius and Aulus Gellius, and be these:

[...]
[...].

Which are of a certaine Writer trā ­slated into Latine after this manner:

Seruus Epictetus genitus sum corpore claudus,
Paupertate irus, Dijs & amicus ego.

And may thus be Englished:

Of seruile kinde I borne was,
hight Epictete by name,
[Page] In substance pore, to God a friend
and eke in body lame.

He serued in Rome one called Epa­phroditus familiar with the Empe­rour Nero. And liued in Rome all the time of Marcus Antonius raigne. But when Domitian tooke rule in hande, he went from Rome to Hiero­polis where he was borne, supposing that to be true, whiche is in the Tra­gicall Poet. Patriam esse cuiusque, vbi quis recte ageret, that is:

A man his countrey is euen there
Where of God and man he stands in feare.

He did reade in Plato (of whome he was a diligent Reader and follower) in that Dialogue which is entituled Primus Alcibiades, or De natura ho­minis, that he properly and verily was a man, whose substaunce altogether did consiste in the reasonable mynde, accompting the minde only to be mā, and y e body but an instrument. Wher­fore whatsoeuer was withoute thys man, he thoughte thesame nothing to appertaine vnto hym, neyther dyd he [Page] declare that only in wordes or bokes, but also in hys life: for he did so withdrawe himselfe from the care & loue of outwarde things, so litle regarding hys body, or any thing thereto belon­ging, that at Rome hys house had no dore, for there was nothing at all in it but a bad beggerly bed of little va­lue. Lucian the Sirian writeth that Epictetus was after his death so estemed, that an earthen candle­sticke that he had, was sold for fifty pounds.

[Page] [Page] The Manuel of Epictetus

Cap. 1. ¶What things are in man, and what are not.

OF al things which are, A diuision of things. some are in vs, some are not. In vs are Opinion, Endeuor, Desire, Eschuing, & briefly al that which is our worke. In vs are not our Body, Possessions, Honours, Souerainties, The natural condition of things. and summarily al that which is not our worke. Then the things which are in vs are frée and franke by nature, and can not be pro­hibited, empeached, nor taken away. But such things as are not in vs, bée seruile, féeble, and may be prohibited, empeched and taken away, as things vnto other men belonging, and not ours.

Cap. 2. ¶Of the domage which proceedeth of taking the one for the other, and of the profit in good Iudgement. The effects of a good and euill iudgement.

IF the thinges which are franke and frée, thou shalte estéeme and Iudge [Page] seruill, and the thinges which are not oures, thou thynke proper, thou shalt be sorrowfull, thou shalte be troubled, thou shalt finde thy selfe encombred, & shalte miscontente thy selfe with God and men. But if thou thinke onely the things thyne, which truely are thine, and the things other mennes, which truely are other mens, no man wyll constrayne thée, no man wyll hinder thée, thou shalt blame no body, thou shalt accuse no body, thou shalt do no­thing againste thy wyll, no man shall hurte thée, and moreouer thou shalte haue no enimy. For in nothing which is hurtefull thou canst not be perswa­ded.

Cap. 3. ¶That other mens matters must be omitted, our owne must be seene vnto, and that we can not do both.

THen if thou desire such things, remember that thou oughteste not beyng greatly mooued and troubled, to take them in hand: but eyther altogether thou oughteste [Page 1] to reiecte them, Our consideration is to be stirred vp and a diligēt preparation to be vsed. or for a tyme laye thē a side, and before al things to be care­full ouer thy selfe. But if thou desire these things, that is to rule, to be rich, to haue thine to prosper, peraduen­ture thou shalte not aspire to all these things, One can not serue vertue and vanitie. bicause thou doest desire also the chefest. So by no maner of means thou art able to attain vnto y e things which giue felicitie & libertie to man.

Annotations.

All these things) That is rule, riches. &c. bicause thou doest desire the chiefest) that is, these things which Philosophie giueth, Libertie, tranquillitie of the mynde, and secu­ritie.

Cap. 4. ¶Howe we oughte to behaue oure selues in euery sharpe imagination.

IN any strong and sharpe Imagina­tion, We must re­frain our cō sent before the matter bee plainely perceiued. thou must accustome thy selfe immediatly to consider, that this is nothing else but Imagination, and that in déede it is not as thou déemest. Afterward search it out, and examine it, with these rules whiche thou haste. [Page] First and principally by this, whether the thing concerne the things whiche are in vs, or the things which are not. And if it be of the things whiche are not in vs, haue incontinently thys in remembrance: That belongeth nothing to me.

Cap. 5. ¶What thing it is that one ought to desire, & one ought to flee.

CAll to remembraunce, A vain flight from discommodities maketh a man miserable, & a depriuing of desires maketh a man vnfortunate. that the promise and the end of desire is, enioying of the thyng desired: and that the promise and ende of eschewing is not to fall into that, whiche one oughte to flée: He then which cōmeth not to enioy, but is de­priued of the promise of his desire, is not happy, but vnfortunate, and whoso falleth on y e, which he declineth, is mi­serable. If thē onely thou decline that which is not agreable to the nature of the things whiche are in vs, thou shalt neuer chaunce into that, whiche thou shalt flee. But if thou thinkest to [Page 2] erempt thy selfe from sickenesse death or frō pouertie, or altogether shunne them, thou shalt finde thy selfe vnhap­py. One newely entred in the doctrine of vertue ought not to take to much vpō him. Wherfore thou must set apart all the eschuing, and auoiding of suche things as are not in vs, and transpose these into them which are against the nature of things, whiche be in vs. As touching desire, thou must altogether set it aside at this present. For if thou couet the things which are not in our power, it must néedes be, that thou be frustrate. Howe and after what sorte thou must desire the things which are in vs, thou art yet vncertaine. As for endeuoure and refraining of y e minde vse it sleightly with reason, and a res­ted deliberation.

Annotations.

Promise of desire, It is a certain faining of desire speaking with a mā. To the vnlearned sort the wordes should be more plaine▪ if he had thus spoken: when thou doest desire any thing, haue a cōfidence to obtaine it, & to haue thy desire. &c that which is not agreable to y e nature of the things which are in vs, Against these things verely do repugne, false opinion, [Page] naughtie & corrupt appetite, all the perturbatiōs of the minde, whiche the Stoicke Philosophers would haue to be in mans power: not so per­aduenture that they appeare not (for that were more beseming God than man) but that they obeye reason. Trāspose these into them which ar against the nature of things which be in vs. These words seme vnto the vnlearned obscure, which had ben more lighter and easy, if he had written thus: To abhorre false opinions, folish and euil desires, dishonestie, and disworship. For as thou mayest flee these thin­ges, so thou mayest eschewe them.

Cap. 6. ¶Howe we oughte to esteme the thinges wherein we take pleasure, or which bryng vs profite.

IN euery thing, whiche doth eyther delite thée, The nature of the thing derely loued is to be con­sidered. or whiche are profitable vnto thée, or which thou louest, thou must diligently consider the quali­tie, beginning at the least thyngs. If thou loue a pot, say in thys manner: I loue a pot, thesame beyng brokē, thou shalte not disquiete thy selfe, for thou diddest well knowe, that he was fra­gile and brittle. Likewise if thou loue [Page 3] thy sonne, or thy wyfe, saye that thou doest loue a man: if one or other chāce to dye thou shalt not be troubled, bi­cause thou dyddest consider well that he was mortall.

Annotations.

If thou loue a pot, Albeit Epictet, as a dis­piser of riches, bringeth forth examples of vyle thyngs, as of baynes, lactuce, and other of that sort: yet Simplicius hath a more apte worde: If thou hādell or tosse a pot: that is, a brittle thing that cānot abyde or suffer tossyng, or hitting a­gainst the walles, as glasse, wherof Publiā sayth, Fortune is as brittle as glasse, whiche when it shineth, it is broken. Peraduenture he alluded to Diogenes Tonne.

Cap. 7. ¶How a man ought to take a matter in hand that we may be voide of perturbation, & first by meditation.

WHen y u doest take any thing in hande, The circumstāces of euery businesse are to be considered. thou muste set be­fore thy eyes y e qualitie ther­of: as if thou wylt goe to the baines, cōsider with thy selfe diligēt­ly all that which may happen, & what [Page] they do. Some cast water, some are driuen out of their places, some doe a thing to the rebuke of an other, and in the meane season other picke & steale. In doyng thys thou shalt more cer­tainely and constantly bryng thy mat­ter to passe, if finally thou saye I wyll bath my selfe, and obserue thy purpose vnto nature agréeable, and semblably in all things thou shalt not do amisse. For after this sort if any harme befall while thou arte in the baine, this say­ing shal be in a redinesse: I would not onely obserue this, but also would not swarue from my purpose whiche is agréeable vnto nature, whiche I shall not performe, if I take displeasauntly the things which happen and befall.

Cap. 8. ¶Howe to put awaye our perturbations, tho­rowe the consideration of the nature of suche things, We are troubled with opinions, not with the things them selues. as trouble vs.

THe things do not trouble men, but the opinions whiche they conceyue of them, as for exam­ple: [Page 4] death is not terrible (thē it would haue so séemed to Socrates) but bi­cause the opinion of death is terrible, A wise man is without complaint. death semeth terrible. Then when we are brought in the briers, or be trou­bled, or that we do bewaile our owne state, let vs not blame others but our selues, that is to say our opinions.

Annotations.

Death is not terrible, If either the soule be extinguished with the body, or be trāsferred and caried into a better place. But if thou shalte be punished for thy offences, it is a daungerous matter, and a harde case, excepte thou be fensed with the buckler of true pietie.

Cap. 9. ¶The reason and proufe of the former precept with an assignation of thre sorts of men.

THe vnlerned accuseth other in his owne propre faulte. He that begynneth to haue knowledge accuseth him selfe. The learned accuseth neither an other, neither him selfe.

Annotations.

[Page] The vnlerned, That is he, which conside­reth not what things are his owne, and what ar an other mannes: who requireth all things to be done according to his wil and pleasure, that which neither may be done, neither perhappes ought not. Himself for he doth acknowledge hys faulte, and also is intentiue and diligente a­bout it, leaste that he stumble againe at the same stone: that is, lest that he claime or attribute o­ther mens right to himselfe.

Cap. 10. ¶That the glory in exteriour and outwarde things is vayne.

GLory not in thy selfe for the ex­cellencie of an other thing. We must a­uaunt in the riches of the minde, and not in the gifts of for­tune. It shoulde be tollerable, if a horse aduaunting himself should say: I am faire. But thou when in bosting thy selfe, thou doest say, I haue a faire horse: remember that thou dost glori­fie thy selfe for the beautie which is in the horse. The vse of opinion is propre vnto man. What haste thou then? No­thing bisides the vse of opinion.

Therefore when in the vse of opinion thou shalt gouerne thy selfe according to nature, then thou shalt haue wher­with [Page 5] to auaunte thy selfe, for in any commoditie which is thine, thou wilte glorifie thy selfe.

Annotations.

The vse of opinion, This semeth obscure to the vnlearned. But it is euen as he should says In all things we ought not to follow appetite, or the common opinion, but the iudgement of reason. For to vse well opinion, is nothing else than to iudge well of all things, and to obey reason, not affection.

Cap. 11. ¶What outwarde things are graunted vs, and howe we should vse them, by a similitude.

EVen as in Nauigation, We oughte in al things principally to be mindful of God. when men make their abode at any ha­uen, if y e Mariner goeth to lande for freshe water, and it hapneth that incidently by the way, he thin­keth to gather cockles or oysters, yet neuerthelesse he ought to haue regard of the shippe, and oftentimes to looke back, whether y e Master calleth: and if he call thée, leaue all behinde, and returne to the shippe, least that thou [Page] being bond like a beast, be not drawen by force to the shippe. Euen so it is, in the course of our life, as if for a cockle or an oister, there be gyuen vs a wife and a childe, or other things, which we holde deare, and wherin we take plesure, they ought not to put vs from our purpose vnto nature agréeable: But if the master do call, run vnto the shippe, leauing these things behinde, not looking backe towards them. But if thou be olde, go neuer farre from the ship, least that thou being called, do fail, & that thou be not constrained. For he which willingly followeth not necessitie, by force and maulgre his téeth she draweth him.

Annotations.

Least y t thou being called dost fail. He speaketh not of the outwarde power, but of the imbecillitie and weaknesse of the might: which the greter it shalbe whē age cōmeth on vs with more few things the mind is to be occupied: for bicause it is very difficulte to be voide of these, and to fulfill that which Philosophie comman­deth. A single person (if other things be corre­spondent) may be in his life time, cōtented with [Page 6] a little, and die with a more pacient minde. A wife, children, and familie, do more trouble and disquiete the husbande and father, being as well in good healthe, as sicke, than his life. I vnder­stande the shippe, either to be Philosophie, or the trade of our life: the ruler and maister of the Shippe to be GOD: to whom when he calleth, who so obeyeth not either is entreted as a slaue, or else is vtterly forsaken.

Cap. 12. ¶How we may enioy outward things with­out fault or trouble.

WIsh not that the thyng which is done, We muste not couet in vaine, that which is impossible. be done according to thy pleasure and will. But wish that it be done, euen as it is don, and thou shalt be happie. Sicknesse is an impedimēt of the body, not of thy purpose, except thou wilt thy selfe. A wel fra­med mynde is disturbed with nothing. Halting is an im­pediment of the legge or foote, and not of thy purpose, and so consider in eue­rie inconuenience whiche may befall, and thou shalte finde the impediment to appertaine to an other, and not to thée.

Annotations.

[Page] Halting is an impediment of y e foote, not of thy purpose. But thou wilt say whē thou art purposed to goe a iourney (namely if thou want a horse, or a waggon) halting hinde­reth thee. Epictet wil answer & say: If thou shalt follow my precepts, thou shalt begyn no iour­ney, whiche thou art not hable to atchieue. So the more and greater the impedimentes of the body shall be, so much the more thou shalt sup­presse appetite, and shalte take fewer things in hande. But thou dost say, that this is the impe­diment of purpose, and therefore very trouble­some. Epictet denieth it to be an impediment, to desire nothing rashly and in vaine: but affir­meth it to be the propre part & office of a Phi­losopher. Verily, euen a foole doth vnderstande this, that it is better to make appetite obey rea­son, than to burne in vaine desires. The impe­diment to appertaine to another and not to thée) If he would graūt the foote to be a part of the body, (neither doeth he denie it) & the bodie to be part of man (which he seemeth to denie) when his foote is poistered & shakled, the bodie is also cūbred, the body being cum­bred, mā hym selfe at least wise partely is cum­bred, but if the body be the instrument of man, doutlesse it cā not be denied, but that the instru­ment being mutilate and vnperfect, the worke shalbe more vnperfect and vnmeete. For thou shalt haue the ouerthrowe, if thy Sworde or Dagger lacke hiltes and handle.

Cap. 13. ¶Of the remedies which we haue against all accidentes.

IN euery accident thou must incon­tinently consider what puissaunce & strēgth thou hast to withstand that whiche is hapned. The power of the mind ought to resist aduersi­ty & naughty desires. If any mischiefe befall vnto thée, thou shalt finde ver­tue whiche is good and holsome, as a­gainst voluptuousnesse, continencie. If laboure be offred thée, thou shalte finde strength: if wrong, pacience: and if thou shalt thus accustome thy selfe, thou shalt neuer be troubled with y­maginations.

Annotations.

Thou shalt not be troubled with ima­ginations) That is, thou shalt neuer be ouer­come and subdued with pleasure and sorrowe, but shalt conquere naughtie desires, and affecti­ons, by the helpe of wisedome and vertue.

Cap. 14. ¶What maner of men we oughte to shewe oure selues, when we lose outwarde worldly goodes.

[Page] NEuer say that thou haste loste any thing, We do ne­uer lose our goods, but restore thē, to him of whom we receiued them, that is to God. but that thou haste restored it. If thy sonne die, he is restored. Thy liuelode is ta­ken away, hast thou not restored it? But he which depriued thée of it, is an yll man. What matter maketh it to thée, by whome he which gaue it, hath eftsoones taken it? Haue a care and re­garde to all things, keping and vsing them (during the time only that thou haste them in thy custodie) as things vnto other men belongyng, euen as the wayfaring man dothe to his lod­ging.

Cap. 15. ¶That a man ought not to lose the quietnesse of mynde, for exteriour and worldly things.

IF thou wilt profite thy self, The gar­nishing of the minde is to be re­garded a­boue all things. let passe these cogitations. If I shall not be carefull of my affaires, I shall not haue wherwith to liue. If I correct not my seruāt, he will be naught. For it is farre better to famish without so­rowe and feare, than to liue in abun­dance [Page 8] with a troubled minde. And it is much better, that the seruant shoulde bée faultie, than thou whiche art his maister vnhappy. Then thou must be­gin with the least things, the Oyle is spilte, the Wine is stolne. Consider with thy selfe, that quietnesse and se­curitie of the mind cost thée so much: for nothing is fréely gotten. If thou call thy seruant, imagine it may so fal out, that he heareth thée not, or hea­ring thée, to doe nothing whiche thou wouldest haue him do. But that he is not worth so much, that for him thou shouldst be troubled.

Annotations.

It is far better to famish. &c. It may be asked not without a cause whether so greate constancie may agree with mans nature, that it may suffer and endure extreme hunger?

Cap. 16. We muste take paciently the euill opinion of the multi­tude con­ceiued of vs. ¶That for the estimation of the people we ought not abandon vertue.

IF thou wilte profit thy selfe, be not displeased, if for outwarde things, [Page] thou seme to other madde or folish.

Annotations.

If thou wilt profit That is to say in Phi­losophy and garnishing of the mind. For he vn­derstandeth and meaneth that progressiō, wher­by the tranquillitie and libertie of the minde is increased. Be not displeased, if for. &c. For who so regardeth not pleasures, riches, & honor, namely if he may obtaine them: of all men he is accompted a foole, namely in these dayes. But in times past diuers Philosophers and good mē for the loue they had to vertue abandoned al worldly wealth and promotions, as Crates, Diogenes, and thys our Epictete.

Cap. 17. ¶Against vaine glory.

SEke not to séeme learned and ex­perte in any thing, It is hard to doe many things at once. and if to any thou doest seme, trust not thy self: for thou knowest it is not easy for a man to kepe hys purpose agreable vnto nature, and to embrace exteriour things, but it must néedes be, that he which is careful of one, should be neg­ligent in the other.

Cap. 18. ¶What things we oughte to desire, & what we ought not.

IF thou wilt haue thy wife, We do in vaine seke to kepe those things inuiolable, which are not in our power. thy chil­dren, and thy frends to liue for euer, thou art a foole. For thou wilt haue in thy power the things whiche are not, & wilt haue y e things to be thine, which are belonging to other mē. And so if thou wilt not haue thy seruaunte to offende, thou art a foole, for y u wilte haue vice to be no vice. But if thou wilt not be frustrate of that whiche thou doest desire, this thou maiest do: herein then exercise thy selfe.

Annotations.

For thou wilt haue vice to be no vice, He meaneth (as I suppose) that boyes and al ma­ner of men, by nature are inclined to vice: and that vices cannot be repelled, but by philosophie which yong and tender age is not able to re­ceyue.

Cap. 19. ¶What things make vs bonde, and what free.

[Page] HE is Master and Lord of any man, Who is a maister. to whome (nil he will he) he maye either giue or take a­waye. He then which will be frée, let him neither desire, nor flée any thing, which is in an other man hys hande, and power, otherwise of neces­sitie he shal be constrained to serue.

Annotations.

He is Master of any man. &c. How ma­ny Maisters then hath Fortune layed vpon vs? Howe many more do we laye vpon vs, thorowe the insaciable desire of transitorie thinges?

Cap. 20. ¶A rule to electe and choose things present▪ past, and to come, by a similitude.

REmēber that thou muste make comparison of thy lyfe to a ban­ket: Such things as are offred are to be ta­ken: suche things as are denied vs, are not to be desired. where if the meate stande before thée, thou muste take it modestlie: if he, whiche doth bring it, doe passe by thée, staye hym not, or if he be not yet come to thée, be not ouer gredy thereof: but stay vntill he come to thée. In like manner thou must dis­pose [Page 10] thy self, towards thy children, to­wards thy wyfe, towards greate men, and towards riches, so at length thou shalt be worthie the table of y e Godds. But if thou take not that which is set before thée, but doest refuse it: then thou shalt not only be worthy of their table, but to be their companion: for when Diogenes, and Heraclitus and other like to them did thus, worthily, and of very good righte they were di­uine, and so were accompted.

Annotations.

Worthy the table of the Goddes) He signifieth, that the despising of outwarde & worldly things is a certaine heauenly thing, & that it maketh a man like to God. They wer diuine, & so were accompted. Arrogantly doubtlesse, and ignorantelye. For howe farre doth euen the excellentest man that euer was differ from the least part of the Godhead?

Cap. 21. ¶By what meanes we muste gouerne oure Imagination about such things, as seme to be eschewed.

[Page] WHen thou doest sée any man sorrowful, We muste haue regard to humani­tie in suche sort, that the quietnesse of minde be retained. and torment hym self either bicause he hath no tidings of his son, either bi­cause he is dead, either bicause he hath spent all, beware enter not into ima­ginatiō, that this maketh him vnhap­py: but haue redilie in remembraunce that it is not the accident, which trou­bleth him (seing it tormenteth not an other) but his opinion conceyued ther­of. But if thou fall in talke with him, accommodate thy self to his perturba­tion, and moreouer if the matter so re­quire, wéepe also with him for compa­nie: but take héede that thou sorrowe not inwardlie.

Cap. 22. ¶That it lieth not in vs to choose the state of our life, but to vse it euen as it chaunceth, by a very apte similitude.

THou must remember that thou arte one of the players in an en­terlude, We muste passe the whole course and time of our life, accor­ding to Gods will. and must plaie y e parte, which the authour thereof shall [Page 11] appoint, thou must play be it lōg, be it shorte. If he appointe thée to play the begger, y e Creple, y e Prince, or the pri­uate person, do it well and wittilie, for it lieth in thée to play that part, wher­vnto thou art appointed, and in an o­ther to choose and appoint thée.

Annotations.

Which the authors therof shall ap­point, That is, whether he be a comicall, or a tragical Poet? As concerning the very mater the Greeke Epigram doth declare.

[...],
[...].

Which may thus be englished:

What is our life? a gawish game
a sweete delighting play.
Then cares in gaming lay a side,
or liue a miser aye.

Nazianzenus doeth almost signifie the same, but with a more grauitie and pietie, in these verses worthy to be [Page] had in remembraunce.

Mens age suspice, terrenas age despice sordes,
Corporis à vitijs ne subigare caue,
Quam breuis est haec vita? beatos som­nia ludunt:
Sors vaga sic alios, sic alios (que) rotat.
Vita diu durat, nulla peritura sub aeuo
Sancta: labor fructu non caret ille suo.

Which may after this sorte be En­glished.

O minde search high and heauenly things,
despise this earthelie pelfe:
Beware, to lawelesse lusting fleshe
thou ne subdue thy selfe.
How sone ar spent our brittle dais?
they dreame, that swim in blisse:
So those and those not all alike
doth fickle fortune kisse.
A life ensuing godly lawes
shall neuer cleane decaye:
So trauaile spent in holie deedes
his hired meede doth paye.

Cap. 23. ¶By what meanes we ought to gouerne our Imagination, in looking for diuers things.

IF thou take the croking of a crow to be vnluckie, A wyse man taketh pro­fite by euery chaunce. lette not that imagi­nation moue thée, but iudge imme­diatly in thy self, and say: That por­tendeth nothyng to me, but eyther to my body, or to my possession, or to my estimation, or to my wyfe, or to my children: but as touchyng my selfe, they signifie nothing but good, at least wise if I will: for what so euer shall chaunce, it lieth in mée to haue the profite and commoditie of it, if I will.

Annotations.

If thou take the croking. &c. We haue in stede of diuination by flying and crying of birdes Astrologie: Which if by yerely reuolu­tions & progressions of the starres, it threatten damages and dangers, let vs not vse Epictet his counsell, but godly prayers.

Cap. 24. ¶Howe to be vnconquerable, being the cause of the former precepte, and as it were the con­clusion.

[Page] THou mayest bée inuincible, We muste take in hand things agre­able to oure strength. if thou neuer enter into battaile, for thou art vncertain, whether it lye in thée or no, to haue the the victorie.

Annotations.

Thou mayest bée vnconquerable. This saying dependeth vppon the diuision of things made in the beginning. They are con­quered, which couet other mens goodes, that is, suche as belong to the body, and are placed in fortunes hande. They conquere, whiche resiste naughtie opinious and desires, so that they con­tende according to the lawe.

Cap. 25. ¶Which is the readiest way to vertue.

TAke héede that in following thy imaginatiō thou say at no time, He that se­keth for all good things of him selfe, he doth nei­ther mar­uell at any mā, nor en­uyeth any. the man is happie, whom thou doest sée auaunced eyther to ho­nour, or authoritie, or renoumed: for if the substance of goodnesse be in the things, which are subiecte to vs, there nether enuie, nor emulatiō taketh any place. Then thy purpose is not to be [Page 13] Emperour, There is one way to libertie: the despising of outwarde things. or King, but frée, & frāke. But vnto that thing there is but one certaine waye, that is, the contempte of such things as are not in vs.

Annotations.

For if the substaūce of goodnesse. &c. The vnderstanding of this sentence is vttered stoicallie in darke wordes. He which seeketh all good things of himselfe, is of a quiet mind: who so is of a quiet minde, he doeth neither enuie, nor emulate. For seing that lack of paine called in Latin Indolentia excludeth all perturbations: [...] verely it excludeth enuie and emulation. But if these affections do rule in any: it is manifestlie gathered thereof, that he is farre from the tran­quilitie of the minde, and doth not obey the preceptes of Philosophie.

Cap. 26. ¶A solution of them which seme to let the things before mentioned, & how a man should not be angrie.

REmember, No man is hurt, but of himselfe. that he, which taun­teth or beateth, is not y e author of reproch, but the opinion con­ceiued of y e same as reprocheful. Then when any doeth kindle thée to [Page] wrath, vnderstande that thou art mo­ued to anger thorow thine opinion. Wherefore especiallie endeuoure thy selfe, Delay esta­blysheth iudgement. that imaginations plucke not cō ­sente from thée, for if thou shalte once suppresse it for a certaine time, thou shalt more easilie be thy own Miaster.

Cap. 27. ¶How to learne, and set our minde in highe thinges.

SEt before thy eyes, deathe, banish­ment, and all things which séeme terrible, but especially death: in so doing, thou shalt not thinke vpō base and vile things, and shalte neuer be excéeding couetous.

Annotations.

And shalt neuer be exceding couetous. Syracides affirmeth, Syracides. that the imagination of death, and God his iudgemente doth feare vs frō sinne. Which if it do: we are taught to suffer ad­uersitie much more paciently, & to despise pros­peritie, bicause of their sorrow and profit, which endureth for a little space. Cicero. So Cicero. All plea­sure sayth he is to be estemed as nothing, which [Page 14] when it is paste, it is as if there had ben none at all. But in great griefe of the bodie and anguish of the minde, one houre seemeth longer than a whole yeare.

Cap. 28. ¶The seconde part, wherein he doeth pointe him out which hath already profited. And doth first dissolue such things, as come in vre to the students of Philosophie.

AS soone as thou haste determi­ned to leade a perfect lyfe, A Philoso­pher ought not to re­garde the mockery of the people. pre­pare and addresse thy self to be scorned and mocked of many, and to heare what they speake of thée, wherof commeth this sodain sagenesse and grauitie? whereof commeth this sadnesse? laye aparte thy sadde sowre countenance. But yet reteine & kepe these things which séeme best to thée, in such sorte, as if this were the front where God hath ordained and placed thée to fight. Constancie getteth vic­torie. And if thou persist in the same things, they whiche before haue mocked thée, will haue thée in admi­ration: but if like one fléeing awaye, thou gyue ouer thy enterprise, thou [Page] shalte be double as much mocked and scorned.

Annotations.

Lay apart thy sad sowre coūtenāce. That is, a musing countenance, sad grauitie and hautinesse of minde. And it appeareth by this shorte and quicke sentence of Menander, Menāder that this was the countenance of Philosophers. They which loke stately, say, that Solitarinesse is mete for meditation.

Cap. 29. ¶That bosting destroyeth the state of a Phi­losopher, in shewyng wherevnto he oughte to leane.

IF it chaunce at any time, that thou giue thy self to the things which are not in vs, and that thou dost desire to please any man, vnderstand that at the same present thou art fallen frō thy state. By this worde Phi­losopher is ment a wise man. Wherefore in all things let this suffise thée, to bée a Philosopher: But if thou dost couet to séeme to any a Philosopher, let it be to thy self, and that shall be sufficient.

Annotations.

If it chaunce at any tyme that thou giue thy self. &c. He forbiddeth the desire of glorie, & seeking for ostentation, which affectiō it will be long before it take place in good and learned men. He woulde haue a Philosopher to kepe him self within the limittes of his consci­ence, as an oyster within his shell, and to iudge that, the most noble shew of his vertue. Thou art fallen from thy state, That is to saye, thou arte vanquished.

Cap. 30. ¶How to aunswere to such stayes as woulde hinder a man from wisedome.

LEtte not these cogitations tor­ment thée, That a Phi­losopher euen of small sub­staunce, may muche profit the common wealth▪ by teaching of vertue & hys good example. I shall not be in honor nor in place, where I shall be re­garded: for if to bée without ho­nour is an ill thing, thou canst not be in euill for an other thing, no more than in a dishonest thing. Is it in thée to beare rule, or to be bidden to a ban­ket? No. What is this then, but to be without honour? and howe sayest thou, that thou shalte not be estemed, whom it behoueth to to medle in those [Page] things onely which are in our power, in which thou mayst beare a great sway and stroke. But thou wilt say I can not profit my friends. What doest thou call to profite? How a wise man aideth his friends. shall they haue no mony of thée? neither wilt thou make them citizens of Rome? But who told thée that these things be in vs, & other mens workes? Who can gyue to an other that he himself hath not? Get it, (say they) that we may haue it, also. If I may get it, We ought to require of euerye mā but such things as he maye and ought to performe. kéeping my selfe mo­dest, faithful, and valiant, shew me the way, and I will get it. If ye thinke it méete, that I should lose my goods, that you should get such thinges as are not good, sée your selues haue vnreasona­ble and vngratefull you are? But if thou preferre a faithfull and sincere friende before money, herein help me, and thinke it not méete that I shoulde doe the things whereby I should loose modestie and fidelitie: But I can not succoure nor ayde my coūtrey. How a wise mā helpeth his coūtrey. What doest thou call succoure & aide? That it shall not haue of thée, nor by thy [Page 16] meanes, faire & sumptuous buildings, nor baines? What then? hath it not shooes by the Shoemaker and Armour by the Armorer? It is sufficient when euery vocation doth his work. If thou get it a faithfull and modest member, doest thou thinke, that thou bringest it but a little profit? very great doubt­lesse. In so doing thou arte not vnpro­fitable to it. In what state shall I be in my coūtry? in that thou maist, keping alwayes fidelitie and modestie. But if supposing to aide it thou loose modesty and fidelitie, what profit shalt thou do to it, which arte become impudent and disloyall.

Annotations.

Thou canst not be in euil for an other thing, This sentence dependeth vpon the opi­nion of the stoicks, that only honesty is good, & onely vice is naught. The contempt and despi­sing of me, if I do my duety, is not my vice, ther­fore neither my euill, but theyr vice and euyll who of a peruerse iudgement & naughty mind do contemne, dispise, and misuse mee without cause. Shewe mée the way, He signifieth that ryches and dignitie is gotten by nothyng [Page] else but by deceit, and for that cause a good man ought to despise them. Neither doth he speake of them, which shewe themselues vnworthy of honoure, and they are the cause, that they are not regarded. A faithfull and sincere friend, Nowe a daies most men had leiffer to haue mo­ney. Neither do they thinke that a poore friend may help vs in any thing. So are endowed mai­dens preferred before them, who are chaste, and well brought vp, if perhaps there be any suche, and doe so continue. Wherefore the wowers peraduenture are to be pardoned, who in so vn­certayne a hazarde of chastitie, & honestie, had rather to abyde the vnquietnesse of riche than of poore wiues. Neither hath it Shooes by the Shooemaker, nor Armour by the Armourer. The sence is: sumptuous buildings bains, and the citie of Rome is no more to be re­quired of a Philosopher, than weapons of the Shooemaker, or Shooes of the Smyth: seyng that it is the duety of a Philosopher, to traine vp his countrey men in vertue, as it is the Shoema­kers duetie to make Shooes, and the Smithes, Weapons.

Cap. 31. ¶A continuation of the solution of suche things as do hinder him which doth beginne to studye philosophie and wisedome, in shewing that a man should not moue himselfe, for that which chaūceth to an other & that he hath no­thing of an other without giuing of his owne.

[Page 17] IS there any placed before thée at a feast? We must en­uie no man, and reioyce of an others good for­tune. or was reuerēce done to him before it was done to thée? or is he preferred before thée in coūsaile? If these things be good, thou must re­ioyce, that thy neighbour hath them: if they be ill: then be not sorrowfull, bicause they chāced not to thée. Then remember in giuing thy minde to no­thing else, A benefit cō monly is gi­uen for pleasure and ser­uice. but to the things which are in vs, thou canst not attaine to the like things, which other doe in them which are not in vs. Howe may it bée done, that a man frequentyng not thy house shall haue like thynges as hée whiche haunteth thy house, or he that seketh not friendship and fauoure, as he which doth? or he which doth not please and praise the, as he which doth please and praise thée? Thou shalte be vniust and vnsaciable if thou haue not payde for suche thinges as thou haste bought, but doest require to haue them [Page] for nothing. Admit the case I could not buye lectuce for a halfe penny, Who so lac­keth cōmo­ditie lacketh also cost and disquietnesse if any then buy a half peny worth of lectuce, and thou dost buy none: think not thy self in worsser case & to haue lesse then he, which hath bought lectuce: for as he hath bought so thou hast not giuen thy halfpenny. Euen so it fareth, thou art not bidden to a mans feast, because thou haste not giuen him asmuche as his feaste coste him. He selleth it for praise, he selleth it for seruice. Giue him then (if thou thinke it good) the pryce, for the whiche he solde it thée. But if thou wilte not performe that and take these things, thou arte vnsa­tiable and foolish. Hast thou giuen no­thing in steade of the feast? Yes mary, for thou hast not praised him, whome thou wouldest, and haste not suffered him in his portly going.

Annotations.

If these thinges be good, Bycause they are good, they are sorrowfull that they coulde not [Page 18] attaine to them: bicause they be euill, they are glad, that they are chaunced to other, And hast not suffered. &c. Pride and ambitious saluta­tions of riche men do seeme to be vnderstoode in this place very troublous to a simple and learned man, in like maner salutations, retinues, praises. But perhaps rich men giuen to pleasures, going in their pompe, were wonte on euery side to leane and cleaue to Parasites.

Cap. 32. ¶What thinges are common euen according to the will of nature.

THe purpose and will of nature, We must not iudge other­wise of oure owne mis­fortune than of other mens. may be iudged by these things, in which we differ not one from an other: as for exaumple, if a mans seruaunt breake his Maisters cuppe or any other thing, incontinent­ly it is saide this is a thing which oftē ­times chaūceth: remember then when thine is broken, that thou be the same maner of man, as thou were when the other mans cuppe was broken. And so do in greater thyngs. If a mans child or wife chaunce to dye, there is no mā [Page] but will saye incontinently this is na­turall. Notwithstanding euery man when any of his is dead, he doth lamēt and bewaile pitifully: But we muste remember how we are disposed, when we haue hearde any suche thing of o­thers.

Cap. 33. ¶Howe one ought to vnderstande the nature of yll.

EVen as the white whereat Ar­chers shoote, It is in our choyse whe­ther we wil be trou­bled with the opinion of yl things. is not set ther, wher it may not be stricken, so it is of the nature of ill in this worlde, for it is not set out to be embraced, but to be eschued: as if goodnesse were sette for the white, and euill were all that, wher the white were not, besides the white, the Archer hath an ample and large space to shoote frō the white: so without the onely marke of good­nesse on euery side is placed euil, which is as easy to be done and committed, as it is difficill to hitte the white, or to doe good.

Cap. 34. ¶We ought not abandon our minde to wrath for iniuries done: and how to take in hand our enterprises.

IF any deliuer thy body to the firste he meteth, it wil greue thée exceding­ly: but when thou doest yelde thy minde to the first that commeth, as when thou arte wronged, thy mynde is troubled and heauy, arte not thou ashamed? A premeditation and a diligent preparatiō putteth away igno­mie and re­pentance. Before thou take any thing in hande, consider first the beginning, and the sequele, & then take it in hand. If thou do not so thou shalte neuer be certaine and sure in thy enterprises, not regarding that which may befall, but after when any dishonest thinges chaunce, thou shalte be ashamed.

Annotations.

If any deliuer thy bodie to the first he meteth, He argueth from a lesse thing to a more, after this sort: thou wilt be angrie with them, which gaue power to any to violate thy bodie (such is the condition of them whiche are banished) how much more oughtest thou to be angrie with thy selfe, whiche art wont to giue [Page] power to euerie man to hurte thy minde, wher­as it lieth in thee not to be hurt of any man at all?

Cap. 35. ¶An effectuall example to consider what may befall in euerie thing which we shall take in hande.

WIlt thou cōquere at y e playes Olimpia? Temeritie is the mother of lightnesse and incon­stancie. And I by y e faith of my bodie: for it is a verie honourable thing, but consi­der wel the beginning, and the sequele and then take the matter in hande. Thou must order well thy selfe, & vse necessarie meats, abstaine frō delicate and daintie things, and exercising thy selfe, according as it is expediente for the time and houre appointed, be it hote or colde, not drinking water or wine, if occasiō so require. And briefly thou must commit thy selfe whollie to the chiefe of the games as to the Phi­sicion in doing that whiche he shal ap­point thée. Afterward enter into fight, and sometime to haue thy hand hurt, [Page 20] thy foote out of ioynte, to swallowe downe much dust, to receiue gréeuous strokes, and otherwhile after all this to be vanquished. When thou haste considered all these things, if thou be willing, go and fight, otherwyse thou shalt be like the little boyes which are now wrastlers, nowe swordplayers, nowe trumpetters, forthwith players in tragedies. So thou also now a figh­ter, now a swordplayer, afterward an Oratour, at length a Philosopher: but throughly nothing at al, but as an Ape thou doest counterfait and resemble al things, and nowe one thing shall lyke thée, now an other: for thou hast not done thy enterprise aduisedly, in fore­séeyng the circumstances, but aduen­turouslie following a lighte and colde desire. So the greater number, when they sée a Philosopher, or when they heare say that Socrates speaketh wel, (but who can speake so well as he?) they will incontinentlie dispute and reason of Philosophie, and searche the causes and nature of things. Man first [Page] consider the thing, & the qualitie ther­of, and then enterprise it. Bothe the thyng and our nature is to be consi­dered and compared together. Afterwarde trie whether thy nature be able to en­dure that whiche may happen. Wilte thou be a wrastler? behold thy armes, thy thighes, and thy loines: For na­ture mother of all things, hath framed euery man to some particular thing. Doest thou thinke that endeuouring thy selfe about these things y u mayest liue as thou hast bene accustomed? As to drinke so much as thou wer wont, to be angrie so muche as thou were wont? Thou must be vigilante, thou must trauell, thou muste set aside thy proper affaires, thou muste be mocked of boyes, dispised of all the world, and in all things to haue leste authoritie, be it in honoure, in office, or in iudge­ment, and in all other affaires. Constancie is to be ob­serued. Then consider al these things, and loke whe­ther in their stéede, thou haddest lei­uer to haue rest and libertie, without any perturbation. But if thou haddest not leiuer to haue it, sée that thou take not in hande many things, to the ende [Page 21] that (as I haue tolde thée) like little boyes, thou be not now a philosopher, now a lawyer, afterward an aduocate lastlie the Proctor of Cesar. All which things knitte in one, can in no wise a­gree: for it must néedes be that thou be either a good or an ill man, that thou addict thy selfe to interiour or exteri­our thinges: that thou possesse the place of a Philosopher and well adui­sed man, or of a Foole and Ideote.

Annotations.

At the playes Olympia. Olympia were playes as running, wrestling, and suche o­ther faictes of actiuitie accustomablie kepte in the honour of Iupiter Olympicus, at Pisa & He­lides Cities in Greece. Man firste consider, He signifieth as to wrastling, to leaping and rū ­ning, al are not meete, so neither to Philosophie, both haue neede of pacience of bodie & minde. Of which things, whoso is destitute, he shal be rather a counterfayt then a very wrastler & Phi­losopher. Thou must be mocked of little boyes,) Verely Philosophers were wonte of al men to be dispised, but great stoute champions were in admiration.

Cap. 36. ¶That dueties do arise of nature, and that they are considered howe a man shoulde behaue him selfe towardes any man, nexte of the dueties to­wards men.

DVtie is measured by mutual af­fections. We muste do our due­tie towards all men, al­though o­ther mē do not their duetie to­wards vs. If thou haue a father, thou must regarde and honoure him: giue place to him in all things, and if he chide or beate thée, in­dure it. He is a naughtie father thou wilt say. Nature hath enioyned vs the obedience of the father without men­tion of good. Arte thou not ioyned by nature with a good father? No, but with a father. Wherfore do thy dutie towards him, and consider not what he doth: but do such things, whereby thou maiest kepe thy purpose agreable to nature. No man will hurte thée ex­cepte thou wilte. Thou shalte be then hurted, when thou shalte thinke thy selfe hurt. So thou shalt do the dutie of neyghbour to neyghbour, of Citizen to Citizen, of lord to lord, if thou ac­custome thy selfe to consider the mu­tuall [Page 22] affections.

Annotations.

By mutuall affections. Affections are v­sed as a certaine rule to measure dueties by.

Cap. 37. ¶What our dueties are towards GOD, and how to behaue vs in his doings.

THe principall point of honoring God, is to thinke well of him, to beleue that he is, that he hath created all things, and that well and iustly he gouerneth them: Their reli­gion is no­thing wor­th whiche do not place felicitie in the riches of the minde. after­ward to obey him, accepting al things that he doth, as procéeding of a very good intent. In so doing, thou shalte not blaspheme God, neither shalt thou accuse him of negligence. Thou arte not able to do this, otherwise, excepte thou withdraw thy self frō the things which are not in vs, and placing good and ill in them which are in vs. But if thou estéeme any of the things, which are not in vs, to be good or ill, thou must of necessity, when thou doest not [Page] attaine to that whiche thou wouldest, or when thou doest fal into that which thou doest shunne, blame and hate the cause of such an accidēt which is good. All liuing creatures haue this by na­ture, Tull. 1. Offic. that they flée and eschewe suche things, and séeme vnto them noysome, and their causes: but contrarywise they search, & maruell at these things which séeme to bring profite, and the causes of them. He then which thin­keth himselfe hurte, can take no delite in that which vnto him séemeth hurte­full. So it is impossible that a man hurte may reioyce. And hereof it com­meth to passe that the son doth checke the father, when the father maketh him not partaker of the things, which séeme good vnto him. This is that, which made discorde betwene Polinix and Eteocles, bycause they estéemed rule good. For this cause the husband­man, for this cause the Mariner, for this cause the Marchant, for this cause they which loose their wife and childrē do oftentimes defile and detest God, [Page 23] for wheras vtilitie is, Where as v­tilitie is, there is pie­tie. there is also pie­tie. Wherfore he that doth endeuor to desire and flée that, euen as he ought, by the same meanes he obserueth and kéepeth pietie. He prefer­reth the ri­tes of a coū trey before the truthe. As touching offerings and oblations let euery man doe them according to the guise of his countrey: purely, without superfluitie, according to his abilitie, without negligence or nigardshippe.

Annotations.

Whereas vtilitie is, there is pietie, O wonderfull sentence, and also wicked to see to: but so applied that it vncouereth the dissimulation of mans minde, and can scarce be nothing more agreeable to religion. Guise of his countrey. Forasmuche as pietie consisteth in the mind, he thinketh that we should not much regarde ceremonies. Which if it mighte be per­swaded to some men which are in these dayes, we should liue more quietlie. It mighte be per­swaded, if we woulde rather endeuoure to lyue according to religion, than to dispute of religiō: if we were rather desirers of the veritie than of vanitie, that is, of ambition, of emulation, of co­uetousnesse, of reuengemente, and of suche like [Page] confusions and destructions of the minde, if there be any other.

Cap. 38. ¶What maner of man he ought to be that cō ­meth to a Diuinour, and how to vse diuinations, wherin resteth our duetie towardes God, and to­wardes our selues.

IF thou desire and seke to knowe that which is to come of any thing, The diui­nour is not to be coun­seled of our duetie, but of the su [...] ­cesse of cer­taine actiōs first thou must vnderstande y t thou art ignoraunt of that shal come, and therefore thou doest goe to the Diui­nour to knowe it of hym. Notwith­standing if thou be wise thou arte not ignoraunt what it is, nor the qualitie therof. For if it be among the number of the thinges whiche are not in vs, truelie it is necessarie, that it be nei­ther good nor ill. Remoue then from thée (if thou go to the Diuinour) al de­sire & eschuing other thou shalte come to him trembling and quakyng. But when thou shalt vnderstande, whatso­euer shall befall to appertain nothing to thée, and of thée not to be passed vpō [Page 24] thou mayest vse it well, and no man shall forbid thée. Therfore goe & aske counsaile of God, as of him who can giue thée very good, and after he hath giuen thée counsaile, remember whō thou hast called to counsaile, & whose counsaile thou hast despised. Coūsaile may be demaunded of the Diuinour (as Socrates sayeth) for such things, whose consideration is referred to the end, the knowledge of which ende, oc­casion cannot be giuen by any maner of meanes, nor any arte. And therfore thou must not aske counsaile of the Diuinour, whether thou shalt put thy life in daunger for thy country, or for thy friend, if nede require, for if he per­ceiue any vnluckie signe, it is altoge­ther manifest, that it signifieth death, or some impedimente of thy bodie, or banishment: but reason telleth & per­swadeth thée, that thou muste put thy selfe in daunger for Countrey, or for thy friend whē néede requireth. Giue eare then to that which the great Di­uine Apollo sayeth, who did chase [Page] out of his temple, the man, which hel­ped not his frend being in daunger of death.

Annotations.

Remember whome thou hast called to counsaile, It must needes be, that the cun­ning of the diuinours, southsayers, was in diui­nation very great. Otherwise a man of so greate grauitie woulde not haue accompted their pro­phecies, for diuine aunswers.

Cap. 39. ¶Dueties towards our selues, & firste of such as tende to the constancie of maners, and what thinges let it, and chiefly of talke and silence.

THou must prescribe a rule and fashion, We must determin who and what maner of men wee will be. which from hence forth thou shalte obserue when thou art alone and when thou art in companie. Let silence be kept for the most part: or let necessarie things be talked of, and thesame in fewe words. But if the time require thée to speake, We muste rule our tongue. speake: but not of all thinges, not of the combate betwene fensers, not of rūning with horses, not of wrastlers, [Page 25] not of meates & drinkes triflingly, nor principally of men, in praising or bla­ming them, or comparing them with others. And if thou be able, chaūge thy familiars Communication into that which is honest and comelie. But if thou be enuironed with straungers, holde thy peace.

Annotations.

Enuironed with straungers, He vnder­standeth those men, whome bicause of their es­timation and authoritie he dareth not admo­nishe.

Cap. 40. ¶Of laughing.

LAughe not muche, Laughter. nor at all com­munication, neither a loude.

Cap. 41. ¶Of Othes.

SWere not, Othes. neither make an othe if it be possible for thée. But if thou canst not otherwise do, do it [Page] when it shall be nedefull.

Cap. 42. ¶What conuersation may do.

FRequent not the bankets and fa­miliaritie of the cōmon sort, Bankets. and straungers. But if occasion so re­quire, be mindeful and take héede that thou become not one of the com­mon sort. And vnderstande thou that he which wrestleth with the defiled, must néedes be defiled also.

Cap. 43. ¶Of the vse of suche things as belong to the bodie.

AS touching the body, take such things as shal be to his vse and also be profitable for the mind, as meate, drinke, apparell, har­bour. But as touching daintie and de­licate dishes, thou must altogether re­iect them, and banishe them from thée.

Cap. 44. ¶Of the acte of Nature.

[Page 26] TOuching Venerie we ought as muche as is possible, to leade a chast life before mariage. But if we be cōstrained, we must take nothing but that which is lawful: not withstanding reproue them not which vse it, in blaming them, and auaūting thy selfe abroade, that thou doest not vse it.

Annotations.

In blaming them. Christian charitie com­maundeth that sinners should be reproued, and obstinate persons to be eschued.

Cap. 45. ¶Against anger, and what manner of men we should shewe our selues towards backebiters.

IF any bring thée worde, An yl report is not to bee passed vpon. such a man misreporteth and backebiteth thée. Excuse not that which he hath said, but make this aunswere: he is igno­raunt of many other great faults, and imperfections which are in me, other­wise, he woulde not onely haue sayd this.

Cap. 46. ¶How to behaue our selues in shewes and triumphes.

IT is not requisite to frequent often the shewes and turnaments. Shewes are to be seene with a quiet minde. But if at any time occasion requireth, sée that thou séeme not to fauoure any man more than thy selfe, that is, wilt thou onely haue that done whiche is done: and him only to conquer, which conquereth? For so thou shalte not be empeched. Abstaine thy self altoge­ther frō shouting, frō consenting coun­tenaunce, and let not thy gesture be sad and graue, but somewhat merry. At thy returne from the shewes, talke not much of the thinges whiche haue ben there done or said, seing they auail nothing to thy amendement.

Cap. 47. ¶Of the desire of suche as go to heare others communication.

APproch not néere them, whom thou séest to commen apart, and be not thou present if it be pos­sible, [Page 27] or as seldome as thou mayest. But if thou be presente kepe in suche wise thy constancie, that thou shewe thy selfe voyde of all perturbations.

Cap. 48. ¶When one hath to speake with a noble per­sonage.

IF thou haue any thing to do espe­cially with suche as are of noble blood, In meetings, we must fo­low the ex­amples of wise men. and great authoritie. Cōsider what Socrates or Zeno haue done herein, or the wisest man y t euer thou diddest knowe, and so thou shalte not be in doubte, howe thou must behaue thy selfe.

Annotations.

What Socrates or Zeno, That may be ga­thered out of bothe their sayinges and doings, forasmuch as we haue not any thing written of neither of them. But vnlesse thou shalt be ende­wed with the learning and constancie of them both foolish imitatiō will turne thee to shame. And perhappes they obserued not euery where a seemelinesse and grace.

Cap. 49. ¶How we ought to prepare our selues, when we goe to speake with a man of honoure.

WHen thou wilt go to such a man as is of greate honoure, The difficult comming to noble men is to be suf­fered. presup­pose in thy minde, what may chaunce, that (possibly) thou shalt not be recei­ued, that thou shalte be shutte oute of doores, that the gate shall not be ope­ned, or that he will not regarde thée. Afterwarde ponder with thy selfe, if with all these thyngs, it bée expedient for thée to go to him: and when thou shalte come before him, suffer and en­dure that which shalbe done, and saye not to thy selfe: I deserue not to be thus entreated: for it is to common a thing to reproue and blame the thin­ges which are not in vs.

Cap. 50. ¶When we meete with many men, how to frame our communication.

IN company speake not ouermuche, nor beyonde measure, of thy déedes, [Page 28] neither of thy daungers: for it can not so much contente other to heare them as thy selfe to reherse them. Laughter is not to bee moued. Sée also that thou moue no laughter by thy communication, for that (I wote not how) engendreth disdaine, and al­so causeth that no reuerence is giuen to thée by them which are present. And very often leadeth thy communicati­on to filthy and dishonest talke: Ribauldrie is to be ab­horred. But if it befall, and that the matter and time require it, reproue him that shall vse such ribauldrie and filthynesse. If not, at the least shewe and declare by silence and shamefastnesse, that suche communication doth displease thée.

Cap. 51. ¶Howe to resist pleasure.

IF thou cōceyue any pleasure in thy minde, It is better to despise than to em­brace plea­sure. be circumspecte (euen as in other things) that shée beguile thée not, but examine the matter, & take space to deliberate on it. Afterwarde consider both the times, that is to say, the time wherin thou dost enioy plea­sure, [Page] and the time wherein after the enioying of it thou mayste repent thée for hauing enioyed it. And afterwarde reproue thy self, and consider how wel at ease and contented thou shalte bée, if thou abstaine thy selfe, and in so do­ing thou doest commende thy selfe. But yf the matter séeme to require thée to doe▪ it, beware that hir flat­teries, hir swéetenesse, and hir intice­ments ouercome thée not, but consider how farre better it shall be, if thou be able to winne the victorie of that con­flicte.

Cap. 52. ¶That we oughte not to leaue off our good purpose, what soeuer men say.

WHen thou arte resolued to do a­ny thing, Oure duetie oughte to moue vs, and not the communication of the people and hast not yet done it, refuse not to be séene in doing ther­of, although other may iudge amisse thereof, for if thou do euill, thou muste geue ouer thy worke: if thou do wel, feare them not who wrongfully, and without cause shall reproue thée.

Cap. 53. ¶Of the honestie that we ought to keepe at the table.

WHo hath said: We muste not haue regard to our owne luste but to the Commu­naltie. it is daye, and it is night, taking the propo­sition seuerally we ought to agrée, but to vnderstande it together, it is not to be receyued. So at the table to choose for our selues the greatest, & the best parte of the meate, is a greate commoditie towardes the bodye, but it is against the honest par­ticipation that we ought to haue at the table. Then if at any time thou be bidden to a banket, In feastes modestie is to be obserued. remēber that thou muste not onely haue regarde to the meate, for the profite of thy body: but also to honestie, and to behaue thy self at the table, as thou oughtest.

Annotations.

Wheras before he compared our life to a feast, let this precept be applied to all the parts of our life: and euery where let there not be a respecte to our priuate desire and vtilitie, but of equitie & societie, & let the will of the feaster, that is God, be considered.

Cap. 54. ¶That we should not vndertake more than we are able to do.

IF thou haue taken more in hande, We ought to measure our strēgth in al things than thou arte able to atchieue or bring to passe: thou shalt not bring it to effect, and also hast omitted that which thou were able to performe.

Cap. 55. ¶That we ought to be circumspect aswell to saue the minde harmelesse, as the body.

EVen as in going thou doest take héede that thou steppe not vppon a nayle, We must endeuour to haue a per­fect minde. or that thou wreaste not thy foote: so in leading thy life take héede, that thou hurte not thy minde, the gouernesse of all thy doin­ges, which if we obserue in al things, we shall without daunger take them in hande.

Cap. 56. ¶Of the possession of suche things as belong to the body.

[Page 30] THe bodie is to euery man the forme of riches, A few thin­ges are sufficient for nature, but in­finite sub­stance suffi­seth not co­uetousnesse as the foote is of the shooe. If then in thys thou perseuer, thou shalte kepe the meane: if thou excede, thou must néeds as it were, fall downe headlong: as if thou be more curious about the fashiō of the shooe, then is nedeful for y e foote, thou wilt make him of golde, after of purple, laste of all set with studdes of gold: for there is no end of that thing which hath once passed measure.

Cap. 56. ¶For maydens vnmaried.

WOmen after .xiiij. yeares of age are called of louers Ladies: Modestie in women is more to bee regarded, than theyr beautie. for after this age men (to the end to com­pany with them) endeuoure wholly to please them. To obtaine then mennes good will afterwarde they become ve­ry curious in trimming and decking themselues. Wherfore they muste be admonished, that for no other cause we esteme them, but bicause they are modest, wise and honest, bearing re­uerence [Page] and obedience to their hus­bandes.

Cap. 57. ¶That more care is to be had of the mynde than of the bodie.

TO persiste and continewe in things which belong to the bo­die, We must be stow much time in garnishing of the minde, but a little in the body for pleasures sake, as in much exercise, in muche trim­ming, & adorning of the bodie, is signe of an abiecte minde, and verie muche swaruing from nature, and also it is a signe of consenting to superfluitie: for we embrace pleasure, and reioyce in things which we allowe. We must thinke then the excéeding care of the bodie to be frō the purpose: but prin­cipallie we muste be carefull of that whereof the bodie is but the instru­ment, that is, the minde.

Cap. 58. ¶A precept to learne pacience and meekenesse.

[Page 31] WHen any hath misused thée either in word or déede, remember that he doth suppose it to be done and saide according to his dutie. Wherfore it is impossible for him to followe thy ad­uise and counsaile, but his own. But if he iudge amisse, he is hurt whiche is deceyued. For if any do iudge hidden truthe to be a lye, the truthe hydden is not hurte, but he which shal be decey­ued. If so be then thou be perswaded, thou shalt shewe thy selfe gentle and paciente towards him that hath iniu­ried thée. And at euerie thing thou shalt say, it hath so pleased him.

Annotations.

He doth suppose it to be done accor­ding to his dutie. Pletho putteth vs in mind of the same, Pletho. that also we shoulde be blamed, which are able to perswade one thing, and can not induce others into our opinion. But thou wilt say, oftentimes vnreasonable and slaunde­rous men know that such things as they do are dishonest and shamefull for them to do. Epicte­tus maketh aunswere: they ar so much the more worse & miserable: but thou art neuer the more worse and miserable. But their dishonestie is to [Page] me a damage, bicause they hurte my estimation, bicause they diminish my substāce, bicause they doe afflict my body by violence or witchcraft, bicause they hinder my cōmodities? Epictet wil make aunswere, that these are none of thine, but other mens, and to appertaine nothing to thee. Wherof much is spoken of before. The hid­den truth, As it is in Sophocles in Electra, O­restes was not therfore dead, bicause he had per­swaded himselfe to bring his bones shutte in a coffin to Egisthus and others.

Cap. 59. ¶That all things partely do agree the one with the other, and partly do disagree.

EVery thing hath .tj. handels, one whereby it may be carried, The handle of humani­tie and not of immani­tie is to be taken. the o­ther whereby it may not. If thy brother be yll condicioned, take him not by that whereby he is yll con­dicioned, for it is the handle whereby he cannot be carried, but take him by that, whereby he is thy brother, and whereby he is nourished with thée, in so doing thou shalt take him by y e han­dle, whereby he ought to be carried.

Cap. 60. ¶That bicause of knoweledge, or hauing more than other, we cannot inferre that we are better.

THese words agrée not together I am richer than thou, We muste not triūph of the giftes of fortune, but of the riches of the minde. therfore better. I am wiser & better lear­ned than thou art, therfore I am better: but these agrée farre better. I am richer than thou art, then my pos­session is better than thine. I am wi­ser and better learned than thou arte, my words then are better than thine, but thou art neither thy possession nor yet thy communication.

Annotations.

But thou art neither. &c. Thou wylte say, yea: but bicause of riches, eloquence, and po­wer, I am much regarded. The same doth Epi­ctet reproue, who thinketh good onely wise­dome and vertue to be much set by. What man except he were a very naughtie and wicked flat­terer, Nero. hath had Nero the Emperour in greate e­stimation, although besides his ryches and Em­pire, he were eloquent, a Poet, and a Musician? The minde of a perfect man abhorreth to allow those, whose folishnesse and dishonestie is kno­wen, [Page] in what fashion soeuer honour for a shewe be giuen to them, bicause of the giftes of for­tune, and corrupte conuersation.

Cap. 61. ¶Of an exact iudgement in things.

IF any washe himselfe spéedily, saye not that hée washeth himself naugh­tily, Not onely the deede it selfe, but the cause of the dede is to be considered. but spedily. If any drinke much, say not that he drinketh naughtily, but muche, for if thou knowe not why he doth it, howe doest thou know that he doth naughtily? So it shall chaunce that we doe receyue and supporte the fantasies and imaginations of some, and to other we agrée.

Cap. 62. ¶Against glorie and ostentation. And first as touching knowledge.

REpute not thy selfe a Philoso­pher in any case: Philosophie is not to be declared by words, but by deedes. nether dispute not much of precepts, but rather put some thing in execution, as at the table, teach not how one should eate his meate, but eate as it behoueth [Page 33] thée. Nothyng must be spo­ken vnadui­sedly. For remember that Socrates did so set aside all ostentation. But if at a­ny time these precepts come in questi­on, speake as little as is possible, for it is daungerous to vomite that which the stomacke hath not well digested. And if it chaunce, that a man tell thée, that thou knowest nothing, and that it moueth thée not, The Sheepe declare by their wooll and milke how much they haue eaten. vnderstande that this is a great entraunce of thy worke, for the shéepe vomiting vp their grasse, de­clare not to y e Shepherds how muche they haue eatē, but digesting it within they shewe w tout their fine wooll and milke. Thou therfore shewe not, nei­ther vtter thy learning to y e rude and ignoraūt: but declare some effects out­wardly of that being well digested.

Cap. 63. ¶Against the boasting of sobrietie and suffe­raunce.

GLory not thy selfe to haue mor­tified, Ostentation is to be es­chued. empaired, and weakened thy body thorough abstinence: Neither if thou haste dronken nothing but water, saye not at euery [Page] occasion, I drinke nothing but water. But consider how much more abstinēt the poore are, who craue almes, suffe­ring and enduring muche more than thou. Furthermore consider howe ma­ny perfections and vertues thou haste not, which other haue. But if thou wilt exercise thy self in paine and pacience, do it by thy self, and séeke not to aduer­tise other of it, as they do who suffring wrong of great men, sette images on fire, & say, we are vndone, to the end to moue & assemble the people. For a bragger is altogether mindefull of worlde­ly things, and turneth topsie turuie the goodnesse of paciēce and abstinence, bi­cause he determineth the ende of them is to haue, the good opinion and prayse of many.

Cap. 64. ¶The description of a triple qualitie or pro­pertie, that is, of the vnlearned, of the Philosopher, and of him that beginneth to learne.

THe condicion and state of the vn­learned is, to looke for of hym selfe [Page 34] neither profite nor damage, but of out­warde thyngs. The state and condici­on of the philosopher is, to looke for of himselfe all vtilitie and discommoditie. The signe of him which beginneth to profite is, The signes of him whi­che profiteth that he dispraise no man, that he praise no mā, that he cōplaine of no man, y t he accuse no mā, that he speake nothing of himself, as though he were any body, or knewe any thing. When he shal be at any tyme empeched or di­sturbed, he blameth none but himselfe. And if one commende him, he mocketh him couertly which cōmendeth him, if he be dispraised, he purgeth nor iustifi­eth himself: but liueth like a sicke per­son fearing to moue & troble any thing within him before he be recouered. He setteth apart all appetite, and fléeth the thinges which are againste the nature of them whiche are in vs. He vseth a light endeuour aboute all things, and passeth not whether he be tearmed a Foole or an Ideote. And (in briefe) he watcheth himselfe, as his Enimie and Spye.

Annotations.

That he dyspraise no man, That is through curiositie and too much diligence in o­ther mens matters, or prouoked thoroughe selfe loue: Epitecte commendeth Agrippinus, but why? that other shoulde follow his example. He reproueth other, wherefore? that they shoulde be amended.

Cap. 65. ¶That learning is not only to be expounded but also to liue according as it doth prescribe.

IF any do auaunte that he can well interprete and expounde the senten­ces of Chrisippus, They are Grāmarians not Philo­sophers, whiche doe ex­pounde the preceptes of wise men, & follow them not. say with thy self, if Chrisippus had not writtē dark­ly, & obscurely, I should haue nothing wherewith to auaunte my selfe. But Chrisippus hath not written, to the ende he would be interpreted, but to the end that according to his doctrine we should liue. If then I vse his pre­ceptes, then shall I attaine to y e good­nesse of them. But if I maruell at the interpretation, or if I can well inter­prete it my selfe, I maruel at the Grā ­marian, [Page 35] not at the Philosopher, or else play the Grāmarian not the Philoso­pher. But what auaileth it to haue founde written remedies, to vnder­stande them well, and being sicke thy selfe not to vse them?

Cap. 66. ¶That we ought to perseuer in goodnesse.

THou must be stable and firme in thy good purpose and delibera­tion of life, Preceptes are to be obeied, and wordes are not to be regarded. euē as in a law. Perseuer therfore, euē as if in trās­gressing, thou shouldest incurre the crime of impietie. And whatsoeuer mē talke of thée, regarde it not, for that be­longeth not to thée.

Cap. 67. ¶That we ought not to deferre from day to day, for to leade a perfect life.

HOw lōg yet wilt thou deferre to esteme thy selfe at any tyme worthy of these thinges which are so excellēt, and not to trās­gresse [Page] one? But if frō day to day thou dost deferre y e time, thou dost not auāce but hinder thy selfe. Then incontinēt­ly accustome thy selfe to liue as per­fecte, and to vse well all accidents and chaunces. And in euery thing suppose that the combate is ready for thée, and neglecte no time, for that daye in the which thou doest not profit, thou doest receyue damage. After this manner Socrates became the wisest of al. But yf thou bée not yet Socrates, thou oughtest to liue as, one that would be­come Socrates.

Cap. 68. ¶Three places in Philosophie, and the order of them together.

THe firste and moste necessarie place is that which appertaineth to the practise of knowledge: Precepts are better than the cause of preceptes, and the Me­thode of de­monstratiōs. as, not to lye. The seconde whiche appertaineth to demonstrations: as, how commeth it to passe that this is demonstration? What demonstration is? what cōsequence is? what fighting [Page 36] is? what is true? what is false? There­fore y e thirde place is necessarie for the seconde, the seconde for the first. The most necessarie of all, and wherein to rest our selues is the first. But we doe contrary, for we stay our selues in the thirde, and therein bestow all our stu­die, and make no accompt of the first, but are alltogether negligente. And how? For we make leasinges, and not­withstanding wée haue well néere al­wayes no other thing in our mouthe, why and wherefore we oughte not to lye.

Annotations.

Not to lye. And this is the actiue or morall part. We should not lye. This is called the iudiciall or naturall part. To demonstrati­ons. This is logike and Rhetoricke, wherby we proue and trie the truthe, and disproue that which is false.

Cap. 69. ¶Three sentences of the auncientes to be had in minde. Of the which the first is of Cleantes, the seconde of Euripides, the thirde of Plato.

[Page] LEt vs alwayes haue these thrée thinges in memorie and before 1 our eyes. The first is, Necessitie draweth all thinges (will we nill we) euē as God hath appointed, wher­fore he which willingly followeth it, is 2 wise. The seconde is if I recoile and giue back, I shal be naughte, & spite of my téeth wéeping and wailing I must 3 néedes follow. But the third, O Crito If it so please god, so be it. Anitus tru­lie and Melitus may well kill me, but to hurte me, it lieth not in their po­wer.

Annotations.

¶It is maruell that this morall and auailable saying of Epictetus was omitted, [...], that is, Beare and Forbeare, whiche be vsed very often, and doth in a manner compre­hende al that whereof mencion is made at large in this boke.

¶The Poesie of Epictetus which he vsed as hys badge or Cognisaunce.
The translater vpon the same.

[...].

Sustine & abstine

Sustaine and refraine.

SVstaine al wrong and iniurie,
and neuer sée thou pine
At any thing, which fortune blinde
doth claime not to be thine.
Endure the losse of worldlye wealth
and couet chiefely thys:
A quiet minde, a godly life
which makes thée liue in blisse.
Refraine w t pompe to vaunte thy selfe
in fraile externall things,
Seing to this wearing wasting world
thou nothing with thée brings.
Sée thou expell not from thy minde
and quite from it displace
Al vertuous actes and holie déedes,
though some séeke to deface
Thée, in whose minde is fullie fixte
the trade to vertues way
[Page] By pleasant shewe of filthie vice
which leadeth men astray.
For some there are, who whē they sée
one folowing vertues lore,
From vertue hard, to easie vice
they séeke him to restore.
Abstaine from wrathe in matters all
from Othes and laughter great,
From naughtie and yll companie,
from all delicious meate:
From giuing eare to secrete talke
and from dame Venus fielde
Retire thy selfe, and take in hande
of chastitie the sheilde.
Sustaine, Refraine, these ar two words
which great importaunce haue,
And if with reason thou them skan.
from damage much do saue.

The Apophthegs or quicke Sentences of Epictetus.

EPictetus y e Stoike Phi­losopher seing a certain fellowe voide of al good condicions, hauing a bolde spirite to speake yet to an ill intente, giuing his minde to the study of Philosophie: he with a loude voyce cryed out on the faythe of God and man, reprouing the man in these wordes: O man sée whether the vessell be cleane, wherin thou dost put these things. For if thou shalte of arrogancie poure them in, they wil perishe: if they shall putrifie, they wil be­come vrine, or vineger, or worse than these, if worse may be. He ment, that learning inferreth great hurt and da­mage, if it happen vpon a mind which is corrupted with yll affections: & the more excellente euery learning is, the greater hurte it causeth if it happen on a naughtie man: like as there is no thing more better then a good di­uine, [Page] so there is nothing more pestilēt then an ill diuine. Gellius. lib. xvij. cap. xix. & Erasmus. li. vij. Apoph.

He on a time hearing of a certaine man y t would easilie be flattered, said, the crowes plucke dead mens eies out of the carkasses and that not withoute a cause, for none which is depriued of life, hath the vse of hys sight. But flat­terers corrupting the mindes of them which are aliue, do take away al their sighte. Stob. Antonius in Melissa. part. .j. ser. lii.

He counselled that we shoulde con­sider thrée maner of wayes: the man with whome we are conuersaunte: whether he be better than we oure selues are, or inferiour, or equall vn­to vs. It is méete to heare diligently, & obeye him whiche is better then oure selues, modestly to persuade the yon­ger or inferioure, and to agrée w t thy equall. And truly by this meanes thou shalt neuer fall in contention when thou art in cōpany. Stob. serm. iij. de Tē ­perantia. Although this be before a­mong [Page 37] the precepts, yet I thought good againe to repeate and recken it also in this place. For as the prouerbe is, Bis & ter quod pulchrun est repetendū: y t is, that which is goodly ought twice and thrice to be sayd or repeated.

He being demaunded, what man was riche. To whom (sayed he) that is sufficient which he hath. Strob.

He sayd that the Gods did not hate such, as in this life doe contende and wrastle w t diuers miseries. The Phi­losophers meaning was, that aduersi­tie was vnto men auailable: to whom if things do prosper according to their desire, they are so vexed w t the Furies, that is, with anger, couetousnesse and lust, y e through their prosperitie, they moue y e Gods to wrath. This is foūde in Brusonius Contursin us. li. ij. Exempl. He being demaunded, by what meane a man might purchase an honeste re­porte, he aunswered. If thou wilt haue a good name, learne to speake well, when thou hast learned to speake wel, endeuoure to do well, and by this [Page] meanes thou shalt get a good reporte.

He being demaunded howe a man might procure sorrow to his ennimie, sayd: If a man do so frame and dispose hymselfe, that he do all good things.

The same was accustomed to saye, that it was more necessarie to cure the soule than the body, seing that it is bet to dye, than to leade an ill life. Anto­nius in Melissa, part .i. Ser. lviij.

The same was wont to call such as shewed thē selues to be Philosophers by their beard, garmēt, and bragging wordes, Factis procul, verbis tenus, ha­uing their déedes farre of, & their wor­des at hande.

The same was wont to say, that a life ioyned with fortune, was like vn­to a violent floud of water. For it is troubled, and full of dirte, and harde to enter into it, it is violent, roring, and cō tinueth a shorte space.

FINIS.

Imprinted at London in Pater Noster Rowe, by Hen­rie Bynneman, for Leonarde Maylard. And are to be sold in Paules Churchyarde, at the signe of the Cock. 1567.

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