#B 1#                       BOOK I


#C 01#                      CHAPTER I

                        <Introduction>.
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#S 01#. SINCE it is the <Understanding> that sets Man above the rest of
sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion,
which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Noble-
ness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the
Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no
notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance,
and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties, that
lie in the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much
in the Dark to our selves; sure I am, that all the Light we can let in
upon our own Minds; all the Acquaintance we can make with our
own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant; but bring us
great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the search of other
Things.
#S 02#. This, therefore, being my <Purpose> to enquire into the Original,
Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the
Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent; I shall not at
present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or
trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what
Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have
any Sensation by our Organs, or any <Ideas> in our Understandings;
and whether those <Ideas> do in their Formation, any, or all of them,
depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, which, however
curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, in
the Design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to
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consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd
about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine
I have not wholly misimploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have
on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any
Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain
those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures
of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Per-
swasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different,
and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted some where or other
with such Assurance, and Confidence, that he that shall take a view
of the Opinions of Mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the
same time, consider the Fondness, and Devotion wherewith they
are embrac'd; the Resolution, and Eagerness, wherewith they are
maintain'd, may perhaps have Reason to suspect, That either there
is no such thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient
Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.
#S 03#. It is therefore worth while, to search out the <Bounds> between
Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things,
whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our
Assent, and moderate our Perswasions. In Order whereunto, I shall
pursue this following Method.
<First>, I shall enquire into the <Original> of those <Ideas>, Notions, or
whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is
conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the
Understanding comes to be furnished with them.
<Secondly>, I shall endeavour to shew, what <Knowledge> the Under-
standing hath by those <Ideas>; and the Certainty, Evidence, and
Extent of it.
<Thirdly>, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds
of <Faith>, or <Opinion>: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to
any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain
Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the
Reasons and Degrees of <Assent>.
#S 04#. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I
can discover the Powers thereof; <how far> they reach; to what things
they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I
suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to
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be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Compre-
hension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and
to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon
Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities.
We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an Affectation of
an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves
and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understand-
ings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any
clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often
happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how 
far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties
to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess,
we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in
this State.
#S 05#. For though the <Comprehension> of our Understandings, comes
exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things; yet, we shall have
Cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that
Portion and Degree of Knowledge, he has bestowed on us, so far
above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion. Men have
Reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for
them, since he has given them (as St. <Peter> says,) GREEK
     , Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of
Life, and Information of Vertue;* and has put within the reach of
their Discovery the comfortable Provision for this Life and the Way
that leads to a better. How short soever their Knowledge may come
of an universal, or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet
secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to
lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their
own Duties. Men may find Matter sufficient to busy their Heads,
and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight, and Satisfaction; if
they will not boldly quarrel with their own Constitution, and throw
away the Blessings their Hands are fill'd with, because they are not
big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much Reason to
complain of the narrowness of our Minds, if we will but employ
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them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very
capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as Childish
Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge,
and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us,
because there are some Things that are set out of the reach of it.
It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would
not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not
broad Sun-shine. The Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright
enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this,
ought to satisfy us: And we shall then use our Understandings
right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion,
that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds, they
are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or
intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, where
Probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all
our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we
cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely
as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because
he had no Wings to fly.
#S 06#. When we know our own <Strength>, we shall the better know
what to undertake with hopes of Success: And when we have well
survey'd the <Powers> of our own Minds, and made some Estimate
what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit
still, and not set our Thoughts on work at all, in Despair of know-
ing any thing; nor on the other side question every thing, and dis-
claim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood.
Tis of great use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though
he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the Ocean.   'Tis well he
knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such Places,
as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against
running upon Shoals, that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to
know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can
find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that
State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his
Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled,
that some other things escape our Knowledge.
#S 07#. This was that which gave the first <Rise> to this Essay con-
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cerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step
towards satisfying several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very
apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings,
examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted.
Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in
vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of
Truths, that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts
into the vast Ocean of <Being>, as if all that boundless Extent, were the
natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings, wherein
there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escaped its 10
Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their
Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths,
where they can find no sure Footing;   'tis no Wonder, that they raise
Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear
Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts,
and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the
Capacities of our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our
Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the
Bounds between the enlightned and dark Parts of Things; between
what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps
with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and
imploy their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and
Satisfaction in the other.
#S 08#. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occa-
sion of this Enquiry into humane Understanding. But, before I
proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in
the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the
Word <Idea>, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being
that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is
the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it
to express whatever is meant by <Phantasm, Notion, Species>, or whatever
it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I
could not avoid frequently using it.
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I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such <Ideas> in
Men's Minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and Men's
Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.
Our first Enquiry then shall be, how they come into the Mind.


#C 02#                       CHAPTER II

              <No innate Principles in the Mind>.

#S 01#. IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there
are in the Understanding certain <innate Principles>; some primary
Notions, GREEK , Characters, as it were stamped upon the
Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and
brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince
unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I
should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this
Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties,
may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any
innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such
Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily
grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the <Ideas> of
Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a
Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no
less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the
Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may
observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain
Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the
Mind.
But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow
his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they lead him ever
so little out of the common Road: I shall set down the Reasons,
that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuse for
my Mistake, if I be in one, which I leave to be consider'd by those,
who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth, where-ever
they find it.
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#S 02#. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than
that there are certain Principles both <Speculative> and <Practical> (for
they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind: which
therefore they argue, must needs be the constant Impressions, which
the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring
into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any
of their inherent Faculties.
#S 03#. This Argument, drawn from <Universal Consent>, has this Mis-
fortune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fact, that there were
certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove 10
them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may
come to that Universal Agreement, in the things they do consent
in; which I presume may be done.
#S 04#. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent,
which is made use of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a 15
Demonstration that there are none such: Because there are none to
which all Mankind give an Universal Assent. I shall begin with the
Speculative, and instance in those magnified Principles of Demon-
stration, <Whatsoever is, is>; and <  'Tis impossible for the same thing to be>,
<and not to be>, which of all others I think have the most allow'd Title
to innate. These have so setled a Reputation of Maxims universally
received, that   'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one
should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, That these
Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent, that there
are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as
known.
#S 05#. For, first   'tis evident, that all <Children>, and <Ideots>, have not
the least Apprehension or Thought of them: and the want of that is
enough to destroy that universal Assent, which must needs be the
necessary concomitant of all innate Truths: it seeming to me near a
Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul,
which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any
thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be
perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the
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Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore
Children and <Ideots> have Souls, have Minds, with those Impressions
upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily
know and assent to these Truths, which since they do not, it is evi-
dent that there are no such Impressions. For if they are not Notions
naturally imprinted, How can they be innate? And if they are
Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To say a Notion is
imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the
mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this
Impression nothing. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind,
which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For
if any one may; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are
true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be
in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be
in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is
capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall
know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it
never did, nor ever shall know: for a Man may live long, and die
at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable
of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of
knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths
a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of
them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only
to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to
assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny
innate Principles. For no Body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind
was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is
innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest
for certain innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Under-
standing without being perceived, I can see no difference there can
be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect
of their Original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In
vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that
talks of innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend
thereby any distinct sort of Truths) mean such Truths to be in the
Understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of.
For if these Words (<to be in the Understanding>) have any Propriety,
they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the Understanding,
and, not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and, never to be
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perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind
or Understanding. If therefore these two Propositions, <Whatsoever is>,
<is>; and, <It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>, are by Nature
imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them: Infants, and all
that have Souls must necessarily have them in their Understandings,
know the Truth of them, and assent to it.
#S 06#. To avoid this,   'tis usually answered, that all Men know and
<assent> to them, <when they come to the use of Reason>, and this is enough to
prove them innate. I answer,
#S 07#. Doubtful Expressions, that have scarce any signification, go
for clear Reasons to those, who being prepossessed, take not the
Pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this
Answer with any tolerable Sence to our present Purpose, it must
signify one of these two things; either, That as soon as Men come
to the use of Reason, these supposed native Inscriptions come to be
known, and observed by them: Or else, that the Use and Excerise
of Men's Reasons assists them in the Discovery of these Principles,
and certainly makes them known to them.
#S 08#. If they mean that by the <Use of Reason> Men may discover
these Principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate;
their way of arguing will stand thus, (<viz>.) That whatever Truths
Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to,
those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind; since that universal
Assent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but
this; That by the use of Reason, we are capable to come to a certain
Knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this Means there will be
no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and
Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allow'd
innate, they being all Discoveries made by the use of Reason, and
Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he
apply his Thoughts rightly that Way.
#S 09#. But how can these Men think the <Use of Reason> necessary to
discover Principles that are supposed innate, when Reason (if we
may believe them) is nothing else, but the Faculty of deducing un-
known Truths from Principles or Propositions, that are already
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known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have
need of Reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the
certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may
as well think the use of Reason necessary to make our Eyes discover
visible Objects, as that there should be need of Reason, or the
Exercise thereof, to make the Understanding see, what is Origin-
ally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Understanding, before it be
perceived by it. So that to make Reason discover those Truths thus
imprinted, is to say, that the use of Reason discovers to a Man,
what he knew before; and if Men have these innate, impressed
Truths Originally, and before the use of Reason, and yet are always
ignorant of them, till they come to the use of Reason,   'tis in effect
to say, that Men know, and know them not at the same time.
#S 10#.   'Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demon-
strations, and other Truths, that are not innate, are not assented to,
as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these
Maxims, and other innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of
Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I
shall here only, and that very readily, allow, That these Maxims,
and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the
one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to
gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without
any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg
leave to observe, That it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge,
which requires the <Use of Reason> for the Discovery of these general
Truths: Since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery, there is
no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this
Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this
Maxim, <That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>, is a
deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty
of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of
those Principles to depend on the labour of our Thoughts. For all
Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains and
Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos'd,
that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide
of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?
#S 11#. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little atten-
tion on the Operations of the Understanding, will find, that this
ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not, either on
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native Inscription, or the <Use of Reason>; but on a Faculty of the Mind
quite distinct from both of them as we shall see hereafter. Reason
therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these
Maxims, if by saying, that <Men know and assent to them, when they>
<come to the Use of Reason>, be meant, That the use of Reason assists us
in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it
true, would prove them not to be innate.
#S 12#. If by knowing and assenting to them, <when we come to the use>
<of Reason> be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be
taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to
the use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these
Maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. <First>, It is false. Because it is
evident, these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the use of
Reason: and therefore the coming to the use of Reason is falsly
assigned, as the time of their Discovery. How many instances of the
use of Reason may we observe in Children, a long time before they
have any Knowledge of this Maxim, <That it is impossible for the same>
<thing to be, and not to be>? and a great part of illiterate People, and
Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever
thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant Men
come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract
Truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of
Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after
they come to the use of Reason, those general abstract <Ideas> are not
framed in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which
are mistaken for innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made,
and Verities introduced, and brought into the Mind by the same
Way, and discovered by the same Steps, as several other Propo-
sitions, which no Body was ever so extravagant as to suppose
innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse.
I allow therefore a Necessity, that Men should come to the use of
Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths:
but deny, that Men's coming to the use of Reason is the time of
their Discovery.
#S 13#. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that
Men know, and assent to these Maxims, <when they come to the use of>
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<Reason>, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are
never known, nor taken notice of before the use of Reason, but may
possibly be assented to sometime after, during a Man's Life; but
when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths, as well as
these, which therefore have no Advantage, nor distinction from
others, by this Note of being known when we come to the use of
Reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.
#S 14#. But <Secondly>, were it true, that the precise time of their
being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the <Use of>
<Reason>; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing
is as frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is false. For by what kind
of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is Originally by Nature
imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes
first to be observed, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind,
which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And
therefore, the coming to the use of Speech, if it were supposed the
time, that these Maxims are first assented to (which it may be with
as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the use of Reason)
would be as good a Proof that they were innate, as to say, they are
innate because Men assent to them, when they come to the use of
Reason. I agree then with these Men of innate Principles, that there
is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the
Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: but I deny that the
coming to the use of Reason, is the precise time when they are first
taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it
would prove them innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by
this Proposition, That Men <assent to them when they come to the use of>
<Reason>, is no more but this, That the making of general abstract
<Ideas>, and the Understanding of general Names, being a Concomi-
tant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children
commonly get not those general <Ideas>, nor learn the Names that
stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their Reason
about familiar and more particular <Ideas>, they are by their ordinary
Discourse and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of
rational Conversation. If assenting to these Maxims, when Men
come to the use of Reason, can be true in any other Sence, I desire it
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may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other Sence it proves
them innate.
#S 15#. The Senses at first let in particular <Ideas>, and furnish the yet
empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with
some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to
them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and
by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the
Mind comes to be furnish'd with <Ideas> and Language, the Materials
about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of
Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it
Employment, increase. But though the having of general <Ideas>, and
the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together: yet,
I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of
some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that
shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it
still to be about <Ideas>, not innate, but acquired: It being about those
first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants
have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions
on their Senses. In <Ideas> thus got, the Mind discovers, That some
agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of
Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct <Ideas>.
But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before
it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call
the <use of Reason>. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak,
the difference between the <Ideas> of Sweet and Bitter (<i.e>. That Sweet
is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That
Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.
#S 16#. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven,
till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and
<Idea> of Equality: and then upon the explaining those Words, he
presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Propo-
sition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an
innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting, till then, because he
wanted the <Use of Reason>; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon
as he has setled in his Mind the clear and distinct <Ideas>, that these
Names stand for: And then, he knows the Truth of that Proposition,
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upon the same Grounds, and by the same means, that he knew
before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing; and upon the
same Grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, <That it is>
<impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>, as shall be more fully
shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have
those general <Ideas>, about which those Maxims are; or to know the
Signification of those general Terms, that stand for them; or to put
together in his Mind, the <Ideas> they stand for: the later also will it
be, before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with
the <Ideas> they stand for, being no more innate, than those of a Cat
or a Weesel, he must stay till Time and Observation have ac-
quainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know
the Truth of these Maxims, upon the first Occasion, that shall
make him put together those <Ideas> in his Mind, and observe,
whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those
Propositions. And therefore it is, That a Man knows that Eighteen
and Nineteen, are equal to Thirty Seven, by the same self-Evidence,
that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet, a Child
knows this, not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of
Reason: but because the <Ideas> the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and
Thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those, which are
signify'd by One, Two, and Three.
#S 17#. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come
to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference
between those supposed-innate, and other Truths, that are
afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to secure
an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are
generally <assented to, as soon as proposed>, and the Terms they are
propos'd in, understood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as soon as
they hear and understand the Terms, assent to these Propositions,
they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since Men never
fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledge
them for undoubted Truths, they would inferr, That certainly these
Propositions were first lodged in the Understanding, which, with-
out any teaching, the Mind at very first Proposal, immediately
closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
#P 057#
#L 1#
#S 18#. In Answer to this, I demand whether ready <assent>, given to a
Proposition <upon first hearing>, and understanding the Terms, be a
certain mark of an innate Principle? If it be not, such a general
assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is
a mark of innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be
innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby
they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate Principles.
For upon the same ground (<viz.>) of Assent at first hearing and
understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims
pass for innate, they must also admit several Propositions about
Numbers, to be innate: And thus, <That One and Two are equal to>
<Three, That Two and Two are equal to Four>, and a multitude of other
the like Propositions in Numbers, that every Body assents to, at
first hearing, and understanding the Terms, must have a place
amongst these innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of
Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them: But
even natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propo-
sitions, which are sure to meet with Assent, as soon as they are
understood. <That two Bodies cannot be in the same place>, is a Truth,
that no Body any more sticks at, than at this Maxim, <That it is>
<impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; That White is not Black>,
<That a Square is not a Circle, That Yellowness is not Sweetness>: These,
and a Million of other such Propositions, as many at least, as we
have distinct <Ideas>, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and
knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If
then these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have <Assent at>
<first hearing and understanding the Terms>, to be a mark of innate, they
must allow, not only as many innate Propositions, as Men have
distinct <Ideas>; but as many as Men can make Propositions, wherein
different <Ideas> are denied one of another. Since every Proposition,
wherein one different <Idea> is denied of another, will as certainly find
Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this
general one, <It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be>; or that which
is the Foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, <The>
<same is not different>: By which Account, they will have Legions of
innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other.
#P 058#
#L 1#
But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the <Ideas>, about which
it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our <Ideas> of Colours,
Sounds, Tastes, Figures, <etc>. innate; than which there cannot be
any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and
ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I
grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on
innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew here-
after) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so
extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.
#S 19#. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident
Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, <That One and>
<Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red>, etc. are received as the
Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are
look'd on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the
Pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly
find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly
known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant
of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind
than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them
the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.
#S 20#. If it be said, that these Propositions, <viz. Two and Two are>
<equal to Four; Red is not Blue>, etc. are not general Maxims, nor of any
great use. I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of uni-
versal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For if that be the
certain mark of innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that
receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must
be admitted for an innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, <That it>
<is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>, they being upon this
Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that
makes this Maxim more remote from being innate; those general
and abstract <Ideas>, being more strangers to our first Apprehensions,
than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and there-
fore,   'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the
growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified
Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally con-
ceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.
#P 059#
#L 1#
#S 21#. But we have not yet done with <assenting to Propositions at first>
<hearing and understanding their Terms>;   'tis fit we first take notice, That
this, instead of being a mark, that they are innate, is a proof of the
contrary: Since it supposes, that several, who understand and know
other things, are ignorant of these Principles, till they are propos'd
to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these Truths, till
he hears them from others. For if they were innate, What need they
be propos'd, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the
Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were
any such) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the
proposing them, print them clearer in the Mind, than Nature did?
If so, then the Consequence will be, That a Man knows them better,
after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it
will follow, That these Principles may be made more evident to us
by other's teaching, than Nature has made them by Impression:
which will ill agree with the Opinion of innate Principles, and give
but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them un-
fit to be the foundations of all our other Knowledge, as they are
pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow first
acquainted with many of these self-evident Truths, upon their
being proposed: But it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in
himself, That he then begins to know a Proposition, which he
knew not before; and which from thenceforth he never questions:
not because it was innate; but, because the consideration of the
Nature of the things contained in those Words, would not suffer
him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to
reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing, and
understanding the terms, must pass for an innate Principle, every
well grounded Observation drawn from particulars into a general
Rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only
sagacious Heads light at first on these Observations, and reduce
them into general Propositions, not innate, but collected from a
preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular instances.
These, when observing Men have made them, unobserving Men,
when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuse their assent to.
#S 22#. If it be said, The Understanding hath an <implicit Knowledge>
#P 060#
#L 1#
of these Principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing, (as
they must, who will say, That they are in the Understanding before
they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a
Principle imprinted on the Understanding Implicitly; unless it be
this, That the Mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly
to such Propositions. And thus all Mathematical Demonstrations,
as well as first Principles, must be received as native Impressions on
the Mind: which, I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find
it harder to demonstrate a Proposition, than assent to it, when
demonstrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe,
That all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of those
innate Characters, which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds.
#S 23#. There is I fear this farther weakness in the foregoing
Argument, which would perswade us, That therefore those Maxims
are to be thought innate, which Men <admit at first hearing>, because
they assent to Propositions, which they are not taught, nor do
receive from the force of any Argument or Demonstration, but a
bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which,
there seems to me to lie this fallacy; That Men are supposed not to
be <taught>, nor to <learn> any thing <de novo>; when in truth, they are
taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For
first it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signifi-
cation: neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the
acquired Knowledge in the case: The <Ideas> themselves, about which
the Proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their
Names, but got afterwards. So, that in all Propositions that are
assented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Proposition, their
standing for such <Ideas>, and the <Ideas> themselves that they stand for,
being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is
remaining in such Propositions, that is innate. For I would gladly
have any one name that Proposition, whose Terms or <Ideas> were
either of them innate. We by degrees get <Ideas> and Names, and
learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to
Propositions, made in such Terms, whose signification we have
learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can
perceive in our <Ideas>, when put together, is expressed, we at first
#P 061#
#L 1#
hearing assent; though to other Propositions, in themselves as
certain and evident, but which are concerning <Ideas>, not so soon or
so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting.
For though a Child quickly assent to this Proposition, <That an>
<Apple is not Fire>; when, by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the
<Ideas> of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his Mind,
and has learnt that the Names <Apple> and <Fire> stand for them: yet, it
will be some years after, perhaps, before the same Child will assent
to this Proposition, <That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not>
<to be>. Because, that though, perhaps, the Words are as easie to be
learnt: yet the signification of them, being more large, compre-
hensive, and abstract, than of the Names annexed to those sensible
things, the Child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their
precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his
Mind those general <Ideas>, they stand for. Till that be done, you will
in vain endeavour to make any Child assent to a Proposition, made
up of such general Terms: but as soon as ever he has got those
<Ideas>, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly closes with the one, as
well as the other of the forementioned Propositions; and with both
for the same Reason; (<viz>.) because he finds the <Ideas> he has in his
Mind, to agree or disagree, according as the Words standing for
them, are affirmed, or denied one of another in the Proposition. But
if Propositions be brought to him in Words, which stand for <Ideas>
he has not yet in his Mind: to such Propositions, however evidently
true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but
is ignorant. For Words being but empty sounds, any farther than
they are signs of our <Ideas>, we cannot but assent to them, as they
correspond to those <Ideas> we have, but no farther than that. But the
shewing by what Steps and Ways Knowledge comes into our
Minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the
Business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only
touched on it here, as one Reason, that made me doubt of those
innate Principles.
#S 24#. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent, I agree
with these Defenders of innate Principles, That if they are <innate>,
they must needs <have universal assent>. For that a Truth should be
innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a
#P 062#
#L 1#
Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But
then, by these Men's own Confession, they cannot be innate; since
they are not assented to, by those who understand not the Terms,
nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet
never heard, nor thought of those Propositions; which, I think, is at
least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far less, it would
be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these Pro-
positions not to be innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.
#S 25#. But that I may not be accused, to argue from the thoughts
of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what
passes in their Understandings, before they express it; I say next,
That these two general Propositions are not the Truths, that <first>
<possess the Minds> of Children; nor are antecedent to all acquired, and
adventitious Notions: which if they were innate, they must needs
be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is
certainly a time, when Children begin to think, and their Words
and Actions do assure us, that they do so. When therefore they are
capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of Assent, can it rationally be
supposed, they can be ignorant of those Notions that Nature has
imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagin'd, with any
appearance of Reason, That they perceive the Impressions from
things without; and be at the same time ignorant of those Charac-
ters, which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within? Can they
receive and assent to adventitious Notions, and be ignorant of those,
which are supposed woven into the very Principles of their Being,
and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation,
and Guide of all their acquired Knowledge, and future Reasonings?
This would be, to make Nature take Pains to no Purpose; Or, at
least, to write very ill; since its Characters could not be read by
those Eyes, which saw other things very well: and those are very ill
supposed the clearest parts of Truth, and the Foundations of all our
Knowledge, which are not first known, and without which, the
undoubted Knowledge of several other things may be had. The
Child certainly knows, that the <Nurse> that feeds it, is neither the <Cat>
it plays with, nor the <Blackmoor> it is afraid of; That the <Wormseed> or
<Mustard> it refuses, is not the <Apple> or <Sugar> it cries for: this it is
#P 063#
#L 1#
certainly and undoubtedly assured of: But will any one say, it is by
Virtue of this Principle, <That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and>
<not to be>, that it so firmly assents to these, and other parts of its
Knowledge? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehension of
that Proposition at an Age, wherein yet   'tis plain, it knows a great
many other Truths? He that will say, Children join these general
abstract Speculations with their sucking Bottles, and their Rattles,
may, perhaps, with Justice be thought to have more Passion and
Zeal for his Opinion; but less Sincerity and Truth, than one of that
Age.
#S 26#. Though therefore there be several general Propositions,
that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to
Men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and
abstract <Ideas>, and Names standing for them: yet they not being to
be found in those of tender Years, who nevertheless know other
things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent
Persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate: It being
impossible, that any Truth which is innate (if there were any such)
should be unknown, at least to any one, who knows any thing else.
Since, if they are innate Truths, they must be innate thoughts:
there being nothing a Truth in the Mind, that it has never thought
on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any <innate Truths>, they <must>
<necessarily be the first of any thought on>; the first that appear there.
#S 27#. That the general Maxims, we are discoursing of, are not
known to Children, <Ideots>, and a great part of Mankind, we have
already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident, they have not
an universal assent, nor are general Impressions. But there is this
farther Argument in it against their being innate: That these
Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, <should>
<appear fairest and clearest in> those Persons, in whom yet we find no
Footsteps of them: And   'tis, in my Opinion, a strong Presumption,
that they are not innate; since they are least known to those, in
whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with
most Force and Vigour. For <Children, Ideots, Savages>, and <illiterate>
People, being of all others the least corrupted by Custom, or bor-
rowed Opinions; Learning, and Education, having not cast their
Native thoughts into new Moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign
#P 064#
#L 1#
and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature
had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that in their
Minds these innate Notions should lie open fairly to every one's
view, as   'tis certain the thoughts of Children do. It might very well
be expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to
Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these
Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or
Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them
and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles,
That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should
in those, who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out
in their full Lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being
there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain.
But alas, amongst <Children, Ideots, Savages>, and the grosly <Illiterate>,
what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of
Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only
from those Objects, they have had most to do with, and which have
made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions.
A Child knows his Nurse, and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-
things of a little more advanced Age: And a young Savage has,
perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the
fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild
Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims, and
reputed Principles of Sciences, will I fear, find himself mistaken.
Such kind of general Propositions, are seldom mentioned in the
Huts of <Indians>: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of
<Children>, or any Impressions of them on the Minds of <Naturals>. They
are the Language and Business of the Schools, and Academies
of learned Nations, accustomed to that sort of Conversation, or
Learning, where Disputes are frequent: These Maxims being suited
to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not
much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of
Knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of Know-
ledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, <l>. 4. <c>. 7.
#S 28#. I know not how absurd this may seem to the Masters of
Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any Body
#P 065#
#L 1#
at first Hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice,
and the forbearance of censure till I have been heard out in the
sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better
Judgments. And since I impartially search after Truth, I shall not
be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own
Notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when Application and
Study have warmed our Heads with them.
Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these
two famed speculative Maxims innate: since they are not uni-
versally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no 10
other, than what several Propositions, not allowed to be innate,
equally partake in with them: And since the assent that is given
them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural
Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following
Discourse. And if <these first Principles> of Knowledge and Science, <are>
found <not> to be <innate, no other speculative Maxims can> (I suppose) <with>
<better Right pretend to be so>.


#C 03#                      CHAPTER III

               <No innate practical Principles>.

#S 01#. IF those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the
fore-going Chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all
Mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning
<practical Principles>, that they <come short of an universal Reception>: and I
think it will be hard to instance any one moral Rule, which can
pretend to so general and ready an assent as, <What is, is>, or to be so
manifest a Truth as this, <That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and>
<not to be>. Whereby it is evident, That they are farther removed from
a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native Impressions
on the Mind, is stronger against these moral Principles than the
other. Not that it brings their Truth at all in question. They are
equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative
#P 066#
#L 1#
Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral Principles
require Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind,
to discover the certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as
natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which if any such were,
they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light
be certain and known to every Body. But this is no Derogation
to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or
Certainty, of the Three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two
right ones, because it is not so evident, as <The whole is bigger than a>
<part>; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that
these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: and therefore it is
our own faults, if we come not to a certain Knowledge of them. But
the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the slowness of
assent, wherewith others receive them, are manifest Proofs, that
they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view
without searching.
#S 02#. Whether there be any such moral Principles, wherein all
Men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately
conversant in the History of Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond
the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth,
that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be
if innate? <Justice>, and keeping of Contracts, is that which <most Men>
<seem to agree in>. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it self
to the Dens of Thieves, and the Confederacies of the greatest
Villains; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off
of Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of justice one with
another. I grant that Outlaws themselves do this one amongst
another: but   'tis without receiving these as the innate Laws of
Nature. They practise them as Rules of convenience within their
own Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that he im-
braces Justice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his
Fellow High-way-men, and at the same time plunders, or kills the
next honest Man he meets with. Justice and Truth are the common
ties of Society; and therefore, even Outlaws and Robbers, who break
with all the World besides, must keep Faith and Rules of Equity
amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But
#P 067#
#L 1#
will any one say, That those that live by Fraud and Rapine,
have innate Principles of Truth and Justice which they allow and
assent to?
#S 03#. Perhaps it will be urged, That the <tacit assent of their Minds>
<agrees to what their Practice contradicts>. I answer, <First>, I have always
thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their thoughts.
But since it is certain, that most Men's Practice, and some Men's
open Professions, have either questioned or denied these Principles,
it is impossible to establish an universal consent (though we should
look for it only amongst grown Men) without which, it is impos-
sible to conclude them innate. <Secondly>,   'Tis very strange and un-
reasonable, to suppose innate practical Principles, that terminate
only in Contemplation. Practical Principles derived from Nature,
are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action,
not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain
distinguish'd from speculative Maxims. Nature, I confess, has put
into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery: These
indeed are innate practical Principles, which (as practical Principles
ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our
Actions, without ceasing: These may be observ'd in all Persons and
all Ages, steady and universal; but these are Inclinations of the
Appetite to good, not Impressions of truth on the Understanding.
I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the Minds
of Men; and that, from the very first instances of Sense and Per-
ception, there are some things, that are grateful, and others un-
welcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that
they fly: But this makes nothing for innate Characters on the
Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledge, regulating our
Practice. Such natural Impressions on the Understanding, are so far
from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an Argument against
them; since if there were certain Characters, imprinted by Nature
on the Understanding, as the Principles of Knowledge, we could
not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our
Knowledge, as we do those others on the Will and Appetite; which
never cease to be the constant Springs and Motives of all our
Actions, to which, we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

#P 068#
#L 1#

#S 04#. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical
Principles, is, That I think, <there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd>,
<whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason>: which would be perfect-
ly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-
evident; which every innate Principle must needs be, and not need 5   
any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reason to gain it
Approbation. He would be thought void of common Sense, who
asked on the one side, or on the other side went about to give a
Reason, <Why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>. It
carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other 10  
Proof: He that understands the Terms, assents to it for its own sake,
or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But
should that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all
social Virtue, <That one should do as he would be done unto>, be propos'd to
one, who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand 15  
its meaning; Might he not without any absurdity ask a Reason
why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the
Truth and Reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not
to be innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any
Proof: but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) 20  
be received and assented to, as an unquestionable Truth, which a
Man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral
Rules, plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and
from which they must be deduced, which could not be, if either
they were innate, or so much as self-evident. 25  
#S 05#. That Men should keep their Compacts, is certainly a great
and undeniable Rule in Morality: But yet, if a Christian, who has the
view of Happiness and Misery in another Life, be asked why a Man
must keep his Word, he will <give> this as a <Reason>: Because God, who
has the Power of eternal Life and Death, requires it of us. But if an 30  
<Hobbist> be asked why; he will answer: Because the Publick requires
it, and the <Leviathan> will punish you, if you do not. And if one of the
old <Heathen> Philosophers had been asked, he would have answer'd:
Because it was dishonest, below the Dignity of a Man, and opposite
to Vertue, the highest Perfection of humane Nature, to do otherwise. 35  
#S 06#. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions, con-
                                                         #P 069#
#L 1#
cerning Moral Rules, which are to be found amongst Men, accord-
ing to the different sorts of Happiness, they have a Prospect of, or
propose to themselves: Which could not be, if practical Principles
were innate, and imprinted in our Minds immediately by the Hand
of God. I grant the existence of God, is so many ways manifest, and 5
the Obedience we owe him, so congruous to the Light of Reason,
that a great part of Mankind give Testimony to the Law of Nature:
But yet I think it must be allowed, That several Moral Rules, may
receive, from Mankind, a very general Approbation, without either
knowing, or admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only 10
be the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his
Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to
account the Proudest Offender. For God, having, by an inseparable
connexion, joined <Virtue> and publick Happiness together; and made
the Practice thereof, necessary to the preservation of Society, and 15
visibly <beneficial> to all, with whom the Virtuous Man has to do; it is
no wonder, that every one should, not only allow, but recommend,
and magnifie those Rules to others, from whose observance of
them, he is sure to reap Advantage to himself. He may, out of
Interest, as well as Conviction, cry up that for Sacred; which if once 20
trampled on, and prophaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure.
This, though it takes nothing from the Moral and Eternal Obli-
gation, which these Rules evidently have; yet it shews, that the
outward acknowledgment Men pay to them in their Words, proves
not that they are innate Principles: Nay, it proves not so much, as, 25
that Men assent to them inwardly in their own Minds, as the in-
violable Rules of their own Practice: Since we find that self-interest
and the Conveniences of this Life, make many Men, own an outward
Profession and Approbation of them, whose Actions sufficiently
prove, that they very little consider the Law-giver, that prescribed 30
these Rules; nor the Hell he has ordain'd for the Punishment of
those that transgress them.
#S 07#. For, if we will not in Civility allow too much Sincerity to the
Professions of most <Men>, but think their Actions to be the Inter-
preters of their Thoughts, we shall find, that they have <no> such 35
#P 070#
#L 1#
internal Veneration for these Rules, nor so <full a Perswasion of their>
<Certainty> and Obligation. The great Principle of Morality, <To do as>
<one would be done to>, is more commended, than practised. But the
Breach of this Rule cannot be a greater Vice, than to teach others,
That it is no Moral Rule, nor Obligatory, would be thought Mad-    
ness, and contrary to that Interest Men sacrifice to, when they
break it themselves. Perhaps <Conscience> will be urged as checking us
for such Breaches, and so the internal Obligation and Establishment
of the Rule be preserved.
#S 08#. To which, I answer, That I doubt not, but without being 10      
written on their Hearts, many Men, may, by the same way that they
come to the Knowledge of other things, come to assent to several
Moral Rules, and be convinced of their Obligation. Others also may
come to be of the same Mind, from their Education, Company, and
Customs of their Country; which, <Perswasion however got, will serve to> 15  
<set Conscience on work>, which is nothing else, but our own Opinion
or Judgment of the Moral Rectitude or Pravity of our own Actions.
And if Conscience be a Proof of innate Principles, contraries may be
innate Principles: Since some Men, with the same bent of Con-
science, prosecute what others avoid. 20  

#S 09#. But I cannot see how any <Men>, should ever <transgress> those
<Moral Rules, with Confidence>, and <Serenity>, were they innate, and
stamped upon their Minds. View but an Army at the sacking of a
Town, and see what Observation, or Sense of Moral Principles, or
what touch of Conscience, for all the Outrages they do. <Robberies>, 25  
<Murders, Rapes>, are the Sports of Men set at Liberty from Punish-
ment and Censure. Have there not been whole Nations, and those
of the most civilized People, amongst whom, the exposing their
Children, and leaving them in the Fields, to perish by Want or
wild Beasts, has been the Practice, as little condemned or scrupled, 30  
as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some Countries, put
them into the same Graves with their Mothers, if they die in
Child-birth; Or dispatch them, if a pretended Astrologer declares
them to have unhappy Stars? And are there not Places, where at a
certain Age, they kill, or expose their Parents without any remorse 35  
                                                         #P 071#
                                                         #L 1#
at all? In a Part of <Asia>, the Sick, when their Case comes to be
thought desperate, are carried out and laid on the Earth, before
they are dead, and left there, exposed to Wind and Weather, to
perish without Assistance or Pity. (a) It is familiar amongst the
<Mengrelians>, a People professing Christianity, to bury their Children 5
alive without scruple. (B) There are Places where they eat their own
Children. (y) The <Caribes> were wont to geld their Children, on
purpose to fat and eat them. (d) And <Garcilasso de la Vega> tells us of a
People in <Peru>, which were wont to fat and eat the Children they
got on their female Captives, whom they kept as Concubines for 10
that purpose; and when they were past Breeding the Mothers
themselves were kill'd too and eaten. (e) The Vertues, whereby the
<Tououpinambos> believed they merited Paradise, were Revenge, and
eating abundance of their Enemies. (3) They have not so much as a
Name for God, <Lery, pag>. 216. No Acknowledgment of any God, no 15
Religion, no Worship, <pag>. 231. The Saints, who are canonized
amongst the <Turks>, lead Lives, which one cannot with Modesty
relate. A remarkable Passage to this purpose, out of the Voyage of
<Baumgarten>, which is a Book, not every Day to be met with, I shall
set down at large, in the Language it is published in. <Ibi> (sc. <prope> 20
Belbes <in> AEgypto) <vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicun inter arenarum>
<cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didi->
<cimus> Mahometistis, <ut eos, qui amentes et sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis>
<colant et venerentur. Insuper et eos qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam>,
<voluntariam demum paenitentiam et paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos> 25
<deputant. Ejusmodi vero\ genus hominum libertatem quandam effraenem>
<habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et quod majus est>,
<concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter>
<habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis>
<vero\ vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac>  30
<sepelire maxmae fortunae ducunt loco. Audivimus haec dicta et dicenda per>

#P 072#
#L 1#
<interpretem a\ Mucrelo nostro. Insuper sanctum illum, quem eo loci vidimus>,
<publicitus apprime\ commendari, eum esse Hominem sanctum, divinum ac>
<integritate praecipuum; eo quod, nec faeminarum unquam esset, nec pue->
<rorum, sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum>. Peregr.
Baumgarten, l. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the same Kind, concerning 5   
these precious Saints amongst the <Turks>, may be seen in <Pietro>
<della Valle>, in his Letter of the <25th of January>, 1616. Where then are
those innate Principles, of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity,
Chastity? Or, where is that universal Consent, that assures us
there are such inbred Rules? Murders in Duels, when Fashion has 10  
made them honourable, are committed without remorse of Con-
science: Nay, in many Places, Innocence in this Case is the greatest
Ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of Men, as they are,
we shall find, that they have remorse in one Place, for doing or
omitting that, which others, in another Place, think they merit by. 15  
#S 10#. He that will carefully peruse the History of Mankind, and
look abroad into the several Tribes of Men, and with indifferency
survey their Actions, will be able to satisfy himself, That there is
scarce that Principle of Morality to be named, or <Rule> of <Vertue> to
be thought on (those only excepted, that are absolutely necessary 20  
to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected
betwixt distinct Societies) which is not, somewhere or other,
<slighted> and condemned by the generall Fashion of <whole Societies> of
Men, governed by practical Opinions, and Rules of living quite
opposite to others. 25  
#S 11#. Here, perhaps,  'twill be objected, that it is no Argument,
that the <Rule> is <not known, because> it is <broken>. I grant the Objection
good, where Men, though they transgress, yet disown not the Law;
where fear of Shame, Censure, or Punishment, carries the Mark of
some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive, that a 30  
<whole Nation> of Men should all <publickly reject> and renounce, what
every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a Law: For
so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their Minds.  'Tis
possible, Men may sometimes own <Rules of Morality>, which, in their
private Thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep 35  
themselves in Reputation, and esteem amongst those, who are
                                                         #P 073#
                                                         #L 1#
persuaded of their Obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd, That a
whole Society of Men, should, publickly and professedly, disown,
and cast off a Rule, which they could not, in their own Minds, but
be infallibly certain, was a Law; nor be ignorant, That all Men, they
should have to do with, knew it to be such: And therefore must 5
every one of them apprehend from others, all the Contempt and
Abhorrence due to one, who professes himself void of Humanity;
and one, who confounding the known and natural measures of
Right and Wrong, cannot but be look'd on, as the professed Enemy
of their Peace and Happiness. Whatever practical Principle is innate, 10
cannot but be known to every one, to be just and good. It is there-
fore little less than a contradiction, to suppose, That whole Nations
of Men should both in their Professions, and Practice unanimously
and universally give the Lye to what, by the most invincible
Evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This 15
is enough to satisfy us, That no practical Rule, which is any where
universally, and with publick Approbation, or Allowance, trans-
gressed, can be supposed innate. But I have something farther to
add, in Answer to this Objection.
#S 12#. The breaking of a Rule, say you, is no Argument, that it is 20
unknown. I grant it: But the <generally allowed breach of it any where>, I
say, <is a Proof, that it is not innate>. For Example, Let us take any of
these Rules, which being the most obvious deductions of Humane
Reason, and conformable to the natural Inclination of the greatest
part of Men, fewest People have had the Impudence to deny, or 25
Inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally
imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer Pretence to be innate,
than this; <Parents preserve and cherish your Children>. When therefore
you say, That this is an innate Rule, What do you mean? Either,
that it is an innate Principle; which upon all Occasions, excites and 30
directs the Actions of all Men: Or else, that it is a Truth, which all
Men have imprinted on their Minds, and which therefore they know,
and assent to. But in neither of these Senses is it innate. <First>, That
it is not a Principle, which influences all Men's Actions, is, what I
have proved by the Examples before cited: Nor need we seek so 35
far as <Mingrelia> or <Peru>, to find instances of such as neglect, abuse,
nay and destroy their Children; or look on it only as the more than
Brutality of some savage and barbarous Nations, when we remem-
ber, that it was a familiar, and uncondemned Practice amongst the
#P 074#
#L 1#
<Greeks> and <Romans>, to expose, without pity or remorse, their inno-
cent Infants. <Secondly>, That it is an innate Truth, known to all Men,
is also false. For, <Parents preserve your Children>, is so far from an
innate Truth, that it is no Truth at all; it being a Command, and
not a Proposition, and so not capable of Truth or Falshood. To make 5   
it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some
such Proposition as this: <It is the Duty of Parents to preserve their>
<Children>. But what Duty is, cannot be understood without a Law;
nor a Law be known, or supposed without a Law-maker, or without
Reward and Punishment: So that it is impossible, that this, or any 10  
other practical Principle should be innate; <i.e>. be imprinted on the
Mind as a Duty, without supposing the <Ideas> of God, of Law, of
Obligation, of Punishment, of a Life after this, innate. For that
Punishment follows not, in this Life, the breach of this Rule; and
consequently, that it has not the Force of a Law in Countries, where 15  
the generally allow'd Practice runs counter to it, is in it self evident.
But these <Ideas> (which must be all of them innate, if any thing as a
Duty be so) are so far from being innate, that 'tis not every studious
or thinking Man, much less every one that is born, in whom they
are to be found clear and distinct: And that one of them, which of 20  
all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the <Idea>
of God) I think, in the next Chapter, will appear very evident to any
considering Man.
#S 13#. From what has been said, I think we may safely conclude,
That, <whatever practical Rule is, in any Place, generally, and with> 25  
<allowance, broken, cannot be supposed innate>, it being impossible, that
Men should, without Shame or Fear, confidently and serenely
break a Rule, which they could not but evidently know, that God
had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of (which they
must if it were innate) to a degree to make it a very ill Bargain to 30  
the Transgressor. Without such a Knowledge as this, a Man can
never be certain, that any thing is his Duty. Ignorance or Doubt of
the Law; hopes to escape the Knowledge or Power of the Law-maker,
or the like, may make Men give way to a present Appetite: But let
any one see the Fault, and the Rod by it, and with the Transgres-   
sion, a Fire ready to punish it; a Pleasure tempting, and the Hand of
the Almighty visibly held up, and prepared to take Vengeance (for
this must be the Case, where any Duty is imprinted on the Mind)
and then tell me, whether it be possible, for People, with such a
Prospect, such a certain Knowledge as this, wantonly, and without
#P 075#
#L 1#
scruple, to offend against a Law, which they carry about them in
indelible Characters, and that stares them in the Face, whilst they
are breaking it? Whether Men, at the same time that they feel in
themselves the imprinted Edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker,
can, with assurance and gaity, slight and trample under Foot his 5
most sacred Injunctions? And lastly, Whether it be possible, that
whilst a Man thus openly bids defiance to this innate Law, and
supreme Law-giver, all the By-standers; yea even the Governors
and Rulers of the People, full of the same Sense, both of the Law
and Law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their 10
dislike, or laying the least blame on it? Principles of Actions indeed
there are lodged in Men's Appetites, but these are so far from being
innate Moral Principles, that if they were left to their full swing,
they would carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality. Moral
Laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant Desires, 15
which they cannot be but by Rewards and Punishments, that will
over-balance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the
breach of the Law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the Mind
of all Men as a Law, all Men must have a certain and unavoidable
knowledge, that certain, and unavoidable punishment will attend 20
the breach of it. For if Men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is
innate, innate Principles are insisted on, and urged to no purpose;
Truth and Certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured
by them: But Men are in the same uncertain, floating estate with,
as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoid-
able punishment, great enough to make the transgression very un-
eligible, must accompany an innate Law: Unless with an innate
Law, they can suppose an innate Gospel too. I would not be here
mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate Law, I thought there were
none but positive Laws. There is a great deal of difference between 30
an innate Law, and a Law of Nature; between something imprinted
on our Minds in their very original, and something that we being
ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due
application of our natural Faculties. And I think they equally
forsake the Truth, who running into the contrary extreams, either 35
affirm an innate Law, or deny that there is a Law, knowable by the
light of Nature; <i.e>. without the help of positive Revelation.
#P 076#
#L 1#
#S 14#. The difference there is amongst Men in their practical
Principles, is so evident, that, I think, I need say no more to evince,
that it will be impossible to find any innate Moral Rules, by this
mark of general assent: And   'tis enough to make one suspect, that
the supposition of such innate Principles, is but an Opinion taken 5  
up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them, are so
sparing to <tell> us, <which they are>. This might with justice be expected
from those Men, who lay stress upon this Opinion: and it gives
occasion to distrust either their Knowledge or Charity, who declar-
ing, That God has imprinted on the Minds of Men, the foun-  
dations of Knowledge, and the Rules of Living, are yet so little
favourable to the Information of their Neighbours, or the Quiet of
Mankind, as not to point out to them, which they are, in the
variety Men are distracted with. But in truth, were there any such
innate Principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did Men 15 
find such innate Propositions stamped on their Minds, they would
easily be able to distinguish them from other Truths, that they
afterwards learned, and deduced from them; and there would be
nothing more easy, than to know what, and how many they were.
There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is 20 
about the number of our Fingers; and   'tis like then, every System
would be ready to give them us by tale. But since no body, that I
know, has ventured yet to give a Catalogue of them, they cannot
blame those who doubt of these innate Principles; since even they
who require Men to believe, that there are such innate Propositions, 25 
do not tell us what they are.   'Tis easy to foresee, that if different
Men of different Sects should go about to give us a List of those
innate practical Principles, they would set down only such as
suited their distinct Hypotheses, and were fit to support the
Doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches: A plain evidence, 30 
that there are no such innate Truths. Nay, a great part of Men are
so far from finding any such innate Moral Principles in themselves,
that by denying freedom to Mankind; and thereby making Men no
other than bare Machins, they take away not only innate, but all
Moral Rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any 35 
such, to those who cannot conceive, how any thing can be capable
of a Law, that is not a free Agent: And upon that ground, they must

#P 077#
#L 1#
necessarily reject all Principles of Vertue, who cannot <put Morality>
<and Mechanism together>; which are not very easy to be reconciled, or
made consistent.
#S 15#. When I had writ this, being informed, that my Lord
<Herbert> had in his Books <de Veritate>, assigned these innate Principles, 5
I presently consulted him, hoping to find, in a Man of so great Parts,
something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my
Enquiry. In his Chapter <de Instinctu naturali, p. 76. edit>. 1656. I met with
these six Marks of his <notitiae Communes>, 1. <Prioritas. 2. Independentia>.
3. <Universalitas>. 4. <Certitudo>. 5. <Necessitas>, i.e. as he explains it, <faciunt> 10 
<ad hominis conservationem>. 6. <Modus conformationis>, i.e. <Assensus nulla^>
<interposita^ mora^>. And at the latter end of his little Treatise, <De>
<Religione Laici>, he says this of these innate Principles: <Adeo ut non>
<uniuscujusvis Religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates>.
<Sunt enim in ipsa^ mente coelitu\s descriptae nullisque traditionibus, sive> 15
<scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiae>, p. 3. And, <Veritates nostrae Catholicae>,
<quae tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descripta>. Thus having
given the Marks of the innate Principles or common Notions,
and asserted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the
Hand of God, he proceeds to set them down; and they are these: 1. 20
<Esse aliquod supremum numen>. 2. <Numen illud coli debere>. 3. <Virtutem cum>
<pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultu^s divini. 4. Resipiscendum>
<esse a\ peccatis>. 5. <Dari praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam>.
Though I allow these to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly
explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to: 25
yet I think he is far from proving them innate Impressions <in Foro>
<interiori descriptae>. For I must take leave to observe,
#S 16#. First, That these Five Propositions are either not all, or
more than all, those common Notions writ on our Minds by the
finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so 30
written. Since there are other Propositions, which even by his own
Rules, have as just a pretence to such an Original, and may be as
well admitted for innate Principles, as, at least, some of these Five
he enumerates, <viz. Do as thou wouldst be done unto>: And, perhaps,
some hundreds of others, when well considered.                  35
#S 17#. Secondly, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of
his Five Propositions, <viz>. his First, Second, and Third Marks, agree

#P 078#
#L 1#
perfectly to neither of them; and the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Marks, agree but ill to his Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Propositions. For, besides that, we are assured from History, of
many Men, nay, whole Nations who doubt or disbelieve some or all
of them, I cannot see how the Third, <viz. That Vertue join'd with> 5  
<Piety, is the best Worship of God>, can be an innate Principle, when the
name, or sound <Vertue>, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much
uncertainty in its signification; and the thing it stands for, so much
contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can
be but a very uncertain Rule of Humane Practice, and serve but 10 
very little to the conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit
to be assigned as an innate practical Principle.
#S 18#. For let us consider this Proposition as to its meaning, (for it
is the sence, and not sound, that is, and must be the Principle or
common Notion) <viz. Vertue is the best Worship of God>; i.e. is most 15 
acceptable to him; which if <Vertue> be taken, as most commonly it
is, for those Actions, which according to the different Opinions of
several Countries, are accounted laudable, will be a Proposition so
far from being certain, that it will not be true. If <Vertue> be taken for
Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by 20 
God, which is the true and only measure of Vertue, when Vertue is
used to signifie what is in its own nature right and good; then this
Proposition, <That Vertue is the best Worship of God>, will be most true
and certain, but of very little use in humane Life: since it will
amount to no more but this, <viz. That God is pleased with the doing of> 25 
<what he Commands>; which a Man may certainly know to be true,
without knowing what it is, that God doth command; and so be as
far from any Rule or Principle of his Actions, as he was before: And
I think very few will take a Proposition which amounts to no more
than this, <viz>. That God is pleased with the doing of what he him-  
self commands, for an innate Moral Principle writ on the Minds of
all Men, (however true and certain it may be) since it teaches so
little. Whosoever does so, will have reason to think hundreds of
Propositions, innate Principles, since there are many, which have as
good a title, as this, to be received for such, which no body yet ever 35 
put into that rank of innate Principles.
#S 19#. Nor is the Fourth Proposition (<viz>.) <Men must repent of their>
<Sins>, much more instructive, till what those Actions are, that are

#P 079#
#L 1#
meant by Sins, be set down. For the word <Peccata>, or <Sins>, being
put, as it usually is, to signifie in general ill Actions, that will draw
on punishment upon the Doers; What great Principle of Morality
can that be, to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that,
which will bring mischief upon us, without knowing what those 5
particular Actions are, that will do so? Indeed, this is a very true
Proposition, and fit to be inculcated on, and received by those, who
are supposed, to have been taught, what Actions in all kinds are
<sins>; but neither this, nor the former, can be imagined to be innate
Principles; nor to be of any use, if they were innate, unless the 10
particular measures and bounds of all Vertues and Vices, were
engraven in Men's Minds, and were innate Principles also, which,
I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it
will scarce seem possible, that God should engrave Principles in
Mens Minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as <Vertues> 15
and <Sins>, which amongst different Men, stand for different things:
Nay, it cannot be supposed to be in words at all, which, being in
most of these Principles very general names cannot be understood,
but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in
the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the know- 20
ledge of the Actions themselves, and the Rules of them abstracted
from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of Names; which
Rules a Man must know, what Language soever he chance to learn,
whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no Language at all,
or never should understand the use of Words, as happens in the case 25
of Dumb and Deaf Men. When it shall be made out, that Men
ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their
Country, know that it is part of the Worship of God, Not to kill
another Man; Not to know more Women than one; Not to procure
Abortion; Not to expose their Children; Not to take from another 30
what is his, though we want it our selves, but on the contrary,
relieve and supply his wants; And whenever we have done the
contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no
more: When, I say, all Men shall be proved actually to know, and
allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come 35
under these two general words made use of above, <viz. Virtutes et>
<Peccata, Vertues> and <Sins>, there will be more reason for admitting
these, and the like, for common Notions, and practical Principles:

#P 080#
#L 1#
yet after all, universal Consent (were there any in Moral Principles)
to Truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise,
would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.
#S 20#. Nor will it be of much moment here, to offer that very
ready, but not very material Answer, (<viz>.) That the <innate Principles> 5  
of Morality, <may, by Education, and Custom>, and the general Opinion
of those, amongst whom we converse, <be darkned>, and at last <quite>
<worn out> of the Minds of Men. Which assertion of theirs, if true,
quite takes away the Argument of universal Consent, by which this
Opinion of innate Principles is endeavoured to be proved: unless 10 
those Men will think it reasonable, that their private Perswasions,
or that of their Party, should pass for universal Consent; a thing not
unfrequently done, when Men presuming themselves to be the only
Masters of right Reason, cast by the Votes and Opinions of the rest
of Mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their Argument 15 
stands thus: The Principles which all mankind allow for true, are
innate; those that Men of right Reason admit, are the Principles
allowed by all mankind; we and those of our mind, are Men of
reason; therefore we agreeing, our Principles are innate: which is a
very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to Infallibility. For 20 
otherwise it will be very hard to understand, how there be some
Principles, which all Men do acknowledge, and agree in; and yet
there are none of those <Principles>, which are <not by depraved Custom, and>
<ill Education, blotted out> of the minds of many Men: Which is to say,
That all Men admit, but yet many Men do deny, and dissent from 25 
them. And indeed the supposition of such first Principles, will
serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss
with, as without them, if they may by any humane Power, such as
is the Will of our Teachers, or Opinions of our Companions, be
altered or lost in us: and notwithstanding all this boast of first 30 
Principles, and innate Light, we shall be as much in the dark and
uncertainty, as if there were no such thing at all: It being all one to
have no Rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various
and contrary Rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning
innate Principles, I desire these Men to say, whether they can, or 35 
cannot, by Education and Custom, be blurr'd and blotted out: If

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they cannot, we must find them in all Mankind alike, and they
must be clear in every body: And if they may suffer variation
from adventitious Notions, we must then find them clearest
and most perspicuous, nearest the Fountain, in Children and
illiterate People, who have received least impression from foreign 5
Opinions.  Let them take which side they please, they will
certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact, and daily
observation.
#S 21#. I easily grant, that there are great numbers of <Opinions>,
which, by Men of different Countries, Educations, and Tempers, 10
are received and <embraced as first and unquestionable Principles; many>
<whereof>, both for their absurdity, as well as oppositions one to
another, <it is impossible should be true>. But yet all those Propositions,
how remote soever from Reason, are so sacred somewhere or other,
that Men even of Good Understanding in other matters, will 15
sooner part with their Lives, and whatever is dearest to them,
than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth
of them.
#S 22#. This, however strange it may seem, is that which every days
Experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if 20
we consider the <ways>, and steps <by which> it is brought about; and
how really it may come to pass, that <Doctrines>, that have been
derived from no better original, than the Superstition of a Nurse, or
the Authority of an old Woman; may, by length of time, and consent
of Neighbours, <grow up to the dignity of Principles> in Religion or 25
Morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle
Children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those
Principles for them, which they believe in) instil into the unwary,
and, as yet, unprejudiced Understanding, (for white Paper receives
any Characters) those Doctrines they would have them retain and 30
profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any appre-
hension; and still as they grow up, confirmed to them, either by the
open Profession, or tacit Consent, of all they have to do with; or at
least by those, of whose Wisdom, Knowledge, and Piety, they have
an Opinion, who never suffer those Propositions to be otherwise 35
mentioned, but as the Basis and Foundation, on which they build
 
#P 082#
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their Religion or Manners, come, by these means, to have the
reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate Truths.
#S 23#. To which we may add, That when <Men>, so instructed, are
grown up, and reflect on their own Minds, they cannot find any
thing more ancient there, than those Opinions, which were taught 5  
them, before their Memory began to keep a Register of their
Actions, or date the time, when any new thing appeared to them;
and therefore make no scruple to <conclude, That those Propositions, of>
<whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the>
<impress of God and Nature> upon their Minds; and not taught them by 10 
any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to
their Parents, with Veneration; not because it is natural; nor do
Children do it, where they are not so taught; but because, having
been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the
beginning of this Respect, they think it is natural. 15 
#S 24#. This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to
come to pass, if we consider the Nature of Mankind, and the
Constitution of Humane Affairs: Wherein <most Men cannot live>,
<without employing their time in the daily Labours of their Callings; nor be>
<at quiet in their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest their> 20 
<Thoughts on>. There is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his
Understanding, who hath not some reverenced Propositions, which
are to him the Principles on which he bottoms his Reasonings; and
by which lie judgeth of Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong;
which some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, 25 
and some being taught, that they ought not, to examine; there are
few to be found, who are not exposed by their Ignorance, Laziness,
Education, or Precipitancy, to <take them upon trust>.
#S 25#. This is evidently the case of all Children and young Folk;
and Custom, a greater power than Nature, seldom failing to make 30 
them worship for Divine, what she hath inured them to bow their
Minds, and submit their Understandings to, it is no wonder, that
grown <Men>, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of Life, or hot
in the pursuit of Pleasures, should <not> seriously sit down to <examine>
<their own Tenets>; especially when one of their Principles is, That 35 
Principles ought not to be questioned. And had Men leisure, parts,
and will, Who is there almost, that dare shake the foundations of all


#P 083#
#L 1#
his past Thoughts and Actions, and endure to bring upon himself,
the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error?
Who is there, hardy enough to contend with the reproach, which is
every where prepared for those, who dare venture to dissent from
the received Opinions of their Country or Party? And where is the 5
Man to be found, that can patiently prepare himself to bear the
name of Whimsical, Sceptical, or Atheist, which he is sure to meet
with, who does in the least scruple any of the common Opinions?
And he will be much more <afraid to question those Principles>, when he
shall think them, as most Men do, the Standards set up by God in 10
his Mind, to be the Rule and Touchstone of all other Opinions. And
what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them
the earliest of all his own Thoughts, and the most reverenced by
others?
#S 26#. It is easy to imagine, <how> by these means it comes to pass, 15
that <Men> worship the Idols that have been set up in their Minds;
grow fond of the Notions they have been long acquainted with
there; and <stamp the Characters of Divinity, upon Absurdities and Errors>,
become zealous Votaries to Bulls and Monkeys; and contend too,
fight, and die in defence of their Opinions. <Dum solos credit habendos> 20
<esse Deos, quos ipse colit>.<*> For since the reasoning Faculties of the Soul,
which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely
employ'd, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation
and footing, in most Men, who through laziness or avocation, do
not; or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot, 25
penetrate into the Principles of Knowledge, and trace Truth to its
fountain and original,  'tis natural for them, and almost unavoidable,
to take up with some borrowed Principles; which being reputed and
presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not
to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of 30
these into his Mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence
usually paid to Principles, never venturing to examine them; but
accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be be-
lieved, may take up from his Education, and the fashions of his


#P 084#
#L 1#
Country, any absurdity for innate Principles; and by long poring
on the same Objects, so dim his sight, as to take Monsters lodged in
his own brain, for the Images of the Deity, and the Workmanship of
his Hands.
#S 27#. By this progress, how many there are, who arrive at Prin-     
ciples, which they believe innate, may be easily observed, in the
variety of opposite Principles, held, and contended for, by all sorts
and degrees of Men. And he that shall deny this to be the method,
wherein most Men proceed to the assurance they have, of the truth
and evidence of their Principles, will, perhaps, find it a hard matter, 10 
any other way to account for the contrary Tenets, which are firmly
believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at
any time to seal with their Blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege
of innate Principles, to be received upon their own Authority,
without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how 15 
any one's <Principles> can be questioned. If they may, and <ought to be>
<examined>, and tried, I desire to know how first and innate Principles
can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and
characters, whereby the genuine, innate Principles, may be dis-
tinguished from others; that so, amidst the great variety of Pre-  
tenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a point as this.
When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome, and
useful, Propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt, since I
fear universal Consent, which is the only one produced, will scarce
prove a sufficient mark to direct my Choice, and assure me of any 25 
innate Principles. From what has been said, I think it is past doubt,
that there are no practical Principles wherein all Men agree; and
therefore none innate.


#C 04#                     CHAPTER IV

       <Other Considerations concerning innate Principles>,
                <both speculative and practical>.

#S 01#. HAD those, who would perswade us, that there are innate
Principles, not taken them together in gross; but considered, 30 

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separately, the parts, out of which those Propositions are made,
they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were
innate. Since, if the <Ideas>, which made up those Truths, were not, it
was impossible, that the Propositions, made up of them, should be
innate, or our Knowledge of them be born with us. For if the <Ideas> 5
be not <innate>, there was a time, when the Mind was without those
Principles; and then, they will not be innate, but be derived from
some other Original. For, where the <Ideas> themselves are not, there
can be no Knowledge, no Assent, no Mental, or Verbal Propositions
about them.                                                           10
#S 02#. If we will attentively consider new born <Children>, we shall
have little Reason, to think, that they bring many <Ideas> into the
World with them. For, bating, perhaps, some faint <Ideas>, of Hunger,
and Thirst, and Warmth, and some Pains, which they may <have> felt
in the Womb, there is <not> the least appearance of any setled <Ideas> at 15
all in them; especially of <Ideas, answering the Terms, which make up those>
<universal Propositions>, that are esteemed innate Principles. One may
perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, <Ideas> come into their Minds;
and that they get no more, nor no other, than what Experience,
and the Observation of things, that come in their way, furnish 20
them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not
Original Characters, stamped on the Mind.
#S 03#. <It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>, is certainly
if there be any such) an innate Principle. But can any one think, or
will any one say, that <Impossibility> and <Identity>, are two innate <Ideas>? 25
Are they such as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with
them? And are they those, that are the first in Children, and ante-
cedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so.
Hath a Child an <Idea> of <Impossibility> and <Identity>, before it has of
<White> or <Black; Sweet> or <Bitter>? And is it from the Knowledge of this 30
Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple,
hath not the same Taste, that it used to receive from thence? Is it the
actual Knowledge of <impossibile est idem esse, et non esse>, that makes a
Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger; or, that makes
it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate 35
it self, and its assent by <Ideas>, that it never yet had? Or the


#P 086#
#L 1#
Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles, which it never
yet knew or understood? The Names <Impossibility> and <Identity>, stand
for two <Ideas>, so <far from being innate>, or born with us, that I think
it requires great Care and Attention, to form them right in our
Understandings. They are so far from being brought into the 5  
World with us; so remote from the thoughts of Infancy and Child-
hood, that, I believe, upon Examination, it will be found, that
many grown Men want them.
#S 04#. If <Identity> (to instance in that alone) be a native Impression;
and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs 10 
know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one
of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature,
consisting of Soul and Body, be the same Man, when his Body is
changed? Whether <Euphorbus> and <Pythagoras>, having had the same
Soul, were the same Man, though they lived several Ages asunder? 15 
Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the same Soul, were not
the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that
our <Idea of sameness>, is <not> so settled and clear, as to deserve to be
thought <innate> in us. For if those innate <Ideas>, are not clear and
distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, 20 
they cannot be the Subjects of universal, and undoubted Truths;
but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty.
For, I suppose, every one's <Idea> of <Identity>, will not be the same,
that <Pythagoras>, and Thousands others of his Followers, have:
And which then shall be the true? Which innate? Or are there two 25 
different <Ideas> of <Identity>, both innate?
#S 05#. Nor let any one think, that the Questions, I have here
proposed, about the <Identity> of Man, are bare, empty Speculations;
which if they were, would be enough to shew, That there was in the
Understandings of Men <no innate> Idea <of> Identity. He, that shall, 30 
with a little Attention, reflect on the Resurrection, and consider,
that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment, at the last Day, the
very same Persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did
well or ill in this Life, will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with
himself, what makes the same Man, or wherein <Identity> consists: 35 
And will not be forward to think he, and every one, even Children
themselves, have naturally a clear <Idea> of it.

#P 087#
#L 1#
#S 06#. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks, <viz. That the>
<whole is bigger than a part>. This, I take it, is reckon'd amongst innate
Principles. I am sure it has as good a Title, as any, to be thought so;
which yet, no Body can think it to be, when he considers the <Ideas> it
comprehends in it, <Whole> and <Part>, are perfectly Relative; but the 5
Positive <Ideas>, to which they properly and immediately belong, are
Extension and Number, of which alone, <Whole> and <Part>, are Rela-
tions. So that if <Whole> and <Part> are innate <Ideas>, Extension and Number
must be so too, it being impossible to have an <Idea> of a Relation,
without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in 10
which it is founded. Now, Whether the Minds of Men have naturally
imprinted on them the <Ideas> of Extension and Number, I leave to be
considered by those, who are the Patrons of innate Principles.
#S 07#. That <God is to be worshipped>, is, without doubt, as great a Truth
as any can enter into the mind of Man, and deserves the first place
amongst all practical Principles. But yet, it can by no means be
thought innate, unless the <Ideas> of <God>, and <Worship>, are innate.
That the <Idea>, the Term <Worship> stands for, is not in the Under-
standing of Children, and a Character stamped on the Mind in its
first Original, I think, will be easily granted, by any one, that con-
siders how few there be, amongst grown Men, who have a clear and
distinct Notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more
ridiculous, than to say, that Children have this practical Principle
innate, <That God is to be worshipped>; and yet, that they know not what
that Worship of God is, which is their Duty. But to pass by this.
#S 08#. If any <Idea> can be imagin'd <innate>, the <Idea of God> may, of all
others, for many Reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to con-
ceive, how there should be innate Moral Principles, without an
innate <Idea> of a <Deity>: Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is
impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe
it. Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and
left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation
discovered, in these latter Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of
<Soldania> (a), in <Brasil> ( ), in <Boranday> (y), and the <Caribee> Islands,
<etc>. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a

#P 088#
#L 1#
God, no Religion. <Nicolaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaig->
<uarum conversione>, has these Words (d), Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen1>>
<habere, quod Deum, et Hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla>
<Idola>. These are Instances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has
been left to it self, without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and 5  
the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be
found, who have enjoy'd these in a very great measure, who yet,
for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the
<Idea>, and Knowledge of God.  'Twill I doubt not be a Surprise to
others, as it was to me, to find the <Siamites> of this number. But for 10 
this, let them consult the King of <France's> late Envoy thither (e),
who gives no better account of the <Chineses> themselves (x). And if we
will not believe <La Loubere>, the Missionaries of <China>, even the Jesuits
themselves, the great Encomiasts of the <Chineses>, do all to a Man
agree and will convince us that the Sect of the <Litterati>, or <Learned>, 15 
keeping to the old Religion of <China>, and the ruling Party there, are
all of <them Atheist>. Vid. <Navarette> in the Collection of Voyages, Vol.
the First, and <Historia cultus Sinensium>. And, perhaps, if we should,
with attention, mind the Lives, and Discourses of People not so far
off, we should have too much Reason to fear, that many, in more 20 
civilized Countries, have no very strong, and clear Impressions of a
Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of Atheism, made
from the Pulpit, are not without Reason. And though only some
profligate Wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet, perhaps, we
should hear, more than we do, of it, from others, did not the fear 25 
of the Magistrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Censure, tie up
Peoples Tongues; which, were the Apprehensions of Punishment,
or Shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their <Atheism>, as
their Lives do.

#P 089#
#L 1#
#S 09#. But had all Mankind, every where, a <Notion of a God>, (where-
of yet History tells us the contrary) it would <not> from thence
follow, that the <Idea> of him was <innate>. For, though no Nation were
to be found without a Name, and some few dark Notions of him;
yet that would not prove them to be natural Impressions on the 5
Mind, no more than the Names of Fire, or the Sun, Heat, or Num-
ber, do prove the <Ideas> they stand for, to be innate, because the
Names of those things, and the <Ideas> of them, are so universally
received, and known amongst Mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the
want of such a Name, or the absence of such a Notion out of Men's 10
Minds, any Argument against the Being of a God, any more, than it
would be a Proof, that there was no Load-stone in the World,
because a great part of Mankind, had neither a Notion of any such
thing, nor a Name for it; or be any shew of Argument to prove, that
there are no distinct and various species of Angels, or intelligent
Beings above us, because we have no <Ideas> of such distinct species,
or names for them: For Men, being furnished with Words, by the
common Language of their own Countries, can scarce avoid having
some kind of <Ideas> of those things, whose Names, those they con-
verse with, have occasion frequently to mention to them: and if
it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatness, or something
extraordinary; if Apprehension and Concernment accompany it; if
the Fear of absolute and irresistible Power set it on upon the Mind,
the <Idea> is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especi-
ally if it be such an <Idea>, as is agreeable to the common light of 25
Reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge,
as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom
and Power, appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that
a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot
miss the discovery of a <Deity>: And the influence, that the discovery
of such a Being must necessarily have on the Minds of all, that have
but once heard of it, is so great, and carries such a weight of Thought
and Communication with it, that it seems stranger to me, that a
whole Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish, as to
want the Notion of a God; than that they should be without any
Notion of Numbers, or Fire.
#S 10#. The Name of God being once mentioned in any part of the
World, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the

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#L 1#
suitableness of such a Notion to the Principles of common Reason,
and the Interest Men will always have to mention it often, must
necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all
Generations: though yet the <general reception of this Name, and some>
<imperfect and unsteady Notions, conveyed thereby> to the unthinking part 5 
of Mankind, <prove not the> Idea <to be innate>; but only that they, who
made the Discovery, had made a right use of their Reason, thought
maturely of the Causes of things, and traced them to their Original;
from whom other less considering People, having once received so
important a Notion, it could not easily be lost again. 10 
#S 11#. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a <God>, were it
to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally
acknowledged, by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the
generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended
is no farther than that; which if it be sufficient to prove the <Idea of God>,
<innate>, will as well prove the <Idea> of Fire, innate; since, I think, it may
truly be said, That there is not a Person in the World, who has a
Notion of a <God>, who has not also the <Idea> of Fire. I doubt not, but if
a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island, where no
Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a 20 
thing, nor Name for it, how generally soever it were received, and
known in all the World besides; and, perhaps too, their Appre-
hensions would be as far removed from any Name, or Notion of a
God, till some one amongst them had imployed his Thoughts, to
enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things, which would 25 
easily lead him to the Notion of a <God>; which having once taught to
others, Reason, and the natural Propensity of their own Thoughts,
would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.
#S 12#. Indeed it is urged, That it is <suitable to the goodness of God, to>
<imprint, upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of himself>, and
not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a Concern-
ment; and also by that means, to secure to himself the Homage and
Veneration, due from so intelligent a Creature as Man; and there-
fore he has done it.
      This Argument, if it be of any Force, will prove much more than

                                                                 #P 091#
                                                                 #L 1#
those, who use it in this case, expect from it. For if we may conclude,
that <God> hath done for Men, all that Men shall judge is best for
them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove,
not only, that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men an <Idea> of
himself; but that he hath plainly stamp'd there, in fair Characters, 5
all that Men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought
to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will
and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will
think it better for Men, than that they should, in the dark, grope
after Knowledge, as St. <Paul> tells us all Nations did after God, <Acts> 10
XVII. 27. than that their Wills should clash with their Under-
standings, and their Appetites cross their Duty. The <Romanists> say,
Tis best for Men, and so, suitable to the goodness of God, that
there should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth; and
therefore there is one: and I, by the same Reason, say,  'Tis better for 15
Men that every Man himself should be infallible. I leave them to
consider, whether by the force of this Argument they shall think,
that every Man is so. I think it a very good Argument, to say, the
infinitely wise God hath made it so: And therefore it is best. But it
<seems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wisdom, to say, I think it>
<best, and therefore God hath made it so>; and in the matter in Hand, it
will be in vain to argue from such a Topick, that God hath done so,
when certain Experience shews that he hath not. But the Good-
ness of God hath not been wanting to Men without such Original
Impressions of Knowledge, or <Ideas> stamped on the Mind: since he 25
hath furnished Man with those Faculties, which will serve for the
sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a Being;
and I doubt not but to shew, that a Man by the right use of his
natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the
Knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God hav-
ing endued Man with those Faculties of knowing which he hath,
was no more obliged by his Goodness, to implant those innate
Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reason, Hands,
and Materials, he should build him Bridges, or Houses; which some
People in the World, however of good parts, do either totally want,
or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without <Ideas of>

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#L 1#
<God>, and Principles of Morality; or at least have but very ill ones.
The reason in both cases being, That they never employ'd their
Parts, Faculties, and Powers, industriously that way, but contented
themselves with the Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their
Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had 5  
you or I been born at the Bay of <Soldania>, possibly our Thoughts,
and Notions, had not exceeded those brutish ones of the <Hotentots>
that inhabit there: And had the <Virginia> King <Apochancana>, been
educated in <England>, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a Divine,
and as good a Mathematician, as any in it. The difference between
him, and a more improved <English->man, lying barely in this, That
the exercise of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes,
and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other,
or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any <Idea> of a God, it was only
because he pursued not those Thoughts, that would have led him 15 
to it.
#S 13#. I grant, That <if> there were <any Ideas> to be found <imprinted> on
the Minds of Men, we have reason to expect, <it should be the Notion of>
<his Maker>, as a mark GOD set on his own Workmanship, to mind
Man of his dependance and Duty; and that herein should appear the 20 
first instances of humane Knowledge. But how late is it before any
such notion is discoverable in Children? And when we find it there,
How much more does it resemble the Opinion, and Notion of the
Teacher, than represent the True God? He that shall observe in
Children, the progress whereby their Minds attain the knowledge
they have, will think, that the Objects they do first, and most
familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions
on their Understandings: Nor will he find the least footsteps of any
other. It is easie to take notice, how their Thoughts enlarge them-
selves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of
sensible Objects, to retain the <Ideas> of them in their memories; and to
get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put
them together. How by these means they come to frame in their
minds an <Idea> Men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter shew.
#S 14#. Can it be thought, that the <Ideas> Men have of God, are the
Characters, and Marks of Himself, engraven in their minds by his
own finger, when we see, that in the same Country, under one and


                                                                 #P 093#
                                                                 #L 1#
the same Name, <Men have far different>, nay, often <contrary and in->
<consistent Ideas>, and conceptions <of him>? Their agreeing in a Name, or
Sound, will scarce prove an innate Notion of Him.
#S 15#. What true or tolerable Notion of a <Deity>, could they have,
who acknowledged, and worshipped hundreds? Every Deity, that 5
they owned above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance
of Him, and a proof, that they had no true Notion of God, where
Unity, Infinity, and Eternity, were excluded. To which if we add
their gross Conceptions of Corporeity, expressed in their Images,
and Representations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, 10
Copulations, Lusts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities, attributed
by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the
heathen World, <i.e>. the greatest part of mankind, had such <Ideas> of
God in their minds, as he himself, out of care, that they should not be
mistaken about him, was Author of. And this universality of con-  15
sent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions,  'twill be
only this: That God imprinted on the minds of all Men, speaking
the same Language, a Name for Himself, but not any <Idea>: Since
those People, who agreed in the Name, had at the same time, far
different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say, That 20
the variety of Deities worshipped by the heathen World, were but
figurative ways of expressing the several Attributes of that in-
comprehensible Being, or several parts of his Providence: I answer,
What they might be in their original, I will not here enquire; but
that they were so in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body 25
will affirm: And he that will consult the Voyage of the Bishop of
<Beryte>, c. 13. (not to mention other Testimonies) will find, that the
Theology of the <Siamites>, professedly owns a plurality of Gods: Or,
as the <Abbe/ de Choisy> more judiciously remarks, in his Journal <du>
<Voiage de Siam, > 107/155, it consists properly in acknowledging no God 30
at all.
#S 15# [<bis>]. If it be said, That <wise Men> of all Nations came to <have>
<true Conceptions> of the Unity and Infinity <of the Deity>, I grant it. But
then this,
First, Excludes universality of Consent in any thing, but the 35
name, for those wise Men being very few, perhaps one of a thou-
sand, this universality is very narrow.
#P 094#
#L 1#
      Secondly, It seems to me plainly to prove, That the truest and
best Notions Men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by
thought and meditation, and a right use of their Faculties: since the
wise and considerate Men of the World, by a right and careful
employment of their Thoughts and Reason, attained true Notions 5  
in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate
part of Men, making the far greater number, took up their Notions,
by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, with-
out much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a reason to
think <the notion of God innate>, because all wise Men had it, Vertue too 10 
must be thought innate; for that also wise Men have always had.
#S 16#. This was evidently the case of all <Gentilism>: Nor hath even
amongst <Jews, Christians>, and <Mahometans>, who acknowledge but
One God, this Doctrine, and the care is taken in those Nations to
teach Men, to have true Notions of a GOD, prevailed so far, as to 15 
make Men to have the same, and true <Ideas> of Him. How many, even
amongst us, will be found upon enquiry, to fancy him in the shape
of a Man, sitting in Heaven; and to have many other absurd and
unfit conceptions of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had
whole Sects owning, and contending earnestly for it, That the 20 
Deity was corporeal and of humane shape: And though we find few
amongst us, who profess themselves <Anthropomorphites>, (though some
I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it
his business, may find amongst the ignorant, and uninstructed
Christians, many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-people, 25 
almost of any Age; or young People, almost of any condition, and
you shall find, that though the Name of GOD be frequently in their
mouths; yet the notions they apply this Name to, are so odd, low,
and pitiful, that no body can imagine, they were taught by a ration-
al Man; much less, that they were Characters writ by the finger of 30 
God Himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the Goodness
of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these <Ideas> of
Himself, than that he hath sent us into the World, with Bodies
uncloathed; and that there is no Art or Skill born with us. For being
fitted with Faculties to attain these, it is want of Industry, and 35 
Consideration in us, and not of Bounty in Him, if we have them not.
     'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the opposite Angles,

                                                                  #P 095#
                                                                  #L 1#
made by the intersection of two strait Lines, are equal. There was
never any rational Creature, that set himself sincerely to examine
the truth of these Propositions, that could fail to assent to them:
Though yet it be past doubt, that there are many Men, who having
not applied their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one 5
and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost
of its extent) universal Consent, such an one I easily allow: But
such an universal Consent as this, proves not the <Idea> of <God>, no
more than it does the <Idea> of such Angles, <innate>.
#S 17#. Since then though the knowledge of a <GOD>, be the most 10
natural discovery of humane Reason, yet <the Idea of him>, is <not innate>,
as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will
be scarce any other <Idea> found, that can pretend to it: since if God
had set any impression, any character on the Understanding of
Men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear 15
and uniform <Idea> of Himself, as far as our weak Capacities were
capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an Object. But
our minds being, at first, void of that <Idea>, which we are most
concerned to have, it <is a strong presumption against all other innate>
<Characters>. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and 20
would be glad to be informed by any other.
#S 18#. I confess, there is another <Idea>, which would be of general
use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it;
and that is the <Idea of Substance>, which we neither have, nor can have,
by <Sensation> or <Reflection>. If Nature took care to provide us any <Ideas>, 25
we might well expect it should be such, as by our own Faculties we
cannot procure to our selves: But we see on the contrary, that since
by those ways, whereby other <Ideas> are brought into our Minds,
this is not, We have no such <clear Idea> at all, and therefore signify
nothing by the word <Substance>, but only an uncertain supposition of 30
we know not what; (<i.e>. of something whereof we have no particular
distinct positive) <Idea>, which we take to be the <substratum>, or sup-
port, of those <Ideas> we do know.
#S 19#. Whatever then we talk of innate, either <speculative>, or

#P 096#
#L 1#
<practical Principles>, it may, with as much probability, be said, That a
Man hath 100 <l>. sterling in his Pocket, and yet denied, that he hath
there either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of
which the Sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain Propo-
sitions are innate, when the <Ideas> about which they are, can by no 5  
means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that
is given, doth <not> at all prove, that the <Ideas> expressed in them, are
<innate>: For in many cases, however the <Ideas> came there, the assent
to Words expressing the agreement, or disagreement, of such <Ideas>,
will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true <Idea> of <God>, and 10 
<Worship>, will assent to this Proposition, That God is to be wor-
shiped, when expressed, in a Language he understands: And every
rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to
assent to this Proposition to morrow; and yet millions of Men may
be well supposed to want one, or both, of those <Ideas> to day. For if 15 
we will allow Savages, and most Country-people, to have <Ideas> of
<God> and <Worship> (which conversation with them, will not make one
forward to believe) yet I think, few Children can be supposed to
have those <Ideas>, which therefore they must begin to have sometime
or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that Proposition, 20 
and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent
upon hearing, no more proves the <Ideas> to be innate, than it does,
That one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couched to
morrow) had the innate <Ideas> of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or
Yellow; because when his Sight is cleared, he will certainly assent 25 
to this Proposition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow:
And therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the <Ideas>
innate, it can much less the Propositions made up of those <Ideas>. If
they have any innate <Ideas>, I would be glad to be told, what, and
how many they are. 30 
#S 20#. To which let me add: If there be any innate <Ideas>, any <Ideas>,
in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on; they must
be lodg'd in the memory, and from thence must be brought
into view by Remembrance; <i.e>. must be known, when they are
remembred, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless 35 
Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to

#P 097#
#L 1#
perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it
was known or perceived before: without this, whatever <Idea> comes
into the mind is new, and not remembred: This consciousness of its
having been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes
Remembring from all other ways of Thinking. Whatever <Idea> was 5
never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever <Idea>
is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an
actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be
made an actual perception again.  Whenever there is the actual
perception of an <Idea> without memory, the <Idea> appears perfectly 10
new and unknown before to the Understanding: Whenever the
memory brings any <Idea> into actual view, it is with a consciousness,
that it had been there before, and was not wholly a Stranger to the
mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every ones observation:
And then I desire an instance of an <Idea>, pretended to be innate, 15
which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be men-
tioned) any one could revive and remember as an <Idea>, he had
formerly known; without which consciousness of a former percep-
tion there is no remembrance; and whatever <Idea> comes into the
mind without that consciousness is not remembred, or comes not 20
out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that
appearance. For what is not either actually in view, or in the
memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had
been there. Suppose a Child had the use of his Eyes till he knows
and distinguishes Colours; but then Cataracts shut the Windows, 25
and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time
perfectly loses all memory of the <Ideas> of colours, he once had. This
was the case of a blind Man I once talked with, who lost his sight by
the small Pox when he was a Child, and had no more notion of
colours, than one born Blind. I ask whether any one can say this 30
Man had then any <Ideas> of colours in his mind, any more than one
born Blind? And I think no body will say, that either of them had in
his mind any <Idea> of colours at all. His cataracts are couch'd, and
then he has the <Ideas> (which he remembers not) of colours, <de novo>,
by his restor'd sight, convey'd to his mind, and that without any 35
consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can
revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these <Ideas> of
colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a consciousness

#P 098#
#L 1#
of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be
in the mind. The use I make of this is, that whatever <Idea> being not
actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the mem-
ory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be
in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual 5  
view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory, which
is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembred. If
therefore there be any innate <Ideas>, they must be in the memory, or
else no where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can
be reviv'd without any impression from without, and whenever 10 
they are brought into the mind, they are remembred, <i.e>. they
bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it.
This being a constant, and distinguishing difference between what
is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not
in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, 15 
and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind,
whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new,
but the mind finds it in it self, and knows it was there before. By
this it may be tried, whether there be any innate <Ideas> in the mind
before impression from <Sensation> or <Reflection>. I would fain meet with 20 
the Man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other
time remembred any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they
were never new. If any one will say, there are <Ideas> in the mind,
that are not in the memory; I desire him to explain himself, and
make what he says intelligible. 25 
#S 21#. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason,
why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other Principles are in-
nate. I that am fully perswaded, that the infinitely Wise GOD made
all Things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfy my self, why he should
be supposed to print upon the minds of Men, some universal 30 
<Principles>; whereof those <that> are pretended innate, and <concern>
<Speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern Practice, not self->
<evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other Truths, not>
<allowed to be innate>. For to what purpose should Characters be graven
on the Mind, by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there, 35 
than those, which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distin-
guish'd from them? If any one thinks there are such innate <Ideas> and

#P 099#
#L 1#
Propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness, are distin-
guishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it
will not he a hard matter for him to tell us, which they are; and then
every one will be a fit Judge, whether they be so, or no. Since if
there be such innate <Ideas> and Impressions, plainly different from all 5
our other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in
himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate Maxims, I have
spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occasion to speak
more hereafter.
#S 22#. To conclude, some <Ideas> forwardly offer themselves to all 10
Men's Understandings; and some sorts of Truths result from any
<Ideas>, as soon as the mind puts them into Propositions: Other
Truths require a train of <Ideas> placed in order, a due comparing of
them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be
discovered, and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their 15
general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: But the
truth is, <Ideas> and Notions are no more born with us, than Arts and
Sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our
Faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more gener-
ally received: Though that too, be according as the Organs of our 20
Bodies, and Powers of our Minds, happen to be employ'd; <God having>
<fitted Men with faculties and means, to discover, receive, and retain Truths>,
<accordingly as they are employ'd>. The great difference that is to be found
in the Notions of Mankind, is, from the different use they put their
Faculties to, whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon 25
trust, misimploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their
Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which
it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an
implicit faith, to swallow: Others employing their Thoughts only
about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, 30
attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all
other, having never let their Thoughts loose, in the search of other
Enquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to
two Right ones, is a Truth, as certain as any thing can be; and I
think more evident, than many of those Propositions, that go for 35
Principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other
things, who know not this at all, because they never set their


#P 100#
#L 1#
Thoughts on work about such Angles: And he that certainly knows
this Proposition, may yet he utterly ignorant of the truth of other
Propositions, in Mathematicks it self, which are as clear and evident
as this; because, in his search of those mathematical Truths, he
stopp'd his Thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may 5  
happen concerning the notions we have of the Being of a Deity; for
though there be no Truth, which a Man may more evidently make
out to himself, than the Existence of a God, yet he that shall content
himself with things, as he finds them, in this World, as they minister
to his Pleasures and Passions, and not make enquiry a little farther 10 
into their Causes, Ends, and admirable Contrivances, and pursue
the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long
without any notion of such a Being: And if any Person hath, by talk,
put such a Notion into his head, he may, perhaps, believe it: But if
he hath never <examined> it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter, 15 
than his, who having been told, that the three Angles of a Triangle
are equal to two Right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining
the demonstration; and may yield his assent as to a probable
Opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his
Faculties, if carefully employ'd, were able to make clear and evi-  
dent to him. But this only by the by, to shew how much our
<knowledge depends upon the right use of those Powers Nature hath bestowed>
<upon us>, and how little upon such innate Principles, as are in vain
supposed to be in all Mankind for their direction; which all Men
could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there 25 
to no purpose: And which since all Men do not know, nor can
distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude
there are no such.
#S 23#. What censure, doubting thus of innate Principles, may
deserve from Men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old 30 
foundations of Knowledge and Certainty, I cannot tell: I perswade
my self, at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to
Truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not
made it my business, either to quit, or follow any Authority in the
ensuing Discourse: Truth has been my only aim; and where-ever 35 
that has appeared to lead, my Thoughts have impartially followed,


#P 101#
#L 1#
without minding, whether the footsteps of any other lay that way,
or no. Not that I want a due respect to other Mens Opinions; but
after all, the <greatest reverence is due to Truth>; and, I hope, it will not be
thought arrogance, to say, That, perhaps, we should make greater
progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative <Knowledge>, if 5
we <sought> it in the Fountain, <in the consideration of Things themselves>;
and made use rather of our own Thoughts, than other Mens to
find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other
Mens Eyes, as to know by other Mens Understandings. So much as
we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so 10
much we possess of real and true Knowledge. The floating of other
Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more know-
ing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is
in us but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our Assent only to rever-
end Names, and do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to 15
<understand> those <Truths>, which gave them reputation. <Aristotle> was
certainly a knowing Man, but no body ever thought him so,
because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the Opinions
of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without
examining them, made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will 20
hardly make any body else so. In the Sciences, every one has so
much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only,
and takes upon trust, are but shreads; which however well in the
whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock, who
gathers them. Such borrowed Wealth, like Fairy-money, though it 25
were Gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but Leaves
and Dust when it comes to use.
#S 24#. When Men have found some general Propositions that could
not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, <a short and>
<easy way to conclude them innate>. This being once received, it eased 30
the lazy from the pains of search, and stopp'd the enquiry of the
doubtful, concerning all that was once stiled innate: And it was of
no small advantage to those who affected to be Masters and
Teachers, to make this the Principle of <Principles>, That Principles
must not be questioned: For having once established this Tenet, 35
That there are innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a

#P 102#
#L 1#
necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take
them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put
them upon believing and taking them upon trust, without farther
examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be
more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who 5  
had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a
small power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority
to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unquestionable
Truths; and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle,
which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them. Whereas had 10 
they examined the ways, whereby Men came to the knowledge of
many universal <Truths>, they would have found them to result in the
minds of Men, from the being of things themselves, when duly
considered; and that they were discovered by the application of
those Faculties, that were fitted by Nature to receive and judge of 15 
them, when duly employ'd about them.
#S 25#. <To shew how the Understanding proceeds herein, is the design of the>
<following Discourse>; which I shall proceed to, when I have first pre-
mised, that hitherto to clear my way to those foundations, which, I
conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish those Notions 20 
we can have of our own Knowledge, it hath been necessary for me
to give an account of the Reasons I had to doubt of innate Principles:
And since the Arguments which are against them, do, some of them,
rise from common received Opinions, I have been forced to take
several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, 25 
whose Task it is to shew the falshood, or improbability, of any
Tenet; it happening in Controversial Discourses, as it does in
assaulting of Towns; where, if the ground be but firm, whereon the
Batteries are erected, there is no farther enquiry of whom it is
borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the 30 
present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing
to raise an Edifice uniform, and consistent with it self, as far as my
own Experience and Observation will assist me, I hope, to erect it
on such a Basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and
buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begg'd foundations: Or at least, 35 

                                                               #P 103#
                                                               #L 1#
if mine prove a Castle in the Air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a
piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the Reader not to expect
undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allow'd the
Privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my Principles for
granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that 5
I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only <appeal> to
Mens own unprejudiced <Experience>, and Observation, whether they
be true, or no; and this is enough for a Man who professes no more,
than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures, concern-
ing a Subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design, 10
than an unbias'd enquiry after Truth.

#P 104#
#L 1##B 2#                        BOOK II



#C 01#                      CHAPTER I

              <Of> Ideas <in general, and their Original>.

#S 01#. EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and
that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the
<Ideas>, that are there,   'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds
several <Ideas>, such as are those expressed by the words, <Whiteness>,
<Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunken-> 5  
<ness>, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he
comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have
native <Ideas>, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in
their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examined
already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will 10 
be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the
Understanding may get all the <Ideas> it has, and by what ways and
degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to
every one's own Observation and Experience.
#S 02#. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, 15 
void of all Characters, without any <Ideas>; How comes it to be fur-
nished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and
boundless Fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless
variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge?
To this I answer, in one word, From <Experience>: In that, all our 20 
Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self.
Our Observation employ'd either about <external, sensible Objects; or>
<about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our>
<selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of>
<thinking>. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all 25 
the <Ideas> we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
                                                                
                                                                     #P 105#
                                                                     #L 1#
#S 03#. First, <Our Senses>, conversant about particular sensible
Objects, do <convey into the Mind>, several distinct <Perceptions> of things,
according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect
them: And thus we come by those <Ideas>, we have of <Yellow, White>,
<Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet>, and all those which we call 5
sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the
mind, I mean, they from external Objects convey into the mind what
produces there those <Perceptions>. This great Source, of most of the
<Ideas> we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by
them to the Understanding, I call <SENSATION>.                    10
#S 04#. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience
furnisheth the Understanding with <Ideas>, is the <Perception of the>
<Operations of our own Minds> within us, as it is employ'd about the <Ideas>
it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and
consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of <Ideas>, 15
which could not be had from things without: and such are, <Per->
<ception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing>, and
all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being con-
scious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our
Understandings, as distinct <Ideas>, as we do from Bodies affecting our 20
Senses. This Source of <Ideas>, every Man has wholly in himself: And
though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external
Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd
internal Sense. But as I call the other <Sensation>, so I call this <RE->
<FLECTION>, the <Ideas> it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by 25
reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By <REFLECTION>
then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood
to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations,
and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be <Ideas>
of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, <viz>. 30
External, Material things, as the Objects of <SENSATION>; and the
Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of <REFLEC->
<TION>, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our <Ideas>
take their beginnings. The term <Operations> here, I use in a large
sence, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about 35

#P 106#
#L 1#
its <Ideas>, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them,
such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.
#S 05#. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least
glimmering of any <Ideas>, which it doth not receive from one of these
two. <External Objects furnish the Mind with the> Ideas <of sensible qualities>, 5  
which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: And
the <Mind furnishes the Understanding with> Ideas <of its own Operations>.
      These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their
several Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we shall find to
contain all our whole stock of <Ideas>; and that we have nothing in 10 
our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any
one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his
Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original
<Ideas> he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his <Senses>; or
of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his <Reflec-> 15 
<tion>: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be
lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see, that he has <not>
<any> Idea <in his Mind, but what one of these two have imprinted>; though,
perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the
Understanding, as we shall see hereafter. 30 
#S 06#. He that attentively considers the state of a <Child>, at his first
coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored
with plenty of <Ideas>, that are to be the matter of his future Know-
ledge.   'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And
though the <Ideas> of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint them- 25 
selves, before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and
Order, yet 'tis often so late, before some unusual qualities come in
the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning
of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no
doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even 30 
of the ordinary <Ideas>, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that
are born into the World being surrounded with Bodies, that per-
petually and diversly affect them, variety of <Ideas>, whether care be
taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. <Light>,
and <Colours>, are busie at hand every where, when the Eye is but 35 
                                                               #P 107#
                                                               #L 1#
open; <Sounds>, and some <tangible Qualities> fail not to solicite their
proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think,
it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where
he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he
would have no more <Ideas> of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his 5
Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those
particular Relishes.
#S 07#. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple
<Ideas> from without, according as the <Objects>, they converse with,
afford greater or less variety; and from the Operation of their Minds 10
within, according as they more or less <reflect> on them. For, though he
that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain
and clear <Ideas> of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way,
and considers them <attentively>, he will no more have clear and
distinct <Ideas> of all the <Operations of his Mind>, and all that may be 15
observed therein, than he will have all the particular <Ideas> of any
Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not
turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The
Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way
every day; but yet he will have but a confused <Idea> of all the Parts 20
they are made up of, till he <applies himself with attention>, to consider
them each in particular.
#S 08#. And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before
most Children get <Ideas> of the Operations of their own Minds; and
some have not any very clear, or perfect <Ideas> of the greatest part of 25
them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually;
yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough,
to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting <Ideas>, till the Under-
standing turns inwards upon it self, <reflects> on its own <Operations>, and
makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when 30
they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things,
which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind
constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be

#P 108#
#L 1#
delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first
Years are usually imploy'd and diverted in looking abroad. Men's
Business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be
found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to out-
ward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what 5  
passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some
scarce ever at all.
#S 09#. To ask, <at what time a Man has first any> Ideas, is to ask, when
he begins to perceive; having <Ideas>, and Perception being the same
thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that 10 
it has the actual Perception of <Ideas> in it self constantly, as long as it
exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as
actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the
beginning of a Man's <Ideas>, is the same, as to enquire after the
beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its <Ideas>, as 15 
Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.
#S 10#. But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or
coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation,
or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by
those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self, to 20 
have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to
contemplate <Ideas>, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the
<Soul always to think>, than for the Body always to move; the perception
of <Ideas> being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the
Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore, 25 
though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of
the Soul; yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always
thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the
infinite Author and Preserver of things, <who never slumbers nor sleeps>;<*>
but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of 30 
Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think,

                                                                #P 109#
                                                                #L 1#
and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is some-
thing in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance
perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than
Experience informs us For to say, that actual thinking is essential
to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg, what is in Question, 5
and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it
be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, <That the Soul>
<always thinks>, be a self-evident Proposition, that every Body assents
to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind.   'Tis doubted whether I
thought all last night, or no; the Question being about a matter of 10
fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as a proof for it, an Hypothesis, which
is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove any thing,
and 'tis but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats,
think, and 'tis sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch
thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself, 15
ought to build his Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by
sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of
his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way
of proving, amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last
night, because another supposes I always think, though I my self 20
cannot perceive, that I always do so.
But Men in love with their Opinions, may not only suppose what
is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any
one make it an <inference> of mine, <that a thing is not, because we are not>
<sensible of it in our sleep>. I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because 25
he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at
any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being
sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and
to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can
think without being conscious of it.                                30
#S 11#. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without
thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether
#P 110#
#L 1#
sleeping without dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man,
Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration;
it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be
conscious of it. If the <Soul> doth <think in a sleeping Man>, without being
conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any 5  
Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure
the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be
happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me
utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the
Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoy-  
ments, and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is
not conscious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that <Socrates> asleep,
and <Socrates> awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he
sleeps, and <Socrates> the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is
waking, are two Persons: Since waking <Socrates>, has no Knowledge 15 
of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul,
which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving
any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of
a Man in the <Indies>, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly
away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of 20 
Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will
be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.
#S 12#. The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. <Whilst>
<it thinks> and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or
Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and <it must necessarily be> 25 
<conscious of its own Perceptions>. But it has all this apart: The sleeping
Man, 'tis plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose
then the Soul of <Castor>, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body,
which is no impossible Supposition for the Men I have here to do
with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul to all 30 
other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or a
contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor
that the Soul should subsist and think, or have Perception, even
Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then,
as I say, suppose the Soul of <Castor> separated, during his Sleep, from 35 
                                                                #P 111#
                                                                #L 1#
his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses for its
Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, <v.g. Pollux>, who is
sleeping without a Soul: For if <Castor's> Soul can think whilst <Castor>
is asleep, what <Castor> is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what
Place it chuses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two 5
Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to
sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still thinking in the waking
Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the
least Perception. I ask then, Whether <Castor> and <Pollux>, thus, with
only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, 10
what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not
two as distinct Persons, as <Castor> and <Hercules>; or, as <Socrates> and
<Plato> were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and
the other very miserable? Just by the same Reason, they make the
Soul and the Man two Persons, who make the Soul think apart, 15
what the Man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, no body will make
Identity of Persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the very
same numerical Particles of matter: For if that be necessary to
Identity,   'twill be impossible, in that constant flux of the Particles
of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same Person, two days, 20
or two moments together.
#S 13#. Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine,
who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who
do at any time <sleep without dreaming>, can never be convinced, That
their Thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their 25
knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the
middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of
account of it.
#S 14#.   'Twill perhaps be said, That the <Soul thinks>, even <in> the
soundest <Sleep, but the Memory retains it not>. That the Soul in a sleep- 
ing Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next
moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect
one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and
would need some better Proof than bare Assertion, to make it be
believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely 35
told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men, do, during all their
Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if
they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could
#P 112#
#L 1#
remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of
their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a
Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never
dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly
recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year 5  
of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At
least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples
enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.
#S 15#.  <To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a>
<very useless sort of thinking>: and the Soul in such a state of thinking, 10 
does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which
constantly receives variety of Images, or <Ideas>, but retains none;
they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them;
the Looking-glass is never the better for such <Ideas>, nor the Soul for
such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the 15 
materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking;
and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by the impressions
that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such
thinking; but that in the <thinking of the Soul>, which is not perceived
<in a sleeping Man>, there the Soul thinks apart, and <making no use> of the 20 
Organs of <the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory>
of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two
distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer
farther, That whatever <Ideas> the Mind can receive, and contem-
plate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it 25 
can retain without the help of the Body too, or else the Soul, or any
separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has
no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its
use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect
upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reason-  
ings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They,
who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate, will not make it a
much more noble Being, than those do, whom they condemn, for
allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Charac-
ters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Im-  
pressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether
                                                               #P 113#
                                                               #L 1#
as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a
Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for
ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature
never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly
to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so 5
admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which
comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being,
to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd, at least 1/4 part of its time here,
as to think constantly, without remembring any of those Thoughts,
without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful 10
to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not
find, I suppose, the motion of dull and sensless matter, any where in
the Universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.
#S 16#.   'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception,
whilst we are <asleep>, and retain the memory of those <Thoughts>: but 15
how <extravagant> and incoherent for the most part they are; how
little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being,
those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I
would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks
thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less ration- 
ally than when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be
less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the
perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a
wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous
and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more 25
rational Soliloquies and Meditations.
#S 17#. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always
actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those <Ideas>
are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or just at the union with
the Body, before it hath received any by <Sensation>. The <Dreams> of 30
sleeping Men, <are>, as I take it, all <made up of the waking Man's> Ideas,
though, for the most part, oddly put together.   'Tis strange, if the
Soul has <Ideas> of its own, that it derived not from <Sensation> or
<Reflection>, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any
impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private 35

#P 114#
#L 1#
thinking, (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) retain
any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make
the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable,
that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many
hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those <Ideas> it borrowed 5  
not from <Sensation> or <Reflection>, or at least preserve the memory of
none, but such, which being occasioned from the Body, must needs
be less natural to a Spirit?   'Tis strange, the Soul should never once
in a Man's whole life, recal over any of its pure, native Thoughts,
and those <Ideas> it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body; 10 
never bring into the waking Man's view, any other <Ideas>, but what
have a tangue of the Cask, and manifestly derive their Original from
that union. If it always thinks, and so had <Ideas> before it was united,
or before it received any from the Body, 'tis not to be supposed, but
that during sleep, it recollects its native <Ideas>, and during that 15 
retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by
it self, the <Ideas>, it is busied about, should be, sometimes at least,
those more natural and congenial ones which it had in it self, un-
derived from the Body or its own Operations about them: which
since the waking Man never remembers, we must from this Hy-  
pothesis conclude, either that the Soul remembers something that
the Man does not; or else that Memory belongs only to such <Ideas>,
as are derived from the Body, or the Minds Operations about them.
#S 18#. I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so
confidently pronounce, that the humane Soul, or which is all one, 25 
that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, <how they>
<come to know, that they themselves think, when they themselves do not>
<perceive it>. This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to
know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confused Notion, taken
up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that 30 
either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Ex-
perience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said
of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always
                                                               #P 115#
                                                               #L 1#
retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may
not always think; and much more probable, that it should some-
times not think, than that it should often think, and that a long
while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment
after, that it had thought.                                        5
#S 19#. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not to perceive it,
is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one
considers well these Men's way of speaking, one should be led into
a suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul
always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always 10
thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and
not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of <Jargon>
in others. If they say, The Man thinks always, but is not always
conscious of it; they may as well say, His Body is extended, without
having parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is 15
extended without parts, as that any thing <thinks without being>
<conscious of it>, or perceiving, that it does so. They who talk thus,
may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis,
say, That a Man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel
it: Whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking con- 
sists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a Man is
always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, How they know it?
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man's own
mind. Can another Man perceive, that I am conscious of any thing,
when I perceive it not my self? No Man's Knowledge here, can go 25
beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound sleep, and ask
him, What he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be
conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable
Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thinking:
May he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This 30
is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot he less than Reve-
lation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind, when I can
find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating
sight, who can certainly see, that I think, when I cannot perceive

#P 116#
#L 1#
it my self, and when I declare, that I do not; and yet can see, that
Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the demon-
stration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that they do so. This
some may suspect to be a step beyond the <Rosecrucians>; it seeming
easier to make ones self invisible to others, than to make another's 5  
thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but
defining the Soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the
business is done. If such a definition be of any Authority, I know not
what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, That they
have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass 10 
away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no
Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant
Experience; and, perhaps, 'tis the affectation of knowing beyond
what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute, and noise,
in the World. 15 
#S 20#. I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the <Soul thinks>
<before the Senses have furnish'd it with Ideas> to think on; and as those are
increased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its
Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by
compounding those <Ideas>, and reflecting on its own Operations, it 20 
increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining,
reasoning, and other modes of thinking.
#S 21#. He that will suffer himself, to be informed by Observation
and Experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of
Nature, will find few Signs of a Soul accustomed to much thinking 25 
in a new born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And
yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much,
and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly
come into the World, spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep,
and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or 30 
some Pain, (the most importunate of all Sensations) or some other
violent Impression on the Body, forces the mind to perceive, and

                                                                #P 117#
                                                                #L 1#
attend to it. He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find
Reason to imagine, That a <Foetus in the Mother's Womb, differs not>
<much from the State of a Vegetable>; but passes the greatest part of its
time without Perception or Thought, doing very little, but sleep
in a Place, where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with 5
Liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where
the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears, so shut up, are not very
susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or
change of Objects, to move the Senses.
#S 22#. Follow a <Child> from its Birth, and observe the alterations 10
that time makes, and you shall find, as the Mind by the Senses
comes more and more to be furnished with <Ideas>, it comes to be more
and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on.
After some time, it begins to know the Objects, which being most
familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes, 15
by degrees, to know the Persons it daily converses with, and dis-
tinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of
its coming to retain and distinguish the <Ideas> the Senses convey to
it: And so we may observe, how the Mind, <by degrees>, improves in
these, and <advances> to the Exercise of those other Faculties of <En-> 20
<larging, Compounding>, and <Abstracting> its <Ideas>, and of reasoning
about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which, I shall have
occasion to speak more hereafter.
#S 23#. If it shall be demanded then, <When a Man begins to have any>
<Ideas>? I think, the true Answer is, When he first has any <Sensation>. 25
For since there appear not to be any <Ideas> in the Mind, before the
Senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that <Ideas> in the Under-
standing, are coeval with <Sensation>; which is such an Impression or
Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Per-
ception in the Understanding.   'Tis about these Impressions made 30
on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to
employ it self in such Operations as we call <Perception, Remembring>,
<Consideration, Reasoning>, etc.
#S 24#. In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own <Operations>,
about the <Ideas> got by <Sensation>, and thereby stores it self with a new 35
#P 118#
#L 1#
set of <Ideas>, which I call <Ideas> of <Reflection>. These are the <Impres->
<sions> that are made on our <Senses> by outward Objects, that are
extrinsical to the Mind; and <its own Operations>, proceeding from
Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by
it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, 5  
<the Original of all Knowledge>. Thus the first Capacity of Humane
Intellect, is, That the mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made
on it; either, through the <Senses>, by outward Objects; or by its own
Operations, when it <reflects> on them. This is the first step a Man
makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the Groundwork, 10 
whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have
naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which towre
above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their
Rise and Footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the mind
wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated 15 
with, it stirs not one jot beyond those <Ideas>, which <Sense> or <Reflection>,
have offered for its Contemplation.
#S 25#. In this Part, the <Understanding> is meerly <passive>; and whether
or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of
Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senses, 20 
do, many of them, obtrude their particular <Ideas> upon our minds,
whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not
let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man,
can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These
<simple Ideas>, when offered to the mind, <the Understanding can> no more 25 
refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them
out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or
obliterate the Images or <Ideas>, which, the Objects set before it, do
therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect
our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and 30 
cannot avoid the Perception of those <Ideas> that are annexed to them.

#P 119#
#L 1##C 02#                       CHAPTER II

                         <Of simple> Ideas.

#S 01#. THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of
our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning
the <Ideas> we have; and that is, That <some> of them are <simple>, and <some>
<complex>.
Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things 5
themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no
distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the <Ideas> they produce in the
Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. For though the
Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same
time, different <Ideas>; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the 10
Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the
simple <Ideas> thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly dis-
tinct, as those that come in by different Senses. The coldness and
hardness, which a Man feels in a piece of <Ice>, being as distinct <Ideas>
in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily; or as the taste of 15
Sugar, and smell of a Rose: And there is nothing can be plainer to a
Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those simple
<Ideas>; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it
nothing but <one uniform Appearance>, or Conception in the mind, and
is not distinguishable into different <Ideas>.                           20
#S 02#. These simple <Ideas>, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are
suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above
mentioned, <viz. Sensation> and <Reflection>. When the Understanding is
once stored with these simple <Ideas>, it has the Power to repeat, com-
pare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can 25
make at Pleasure new complex <Ideas>. But it is not in the Power of the
most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or

#P 120#
#L 1#
variety of Thought, to <invent or frame one new simple> Idea in the mind,
not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the
Understanding, destroy those that are there. The Dominion of Man,
in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the
same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his Power, 5  
however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to
compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but
can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter,
or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same
inability, will every one find in himself, who shall go about to 10 
fashion in his Understanding any simple <Idea>, not received in by his
Senses, from external Objects; or by reflection from the Operations
of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any
Taste, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the <Idea> of a
Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also 15 
conclude, that a blind Man hath <Ideas> of Colours, and a deaf Man
true distinct Notions of Sounds.
#S 03#. This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it im-
possible to God, to make a Creature with other Organs, and more
ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of Corporeal 20 
things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has
given to Man: Yet I think, it is <not possible>, for any one <to imagine> any
other <Qualities> in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can
be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and
tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four 25 
Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the Fifth Sense,
had been as far from our Notice, Imagination, and Conception, as
now any <belonging to a Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Sense>, can possibly be:
which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other Parts of
this vast, and stupendious Universe, may not have, will be a great 30 
Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the
top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick,
and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and incon-
siderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think,
that in other Mansions of it, there may be other, and different 35 
intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties, he has as little Knowledge or
Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath
of the Senses or Understanding of a Man; Such Variety and
Excellency, being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker.

                                                                #P 121#
                                                                #L 1#
I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five
Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but
either Supposition serves equally to my present purpose.


#C 03#                       CHAPTER III

                       <Of> Ideas <of one Sense>.

#S 01#. THE better to conceive the <Ideas>, we receive from Sensation, it
may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the 5
different ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our minds,
and make themselves perceivable by us.

<First> then, There are some, which come into our minds <by one>
<Sense> only.
<Secondly>, There are others, that convey themselves into the mind 10
<by more Senses than one>.
<Thirdly>, Others that are had from <Reflection> only.
<Fourthly>, There are some that make themselves way, and are
suggested to the mind <by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection>.
We shall consider them apart under these several Heads.         15

<First>, There are <some> Ideas, <which have admittance only through one>
<Sense>, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and
Colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several Degrees or
Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the
rest, come in only by the Eyes: All kinds of Noises, Sounds, and 20
Tones only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose
and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the
Conduits, to convey them from without to their Audience in the
Brain, the mind's Presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of
them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no 25
Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into
view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

#P 122#
#L 1#
      The most considerable of those, belonging to the Touch, are
Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly
in the sensible Configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more,
or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and
brittle, are obvious enough. 5  
#S 02#. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular
<simple Ideas>, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we
would, there being a great many <more> of them belonging to most of
the Senses, <than we have Names for>. The variety of Smells, which are
as many almost, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do 10 
most of them want Names. <Sweet> and <Stinking> commonly serve our
turn for these <Ideas>, which in effect, is little more than to call them
pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet,
both sweet, are certainly very distinct <Ideas>. Nor are the different
Tastes that by our Palates we receive <Ideas> of, much better provided 15 
with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sowr, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the
Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes,
which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of
Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or
Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall there- 20 
fore in the account of simple <Ideas>, I am here giving, content my self
to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose,
or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are
very frequently the Ingredients of our complex <Ideas>, amongst
which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall 25 
treat of in the next Chapter.


#C 04#                       CHAPTER IV

                          <Of Solidity>.

#S 01#. THE <Idea> of <Solidity> we receive by our Touch; and it arises from
the resistance which we find in Body, to the entrance of any other

                                                                #P 123#
                                                                #L 1#
Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no <Idea>,
which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than <Solidity>.
Whether we move, or rest, in what Posture soever we are, we always
feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther
sinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us 5
perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do by an
insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our
Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of
two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call
<Solidity>. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the Word 10
<solid> be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathe-
maticians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of
Solidity will allow, if not justifie, this use of it; but if any one think
it better to call it <Impenetrability>, he has my Consent. Only I have
thought the Term <Solidity>, the more proper to express this <Idea>, not 15
only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it
carries something more of positive in it, than <Impenetrability>, which
is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of <Solidity>, than
<Solidity> it self. This of all other, seems the <Idea> most intimately
connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be 20
found or imagin'd, but only in matter: and though our Senses take
no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause
a Sensation in us; Yet the Mind, having once got this <Idea> from such
grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as
Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter, that can exist; and finds 25
it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified.
#S 02#. This is the <Idea> belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it <to>
<fill space>. The <Idea> of which filling of space, is, That where we
imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so
to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and, will 30
for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another
in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes
from between them in a Line, not parallel to that which they move
in. This <Idea> of it the Bodies, which we ordinarily handle, sufficient-
ly furnish us with.                                                 35
#P 124#
#L 1#
#S 03#. This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the
space which it possesses, is so great, That no force, how great
soever, can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World, pressing a drop
of Water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance,
which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, 5  
till it be removed out of their way: whereby our <Idea> of <Solidity> is
<distinguished> both <from pure space>, which is capable neither of Resist-
ance nor Motion; and from the ordinary <Idea> of <Hardness>. For a Man
may conceive two Bodies at a distance, so as they may approach
one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till 10 
their Superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear
<Idea> of Space without <Solidity>. For (not to go so far as annihilation of
any particular Body) I ask, Whether a Man cannot have the <Idea> of
the motion of one single Body alone, without any other succeeding
immediately into its Place? I think, 'tis evident he can: the <Idea> of 15 
Motion in one Body, no more including the <Idea> of Motion in
another, than the <Idea> of a square Figure in one Body includes the
<Idea> of a square Figure in another. I do not ask, Whether Bodies do
so exist, that the motion of one Body cannot really be without the
motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the 20 
Question for, or against a <Vacuum>. But my Question is, Whether
one cannot have the <Idea> of one Body moved, whilst others are at
rest? And, I think, this no one will deny: If so, then the Place it
deserted, gives us the <Idea> of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto
another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion 25 
of any thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it
filled in the Tube is certainly the same, whether any other Body
follows the motion of the Sucker or no: nor does it imply a contra-
diction, That upon the motion of one Body, another, that is only
contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion, 30 
is built only on the Supposition, That the World is full; but not on
the distinct <Ideas> of Space and Solidity: which are as different, as
Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion. And
that Men have <Ideas> of Space without Body, their very Disputes
about a <Vacuum> plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another 35 
Place.
                                                               #P 125#
                                                               #L 1#
#S 04#. <Solidity> is hereby also <differenced from Hardness>, in that Solidity
consists in repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out
of the space it possesses; but Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the
parts of Matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the
whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed, Hard and Soft 5
are Names that we give to things, only in relation to the Consti-
tutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us,
which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure
of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which
changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie, and unpainful 10
touch.
But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts
amongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more
Solidity to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is
an Adamant one jot more solid than Water. For though the two 15
flat sides of two pieces of Marble, will more easily approach each
other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if
there be a Diamond hetween them: yet it is not, that the parts of
the Diamond are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but
because the parts of Water, being more easily separable from each 20
other, they will by a side-motion be more easily removed, and give
way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble: But if they could
be kept from making Place, by that side-motion, they would eter-
nally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble, as much as
the Diamond; and   'twould be as impossible by any force, to sur- 
mount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the parts
of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invincibly
resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put
out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest, that can
be found, or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well 30
with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that
thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are hard, can keep his Hands
from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with
the Air inclosed in a Football. The Experiment, I have been told
was made at <Florence>, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with 35
#P 126#
#L 1#
Water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a
body as Water. For the golden Globe thus filled, being put into a
Press, which was driven by the extreme force of skrews, the water
made it self way through the pores of that very close metal, and
finding no room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to 5  
the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before
the sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent com-
pression of the Engine, that squeezed it.
#S 05#. By this <Idea> of Solidity, is the Extension of Body distinguished
from the Extension of Space. The Extension of Body being nothing, 10 
but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable Parts;
and the Extension of Space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable,
and immoveable Parts. <Upon the Solidity of Bodies> also <depends their>
<mutual Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion>. Of pure Space then, and
Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one) 15 
who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct <Ideas>; and
that they can think on Space, without any thing in it, that resists,
or is protruded by Body. This is the <Idea> of pure Space, which they
think they have as clear, as any <Idea> they can have of the Extension
of Body: the <Idea> of the distance, between the opposite Parts of a 20 
concave Superficies, being equally as clear, without, as with the <Idea>
of any solid Parts between: and on the other side, they persuade
themselves, That they have, distinct from that of pure Space, the
<Idea> of something that fills Space, that can be protruded by the
impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others, 25 
that have not these two <Ideas> distinct but confound them, and make
but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the same <Idea>,
under different Names, or different <Ideas>, under the same Name,
can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who
not being blind, or deaf, has distinct <Ideas> of the Colour of Scarlet, 30 
and the sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-
Colour with the blind Man, I mention in another Place, who
fancied, that the <Idea> of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet.
#S 06#. If any one asks me, <What this Solidity is>, I send him to his
Senses to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-ball between 35 

                                                                #P 127#
                                                                #L 1#
his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he
thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and
wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it
consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists;
or explain to me, what Extension or Motion is, which, perhaps, 5
seems much easier. The simple <Ideas> we have are such, as experience
teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour, by Words, to
make them clearer in the Mind, we shall succeed no better, than if
we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind, by
talking; and to discourse into him the <Ideas> of Light and Colours.  10
The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place.



#C 05#                         CHAPTER V

                  <Of simple> Ideas <of divers Senses>.

THE <Ideas> we get by more than one Sense, are of <Space>, or <Extension>,
<Figure, Rest>, and <Motion>: For these make perceivable impressions,
both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into
our Minds the <Ideas> of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest 15
of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak
more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.



#C 06#                          CHAPTER VI

                   <Of simple> Ideas <of Reflection>.

#S 01#. THE Mind receiving the <Ideas>, mentioned in the foregoing
Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self,
and observes its own Actions about those <Ideas> it has, takes from 20
thence other <Ideas>, which are as capable to be the Objects of its
Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.
#P 128#
#L 1#
#S 02#. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are
most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every
one that pleases, may take notice of'em in himself, are these two:

                    <Perception>, or <Thinking>, and
<Volition>, or <Willing>. 5                      
The Power of Thinking is called the <Understanding>, and the Power of
Volition is called the <Will>, and these two Powers or Abilities in the
Mind are denominated <Faculties>. Of some of the Modes of these
simple <Ideas> of Reflection, such as are <Remembrance, Discerning>,
<Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith>, etc. I shall have occasion to 10 
speak hereafter.


#C 07#                       CHAPTER VII

          <Of simple> Ideas <of both Sensation and Reflection>.

#S 01#. THERE be other simple <Ideas>, which convey themselves into
the Mind, by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection, <viz>.
                   <Pleasure>, or <Delight>, and its opposite.
<Pain>, or <Uneasiness>. 15                 
                   <Power>.
                   <Existence>.
                   <Unity>.

#S 02#. <Delight>, or <Uneasiness>, one or other of them join themselves to
almost all our <Ideas>, both of Sensation and Reflection: And there is 20 
scarce any affection of our Senses from without, any retired thought
of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us <pleasure> or
<pain>. By <Pleasure> and <Pain>, I would be understood to signifie, what-
soever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of
our Minds, or any thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we 25 
call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, <etc>. on the one
side; or Uneasiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguish, Misery, <etc>.

                                                                #P 129#
                                                                #L 1#
on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing,
and belong to the <Ideas> of <Pleasure> and <Pain>, Delight or Uneasiness;
which are the Names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts
of <Ideas>.
#S 03#. The infinite Wise Author of our being, having given us the 5
power over several parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at
rest, as we think fit; and also by the motion of them, to move our
selves, and other contiguous Bodies, in which consists all the Actions
of our Body: Having also given a power to our Minds, in several
Instances, to chuse, amongst its <Ideas>, which it will think on, and to 10
pursue the enquiry of this or that Subject with consideration and
attention, to excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that
we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several Thoughts, and
several Sensations, a <perception> of <Delight>. If this were wholly sepa-
rated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we 15
should have no reason to preferr one Thought or Action, to another;
Negligence, to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. And so we should
neither stir our Bodies, nor employ our Minds; but let our Thoughts
if I may so call it) run a drift, without any direction or design; and
suffer the <Ideas> of our Minds, like unregarded shadows, to make 20
their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them.
In which state Man, however furnished with the Faculties of
Understanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature,
and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore
pleased our Wise Creator, to annex to several Objects, and to the 25
<Ideas> which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts,
a concomitant pleasure, and that in several Objects, to several
degrees, that those Faculties which he had endowed us with, might
not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.
#S 04#. <Pain> has the same efficacy and use to set us on work, that 30
Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid
that, as to pursue this: Only this is worth our consideration, That
<Pain is often produced by the same Objects and> Ideas, <that produce Pleasure>
in us. This their near Conjunction, which makes us often feel pain
in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new 35
occasion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker, who

#P 130#
#L 1#
designing the preservation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the
application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm
that they will do; and as advices to withdraw from them. But he,
not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every
part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain 5  
to those very <Ideas>, which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very
agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it,
proves no ordinary torment: and the most pleasant of all sensible
Objects, Light it self, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond
a due proportion to our Eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which 10 
is wisely and favourably so ordered by Nature, that when any
Object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the
instruments of Sensation, whose Structures cannot but be very nice
and delicate, we might by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before
the Organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper 15 
Functions for the future. The consideration of those Objects that
produce it, may well perswade us, That this is the end or use of
pain. For though great light be insufferable to our Eyes, yet the
highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them: because
that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious Organ 20 
unharm'd, in its natural state. But yet excess of Cold, as well as
Heat, pains us: because it is equally destructive to that temper,
which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the
several functions of the Body, and which consists in a moderate
degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts 25 
of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.
#S 05#. Beyond all this, we may find another reason <why> God hath
scattered up and down <several degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the>
<things that environ and affect us>; and blended them together, in almost
all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding 30 
imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all
the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to
seek it in the enjoyment of him, <with whom there is fullness of joy, and>
<at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore>.<*>
#S 06#. Though what I have here said, may not, perhaps, make the 35 
<Ideas of Pleasure and Pain> clearer to us, than our own Experience does,
                                                               #P 131#
                                                               #L 1#
which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the
consideration of the Reason, why they are annexed to so many
other <Ideas>, serving to give us due sentiments of the Wisdom and
Goodness of the Soveraign Disposer of all Things, may not be
unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries: The knowledge and 5
veneration of Him, being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the
proper business of all Understandings.
#S 07#. <Existence> and <Unity>, are two other <Ideas>, that are suggested
to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every <Idea>
within. When <Ideas> are in our Minds, we consider them as being 10
actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without
us; which is, that they exist, or have <Existence>: And whatever we
can consider as one thing, whether a real Being, or <Idea>, suggests to
the Understanding, the <Idea> of <Unity>.
#S 08#. <Power> also is another of those simple <Ideas>, which we receive 15
from <Sensation and Reflection>. For observing in our selves, that we
can, at pleasure, move several parts of our Bodies, which were at
rest; the effects also, that natural Bodies are able to produce in one
another, occurring every moment to our Senses, we both these ways
get the <Idea> of <Power>.                                              20
#S 09#. Besides these, there is another <Idea>, which though suggested
by our Senses, yet is more constantly offered us, by what passes in
our own Minds; and that is the <Idea> of <Succession>. For if we look
immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable
there, we shall find our <Ideas> always, whilst we are awake, or have 25
any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming,
without intermission.
#S 10#. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most
considerable of those <simple Ideas> which the Mind has, and out of
which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by 30
the two forementioned ways of <Sensation> and <Reflection>.
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious
Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the
Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that
extends its thoughts often, even beyond the utmost expansion of
                                                                #P 132#
                                                                #L 1#
Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible <Inane>.
I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any <simple Idea>, which is
not <received from> one of <those Inlets> before-mentioned, or any <complex>
<Idea> not <made out of those simple ones>. Nor will it be so strange, to
think these few simple <Ideas> sufficient to employ the quickest  5 
Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all
that various Knowledge, and more various Fancies and Opinions of
all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of
the various composition of 24 Letters; or if going one step farther,
we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, 10 
with barely one of the above-mentioned <Ideas, viz>. Number, whose
stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite: And what a large and
immense field, doth Extension alone afford the Mathematicians?


#C 08#                      CHAPTER VIII

      <Some farther Considerations concerning our simple> Ideas.

#S 01#. CONCERNING the simple <Ideas> of Sensation 'tis to be con-
sidered, That whatsoever is so constituted in Nature, as to be able, 15 
by affecting our Senses, to cause any perception in the Mind,
doth thereby produce in the Understanding a simple <Idea>; which,
whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken
notice of, by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on
and considered there, to be a real <positive Idea> in the Understanding, 20 
as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it
be but a privation in the subject.
#S 02#. Thus the <Idea> of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White
and Black, Motion and Rest, are equally clear and <positive Ideas> in
the Mind; though, perhaps, some of <the causes> which produce them, 25 
are barely <privations> in those Subjects, from whence our Senses
derive those <Ideas>. These the Understanding, in its view of them,
considers all as distinct positive <Ideas>, without taking notice of the
Causes that produce them: which is an enquiry not belonging to the
<Idea>, as it is in the Understanding; but to the nature of the things 30 
                                                                #P 133#
                                                                #L 1#
existing without us. These are two very different things, and care-
fully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive, and know
the <Idea> of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind
of particles they must be, and how ranged in the Superficies, to
make any Object appear White or Black.                           5
#S 03#. A Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath
the <Ideas> of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly,
and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly,
than the Philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their
Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause 10
positive or privative; and the <Idea of Black> is no less <positive> in his
Mind, than that of White, <however the cause> of that Colour in the
external Object, may <be only a privation>.
#S 04#. If it were the design of my present Undertaking, to enquire
into the natural Causes and manner of Perception, I should offer this 15
as a reason <why a privative cause might>, in some cases at least, <produce>
<a positive Idea, viz>. That all Sensation being produced in us, only
by different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits,
variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any
former motion, must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as 20
the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new <Idea>, which
depends only on a different motion of the animal Spirits in that
Organ.
#S 05#. But whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine, but
appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the shadow of a 25
Man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of Light (and
the more the absence of Light is, the more discernible is the
shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and posi-
tive an <Idea> in his mind, as a Man himself, though covered over with
clear Sun-shine? And the Picture of a Shadow, is a positive thing.
Indeed, we have <negative Names>, which stand not directly for
positive <Ideas>, but for their absence, such as <Insipid, silence, Nihil>, etc.
which Words denote positive <Ideas; v.g. Tast, Sound, Being>, with a
signification of their absence.
#S 06#. And thus one may truly be said to see Darkness. For 35
supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected,
#P 134#
#L 1#
     'tis certain one may see the Figure of it, or it may be Painted; or
whether the Ink, I write with, makes any other <Idea>, is a Question.
The privative causes I have here assigned of positive <Ideas>, are
according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to
determine, whether there be really any <Ideas> from a privative cause, 5  
till it be determined, <Whether Rest be any more a privation than Motion>.
#S 07#. To discover the nature of our <Ideas> the better, and to dis-
course of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish
them, as they are <Ideas> or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are
modifications of matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in 10 
us: that so we <may not> think (as perhaps usually is done) that they
are exactly the Images and <Resemblances> of something inherent in the
subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the
likeness of something existing without us, than the Names, that
stand for them, are the likeness of our <Ideas>, which yet upon hearing, 15 
they are apt to excite in us.
#S 08#. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate
object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call <Idea>;
and the Power to produce any <Idea> in our mind, I call <Quality> of the
Subject wherein that power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the power 20 
to produce in us the <Ideas> of <White, Cold>, and <Round>, the Powers to
produce those <Ideas> in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call
<Qualities>; and as they are Sensations, or Perceptions, in our Under-
standings, I call them <Ideas>: which <Ideas>, if I speak of sometimes, as
in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those 25 
Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.
#S 09#. Qualities thus considered in Bodies are, First such as are
utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be; such
as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be
used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense constantly 30 
finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be
                                                                #P 135#
                                                                #L 1#
perceived, and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of
Matter, though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our
Senses. <v.g>. Take a grain of Wheat, divide it into two parts, each
part has still <Solidity, Extension, Figure>, and <Mobility>; divide it again,
and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the 5
parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all
those qualities. For division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestel, or
any other Body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible
parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extension, Figure, or
Mobility from any Body, but only makes two, or more distinct 10
separate masses of Matter, of that which was but one before, all
which distinct masses, reckon'd as so many distinct Bodies, after
division make a certain Number. These I call <original> or <primary>
<Qualities> of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple
<Ideas> in us, <viz>. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and 15
Number.
#S 10#. <2dly>, Such <Qualities>, which in truth are nothing in the
Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us
by their <primary Qualities, i.e>. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and
Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tasts, <etc>. 20
These I call <secondary Qualities>. To these might be added a third sort
which are allowed to be barely Powers though they are as much
real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I to comply with the
common way of speaking call <Qualities>, but for distinction <secondary>
<Qualities>. For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or con- 
sistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a
quality in Fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new <Idea> or
Sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the
same primary Qualities, <viz>. The Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its
insensible parts.
#S 11#. The next thing to be consider'd, is how <Bodies> produce
#P 136#
#L 1#
<Ideas> in us, and that is manifestly <by impulse>, the only way which we
can conceive Bodies operate in.
#S 12#. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when
they produce <Ideas> in it; and yet we perceive <these original Qualities> in
such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident, that some  5 
motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits,
by some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation,
there to <produce in our Minds the particular> Ideas <we have of them>. And
since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an
observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance <by> the sight,   'tis 10 
evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to
the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some <Motion>, which
produces these <Ideas>, which we have of them in us.
#S 13#. After the same manner, that the <Ideas> of these original
Qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the <Ideas of> 15 
<secondary Qualities> are also <produced>, viz. <by the operation of insensible>
<particles on our Senses>. For it being manifest, that there are Bodies,
and good store of Bodies, each whereof is so small, that we cannot,
by any of our Senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as
is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extremely 20 
smaller than those, perhaps, as much smaller than the Particles of
Air, or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water, are smaller than
Pease or Hail-stones. Let us suppose at present, that the different
Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting
the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different 25 
Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies,
<v.g>. that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of
matter of peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and
modifications of their Motions, causes the <Ideas> of the blue Colour,
and sweet Scent of that Flower to be produced in our Minds. It 30 
being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such
<Ideas> to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than
that he should annex the <Idea> of Pain to the motion of a piece of
                                                                #P 137#
Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that <Idea> hath no resem#L 1#-
blance.
#S 14#. What I have said concerning <Colours> and <Smells>, may be
understood also of <Tastes> and <Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities>;
which, whatever reality we, by mistake, attribute to them, are in 5
truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce
various Sensations in us, and <depend on these primary Qualities, viz>.
Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of parts; as I have said.
#S 15#. From whence I think it is easie to draw this Observation,
That the <Ideas of primary Qualities> of Bodies, <are Resemblances> of them, 10
and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the
<Ideas, produced> in us <by> these <Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance> of
them at all. There is nothing like our <Ideas>, existing in the Bodies
themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only
a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is Sweet, Blue, 15
or Warm in <Idea>, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the
insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so.
#S 16#. <Flame> is denominated <Hot> and <Light; Snow White> and <Cold>;
and <Manna White> and <Sweet>, from the <Ideas> they produce in us.
Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those 20
Bodies, that those <Ideas> are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of
the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be
judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he,
that will consider, that <the same Fire>, that at one distance <produces> in
us the Sensation of <Warmth>, does at a nearer approach, produce in 25
us the far different Sensation of <Pain>, ought to bethink himself,
what Reason he has to say, That his <Idea> of <Warmth>, which was
produced in him by the Fire, is actually <in the Fire>; and his <Idea> of
<Pain>, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is <not> in the
<Fire>. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when
it produces the one and the other <Idea> in us; and can do neither,
but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its solid Parts?
#S 17#. The particular <Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of>
<Fire, or Snow, are really in them>, whether any ones Senses perceive
them or no: and therefore they may be called <real Qualities>, because
#P 138#
#L 1#they really exist in those Bodies. But <Light, Heat, Whiteness>, or
<Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in> Manna.
Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or
Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taste, nor the
Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they 5   
are such particular <Ideas>, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their
Causes, <i.e>. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts.
#S 18#. A piece of Manna of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us
the <Idea> of a round or square Figure; and, by being removed from
one place to another, the <Idea> of Motion. This <Idea> of Motion 10  
represents it, as it really is in the <Manna> moving: A Circle or Square
are the same, whether in <Idea> or Existence; in the Mind, or in the
<Manna>: And this, <both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna>,
whether we take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to
agree to. Besides, <Manna> by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion 15  
of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Sensations of Sickness, and
sometimes of acute Pains, or Gripings in us. That these <Ideas> of
<Sickness and Pain are not in the> Manna, but Effects of its Operations on
us, and are no where when we feel them not: This also every one
readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, 20  
that <Sweetness and Whiteness are not really in Manna>; which are but the
effects of the operations of <Manna>, by the motion, size, and figure of
its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickness caused
by <Manna>, are confessedly nothing, but the effects of its operations
on the Stomach and Guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its 25  
insensible parts; (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has
been proved:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and
thereby produce in the Mind particular distinct <Ideas>, which in it
self it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and
Stomach, and thereby produce distinct <Ideas>, which in it self it has
not. These <Ideas> being all effects of the operations of <Manna>, on
several parts of our Bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion
of its parts, why those produced by the Eyes and Palate, should
rather be thought to be really in the <Manna>, than those produced by
the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, <Ideas> that are
the effects of <Manna>, should be thought to be no-where, when they
are not felt; and yet the Sweetness and Whiteness, effects of
the same <Manna> on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as
                                                                #P 139#
#L 1#
unknown, should be thought to exist in the <Manna>, when they are
not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.
#S 19#. Let us consider the red and white colours in <Porphyre>: Hin-
der light but from striking on it, and its Colours Vanish; it no
longer produces any such <Ideas> in us: Upon the return of Light, it 5
produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real
alterations are made in the <Porphyre>, by the presence or absence of
Light; and that those <Ideas> of whiteness and redness, are really in
<Porphyre> in the light, when   'tis plain <it has no colour in the dark>? It has,
indeed, such a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as 10
are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from some parts of that
hard Stone, to produce in us the <Idea> of redness, and from others the
<Idea> of whiteness: But whiteness or redness are not in it at any time,
but such a texture, that hath the power to produce such a sensation
in us.                                                              15
#S 20#. Pound an Almond, and the clear white <Colour> will be altered
into a dirty one, and the sweet <Taste> into an oily one. What real
Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an
Alteration of the <Texture> of it?
#S 21#. <Ideas> being thus distinguished and understood, we may be 20
able to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same time,
may produce the <Idea> of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the
other: Whereas it is impossible, that the same Water, if those <Ideas>
were really in it, should at the same time be both Hot and Cold. For
if we imagine <Warmth>, as it is <in our Hands>, to be <nothing but a> 25
<certain sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or>
<animal Spirits>, we may understand, how it is possible, that the same
Water may at the same time produce the Sensation of Heat in one
Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that
never producing the <Idea> of a square by one Hand, which has pro-
duced the <Idea> of a Globe by another. But if the Sensation of Heat
and Cold, be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion
of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caused by the Corpuscles of any
other Body, it is easie to be understood, That if that motion be
greater in one Hand, than in the other; if a Body be applied to the
two Hands, which has in its minute Particles a greater motion,
than in those of one of the Hands, and a less, than in those of the
other, it will increase the motion of the one Hand, and lessen it in
the other, and so cause the different Sensations of Heat and Cold,
that depend thereon.
#P 140#
#L 1#
#S 22#. I have in what just goes before, been engaged in Physical
Enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being
necessary, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and
to make the <difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the> Ideas
<produced by them in the Mind>, to be distinctly conceived, without 5   
which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope,
I shall be pardoned this little Excursion into Natural Philosophy, it
being necessary in our present Enquiry, to distinguish the <primary>,
and <real Qualities> of Bodies, which are always in them, (<viz>. Solidity,
Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Rest; and are some-
times perceived by us, <viz>. when the Bodies they are in, are big
enough singly to be discerned) from those <secondary> and <imputed>
<Qualities>, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those
primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly dis-
cerned; whereby we also may come to know what <Ideas> are, and 15  
what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the
Bodies, we denominate from them.
#S 23#. The <Qualities> then that are in <Bodies> rightly considered, are
of <Three sorts>.
<First>, The <Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion, or Rest> of 20    
their solid Parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or
no; and when they are of that size, that we can discover them, we
have by these an <Idea> of the thing, as it is in it self, as is plain in
artificial things. These I call <primary Qualities>.
<Secondly>, The <Power> that is in any Body, <by> Reason of <its> insensible 25  
<primary Qualities>, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our
Senses, and thereby produce <in us> the <different Ideas> of several Colours,
Sounds, Smells, Tasts, <etc>. These are usually called sensible
Qualities.
      <Thirdly>, The <Power> that is in any Body, <by> Reason of the particular
Constitution of <its primary Qualities, to> make such a <change> in the
<Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body>, as to make it
operate on our Senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the
                                                                 #P 141#
#L 1#
Sun has a Power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid.  
These are usually called Powers.

The First of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly
called <real Original>, or <primary Qualities>, because they are in the
things themselves, whether they are perceived or no: and upon their 5
different Modifications it is, that the secondary Qualities depend.
The other two, are only Powers to act differently upon other
things, which Powers result from the different Modifications of
those primary Qualities.
#S 24#. But though <these two later sorts of Qualities are Powers barely>, 10
and nothing but Powers, relating to several other Bodies, and
resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities;
yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For <the Second sort, viz>.
The Powers to produce several <Ideas> in us by our Senses, <are looked>
<upon as real Qualities, in the things> thus affecting us: But <the Third sort> 15
<are call'd, and esteemed barely Powers. v.g>. the <Idea> of Heat, or Light,
which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are common-
ly thought <real Qualities>, existing in the Sun, and something more
than mere Powers in it. But when we consider the Sun, in reference
to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look upon the Whiteness 20
and Softness produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but
Effects produced by <Powers> in it: Whereas, if rightly considered,
these Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me
when I am warmed, or enlightned by the Sun, are no otherwise in
the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanched or 25
melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the
Sun, depending on its primary Qualities; whereby it is able in the
one case, so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of some of
the insensible parts of my Eyes, or Hands, as thereby to produce in
me the <Idea> of Light or Heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter
the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the insensible Parts of the
Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct <Ideas> of
White and Fluid.
#P 142#
#L 1#
#S 25#. The Reason, <Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities>,
<and the other only for bare Powers>, seems to be, because the <Ideas> we
have of distinct Colours, Sounds, <etc>. containing nothing at all in
them, of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the
Effects of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses to 5  
operate in their Production; and with which, they have not any
apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is, that
we are so forward to imagine, that those <Ideas> are the resemblances
of something really existing in the Objects themselves: Since
Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure, or Motion of parts in 10 
their Production; nor can Reason shew, how Bodies by their Bulk,
Figure, and Motion, should produce in the Mind the <Ideas> of Blue,
or Yellow, <etc>. But in the other Case, in the Operations of Bodies,
changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the
Quality produced, hath commonly no resemblance with any thing 15 
in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of
Power. For though receiving the <Idea> of Heat, or Light, from the
Sun, we are apt to think,   'tis a Perception and Resemblance of such
a Quality in the Sun: yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive
change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine, that to be the 20 
Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we
find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses,
being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness of sensible Qualities
in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude
the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject, to be an 25 
Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality,
which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible
Quality in the thing that produced it. But our Senses, not being
able to discover any unlikeness between the <Idea> produced in us,
and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine,
that our <Ideas> are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not
the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their
primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the <Ideas> produced
in us have no resemblance.
#S 26#. To conclude, beside those before mentioned <primary>
<Qualities> in Bodies, <viz>. Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and
                                                                #P 143#
                                                                #L 1#
Motion of their solid Parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of
Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else,
but several Powers in them, depending on those primary Qualities;
whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our
Bodies, to produce several different <Ideas> in us; or else by operating 5
on other Bodies, so to change their primary Qualities, as to render
them capable of producing <Ideas> in us, different from what before
they did. The former of these, I think, may be called <Secondary>
<Qualities, immediately perceivable>: The latter, <Secondary Qualities>,
<mediately perceivable>.


#C 09#                       CHAPTER IX

                           <Of Perception>.

#S 01#. <PERCEPTION>, as it is the first faculty of the Mind, exercised
about our <Ideas>; so it is the first and simplest <Idea> we have from
Reflection, and is by some called Thinking in general. Though
Thinking, in the propriety of the <English> Tongue, signifies that
sort of operation of the Mind about its <Ideas>, wherein the Mind is 15
active; where it with some degree of voluntary attention, considers
any thing. For in bare naked <Perception>, the Mind is, for the most
part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.
#S 02#. <What Perception is>, every one will know better by reflecting
on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, <etc>. or thinks, 20
than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in
his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the
Words in the World, cannot make him have any notion of it.
#S 03#. This is certain, That whatever alterations are made in the
Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impressions are made 25
on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is
no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than
it does a Billet, unless the motion be continued to the Brain, and
there the sence of Heat, or <Idea> of Pain, be produced in the Mind,
wherein consists <actual Perception>.
#P 144#
#L 1#
#S 04#. How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his
Mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some Objects;
and curiously surveying some <Ideas> that are there, it takes no notice
of impressions of sounding Bodies, made upon the Organ of Hearing,
with the same alteration, that uses to be for the producing the <Idea> 5   
of a Sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the Organ; but it
not reaching the observation of the Mind, there follows no per-
ception: And though the motion, that uses to produce the <Idea> of
Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of Sen-
sation in this case, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that 10  
the Man's Ears are less affected, than at other times, when he does
hear: but that which Uses to produce the <Idea>, though conveyed in
by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding,
and so imprinting no <Idea> on the Mind, there follows no Sensation.
<So that where-ever there is Sense, or Perception, there some> Idea <is actually> 15  
<produced, and present in the Understanding>.
#S 05#. Therefore I doubt not but <Children>, by the exercise of their
Senses about Objects, that affect them <in the Womb, receive some few>
<Ideas>, before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the
Bodies that environ them, or else of those Wants or Diseases they 20  
suffer; amongst which, (if one may conjecture concerning things
not very capable of examination) I think the <Ideas> of Hunger and
Warmth are two: which probably are some of the first that Children
have, and which they scarce ever part with again.
#S 06#. But though it be reasonable to imagine, that <Children> receive 25   
some <Ideas> before they come into the World, yet these simple <Ideas>
are <far from> those <innate Principles>, which some contend for, and we
above have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of
Sensation, are only from some Affections of the Body, which happen
to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the Mind; no
otherwise differing in their manner of production from other <Ideas>
derived from Sense, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas
those innate Principles are supposed to be of quite another nature;
not coming into the Mind by any accidental alterations in, or
operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters
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                                                                #L 1#
impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its Being and
Constitution.
#S 07#. As there are some <Ideas>, which we may reasonably suppose
may be introduced into the Minds of Children in the Womb, sub-
servient to the necessities of their Life, and Being there: So after 5
they are born, <those Ideas> are the <earliest imprinted, which happen to be the>
<sensible Qualities, which first occur> to them; amongst which, Light is
not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how
covetous the Mind is, to be furnished with all such <Ideas>, as have no
pain accompanying them, may be a little guess'd, by what is ob-  
servable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that
part, from whence the Light comes, lay them how you please. But
the <Ideas> that are most familiar at first, being various, according to
the divers circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the
World, the order, wherein the several <Ideas> come at first into 15
the Mind, is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much
material to know it.
#S 08#. We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the
<Ideas we receive by sensation, are often> in grown People <alter'd by the>
<Judgment>, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our 20
Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform colour, <v.g>. Gold, Alabaster, or
Jet,   'tis certain, that the <Idea> thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a
flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and
Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accus-
tomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont 25
to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of Light, by
the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies, the Judgment pres-
ently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their
Causes: So that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour,
collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames
to it self the perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform Colour;
when the <Idea> we receive from thence, is only a Plain variously col-
our'd, as is evident in Painting. To which purpose I shall here insert
a Problem of that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of real Know-
ledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. <Molineux>, which he was pleased to
#P 146#
#L 1#
send me in a Letter some Months since; and it is this: <Suppose a Man>
<born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a>
<Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to>
<tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere>.
<Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be> 5  
<made to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd them, he could>
<now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube>. To which the
acute and judicious Proposer answers: <Not. For though he has obtain'd>
<the experience of how a Globe, how a Cube affects his touch; yet he has not>
<yet attained the Experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect> 10 
<his sight so or so; Or that a protuberant angle in the Cube, that pressed his>
<hand unequally, shall appear to his eye, as it does in the Cube>. I agree with
this thinking Gent. whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his
answer to this his Problem; and am of opinion, that the Blind Man,
at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was 15 
the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them: though he
could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish
them by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have set down,
and leave with my Reader, as an occasion for him to consider, how
much he may be beholding to experience, improvement, and ac-  
quired notions, where he thinks, he has not the least use of, or help
from them: And the rather, because this observing Gent. farther
adds, that <having upon the occasion of my Book, proposed this to divers very>
<ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to>
<it, which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced>. 25 
#S 09#. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our <Ideas>, but those
received by <Sight>: Because Sight, the most comprehensive of all our
Senses, conveying to our Minds the <Ideas> of Light and Colours,
which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also the far different
<Ideas> of Space, Figure, and Motion, the several varieties whereof
change the appearances of its proper Object, <viz>. Light and Colours,
we bring our selves by use, to judge of the one by the other. This in
many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent
experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take
that for the Perception of our Sensation, which is an <Idea> formed by
our Judgment; so that one, <viz>. that of Sensation, serves only to
excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of it self; as a Man who
                                                                #P 147#
#L 1#
reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice
of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the <Ideas>, that are excited in
him by them.
#S 10#. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice,
if we consider, how very <quick> the <actions of the Mind> are performed: 5
For as it self is thought to take up no space, to have no extension; so
its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be
crouded into an Instant. I speak this in comparison to the Actions
of the Body. Any one may easily observe this in his own Thoughts,
who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an 10
instant, do our Minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a
demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we
consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by
step shew it another? Secondly, we shall not be so much surprized,
that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider, how the 15
facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes
them often pass in us without our notice. <Habits>, especially such as
are begun very early, come, at last, to <produce actions in us, which>
<often escape our observation>. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our
Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the 20
dark? Men, that by custom have got the use of a By-word, do almost
in every sentence, pronounce sounds, which, though taken notice of
by others, they themselves neither hear, nor observe. And therefore
tis not so strange, that our Mind should often change the <Idea> of its
Sensation, into that of its Judgment, and make one serve only to 25
excite the other, without our taking notice of it.
#S 11#. This faculty of <Perception>, seems to me to be that, which
<puts the distinction betwixt the animal Kingdom, and the inferior parts of>
<Nature>. For however Vegetables have, many of them, some degrees
of Motion, and upon the different application of other Bodies to 
them, do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions, and so have
obtained the name of sensitive Plants, from a motion, which has some
resemblance to that, which in Animals follows upon Sensation: Yet,
I suppose, it is all bare Mechanism; and no otherwise produced,
than the turning of a wild Oat-beard, by the insinuation of the
#P 148#
#L 1#
Particles of Moisture; or the short'ning of a Rope, by the affusion of
Water. All which is done without any Sensation in the Subject, or
the having or receiving any <Ideas>.
#S 12#. <Perception>, I believe, is, in some degree, <in all sorts of Animals>;
though in some, possibly, the Avenues, provided by Nature for the 5  
reception of Sensations are so few, and the Perception, they are
received with, so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of
the quickness and variety of Sensations, which is in other Animals:
but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and
condition of that sort of Animals, who are thus made: So that the 10 
Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appears in all the Parts
of this stupendious Fabrick, and all the several degrees and ranks
of Creatures in it.
#S 13#. We may, I think, from the Make of an <Oyster>, or <Cockle>,
reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick Senses, 15 
as a Man, or several other Animals; nor if it had, would it, in that
state and incapacity of transferring it self from one place to another,
be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a
Creature, that cannot move it self to, or from the Objects, wherein
at a distance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not quickness of 20 
Sensation, be an Inconvenience to an Animal, that must lie still,
where Chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of
colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?
#S 14#. But yet, I cannot but think, there is some small dull Percep-
tion, whereby they are distinguished from perfect Insensibility. 25 
And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in Mankind
it self. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the
Memory of his past Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the <Ideas> his
Mind was formerly stored with; and has, by destroying his Sight,
Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taste to a great degree, stopp'd
up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter; or, if there be some
of the Inlets yet half open, the Impressions made are scarce per-
ceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding
all that is boasted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledge, and
intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a Cockle, or an Oyster,
I leave to be considered. And if a Man had passed Sixty Years in
such a State, as   'tis possible he might, as well as three Days, I
                                                                #P 149#
                                                                #L 1#
wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual
Perfections, between him, and the lowest degree of Animals.
#S 15#. <Perception> then being <the frst step and degree towards Know->
<ledge, and the inlet of all the Materials of it>, the fewer Senses any Man,
as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the 5
Impressions are, that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties
are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from
that Knowledge, which is to be found in some Men. But this being
in great variety of Degrees, (as may be perceived amongst Men,)
cannot certainly be discovered in the several Species of Animals, 10
much less in their particular Individuals. It suffices me only to have
remarked here, that Perception is the first Operation of all our
intellectual Faculties, and the inlet of all Knowledge into our
Minds. And I am apt too to imagine, That it is Perception in the
lowest degree of it, which puts the Boundaries between Animals, 15
and the inferior ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my
conjecture by the by, it being indifferent to the Matter in Hand,
which way the Learned shall determine of it.



#C 10#                        CHAPTER X

                            <Of Retention>.

#S 01#. THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther
Progress towards Knowledge, is that which I call <Retention>, or the 20
keeping of those simple <Ideas>, which from Sensation or Reflection it
hath received. This is done two ways. First, by keeping the <Idea>,
which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is
called <Contemplation>.
#S 02#. The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in 25
our Minds those <Ideas>, which after imprinting have disappeared, or
have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when
#P 150#
#L 1#
we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being
removed. This is <Memory>, which is as it were the Store-house of our
<Ideas>. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having
many <Ideas> under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary
to have a Repository, to lay up those <Ideas>, which at another time it 5  
might have use of. But our <Ideas> being nothing, but actual Per-
ceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no
perception of them, this <laying up> of our <Ideas> in the Repository of the
Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in
many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this 10 
additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.
And in this Sense it is, that our <Ideas> are said to be in our Memories,
when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability
in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were
paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less 15 
difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus
it is, by the Assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all
those <Ideas> in our Understandings, which though we do not actually
contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and
be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible 20 
Qualities, which first imprinted them there.
#S 03#. <Attention> and <Repetition help> much to the fixing any <Ideas> in <the>
<Memory>: But those, which naturally at first make the deepest, and
most lasting Impression, are those, which are accompanied with
<Pleasure> or <Pain>. The great Business of the Senses, being to make us 25 
take notice of what hurts, or advantages the Body, it is wisely
ordered by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany
the Reception of several <Ideas>; which supplying the Place of Con-
sideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than
Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Young and Old avoid
painful Objects, with that haste, which is necessary for their
Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a caution for the
Future.
#S 04#. Concerning the several <degrees> of lasting, wherewith <Ideas> are
                                                                #P 151#
#L 1#
imprinted on the <Memory>, we may observe, That some of them have
been produced in the Understanding, by an Object affecting the
Senses once only, and no more than once: Others, that have more
than once offer'd themselves to the Senses, have yet been little
taken notice of; the Mind, either heedless, as in Children, or other- 
wise employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not setting the
stamp deep into it self. And in some, where they are set on with care
and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the Body,
or some other default, the Memory is very weak: In all these cases,
<Ideas> in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the 10
Understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining Characters
of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the
Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.
#S 05#. Thus many of those <Ideas>, which were produced in the Minds
of Children, in the beginning of their Sensation (some of which, 15
perhaps, as of some Pleasures and Pains, were before they were
born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their
Lives, they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least
glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by
some Mischance have lose their sight, when they were very Young; 20
in whom the <Ideas> of Colours, having been but slightly taken notice
of, and ceasing to be repeated. do quite wear out; so that some years
after, there is no more Notion, nor Memory of Colours left in their
Minds, than in those of People born blind. The Memory in some
Men,   'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a Miracle: But yet there 25
seems to be a constant decay of all our <Ideas>, even of those which are
struck deepest, and in Minds the most retentive; so that if they
be not sometimes renewed by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or
Reflection on those kind of Objects, which at first occasioned them,
the Print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen.
Thus the <Ideas>, as well as Children, of our Youth, often die before
us: And our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are
approaching; where though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the
#P 152#
#L 1#
Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery moulders away.
<The Pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours>; and if not
sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the Con-
stitution of our Bodies, and the make of our animal Spirits, are
concerned in this; and whether the Temper of the Brain make this 5  
difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like
Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than
Sand, I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that
the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory;
since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its 10 
<Ideas>, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those
Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if
graved in Marble.
#S 06#. But concerning the <Ideas> themselves, it is easie to remark,
That those that are <oftenest refreshed> (amongst which are those that 15 
are conveyed into the Mind by more ways than one) by a frequent
return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, <fix themselves>
<best in the Memory>, and remain clearest and longest there; and
therefore those, which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, <viz>.
<Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion>, and <Rest>, and those that almost 20 
constantly affect our Bodies, as <Heat> and <Cold>; and those which are
the Affections of all kinds of Beings, as <Existence, Duration>, and
<Number>, which almost every Object that affects our Senses, every
Thought which imploys our Minds, bring along with them:
These, I say, and the like <Ideas>, are seldom quite lost, whilst the 25 
Mind retains any <Ideas> at all.
#S 07#. In this secondary Perception, as I may so call it, or viewing
again the <Ideas>, that are lodg'd <in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes>
<more than barely passive>, the appearance of those dormant Pictures,
depending sometimes on the Will. The Mind very often sets it self
on work in search of some hidden <Idea>, and turns, as it were, the
Eye of the Soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our
Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Under-
standing; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark

                                                                #P 153#
                                                                #L 1#
Cells, into open Day-light, by some turbulent and tempestuous
Passion; our Affections bringing <Ideas> to our Memory, which had
otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observed,
concerning <Ideas> lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occasion revived
by the Mind, that they are not only (as the Word <revive> imports) 5
none of them new ones; but also that the Mind takes notice of them,
as of a former Impression, and renews its acquaintance with them,
as with <Ideas> it had known before. So that though <Ideas> formerly
imprinted are not all constantly in view, yet in remembrance they
are constantly known to be such, as have been formerly imprinted, 10
<i.e>. in view, and taken notice of before by, the Understanding.
#S 08#. <Memory>, in an intellectual Creature, is necessary in the next
degree to Perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is
wanting, all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless:
And we in our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Knowledge, could not 15
proceed beyond present Objects, were it not for the assistance of our
Memories, wherein there may be <two defects>.
<First>, That it <loses the Idea> quite, and so far it produces perfect
Ignorance. For since we can know nothing farther, than we have the
<Idea> of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect <ignorance>. 20
<Secondly>, That it moves slowly, and <retrieves not the Ideas>, that it
has, and are laid up in store, <quick enough> to serve the Mind upon
occasions. This, if it be to a great degree, is <Stupidity>; and he, who
through this default in his Memory, has not the <Ideas>, that are really
preserved there, ready at hand, when need and occasion calls for 25
them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve
him to little purpose. The dull Man, who loses the opportunity,
whilst he is seeking in his Mind for those <Ideas>, that should serve
his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledge, than one that
is perfectly ignorant.   'Tis the business therefore of the Memory to 30
furnish to the Mind those dormant <Ideas>, which it has present
occasion for, and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions,
consists that which we call <Invention, Fancy>, and quickness of Parts.
#S 09#. These are defects, we may observe, in the Memory of one
Man compared with another. There is another defect, which we may 35

#P 154#
#L 1#
conceive to be in the memory of Man in general, compared with
some superiour created intellectual Beings, which in this faculty
may so far excel Man, that they may have constantly in view
the whole Scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of
the thoughts they have ever had, may slip out of their sight. The 5  
omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to
come, and to whom the thoughts of Men's hearts always lie open,
may satisfie us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt, but
God may communicate to those glorious Spirits, his immediate
Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what proportion he pleases, 10 
as far as created finite Beings can be capable.   'Tis reported of that
prodigy of Parts, Monsieur <Pascal>, that, till the decay of his health
had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done,
read, or thought in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege
so little known to most Men, that it seems almost incredible to 15 
those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves:
But yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts
towards greater Perfections of it in superior ranks of Spirits. For
this of Mr. <Pascal> was still with the narrowness, that humane
Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of <Ideas> only by
succession, not all at once: Whereas the several degrees of Angels
may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed
with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before
them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we
may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a 25 
thinking Man; if all his past thoughts, and reasonings could be
always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of
those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate Spirits may ex-
ceedingly surpass ours.
#S 10#. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the <Ideas>, that are 30   
brought into the Mind, several <other Animals> seem to have, to a great
degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other Instances, Birds learn-
ing of Tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them, to hit
the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Per-
ception, and retain <Ideas> in their Memories, and use them for
Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour
to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they
                                                                #P 155#
                                                                #L 1#
had no <Ideas>. For though I should grant Sound may mechanically
cause a certain motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of those
Birds, whilst the Tune is actually playing; and that motion may be
continued on to the Muscles of the Wings, and so the Bird mechani-
cally be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the
Birds Preservation: yet that can never be supposed a Reason, why
it should cause mechanically, either whilst the Tune was playing,
much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the Organs of the
Bird's Voice, as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound,
which imitation can be of no use to the Bird's Preservation. But 10
which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reason, be sup-
posed (much less proved) that Birds, without Sense and Memory,
can approach their Notes, nearer and nearer by degrees, to a Tune
play'd yesterday; which if they have no <Idea> of in their Memory, is
now no-where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which
any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no
reason why the sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains,
which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the
like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, should not
make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe,
is impossible to conceive.



#C 11#                       CHAPTER XI

          <Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind>.

#S 01#. ANOTHER Faculty, we may take notice of in our Minds, is
that of <Discerning> and distinguishing between the several <Ideas> it
has. It is not enough to have a confused Perception of something in
general: Unless the Mind had a distinct Perception of different 25
Objects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little
Knowledge; though the Bodies that affect us, were as busie about
us, as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in
thinking. On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another,
depends the <evidence and certainty> of several, even very general
Propositions, which have passed for innate Truths; because Men
over-looking the true cause, why those Propositions find universal
#P 156#
#L 1#
assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions; whereas it
in truth <depends upon this clear discerning Faculty> of the Mind, whereby
it perceives two <Ideas> to be the same, or different. But of this more
hereafter.
#S 02#. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating 5   
<Ideas> one from another lies, either in the dulness, or faults of the
Organs of Sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the
Understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some
Tempers, I will not here examine: It suffices to take notice, that
this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on, and
observe in it self. It is of that consequence to its other Knowledge,
that so far as this faculty is in it self dull, or not rightly made use of,
for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our Notions
are confused, and our Reason and Judgment disturbed or misled.
If in having our <Ideas> in the Memory ready at hand, consists quick-
ness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able
nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but
the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of
Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observed in one
Man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some
Reason of that common Observation, That Men who have a great
deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest
Judgment, or deepest Reason. For <Wit> lying most in the assem-
blage of <Ideas>, and putting those together with quickness and
variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity,
thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the
Fancy: <Judgment>, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in
separating carefully, one from another, <Ideas>, wherein can be found
the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude,
and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of
proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for
the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which
strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all
People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is
required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason
there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied
                                                                #P 157#
                                                                #L 1#
with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy:
And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the
severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason; whereby it appears, that
it consists in something, that is not perfectly conformable to them.
#S 03#. To the well distinguishing our <Ideas>, it chiefly contributes, 5
that they be <clear and determinate>: And when they are so, it will <not>
<breed any confusion> or mistake about them, though the Senses should
as sometimes they do) convey them from the same Object different-
ly, on different occasions, and so seem to err. For though a Man in a
Fever should from Sugar have a bitter taste, which at another time 10
would produce a sweet one; yet the <Idea> of Bitter in that Man's
Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the <Idea> of Sweet, as if he
had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between
the two <Ideas> of Sweet and Bitter, that the same sort of Body
produces at one time one, and at another time another <Idea>, by the 15
taste, than it makes a confusion in the two <Ideas> of White and
Sweet, or White and Round, that the same piece of Sugar produces
them both in the Mind at the same time. And the <Ideas> of Orange-
colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the same par-
cel of the infusion of <Lignum Nephriticum>, are no less distinct <Ideas>, 20
than those of the same Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.
#S 04#. The <COMPARING> them one with another, in respect of
Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumstances, is
another operation of the Mind about its <Ideas>, and is that upon which
depends all that large tribe of <Ideas>, comprehended under <Relation>; 25
which of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider
hereafter.
#S 05#. How far Brutes partake in this faculty, is not easie to
determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For
though they probably have several <Ideas> distinct enough, yet it 30
seems to me to be the Prerogative of Humane Understanding, when
it has sufficiently distinguished any <Ideas>, so as to perceive them to
be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and
consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared.
And therefore, I think, <Beasts compare> not their <Ideas>, farther than
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some sensible Circumstances annexed to the Objects themselves.
The other power of Comparing, which may be observed in Men,
belonging to general <Ideas>, and useful only to abstract Reasonings,
we may probably conjecture Beasts have not.
#S 06#. The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its
<Ideas>, is <COMPOSITION>; whereby it puts together several of
those simple ones it has received from Sensation and Reflection,
and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Composition,
may be reckon'd also that of <ENLARGING>; wherein though the
Composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet 10 
it is nevertheless a putting several <Ideas> together, though of the
same kind. Thus by adding several Unites together, we make the
<Idea> of a dozen; and putting together the repeated <Ideas> of several
Perches, we frame that of Furlong.
#S 07#. In this also, I suppose, <Brutes> come far short of Men. For 15    
though they take in, and retain together several Combinations of
simple <Ideas>, as possibly the Shape, Smell, and Voice of his Master,
make up the complex <Idea> a Dog has of him; or rather are so many
distinct Marks whereby he knows him: yet, I <do not> think they do
of themselves ever compound them, and <make complex> Ideas. And
perhaps even where we think they have complex <Ideas>, 'tis only one
simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things,
which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight, than we
imagine. For I have been credibly informed, that a Bitch will nurse,
play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of
her Puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that
her Milk may go through them. And those animals, which have a
numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any
knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned
for any of their Young, that are taken from them whilst they are in
sight or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stollen from them in
their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them; or to
have any sense, that their number is lessen'd.
#S 08#. When Children have, by repeated Sensations, got <Ideas> fixed
in their Memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of Signs. 35 
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And when they have got the skill to apply the Organs of Speech to
the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make <Use of Words>,
to signifie their <Ideas> to others: These verbal Signs they sometimes
borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may
observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to 5
things in their first use of Language.
#S 09#. The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of
our internal <Ideas>, and those <Ideas> being taken from particular
things, if every particular <Idea> that we take in, should have a
distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind 10
makes the particular <Ideas>, received from particular Objects, to
become general; which is done by considering them as they are in
the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences,
and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other
concomitant <Ideas>. This is called <ABSTRACTION>, whereby 15
<Ideas> taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives
of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract <Ideas>. Such precise,
naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering, how, whence,
or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up 20
with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to
rank real Existences into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns,
and to <denominate> them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being
observed to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday
received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a 25
representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name
<Whiteness>, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever
to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Universals, whether <Ideas> or
Terms, are made.
#S 10#. If it may be doubted, Whether <Beasts> compound and enlarge
their <Ideas> that way, to any degree: This, I think, I may be positive
in, That the power of <Abstracting> is not at all in them; and that the
having of general <Ideas>, is that which puts a perfect distinction
betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties
of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we observe no

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foot-steps in them, of making use of general signs for universal
<Ideas>; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the
faculty of abstracting, or making general <Ideas>, since they have no
use of Words, or any other general Signs.
#S 11#. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs, to frame 5     
articulate Sounds, that they have no use, or knowledge of general
Words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such Sounds,
and pronounce Words distinctly enough, but never with any such
application. And on the other side, Men, who through some defect
in the Organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal 10 
<Ideas> by signs, which serve them instead of general words, a faculty
which we see Beasts come short in. And therefore I think we may
suppose, That 'tis in this, that the Species of <Brutes> are discrimi-
nated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are
wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For 15 
if they have any <Ideas> at all, and are not bare Machins (as some would
have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as
evident to me, that they do some of them in certain Instances
reason, as that they have sence; but it is only in particular <Ideas>,
just as they receiv'd them from their Senses. They are the best of
them tied up within those narrow bounds, and <have not> (as I think)
the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of <Abstraction>.
#S 12#. How far <Idiots> are concerned in the want or weakness of any,
or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact observation of their
several ways of faltering, would no doubt discover. For those who 25 
either perceive but dully, or retain the <Ideas> that come into their
Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will
have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish,
compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and
make use of Language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree:
but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very
familiar to their Senses. And indeed, any of the forementioned
Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in
Men's Understandings and Knowledge.
#S 13#. In fine, the defect in <Naturals> seems to proceed from want of
quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, where-
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by they are deprived of Reason: Whereas <mad Men>, on the other
side, seem to suffer by the other Extreme. For they do not appear
to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having joined
together some <Ideas> very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths;
and they err as Men do, that argue right from wrong Principles.  5
For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their
Fancies for Realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus
you shall find a distracted Man fancying himself a King, with a
right inference, require suitable Attendance, Respect, and Obedi-
ence: Others who have thought themselves made of Glass, have 10
used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle Bodies. Hence it
comes to pass, that a Man, who is very sober, and of a right Under-
standing in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick, as
any in <Bedlam>; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or
long fixing his Fancy upon one sort of Thoughts, incoherent <Ideas> 15
have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united.
But there are degrees of Madness, as of Folly; the disorderly
jumbling <Ideas> together, is in some more, and some less. In short,
herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and mad Men,
That mad Men put wrong <Ideas> together, and so make wrong 20
Propositions, but argue and reason right from them: But Idiots
make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.
#S 14#. These, I think, are the first Faculties and Operations of the
Mind, which it makes use of in Understanding; and though they are
exercised about all its <Ideas> in general; yet the Instances, I have
hitherto given, have been chiefly in simple <Ideas>; and I have sub-
joined the explication of these Faculties of the Mind, to that of
simple <Ideas>, before I come to what I have to say, concerning complex
ones, for these following Reasons:
<First>, Because several of these Faculties being exercised at first
principally about simple <Ideas>, we might, by following Nature in its
ordinary, method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress,
and gradual improvements.
<Secondly>, Because observing the Faculties of the Mind, how they
operate about simple <Ideas>, which are usually in most Men's Minds

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much more clear, precise, and distinct, than complex ones, we may
the better examine and learn how the Mind abstracts, denominates,
compares, and exercises its other Operations, about those which are
complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.
<Thirdly>, Because these very Operations of the Mind about <Ideas>, 5      
receiv'd from <Sensation>, are themselves, when reflected on, another
set of <Ideas>, derived from that other source of our Knowledge, which
I call <Reflection>; and therefore fit to be considered in this place,
after the simple <Ideas> of <Sensation>. Of Compounding, Comparing,
Abstracting, <etc>. I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of 10 
them more at large in other places.
#S 15#. And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true <History of>
<the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge>; whence the Mind has its
first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying
in, and storing up those <Ideas>, out of which is to be framed all the 15 
Knowledge it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and
Observation, whether I am in the right: The best way to come to
Truth, being to examine Things as really they are, and not to
conclude they are, as we fancy of our selves, or have been taught by
others to imagine. 20 
#S 16#. To deal truly, <this is the only way>, that I can discover,
<whereby> the <Ideas> of things <are brought into the Understanding>: If other
Men have either innate <Ideas>, or infused Principles, they have reason
to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to
deny them the privilege that they have above their Neighbours. 25 
I can speak but of what I find in my self, and is agreeable to those
Notions; which, if we will examine the whole course of Men in their
several Ages, Countries, and Educations, seem to depend on these
foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this Method,
in all the parts and degrees thereof.
#S 17#. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire; and therefore can-
not but confess here again, That external and internal Sensation,
are the only passages that I can find, of Knowledge, to the Under-
standing. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the Windows by

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which light is let into this <dark Room>. For, methinks, the <Under->
<standing> is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with
only some little openings left, to let in external visible Resem-
blances, or <Ideas> of things without; would the Pictures coming into
such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found 5
upon occasion, it would very much resemble the Understanding of
a Man, in reference to all Objects of sight, and the <Ideas> of them.
These are my Guesses concerning the means whereby the Under-
standing comes to have, and retain simple <Ideas>, and the modes of
them, with some other operations about them. I proceed now to 10
examine some of these simple <Ideas>, and their Modes, a little more
particularly.

#C 12#                       CHAPTER XII

                          <Of Complex> Ideas.

#S 01#. WE have hitherto considered those <Ideas>, in the reception
whereof, the Mind is only passive, which are those simple ones
received from <Sensation> and <Reflection> before-mentioned, whereof the 15
Mind cannot make any one to it self, nor have any <Idea> which does
not wholly consist of them. But as the Mind is wholly Passive in the
reception of all its simple <Ideas>, so it exerts several acts of its own,
whereby out of its simple <Ideas>, as the Materials and Foundations of
the rest, the other are framed. The Acts of the Mind wherein it ex- 
erts its Power over its simple <Ideas> are chiefly these three, 1. Com-
bining several simple <Ideas> into one compound one, and thus all
Complex <Ideas> are made. 2. The 2<d>. is bringing two <Ideas>, whether
simple or complex, together; and setting them by one another, so
as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; 25
by which way it gets all its <Ideas> of Relations. 3. The 3<d>. is separat-
ing them from all other <Ideas> that accompany them in their real
existence; this is called <Abstraction>: And thus all its General <Ideas>
are made. This shews Man's Power and its way of Operation to be
muchwhat the same in the Material and Intellectual World. For the 30

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Materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to
make or destroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them
together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.
I shall here begin with the first of these in the consideration of
Complex <Ideas>, and come to the other two in their due places. As 5  
simple <Ideas> are observed to exist in several Combinations united
together; so the Mind has a power to consider several of them
united together, as one <Idea>; and that not only as they are united in
external Objects, but as it self has join'd them. <Ideas> thus made up of
several simple ones put together, I call <Complex>; such as are <Beauty>, 10 
<Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Universe>; which though complicated
of various simple <Ideas>, or <complex Ideas> made up of simple ones, yet
are, when the Mind pleases, considered each by it self, as one entire
thing, and signified by one name.
#S 02#. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its <Ideas>, the 15    
Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its
Thoughts, infinitely beyond what <Sensation> or <Reflection> furnished it
with: But all this still confined to those simple <Ideas>, which it
received from those two Sources, and which are the ultimate
Materials of all its Compositions. For simple <Ideas> are all from things 20 
themselves; and of these <the Mind can> have no more, nor other than
what are suggested to it. It can have no other <Ideas> of sensible
Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses; nor any
<Ideas> of other kind of Operations of a thinking Substance, than what
it finds in it self: but when it has once got these simple <Ideas>, it is not 25 
confined barely to Observation, and what offers it self from without;
it can, by its own power, put together those <Ideas> it has, and <make>
<new complex ones>, which it never received so united.
#S 03#. <Complex Ideas>, however compounded and decompounded,
though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, where-  
with they fill, and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they
may be all reduced under these three Heads.
                         1.   <Modes>.
                         2.   <Substances>.                               
                         3.   <Relations>. 35                           

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#S 04#. First, <Modes> I call such complex <Ideas>, which however com-
pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by
themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of
Substances; such are the <Ideas> signified by the Words <Triangle>,
<Gratitude, Murther, etc>. And if in this I use the word <Mode>, in some- 
what a different sence from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon;
it being unavoidable in Discourses, differing from the ordinary
received Notions, either to make new Words, or to use old Words in
somewhat a new signification, the latter whereof, in our present
case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.                      10
#S 05#. Of these <Modes>, there are two sorts, which deserve distinct
consideration. First, There are some which are only variations, or
different combinations of the same simple <Idea>, without the mixture
of any other, as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the <Ideas>
of so many distinct Unites added together, and these I call <simple> 15
<Modes>, as being contained within the bounds of one simple <Idea>.
Secondly, There are others compounded of simple <Ideas> of several
kinds, put together to make one complex one; <v.g. Beauty>, con-
sisting of a certain composition of Colour and Figure, causing
delight in the Beholder; <Theft>, which being the concealed change of 20
the possession of any thing, without the consent of the Proprietor,
contains, as is visible, a combination of several <Ideas> of several kinds;
and these I call <mixed Modes>.
#S 06#. Secondly, The <Ideas> of <Substances> are such combinations of
simple <Ideas>, as are taken to represent distinct particular things 25
subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused <Idea>
of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to
Substance be joined the simple <Idea> of a certain dull whitish colour,
with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility, and Fusi-
bility, we have the <Idea> of <Lead>; and a combination of the <Ideas> of a 30
certain sort of Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and
Reasoning, joined to Substance, make the ordinary <Idea> of <a Man>.
Now of Substances also, there are two sorts of <Ideas>; one of single
Substances, as they exist separately, as of <a Man>, or <a Sheep>; the
other of several of those put together, as an <Army> of Men, or <Flock> 35
of Sheep; which <collective> Ideas <of> several <Substances> thus put

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#L 1#
together, are as much each of them one single <Idea>, as that of a
Man, or an Unite.
#S 07#. Thirdly, The last sort of complex <Ideas>, is that we call
<Relation>, which consists in the consideration and comparing one
<Idea> with another: Of these several kinds we shall treat in their 5  
order.
#S 08#. If we will trace the progress of our Minds, and with atten-
tion observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple
<Ideas> received from Sensation or Reflection, it will lead us farther
than at first, perhaps, we should have imagined. And, I believe, we 10 
shall find, if we warily observe the Originals of our Notions, that
even <the most abstruse> Ideas, how remote soever they may seem from
Sense, or from any operation of our own Minds, are yet only such,
as the Understanding frames to it self, by repeating and joining
together <Ideas>, that it had either from Objects of Sense, or from its 15 
own operations about them: So that those even large <and abstract>
Ideas <are derived from Sensation, or Reflection>, being no other than what
the Mind, by the ordinary use of its own Faculties, employed about
<Ideas>, received from Objects of Sense, or from the Operations it
observes in it self about them, may, and does attain unto. This I 20 
shall endeavour to shew in the <Ideas> we have of <Space, Time>, and
<Infinity>, and some few other, that seem the most remote from those
Originals.

#C 13#                      CHAPTER XIII

      <Of simple Modes; and first, of the simple Modes of Space>.

#S 01#. THOUGH in the foregoing part, I have often mentioned simple
<Ideas>, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having 25 
treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the
Mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will
not be, perhaps, amiss to take a view of some of them again under
this Consideration, and examine those different <Modifications of the>
<same> Idea; which the Mind either finds in things existing, or is able 30 
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to make within it self, without the help of any extrinsical Object, or
any foreign Suggestion.
Those <Modifications of any one simple> Idea, (which, as has been said,
<I call simple Modes>) are as perfectly different and distinct <Ideas> in the
Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the <Idea> 5
of <Two>, is as distinct from that of <One>, as <Blueness> from <Heat>, or either
of them from any Number: and yet it is made up only of that simple
<Idea> of an Unite repeated; and Repetitions of this kind joined to-
gether, make those distinct <simple Modes>, of a <Dozen>, a <Gross, a Million>.
#S 02#. I shall begin with the <simple Idea of Space>. I have shewed above, 10
<c>.4. that we get the <Idea> of Space, both by our Sight, and Touch;
which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless, to go to
prove, that Men perceive, by their Sight, a distance between Bodies
of different Colours, or between the parts of the same Body; as that
they see Colours themselves: Nor is it less obvious, that they can i5
do so in the Dark by Feeling and Touch.
#S 03#. This Space considered barely in length between any two
Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called
<Distance>: If considered in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I think,
it may be called <Capacity>: The term Extension is usually applied to 20
it, in what manner soever considered.
#S 04#. Each different distance is a different Modification of Space,
and <each> Idea <of any different distance, or Space, is a simple Mode of this>
Idea. Men for the use, and by the custom of measuring, settle in
their Minds the <Ideas> of certain stated lengths, such as are an <Inch>, 25
<Foot, Yard, Fathom, Mile, Diameter of the Earth>, etc. which are so many
distinct <Ideas> made up only of Space. When any such stated lengths
or measures of Space are made familiar to Men's Thoughts, they
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#L 1#
can, in their Minds, repeat them as often as they will, without
mixing or joining to them the <Idea> of Body, or any thing else; and
frame to themselves the <Ideas> of long, square, or cubick, <Feet, Yards>,
or <Fathoms>, here amongst the Bodies of the Universe, or else beyond
the utmost Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding these still one to 5  
another, enlarge their <Idea> of Space as much as they please. This
Power of repeating, or doubling any <Idea> we have of any distance,
and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever
able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we
will, is that, which gives us the <Idea> of <Immensity>. 10 
#S 05#. There is another Modification of this <Idea>, which is nothing
but the Relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extension,
or circumscribed Space have amongst themselves. This the Touch
discovers in sensible Bodies, whose Extremities come within our
reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose 15 
Boundaries are within its view: Where observing how the Extremi-
ties terminate, either in streight Lines, which meet at discernible
Angles; or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceived,
by considering these as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the
Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that <Idea> we call <Figure>, 20 
which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. For besides the vast
Number of different Figures, that do really exist in the coherent
masses of Matter, the Stock, that the Mind has in its Power, by
varying the <Idea> of Space; and thereby making still new Com-
positions, by repeating its own <Ideas>, and joining them as it pleases, 25 
is perfectly inexhaustible: And so it can multiply Figures <in>
<infinitum>.
#S 06#. For the Mind, having a Power to repeat the <Idea> of any length
directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same Direction,
which is to double the length of that streight Line; or else join it to 30 
another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort
of Angle it pleases: And being able also to shorten any Line it
imagines, by taking from it 1/2 or 1/4, or what part it pleases, without
being able to come to an end of any such Divisions, it can make an

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Angle of any bigness: So also the Lines that are its sides, of what
length it pleases, which joining again to other Lines of different
lengths, and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclosed any
Space, it is evident that it can multiply <Figures> both in their Shape,
and Capacity, <in infinitum>, all which are but so many different 5
<simple Modes of Space>.
The same that it can do with streight Lines, it can do also with
crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the same it can do
in Lines, it can also in Superficies, by which we may be led into
farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of <Figures>, that the Mind 10
has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the <simple Modes> of
Space.
#S 07#. Another <Idea> coming under this Head, and belonging to this
Tribe, is that we call <Place>. As in simple Space, we consider the
relation of Distance between any two Bodies, or Points; so in our 15
<Idea> of <Place>, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing,
and any two or more Points, which are considered, as keeping the
same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest; for
when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was
Yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not since 20
changed their distance one with another, and with which we then
compared it, we say it hath kept the same <Place>: But if it hath
sensibly altered its distance with either of those Points, we say it
hath changed its Place: Though vulgarly speaking in the common
Notion of <Place>, we do not always exactly observe the distance from 25
precise Points; but from larger Portions of sensible Objects, to
which we consider the thing placed to bear Relation, and its
distance from which we have some Reason to observe.
#S 08#. Thus a Company of Chess-men, standing on the same squares
of the Chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the 30
<same Place>, or unmoved; though, perhaps, the Chess-board hath
been in the mean time carried out of one Room into another,
because we compared them only to the Parts of the Chess-board,
which keep the same distance one with another. The Chess-board,
we also say, is in the <same Place> it was, if it remain in the same part of 35
the Cabin, though, perhaps, the Ship which it is in, sails all the

#P 170#
#L 1#
while: and the Ship is said to be in the <same Place>, supposing it kept
the same distance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land; though,
perhaps, the Earth hath turned round; and so both Chess-men, and
Board, and Ship, have every one <changed Place> in respect of remoter
Bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But 5  
yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which
determines the Place of the Chess-men; and the distance from the
fixed parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Comparison)
being that which determined the Place of the Chess-board, and the
fixed parts of the Earth, that by which we determined the Place of 10 
the Ship, these things may be said properly to be in the <same Place>,
in those respects: Though their distance from some other things,
which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have
undoubtedly <changed Place> in that respect; and we our selves shall
think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those 15 
other.
#S 09#. But this Modification of Distance, we call <Place>, being made
by Men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to
design the particular Position of Things, where they had occasion
for such Designation, Men consider and determine of this <Place>, 20 
by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their
present Purpose, without considering other things, which to
another Purpose would better <determine the Place> of the same thing.
Thus in the Chess-board, the use of the <Designation of> the <Place> of
each Chess-man, being determined only within that chequer'd 25 
piece of Wood, 'twould cross that Purpose, to measure it by any
thing else: But when these very Chess-men are put up in a Bag, if
any one should ask, where the black King is, it would be proper to
<determine the Place> by the parts of the Room it was in, and not by the
Chess-board; there being another use of <designing the Place> it is now 30 
in, than when in Play it was on the Chess-board, and so must be
determined by other Bodies. So if any one should ask, in what Place
are the Verses, which report the Story <of Nisus> and Eurialus, 'twould
be very improper to determine this Place, by saying, they were in
such a part of the Earth, or in <Bodley's> Library: But the right 35 
Designation of the place, would be by the parts of <Virgil's> Works;
and the proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the
middle of the Ninth Book of his <AEneids>; And that they have been
always constantly in the same Place ever since <Virgil> was printed:
Which is true, though the Book it self hath moved a Thousand

                                                                #P 171#
                                                                #L 1#
times, the use of the <Idea> of Place here, being to know only, in what
part of the Book that Story is; that so upon occasion, we may know
where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.
#S 10#. That our <Idea> of Place, is nothing else, but such a relative
Position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think, is plain, 5
and will be easily admitted, when we consider, that we can have
no <Idea> of the Place of the Universe, though we can of all the parts
of it; because beyond that, we have not the <Idea> of any fixed,
distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which, we can imagine it
to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform 10
Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no variety, no marks.
For to say that the World is somewhere, means no more, than that
it does exist; this though a Phrase, borrowed from Place, signifying
only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out, and
frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe, 15
he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the
undistinguishable <Inane> of infinite Space; though it be true, that the
Word Place, has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for
that Space, which any Body takes up; and so the Universe is in a
Place. The <Idea> therefore of <Place>, we have by the same means, that 20
we get the <Idea> of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited
Consideration) <viz>. by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we
receive into our Minds the <Ideas> of Extension or Distance.
#S 11#. There are some that would persuade us, that <Body and>
<Extension are the same thing>; who either change the Signification of 25
Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely
condemned the Philosophy of others, because it hath been too much
placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful
or insignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by <Body and Extension>
<the same>, that other People do, <viz>. by <Body> something that is solid, 30
and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different
ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the
Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possessed by
them, they confound very different <Ideas> one with another. For I
appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the <Idea> of Space be 35

#P 172#
#L 1#
not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the <Idea> of Scarlet-
Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither
can Scarlet-Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not,
but that they are distinct <Ideas>. Many <Ideas> require others as
necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very 5  
distinct <Ideas>. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without
Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can
exist without it, and they are very distinct <Ideas>; and so, I think,
are those of Space and Solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an <Idea>
from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, 10 
Impulse, and Communication of Motion upon Impulse. And if it be
a Reason to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, because
Thinking includes not the <Idea> of Extension in it; the same Reason
will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that <Space is not Body>, because it
includes not the <Idea> of Solidity in it; <Space and Solidity> being <as> 15 
<distinct Ideas>, as Thinking and Extension, and as wholly separable in
the Mind one from another. <Body> then and <Extension, 'tis> evident,
are two distinct <Ideas>. For,
#S 12#. <First, Extension> includes no Solidity, nor resistance to the
Motion of <Body>, as Body does. 20 
#S 13#. <Secondly>, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from
the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither
really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part
of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in
Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing 25 
the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before
there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the
Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and
consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be
done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being sepa-  
rated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies,
which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these
ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, com-
patible to pure <Space>.
Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a <Space>, as is 35   '
answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the
rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as
mental Separation, or Division; since a Man can no more mentally
divide, without considering two Superficies, separate one from the

                                                                 #P 173#
                                                                 #L 1#
other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies
disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial consideration is not
separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its
Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking
of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating 5
in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing
separately.
#S 14#. <Thirdly>, The parts of pure <Space>, are immovable, which fol-
lows from their inseparability; <Motion> being nothing but change of
distance between any two things: But this cannot be between 10
Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at
perpetual rest one amongst another.
Thus the determined <Idea> of simple <Space> distinguishes it plainly,
and sufficiently from <Body>; since its Parts are inseparable, im-
movable, and without resistance to the Motion of Body.               15
#S 15#. If any one ask me, <What> this <Space>, I speak of, <is>? I will tell
him, when he tells me what his <Extension> is. For to say, as is usually
done, That Extension is to have <partes extra partes>, is to say only,
That <Extension> is <Extension>: For what am I the better informed in the
nature of <Extension>, when I am told, That <Extension is to have parts that> 20
<are extended, exterior to parts that are extended>, i.e. <Extension> consists of
extended Parts? As if one asking, What a Fibre was; I should answer
him, That it was a thing made up of several Fibres: Would he
hereby be enabled to understand what a Fibre was, better than he
did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my 25
design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to in-
struct him?
#S 16#. Those who contend that <Space and Body> are <the same>, bring
this <Dilemma>. Either this <Space> is something or nothing; if nothing be
between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to 30
be something, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I
answer by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or
could be nothing, but solid Beings, which could not think; and
thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean
by the terms <Body> and <Spirit>.   35

                                                                    #P 174#
                                                                    #L 1#
#S 17#. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this <Space> void of
<Body>, be <Substance> or <Accident>, I shall readily answer, I know not: nor
shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me
a clear distinct <Idea> of <Substance>.
#S 18#. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my self from those 5     
Fallacies, which we are apt to put upon our selves, by taking Words
for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledge, where
we have none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and
distinct Significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the
nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are 10 
signs of, and stand for determined <Ideas>. And I desire those who lay
so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, <Substance>, to
consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incompre-
hensible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same sense;
and whether it stands for the same <Idea>, when each of those three so 15 
different Beings are called <Substances>? If so, whether it will not thence
follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common
nature of <Substance>, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different
modification of that <Substance>; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the
same sense Body, and agreeing in the common nature of Body, 20 
differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will
be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God,
finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different significations, and that
it stands for one <Idea>, when GOD is said to be a <Substance>; for another,
when the Soul is called <Substance>; and for a third, when a Body is 25 
called so. If the name <Substance>, stands for three several distinct
<Ideas>, they would do well to make known those distinct <Ideas>, or at
least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so im-
portant a Notion, the Confusion and Errors, that will naturally
follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so 30 
far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use
it has scarce one clear distinct signification: And if they can thus
make three distinct <Ideas> of <Substance>, what hinders, why another
may not make a fourth?

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                                                                 #L 1#
#S 19#. They who first ran into the Notion of <Accidents>, as a sort of
real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find
out the word <Substance>, to support them. Had the poor <Indian>
Philosopher (who imagined that the Earth also wanted something
to bear it up but thought of this word <Substance>, he needed not to 5
have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a
Tortoise to support his Elephant: The word <Substance> would have
done it effectually. And he that enquired, might have taken it for as
good an Answer from an <Indian> Philosopher, That <Substance>, without
knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth, as we take 10
it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine, from our <European>
Philosophers, That <Substance> without knowing what it is, is that
which supports <Accidents>. So that of <Substance>, we have no <Idea> of
what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.
#S 20#. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent 15
<American>, who enquired into the Nature of Things, would scarce
take it for a satisfactory Account, if desiring to learn our Archi-
tecture, he should be told, That a Pillar was a thing supported by a
<Basis>, and a <Basis> something that supported a Pillar. Would he not
think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as 20
this? And a Stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in
the nature of Books, and the things they contained, if he should be
told, that all learned Books consisted of Paper and Letters, and that
Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held
forth Letters; a notable way of having clear <Ideas> of Letters and 25
Paper. But were the Latin words <Inhaerentia> and <Substantia>, put into
the plain English ones that answer them, and were called <Sticking on>,
and <Under-propping>, they would better discover to us the very great
clearness there is in the Doctrine of <Substance and Accidents>, and
shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy. 30
#S 21#. But to return to our <Idea> of <Space>. If <Body> be not supposed
infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if
God placed a Man at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not
stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put

#P 176#
#L 1#
his Arm, where there was before <Space> without <Body>; and if there he
spread his Fingers, there would still be <Space> between them without
<Body>: If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be because of
some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a
power of moving the parts of his Body, that he hath now, which is 5  
not in it self impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is
not impossible for God so to move him:) And then I ask, Whether
that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Substance
or Accident, Something or Nothing? And when they have resolved
that, they will be able to resolve themselves, what that is, which is 10 
or may be between two Bodies at a distance, that is not Body, has
no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at least as good,
That where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all
Bodies) a <Body> put into motion may move on, as where there is
nothing between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch. For 15 
pure <Space> between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of
mutual Contact; but bare <Space> in the way, is not sufficient to stop
Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own, that they think
Body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm,
that <Space> is not <Body>. For I would fain meet with that thinking 20 
Man, that can, in his Thoughts, set any bounds to Space, more than
he can to Duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of
either: And therefore if his <Idea> of Eternity be infinite, so is his <Idea>
of Immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.
#S 21# [<bis>]. Farther, those who assert the impossibility of <Space> 25    
existing without <Matter>, must not only make Body infinite, but
must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No
one, I suppose, will deny, that God can put an end to all motion
that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect
quiet and rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever 30 
then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate
either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily
admit the possibility of a <Vacuum>. For it is evident, that the Space,
that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain,
and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being 35 
in perfect rest, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that state make it a

                                                                 #P 177#
                                                                 #L 1#
perfect impossibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And
indeed the necessary motion of one Particle of Matter, into the
place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a
consequence from the supposition of Plenitude; which will there-
fore need some better proof, than a supposed matter of fact, which 5
Experiment can never make out; our own clear and distinct <Ideas>
plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connexion between
<Space> and <Solidity>, since we can conceive the one without the other.
And those who dispute for or against a <Vacuum>, do thereby confess,
they have distinct <Ideas> of <Vacuum> and <Plenum>, i.e. that they have an 10
<Idea> of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence;
or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much
alter the signification of Words, as to call <Extension Body>, and con-
sequently make the whole Essence of Body, to be nothing but pure
Extension without Solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they 15
speak of <Vacuum>, since it is impossible for Extension to be without
Extension. For <Vacuum>, whether we affirm or deny its existence,
signifies Space without Body, whose very existence no one can deny
to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from
God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.                        20
#S 22#. But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of Body
in the Universe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency to find a <Vacuum>,
the <motion> of Bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem
to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid
Body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the 25
solid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the
bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as
big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body.
And if where the least Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a
Mustard-seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Mustard-seed, be 30
requisite to make room for the free motion of the Parts of the
divided Body within the bounds of its Superficies, where the
Particles of Matter are 1,000,000,000 less than a Mustard-seed, there
must also be a space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part
of a Mustard-seed; for if it holds in one, it will hold in the other, 35
and so on <in infinitum>. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it

                                                                    #P 178#
                                                                    #L 1#
destroys the Hypothesis of <Plenitude>. For if there can be a Space
void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now
existing in Nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great
a difference between Space and Body, as if it were
a distance as wide as any in Nature. And therefore if we suppose not 5  
the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the
divided solid Matter, but to 1/10 or 1/1000 of it, the same consequence
will always follow of Space without Matter.
#S 23#. But the Question being here, whether the <Idea of Space> or
<Extension>, be <the same with the Idea of Body>, it is not necessary to prove 10 
the real existence of a <Vacuum>, but the <Idea> of it; which 'tis plain
Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a
<Vacuum> or no? For if they had not the <Idea> of Space without Body,
they could not make a question about its existence: And if their
<Idea> of Body did not include in it something more than the bare <Idea> 15 
of Space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the
World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were
Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or
Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the
same <Idea>. 20 
#S 24#>.  'Tis true, the <Idea> of <Extension> joins it self so inseparably with
all visible, and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no
one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in impressions
of Extension too. This readiness of Extension to make it self be
taken notice of so constantly with other <Ideas>, has been the occasion, 25 
I guess, that some have made the whole essence of <Body>, to consist
in Extension; which is not much to be wond'red at, since some have
had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our
Senses) so filled with the <Idea> of Extension, and as it were wholly
possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing, that 30 
had not Extension. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take
the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and
gross Imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who
conclude the essence of Body to be <Extension>, because, they say, they
cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Exten-  
sion, I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on
their <Ideas> of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and
Touch; nay, had they examined their <Ideas> of Hunger and Thirst,
                                                                #P 179#
                                                                #L 1#
and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included
in them no <Idea> of Extension at all, which is but an affection of
Body, as well as the rest discoverable by our Senses, which are scarce
acute enough to look into the pure Essences of Things.
#S 25#. If those <Ideas>, which are constantly joined to all others, must 5
therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those Things, which
have constantly those <Ideas> joined to them, and are inseparable
from them; then Unity is without doubt the essence of every thing.
For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does
not carry with it the <Idea> of one: But the weakness of this kind of 10
Argument, we have already shewn sufficiently.
#S 26#. To conclude, whatever Men shall think concerning the
existence of a <Vacuum>, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an
<Idea of Space distinct from Solidity>, as we have of Solidity distinct from
Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more distinct 15
<Ideas>, and we can as easily conceive space without Solidity, as we
can conceive Body or Space without Motion, though it be never so
certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space. But
whether any one will take Space to be only a relation resulting from
the Existence of other Beings at a distance; or whether they will 20
think the Words of the most knowing King <Solomon, The Heaven, and>
<the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee>;<*> or those more emphatical
ones of the inspired Philosopher St. <Paul, In Him we live, move, and>
<have our Being>,<**> are to be understood in a literal sence, I leave every
one to consider; only our <Idea> of <Space> is, I think, such as I have 25
mentioned, and distinct from that of <Body>. For whether we con-
sider in Matter it self, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and
call it, in respect of those solid parts, <Extension>; or whether con-
sidering it, as lying between the extremities of any Body in its
several dimensions, we call it <Length, Breadth>, and <Thickness>; or else 30
considering it as lying between any two Bodies, or positive Beings,
without any consideration, whether there be any Matter or no
between, we call it <Distance>. However named or considered, it is
always the same uniform simple <Idea> of <Space>, taken from Objects,
about which our Senses have been conversant, whereof having 35
                                                                    #P 180#
                                                                    #L 1#
setled <Ideas> in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one
to another as often as we will, and consider the Space or Distance so
imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another Body
cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the Body
that was there before; or else as void of Solidity, so that a Body of 5  
equal dimensions to that empty or pure Space, may be placed in it
without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But
to avoid Confusion in Discourses concerning this Matter, it were
possibly to be wished that the Name <Extension> were applied only
to Matter, or the distance of the Extremities of particular Bodies, 10 
and the Term <Expansion> to Space in general, with or without solid
Matter possessing it, so as to say <Space> is <expanded>, and <Body extended>.
But in this every one has his liberty; I propose it only for the more
clear and distinct way of speaking.
#S 27#. The knowing precisely what our Words stand for, would, I 15    
imagine, in this, as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the
dispute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to
examine them, find their simple <Ideas> all generally to agree, though
in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another
with different Names. I imagine, that <Men> who abstract their 20 
Thoughts, and do well examine the <Ideas> of their own Minds,
<cannot much differ in thinking>; however, they may perplex themselves
with words, according to the way of speaking of the several
Schools, or Sects, they have been bred up in: Though amongst un-
thinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their 25 
own <Ideas>, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but
confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrang-
ling, and jargon; especially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted
to some Sect, and accustomed to the Language of it; and have
learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two 30 
thinking Men should really have different <Ideas>, I do not see how
they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be
mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Men's Brains,
is presently of that sort of <Ideas> I speak of. 'Tis not easie for the
Mind to put off those confused Notions and Prejudices it has 35 
imbibed from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Conversation:




                                                           #P 181#
                                                           #L 1#
it requires pains and assiduity to examine its <Ideas>, till it resolves
them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they
are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have
or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon
another: Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions
of Things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and
will often find himself at a loss.


#C 14#                    CHAPTER XIV

               <Of Duration, and its simple Modes>.

#S 01#. THERE is another sort of Distance, or Length, the <Idea>
whereof we get not from the permanent parts of Space, but from
the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we 10
call <Duration>, the simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of
it, whereof we have distinct <Ideas>, as <Hours, Days, Years>, etc. <Time>,
and <Eternity>.
#S 02#. The Answer of a great Man, to one who asked what Time
was <Si non rogas intelligo,*> (which amounts to this; the more I set my 15
self to think of it, the less I understand it;) might perhaps perswade
one, That <Time>, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be
discovered. <Duration, Time>, and <Eternity>, are, not without reason,
thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But
however remote these may seem from our Comprehension, yet if 20
we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of those
Sources of all our Knowledge, <viz. Sensation> and <Reflection>, will be
able to furnish us with these <Ideas>, as clear and distinct as many
other, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that
the <Idea> of Eternity it self is derived from the same common Original 25
with the rest of our <Ideas>.
#S 03#. To understand <Time> and <Eternity> ar1ght, we ought with
attention to consider what <Idea> it is we have of <Duration>, and how
#P 182#
#L 1#
we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one who will but observe what
Passes in his own Mind, that there is a train of <Ideas>, which con-
stantly succeed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is
awake. <Reflection> on these appearances of several <Ideas> one after
another in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the <Idea> of 5  
<Succession>: And the distance between any parts of that Succession, or
between the appearance of any two <Ideas> in our Minds, is that we
call <Duration>. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive
successively several <Ideas> in our Minds, we know that we do exist;
and so we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of 10 
our selves, or any thing else, Commensurate to the succession of any
<Ideas> in our Minds, the <Duration> of our selves, or any such other
thing co-existing with our Thinking.
#S 04#. That we have our notion of <Succession and Duration> from this
Original, <viz>. from Reflection on the train of <Ideas>, which we find to 15 
appear one after another in our own Minds, seems plain to me, in
that we have no perception of <Duration>, but by considering the
train of <Ideas>, that take their turns in our Understandings. When
that succession of <Ideas> ceases, our perception of Duration ceases
with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he 20 
sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day; a month, or a year; of
which Duration of things, whilst he sleeps, or thinks not, he has no
perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment
wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think
again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not but it 25 
would be to a waking Man, if it were possible for him to keep only
one <Idea> in his Mind, without variation, and the succession of
others: And we see, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently
on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of <Ideas>
that pass in his Mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest
Contemplation, lets slip out of his Account a good part of that
Duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep
commonly unites the distant parts of Duration, it is, because during
that time we have no Succession of <Ideas> in our Minds. For if a Man,
during his Sleep, dreams, and variety of <Ideas> make themselves
perceptible in his Mind one after another, he hath then, during such
a dreaming, a Sense of <Duration>, and of the length of it. By which it is
to me very clear, that Men derive their <Ideas> of Duration, from their

#P 183#
#L 1#
<Reflection on the train of the> Ideas, they observe to succeed one
another in their own Understandings, without which Observation
they can have no Notion of <Duration>, whatever may happen in the
World.
#S 05#. Indeed a Man having from reflecting on the Succession and 5
Number of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or <Idea> of <Duration>,
he can apply that Notion to things, which exist while he does not
think; as he, that has got the <Idea> of Extension from Bodies by his
Sight or Touch, can apply it to distances, where no Body is seen or
felt. And therefore, though a Man has no Perception of the length 10
of Duration, which past whilst he slept or thought not: yet having
observed the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the length
of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and constant, he can,
upon the supposition, that that Revolution has proceeded after the
same manner, whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do 15
at other times, he can, I say, imagine and make allowance for the
length of <Duration>, whilst he slept. But if <Adam> and <Eve> (when they
were alone in the World) instead of their ordinary Nights Sleep,
had passed the whole 24 hours in one continued Sleep, the Duration
of that 24 hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for 20
ever left out of their Account of time.
#S 06#. Thus <by reflecting on the appearing of various> Ideas, <one after>
<another in our Understandings, we get the Notion of Succession>; which if
any one should think, we did rather get from our Observation of
Motion by our Senses, he will, perhaps, be of my Mind, when he 25
considers, that even Motion produces in his Mind an <Idea> of
Succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued
train of distinguishable <Ideas>. For a Man looking upon a Body really
moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces
a constant train <of successive> Ideas. <v.g>. a Man becalmed at Sea, out of
sight of Land, in a fair Day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship,
a whole hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either;
though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have
moved, during that time, a great way: But as soon as he perceives
either of them to have changed distance with some other Body, as
#P 184#
#L 1#
soon as this Motion produces any new <Idea> in him, then he per-
ceives, that there has been Motion. But where-ever a Man is, with
all things at rest about him, without perceiving any Motion at all;
if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive
the various <Ideas> of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing 5  
one after another, and thereby observe and find Succession, where
he could observe no Motion.
#S 07#. And this, I think, is the Reason, <why Motions very slow>, though
they are constant, <are not perceived> by us; because in their remove
from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is 10 
so slow, that it causes no new <Ideas> in us, but a good while one after
another: And so not causing a constant train of new <Ideas>, to follow
one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of
Motion; which consisting in a constant Succession, we cannot
perceive that Succession, without a constant Succession of varying 15 
<Ideas> arising from it.
#S 08#. On the contrary, <things that move> so swift, as not to affect the
Senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their
Motion, and so cause not any train of <Ideas> in the Mind, <are not> also
<perceived> to move. For any thing, that moves round about in a Circle, 20 
in less time than our <Ideas> are wont to succeed one another in our
Minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect, entire
Circle of that Matter, or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in
Motion.
#S 09#. Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not 25   
probable that our <Ideas> do, whilst we are awake, succeed one
another in our Minds at certain distances, not much unlike the
Images in the inside of a Lanthorn, turned round by the Heat of a
Candle. This Appearance of theirs in train, though, perhaps, it may
be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower; yet, I guess, varies not
very much in a waking Man: There seem to be <certain Bounds to the>
<quickness and slowness of the Succession of> those <Ideas> one to another in
our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.
#S 10#. The Reason I have for this odd conjecture is, from observ-
ing that in the Impressions made upon any of our Senses, we can but
to a certain degree perceive any Succession; which if exceeding
quick, the Sense of Succession is lost, even in Cases where it is
                                                           #P 185#
                                                           #L 1#
evident, that there is a real Succession. Let a Cannon-Bullet pass
through a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleshy
Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonstration can be, that it
must strike successively the two sides of the Room: 'Tis also evi-
dent, that it must touch one part of the Flesh first, and another 5
after; and so in Succession: And yet I believe, no Body, who ever
felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two
distant Walls, could perceive any Succession, either in the pain, or
sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein
we perceive no Succession, is that which we may call an <Instant>; and 10
is <that which takes up the time of only one Idea> in our Minds, without the
Succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession
at all.
#S 11#. This also happens, <where the Motion is> so <slow>, as not to
supply a constant train of fresh <Ideas> to the Senses, as fast as the 15
Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other <Ideas> of
our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between
those offered to our Senses by the moving Body, <there the Sense of>
<Motion is lost>; and the Body, though it really moves, yet not chang-
ing perceivable distance with some other Bodies, as fast as the <Ideas> 20
of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in train, the
thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks, and
Shadows of Sun-dials, and other constant, but slow Motions, where
though after certain Intervals, we perceive by the change of dis-
tance, that it hath moved, yet the Motion it self we perceive not.  25
#S 12#. So that to me it seems, that <the constant and regular Succession>
<of Ideas> in a waking Man, <is>, as it were, <the Measure> and Standard <of>
<all other Successions>, whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our
<Ideas>; as where two sounds or pains, <etc>. take up in their Succession
the Duration of but one <Idea>; or else where any Motion or Succession
is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the <Ideas> in our Minds, or
the quickness, in which they take their turns; as when any one, or
more <Ideas> in their ordinary course come into our Mind between
those, which are offered to the sight, by the different perceptible
distances of a Body in Motion, or between Sounds, or Smells,
#P 186#
#L 1#
following one another, there also the Sense of a constant continued
Succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of
rest between.
#S 13#. If it be so, that the <Ideas> of our Minds, whilst we have any
there, do constantly change, and shift in a continual Succession, it  5 
would be impossible, may any one say, for a Man to think long of
any one thing: By which if it be meant, that a Man may <have one>
<self-same single> Idea <a long time alone in his Mind, without any variation at>
<all>, I think, in matter of Fact it is <not possible>, for which (not knowing
how the <Ideas> of our Minds are framed, of what Materials they are 10 
made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make
their Appearances,) I can give no other Reason but Experience: and
I would have any one try, whether he can keep one unvaried single
<Idea> in his Mind, without any other, for any considerable time
together. 15 
#S 14#. For Trial, let him take any Figure, any Degree of Light or
Whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it
difficult to keep all other <Ideas> out of his Mind: But that some, either
of another kind, or various Consideration of that <Idea> (each of
which Considerations is a new <Idea>) will constantly succeed one 20 
another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.
#S 15#. All that is in a Man's Power in this Case, I think, is only to
mind and observe what the <Ideas> are, that take their turns <in> his Un-
derstanding; or else, to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a
desire or use of: but hinder the <constant Succession> of fresh ones, I 25 
think he cannot, though he may commonly chuse, whether he will
heedfully observe and consider them.
#S 16#. Whether these several <Ideas> in a Man's Mind be made by
certain Motions, I will not here dispute: But this I am sure, that
they include no <Idea> of Motion in their Appearance; and if a Man had
not the <Idea> of Motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all,
which is enough to my present Purpose; and sufficiently shews, that
the notice we take of the <Ideas> of our own Minds, appearing there
one after another, is that, which gives us the <Idea> of Succession and
Duration, without which we should have no such <Ideas> at all. 'Tis
<not> then, <Motion>, but the constant train of <Ideas> in our Minds, whilst
                                                           #P 187#
                                                           #L 1#
we are waking, <that furnishes us with the> Idea <of Duration>, whereof
Motion no otherwise gives us any Perception, than as it causes in
our Minds a constant Succession of <Ideas>, as I have before shewed:
and we have as clear an <Idea> of Succession, and Duration by the train
of other <Ideas> succeeding one another in our Minds, without the 5
<Idea> of any Motion, as by the train of <Ideas> caused by the uninter-
rupted sensible change of distance between two Bodies, which we
have from Motion; and therefore we should as well have the <Idea> of
Duration, were there no Sense of Motion at all.
#S 17#. Having thus got the <Idea> of Duration, the next thing natural 10
for the Mind to do, is to get some <measure> of this common <Duration>,
whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the
distinct Order, wherein several things exist, without which a great
part of our Knowledge would be confused, and a great part of
History be rendered very useless. This Consideration of Duration, 15
as set out by certain Periods, and marked by certain Measures or
<Epochs>, is that, I think, which most properly we call <Time>.
#S 18#. In the measuring of Extension, there is nothing more re-
quired, but the Application of the Standard or Measure we make
use of, to the thing of whose Extension we would be informed. But 20
in the measuring of Duration, this cannot be done, because no two
different parts of Succession can be put together to measure one
another: And nothing being a <measure of Duration>, but Duration; as
nothing is of Extension, but Extension, we cannot keep by us any
standing unvarying measure of Duration, which consists in a 25
constant fleeting Succession, as we can of certain lengths of Ex-
tension, as Inches, Feet, Yards, <etc>. marked out in permanent parcels
of Matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure
of Time, but what has divided the whole length of its Duration into
apparently equal Portions, by constantly repeated Periods. What
Portions of Duration are not distinguished, or considered as dis-
tinguished and measured by such Periods, come not so properly
under the Notion of Time, as appears by such Phrases as these, <viz>.
<before all time>, and <when time shall be no more>.
#P 188#
#L 1#
#S 19#. The diurnal, and annual <Revolutions of the Sun>, as having been
from the beginning of Nature, constant, regular, and universally
observable by all Mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have
been with Reason <made use of for the measure of Duration>. But the
distinction of Days and Years, having depended on the motion 5  
of the Sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been
thought, that Motion and Duration were the measure one of
another. For Men in the <measuring of the length of time>, having been
accustomed to the <Ideas> of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years,
<etc>. which they found themselves upon any mention of Time or 10 
Duration presently to think on, all which Portions of Time, were
measured out by the motion of those heavenly Bodies, they were apt
to confound time and motion; or at least to think, that they had
a necessary Connexion one with another: whereas any constant
periodical Appearance, or Alteration of <Ideas> in seemingly equi-  
distant Spaces of Duration, if constant and universally observable,
would have as well distinguished the intervals of Time, as those
that have been made use of. For supposing the Sun, which some
have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of
time that it now every Day comes about to the same Meridian, and 20 
then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the Space
of an annual Revolution, it had sensibly increased in Brightness and
Heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular Appearances
serve to measure out the distances of Duration to all that could
observe it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances 25 
were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant Periods,
they would serve Mankind for measure of time as well, were the
Motion away.
#S 20#. For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant,
returning at equidistant Periods in all parts of the Earth, would as
well serve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun:
and in effect we see, that some People in <America> counted their Years
by the coming of certain Birds amongst them at their certain
Seasons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague; the Sense
                                                           #P 189#
                                                           #L 1#
of Hunger, or Thirst; a Smell, or a Taste; or any other <Idea> return-
ing constantly at equidistant Periods, and making it self universally
be taken notice of, <would> not fail to <measure> out the course of Succes-
sion, and distinguish the distances of <Time>. Thus we see that Men
born blind, count Time well enough by Years, whose Revolutions 5
yet they cannot distinguish by Motions, that they perceive not:
And I ask, whether a blind Man, who distinguished his Years, either
by heat of Summer, or cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of
the Spring, or taste of any Fruit of the Autumn, would not have a
better measure of Time, than the <Romans> had before the Refor- 
mation of their <Calendar> by <Julius Caesar>, or many other People,
whose Years, notwithstanding the motion of the Sun, which they
pretend to make use of, are very irregular: and it adds no small
difficulty to Chronology, that the exact lengths of the Years that
several Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing 15
very much one from another, and, I think, I may say all of them,
from the precise motion of the Sun: and if the Sun moved from the
Creation to the Flood constantly in the AEquator, and so equally
dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in
Days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the 20
Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author supposes, I do not think it very
easie to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the Sun)
Men should in the <Antediluvian> World, from the beginning count
by years, or measure their time by Periods that had no sensible
marks very obvious to distinguish them by.                      25
#S 21#. But, perhaps, it will be said without a regular Motion, such
as of the Sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such
Periods were equal? To which I answer, the Equality of any other
returning appearances might be known by the same way, that that
of Days was known, or presumed to be so at first, which was only
by judging of them by the train of <Ideas> had passed in Men's Minds
in the Intervals, by which train of <Ideas> discovering inequality in the
natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or
            were guessed to be equal, which was sufficient to make
#P 190#
#L 1#
them serve for a measure: tho, exacter search has since discovered
inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not
whether the Annual also be not unequal: These yet by their pre-
sum'd and apparent Equality, serve as well to reckon time by,
though not to measure the parts of Duration exactly) as if they 5 (
could be proved to be exactly equal. We must therefore carefully
distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the measures we make use
of to judge of its length. Duration in it self is to be considered, as
going on in one constant, equal, uniform Course: but none of the
measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so; nor 10 
can we be assured, that their assigned Parts or Periods are equal in
Duration one to another; for two successive lengths of Duration,
however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. The
Motion of the Sun, which the World used so long, and so confidently
for an exact measure of Duration, has, as I said, been found in its 15 
several parts unequal: and though Men have of late made use of a
Pendulum, as a more steady and regular Motion, than that of the
Sun or (to speak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one should be
asked how he certainly knows, that the two successive swings of a
Pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfie himself, that 20 
they are infallibly so: since we cannot be sure, that the Cause of
that Motion which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally;
and we are sure, that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is
not constantly the same: either of which varying, may alter the
Equality of such Periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and 25 
exactness of the measure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of
other Appearances, the Notion of Duration still remaining clear,
though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to
be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succession can be brought
together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their Equality.
All that we can do for a measure of Time, is to take such as
have continual successive Appearances at seemingly equidistant
Periods; <of> which <seeming Equality, we have no other measure, but>
such as <the train of our own Ideas> have lodged in our Memories, with
the concurrence of other probable Reasons, to perswade us of their
Equality.
                                                           #P 191#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 22#. One thing seems strange to me, that whilst all Men mani-
festly measured Time by the motion of the great and visible Bodies
of the World, <Time> yet should be <defined> to be the <measure of Motion>:
whereas 'tis obvious to every one, who reflects ever so little on it,
that, to measure Motion, Space is as necessary to be considered as 5
Time; and those who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of
the thing moved necessary to be taken into the Computation, by
any one who will estimate or measure Motion, so as to judge right
of it. Nor, indeed, does Motion any otherwise conduce to the
measuring of Duration, than as it constantly brings about the 10
return of certain sensible <Ideas>, in seeming equidistant Periods. For
if the Motion of the Sun, were as unequal as of a Ship driven by
unsteady Winds, sometimes very slow, and at others, irregularly
very swift; or if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not
circular, and produced not the same Appearances, it would not at 15
all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal
motion of a Comet does.
#S 23#. <Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years>, are then <no> more <necessary to>
<Time> or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards, and Miles, marked out
in any Matter, are to Extension. For though we in this part of the
Universe, by the constant use of them, as of Periods set out by the
Revolutions of the Sun, or as known parts of such Periods, have
fixed the <Ideas> of such Lengths of Duration in our Minds, which we
apply to all parts of Time, whose Lengths we would consider; yet
there may be other parts of the Universe, where they no more use
these measures of ours, than in <Japan> they do our Inches, Feet, or
Miles: but yet something Analogous to them, there must be. For
without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure our
selves, or signifie to others, the length of any Duration, though at
the same time the World were as full of Motion, as it is now, but no
part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant Revo-
lutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the
account of Time, do not at all alter the notion of Duration, which is
the thing to be measured, no more than the different standards of a
#P 192#
#L 1#
Foot, and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension, to those, who make
use of those different Measures.
#S 24#. The Mind having once got such a measure of Time, as the
annual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that measure to Duration,
wherein that measure it self did not exist, and with which in the 5  
reality of its being, it had nothing to do: For should one say, That
<Abraham> was born in the 2712 year of the <Julian> Period, it is alto-
gether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the World,
though there were so far back no motion of the Sun, nor any other
motion at all. For though the <Julian> Period be supposed to begin 10 
several hundred years, before there were really either Days, Nights,
or Years, marked out by any Revolutions of the Sun, yet we reckon
as right, and thereby measure Durations as well, as if really at that
time the Sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it
doth now. The <Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun>,
is as easily <applicable> in our Thoughts <to Duration, where no Sun nor>
<Motion was>, as the <Idea> of a Foot or Yard taken from Bodies here, can
be applied in our Thoughts to Distances, beyond the Confines of
the World, where are no Bodies at all.
#S 25#. For supposing it were 5639 Miles, or millions of Miles,
from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe, (for being
finite, it must be at a certain distance,) as we suppose it to be 5639
years, from this time to the first existence of any Body in the
beginning of the World, <we can>, in our Thoughts, <apply this measure of>
<a Year to Duration before the Creation>, or beyond the Duration of 25 
Bodies or Motion, as we can this measure of a Mile to Space beyond
the utmost Bodies; and by the one measure Duration, where there
was no Motion, as well as by the other measure Space in our
Thoughts, where there is no Body.
#S 26#. If it be objected to me here, That in this way of explaining
of Time, I have beg'd what I should not, <viz>. That the World is
neither eternal, nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose,
it is not needful, in this place, to make use of Arguments, to evince
the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extension: But it
being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the
                                                           #P 193#
                                                           #L 1#
liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the
contrary; and I doubt not but that <every one> that will go about it,
may easily <conceive> in his Mind <the beginning of Motion, though not> of all
<Duration>; and so may come to a stop, and <non ultra> in his Consider-
ation of Motion: so also in his Thoughts he may see limits to Body, 5
and the Extension belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body
is, the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the
reach of Thought, as well as the utmost bounds of Number are
beyond the largest comprehension of the Mind, and all for the same
reason, as we shall see in another place.                          10
#S 27#. By the same means therefore, and from the same Original
that we come to have <the Idea> of Time, we have also that <Idea> which
we call <Eternity; viz>. having got the <Idea> of Succession and Duration,
be reflecting on the Train of our own <Ideas>, caused in us either by
the natural appearances of those <Ideas> coming constantly of them- 
selves into our waking Thoughts, or else caused by external Objects
successively affecting our Senses; and having from the Revolutions
of the Sun got the <Ideas> of certain lengths of Duration, we can, in our
Thoughts, add such lengths of Duration to one another, as often
as we please, and apply them, so added, to Durations past or to 20
come: And this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits,
and proceed <in infinitum>, and apply thus the length of the annual
motion of the Sun to Duration, supposed before the Sun's, or any
other Motion had its being; which is no more difficult or absurd,
than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow, one 25
Hour to day upon the Sun-dial, to the Duration of something last
night; <v.g>. The burning of a Candle, which is now absolutely
separate from all actual motion, and it is as impossible for the Dura-
tion of that Flame for an hour last Night, to co-exist with any
Motion that now is, or forever shall be, as for any part of Duration,
that was before the beginning of the World, to co-exist with the
motion of the Sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the
<Idea> of the length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial between
the Marks of two Hours, I can as distinctly measure in my Thoughts
the Duration of that Candle-light last night, as I can the Duration
of any thing, that does now exist: And it is no more than to think,
#P 194#
#L 1#
that had the Sun shone then on the Dial, and moved after the same
rate it doth now, the shadow on the Dial would have passed from
one Hour-line to another, whilst that Flame of the Candle lasted.
#S 28#. The notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the <Idea> I
have of the length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of 5  
which Motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the <Ideas> I have
of them in my Memory derived from my Senses or Reflection, I can
with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my Thoughts
to Duration antecedent to all manner of Motion, as well as to any
thing, that is but a Minute, or a Day, antecedent to the Motion, 10 
that at this very moment the Sun is in. All things past are equally
and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them, are
all one, whether they were before the beginning of the World,
or but yesterday; <the measuring of> any <Duration> by some motion,
<depending> not at all <on> the real co-existence of that thing to that 15 
motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having <a clear>
<Idea of the length of some> periodical known Motion, or other intervals
of <Duration> in my Mind, and <applying that to the Duration of the thing>
<I would measure>.
#S 29#. Hence we see, that some Men imagine the Duration of the 20 
World from its first existence, to this present year 1689. to have been
5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and   
others a great deal more; as the <AEgyptians> of old, who in the time of
<Alexander> counted 23000 years, from the Reign of the Sun; and the
<Chineses> now, who account the World 3,269,000 years old, or more; 25 
which longer duration of the World, according to their Computa-
tion, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally
imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is
longer than the other, as I understand, <that Methusalem's> life was
longer than <Enoch's>: And if the common reckoning of 5639 should
he true, (as it may be, as well as any other assigned,) it hinders not
at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World
1000 years older, since every one may with the same Facility
imagine ( I do not say believe) the World to be 50000 years old,
as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50000 years,
as 5639. Whereby it appears, that <to the measuring the duration of>
<any thing by Time>, it is not requisite, that that thing should be
                                                          #P 195#
                                                          #L 1#
co-existent to the Motion we measure by, or any other periodical
Revolution; but <it suffices> to this purpose, <that we have the Idea of the>
<length of any regular periodical Appearances>, which we can in our Minds
apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never
co-existed.                                                    5
#S 30#. For as in the History of the Creation delivered by <Moses>,
I can imagine that Light existed three days before the Sun was, or
had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of Light
before the Sun was created, was so long as (if the Sun had moved
then, as it doth now,) would have been equal to three of his diurnal 10
Revolutions; so by the same way I can have an <Idea> of the <Chaos>, or
Angels, being created before there was either Light, or any con-
tinued motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years.
For if I can but consider <Duration> equal to one Minute, before either
the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one Minute more till I 15
come to 60; And by the same way of adding Minutes, Hours, or
Years, (<i.e>. such or such parts of the Sun's revolution, or any other
period whereof I have the <Idea>,) proceed <in infinitum>, and suppose a
duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add
whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of <Eternity>, of 20
whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity
of Number, to which we can add for ever without end.
#S 31#. And thus I think it is plain, that <from> those two Fountains
of all Knowledge before mentioned, (<viz.>) <Reflection and Sensation, we>
<get the Ideas of Duration>, and the measures of it.            25
For <First>, By observing what passes in our Minds, how our <Ideas>
there in train constantly some vanish, and others begin to appear,
we come by the <Idea> of <Succession>.
<Secondly>, By observing a distance in the parts of this Succession,
we get the <Idea> of <Duration>.
<Thirdly>, By Sensation observing certain appearances, at certain
regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the <Ideas> of certain
Lengths or <Measures of Duration>, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years,
<etc>.
<Fourthly>, By being able to repeat those Measures of Time, or
<Ideas> of stated length of Duration in our Minds, as often as we will,
we can come to <imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or>
                                                             #P 196#
                                                             #L 1#
<exist>; and thus we imagine to morrow, next year, or seven years
hence.
      <Fifthly>, By being able to repeat any such <Idea> of any length of
Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our
own Thoughts, and add them one to another, without ever coming  5 
to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of
Number, to which we can always add, we come by the <Idea> of
<Eternity>, as the future eternal Duration of our Souls, as well as the
Eternity of that infinite Being, which must necessarily have always
existed. 10 
     <Sixthly>, By considering any part of infinite Duration, as set out by
periodical Measures, we come by the <Idea> of what we call <Time> in
general.


#C 15#                     CHAPTER XV

        <Of Duration and Expansion, considered together>.

#S 01#. THOUGH we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty
long on the Considerations of Space and Duration; yet they being 15 
<Ideas> of general concernment, that have something very abstruse
and peculiar in their Nature, the comparing them one with another
may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the
more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of
them together. Distance or Space, in its simple abstract conception, 20 
to avoid confusion, I call <Expansion>, to distinguish it from <Extension>,
which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the
solid parts of Matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the <Idea>
of Body: Whereas the <Idea> of pure Distance includes no such thing.
I prefer also the Word <Expansion> to <Space>, because <Space> is often 25 
applied to Distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist
together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these,
<viz.>) <Expansion> and <Duration>, the Mind has this common <Idea> of
continued Lengths, capable of greater, or less quantities: For a
Man has as clear an <Idea> of the difference of the length of an Hour,
and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.
#S 02#. The <Mind>, having got the <Idea> of the length of any part of
<Expansion>, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what length you will, <can>, as
                                                          #P 197#
                                                          #L 1#
has been said, repeat that <Idea>; and so adding it to the former,
<enlarge its Idea of Length>, and make it equal to two Spans, or two
Paces, and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts
of the Earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to
the distance of the Sun, or remotest Star. By such a progression as 5
this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can
proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop
its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can easily in
our Thoughts come to the end of solid Extension; the extremity
and bounds of all Body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: But when 10
the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this
endless Expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end.
Nor let any one say, That beyond the bounds of Body, there is
nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of
Matter. <Solomon>, whose Understanding was filled and enlarged with 15
Wisdom, seems to have other Thoughts, when he says, <Heaven, and>
<the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee>:* And he, I think, very much
magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding, who
persuades himself, that he can extend his Thoughts farther than
GOD exists, or imagine any Expansion where he is not.         20
#S 03#. Just so is it in Duration. <The Mind having got the Idea of any>
<length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it>, not only beyond
its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal Beings, and all the
measures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and
their Motions. But yet every one easily admits, That though we 25
make Duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it
beyond all being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills Eternity; and
tis hard to find a Reason, why any one should doubt, that he like-
wise fills Immensity: His infinite Being is certainly as boundless
one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to
Matter, to say, where there is no Body, there is nothing.
#S 04#. Hence, I think, we may learn the Reason, <why every one>
familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and sup-
poses Eternity, and sticks not to <ascribe Infinity to Duration; but> 'tis
<with more doubting> and reserve, that many <admit>, or suppose <the>
                                                             #P 198#
                                                             #L 1#
<Infinity of Space>. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, That
Duration and Extension being used as names of affections belonging
to other Beings, we easily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we
cannot avoid doing so: but not attributing to him Extension, but
only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence  5 
of Expansion without Matter; of which alone we commonly
suppose it an Attribute. And therefore when Men pursue their
Thoughts of Space, they are apt to stop at the confines of Body: as
if Space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if
their <Ideas> upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term 10 
what is beyond the limits of the Universe, imaginary Space: as if it
were nothing, because there is no Body existing in it. Whereas
Duration, antecedent to all Body, and to the motions, which it is
measured by, they never term imaginary: because it is never
supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of 15 
things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of
Mens <Ideas>, (as I am apt to think they may very much,) one may
have occasion to think by the name <Duration>, that the continuation
of Existence, with a kind of Resistance to any destructive force, and
the continuation of Solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with, 20 
and if we will look into the minute atomical parts of Matter, is little
different from Hardness,) were thought to have some Analogy, and
gave occasion to Words, so near of kin as <Durare> and <Durum esse>. And
that <durare> is applied to the <Idea> of Hardness, as well as that of
Existence we see in <Horace, Epod. 16. <1ferro duravit saecula>. But be that 25 
as it will, this is certain, That whoever pursues his own Thoughts,
will find them sometimes lanch out beyond the extent of Body, into

the Infinity of Space or Expansion; the <Idea> whereof is distinct and
separate from Body, and all other things: which may (to those who
please) be a subject of farther meditation.
#S 05#. <Time> in general is to <Duration>, as <Place> to <Expansion>. They are
so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immensity, as is
set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by Land-marks;
and so are made use of, to denote the Position of finite real Beings, in
respect one to another, in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration
and Space. These rightly considered, are nothing but <Ideas> of deter-
                                                          #P 199#
                                                          #L 1#
minate Distances, from certain known points fixed in distinguish-
able sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one
from another. From such points fixed in sensible Beings we reckon,
and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite Quantities;
which so considered, are that which we call <Time> and <Place>. For 5
Duration and Space being in themselves uniform and boundless,
the Order and Position of things, without such known setled Points,
would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an
incurable Confusion.
#S 06#. <Time> and <Place> taken thus, for determinate distinguishable 10
Portions of those infinite Abysses of Space and Duration, set out, or
supposed to be distinguished from the rest, by marks, and known
Boundaries, have each of them a two-fold Acceptation.
<First, Time> in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite
Duration, as is measured out by, and co-existent with the Existence, 15
and Motions of the great Bodies of the Universe, as far as we know
any thing of them: and in this Sense, Time begins and ends with the
frame of this sensible World, as in these Phrases before mentioned,
<before all time>, or <when time shall be no more. Place> likewise is taken
sometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is possessed by, 20
and comprehended within the Material World; and is thereby
distinguished from the rest of Expansion; though this may more
properly be called <Extension>, than Place. Within these two are
confined, and by the observable Parts of them are measured and
determined the particular Time or Duration, and the particular 25
Extension and Place, of all corporeal Beings.
#S 07#. <Secondly>, Sometimes the word <Time> is used <in a larger sense>,
and is applied to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really
distinguished and measured out by this real Existence, and periodi-
cal Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be
for Signs, and for Seasons, and for Days, and Years,* and are accord-
ingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that
infinite uniform Duration, which we upon any occasion do suppose
#P 200#
#L 1#
equal to certain lengths of measured Time; and so consider them as
bounded and determined. For if we should suppose the Creation,
or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the <Julian> period, we
should speak properly enough, and should be understood, if we
said, 'tis a longer time since the Creation of Angels, than the Creation  5 
of the World, by 764 years: Whereby we would mark out so much
of that undistinguished Duration, as we suppose equal to, and
would have admitted, 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun, moving
at the rate it now does. And thus likewise, we sometimes speak of
Place, Distance, or Bulk in the great <Inane> beyond the Confines of 10 
the World, when we consider so much of that Space, as is equal
to, or capable to receive a Body of any assigned Dimensions, as a
Cubick-foot; or do suppose a Point in it, at such a certain distance
from any part of the Universe.
#S 08#. <Where> and <when> are Questions belonging to all finite Exis-    
tences, and are by us always reckoned from some known Parts of
this sensible World, and from some certain Epochs marked out to us
by the Motions observable in it. Without some such fixed Parts or
Periods, the Order of things would be lost, to our finite Under-
standings, in the boundless invariable Oceans of Duration and 20 
Expansion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their
full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to
wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our
Thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly
in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incompre- 25 
hensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings,
the Extension of any Body is so much of that infinite Space, as the
bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Position of any Body,
when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the <Idea>
of the particular <Duration> of any thing, is an <Idea> of that Portion of
infinite <Duration>, which passes during the Existence of that thing;
so the time <when> the thing existed, is the <Idea> of that Space of
Duration, which passed between some known and fixed Period of
Duration, and the Being of that thing. One shews the distance of the
Extremities of the Bulk, or Existence of the same thing, as that it is
a Foot Square, or lasted two Years; the other shews the distance of
                                                          #P 201#
                                                          #L 1#
it in Place, or Existence from other fixed points of Space or Duration;
as that it was in the middle of <Lincolns-Inn>-Fields, or the first degree
of <Taurus>, and in the year of our Lord, 1671. or the 1000 year of the
<Julian> Period: All which distances, we measure by preconceived
<Ideas> of certain lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet, 5
Miles, and Degrees, and in the other Minutes, Days, and Years, <etc>.
#S 09#. There is one thing more, wherein <Space and Duration> have a
great Conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned
amongst our <simple Ideas>: Yet none of the distinct <Ideas> we have of
either is without all manner of <Composition>, it is the very nature of 10
#P 202#
#L 1#
both of them to consist of Parts: But their Parts being all of the
same kind, and without the mixture of any other <Idea>, hinder them
not from having a Place amongst simple <Ideas>. Could the Mind, as
in Number, come to so small a part of Extension or Duration, as
excluded Divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible  5 
Unite, or <Idea>; by repetition of which, it would make its more
inlarged <Ideas> of Extension and Duration. But since the Mind is not
able to frame an <Idea> of any Space, without Parts; instead thereof it
makes use of the common Measures, which by familiar use, in each
Country, have imprinted themselves on the Memory (as Inches, and 10 
Feet; or Cubits, and Parasangs; and so Seconds, Minutes, Hours,
Days, and Years in Duration:) The Mind makes use, I say, of such  
<Ideas> as these, as simple ones: and these are the component Parts of
larger <Ideas>, which the Mind, upon Occasion, makes by the addition
of such known Lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other 15 
side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either, is look'd on as
an Unite in Number, when the Mind by division would reduce them
into less Fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and
division, either of Space or Duration, when the <Idea> under Consider-
ation becomes very big, or very small, its precise Bulk becomes very 20 
obscure and confused; and it is the Number of its repeated additions,
or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily
appear to any one, who will let his Thoughts loose in the vast
Expansion of Space, or Divisibility of Matter. Every part of Dura-
tion is Duration too; and every part of Extension is Extension, both 25 
of them capable of addition or division <in infinitum>. But the least
Portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct <Ideas>,
may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple <Ideas> of
that kind, out of which our complex modes of Space, Extension, and
Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly
                                                          #P 203#
                                                          #L 1#
resolved. Such a small part in Duration, may be called a <Moment>,
and is the time of one <Idea> in our Minds, in the train of their
ordinary Succession there. The other, wanting a proper Name, I
know not whether I may be allowed to call <a sensible Point>, meaning
thereby the least Particle of Matter or Space we can discern, which 5
is ordinarily about a Minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less
than thirty Seconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the centre.
#S 10#. Expansion, and Duration have this farther Agreement, that
though they are both considered by us as having Parts; yet <their>
<Parts> are <not separable> one from another, no not even in Thought: 10
Though the parts of Bodies, from whence we take our measure of
the one; and the parts of Motion, or rather the succession of <Ideas>
in our Minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may
be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by Rest, and the
other is by Sleep, which we call rest too.                         15
#S 11#. But yet there is this manifest difference between them, That
the <Ideas> of Length, which we have of <Expansion, are turned every way>,
and so make Figure, and Breadth, and Thickness; but <Duration is but>
<as it were the length of one streight Line>, extended <in infinitum>, not
capable of Multiplicity, Variation, or Figure; but is one common 20
measure of all Existence whatsoever, wherein all things whilst they
exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all
things, that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part
of their Existence, as much as if they were all but one single Being;
and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of Time. 25
Whether Angels and Spirits have any Analogy to this, in respect of
Expansion, is beyond my Comprehension: and, perhaps, for us, who
have Understandings and Comprehensions, suited to our own
Preservation, and the ends of our own Being, but not to the reality
and extent of all other Beings, 'tis near as hard to conceive any
Existence, or to have an <Idea> of any real Being, with a perfect
Negation of all manner of Expansion; as it is, to have the <Idea> of any
real Existence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration:
And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they
communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that Bodies
do each singly possess its proper Portion of it, according to the
#P 204#
#L 1#	
extent of its solid Parts; and thereby exclude all other Bodies from
having any share in that particular portion of Space, whilst it
remains there.
#S 12#. <Duration>, and Time which is a part of it, <is the Idea> we have
<of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together>, but follow each  5 
other in Succession; as <Expansion is the> Idea <of lasting distance, all>
<whose parts exist together>, and are not capable of Succession. And
therefore though we cannot conceive any Duration without
Succession, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being
does now exist to Morrow, or possess at once more than the present 10 
moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of
the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other finite
Being. Because Man comprehends not in his Knowledge, or Power,
all past and future things: His Thoughts are but of yesterday, and
he knows not what to morrow will bring forth.* What is once passed, 15 
he can never recal; and what is yet to come, he cannot make present.
What I say of Man, I say of all finite Beings, who though they may
far exceed Man in Knowledge and Power, yet are no more than
the meanest Creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of
any Magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite 20 
Duration being accompanied with infinite Knowledge, and infinite
Power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more
distant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his sight, than
the present: They all lie under the same view: And there is
nothing, which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For 25 
the Existence of all things, depending upon his good Pleasure; all
things exist every moment, that he thinks fit to have them exist.
To conclude, Expansion and Duration do mutually imbrace, and
comprehend each other; every part of Space, being in every part of
Duration; and every part of Duration, in every part of Expansion. 30 
Such a Combination of two distinct <Ideas>, is, I suppose, scarce to be
found in all that great Variety, we do or can conceive, and may
afford Matter to farther Speculation.
#P 205# 
#C 16#                      CHAPTER XVI

                           <Of Number>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. AMONGST all the <Ideas> we have, as there is none suggested to
the Mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that <of>
<Unity>, or One: it has no shadow of Variety or Composition in it:
every Object our Senses are employed about; every <Idea> in our
Understandings; every Thought of our Minds brings this <Idea> 5
along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our Thoughts,
as well as it is, in its Agreement to all other things, the most uni-
versal <Idea> we have. For Number applies it self to Men, Angels,
Actions, Thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be
imagined.                                                      10
#S 02#. By repeating this <Idea> in our Minds, and adding the Repe-
titions together, we come by the <complex> Ideas <of the Modes of it>.
Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex <Idea> of a Couple;
by putting twelve Unites together, we have the complex <Idea> of a
dozen; and so of a Score, or a Million, or any other Number.   15
#S 03#. <The simple modes of Number are of all other the most distinct>; every
the least Variation, which is an unite, making each Combination, as
clearly different from that, which approacheth nearest to it, as the
most remote; two being as distinct from one, as Two hundred; and
the <Idea> of Two, as distinct from the <Idea> of Three, as the Magni- 
tude of the whole Earth, is from that of a Mite. This is not so in
other simple Modes, in which it is not so easie, nor, perhaps, possible
for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching <Ideas>, which yet are
really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between
the white of this Paper, and that of the next degree to it: Or can 25
form distinct <Ideas> of every the least excess in Extension?
#S 04#. The Clearness and <Distinctness of each mode of Number> from all
others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think,
that Demonstrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and
exact, than in Extension, yet they are more general in their use, and
#P 206#
#L 1#
more determinate in their Application. Because the <Ideas> of Numbers
are more precise, and distinguishable than in Extension; where
every Equality and Excess are not so easie to be observed, or
measured; because our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any
determined smallness beyond which it cannot go, as an Unite; and 5  
therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least Excess cannot
be discovered, which is clear otherwise in Number, where, as has
been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, though 91
be the next immediate Excess to 90. But it is not so in Extension,
where whatsoever is more than just a Foot, or an Inch, is not 10 
distinguishable from the Standard of a Foot, or an Inch; and in
Lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than
the other by innumerable Parts: Nor can any one assign an Angle,
which shall be the next biggest to a right one.
#S 05#. By the repeating, as has been said, of the <Idea> of an Unite, and 15   
joining it to another Unite, we make thereof one collective <Idea>,
marked by the Name <Two>. And whosoever can do this, and proceed
on, still adding one more to the last collective <Idea>, which he had of
any Number, and give a Name to it, may count, or have <Ideas> for
several Collections of Unites, distinguished one from another, as far 20 
as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory
to retain that Series, with their several Names: All <Numeration>
being but still the adding of one Unite more, and giving to the whole
together, as comprehended in one <Idea>, a new or distinct Name or
Sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distin-  
guish it from every smaller or greater multitude of Unites. So that
he, that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his
Tale, taking still with him the distinct Names belonging to every
Progression; and so again by substracting an Unite from each
Collection retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the <Ideas> of 30 
Numbers, within the compass of his Language, or for which he
hath names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple
Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds, but so many Combina-
tions of Unites, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other
difference, but more or less, Names or Marks for each distinct 35 
Combination, seem more necessary, than in any other sort of <Ideas>.
                                                           #P 207#
                                                           #L 1#
For without such Names or Marks, we can hardly well make use of
Numbers in reckoning, especially where the Combination is made
up of any great multitude of Unites, which put together without a
Name or Mark, to distinguish that precise Collection, will hardly
be kept from being a heap in Confusion.                         5
#S 06#. This, I think, to be the reason why some <Americans>, I have
spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts
enough,) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had
any distinct <Idea> of that Number, though they could reckon very
well to 20. Because their Language being scanty, and accommodated 10
only to the few necessaries of a needy simple Life, unacquainted
either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no Words in it to stand
for 1000; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater
Numbers, they would shew the Hairs of their Head, to express a
great multitude, which they could not number; which inability, I 15
suppose, proceeded from their want of Names. The <Tououpinambos>
had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that,
they made out by shewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others
who were present [(a)]: And I doubt not but we our selves might
distinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we usually do, 20
would we find out but some fit denominations to signifie them by;
whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of
Millions of Millions, <etc>. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most
four and twenty decimal Progressions, without confusion. But to
shew how much <distinct Names conduce to our well reckoning>, or having 25
useful <Ideas> of Numbers, let us set all these following Figures in one
continued Line, as the Marks of one Number: <v.g>.

<Nonilions. Octilions. Septilions. Sextilions. Quintilions. Quatrilions.>
<Trilions. Bilions. Milions. Unites.>
   857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734. 368149.
623137.                              

The ordinary way of naming this Number in <English>, will be the
often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of
Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the denom-
ination of the second six Figures.) In which way, it will be very hard
#P 208#
#L 1#
to have any distinguishing Notions of this Number: But whether,
by giving every six Figures a new and orderly denomination, these,
and perhaps a great many more Figures, in progression, might not
easily be counted distinctly, and <Ideas> of them both got more easily
to our selves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be 5 
considered. This I mention only to shew how necessary distinct
Names are to Numbering, without pretending to introduce new
ones of my invention.
#S 07#. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the
several Progressions of Numbers, or not having yet the faculty to 10 
collect scattered <Ideas> into complex ones, and range them in a
regular Order, and so retain them in their Memories, as is necessary
to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it
very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished
with good store of other <Ideas>; and one may often observe them 15 
discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of
several other things, before they can tell 20. And some, through the
default of their Memories, who cannot retain the several Combina-
tions of Numbers, with their Names annexed in their distinct
orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral Pro- 20 
gressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their
life-time, to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate Series of
Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any <Idea> of that
Number, must know that Nineteen went before, with the distinct
Name or Sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their 25 
order; for where-ever this fails, a gap is made, the Chain breaks,
and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that <to reckon>
<right, it is required>, 1. That the Mind distinguish carefully two <Ideas>,
which are different one from another only by the addition or
subtraction of one Unite. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names, 30 
or Marks, of the several Combinations from an Unite to that
Number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact
order, that the Numbers follow one another: in either of which, if
it trips, the whole business of Numbering will be disturbed, and
there will remain only the confused <Idea> of multitude, but the <Ideas> 35 
necessary to distinct numeration, will not be attained to.
                                                           #P 209#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 08#. This farther is observable in <Number>, That it is that, which
the Mind makes use of in <measuring all things>, that by us are measur-
able, which principally are <Expansion> and <Duration>; and our <Idea> of
Infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing, but the
Infinity of Number. For what else are our <Ideas> of Eternity and 5
Immensity, but the repeated additions of certain <Ideas> of imagined
parts of Duration, and Expansion with the Infinity of Number, in
which we can come to no end of Addition? For such an inexhaustible
stock, Number, of all other our <Ideas>, most clearly furnishes us with,
as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum, as 10
great a Number as he pleases, this Multitude, how great soever,
lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any
nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of Number, where still
there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And
this endless <addition> or <addibility> (if any one like the word better) of 15
Numbers, so apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us
the clearest and most distinct <Idea> of Infinity: of which more in the
following Chapter.


#C 17#                    CHAPTER XVII

                          <Of Infinity>.

#S 01#. HE that would know what kind of <Idea> it is to which we give
the name of <Infinity>, cannot do it better, than by considering to 20
what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and
then how the Mind comes to frame it.
<Finite>, and <Infinite>, seem to me to be looked upon by the Mind,
as the <Modes of Quantity>, and to be attributed primarily in their first
designation only to those things, which have parts, and are 25
capable of increase or diminution, by the addition or subtraction of
any the least part: and such are the <Ideas> of Space, Duration, and
Number, which we have considered in the foregoing Chapters.
#P 210#
#L 1#
Tis true, that we cannot but be assured, That the Great GOD, of
whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly Infinite:
but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being, our <Idea> of
Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in
respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and, I think, more figura-   
tively to his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other Attributes,
which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, <etc>. For
when we call them Infinite, we have no other <Idea> of this Infinity,
but what carries with it some reflection on, and intimation of that
Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wisdom, 10 
and Goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many,
which these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us
multiply them in our Thoughts, as far as we can, with all the
infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these
Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our 15 
narrow Capacities: They do, without doubt, contain in them all
possible perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them,
and these our <Ideas> of their Infinity.
#S 02#. Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind look'd on as
modifications of Expansion and Duration, the next thing to be 20 
considered is, <How the Mind comes by> them. As for the <Idea of Finite>,
there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of Extension, that
affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the <Idea> of Finite:
and the ordinary periods of Succession, whereby we measure Time
and Duration, as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths. 25 
The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless <Ideas> of <Eternity>
and <Immensity>, since the Objects, which we converse with, come so
much short of any approach or proportion to that Largeness.
#S 03#. Every one, that has any <Idea> of any stated lengths of Space,
as a Foot, finds, that he can repeat that <Idea>; and joining it to the
former, make the <Idea> of two Foot; and by the addition of a third,
three Foot; and so on, without ever coming to an end of his
additions, whether of the same Idea of a Foot, or if he pleases of
doubling it, or any other <Idea> he has of any length, as a Mile, or
                                                           #P 211#
                                                           #L 1#
Diameter of the Earth, or of the <Orbis Magnus>: for whichsoever of
these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise
multiplies it, he finds, that after he has continued this doubling in
his Thoughts, and enlarged his <Idea>, as much as he pleases, he has
no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such 5
Addition, than he was at first setting out; the power of enlarging
his <Idea> of Space by farther Additions, remaining still the same, he
hence takes <the Idea of infinite Space>.
#S 04#. This, I think, is the way, whereby the Mind gets the <Idea of>
<infinite Space>. 'Tis a quite different Consideration to examine, whether 10
the Mind has the <Idea> of such a <boundless Space actually existing>, since
our <Ideas> are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things; but yet,
since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are
apt to think, that Space in it self is actually boundless, to which
Imagination, the <Idea> of Space or Expansion of it self naturally leads 15
us. For it being considered by us, either as the Extension of Body,
or as existing by it self, without any solid Matter taking it up, (for
of such a void Space, we have not only the <Idea>, but I have proved,
as I think, from the Motion of Body, its necessary existence,) it is
impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end 20
of it, or be stopp'd any where in its progress in this Space, how far
soever it extends its Thoughts. Any Bounds made with Body, even
Adamantine Walls, are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its
farther progress in Space and Extension, that it rather facilitates and
enlarges it: For so far as that Body reaches, so far no one can doubt of 25
Extension; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of Body,
what is there, that can there put a stop, and satisfie the Mind, that it
is at the end of Space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is
satisfied that Body it self can move into it? For if it be necessary for
the motion of Body, that there should be an empty Space, though
never so little, here amongst Bodies; and it be possible for Body to
move in or through that empty Space; nay, it is impossible for any
particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space, the same
possibility of a Body's moving into a void Space, beyond the utmost
Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space interspersed amongst
#P 212#
#L 1#
Bodies, will always remain clear and evident, the <Idea> of empty pure
Space, whether within, or beyond the confines of all Bodies, being
exactly the same, differing not in Nature, though in Bulk; and there
being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it: So that where-
ever the Mind places it self by any thought, either amongst, or 5  
remote from all Bodies, it can, in this uniform <Idea> of Space, no-
where find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude
it by the very Nature and Idea of each part of it, to be actually
infinite.
#S 05#. As, by the power we find in our selves of repeating, as often 10   
as we will, any <Idea> of Space, we get the <Idea> of Immensity; so, by
being able to repeat the <Idea> of any length of Duration, we have in
our Minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the
<Idea> of <Eternity>. For we find in our selves, we can no more come to an
end of such repeated <Ideas>, than we can come to the end of Number, 15 
which every one perceives he cannot. But here again 'tis another
question, quite different from our having an <Idea> of Eternity, to
know whether there were <any real Being>, whose Duration has been
<eternal>. And as to this I say, He that considers something now
existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having 20 
spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but
proceed on to some other Considerations of our <Idea> of Infinity.
#S 06#. If it be so, that our <Idea> of Infinity be got from the Power, we
observe in our selves, of repeating without end our own <Ideas>; It
may be demanded, <Why we do not attribute Infinity to other Ideas, as> 25 
<well as those of Space and Duration>; since they may be as easily, and as
often repeated in our Minds as the other; and yet no body ever
thinks of infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, though he can
repeat the <Idea> of Sweet or White, as frequently as those of a Yard,
or a Day? To which I answer, All the <Ideas>, that are considered as 30 
having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of any
equal or less parts, afford us by their repetition the <Idea> of Infinity;
because with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlarge-
ment, of which there can be no end. But in other <Ideas> it is not so;
for to the largest <Idea> of Extension or Duration, that I at present 35 
have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to
the perfectest <Idea> I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another
                                                          #P 213#
                                                          #L 1#
of a less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot
add the <Idea>,) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my <Idea> at all;
and therefore the different <Ideas> of Whiteness, <etc>. are called Degrees.
For those <Ideas>, that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented
by every addition of the least part; but if you take the <Idea> of 5
White, which one parcel of Snow yielded yesterday to your Sight,
and another <Idea> of White from another parcel of Snow you see to
day, and put them together in your Mind, they embody, as it were,
and run into one, and the <Idea> of Whiteness is not at all increased;
and if we add a less degree of Whiteness to a greater, we are so far 10
from increasing, that we diminish it. Those <Ideas> that consist not of
Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men please, or be
stretched beyond what they have received by their Senses; but
Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of increase by
repetition, leave in the Mind an <Idea> of an endless room for more; 15
nor can we conceive any where a stop to a further Addition or
Progression, and so those <Ideas> alone lead our Minds towards the
Thought of Infinity.
#S 07#. Though our <Idea> of Infinity arise from the contemplation of
Quantity, and the endless increase the Mind is able to make in 20
Quantity, by the repeated additions of what Portions thereof it
pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when
we join Infinity to any supposed <Idea> of Quantity the Mind can be
thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite
quantity, (<viz.>) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: For <our> 25
<Idea of Infinity> being, as I think, an <endless growing Idea>, but the <Idea> of
any Quantity the Mind has, being at that time terminated in that
<Idea>, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) to
join Infinity to it is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk;
and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that
we are carefully to distinguish between the <Idea> of the Infinity of
Space, and the <Idea> of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a
supposed endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated <Ideas>
of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the <Idea> of a
Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and
actually to have a view of all those repeated <Ideas> of Space, which an
#P 214#
#L 1#
endless repetition can never totally represent to it, which carries in
it a plain contradiction.
#S 08#. This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in
Numbers. The infinity of Numbers, to the end of whose addition
every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one 5  
that reflects on it: But how clear soever this <Idea> of the Infinity of
Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity
of the actual <Idea> of an Infinite Number. Whatsoever positive <Ideas>
we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them
be never so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an 10 
inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and
wherein we allow the Mind an endless progression of Thought,
without ever compleating the <Idea>, there we have our Idea of
Infinity; which though it seems to be pretty clear, when we con-
sider nothing else in it, but the Negation of an end, yet when we 15 
would frame in our Minds the <Idea> of an infinite Space or Duration,
that <Idea> is very obscure, and confused, because it is made up of two
Parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a Man frame in his
mind an <Idea> of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain,
the mind rests and terminates in that <Idea>, which is contrary to the 20 
<Idea of Infinity>, which <consists in> a <supposed endless Progression>. And
therefore, I think, it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we
come to argue, and reason about infinite Space or Duration, <etc>.
Because the parts of such an <Idea>, not being perceived to be, as
they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes, what-  
ever Consequences we draw from the other, as an <Idea> of Motion
not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such
an <Idea>, which is not better than an <Idea> of motion at rest; and such
another seems to me to be the <Idea> of a Space, or (which is the same
thing) a Number infinite, <i.e>. of a Space or Number, which the
Mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a Space
or Number, which in a constant and endless inlarging, and Pro-
gression, it can in Thought never attain to. For how large soever
an <Idea> of Space I have in my Mind, it is no larger than it is that
Instant, that I have it, though I be capable the next instant to
double it; and so on <in infinitum>: For that alone is infinite, which has
                                                           #P 215#
#L 1#
no Bounds; and that the <Idea> of Infinity, in which our Thoughts can
find none.
#S 09#. But of all other <Ideas>, it is <Number>, as I have said, which, I
think, <furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct> Idea <of Infinity>, we
are capable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind 5
pursues the <Idea> of Infinity, it there makes use of the <Ideas> and
Repetitions of Numbers, as of millions of millions of Miles, or Years,
which are so many distinct <Ideas>, kept best by Number from run-
ning into a confused heap, wherein the Mind loses it self; and when
it has added together as many millions, <etc>. as it pleases, of known 10
lengths of Space or Duration, the clearest <Idea>, it can get of
Infinity, is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless
addible Numbers, which affords no prospect of Stop or Boundary.
#S 10#. It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the <Idea> we
have <of Infinity>, and discover to us, that it <is nothing but the Infinity of> 15
<Number applied to determinate parts>, of which we have in our Minds the
distinct <Ideas>, if we consider that Number is not generally thought
by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extension are apt to be so;
which arises from hence, That in Number we are at one end as it
were: for there being in Number nothing less than an Unite, we 20
there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of Num-
ber, we can set no Bounds: and so it is like a Line, whereof one end
terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all
that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwise.
For in Duration, we consider it, as if this Line of Number were 25
extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and
infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on
what Consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, he will
find to be nothing else, but the turning this Infinity of Number
both ways, <a\ parte ante>, and <a\ parte post>, as they speak. For when we
would consider Eternity, <a parte ante>, what do we but, beginning
from our selves, and the present time we are in, repeat in our
Minds the <Ideas> of Years, or Ages, or any other assignable Portion of
Duration past, with a prospect of proceeding, in such Addition,
with all the Infinity of Number; and when we would consider
#P 216#
#L 1#
Eternity, <a\ parte post>, we just after the same rate begin from our
selves, and reckon by multiplied Periods yet to come, still extend-
ing that Line of Number, as before; and these two being put
together, are that infinite Duration we call <Eternity>; which, as we
turn our view either way forwards or backwards, appears infinite,  5 
because we still turn that way the infinite end of Number, <i.e>. the
Power still of adding more.
#S 11#. The same happens also in Space, wherein conceiving our
selves to be as it were in the Centre, we do on all sides pursue those
indeterminable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our 10 
selves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or <Orbis magnus>, by the
infinity of Number, we add others to them, as often as we will; and
having no more Reason to set Bounds to those repeated <Ideas>, than
we have to set Bounds to Number, we have that indeterminable
<Idea of Immensity>. 15 
#S 12#. And since in any bulk of Matter, our Thoughts can never
arrive at the utmost <Divisibility>, therefore there is an apparent
Infinity to us also in that, which has the Infinity also of Number,
but with this difference, That in the former Considerations of the
Infinity of Space and Duration, we only use Addition of Numbers; 20 
whereas this is like the division of an Unite into its Fractions,
wherein the Mind also can proceed <in infinitum>, as well as in the
former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition still of new
Numbers: though in the Addition of the one, we can have no more
the positive <Idea> of a Space infinitely great, than in the Division of 25 
the other, we can have the <Idea> of a Body infinitely little; our <Idea> of
Infinity being, as I may so say, a growing and fugitive <Idea>, still in
a boundless Progression, that can stop no where.
#S 13#. Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd, as to
say, he has the positive <Idea> of an actual infinite Number; the
Infinity whereof lies only in a Power still of adding any Combination
of Unites to any former Number, and that as long, and as much as
one will; the like also being in the Infinity of Space and Duration,
which Power leaves always to the Mind room for endless Additions;
yet there be those, who imagine they have <positive> Ideas <of infinite>
Duration and Space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any
                                                          #P 217#
                                                          #L 1#
such positive <Idea> of infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he
could add to it or no; which would easily shew the mistake of such
a positive <Idea>. We can, I think, have no positive <Idea> of any Space or
Duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated
Numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the 5
common measures, whereof we have the <Ideas> in our Minds, and
whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And
therefore, since an <Idea> of infinite Space or Duration must needs be
made up of infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity, than that of
Number capable still of farther Addition; but not an actual positive 10
<Idea> of a Number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the
Addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we
have the positive <Ideas>) can never otherwise produce the <Idea> of
infinite, than as Number does; which consisting of Additions of
finite Unites one to another, suggests the <Idea> of Infinite, only by a 15
Power, we find we have of still increasing the Sum, and adding
more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of
such Progression.
#S 14#. They who would prove their <Idea of Infinite to be positive>,
seem to me to do it by a pleasant Argument, taken from the 20
Negation of an end; which being negative, the Negation of it is
positive. He that considers, that the end is in Body but the ex-
tremity or superficies of that Body, will not, perhaps, be forward to
grant, that the end is a bare negative: And he that perceives the
end of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think, that the end is 25
something more than a pure Negation. Nor is it, when applied to
Duration, the bare Negation of Existence, but more properly the
last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the
bare Negation of Existence, I am sure they cannot deny, but that
the beginning is the first instant of Being, and is not by any Body
conceived to be a bare Negation; and therefore by their own
Argument, the <Idea> of Eternal, <a\ parte ante>, or of a Duration without
a beginning, is but a negative <Idea>.
#S 15#. The <Idea> of Infinite, has, I confess, something of positive in
all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite
Space or Duration, we at first step usually make some very large
<Idea>, as, perhaps, of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which possibly we
double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together
in our Thoughts, is positive, and the assemblage of a great number
#P 218#
#L 1#
of positive <Ideas> of Space or Duration. But what still remains beyond
this, we have no more a positive distinct notion of, than a Mariner
has of the depth of the Sea, where having let down a large portion of
his Sounding-line, he reaches no bottom: Whereby he knows the
depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much that more  5 
is, he hath no distinct notion at all: And could he always supply
new Line, and find the Plummet always sink, without ever stopping,
he would be something in the posture of the Mind reaching after a
compleat and positive <Idea> of Infinity. In which case, let this Line
be 10, or 10000 fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond 10 
it; and gives only this confused, and comparative <Idea>, That this is
not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind compre-
hends of any Space, it has a positive <Idea> of: But in endeavouring to
make it Infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the
<Idea> is still imperfect and incompleat. So much Space as the Mind 15 
takes a view of, in its contemplation of Greatness, is a clear Picture,
and positive in the Understanding: But Infinite is still greater. 1.
Then <the Idea of so much is positive> and clear. 2. <The Idea of Greater is also>
<clear, but it> is but a <comparative Idea>. 3. <The Idea of so much greater, as>
<cannot be comprehended>, and this <is plain Negative>; Not Positive. For he 20 
has no positive clear <Idea> of the largeness of any Extension, (which
is that sought for in the <Idea> of Infinite,) that has not a compre-
hensive <Idea> of the Dimensions of it: And such, no body, I think,
pretends to, in what is infinite. For to say a Man has a positive clear
<Idea> of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reason-  
able as to say, He has the positive clear <Idea> of the number of the
Sands on the Sea-shore, who knows not how many they be; but
only that they are more than Twenty. For just such a perfect and
positive <Idea> has he of an infinite Space or Duration, who says it is
larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other
number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have, a positive
<Idea>; which is all the <Idea>, I think, we have of Infinite. So that what
lies beyond our positive <Idea> towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity;
and has the indeterminate confusion of a Negative <Idea>, wherein I
know, I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too
large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very
far from a positive compleat <Idea>, wherein the greatest part, of
                                                           #P 219#
#L 1#
what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate
intimation of being still greater. For to say, that having in any
quantity measured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the
end, is only to say, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Nega-
tion of an end in any Quantity, is, in other words, only to say, That 5
it is bigger: And a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this
Bigger still with you, in all the Progressions your Thoughts shall
make in Quantity; and adding this <Idea> of still greater, to all the
<Ideas> you have, or can be supposed to have of Quantity. Now
whether such an <Idea> as that, be positive, I leave any one to con- 
sider.
#S 16#. I ask those who say they have a <positive> Idea <of Eternity>,
whether their <Idea> of Duration includes in it Succession, or not? If
it does not, they ought to shew the difference of their Notion of
Duration, when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite: Since, 15
perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them
their Weakness of Understanding in this point; and acknowledge,
That the Notion they have of Duration, forces them to conceive,
That whatever has Duration, is of a longer continuance to day, than
it was yesterday. If to avoid Succession in eternal Existence, they 20
recur to the <Punctum Stans> of the Schools, I suppose, they will
thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and
positive <Idea> of infinite Duration, there being nothing more in-
conceivable to me, than Duration without Succession. Besides, that
<Punctum Stans>, if it signify any thing, being not <Quantum>, finite or 25
infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak Apprehensions cannot
separate Succession from any Duration whatsoever, our <Idea> of
Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succession of Moments of
Duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has,
or can have, a positive <Idea> of an actual infinite Number, I leave him
to consider, till his infinite Number be so great, that he himself can
add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt, he
himself will think the <Idea>, he hath of it, a little too scanty for
positive Infinity.
#S 17#. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational
#P 220#
#L 1#
Creature, that will but examine his own, or any other Existence, to
have the Notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no beginning:
And such an <Idea> of infinite Duration, I am sure I have. But this
<Negation of a Beginning>, being but the Negation of a positive thing,
<scarce gives> me <a positive> Idea <of Infinity>; which whenever I endeavour  5 
to extend my Thoughts to, I confess my self at a loss, and find I
cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.
#S 18#. He that thinks he has a positive <Idea> of infinite Space, will,
when he considers it, find that he can <no> more have a <positive Idea> of
the greatest, than he has <of the least Space>. For in this latter, which 10 
seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension,
we are capable only of a comparative <Idea> of Smalness, which will
always be less than any one, whereof we have the positive <Idea>. All
our positive <Ideas> of any Quantity, whether great or little, have
always bounds; though our comparative <Idea>, whereby we can 15 
always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds.
For that which remains either great or little, not being compre-
hended in that positive <Idea>, which we have, lies in obscurity: And
we have no other <Idea> of it, but of the power of enlarging the one,
and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A Pestle and Mortar 20 
will as soon bring any Particle of Matter to Indivisibility, as the
acutest Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may, as
soon with his Chain, measure out infinite <Space>, as a Philosopher, by
the quickest flight of Mind, reach it; or by thinking comprehend it,
which is to have a positive <Idea> of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an 25 
Inch diameter, has a clear and positive <Idea> of it in his mind, and so
can frame one of 1/2 a 1/4 1/8, and so on till he has the <Idea> in his Thoughts
of something very little: but yet reaches not the <Idea> of that
incomprehensible Littleness, which Division can produce. What
remains of Smalness, is as far from his Thoughts, as when he first
began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and
positive <Idea> of that Smalness, which is consequent to infinite
Divisibility.
#S 19#. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have said,
at first glance make some very large <Idea> of that which he applies it
                                                           #P 221#
                                                           #L 1#
to, let it be Space, or Duration; and possibly he wearies his Thoughts,
by multiplying in his mind that first large <Idea>: But yet by that he
comes no nearer to the having a <positive clear Idea> of what remains, to
make up a positive Infinite, than the Country-fellow had of the
Water, which was yet to come, and pass the Channel of the River 5
where he stood:
            <Rusticus expectat dum transeat amnis, at ille>
            <Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.*>
#S 20#. There are some I have met with, that put so much differ-
ence between infinite Duration, and infinite Space, that they per- 
suade themselves, that they have <a positive> Idea <of Eternity; but> that
they <have not>, nor can have any <Idea of infinite Space>. The reason of
which mistake, I suppose to be this, That finding by a due Con-
templation of Causes and Effects, that it is necessary to admit some
Eternal Being, and so to consider the real existence of that Being, as 15
taking up, and commensurate to their <Idea> of Eternity: But on the
other side, not finding it necessary, but on the contrary apparently
absurd, that Body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude, they
can have no <Idea> of infinite Space, because they can have no <Idea> of
infinite Matter. Which Consequence, I conceive, is very ill collec- 
ted; because the Existence of Matter is no ways necessary to the
Existence of Space, no more than the Existence of Motion, or the
Sun, is necessary to Duration, though Duration uses to be measured
by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the <Idea> of 10000 Miles
square, without any Body so big, as well as the <Idea> of 10000 Years, 25
without any Body so old. It seems as easy to me to have the <Idea>
of Space empty of Body, as to think of the Capacity of a Bushel
without Corn, or the hollow of a Nutshel without a Kernel in it: It
being no more necessary, that there should be existing a solid Body
infinitely extended, because we have an <Idea> of the Infinity of Space,
than it is necessary that the World should be eternal, because we
have an <Idea> of infinite Duration: And why should we think our <Idea>
of infinite Space, requires the real existence of Matter to support it,
#P 222#
#L 1#
when we find, that we have as clear an <Idea> of infinite Duration to
come, as we have of infinite Duration past? Though, I suppose, no
body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in
that future Duration. Nor is it possible to join our <Idea> of future
Duration, with present or past Existence, any more than it is 5  
possible to make the <Ideas> of yesterday, to day, and to morrow to be
the same; or bring Ages past and future together, and make them
contemporary. But if these Men are of the Mind, That they have
clearer <Ideas> of infinite Duration, than of infinite Space, because it is
past doubt, that GOD has existed from all Eternity, but there is 10 
no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: Yet those Philoso-
phers who are of Opinion, That infinite Space is possessed by GOD's
infinite Omnipresence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal
Existence, must be allowed to have as clear an <Idea> of infinite Space,
as of infinite Duration; though neither of them, I think, has any 15 
<positive> Idea <of Infinity> in either case. For whatsoever positive <Ideas> a
Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to
the former, as easy as he can add together the <Ideas> of two Days, or
two Paces, which are positive <Ideas> of Lengths he has in his Mind,
and so on, as long as he pleases: whereby, if a Man had a positive 20 
<Idea> of infinite, either Duration, or Space, he could add two In-
finites together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than
another, Absurdities too gross to be confuted.
#S 21#. But yet if after all this, there be Men, who persuade them-
selves, that they have clear positive comprehensive <Ideas> of In- 25 
finity, 'tis fit they enjoy their privilege: And I should be very glad
with some others, that I know, who acknowledge they have none
such,) to be better informed by their Communication. For I have
been hitherto apt to think, that the great and <inextricable Diffi->
<culties>, which perpetually involve all Discourses <concerning Infinity>,
whether of Space, Duration, or Divisibility, have been the certain
<marks of a defect in our> Ideas <of Infinity>, and the disproportion the
Nature thereof has to the Comprehension of our narrow Capacities.
For whilst Men talk and dispute of infinite Space or Duration, as if
they had as compleat and positive <Ideas> of them, as they have of the
Names they use for them, or as they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or
                                                          #P 223#
                                                          #L 1#
any other determinate Quantity, it is no wonder, if the incompre-
hensible Nature of the thing, they discourse of, or reason about,
leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds
be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty, to be surveyed and
managed by them.                                              5
#S 22#. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of
Duration, Space, and Number; and what arises from the Contem-
plation of them, Infinity, 'tis possibly no more, than the matter
requires, there being few simple <Ideas>, whose Modes give more
exercise to the Thoughts of Men, than these do. I pretend not to 10
treat of them in their full Latitude: it suffices to my Design, to
shew, how the Mind receives them, such as they are, from <Sensation>
and <Reflection>; And how even the <Idea> we have of <Infinity>, how
remote soever it may seem to be from any Object of Sense, or
Operation of our Mind, has nevertheless, as all our other <Ideas>, 15
its Original there. Some Mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced
Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds
<Ideas> of Infinity: But this hinders not, but that they themselves, as
well as all other Men, got the first <Ideas>, which they had of Infinity,
from Sensation and Reflection, in the method we have here set 20
down.

#C 18#             CHAPTER XVIII

                   <Of other Simple Modes>.

#S 01#. THOUGH I have in the foregoing Chapters, shewn how from
simple <Ideas> taken in by Sensation, the Mind comes to extend it self
even to Infinity. Which however it may, of all others, seem most
remote from any sensible Perception, yet at last hath nothing in it, 25
but what is made out of simple <Ideas>: received into the Mind by the
Senses, and afterwards there put together, by the Faculty the Mind
has to repeat its own <Ideas>. Though, I say, these might be instances
enough of simple Modes of the simple <Ideas> of Sensation; and suffice
to shew, how the mind comes by them: yet I shall for Methods sake,
#P 224#
#L 1#
though briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed
to more complex <Ideas>.
#S 02#. To <slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip>, and
abundance others, that might be named, are Words, which are no
sooner heard, but every one, who understands English, has presently 5  
in his Mind distinct <Ideas>, which are all but the different modifica-
tions of Motion. <Modes of Motion> answer those of Extension: <Swift>
and <Slow> are two different <Ideas> of Motion, the measures whereof
are made of the distances of Time and Space put together, so they
are complex <Ideas> comprehending Time and Space with Motion.
#S 03#. The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is
a different <modification of Sound>: by which we see, that from the sense
of Hearing by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with
distinct <Ideas>, to almost an infinite Number. Sounds also, besides the
distinct cries of Birds and Beasts, are modified by diversity of
Notes of different length put together, which make that complex
<Idea> call'd a <Tune>, which a Musician may have in his mind, when he
hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the <Ideas> of those
Sounds, so put together silently in his own Fancy.
#S 04#. Those of Colours are also very various: Some we take notice 20   
of, as the different degrees, or as they are termed, <Shades of the same>
<Colour>. But since we very seldom make assemblages of Colours,
either for Use or Delight, but Figure is taken in also, and has its
part in it, as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-works, <etc>. those which
are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as 25 
being made up of <Ideas> of divers kinds, <viz>. Figure and Colour, such
as <Beauty, Rainbow>, etc.
#S 05#. All <compounded Tastes and Smells>, are also Modes made up of
these simple <Ideas> of those Senses. But they being such, as generally
we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set
down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration,
to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.
#S 06#. In general it may be observed, that those <simple Modes, which>
<are considered but as different degrees of the same simple> Idea; though they
are in themselves many of them very distinct <Ideas>; yet <have>
                                                           #P 225#
                                                           #L 1#
<ordinarily no distinct Names>, nor are much taken notice of, as distinct
<Ideas>, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether
Men have neglected these modes, and given no Names to them, as
wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because when they
were so distinguished, that Knowledge would not be of general, or 5
necessary use, I leave it to the Thoughts of others; it is sufficient to
my purpose to shew, that all our simple <Ideas> come to our Minds
only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has
them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new
complex <Ideas>. But though White, Red, or Sweet, <etc>. have not been 10
modified, or made into complex <Ideas>, by several Combinations, so as
to be named, and thereby ranked into Species; yet some others of
the simple <Ideas, viz>. those of Unity, Duration, Motion, <etc>. above
instanced in, as also Power and Thinking have been thus modified
to a great variety of complex <Ideas>, with Names belonging to them. 15
#S 07#. <The Reason whereof>, I suppose, has been this, That the great
Concernment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the
Knowledge of Men, and their Actions, and the signifying of them
to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made <Ideas> of
Actions very nicely modified, and gave those complex <Ideas> names, 20
that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those
things, they were daily conversant in, without long Ambages and
Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to
give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker
understood. That this is so, and that Man in framing different 25
complex <Ideas>, and giving them Names, have been much governed
by the end of Speech in general (which is a very short and expedite
way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the
Names, which in several Arts have heen found out, and applied
to several complex <Ideas> of modified Actions, belonging to their
several Trades, for dispatch sake, in their Direction or Discourses
about them. Which <Ideas> are not generally framed in the minds of
Men not conversant about these Operations. And thence the words
that stand for them, by the greatest part of Men of the same
Language, are not understood. <v.g. Coltshire, Drilling, Filtration>,
<Cohobation>, are words standing for certain complex <Ideas>, which
#P 226#
#L 1#
being seldom in the minds of any but those few, whose particular
Imployments do at every turn suggest them to their Thoughts,
those names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths,
and Chymists; who having framed the complex <Ideas>, which these
words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them  5 
from others, upon hearing of these names in communication readily
conceive those <Ideas> in their Minds; as by <Cohobation> all the simple
<Ideas> of Distilling, and the pouring the Liquor, distilled from any
thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and distilling it again.
Thus we see, that there are great varieties of simple <Ideas>, as of 10 
Tastes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more.
Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else
not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the Affairs and
Converse of Men, they have not had names given to them, and so
pass not for Species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to con- 15 
sider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.


#C 19#                    CHAPTER XIX

                   <Of the Modes of Thinking>.

#S 01#.  WHEN the Mind turns its view inwards upon it self, and
contemplates its own Actions, <Thinking> is the first that occurs. In it
the Mind observes a great variety of Modifications, and from thence
receives distinct <Ideas>. Thus the Perception, which actually ac-  
companies, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made
by an external object, being distinct from all other Modifications of
<thinking>, furnishes the mind with a distinct <Idea>, which we call
<Sensation>; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any <Idea> into the
Understanding by the Senses. The same <Idea>, when it again recurs 25 
without the operation of the like Object on the external Sensory, is
                                                          #P 227#
                                                          #L 1#
<Remembrance>: If it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and
endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis <Recollection>: If it be
held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis <Contemplation>:
When <Ideas> float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the
Understanding, it is that, which the <French> call <Reverie>; our Lan- 
guage has scarce a name for it: When the <Ideas> that offer themselves,
for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there
will always be a train of <Ideas> succeeding one another in our minds,)
are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is
<Attention>: When the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, 10
fixes its view on any <Idea>, considers it on all sides, and will not be
called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other <Ideas>, it is that we call
<Intention>, or <Study>: Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these.
And <Dreaming> it self, is the having of <Ideas>, (whilst the outward
Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with 15
their usual quickness,) in the mind, not suggested by any external
Objects, or known occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of
the Understanding at all: And whether that, which we call <Extasy>,
be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.
#S 02#. These are some few instances of those various <Modes of> 20
<thinking>, which the Mind may observe in it self, and so have as
distinct <Ideas> of, as it hath of <White> and <Red>, a <Square> or a <Circle>. I do
not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set
of <Ideas>, which are got from <Reflection>: That would be to make a
Volume. It suffices to my present purpose, to have shewn here, by 25
some few Examples, of what sort these <Ideas> are, and how the mind
comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to
treat more at large of <Reasoning, Judging, Volition>, and <Knowledge>,
which are some of the most considerable Operations of the mind,
<and Modes of thinking>.
#S 03#. But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable Digression, nor
wholly impertinent to our present Design, if we reflect here upon
<the different State of the Mind in thinking>, which those instances of
Attention, <Resvery>, and Dreaming, <etc>. before mentioned, naturally
enough suggest. That there are <Ideas>, some or other, always present
#P 228#
#L 1#
in the mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces
him; though the mind employs it self about them with several
degrees of Attention. Sometimes the mind fixes it self with so much
earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns
their <Ideas> on all sides; remarks their Relations and Circumstances; 5  
and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it
shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary
Impressions made then on the Senses, which at another Season
would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times, it barely
observes the train of <Ideas>, that succeed in the Understanding, 10 
without directing, and pursuing any of them: And at other times,
it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows, that
make no Impression.
#S 04#. This difference of <Intention>, and <Remission> of the mind in
thinking, with a great variety of Degrees, between earnest Study, 15 
and very near minding nothing at all, Every one, I think, has
experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the
mind in Sleep, retired as it were from the Senses, and out of the
reach of those Motions made on the Organs of Sense, which at
other times produce very vivid and sensible <Ideas>. I need not, for 20 
this, instance in those, who sleep out whole stormy Nights, without
hearing the Thunder, or seeing the Lightning, or feeling the
shaking of the House, which are sensible enough to those, who are
waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the Senses, it often
retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of <thinking>, which 25 
we call <Dreaming>: And last of all sound Sleep closes the Scene quite,
and puts an end to all Appearances. This I think almost every one
has Experience of in himself, and his own Observation without
difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude
from hence is, That since the mind can sensibly put on, at several
times, several degrees of <Thinking>; and be sometimes even in a wak-
ing Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that
degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at
last in the dark retirements of sound Sleep, loses the sight perfectly
of all <Ideas> whatsoever: Since, I say, this is evidently so in Matter of
Fact, and constant Experience, I ask, whether it be not probable,
that <thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul>? Since the
                                                           #P 229#
                                                           #L 1#
Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission;
but the Essences of things, are not conceived capable of any such
variation. But this by the bye.


#C 20#                     CHAPTER XX

                 <Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain>.

#S 01#. AMONGST the simple <Ideas>, which we receive both from
<Sensation> and <Reflection, Pain> and <Pleasure> are two very considerable 5
ones. For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in it self, or ac-
companied with <Pain> or <Pleasure>; so the Thought, or Perception of
the Mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with <Pleasure> or
<Pain>, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These like other
simple <Ideas> cannot be described, nor their Names defined; the way 10
of knowing them is, as of the simple <Ideas> of the Senses, only by
Experience. For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil, is
no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect
on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various Opera-
tions of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently 15
applied to, or considered by us.
#S 02#. Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or
Pain. That we call <Good>, which <is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or>
<diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any>
<other Good, or absence of any Evil>. And on the contrary we name that 20
<Evil>, which <is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish and Pleasure>
<in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good>. By Pleasure
and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they
are commonly distinguished; though in truth, they be only differ-
ent Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in 25
the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.
#S 03#. <Pleasure> and <Pain>, and that which causes them, Good and
Evil, are the hinges on which our <Passions> turn: and if we reflect on
our selves, and observe how these, under various Considerations,
operate in us; what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what
#P 230#
#L 1#
internal Sensations, (if I may so call them,) they produce in us, we
may thence form to our selves the <Ideas> of our <Passions>.
#S 04#. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the
Delight, which any present, or absent thing is apt to produce in
him, has the <Idea> we call <Love>. For when a Man declares in Autumn, 5  
when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he
<loves> Grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of Grapes delights him;
let an alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the delight of
their Taste, and he then can be said to <lone> Grapes no longer.
#S 05#. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any thing 10   
present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call <Hatred>.
Were it my business here, to enquire any farther, than into the bare
<Ideas> of our Passions, as they depend on different Modifications of
Pleasure and Pain, I should remark, that our <Love> and <Hatred> of in-
animate insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure 15 
and Pain which we receive from their use and application any way
to our Senses, though with their Destruction: But <Hatred> or <Love>, to
Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or
Delight, which we find in our selves arising from a consideration of
their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a 20 
Man's Children or Friends, producing constant Delight in him, be
is said constantly to <love> them. But it suffices to note, that our <Ideas>
of <Love> and <Hatred>, are but the Dispositions of the Mind, in respect
of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caused in us.
#S 06#. The uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of 25   
any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the <Idea> of Delight with
it, is that we call <Desire>, which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is
more or less vehement. Where by the bye it may perhaps be of some
use to remark, that the chief if not only spur to humane Industry
and Action is uneasiness. For whatever good is propos'd, if its
absence carries no displeasure nor pain with it; if a Man be easie and
content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it;
there is no more but a bare <Velleity>, the term used to signifie the
lowest degree of Desire, and that which is next to none at all, when
there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any thing, that it
                                                           #P 231#
                                                           #L 1#
carries a Man no farther than some faint wishes for it, without any
more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. <Desire> also is
stopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the impossibility or unattain-
ableness of the good propos'd, as far as the uneasiness is cured or
allay'd by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts farther 5
were it seasonable in this place.
#S 07#. <Joy> is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the
present or assured approaching possession of a Good; and we are
then possessed of any Good, when we have it so in our power, that
we can use it when we please. Thus a Man almost starved, has <Joy> 10
at the arrival of Relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it:
and a Father, in whom the very well-being of his Children causes
delight, is always, as long as his Children are in such a State, in the
possession of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it to have that
pleasure.                                                      15
#S 08#. <Sorrow> is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a
Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the sense of
a present Evil.
#S 09#. <Hope> is that pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in
himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a 20
thing, which is apt to delight him.
#S 10#. <Fear> is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of
future Evil likely to befal us.
#S 11#. <Despair> is the thought of the unattainableness of any Good,
which works differently in Mens Minds, sometimes producing un- 
easiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.
#S 12#. <Anger> is uneasiness or discomposure of the Mind, upon
the receit of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge.
#S 13#. <Envy> is an uneasiness of Mind, caused by the consideration
of a Good we desire, obtained by one, we think should not have had
it before us.
#S 14#. These two last, <Envy> and <Anger>, not being caused by Pain
and Pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed
Considerations of our selves and others, are not therefore to be
found in all Men, because those other parts of valuing their Merits,
#P 232#
#L 1#
or intending Revenge, is wanting in them: But all the rest termina-
ted purely in Pain and Pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all Men.
For we <love, desire, rejoice>, and <hope>, only in respect of Pleasure; we
<hate, fear>, and <grieve> only in respect of Pain ultimately: In fine all
these Passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the 5  
Causes of Pleasure and Pain, or to have Pleasure or Pain some way or
other annexed to them. Thus we extend our Hatred usually to the
subject, (at least if a sensible or voluntary Agent,) which has pro-
duced Pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: But
we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because 10 
Pleasure operates not so strongly on us, as Pain; and because we
are not so ready to have hope, it will do so again. But this by the
bye.
#S 15#. By <Pleasure> and <Pain>, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all
along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean, not only 15 
bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever <Delight> or <Uneasiness> is felt
by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable Sensation
or Reflection.
#S 16#.  'Tis farther to be considered, That in reference to the
Passions, the removal or <lessening of a Pain is> considered, and operates 20 
as a <Pleasure>: And the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.
#S 17#. The Passions too have most of them in most persons
operations on the Body, and cause various changes in it: Which not
being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the <Idea> of
each Passion. For <Shame>, which is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon 25 
the thought of having done something, which is indecent, or will
lessen the valued Esteem, which others have for us, has not always
blushing accompanying it.
#S 18#. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Dis-
course of the <Passions>; they are <many more than those> I have here named: 30 
And those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a
much larger, and more accurate Discourse. I have only mentioned
these here, as so many instances of Modes of Pleasure and Pain
resulting in our Minds, from various Considerations of Good and
                                                             #P 233#
#L 1#
Evil. I might, perhaps, have instanced in other Modes of Pleasure
and Pain more simple than these, as the Pain of <Hunger> and <Thirst>,
and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; The pain
of tender Eyes, and the pleasure of Musick; Pain from captious un-
instructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation 
with a Friend, or of well directed study in the search and discovery
of Truth. But the Passions being of much more concernment to us,
I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the <Ideas>
we have of them, are derived from Sensation and Reflection.


#C 21#                        CHAPTER XXI

                             <Of Power>.

#S 01#. THE Mind, being every day informed, by the Senses, of the 10
alteration of those simple <Ideas>, it observes in things without; and
taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and
another begins to exist, which was not before; reflecting also on
what passes within it self, and observing a constant change of its
<Ideas>, sometimes by the impression of outward Objects on the 15
Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own choice; and
concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been,
that the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things,
by like Agents, and by the like ways, considers in one thing the
possibility, of having any of its simple <Ideas> changed, and in another 20
the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that <Idea>
which we call <Power>. Thus we say, Fire has a <power> to melt Gold, <i.e.>
to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently
its hardness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a <power> to be melted;
That the Sun has a <power> to blanch Wax, and Wax a <power> to be
blanched by the Sun, whereby the Yellowness is destroy'd, and
Whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like Cases,
the <Power> we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable
<Ideas>. For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or
#P 234#
#L 1#
operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its
sensible <Ideas>; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by
conceiving a Change of some of its <Ideas>.
#S 02#. <Power> thus considered is twofold, <viz.> as able to make, or able
to receive any change: The one may be called <Active>, and the other 5 
<Passive Power>. Whether Matter be not wholly destitute of <active>
<Power>, as its Author GOD is truly above all <passive Power>; and
whether the intermediate state of created Spirits be not that alone,
which is capable of both <active> and <passive Power>, may be worth
consideration. I shall not now enter into that Enquiry, my present 10  
Business being not to search into the original of Power, but how we
come by the <Idea> of it. But since <active Powers> make so great a part
of our complex <Ideas> of natural Substances, (as we shall see here-
after,) and I mention them as such, according to common appre-
hension; yet they being not, perhaps, so truly <active Powers>, as our 15  
hasty Thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss, by
this intimation, to direct our Minds to the consideration of GOD
and Spirits, for the clearest <Idea> of <active Power>.
#S 03#. I confess <Power includes in it some kind of relation>, (a relation to
Action or Change,) as indeed which of our <Ideas>, of what kind so-   
ever, when attentively considered, does not? For our <Ideas> of Exten-
sion, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a
secret relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have something
relative in them much more visibly: And sensible Qualities, as
Colours and Smells, <etc.> what are they but the <Powers> of different 25  
Bodies, in relation to our Perception, <etc.> And if considered in the
things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture,
and Motion of the Parts? All which include some kind of relation in
them. Our <Idea> therefore of <Power>, I think, may well have a place
amongst other simple <Ideas>, and be considered as one of them, being 30  
one of those, that make a principal Ingredient in our complex <Ideas>
of Substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.
#S 04#. We are abundantly furnished with the <Idea of passive Power>,
by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot
                                                                #P 235#
                                                                #L 1#
avoid observing their sensible Qualities, nay their very Substances
to be in a continual flux: And therefore with reason we look on them
as liable still to the same Change. Nor have we of <active Power>
which is the more proper signification of the word <Power>) fewer
instances. Since whatever Change is observed, the Mind must 5
collect a Power somewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a
possibility in the thing it self to receive it. But yet, if we will con-
sider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear
and distinct an <Idea> of <active Power>, as we have from reflection on the
Operations of our Minds. For all <Power> relating to Action, and there 10
being but two sorts of Action, whereof we have any <Idea, viz.>
Thinking and Motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest
<Ideas> of the <Powers>, which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking,
Body affords us no <Idea> at all, it is only from Reflection that we have
that: 2. Neither have we from Body any <Idea> of the beginning of 15
Motion. A Body at rest affords us no <Idea> of any <active Power> to move;
and when it is set in motion it self, that Motion is rather a Passion,
than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the stroke of a Billiard-
stick, it is not any action of the Ball, but bare passion: Also when by
impulse it sets another Ball in motion, that lay in its way, it only 20
communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses
in it self so much, as the other received; which gives us but a very
obscure <Idea> of an <active Power> of moving in Body, whilst we observe
it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very
obscure <Idea> of <Power>, which reaches not the Production of the 25
Action, but the Continuation of the Passion. For so is motion in a
Body impelled by another: The continuation of the Alteration made
in it from rest to motion being little more an Action, than the con-
tinuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the same blow is an
Action. The <Idea> of the beginning of motion, we have only from re- 30
flection on what passes in our selves, where we find by Experience,
that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the Mind, we can
move the parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest. So that it
seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of
Bodies by our Senses, but a very imperfect obscure <Idea> of <active> 35
<Power>, since they afford us not any <Idea> in themselves of the <Power>
to begin any Action, either motion or thought. But if, from the
Impulse Bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one
#P 236#
#L 1#
thinks he has a clear <Idea> of <Power>, it serves as well to my purpose,
<Sensation> being one of those ways, whereby the mind comes by its
<Ideas>: Only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way,
whether the mind doth not receive its <Idea> of <active Power> clearer
from reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any ex-    
ternal Sensation.
#S 05#. This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a
<Power> to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our
minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or prefer-
ence of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or 10  
not doing such or such a particular action. This <Power> which the
mind has, thus to order the consideration of any <Idea>, or the for-
bearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the
body to its rest, and <vice versa^> in any particular instance is that which
we call the <Will>. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any 15  
particular action, or its forbearance is that which we call <Volition> or
<Willing>. The forbearance or performance of that action, consequent
to such order or command of the mind is called <Voluntary>. And
whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind
is called <Involuntary>. The power of Perception is that which we call 20  
the <Understanding>. Perception, which we make the act of the
Understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The Perception of <Ideas> in our
Minds. 2. The Perception of the signification of Signs. 3. The
Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Dis-
agreement, that there is between any of our <Ideas>. All these are 25  
attributed to the <Understanding>, or perceptive Power, though it be
the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.
#S 06#. These Powers of the Mind, <viz.> of <Perceiving>, and of <Preferring>,
are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of
Speaking is, That the <Understanding> and <Will> are two <Faculties> of the 30  
mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be,
                                                                 #P 237#
                                                                 #L 1#
so as not to breed any confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being
supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings
in the Soul, that performed those Actions of Understanding and
Volition. For when we say the <Will> is the commanding and superior
Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the 5
inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the <Understanding>,
etc. though these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully
attend to their own <Ideas>, and conduct their Thoughts more by the
evidence of Things, than the sound of Words, may be understood
in a clear and distinct sense: Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of 10
Speaking of <Faculties>, has misled many into a confused Notion of so
many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and
Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions,
as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of
wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in Questions relating to them. 15
#S 07#. Every one, I think, finds in himself a <Power> to begin or
forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From
the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the
actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the <Ideas>
of <Liberty> and <Necessity>.                                             20
#S 08#. All the Actions, that we have any <Idea> of, reducing them-
selves, as has been said, to these two, <viz.> Thinking and Motion, so
far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not
to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind,
so far is a Man <Free>. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are 25
not equally in a Man's power; where-ever doing or not doing, will
not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it,
there he is not <Free>, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary.
So that the <Idea> of <Liberty>, is the <Idea> of a Power in any Agent to do
or forbear any particular Action, according to the determination or 30
thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the
other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be
#P 238#
#L 1#
produced by him according to his <Volition>, there he is not at <Liberty>,
that Agent is under <Necessity>. So that <Liberty> cannot be, where there is
no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there
may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no <Liberty>. A little
Consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear. 5   
#S 09#. A Tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a Racket,
or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a <free Agent>. If we
enquire into the Reason, we shall find it is, because we conceive not
a Tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition,
or preference of Motion to rest, or <vice versa^>; and therefore has not 10  
<Liberty>, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come
under our <Idea> of <Necessary>, and are so call'd. Likewise a Man falling
into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him,) has not herein
liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he
prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that Motion 15  
not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows
not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not <free>. So a Man
striking himself, or his Friend, by a Convulsive motion of his Arm,
which it is not in his Power, by Volition or the direction of his Mind
to stop, or forbear; no Body thinks he has in this <Liberty>; every one 20  
pities him, as acting by Necessity and Constraint.
#S 10#. Again, suppose a Man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a
Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be
there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is
glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays 25  
willingly in, <i.e.> preferrs his stay to going away. I ask, Is not this
stay voluntary? I think, no Body will doubt it: and yet being locked
fast in, 'tis evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not free-
dom to be gone. So that <Liberty is not an> Idea <belonging to Volition>, or
preferring; but to the Person having the Power of doing, or for- 30  
bearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct. Our <Idea>
of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For where-
ever restraint comes to check that Power, or compulsion takes away
that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting,
there <liberty>, and our Notion of it, presently ceases. 35  
                                                                #P 239#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 11#. We have instances enough, and often more than enough in
our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates,
which 'tis not in his Power by any Thought or Volition to stop; and
therefore in respect of these Motions, where rest depends not on his
choice, nor would follow the determination of his Mind, if it should 5
preferr it, he is not a <free Agent>. Convulsive Motions agitate his
Legs, so that though he <wills> it never so much, he cannot by any
power of his Mind stop their Motion, (as in that odd Disease called
<Chorea Sancti Viti>), but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at
Liberty in this Action, but under as much Necessity of moving, as a 10
Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket. On the other
side, a Palsie or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the de-
termination of his Mind, if it would thereby transferr his Body to
another Place. In all these there is want of <Freedom>, though the
sitting still even of a Paralytick, whilst he preferrs it to a removal, 15
is truly voluntary. <Voluntary> then <is not opposed to Necessary; but to>
<Involuntary>. For a Man may preferr what he can do, to what he
cannot do; the State he is in, to its absence or change, though
Necessity has made it in it self unalterable.
#S 12#. As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts 20
of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take it
up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we
are <at liberty>. A waking Man being under the necessity of having
some <Ideas> constantly in his Mind, is not at <liberty> to think, or not to
think; no more than he is at <liberty>, whether his Body shall touch 25
any other, or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation
from one <Idea> to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is
in respect of his <Ideas>, as much at <liberty>, as he is in respect of Bodies
he rests on: He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another.
But yet some <Ideas> to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are 30
such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their
absence by the utmost effort it can use. A Man on the Rack, is not
at <liberty> to lay by the <Idea> of pain, and divert himself with other
Contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our
Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the 35
#P 240#
#L 1#
liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse.
But as soon as the Mind regains the power to stop or continue,
begin or forbear any of these Motions of the Body without, or
Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to preferr either to the
other, we then consider the Man as a <free Agent> again. 5   
#S 13#. Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to
act or forbear according to the direction of Thought, there <Necessity>
takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the begin-
ning or continuation of any Action is contrary to that preference of
his Mind, is called <Compulsion>; when the hind'ring or stopping any 10  
Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called <Restraint>. Agents that
have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing <necessary>
Agents.
#S 14#. If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be considered,
whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I 15  
think, unreasonable, because unintelligible, Question, <viz. Whether>
<Man's Will be free, or no>. For if I mistake not, it follows, from what
I have said, that the Question it self is altogether improper; and it
is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's <Will> be free, as to ask,
whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: <Liberty> being as 20  
little applicable to the <Will>, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or
squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of
such a Question, as either of these: because it is obvious, that the
modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of
Figure to Vertue: and when any one well considers it, I think he 25  
will as plainly perceive, that <Liberty>, which is but a power, belongs
only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the
<Will>, which is also but a Power.
#S 15#. Such is the difficulty of explaining, and giving clear notions
of internal Actions by sounds, that I must here warn my Reader 30 
that <Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring>, etc. which I have made
use of, will not distinctly enough express <Volition>, unless he will
reflect on what he himself does, when he <wills>. For Example, <Pre->
<ferring> which seems perhaps best to express the Act of <Volition>, does
                                                                 #P 241#
                                                                 #L 1#
it not precisely. For though a Man would preferr flying to walking,
yet who can say he ever <wills> it? <Volition>, 'tis plain, is an Act of the
Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it self to have over
any part of the Man, by imploying it in, or witholding it from any
particular Action. And what is the <Will>, but the Faculty to do this? 5
And is that Faculty any thing more in effect, than a Power, the
power of the Mind to determine its thought, to the producing,
continuing, or stopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For
can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a power to think on its
own Actions, and to preferr their doing or omission either to other, 10
has that Faculty call'd <Will.  Will> then is nothing but such a
power. <Liberty>, on the other side, is the power a Man has to do or
forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or for-
bearance has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the same
thing as to say, according as he himself <wills> it.                     15
#S 16#.'Tis plain then, That the <Will> is nothing but one Power
or Ability, and <Freedom> another Power or Ability: So that to ask,
whether the <Will has Freedom>, is to ask, whether one Power has
another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first
sight too grosly absurd to make a Dispute, or need an Answer. 20
For who is it that sees not, that <Powers> belong only to <Agents>, and
<are Attributes only of Substances, and not of Powers> themselves? So that
this way of putting the question, <viz.> whether the <Will be free>, is in
effect to ask, whether the <Will> be a Substance, an Agent, or at least
to suppose it, since Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing 25
else. If Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be applied to
Power, it may be attributed to the Power, that is in a Man, to
produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by
choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free,
and is Freedom it self. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom 30
were free, he would be suspected, not to understand well what he
said; and he would be thought to deserve <Midas's> Ears, who know-
ing that Rich was a denomination from the possession of Riches,
should demand whether Riches themselves were rich.
#P 242#
#L 1#
#S 17#. However the <name Faculty>, which Men have given to this
Power call'd the <Will>, and whereby they have been led into a way of
talking of the Will as acting, may, by an appropriation that dis-
guises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity; yet the
<Will> in truth, signifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or 5   
chuse: And when the <Will>, under the name of a <Faculty>, is considered,
as it is, barely as an ability to do something, the absurdity, in
saying it is free, or not free, will easily discover it self. For if it be
reasonable to suppose and talk of <Faculties>, as distinct Beings, that
can act, (as we do, when we say the <Will> orders, and the <Will> is 10  
free,)'tis fit that we should make a speaking <Faculty>, and a walking
<Faculty>, and a dancing <Faculty>, by which those Actions are produced,
which are but several Modes of Motion; as well as we make the
<Will> and <Understanding> to be <Faculties>, by which the Actions of
Chusing and Perceiving are produced, which are but several 15  
Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly say, that 'tis the
singing <Faculty> sings, and the dancing <Faculty> dances; as that the
<Will> chuses, or that the Understanding conceives; or, as is usual,
that the <Will> directs the Understanding, or the Understanding
obeys, or obeys not the <Will>: It being altogether as proper and 20  
intelligible to say, that the power of Speaking directs the power of
Singing, or the power of Singing obeys or disobeys the power of
Speaking.
#S 18#. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as
I guess, produced great confusion. For these being all different 25 
Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do several Actions, he exerts
them as he thinks fit: But the power to do one Action, is not
operated on by the power of doing another Action. For the power
of Thinking operates not on the power of Chusing, nor the power
of Chusing on the power of Thinking; no more than the power of 30  
Dancing operates on the power of Singing, or the power of Singing
on the power of Dancing, as any one, who reflects on it, will easily
perceive: And yet this is it which we say, when we thus speak, that
<the Will operates on the Understanding, or the Understanding on the Will>.
#S 19#. I grant, that this or that actual Thought may be the 35   
occasion of Volition, or exercising the power a Man has to chuse;

                                                                #P 243#
                                                                #L 1#
or the actual choice of the Mind, the cause of actual thinking on this
or that thing: As the actual singing of such a Tune, may be the
occasion of dancing such a Dance, and the actual dancing of such a
Dance, the occasion of singing such a Tune. But in all these, it is not
one <power> that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates, 5
and exerts these Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the
Agent that has power, or is able to do. For <Powers> are Relations, not
Agents: And <that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that>
<alone, which is, or is not free>, and not the Power it self: For Freedom,
or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a 10
power to act.
#S 20#. The attributing to <Faculties>, that which belonged not to
them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introduc-
ing into Discourses concerning the Mind with the name of <Faculties>,
a Notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our 15
Knowledge in that part of our selves, as the great use and mention
of the like invention of <Faculties>, in the operations of the Body, has
helped us in the knowledge of Physick. Not that I deny there are
<Faculties> both in the Body and Mind: they both of them have their
<powers> of Operating, else neither the one nor the other could 20
operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and
that is not able to operate, that has no <power> to operate. Nor do I
deny, that those Words, and the like, are to have their place in the
common use of Languages, that have made them currant. It looks
like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and Philosophy it 25
self, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in
publick, must have so much Complacency, as to be cloathed in the
ordinary Fashion and Language of the Country, so far as it can
consist with Truth and Perspicuity. But the fault has been, that
Faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as so many
distinct Agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested
the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready, and very satisfactory
Answer, to say, That it was the <digestive Faculty>. What was it that
made any thing come out of the Body? The <expulsive Faculty>. What
moved? The <Motive Faculty>: And so in the Mind, the <intellectual>
#P 244#
#L 1#
<Faculty>, or the Understanding, understood; and the <elective Faculty>,
or the Will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, That the
ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the
ability to understand, understood. For <Faculty, Ability>, and <Power>,
I think, are but different names of the same things: Which ways 5  
of speaking, when put into more intelligible Words, will, I think,
amount to thus much; That Digestion is performed by something
that is able to digest; Motion by something able to move; and
Understanding by something able to understand. And in truth it
would be very strange, if it should be otherwise; as strange as it 10 
would be for a Man to be free without being able to be free.
#S 21#. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think <the>
<Question is not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether, a Man be free>.
Thus, I think,
  1. That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his 15    
Mind, preferring the existence of any Action, to the non-existence
of that Action, and, <vice versa^>, make it to exist, or not exist, so far
he is <free>. For if I can, by a thought, directing the motion of my
Finger, make it move, when it was at rest, or <vice versa^>, 'tis evident,
that in respect of that, I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my 20 
Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words, or silence,
I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace: and <as far as this Power>
<reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own Thought>
<preferring either, so far is a Man free>. For how can we think any one
freer than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any 25 
one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Rest to any
Action, produce that Action or Rest, so far can he do what he will.
For such a preferring of Action to its absence, is the <willing> of it:
and we can scarce tell how to imagine any <Being> freer, than to be
able to do what he <wills>. So that in respect of Actions, within the
reach of such a power in him, a Man seems as free, as 'tis possible for
Freedom to make him.
#S 22#. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, willing to shift off from
himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by
putting himself into a worse state, than that of fatal Necessity, is
                                                                #P 245#
                                                                #L 1#
not content with this: Freedom, unless it reaches farther than this,
will not serve the turn: And it passes for a good Plea, that a Man is
not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act, what he
wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty there yet therefore is raised this
farther Question, <Whether a Man be free to will>; which, I think, is 5
what is meant, when it is disputed, Whether the <will> be free. And as
to that I imagine,
#S 23#. 2. That <Willing>, or <Volition> being an Action, and Freedom
consisting in a power of acting, or not acting, <a Man in respect of>
<willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his power is once pro-> 10
<posed to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free>. The reason
whereof is very manifest: For it being unavoidable>1 that the Action
depending on his <Will>, should exist, or not exist; and its existence,
or not existence, following perfectly the determination, and pref-
erence of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not 15
existence, of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he <will> the
one, or the other, <i.e. prefer> the one to the other: since one of them
must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the
choice and determination of his Mind, that is, by his <willing it>: for if
he did not <will> it, 1t would not be. So that in respect of the act of 20
<willing>, a Man in such a case is not free: Liberty consisting in a
power to act, or not to act, which, in regard of Volition, a Man,
upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to
prefer the doing, or forbearance, of an Action in a Man's power,
which is once so proposed to his thoughts; a Man must necessarily 25
<will> the one, or the other of them, upon which preference, or voli-
tion, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly
#P 246#
#L 1#
voluntary: But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two,
being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in respect of that act of
<willing>, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless Necessity
and Freedom can consist together, and a Man can be Free and
Bound at once. 5   
#S 24#. This then is evident, That in all proposals of present Action,
<a Man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, because he cannot forbear will->
<ing>: Liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in
that only. For a Man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because
he can walk if he <wills> it. A Man that walks is at liberty also, not 10  
because he walks, or moves; but because he can stand still if he <wills>
it. But if a Man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he
is not at liberty; so likewise a Man falling down a precipice, though
in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion, if
he would. This being so, 'tis plain that a Man that is walking, to 15  
whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether
he <will> determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He
must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them; walking or not walk-
ing: and so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so pro-
posed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast 20  
number of voluntary Actions, that succeed one another every
moment that we are awake, in the course of our Lives, there are
but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the <Will>, 'till
the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have
shewn, the Mind in respect of <willing> has not a power to act, or not 25  
to act, wherein consists Liberty: The Mind in that case has not
a power to forbear <willing>; it cannot avoid some determination con-
cerning them, let the Consideration be as short, the Thought as
quick, as it will, it either leaves the Man in the state he was before
thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an end to it.
Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one in preference
to, or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continua-
tion, or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.
                                                                #P 247#
#L 1#
#S 25#. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man is not at
liberty, whether he will <Will>, or no; the next thing demanded is,
<Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or>
<Rest>. This Question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it
self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty 5
concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to
will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases,
is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he <wills>; or be pleased with
what he is pleased with. A Question, which, I think, needs no
answer: and they, who can make a Question of it, must suppose one 10
Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate
that; and so on <in infinitum>.
#S 26#. To avoid these, and the like absurdities, nothing can be of
greater use, than to establish in our Minds determined <Ideas> of the
things under Consideration. If the <Ideas> of Liberty, and Volition, 15
were well fixed in our Understandings, and carried along with us
in our Minds, as they ought, through all the Questions that are
raised about them, I suppose, a great part of the Difficulties, that
perplex Men's Thoughts, and entangle their Understandings,
would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the 20
confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing
caused the obscurity.
#S 27#. <First> then, it is carefully to be remembred, That <Freedom>
<consists in the dependence of the Existence, or not Existence of any Action>,
<upon our Volition of it, and not in the dependence of any Action, or its> 25
<contrary, on our preference>. A Man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to
leap twenty yards downwards into the Sea, not because he has a
power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty yards
upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he
has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his,
either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free
in that case: Because the doing, or forbearance of that particular
#P 248#
#L 1#
Action, is no longer in his power. He that is a close Prisoner, in a
Room twenty foot-square, being at the North side of his Chamber,
is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, because he can walk,
or not walk it: But is not, at the same time, at liberty, to do the
contrary; <i.e.> to walk twenty foot Northward. 5  
      In this then consists Freedom, (<viz>.) in our being able to act, or
not to act, according as we shall chuse, or <will>.
#S 28#. <Secondly>, We must remember, that <Volition>, or <Willing>, is an
act of the Mind directing its thought to the production of any
Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid 10 
multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word
<Action>, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action proposed;
<sitting still>, or <holding one's peace>, when <walking> or <speaking> are pro-
pos'd, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determina-
tion of the <Will>, and being often as weighty in their consequences, 15 
as the contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough
pass for Actions too: But this I say, that I may not be mistaken, if
for brevity's sake I speak thus.
                                                                #P 249#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 29#. <Thirdly>, The Will being nothing but a power in the Mind to
direct the operative Faculties of a Man to motion or rest, as far as
they depend on such direction. To the Question, what is it deter-
mines the Will? The true and proper Answer is, The mind. For that
which determines the general power of directing, to this or that 5
particular direction, is nothing but the Agent it self Exercising the
power it has, that particular way. If this Answer satisfies not, 'tis
plain the meaning of the Question, <what determines the Will?> is this,
What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its
general power of directing, to this or that particular Motion or 10
Rest? And to this I answer, The motive, for continuing in the same
State or Action, is only the present satisfaction in it; The motive to
change, is always some <uneasiness>: nothing setting us upon the
change of State, or upon any new Action, but some <uneasiness>. This is
the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, 15
which for shortness sake we will call <determining of the Will>, which I
shall more at large explain.
#S 30#. But in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that
though I have above endeavoured to express the Act of <Volition>, by
<chusing, preferring>, and the like Terms, that signify <Desire> as well as 20
<Volition>, for want of other words to mark that Act of the mind,
whose proper Name is <Willing> or <Volition>; yet it being a very simple
Act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it
by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does, when it
<wills>, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This 25
Caution of being careful not to be misled by Expressions, that do not
enough keep up the difference between the <Will>, and several Acts
of the mind, that are quite distinct from it, I think the more neces-
sary: Because I find the Will often confounded with several of the
Affections, especially <Desire>; and one put for the other, and that by 30
Men, who would not willingly be thought, not to have had very
#P 250#
#L 1#
distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about
them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and
mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be
avoided. For he, that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what
passes in his mind, when he <wills>, shall see, that the <will> or power of 5  
<Volition> is conversant about nothing, but our own Actions; ter-
minates there; and reaches no farther; and that <Volition> is nothing,
but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by
a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop
to any Action, which it takes to be in its power. This well con- 10 
sidered plainly shews, that the <Will> is perfectly distinguished from
<Desire>, which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary
tendency from that which our <Wills> sets us upon. A Man, whom I
cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which at
the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. 15 
In this case, 'tis plain the <Will> and <Desire> run counter. I will the
Action, that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and
that the direct contrary. A Man, who by a violent Fit of the Gout in
his Limbs, finds a doziness in his Head, or a want of appetite in his
Stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his Feet or 20 
Hands (for where-ever there is pain there is a desire to be rid of it)
though yet, whilst he apprehends, that the removal of the pain may
translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never
determin'd to any one Action, that may serve to remove this pain.
Whence it is evident, that <desiring> and <willing> are two distinct Acts 25 
of the mind; and consequently that the <Will>, which is but the power
of <Volition>, is much more distinct from <Desire>.
#S 31#. To return then to the Enquiry, <what is it that determines the>
<Will in regard to our Actions>? And that upon second thoughts I am
apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in 30 
view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) <uneasiness>
                                                                #P 251#
                                                                #L 1#
a Man is at present under. This is that which successively deter-
mines the <Will>, and sets us upon those Actions, we perform. This
<Uneasiness> we may call, as it is, <Desire>; which is an <uneasiness> of the
Mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body of what
sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is <uneasiness>: And with this is 5
always join'd Desire, equal to the pain or <uneasiness> felt; and is
scarce distinguishable from it. For <desire> being nothing but an
<uneasiness> in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt,
ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call
it <desire>, no body feeling pain, that he wishes not to be eased of, with 10
a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this
desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good, and
here also the desire and <uneasiness> is equal. As much as we desire any
absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good
does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledg'd to 15
have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire
equal to it self: Because the absence of good is not always a pain, as
the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked
on, and considered without <desire>. But so much as there is any where
of <desire>, so much there is of <uneasiness>.                              20
#S 32#. That <Desire> is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects
on himself, will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in
<Desire>, what the Wise-man says of Hope, (which is not much
different from it) that it being <deferr'd makes the Heart sick>,* and that
still proportionable to the greatness of the <Desire>, which sometimes 25
raises the <uneasiness> to that pitch, that it makes People cry out, <Give>
<me Children>, give me the thing desir'd, <or I die>?** Life it self, and all
its Enjoyments, is a burden cannot be born under the lasting and
unremoved pressure of such an <uneasiness>.
#P 252#
#L 1#
#S 33#. Good and Evil, present and absent, 'tis true, work upon
the mind: But that which immediately determines the <Will>, from
time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the <uneasiness> of <desire>,
fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolency to one in
pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this <uneasiness>, 5  
that determines the <Will> to the successive voluntary actions,
whereof the greatest part of our Lives is made up, and by which we
are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall
endeavour to shew both from Experience, and the reason of the
thing. 10 
#S 34#. When a Man is perfectly content with the State he is in,
which is when he is perfectly without any <uneasiness>, what industry,
what action, what <Will> is there left, but to continue in it? of this
every Man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our All-
wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing 15 
what it is that determines the <Will>, has put into Man the <uneasiness>
of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their
Seasons, to move and determine their <Wills>, for the preservation of
themselves, and the continuation of their Species. For I think we
may conclude, that, if the bare contemplation of these good ends, 20 
to which we are carried by these several <uneasinesses>, had been
sufficient to determine the <will>, and set us on work, we should have
had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this World, little or
no pain at all. <It is better to marry than to burn>, says St. <Paul>;* where
we may see, what it is, that chiefly drives Men into the enjoyments 25 
of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully,
than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.
#S 35#. It seems so establish'd and settled a maxim by the general
consent of all Mankind, That good, the greater good, determines
the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first publish'd my 30 
                                                                #P 253#
                                                                #L 1#
thoughts on this Subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine, that
by a great many I shall be thought more excusable, for having then
done so, than that now I have ventur'd to recede from so received
an Opinion. But yet upon a stricter enquiry, I am forced to con-
clude, that <good>, the <greater good>, though apprehended and acknow- 
ledged to be so, does not determine the <will>, until our desire, raised
proportionably to it, makes us <uneasy> in the want of it. Convince a
Man never so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty;
make him see and own, that the handsome conveniencies of life are
better than nasty penury: yet as long as he is content with the 10
latter, and finds no <uneasiness> in it, he moves not; his <will> never is
determin'd to any action, that shall bring him out of it. Let a Man
be never so well perswaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as
necessary to a Man, who has any great aims in this World, or hopes
in the next, as food to life: yet till he <hungers and thirsts after righteous-> 
<ness>;* till he feels an <uneasiness> in the want of it, his <will> will not be
determin'd to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good;
but any other <uneasinesses> he feels in himself, shall take place, and
carry his <will> to other actions. On the other side, let a Drunkard see,
that his Health decays, his Estate wastes; Discredit and Diseases, 20
and the want of all things, even of his beloved Drink, attends him
in the course he follows: yet the returns of <uneasiness> to miss his
Companions; the habitual thirst after his Cups, at the usual time,
drives him to the Tavern, though he has in his view the loss of
health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least 25
of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses, is far
greater, than the tickling of his palate with a glass of Wine, or the
idle chat of a soaking Club. 'Tis not for want of viewing the greater
good: for he sees, and acknowledges it, and in the intervals of his
drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good; 30
but when the <uneasiness> to miss his accustomed delight returns, the
#P 254#
#L 1#
greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present <uneasiness>
determines the <will> to the accustomed action; which thereby gets
stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion, though he at
the same time makes secret promises to himself, that he will do so
no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of 5  
those greater goods. And thus he is, from time to time, in the State
of that unhappy Complainer, <Video meliora proboque, Deteriora>
<sequor>:* which Sentence, allowed for true, and made good by con-
stant Experience, may this, and possibly no other, way be easily
made intelligible. 10 
#S 36#. If we enquire into the reason of what Experience makes so
evident in fact, and examine why 'tis <uneasiness> alone operates on
the <will>, and determines it in its choice, we shall find, that we being
capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once,
the present <uneasiness>, that we are under, does naturally determine 15 
the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our
actions: For as much as whilst we are under any <uneasiness>, we cannot
apprehend our selves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and <uneasiness>
being, by every one, concluded, and felt, to be inconsistent with
happiness; spoiling the relish, even of those good things which we 20 
have: a little pain serving to marr all the pleasure we rejoyced in.
And therefore that, which of course determines the choice of our
<will> to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as
long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards
happiness. 25 
#S 37#. Another reason why 'tis <uneasiness> alone determines the will,
may be this. Because that alone is present, and, 'tis against the nature
of things, that what is absent should operate, where it is not. It
may be said, that absent good may by contemplation be brought
home to the mind, and made present. The <Idea> of it indeed may be 30 
in the mind, and view'd as present there: but nothing will be in the
                                                                #P 255#
                                                                #L 1#
mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any
<uneasiness>, which we are under, till it raises our desire, and the
<uneasiness> of that has the prevalency in determining the <will>. Till
then the <Idea> in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other
<Ideas>, the object of bare unactive speculation; but operates not on 5
the will, nor sets us on work: the reason whereof I shall shew by and
by. How many are to be found, that have had lively representations
set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of Heaven, which
they acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet would
be content to take up with their happiness here? and so the pre- 
vailing <uneasinesses> of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of
this life, take their turns in the determining their <wills>, and all that
while they take not one step, are not one jot moved, towards the
good things of another life considered as never so great.
#S 38#. Were the will determin'd by the views of good, as it appears 15
in Contemplation greater or less to the understanding, which is the
State of all absent good, and that, which in the received Opinion
the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not see
how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven,
once propos'd and consider'd as possible. For all absent good, by 20
which alone barely propos'd, and coming in view, the <will> is thought
to be determin'd, and so to set us on action, being only possible,
but not infallibly certain, 'tis unavoidable, that the infinitely
greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine
the will in all the successive actions it directs; and then we should 25
keep constantly and steadily in our course towards Heaven,
without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other
end: The eternal condition of a future state infinitely out-weighing
the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other worldly
pleasure, which we can propose to our selves, though we should 30
grant these the more probable to be attain'd: For nothing future is
#P 256#
#L 1#
yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive
us. If it were so, that the greater good in view determines the <will>,
so great a good once propos'd could not but seize the <will>, and hold
it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever
letting it go again: For the <will> having a power over, and directing  5 
the thoughts, as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the
contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.
      This would be the state of the mind, and regular tendency of the
<will> in all its determinations, were it determin'd by that, which is
consider'd, and in view the greater good; but that it is not so is 10 
visible in Experience. The infinitely greatest confessed good being
often neglected, to satisfy the successive <uneasiness> of our desires
pursuing trifles. But though the greatest allowed, even everlasting
unspeakable good, which has sometimes moved, and affected the
mind, does not stedfastly hold the <will>, yet we see any very great, 15 
and prevailing <uneasiness>, having once laid hold on the <will>, lets it not
go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the
<will>. Thus any vehement pain of the Body; the ungovernable
passion of a Man violently in love; or the impatient desire of
revenge, keeps the <will> steady and intent; and the <will> thus deter- 20 
mined never lets the Understanding lay by the object, but all the
thoughts of the Mind, and powers of the Body are uninterruptedly
employ'd that way, by the determinations of the <will>, influenced by
that topping <uneasiness>, as long as it lasts; whereby it seems to me
evident, that the will, or power of setting us upon one action in 25 
preference to all other, is determin'd in us, by <uneasiness>: and
whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.
#S 39#. I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the <uneasiness> of desire,
as that which determines the <will>. Because that is the chief, and
most sensible; and the <will> seldom orders any action, nor is there 30 
any voluntary action performed, without some <desire> accompanying
                                                                #P 257#
                                                                #L 1#
it; which I think is the reason why the <will> and <desire> are so often
confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the <uneasiness> which
makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other Passions, as
wholly excluded in the case. <Aversion, Fear, Anger, Envy, Shame>, etc.
have each their <uneasiness> too, and thereby influence the <will>. These 5
Passions are scarce any of them in life and practice, simple, and
alone, and wholly unmixed with others; though usually in discourse
and contemplation, that carries the name, which operates strongest,
and appears most in the present state of the mind. Nay there is, I
think, scarce any of the Passions to be found without <desire> join'd 10
with it. I am sure, where-ever there is <uneasiness> there is <desire>: For
we constantly desire happiness; and whatever we feel of <uneasiness>,
so much, 'tis certain, we want of happiness; even in our own
Opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will.
Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our 15
enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with
our foresight, and that still carries the <will> with it. So that even in
<joy> it self, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment
depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear to lose it: And when-
ever a greater <uneasiness> than that takes place in the mind, the <will> 20
presently is by that determin'd to some new action, and the present
delight neglected.
#S 40#. But we being in this World beset with sundry <uneasinesses>,
distracted with different <desires>, the next enquiry naturally will be,
which of them has the precedency in determining the <will> to the 25
next action? and to that the answer is, that ordinarily, which is the
most pressing of those, that are judged capable of being then
removed. For the <will> being the power of directing our operative
faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved
towards what is judg'd at that time unattainable: That would be 30
to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to
#P 258#
#L 1#
lose its labour; for so it is to act, for what is judg'd not attainable;
and therefore very great <uneasinesses> move not the <will>, when they are
judg'd not capable of a Cure: They, in that case, put us not upon
endeavours. But these set a-part, the most important and urgent
<uneasiness>, we at that time feel, is that, which ordinarily determines 5  
the <will> successively, in that train of voluntary actions, which make
up our lives. The greatest present <uneasiness> is the spur to action,
that is constantly felt; and for the most part determines the <will> in
its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us,
that the proper and only object of the <will> is some action of ours, 10 
and nothing else. For we producing nothing, by our <willing> it, but
some action in our power, 'tis there the <will> terminates, and reaches
no farther.
#S 41#. If it be farther asked, what 'tis moves <desire>? I answer hap-
piness and that alone. <Happiness> and <Misery> are the names of two 15 
extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; 'tis what <Eye>
<hath not seen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath it entred into the Heart of Man to>
<conceive>.* But of some degrees of both, we have very lively impres-
sions, made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side;
and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake, 20 
I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there
being pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well as the Body: <With him>
<is fullness of Joy, and Pleasure for evermore>:** Or to speak truly, they
are all of the Mind; though some have their rise in the Mind from
Thought, others in the Body from certain modifications of Motion. 25 
#S 42#. <Happiness> then in its full extent is the utmost Pleasure we
are capable of, and <Misery> the utmost Pain: And the lowest degree
of what can be called <Happiness>, is so much ease from all Pain, and
so much present Pleasure, as without which any one cannot be
content. Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the 30 
                                                                #P 259#
                                                                #L 1#
operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies;
and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce
Pleasure in us, is that we call <Good>, and what is apt to produce Pain
in us, we call <Evil>, for no other reason, but for its aptness to pro-
duce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our <Happiness> and 5
<Misery>. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of
Pleasure, be in it self <good>; and what is apt to produce any degree of
Pain, be <evil>; yet it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it
comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because when they
come in competition the degrees also of Pleasure and Pain have 10
justly a preference. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call
<Good> and <Evil>, we shall find it lies much in comparison: For the
cause of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater degree of
Pleasure has the nature of <good>, and <vice versa^>.
#S 43#. Though this be that, which is called <good> and <evil>; and all 15
good be the proper object of <Desire> in general; yet all good, even
seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every
particular Man's <desire>; but only that part, or so much of it, as is
consider'd, and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness. All
other good however great in reality, or appearance, excites not a 20
Man's <desires>, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness,
wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfie himself. <Happi->
<ness>, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and <desires> what
makes any part of it: Other things, acknowledged to be good, he
can look upon without <desire>; pass by, and be content without. 25
There is no Body, I think, so sensless as to deny, that there is
pleasure in Knowledge: And for the pleasures of Sense, they have
too many followers to let it be question'd whether Men are taken
with them or no. Now let one Man place his satisfaction in sensual
Pleasures, another in the delight of Knowledge: Though each of 30
them cannot but confess, there is great Pleasure in what the other
#P 260#
#L 1#
pursues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his
happiness, their <desires> are not moved, but each is satisfied without
what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the
pursuit of it. But yet as soon as the studious Man's hunger and
thirst makes him <uneasie>, he whose <will> was never determined to any 5  
pursuit of good chear, poinant Sauces, or delicious Wine by the
pleasant tast he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of Hunger
and Thirst, presently determined to Eating and Drinking; though
possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome Food comes in
his way. And on the other side, the Epicure buckles to study, when 10 
shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his Mistress, shall
make him <uneasie> in the want of any sort of Knowledge. Thus, how
much soever Men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of happi-
ness; yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed
good, without being concern'd for it, or moved by it, if they think 15 
they can make up their happiness without it. Though, as to pain,
that they are always concern'd for; they can feel no <uneasiness>
without being moved. And therefore being <uneasie> in the want of
whatever is judged necessary to their Happiness, as soon as any
good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they 20 
begin to <desire> it.
#S 44#. This, I think, any one may observe in himself, and others,
that the <greater visible good> does not always raise Men's <desires> in
proportion to the greatness, it appears, and is acknowledged to
have: Though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to 25 
get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our
<happiness> and <misery> it self. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a
part of our present <misery>: But all absent good does not at any time
make a necessary part of our present <happiness>, nor the absence of it
make a part of our <misery>. If it did, we should be constantly and 30 
infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which
                                                                #P 261#
                                                                #L 1#
are not in our possession. All <uneasiness> therefore being removed, a
moderate portion of good serves at present to content Men; and
some few degrees of Pleasure in a succession of ordinary Enjoy-
ments make up a happiness, wherein they can be satisfied. If this
were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent, and 5
visibly trifling actions; to which our <wills> are so often determined;
and wherein we voluntarily wast so much of our Lives; which
remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination
of <will> or <desire> to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I
think, few People need go far from home to be convinced. And 10
indeed in this life there are not many, whose happiness reaches so
far, as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean Pleasures,
without any mixture of <uneasiness>; and yet they could be content
to stay here for ever: Though they cannot deny, but that it is
possible, there may be a state of eternal durable Joys after this life, 15
far surpassing all the good is to be found here. Nay they cannot but
see, that it is more possible, than the attainment, and continuation
of that pittance of Honour, Riches, or Pleasure, which they pursue;
and for which they neglect that eternal State: But yet in full view of
this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and 20
lasting happiness in a future State, and under a clear conviction,
that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their happiness
within some little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the
joys of Heaven from making any necessary part of it, their desires
are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their <wills> 25
determin'd to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.
#S 45#. The ordinary necessities of our lives, fill a great part of
them with the <uneasiness> of <Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness> with
labour, and <Sleepiness> in their constant returns, <etc.> To which, if
besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical <uneasiness>, (as itch 30
after <Honour, Power>, or <Riches>, etc.) which acquir'd habits by Fashion,
#P 262#
#L 1#
Example, and Education have setled in us, and a thousand other
irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us, we shall
find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these
<uneasinesses>, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent
good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the sollicitation  5 
of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of
<uneasinesses> out of that stock, which natural wants, or acquired
habits have heaped up, take the <will> in their turns; and no sooner is
one action dispatch'd, which by such a determination of the <will> we
are set upon, but another <uneasiness> is ready to set us on work. For 10 
the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present pressed with,
being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing
to be done in order to happiness, absent good, though thought on,
confessed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this
unhappiness in its absence, is jostled out, to make way for the 15 
removal of those <uneasinesses> we feel, till due, and repeated Contem-
plation has brought it nearer to our Mind, given some relish of it,
and raised in us some desire; which then beginning to make a part
of our present <uneasiness>, stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be
satisfied, and so according to its greatness, and pressure, comes in 20 
its turn to determine the <will>.
#S 46#. And thus, by a due consideration and examining any good
proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in a due proportion
to the value of that good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may
come to work upon the <will>, and be pursued. For good, though 25 
appearing, and allowed never so great, yet till it has raised desires
in our Minds, and thereby made us <uneasie> in its want, it reaches not
our <wills>; we are not within the Sphere of its activity; our <wills> being
under the determination only of those <uneasinesses>, which are present
to us, which, (whilst we have any) are always solliciting, and ready 30 
at hand to give the will its next determination. The balancing,
                                                                #P 263#
#L 1#
when there is any in the Mind, being only, which desire shall be
next satisfied, which <uneasiness> first removed. Whereby it comes to
pass, that as long as any <uneasiness>, any desire remains in our Mind,
there is no room for <good>, barely as such, to come at the <will>, or at all
to determine it. Because, as has been said, the first step in our 5
endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines
of misery, and to feel no part of it, the <will> can be at leisure for
nothing else, till every <uneasiness> we feel be perfectly removed:
which in the multitude of wants, and desires, we are beset with in
this imperfect State, we are not like to be ever freed from in this 10
World.
#S 47#. There being in us a great many <uneasinesses> always solliciting,
and ready to determine the <will>, it is natural, as I have said, that the
greatest, and most pressing should determine the <will> to the next
action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the 15
mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to
<suspend> the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all,
one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them;
examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies
the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that 20
variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the
conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we
precipitate the determination of our <wills>, and engage too soon
before due <Examination>. To prevent this we have a power to <suspend>
the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may 25
Experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty;
in this seems to consist that, which is (as I think improperly) call'd
<Free will>. For during this <suspension> of any desire, before the <will> be
determined to action, and the action (which follows that deter-
mination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge, 30
of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due
#P 264#
#L 1#
<Examination>, we have judg'd, we have done our duty, all that we
can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and 'tis not a fault,
but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to
the last result of a fair <Examination>.
#S 48#. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of 5     
<Freedom>, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: 'tis not an
Abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our <Liberty>; and the farther we
are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to Misery
and Slavery. A perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by
its last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its 10  
Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of
any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an imperfection,
as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by
the <Will>, would be an imperfection on the other side. A Man is at
liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He is 15  
perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection
in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were deprived of that In-
differency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the
same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand,
or its remaining in rest, when it would save his Head or Eyes from a 20  
blow he sees coming: 'tis as much <a perfection, that desire or the power of>
<Preferring should be determined by Good>, as that the power of Acting
should be determined by the <Will>, and the certainer such determina-
tion is, the greater is the perfection. Nay were we determined by
any thing but the last result of our own Minds, judging of the good 25  
or evil of any action, we were not free, the very end of our Freedom
being, that we might attain the good we chuse. And therefore every
Man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent
Being, to be determined in <willing> by his own Thought and Judg-
ment, what is best for him to do: else he would be under the 30  
determination of some other than himself, which is want of Liberty.
                                                                #P 265#
                                                                #L 1#
And to deny, that a Man's <will>, in every determination, follows his
own Judgment, is to say, that a Man <wills> and acts for an end that
he would not have at the time that he <wills> and acts for it. For if
he prefers it in his present Thoughts before any other, 'tis plain he
then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless 5
he can have, and not have it; <will> and not <will> it at the same time;
a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.
#S 49#. If we look upon those <superiour Beings> above us, who enjoy
perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more
steadily <determined in their choice of Good> than we; and yet we have no 10
reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if
it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are, to pronounce
what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think, we might say,
That God himself cannot choose what is not good; the Freedom of
the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.    15
#S 50#. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of Liberty,
let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less
determined, by wise Considerations, than a wise Man? Is it worth
the Name of <Freedom> to be at liberty to play the Fool, and draw
Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the    20
conduct of Reason, and to want that restraint of Examination and
Judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse, be
<Liberty>, true Liberty, mad Men and Fools are the only Freemen:
But yet, I think, no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of   
such <Liberty>, but he that is mad already. The constant desire of 25
Happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no Body,
I think, accounts an abridgment of <Liberty>, or at least an abridg-
ment of <Liberty> to be complain'd of. God Almighty himself is under
the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent Being is
so, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. 30
That in this state of ignorance we short-sighted Creatures might
#P 266#
#L 1#
not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend
any particular desire, and keep it from determining the <will>, and
engaging us in action. This is <standing still>, where we are not
sufficiently assured of the way: Examination is <consulting a guide>.
The determination of the <will> upon enquiry is <following the direction> 5  
<of that Guide>: And he that has a power to act, or not to act according
as such determination directs, is a <free Agent>; such determination
abridges not that Power wherein Liberty consists. He that has his
Chains knocked off, and the Prison-doors set open to him, is
perfectly at <liberty>, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; 10 
though his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the
Night, or illness of the Weather, or want of other Lodging. He
ceases not to be free; though the desire of some convenience to be
had there, absolutely determines his preference, and makes him
stay in his Prison. 15 
#S 51#. As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature,
lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so
the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real
happiness, is the necessary foundation of our <liberty>. The stronger
ties, we have, to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, 20 
which is our greatest good, and which as such our desires always
follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of
our <will> to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance
with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing
preferable good, till we have duly examin'd, whether it has a 25 
tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness; and there-
fore till we are as much inform'd upon this enquiry, as the weight of
the matter, and the nature of the case demands, we are by the neces-
sity of prefering and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good,
obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases. 30 
#S 52#. This is the hinge on which turns the <liberty> of intellectual
Beings in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution
                                                                #P 267#
#L 1#
of true felicity, that they can <suspend> this prosecution in particular
cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves,
whether that particular thing, which is then proposed, or desired,
lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which
is their greatest good. For the inclination, and tendency of their 5
nature to happiness is an obligation, and motive to them, to take
care not to mistake, or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon
caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their par-
ticular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neces-
sity determines to the pursuit of real Bliss, the same necessity, with 10
the same force establishes <suspence, deliberation>, and scrutiny of each
successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it, does not interfere
with our true happiness, and mislead us from it. This as seems to
me is the great privilege of finite intellectual Beings; and I desire it
may be well consider'd, whether the great inlet, and exercise of all 15
the <liberty> Men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and
that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this,
that they can <suspend> their desires, and stop them from determining
their <wills> to any action, till they have duly and fairly <examin'd> the
good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. 20
This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our
duty, and all that is in our power; and indeed all that needs. For,
since the <will> supposes knowledge to guide its choice, all that we
can do, is to hold our <wills> undetermined, till we have <examin'd> the
good and evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in 25
a chain of Consequences linked one to another, all depending on the
last determination of the Judgment, which whether it shall be upon
an hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature <Examina->
<tion>, is in our power; Experience shewing us, that in most cases we
are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.           30
#S 53#. But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens)
possesses our whole Mind, as when the pain of the Rack, an
#P 268#
#L 1#
impetuous <uneasiness>, as of Love, Anger, or any other violent Passion,
running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we
are not Masters enough of our own Minds to consider throughly,
and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness,
and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was, 5  
and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful
Father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our
desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our
Understandings may be <free> to examine, and reason unbiassed give
its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct 10 
to true Happiness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief
care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish
of our Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in things; and
not permit an allow'd or supposed possible great and weighty good
to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire 15 
of it self there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have
formed appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves
uneasie in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much
this is in every ones power, every one by making resolutions to
himself, such as he may keep, is easie for every one to try. Nor let 20 
any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from
breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do
before a Prince, or a great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence
of God, if he will.
#S 54#. From what has been said, it is easie to give an account, how 25   
it comes to pass, that though all Men desire Happiness, yet their
<wills carry them so contrarily>, and consequently some of them to what
is Evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices, that
Men make in the World, do not argue, that they do not all pursue
Good; but that the same thing is not good to every Man alike. This 30 
variety of pursuits shews, that every one does not place his happi-
ness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the
                                                                #P 269#
#L 1#
Concerns of Man terminated in this Life, why one followed Study 
and Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one
chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another Sobriety and Riches,
would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own
happiness; but because their <Happiness> was placed in different things. 5
And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient,
that had sore Eyes. If you have more Pleasure in the Taste of Wine,
than in the use of your Sight, Wine is good for you; but if the
Pleasure of Seeing be greater to you, than that of Drinking, Wine is
naught.                                                            10
#S 55#. The Mind has a different relish, as well as the Palate; and
you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or
Glory, (which yet some Men place their Happiness in,) as you
would to satisfy all Men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which,
though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others 15
extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with
Reason preferr the griping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes,
which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philo-
sophers of old did in vain enquire, whether <Summum bonum> consisted
in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And 20
they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish
were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided
themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not
on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that
particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the greatest 25
Happiness consists, in the having those things, which produce the
greatest Pleasure; and in the absence of those, which cause any
disturbance, any pain.  Now these, to different Men, are very
different things. If therefore Men in this Life only have hope; if in
this Life they can only enjoy, 'tis not strange, nor unreasonable, 30
that they should seek their Happiness by avoiding all things, that
disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein
#P 270#
#L 1#
it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no
Prospect beyond the Grave, the inference is certainly right, <Let us>
<eat and drink>, let us enjoy what we delight in, <for to morrow we shall>
<die>.* This, I think, may serve to shew us the Reason, why, though
all Men's desires tend to Happiness, yet they are not moved by the 5  
same Object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse
right, supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects, whereof
some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and their sweetness; others,
Beetles, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having
enjoyed for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more 10 
for ever.
#S 56#. These things duly weigh'd, will give us, as I think, a clear
view into the state of humane Liberty. Liberty 'tis plain consists in
a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we <will>.
This cannot be deny'd. But this seeming to comprehend only the 15 
actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is farther enquired,
whether he be at Liberty to <will>, or no? and to this it has been
answered, that in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the
act of volition; he must exert an act of his <will>, whereby the action
proposed, is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case 20 
wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of <willing>, and that is the
chusing of a remote Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may
suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against
the thing proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a
nature in it self and consequences to make him happy, or no. For 25 
when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his
Happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him
<uneasiness>, which determines his <will>, and sets him at work in
pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see
how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly incur punishment, 30 
though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he <wills>,
                                                                #P 271#
                                                                #L 1#
he does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be
good. For though his <will> be always determined by that, which is
judg'd good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because,
by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself
wrong measures of good and evil; which however false and falla- 
cious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they
were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be
answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it.
The eternal Law and Nature of things must not be alter'd to comply
with his ill-order'd choice. If the neglect or abuse of the Liberty he 10
had, to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness,
misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it, must be imputed
to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his determination:
It was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own
Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never 15
judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not, in a matter of so
great and near concernment.
What has been said, may also discover to us the Reason, why Men
in this World prefer different things, and pursue Happiness by
contrary Courses. But yet since Men are always constant, and in 20
earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the Question still
remains, <How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better>; and to
chuse that, which, by their own Confession, has made them
miserable.
#S 57#. To account for the various and contrary ways Men take, 25
though all aim at being happy, we must consider, whence the
various <uneasinesses>, that determine the will in the preference of each
voluntary action, have their rise.
  1.  Some of them come from causes not in our power, such as are  
often the pains of the Body from want, disease, or outward injuries, 30
as the rack, <etc.> which when present, and violent, operate for the
most part forcibly on the <will>, and turn the courses of Men's lives
#P 272#
#L 1#
from Virtue, Piety, and Religion, and what before they judged to
lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring, or through disuse,
not being able by the contemplation of remote, and future good, to
raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counter-balance
the uneasiness, he feels in those bodily torments; and to keep his 5 
<will> steady in the choice of those actions, which lead to future
Happiness.  A neighbour Country has been of late a Tragical
Theatre, from which we might fetch instances, if there needed any,
and the World did not in all Countries and Ages furnish examples
enough to confirm that received observation, <Necessitas cogit ad> 10 
<Turpia>, and therefore there is great reason for us to pray <Lead us not>
<into Temptation.*>
  2. Other <uneasinesses> arise from our desires of absent good; which 
desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we
make, and the relish we have of any absent good; in both which we 15 
are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.
#S 58#. In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments Men
make of future Good and Evil, whereby their desires are misled.
For as to present Happiness and Misery, when that alone comes in
consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, <a Man> 20 
<never chuses amiss>; he knows what best pleases him, and that, he
actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment are what they
seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same.
For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it
is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And 25 
therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and
drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err
in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best.
Were the pains of honest Industry, and of starving with Hunger
and Cold set together before us, no Body would be in doubt which 30 
to chuse: were the satisfaction of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven
                                                                #P 273#
#L 1#
offered at once to any one's present Possession, he would not   
balance, or err in the determination of his choice.
#S 59#. But since our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happiness
and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in their present
performance; but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which 5
they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are
passed, and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoy-
ments, and carry the Mind out to absent <good>, according to the
necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of
our Happiness. 'Tis our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its 10
attraction: without that we are not moved by absent <good>. For in
this narrow scantling of capacity, which we are accustomed to, and
sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which,
when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us
think our selves happy, 'tis not all remote, and even apparent good, 15
that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have,
sufficing for our present Happiness, we desire not to venture the
change: Since we judge that we are happy already, being content,
and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any
new uneasiness comes in, this Happiness is disturb'd, and we are 20
set afresh on work in the pursuit of Happiness.
#S 60#. Their aptness therefore to conclude, that they can be
happy without it, is one great occasion, that Men often are not
raised to the desire of the greatest absent <good>. For whilst such
thoughts possess them, the joys of a future State move them not; 25
they have little concern or uneasiness about them; and the <will>,
free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of
nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which
it then feels in its want of, and longings after them. Change but a
Man's view of these things; let him see, that Virtue and Religion 30
are necessary to his Happiness; let him look into the future State of
Bliss or Misery, and see there God the righteous Judge, ready to
<render to every Man according to his Deeds; To them who by patient>
#P 274#
#L 1#
<continuance in well-doing, seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality>,
<Eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth Evil, Indignation and Wrath>,
<Tribulation and Anguish:*> To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the
different State of perfect Happiness or Misery, that attends all Men
after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the measures of 5  
Good and Evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For
since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life, can bear any pro-
portion to endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery of an immortal
Soul hereafter, Actions in his Power will have their preference, not
according to the transient Pleasure, or Pain that accompanies, or 10 
follows them here; but as they serve to secure that perfect durable
Happiness hereafter.
#S 61#. But to account more particularly for the Misery, that Men
often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in
earnest pursue Happiness, we must consider, how <Things> come to be 15 
<represented> to our desires, <under deceitful appearances>: and that is <by the>
<Judgment> pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far
this reaches, and what are the Causes of wrong Judgment, we must
remember, that things are judged good or bad in a double sense.
<First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleasure> 20 
<or Pain>.
      <Secondly>, But because not only present Pleasure and Pain, but that
also which is apt by its efficacy, or consequences, to bring it upon
us at a distance, is a proper Object of our desires, and apt to move a
Creature, that has foresight; therefore <things> also <that draw after> 25 
<them Pleasure and Pain, are considered as Good and Evil>.
#S 62#. The <wrong Judgment> that <misleads us>, and makes the Will
often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various
Comparisons of these. The <wrong Judgment> I am here speaking of,
is not what one Man may think of the determination of another; 30 
but what every Man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I
lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really seeks
                                                                #P 275#
                                                                #L 1#
Happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of Pleasure, without any
considerable mixture of uneasiness; 'tis impossible any one should
willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave
out any thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and
the compleating of his Happiness, but only by a <wrong Judgment>. 5
I shall not here speak of that mistake, which is the consequence of
invincible Error, which scarce deserves the Name of <wrong Judg->
<ment>; but of that <wrong Judgment>, which every Man himself must
confess to be so.
#S 63#. I. Therefore, as to present Pleasure and Pain, the Mind, as 10
has been said, never mistakes that which is really good or evil; that,
which is the greater Pleasure, or the greater Pain, is really just as it
appears. But though present Pleasure and Pain shew their difference
and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet <when>
<we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future>, (which is usually the 15
case in the most important determinations of the Will) <we often make>
<wrong Judgments> of them, taking our measures of them in different
positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought
greater, than those of a larger size, that are more remote: And so it
is with Pleasures and Pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those 20
at a distance have the disadvantage in the Comparison. Thus most
Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in Hand
better than a great deal to come; and so for small Matters in
Possession, part with great ones in Reversion. But that this is a
<wrong Judgment> every one must allow, let his Pleasure consist in 25
whatever it will: since that which is future, will certainly come to
be present; and then, having the same advantage of nearness, will
shew it self in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake,
who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the Pleasure of
Drinking accompanied, the very moment a Man takes off his Glass, 30
with that sick Stomack, and aking Head, which, in some Men, are
sure to follow not many hours after, I think no body, whatever
Pleasure he had in his Cups, would, on these Conditions, ever let
Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side
#P 276#
#L 1#
comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time.
But if Pleasure or Pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal,
how much more will it be so, by a farther distance, to a Man, that
will not by a right judgment do what time will, <i.e.> bring it home
upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true 5  
dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on our selves, in
respect of bare Pleasure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happiness
or Misery: The future loses its just proportion, and what is present,
obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the <wrong>
<Judgment>, whereby the absent are not only lessened, but reduced 10 
to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in present,
and make sure of that, concluding amiss, That no evil will thence
follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatness of future Good
and Evil, which is that we are here speaking of, but in another sort
of <wrong Judgment>, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is con- 15 
sidered to be the cause and procurement of Pleasure or Pain, that
will follow from it.
#S 64#.  <The cause of our judging amiss>, when we compare our present
Pleasure or Pain with future, seems to me to be <the weak and narrow>
<Constitution of our Minds>. We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at 20 
once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain possesses us. The
present Pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all,
fills our narrow Souls, and so takes up the whole Mind, that it
scarce leaves any thought of things absent: Or if among our
Pleasures there are some, which are not strong enough, to exclude 25 
the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an
abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures:
A little bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no relish of the sweet.
Hence it comes, that, at any rate, we desire to be rid of the present
Evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because 30 
under the present Pain we find not our selves capable of any the
least degree of Happiness. Mens daily complaints are a loud proof
                                                                #P 277#
#L 1#
of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the
worst; and 'tis with anguish they cry out, <Any rather than this>;
<nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer>. And therefore our
whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent, to get rid of the
present Evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our 5
Happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think,
can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon
us. And because the abstinence from a present Pleasure, that offers
it self, is a Pain, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the desire being
inflamed by a near and tempting Object; 'tis no wonder that that 10
operates after the same manner Pain does, and lessens in our
Thoughts, what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold
into its embraces.
#S 65#. Add to this, that absent good, or which is the same thing,
future pleasure, especially if of a sort which we are unacquainted 15
with, seldom is able to counter-balance any uneasiness, either of
pain or desire, which is present. For its greatness being no more,
than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, Men are apt enough
to lessen that, to make it give place to any present desire; and
conclude with themselves, that when it comes to trial, it may 20
possibly not answer the report, or opinion, that generally passes
of it, they having often found, that not only what others have
magnified, but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great
pleasure and delight at one time, has proved insipid or nauseous at
another; and therefore they see nothing in it, for which they should 25
forego a present enjoyment. But that this is a <false> way <of judging>,
when apply'd to the Happiness of another life, they must confess,
unless they will say, God cannot make those happy he designs to
be so. For that being intended for a State of Happiness, it must
certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire: Could we 30
suppose their relishes as different there as they are here, yet the
Manna in Heaven will suit every one's Palate. Thus much of the
<wrong Judgment> we make of present and future Pleasure and Pain,
when they are compared together, and so the absent considered as
future.                                                             35
#P 278#
#L 1#
#S 66#. II. <As to things good or bad in their Consequences>, and by the
aptness is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, <we judge>
<amiss several ways>.
   1.  When <we judge> that so much evil does not really depend on       
them, as in truth there does.  5 
   2.  When we <judge>, that though the Consequence be of that       
moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise
fall out; or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address,
change, repentance, <etc.> That these are <wrong> ways of <judging>, were
easy to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large 10 
singly: But I shall only mention this in general, <viz.> That it is a
very wrong, and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater
Good, for a less, upon uncertain guesses, and before a due exam-
ination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter,
and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every 15 
one must confess, especially if he considers the usual <Causes> of this
<wrong Judgment>, whereof these following are some.
#S 67#. I. <Ignorance>: He that judges without informing himself to
the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of <judging amiss>.
II. <Inadvertency>: When a Man overlooks even that, which he does 20    
know. This is an affected and present Ignorance, which misleads
our Judgments, as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing
an account, and determining on which side the odds lies. If
therefore either side be hudled up in haste, and several of the Sums,
that should have gone into the reckoning, be overlook'd, and left 25 
out, this Precipitancy causes as <wrong> a <Judgment>, as if it were a
perfect Ignorance. That which most commonly causes this, is the
prevalency of some present Pleasure or Pain, heightned by our
feeble passionate Nature, most strongly wrought on by what
is present. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and 30 
Reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search, and
see, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty the Understanding
would be to no purpose: And without Understanding, Liberty (if
it could be) would signify nothing. If a Man sees, what would do
                                                                 #P 279#
                                                                 #L 1#
him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable,
without being able to move himself one step towards or from it,
what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble
in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven
up and down, as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being 5
acted by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little
odds. The first therefore and great use of Liberty, is to hinder blind
Precipitancy; the principal exercise of Freedom is to stand still,
open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of
what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter 10
requires. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the
prevalency of fashion, or acquired indispositions, do severally
contribute on occasion, to these <wrong Judgments>, I shall not here
farther enquire. I shall only add one other false Judgment, which I
think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice 15
of, though of great influence.
#S 68#. All Men desire Happiness, that's past doubt: but, as has
been already observed, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to
take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endear'd to
them; to rest satisfied in that; and so being happy, till some new 20
desire by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness, and shews
them, that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the will
determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent
good. For since we find, that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but
one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent 25
greater good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness:
If we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is
another occasion to Men of <judging wrong>, when they take not that
to be necessary to their Happiness, which really is so. This mistake
misleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often 30
in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But, which way ever
it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the
means, as not necessary to it, when a Man misses his great end
Happiness, he will acknowledge he judg'd not right. That which
contributes to this mistake is the real or suppos'd unpleasantness 35
of the actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming so
#P 280#
#L 1#
preposterous a thing to Men, to make themselves unhappy in
order to Happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.
#S 69#. The last enquiry therefore concerning this matter is,
Whether it be in a Man's power to change the pleasantness, and
unpleasantness, that accompanies any sort of action? and to that,  5 
it is plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their
palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has
none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the Body, and
like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think, that Men
cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in 10 
actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their
power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice,
application, and custom in most. Bread or Tobacco may be neglec-
ted, where they are shewn to be useful to health, because of an in-
indifferency or disrelish to them; reason and consideration at first 15 
recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes
them pleasant. That this is so in Vertue too, is very certain. Actions
are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or consider'd as a
means to a greater and more desirable end. The eating of a well-
season'd dish, suited to a Man's palate, may move the Mind by the 20 
delight it self, that accompanies the eating, without reference to any
other end: To which the consideration of the pleasure there is in
health and strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add a
new Gusto, able to make us swallow an ill relish'd potion. In the
latter of these, any action is rendred more or less pleasing, only by 25 
the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less perswaded
of its tendency to it, or necessary connexion with it: But the pleasure
of the action it self is best acquir'd, or increased, by use and practice.
Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on
with aversion; and by repetition wears us into a liking, of what 30 
possibly, in the first essay, displeased us. Habits have powerful
charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into
what we accustom our selves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at
least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has
suited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible, 35 
and every one's Experience shews him he can do; yet it is a part, in
the conduct of Men towards their Happiness, neglected to a degree,
that it will be possibly entertain'd as a Paradox, if it be said, that
Men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves;
                                                                 #P 281#
                                                                 #L 1#
and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great
deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common Opinion having
settled wrong Notions, and education and custom ill habits, the
just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of Men corrup-
ted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits 5
change our pleasures, and give a relish to that, which is necessary,
or conducive to our Happiness. This every one must confess he can
do, and when Happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will
confess, he did amiss in neglecting it; and condemn himself for it:
And I ask every one whether he has not often done so?            10
#S 70#. I shall not now enlarge any further on the <wrong Judgments>,
and neglect of what is in their power, whereby Men mislead them-
selves. This would make a Volume, and is not my business. But
whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their
power, may put Men out of their way to Happiness, and distract 15
them, as we see, into so different courses of life, this yet is certain,
that Morality, established upon its true Foundations, cannot but
determine the Choice in any one, that will but consider: and he that
will not be so far a rational Creature, as to reflect seriously upon
infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs condemn himself, as not 20
making that use of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and
Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has established,
as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine
the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew,
when the eternal State is considered but in its bare possibility, 25
which no Body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite
and endless Happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good
Life here, and the contrary state the possible Reward of a bad one,
must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude,
That a vertuous Life, with the certain expectation of everlasting 30
Bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the
fear of that dreadful state of Misery, which 'tis very possible may
overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of Anni-
hilation. This is evidently so, though the vertuous Life here had
#P 282#
#L 1#
nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual pleasure: which yet is
for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much
the odds to brag of, even in their present possession; nay, all things
rightly considered, have, I think even the worse part here. But when
infinite Happiness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the  5 
other; if the worst, that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be
the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who
can without madness run the venture? Who in his Wits would
chuse to come within a possibility of infinite Misery, which if he
miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on 10 
the other side, the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite
Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good
Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not
miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in
the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. 15 
Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not
presently see, to which side, in this case, the preference is to be
given? I have foreborn to mention any thing of the certainty, or
probability of a future State, designing here to shew the <wrong>
<Judgment>, that any one must allow, he makes upon his own 20 
Principles laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a
vicious Life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot
but be certain, that a future Life is at least possible.
#S 71#. To conclude this enquiry into humane Liberty, which as it
stood before, I my self from the beginning fearing, and a very 25 
judicious Friend of mine, since the publication suspecting, to have
some mistake in it, though he could not particularly shew it me,
I was put upon a stricter review of this Chapter. Wherein lighting
upon a very easy, and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting
one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery open'd 30 
to me this present view, which here in this second Edition, I sub-
mit to the learned World, and which in short is this: <Liberty> is a
power to act or not to act according as the Mind directs. A power to
direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular in-
stances, is that which we call the <Will>. That which in the train of 35 
                                                                 #P 283#
#L 1#
our voluntary actions determines the <Will> to any change of opera-
tion, is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always
accompanied with that of <Desire>. Desire is always moved by Evil, to
fly it: Because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary
part of our Happiness: But every <Good>, nay every <greater Good> does 5
not constantly move <Desire>, because it may not make, or may not
be taken to make any necessary part of our Happiness. For all that
we desire is only to be Happy. But though this general <Desire> of
Happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction
of any particular <desire> can be suspended from determining the <will> 10
to any subservient action, till we have maturely examin'd, whether
the particular apparent good, which we then desire, makes a part of
our real Happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The
result of our judgment upon that Examination is what ultimately
determines the Man, who could not be <free> if his <will> were determin'd 15
by any thing, but his own <desire> guided by his own <Judgment>. I know
that Liberty by some, is placed in an <indifferency> of the Man, ante-
cedent to the determination of his <Will>. I wish they, who lay so
much stress on such an <antecedent indifferency>, as they call it, had told
us plainly, whether this supposed <indifferency> be antecedent to the 20
Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, as well as to the
decree of the <Will>. For it is pretty hard to state it between them;
<i.e.>  immediately after the Judgment of the Understanding, and
before the determination of the <Will>, because the determination of
the Will immediately follows the Judgment of the Understanding; 25
and to place Liberty in an <indifferency>, antecedent to the Thought
and Judgment of the Understanding, seems to me to place Liberty
in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing
of it; at least it places it in a subject incapable of it, no Agent being
allowed capable of Liberty, but in consequence of Thought and 30
Judgment. I am not nice about Phrases, and therefore consent to
say with those that love to speak so, that Liberty is plac'd in
<indifferency>; but 'tis in an <indifferency> that remains after the Judgment
of the Understanding; yea, even after the determination of the
<Will>: And that is an indifferency not of the Man, (for after he has 35
once judg'd which is best, <viz.> to do, or forbear, he is no longer
indifferent,) but an <indifferency> of the operative Powers of the Man,
which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating
#P 284#
#L 1#
after, as before the decree of the <Will>, are in a state, which, if one
pleases, may be called <indifferency>; and as far as this <indifferency>
reaches, a Man is free, and no farther. <v.g.> I have the Ability to move
my Hand, or to let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to
move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that respect perfectly  5 
free. My <Will> determines that operative Power to rest, I am yet
free, because the <indifferency> of that my operative Power to act, or
not to act, still remains; the Power of moving my Hand, is not at all
impair'd by the determination of my <Will>, which at present orders
rest; the <indifferency> of that Power to act, or not to act, is just as it 10 
was before, as will appear, if the <Will> puts it to the trial, by order-
ing the contrary. But if during the rest of my Hand, it be seized by
a sudden Palsy, the <indifferency> of that operative Power is gone, and
with it my Liberty: I have no longer Freedom in that respect, but
am under a Necessity of letting my Hand rest. On the other side, 15 
if my Hand be put into motion by a Convulsion, the <indifferency>
of that operative Faculty is taken away by that motion, and my
Liberty in that case is lost: For I am under a Necessity of having my
Hand move. I have added this, to shew in what sort of <indifferency>
Liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or 20 
imaginary.
#S 72#. True notions concerning the nature and extent of <Liberty>
are of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardon'd this
Digression, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into. The
<Ideas> of <Will, Volition, Liberty>, and <Necessity>, in this Chapter of 25 
Power, came naturally in my way. In the former Edition of this
Treatise, I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them,
                                                                #P 285#
                                                                #L 1#
according to the light I then had: And now as a Lover of Truth,
and not a Worshipper of my own Doctrines, I own some change of
my Opinion, which I think I have discover'd ground for. In what I
first writ, I with an unbiassed indifferency followed Truth, whither
I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy Infalli- 
bility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of
blemishing my reputation, I have with the same sincere design for
truth only, not been asham'd to publish what a severer enquiry has
suggested. It is not impossible, but that some may think my former
notions right, and some (as I have already found) these later; and 10
some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in Men's
Opinions: Impartial deductions of reason in controverted points
being so very rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very
easy, especially if of any length. And therefore, I should think my
self not a little beholding to any one, who would upon these or any 15
other grounds fairly clear this subject of <Liberty> from any difficulties
that may yet remain.
Before I close this Chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpose, and
help to give us clearer conceptions about <power>, if we make our
thoughts take a little more exact survey of <Action>. I have said above, 20
that we have <Ideas> but of two sorts of <Action>, viz. <Motion> and
<Thinking>. These, in truth, though called and counted <Actions>, yet,
if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For,
if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due
consideration, will be found rather <Passions> than <Actions>, and con- 
sequently so far the effects barely of passive Powers in those subjects,
which yet on their account are thought <Agents>. For in these instances,
the substance that hath motion, or thought, receives the im-
pression whereby it is put into <that Action> purely from without,
and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an im- 
pression from some external Agent; and such a <Power> is not properly
an <Active Power>, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Some-
times the Substance, or Agent, puts it self into <Action> by its own
Power, and this is properly <Active Power>. Whatsoever modification
a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called 35
<Action; v.g.> a solid substance by motion operates on, or alters the
sensible <Ideas> of another substance, and therefore this modification
#P 286#
#L 1#
of motion we call Action. But yet this motion in that solid substance
is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only
from some external Agent. So that the <Active Power> of motion is in
no substance which cannot begin motion in it self, or in another
substance when at rest. So likewise in <Thinking>, a Power to receive   5 
<Ideas>, or Thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is
called a <Power> of thinking: But this is but a <Passive Power>, or Capacity.
But to be able to bring into view <Ideas> out of sight, at one's own
choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an
<Active Power>. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us 10  
from mistakes about <Powers> and <Actions>, which Grammar, and the
common frame of Languages, may be apt to lead us into: Since what
is signified by <Verbs> that Grammarians call <Active>, does not always
signify <Action; v.g.> this Proposition, I see the Moon, or a Star, or I
feel the heat of the Sun, though expressed by a <Verb Active>, does 15  
not signify any <Action> in me whereby I operate on those Substances;
but the reception of the <Ideas> of light, roundness, and heat, wherein
I am not active but barely passive, and cannot in that position of my
Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes
another way, or remove my Body out of the Sun-beams, I am 20  
properly active; because of my own choice, by a power within my
self, I put my self into that Motion. Such an <Action> is the product
<of Active Power>.
#S 73#. And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our
<original Ideas>, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which 25 
they are made up; which if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and
examine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made,
I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary, and
original ones, <viz.>

<Extension>, 30               
                 <Solidity>,
                 <Mobility>, or the Power of being moved;

which by our Senses we receive from Body:
                 <Perceptivity>, or the Power of perception, or thinking;
<Motivity>, or the Power of moving; 35               

which by reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave leave to
                                                                #P 287#
                                                                #L 1#
make use of these two new Words, to avoid the danger of being
mistaken in the use of those which are aequivocal. To which if we
add
              <Existence>,
              <Duration>,                                             5
              <Number>;
which belong both to the one, and the other, we have, perhaps, all
the Original <Ideas> on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine,
might be explained the nature of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells,
and all other <Ideas> we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to 10
perceive the severally modified Extensions, and Motions, of these
minute Bodies, which produce those several Sensations in us. But
my present purpose being only to enquire into the Knowledge the
Mind has of Things, by those <Ideas>, and Appearances, which <God> has
fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that 15
Knowledge; rather than into their Causes, or manner of Production,
I shall not, contrary to the Design of this Essay, set my self to
enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies,
and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the power to
produce in us the <Ideas> of their sensible Qualities: I shall not enter 20
any farther into that Disquisition; it sufficing to my purpose to
observe, That Gold, or Saffron, has a power to produce in us the
<Idea> of Yellow; and Snow, or Milk, the <Idea> of White; which we can
only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the
Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures, or Motion of the 25
Particles, which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular
Sensation: though when we go beyond the bare <Ideas> in our Minds,
and would enquire into their Causes, we cannot conceive any thing
else, to be in any sensible Object, whereby it produces different
<Ideas> in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and 30
Motion of its insensible Parts.
#P 288#
#C 22#                       CHAPTER XXII

                            <Of Mixed Modes>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. HAVING treated of <Simple Modes> in the foregoing Chapters,
and given several instances of some of the most considerable of
them, to shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are
now in the next place to consider those we call <Mixed Modes>, such
are the Complex <Ideas>, we mark by the names <Obligation, Drunkenness>, 5   
a <Lye>, etc. which consisting of several Combinations of simple <Ideas>
of different kinds, I have called <Mixed Modes>, to distinguish them
from the more simple Modes, which consist only of simple <Ideas> of
the same kind. These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of
simple <Ideas>, as are not looked upon to be the characteristical Marks 10  
of any real Beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and
independent <Ideas>, put together by the Mind, are thereby dis-
tinguished from the complex <Ideas> of Substances.
#S 02#. That the Mind, in respect of its simple <Ideas>, is wholly
passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of 15  
Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being
able to make any one <Idea>, Experience shews us. But if we atten-
tively consider these <Ideas> I call <mixed Modes>, we are now speaking
of, we shall find their Original quite different. <The Mind> often
<exercises an active Power in the making these> several <Combinations>. For it 20  
being once furnished with simple <Ideas>, it can put them together
in several Compositions, and so make variety of complex <Ideas>,
without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And
hence, I think, it is, that these <Ideas> are called <Notions>: as if they had
their Original, and constant Existence, more in the Thoughts of 25  
Men, than in the reality of things; and to form such <Ideas>, it
sufficed, that the Mind put the parts of them together, and that
they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering
whether they had any real Being: though I do not deny, but several
                                                                #P 289#
                                                                #L 1#
of them might be taken from Observation, and the Existence of
several simple <Ideas> so combined, as they are put together in the
Understanding. For the Man who first framed the <Idea> of <Hypocrisy>,
might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who
made shew of good Qualities which he had not; or else have framed 5
that <Idea> in his Mind, without having any such pattern to fashion
it by. For it is evident, that in the beginning of Languages and
Societies of Men, several of those complex <Ideas>, which were conse-
quent to the Constitutions established amongst them, must needs
have been in the Minds of Men, before they existed any where 10
else; and that many names that stood for such complex <Ideas>, were
in use, and so those <Ideas> framed, before the Combinations they
stood for, ever existed.
#S 03#. Indeed, now that Languages are made, and abound with
words standing for such Combinations, <an usual way of getting these> 15
<complex> Ideas, <is by the explication of those terms that stand for them>. For
consisting of a company of simple <Ideas> combined, they may by
words, standing for those simple <Ideas>, be represented to the Mind
of one who understands those words, though that complex Com-
bination of simple <Ideas> were never offered to his Mind by the real 20
existence of things. Thus a Man may come to have the <Idea> of
<Sacrilege>, or <Murther>, by enumerating to him the simple <Ideas>
which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them
committed.
#S 04#. Every <mixed Mode> consisting of many distinct simple <Ideas>, it 25
seems reasonable to enquire, <whence it has its Unity>; and how such a
precise multitude comes to make but one <Idea>, since that Combina-
tion does not always exist together in Nature. To which I answer
it is plain, it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining those
several simple <Ideas> together, and considering them as one complex 30
one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this Union, or that
which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to
that Combination. For 'tis by their names, that Men commonly
regulate their account of their distinct Species of mixed Modes,
seldom allowing or considering any number of simple <Ideas>, to make 35
#P 290#
#L 1#
one complex one, but such Collections as there be names for. Thus,
though the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into
one complex <Idea>, as the killing a Man's Father; yet, there being no
name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name <of Parricide>
to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex <Idea>, nor 5   
distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or
any other Man.
#S 05#. If we should enquire a little farther, to see <what> it is, that
<occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple> Ideas into distinct,
and, as it were, settled <Modes>, and neglect others, which in the 10  
Nature of Things themselves, have as much an aptness to be
combined, and make distinct <Ideas>, we shall find the reason of it to
be the end of Language; which being to mark, or communicate
Men's Thoughts to one another, with all the dispatch that may be,
they usually make such Collections of <Ideas> into complex Modes, 15  
and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way
of Living and Conversation, leaving others, which they have but
seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names, that tie
them together: they rather chusing to enumerate (when they have
need) such <Ideas> as make them up, by the particular names, that 20  
stand for them, than to trouble their Memories, by multiplying of
complex <Ideas> with names to them, which they shall seldom or never
have any occasion to make use of.
#S 06#. This shews us <how it comes to pass that there are in every Language>
<many particular words, which cannot be rendred by any one single word of> 25  
<another>. For the several Fashions, Customs, and Manners of one
Nation, making several Combinations <of Ideas> familiar and necessary
in one, which another people have had never any occasion to make,
or, perhaps, so much as take notice of, Names come of course to be
annexed to them, to avoid long Periphrases in things of daily 30  
Conversation; and so they become so many distinct complex <Ideas>
in their Minds. Thus                amongst the <Greeks>, and <Pro->
<scriptio> amongst the <Romans>, were words which other Languages
                                                                #P 291#
#L 1#
had no names that exactly answered; because they stood for com- 
plex <Ideas>, which were not in the Minds of the Men of other Nations.
Where there was no such Custom, there was no notion of any such
Actions; no use of such Combinations of <Ideas>, as were united, and,
as it were, tied together by those terms: and therefore in other 5
Countries there were no names for them.
#S 07#. Hence also we may see the Reason, <Why Languages constantly>
<change>, take up new, and lay by old terms. Because change of
Customs and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of <Ideas>,
which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new 10
names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them; and so
they become new Species of complex Modes. What a number of
different <Ideas> are by this means wrapped up in one short sound,
and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby saved, any one
will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the <Ideas>, that 15
either <Reprieve> or <Appeal> stand for; and instead of either of those
Names use a Periphrasis, to make any one understand their meaning.
#S 08#. Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large,
when I come to treat of Words, and their Use: yet I could not avoid
to take thus much notice here of the names of <mixed Modes>, which 20
being fleeting, and transient Combinations of simple <Ideas>, which
have but a short existence any where, but in the Minds of Men,
and there too have no longer any existence, than whilst they are
thought on, <have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and>
<lasting existence, as in their Names>: which are therefore, in these sort of 25
<Ideas>, very apt to be taken for the <Ideas> themselves. For if we should
enquire where the <Idea> of a <Triumph>, or <Apotheosis> exists, it is evident,
they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things
themselves, being Actions that required time to their performance,
and so could never all exist together: and as to the Minds of Men, 30
where the <Ideas> of these Actions are supposed to be lodged, they
have there too a very uncertain existence; and therefore we are apt
to annex them to the Names, that excite them in us.
#S 09#. There are therefore <three ways whereby we get the complex> Ideas
<of mixed Modes>. 1. By Experience and <Observation> of things themselves. 35
#P 292#
#L 1#
Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the <Idea> of
wrestling or fencing. 2. By <Invention>, or voluntary putting together
of several simple <Ideas> in our own Minds: So he that first invented
Printing, or Etching, had an <Idea> of it in his Mind, before it ever
existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by <explaining the names> of   5 
Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerat-
ing, and thereby, as it were, setting before our Imaginations all
those <Ideas> which go to the making them up, and are the constituent
parts of them. For having by <Sensation> and <Reflection> stored our
Minds with simple <Ideas>, and by use got the Names, that stand for 10  
them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex
<Idea>, we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple
<Idea>, but what he knows, and has, with us, the same name for. For
all our complex <Ideas> are ultimately resolvable into simple <Ideas>, of
which they are compounded, and originally made up, though per-   
haps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex
<Ideas>. Thus the <mixed Mode>, which the word <Lye> stands for, is made
of these simple <Ideas>: i. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain <Ideas> in the
Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those <Ideas>. 4.
Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise 20  
than the <Ideas> they stand for, are in the mind of the Speaker. I think
I need not go any farther in the Analysis of that complex <Idea>, we
call a <Lye>: What I have said is enough to show, that it is made up of
simple <Ideas>: And it could not but be an offensive tediousness to my
Reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every 25  
particular simple <Idea>, that goes to this complex one; which, from
what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself.
The same may be done in all our complex <Ideas> whatsoever; which
however compounded, and decompounded, may at last be resolved
into simple <Ideas>, which are all the Materials of Knowledge or 30  
Thought we have or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear,
that the Mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of <Ideas>, if we
consider, what an inexhaustible stock of simple Modes, Number,
and Figure alone affords us. How far then <mixed Modes>, which admit
of the various Combinations of different simple <Ideas>, and their  35 
infinite Modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily


imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see, that, no Body
need be afraid, he shall not have scope, and compass enough for his
                                                                #P 293#
                                                                #L 1#
Thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only
to simple <Ideas> received from Sensation or Reflection, and their
several Combinations.
#S 10#. It is worth our observing <which of> all <our simple> Ideas <have>
<been most modified, and had most mixed Modes made out of them, with names> 5
<given to them>: And those have been these three; Thinking, and
Motion, (which are the two <Ideas> which comprehend in them all
Action,) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceived to
flow. These simple <Ideas>, I say, of Thinking, Motion, and Power,
have been those, which have been most modified; and out of whose 10
Modifications have been made most complex Modes, with names
to them. For Action being the great business of Mankind, and the
whole matter about which all Laws are conversant, it is no wonder,
that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion, should be taken
notice of, the <Ideas> of them observed, and laid up in the memory, 15
and have Names assigned to them; without which, Laws could be
but ill made, or Vice and Disorder repressed. Nor could any Com-
munication be well had amongst Men, without such complex <Ideas>,
with Names to them: and therefore Men have setled Names, and
supposed setled <Ideas> in their Minds, of modes of Actions distin- 
guished by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time,
Place, and other circumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for
those Actions: <v.g.> Boldness is the Power to speak or do what we
intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the <Greeks> call
the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name : Which 25
power or ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been
acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that <Idea>, we name
<Habit>; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion, to break
into Action, we <call> it <Disposition>: Thus <Testiness> is a disposition or
aptness to be angry.                                                30
To conclude, Let us examine any <Modes of Action>, v.g. <Considera->
<tion> and <Assent>, which are Actions of the Mind; <Running> and <Speaking>,
which are Actions of the Body; <Revenge> and <Murther>, which are
Actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many
<Collections of simple Ideas>, which together make up the complex ones 35
signified by those Names.
#P 294#
#L 1#
#S 11#. <Power> being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the
Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power
into Act, are called <Causes>; and the Substances which thereupon are
produced, or the simple <Ideas> which are introduced into any subject
by the exerting of that Power, are called <Effects>. The <efficacy> 5   
whereby the new Substance or <Idea> is produced, is called, in the
subject exerting that Power, <Action>; but in the subject, wherein any
simple <Idea> is changed or produced, it is called <Passion>: Which
efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite; yet we
can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else 10  
but Modes of Thinking, and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing
else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive
it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action,
besides these, produces any effects, I confess my self to have no
Notion, nor <Idea> of, and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts, 15  
Apprehensions, and Knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as
five other Senses, or as the <Ideas> of Colours to a blind Man: And
therefore <many words, which seem to express some Action>, signify nothing
of the Action, or <Modus Operandi> at all, <but> barely <the effect>, with some
circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; <v.g.> 20  
Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no <Idea> of the Action or
Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and
the thing done. And when a Country-man says, the Cold freezes
Water, though the word Freezing seems to import some <Action>,
yet truly it signifies nothing, but the effect, <viz.> that Water, that 25  
was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing
any <Idea> of the Action whereby it is done.
#S 12#. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power
and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes, marked by
Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other 30  
simple <Ideas>, and their several Combinations, are <not> excluded;
much less, I think, will it be <necessary> for me <to enumerate> all <the mixed>
<Modes>, which have been settled, with Names to them. That would
be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the Words made use of
in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Politicks, and several other Sciences. 35  
All, that is requisite to my present design, is to shew, what sort of
                                                                #P 295#
                                                                #L 1#
<Ideas> those are which I call <Mixed Modes>; how the Mind comes by
them; and that they are Compositions, made up of simple <Ideas> got
from Sensation and Reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.


#C 23#                       CHAPTER XXIII

                  <Of Our Complex> Ideas <of Substances>.

#S 01#. THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great
number of the simple <Ideas>, conveyed in by the <Senses>, as they are 5
found in exteriour things, or by <Reflection> on its own Operations,
takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple <Ideas> go
constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing,
and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of
for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; 10
which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider
as one simple <Idea>, which indeed is a complication of many <Ideas>
together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple
<Ideas> can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose
some <Substratum>, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do 15
result, which therefore we call <Substance>.
#S 02#. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his <Notion>
<of pure Substance in general>, he will find he has no other <Idea> of it at all,
but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such
Qualities, which are capable of producing simple <Ideas> in us; which 20
Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be
asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he
would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if
he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension
#P 296#
#L 1#
inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the <Indian>
before mentioned; who, saying that the World was supported by a
great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which
his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know
what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, some-    
thing, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where
we use Words without having clear and distinct <Ideas>, we talk like
Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they
know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is <something>;
which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children 10  
or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they
pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct <Idea> of
at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The <Idea>
then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being
nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, 15  
we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, <sine re substante>,
without something to support them, we call that Support <Substantia>;
which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain <English>,
<standing under>, or <upholding>.
#S 03#. An obscure and relative <Idea> of Substance in general being 20    
thus made, we come to have the <Ideas of particular sorts of Substances>,
by collecting such Combinations of simple <Ideas>, as are by Experience
and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together,
and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal
Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come 25  
to have the <Ideas> of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, <etc.> of which Sub-
stances, whether any one has any other clear <Idea>, farther than of
certain simple <Ideas> coexisting together, I appeal to every one's own
Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a
Diamond, put together, that make the true complex <Idea> of those 30  
Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better
                                                                #P 297#
                                                                #L 1#
than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of,
has no other <Idea> of those Substances, than what is framed by a
collection of those simple <Ideas> which are to be found in them; only
we must take notice, that our complex <Ideas> of Substances, besides
all these simple <Ideas> they are made up of, have always the confused 5
<Idea> of <something> to which they belong, and in which they subsist:
and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a
<thing> having such or such Qualities, as Body is a <thing> that is ex-
tended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a <thing> capable of
thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we 10
say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like
fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed
always <something> besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion,
Thinking, or other observable <Ideas>, though we know not what it is.
#S 04#. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of 15
corporeal Substances, as <Horse, Stone, etc.> though the <Idea>, we have
of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those
several simple <Ideas> of sensible Qualities, which we use to find
united in the thing called <Horse> or <Stone>, yet because we cannot
conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we 20
suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject;
<which Support we denote by the name Substance>, though it be certain, we
have no clear, or distinct <Idea> of that <thing> we suppose a Support.
#S 05#. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind,
<viz.> Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, <etc.> which we concluding not to 25
subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to
Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of
some other <Substance>, which we call <Spirit>; whereby yet it is evident,
that having no other <Idea> or Notion, of Matter, but <something>
wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do 30
subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein <Thinking, knowing>,
<Doubting>, and a power of Moving, <etc.> do subsist, <We have as clear a>
<Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body>; the one being
supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the <Substratum> to
those simple <Ideas> we have from without; and the other supposed 35
with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the <Substratum> to those
#P 298#
#L 1#
Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain
then, that the <Idea> of corporeal <Substance> in Matter is as remote from
our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual <Substance>,
or <Spirit>; and therefore from our not having any notion of the
<Substance> of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than 5   
we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as
rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and
distinct <Idea> of the <Substance> of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit,
because we have no clear and distinct <Idea> of the <Substance> of a
Spirit. 10  
#S 06#. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of
<Substance> in general, all <the> Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of>1
<Substances>, are nothing but several Combinations of simple <Ideas>, co-
existing in such, though unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes
the whole subsist of itself. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple 15  
<Ideas> and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of <Sub->
<stances> to our selves; such are the <Ideas> we have of their several
species in our Minds; and such only do we, by their specifick
Names, signify to others, <v.g. Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron>, upon
hearing which Words, every one who understands the Language, 20  
frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple <Ideas>,
which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under
that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it
were, adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres
not in any thing else. Though in the mean time it be manifest, and 25  
every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has
no other <Idea> of any <Substance, v.g.> let it be <Gold, Horse, Iron, Man>,
<Vitriol, Bread>, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities,
which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a <Substratum>,
as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple <Ideas>, 30  
which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the <Idea> of
the <Sun>, What is it, but an aggregate of those several simple <Ideas>,
Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a
                                                                 #P 299#
                                                                 #L 1#
certain distance from us, and, perhaps, some other: as he who
thinks and discourses of the <Sun>, has been more or less accurate, in
observing those sensible Qualities, <Ideas>, or Properties, which are
in that thing, which he calls the <Sun>.
#S 07#. For he has the perfectest <Idea> of any of the particular sorts of 5
<Substance>, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple
<Ideas>, which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its
active Powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple
<Ideas>, yet, in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently
enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing 10
Iron, is one of the <Ideas> of the Complex one of that substance we call
a <Load-stone>, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex
one we call <Iron>; which Powers pass for inherent Qualities in those
Subjects. Because every <Substance> being as apt, by the Powers we
observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, 15
as it is to produce in us those simple <Ideas>, which we receive
immediately from it, does, by those new sensible Qualities intro-
duced into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do
thereby mediately affect our Senses, as regularly, as its sensible
Qualities do it immediately, <v.g.> we immediately by our Senses 20
perceive in <Fire> its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly considered,
nothing but Powers in it, to produce those <Ideas> in us: We also by
our Senses perceive the colour and brittleness of <Charcoal>, whereby
we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has
to change the colour and consistency of Wood. By the former Fire 25
immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several
Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities
of Fire, and so make them a part of the complex <Ideas> of it. For all
those Powers, that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the
alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those Subjects, on which 30
they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible <Ideas>,
therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple
<Ideas>, which make the complex ones of the sorts <of Substances>; though
these Powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex <Ideas>.
And in this looser sence, I crave leave to be understood, when I 35
#P 300#
#L 1#
name any of these <Potentialities amongst the simple Ideas>, which we
recollect in our Minds, when we think <of particular Substances>. For
the Powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered,
if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts of Sub-
stances. 5   
#S 08#. Nor are we to wonder, that <Powers make a great part of our com->
<plex> Ideas <of Substances>; since their secondary Qualities are those,
which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances
one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the
complex <Idea> of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us, 10  
in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute
parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences
depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the
characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame <Ideas> of them
in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which 15  
secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare
Powers. For the Colour and Taste of <Opium>, are, as well as its
soporifick or anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its
primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Opera-
tions, on different parts of our Bodies. 20  
#S 09#. <The> Ideas <that make our complex ones of corporeal Substances>, are of
these three sorts. <First>, The <Ideas> of the primary Qualities of things,
which are discovered by our Senses, and are in them even when we
perceive them not, such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation,
and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them, 25  
whether we take notice of them or no. <Secondly>, The sensible secon-
dary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the
Powers, those Substances have to produce several <Ideas> in us by our
Senses; which <Ideas> are not in the things themselves, otherwise than
as any thing is in its Cause. <Thirdly>, The aptness we consider in any 30  
Substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary Qualities,
as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different
<Ideas> from what it did before, these are called active and passive
Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion
of them, terminate only in sensible simple <Ideas>. For whatever 35  

                                                                #P 301#
                                                                #L 1#
alteration a <Load-stone> has the Power to make in the minute Particles
of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to
operate on Iron, did not its sensible Motion discover it; and I doubt
not, but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle,
have a Power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, 5
because they never appear in sensible effects.
#S 10#. <Powers> therefore, justly <make a great part of our complex> Ideas
<of Substances>. He, that will examine his complex <Idea> of Gold, will
find several of its <Ideas>, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the
Power of being melted, but of not spending it self in the Fire; of 10
being dissolved in <Aqua Regia>, are <Ideas>, as necessary to make up our
complex <Idea> of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: which if duly
considered, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak
truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to
produce that <Idea> in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light:  15
and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our <Idea> of the Sun, is
no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into
Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the
Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts, so on a Man, as to make
him have the <Idea> of Heat; and so on Wax, as to make it capable to 20
produce in a Man the <Idea> of White.
#S 11#. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles
of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible
Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite
different <Ideas> in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of 25
Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an
admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This
Microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked Eyes
produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the acuteness of
our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus 30
altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of
a coloured Object to our usual Sight, produces different <Ideas>, from
what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glass, which is opaque,
#P 302#
#L 1#
and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair
seen this way, loses its former Colour, and is in a great measure
pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling Colours, such as
appear from the refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies.
Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope, 5  
wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few Globules of
Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor; and how these red Globules
would appear, if Glasses could be found, that yet could magnify
them 1000, or 10000 times more, is uncertain.
#S 12#. The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, 10   
hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the conveniences of
Life, and the Business we have to do here. We are able, by our
Senses, to know, and distinguish things; and to examine them so
far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways to accommodate
the Exigences of this Life. We have insight enough into their 15 
admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire, and
magnify the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of their Author. Such a
Knowledge as this, which is suited to our present Condition, we
want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended,
we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: 20 
that perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We
are furnished with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover
enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator,
and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with
Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of living: These are our 25 
Business in this World. But were our Senses alter'd, and made
much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward Scheme of
things would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think,
would be inconsistent with our Being, or at least well-being in this
part of the Universe, which we inhabit. He that considers, how little 30 
our Constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this Air, not
much higher than that we commonly breath in, will have reason to
be satisfied, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Mansion,
the all-wise Architect has suited our Organs, and the Bodies, that
are to affect them, one to another. If our Sense of Hearing were but 35 
1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract
                                                                #P 303#
#L 1#
us. And we should in the quietest Retirement, be less able to   
sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that
most instructive of our Senses, Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or
100000 times more acute than it is now by the best Microscope,
things several millions of times less than the smallest Object of his 5
sight now, would then be visible to his naked Eyes, and so he would
come nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the
minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably
get <Ideas> of their internal Constitutions: But then he would be in a
quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the 10
same to him, and others: The visible <Ideas> of every thing would be
different. So that I doubt, Whether he, and the rest of Men, could
discourse concerning the Objects of Sight; or have any Commun-
ication about Colours, their appearances being so wholly different.
And, perhaps, such a quickness and tenderness of Sight could not 15
endure bright Sun-shine, or so much as open Day-light; nor take in
but a very small part of any Object at once, and that too only at a
very near distance. And if by the help of such Microscopical Eyes,
if I may so call them,) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary
into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he 20
would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an
acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and
Exchange; If he could not see things, he was to avoid, at a con-
venient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those
sensible Qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to 25
see the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a
Clock, and observe upon what peculiar Structure and Impulse its
elastick Motion depends, would no doubt discover something very
admirable: But if Eyes so framed, could not view at once the Hand,
and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see 30
what a-Clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by
that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance
of the Parts of the Machin, made him lose its use.
#S 13#. And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture
of mine, <viz.> That since we have some Reason, (if there be any 35
Credit to be given to the report of things, that our Philosophy
#P 304#
#L 1#
cannot account for,) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to them-
selves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure, and Conformation of Parts.
Whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not
lie in this, that they can so frame, and shape to themselves Organs of
Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design, 5  
and the Circumstances of the Object they would consider. For how
much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had
but the Faculty so to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one
Sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of Vision,
which the assistance of Glasses (casually at first light on) has taught 10 
us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit
his Eye to all sorts of Objects, as to see, when he pleased, the Figure
and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other juices of
Animals, as distinctly, as he does, at other times, the shape and
motion of the Animals themselves. But to us in our present State, 15 
unalterable Organs, so contrived, as to discover the Figure and
Motion of the minute parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible
Qualities, we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no ad-
vantage. God has no doubt made us so, as is best for us in our
present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the 20 
Bodies, that surround us, and we have to do with: And though we
cannot by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of
Things; yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-
mentioned, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's
Pardon, for laying before him so wild a Fancy, concerning the ways 25 
of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be,
I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of
Angels, but after this manner, some way or other, in proportion
to what we find and observe in our selves. And though we cannot
but allow, that the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, may frame 30 
Creatures with a thousand other Faculties, and ways of perceiving
things without them, than what we have: Yet our Thoughts can go
no farther than our own, so impossible it is for us to enlarge our
very Guesses, beyond the <Ideas> received from our own Sensation
and Reflection. The Supposition at least, that Angels do sometimes 35 
assume Bodies, needs not startle us, since some of the most ancient,
and most learned Fathers of the Church, seemed to believe, that
they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their state and way of
Existence is unknown to us.
                                                                #P 305#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 14#. But to return to the Matter in hand, the <Ideas> we have of
Substances, and the ways we come by them; I say <our specifick> Ideas
<of Substances> are nothing else but <a Collection of a certain number of>
<simple> Ideas, <considered as united in one thing>. These <Ideas> of Substances,
though they are commonly called simple Apprehensions, and the 5
Names of them simple Terms; yet in effect, are complex and com-
pounded. Thus the <Idea> which an <English->man signifies by the Name
<Swan> is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole
Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the
Water, and making a certain kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man, 10
who has long observed those kind of Birds, some other Properties,
which all terminate in sensible simple <Ideas>, all united in one
common subject.
#S 15#. Besides the complex <Ideas> we have of material sensible
Substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple <Ideas> we have 15
taken from those Operations of our own Minds, which we experi-
ment daily in our selves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing,
Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, <etc.> co-existing in some
Substance, we are able to frame <the complex> Idea <of an immaterial>
<Spirit>. And thus by putting together the <Ideas> of Thinking, Perceiv- 
ing, Liberty, and Power of moving themselves and other things,
we have as clear a perception, and notion of immaterial Substances,
as we have of material. For putting together the <Ideas> of Thinking
and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion,
joined to Substance, of which we have no distinct <Idea>, we have the 25
<Idea> of an immaterial Spirit; and by putting together the <Ideas> of
coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with Sub-
stance, of which likewise we have no positive <Idea>, we have the <Idea>
of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an <Idea>, as the other: The
<Idea> of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct 30
<Ideas>, as the <Ideas> of Extension, Solidity, and being moved. For our
<Idea> of Substance, is equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is
but a supposed, I know not what, to support those <Ideas>, we call
Accidents. It is for want of reflection, that we are apt to think, that
#P 306#
#L 1#
our Senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sen-
sation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts
of nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing
or hearing, <etc.> that there is some Corporeal Being without me, the
object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is 5  
some Spiritual Being within me, that sees and hears. This I must be
convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever
could be without an immaterial thinking Being.
#S 16#. By the complex <Idea> of extended, figured, coloured, and all
other sensible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as 10 
far from the <Idea> of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at
all: <Nor> after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine
we <have> with Matter, and the many Qualities <Men> assure themselves
they perceive and know in Bodies, will it, perhaps, upon examination
be found, that they have any <more, or clearer, primary> Ideas <belonging> 15 
<to Body, then they have belonging to immaterial Spirit>.
#S 17#. <The primary> Ideas <we have peculiar to Body>, as contradistin-
guished to Spirit, <are the cohesion of solid>, and consequently separable
<parts, and a power of communicating Motion by impulse>. These, I think,
are the original <Ideas> proper and peculiar to Body: for Figure is but 20 
the consequence of finite Extension.
#S 18#. <The> Ideas <we have> belonging, and <peculiar to Spirit, are Think->
<ing, and Will>, or a power of putting Body into motion by Thought,
and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but
communicate its Motion by impulse, to another Body, which it 25 
meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or
forbear to do so, as it pleases. The <Ideas> of Existence, Duration, and
Mobility, are common to them both.
#S 19#. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I
make <Mobility belong to Spirit>: For having no other <Idea> of Motion, 30 
but change of distance, with other Beings, that are considered as at
rest; and finding that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate, but
where they are; and that Spirits do operate at several times in
several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite
Spirits: (for of the infinite Spirit, I speak not here.) For my Soul 35 
being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of
                                                                #P 307#
                                                                #L 1#
changing distance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it self;
and so is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can consider a
certain distance, or a change of that distance between two Points;
one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance
between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their approach, 5
or removal, one from another.
#S 20#. Every one finds in himself, that his Soul can think, will, and
operate on his Body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate
on a Body, or in a place, an hundred Miles distant from it. No Body
can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at <Oxford>, 10
whilst he is at <London>; and cannot but know, that being united
to his Body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey,
between <Oxford> and <London>, as the Coach, or Horse does, that
carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in
motion: Or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear <Idea> 15
enough of its motion, its being separated from the Body in death,
I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the Body, or leaving
it, and yet to have no <Idea> of its motion, seems to me impossible.
#S 21#. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because
it hath none, for Spirits are not <in Loco>, but <Ubi>; I suppose that way 20
of talking, will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age, that
is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived,
by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is
any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present
purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible <English>; and then 25
from thence draw a reason to shew that immaterial Spirits are not
capable of Motion. Indeed, Motion cannot be attributed to GOD,
not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an Infinite Spirit.
#S 22#. Let us <compare> then our complex <Idea> of an immaterial
Spirit, with our complex <Idea> of Body, and see whether there be any 30
more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. Our
<Idea> of Body, as I think, is an extended solid Substance, capable of
communicating Motion by impulse: and our <Idea> of our Soul, as an
#P 308#
#L 1#
immaterial Spirit, is of a Substance that thinks, and has a power of
exciting Motion in Body, by Will, or Thought. These, I think, are
<our complex> Ideas <of Soul and Body, as contra-distinguished>; and now let
us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be
apprehended. I know that People, whose Thoughts are immersed in 5  
Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that
they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they
cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which, perhaps, is true: But
I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend
an extended thing. 10 
#S 23#. If any one says, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he
means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing:
No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing.
Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither
knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of Body are 15 
united, or cohere together to make Extension. For though the
pressure of the Particles of Air, may account for the <cohesion of>
<several parts of Matter>, that are grosser than the Particles of Air, and
have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air; yet the weight, or
pressure of the Air, will not explain, nor can he a cause of the 20 
coherence of the Particles of Air themselves. And if the pressure of
the AEther, or any subtiler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold
fast together the parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies;
yet it cannot make Bonds for it self, and hold together the parts,
that make up every the least corpuscle of that <materia subtilis>. So that 25 
that Hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that
the parts of sensible Bodies are held together, by the pressure of
other external insensible Bodies, reaches not the parts of the AEther
it self, and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts
of other Bodies are held together, by the external pressure of the 30 
AEther, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion
and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark, concerning
the cohesion of the parts of the Corpuscles of the AEther it self:
which we can neither conceive without parts, they being Bodies,
and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that 35 
cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all
other Bodies.
                                                                 #P 309#
                                                                 #L 1#
#S 24#. But in truth, <the pressure of any ambient Fluid>, how great
soever, <can be no> intelligible <cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of>
<Matter>. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two
polished Superficies, one from another in a Line perpendicular to
them, as in the Experiment of two polished Marbles: Yet it can 5
never, in the least, hinder the separation by a Motion, in a Line
parallel to those Surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full
liberty to succeed in each point of Space, deserted by a lateral
motion, resists such a motion of Bodies so joined, no more, than it
would resist the motion of that Body, were it on all sides environed 10
by that Fluid, and touched no other Body: And therefore, if there
were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of Bodies must be easily
separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the
AEther be the adequate cause of cohesion, where-ever that cause
operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate 15
against such a lateral separation, (as has been shewed,) therefore in
every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of Matter, there could
be no more cohesion, than of two polished Surfaces, which will
always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a Fluid, easily
slide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an <Idea> soever 20
we think we have of the Extension of Body, which is nothing but
the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his Mind,
may have reason to conclude, That 'tis <as easie> for him <to have a clear>
Idea, <how the Soul thinks, as how Body is extended>. For since Body is no
farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of 25
its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the <extension> of Body,
without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of
its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of
Thinking, and how it is performed.
#S 25#. I allow, it is usual for most People to wonder, how any one 30
should find a difficulty in what they think, they every day observe.
Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of Bodies stick
firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt
can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning <Thinking>,
and <voluntary Motion>: Do we not every moment experiment it in our 35
selves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of Fact is clear,
I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and
consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss, both in the
#P 310#
#L 1#
one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of
Body cohere, as how we our selves perceive, or move. I would have
any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of Gold, or Brass,
that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the
Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass,) come in a few  5 
moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another,
that the utmost force of Mens arms cannot separate them: A con-
sidering Man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfie his own, or
another Man's Understanding.
#S 26#. The little Bodies that compose that Fluid, we call <Water>, 10   
are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a
Microscope, (and yet I have heard of some, that have magnified to
10000; nay, to much above 100,000 times,) pretended to perceive
their distinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of <Water>
are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force 15 
sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion,
we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet
let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these
little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable.
He that could find the Bonds, that tie these heaps of loose little 20 
Bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the Cement,
that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a
great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would
he be far enough from making the extension of Body (which is the
cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein 25 
consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those Bonds, or
of that Cement, or of the least Particle of Matter that exists. Where-
by it appears that this primary and supposed obvious Quality of
Body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible, as
any thing belonging to our Minds, and <a solid extended Substance, as> 30 
<hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial one>, whatever difficulties
some would raise against it.
#S 27#. For to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that pressure,
which is brought to explain the cohesion of Bodies, is as unintelli-
gible, as the cohesion it self. For if Matter be considered, as no 35 
doubt it is, finite, let any one send his Contemplation to the
Extremities of the Universe, and there see what conceivable Hoops,
what Bond he can imagine to hold this mass of Matter, in so close a
                                                               #P 311#
                                                               #L 1#
pressure together, from whence Steel has its firmness, and the parts
of a Diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If Matter be finite,
it must have its Extremes; and there must be something to hinder
it from scattering asunder. If to avoid this difficulty, any one will
throw himself into the Supposition and Abyss of infinite Matter, 5
let him consider, what light he thereby brings to the <cohesion> of
Body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by
resolving it into a Supposition, the most absurd and most incom-
prehensible of all other: So far is our Extension of Body, (which is
nothing but the cohesion of solid parts,) from being clearer, or more 10
distinct, when we would enquire into the Nature, Cause, or Manner
of it, than the <Idea> of Thinking.
#S 28#. Another <Idea> we have of Body, is the power of <communication>
<of Motion by impulse>; and of our Souls, the power of <exciting of Motion>
<by Thought>. These <Ideas>, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, 15
every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we
enquire how this is done, we <are equally in the dark>. For in the com-
munication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost
to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we
can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of 20
one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and uncon-
ceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought;
which we every moment find they do. The increase of Motion by
impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet
harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evi- 
dence of Motion produced both by impulse, and by thought; but
the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are
equally at a loss in both. So that however we consider Motion, and
its communication either from Body or Spirit, <the> Idea <which belongs>
<to Spirit, is at least as clear, as that, that belongs to Body>. And if we con- 
sider the active power of Moving, or, as I may call it, <Motivity>, it is
much clearer in Spirit than Body; since two Bodies, placed by one
another at rest, will never afford us the <Idea> of a power in the one to
move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the Mind, every
day, affords us <Ideas> of an active power of moving of Bodies; and 35
therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not
#P 312#
#L 1#
the proper attribute of Spirits, and passive power of Matter. Hence
may be conjectured, that created Spirits are not totally separate
from Matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure Spirit,
<viz.> God, is only active; pure Matter is only passive; those Beings
that are both active and passive we may judge to partake of both.  5 
But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear <Ideas>
belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Substance
of each being equally unknown to us; and the <Idea> of Thinking in
Spirit, as clear as of Extension in Body; and the communication of
Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident, as 10 
that by impulse, which we ascribe to Body. Constant Experience
makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow Understandings
can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look
beyond those original <Ideas> we have from Sensation or Reflection,
and penetrate into their Causes, and manner of production, we find 15 
still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.
#S 29#. To conclude, Sensation convinces us, that there are solid
extended Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones:
Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings; and that the
one hath a power to move Body by impulse, the other by thought; 20 
this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes
us with the clear <Ideas>, both of the one, and the other. But beyond
these <Ideas>, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will
not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Causes,
and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than 25 
we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as
easie as the other; and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how
a Substance we know not, should by thought set Body into motion,
than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into
motion. So that we are no more able to discover, wherein the <Ideas> 30 
belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit. From
whence it seems probable to me, that the simple <Ideas> we receive
from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts;
beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not
able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it 35 
would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those <Ideas>.
#S 30#. So that, in short, <the Idea> we have <of Spirit, compared with the>
                                                                #P 313#
                                                                #L 1#
<Idea> we have <of Body>, stands thus: The substance of Spirit is un-
known to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to
us: Two primary Qualities, or Properties of Body, <viz.> solid coherent
parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear <Ideas> of: So likewise we
know, and have distinct clear <Ideas> of two primary Qualities, or 5
Properties of Spirit, <viz.> Thinking, and a power of Action; <i.e.> a
power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts or Motions. We
have also the <Ideas> of several Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have
the clear distinct <Ideas> of them: which Qualities, are but the various
modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts, and their 10
motion. We have likewise the <Ideas> of the several modes of Thinking,
<viz.> Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which,
are but the several modes of Thinking. We have also the <Ideas> of
Willing, and Moving the Body consequent to it, and with the Body
it self too; for, as has been shewed, Spirit is capable of Motion.     15
#S 31#. Lastly, if this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have, per-
haps, some difficulties in it, not easie to he explained, we have
therefore no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of such
Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of Body;
because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very 20
hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by
us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of
Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very
notion of Body includes in it; the divisibility <in infinitum> of any
finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in con- 
sequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehen-
sions consistent; Consequences that carry greater difficulty, and
more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion
of an immaterial knowing substance.
#S 32#. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but 30
some few superficial <Ideas> of things, discovered to us only by the
Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experi-
ments in it self within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much less
of the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being
destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and 35
#P 314#
#L 1#
discovering in our selves Knowledge, and the power of voluntary
Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without
us, the cohesion and separation of solid Parts, which is the Exten-
sion and Motion of Bodies; <we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our>
<Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Existence> 5  
<of the one, as well as the other>. For it being no more a contradiction,
that Thinking should exist, separate, and independent from
Solidity; than it is a contradiction, that Solidity should exist,
separate, and independent from Thinking, they being both but
simple <Ideas>, independent one from another; and having as clear and 10 
distinct <Ideas> in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not, why
we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, <i.e.>
<immaterial>, to exist; as a solid thing without Thinking, <i.e. Matter>, to
exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how Thinking
should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For 15 
whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple <Ideas>, we have
from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature
of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity, Per-
plexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but
our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which ever of these complex 20 
<Ideas> be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident,
that the simple <Ideas> that make them up, are no other than what we
have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our
other <Ideas> of Substances, even of God himself.
#S 33#. For if we examine the <Idea> we have of the incomprehensible 25   
supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and
that the complex <Ideas> we have both of God, and separate Spirits,
are made up of the simple <Ideas> we receive from <Reflection; v.g.> having
from what we experiment in our selves, got the <Ideas> of Existence
and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness; 30 
and of several other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have,
than to be without; when we would frame an <Idea> the most suitable
we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with
our <Idea> of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our
complex <Idea of God>. For that the Mind has such a power of enlarg- 35 
                                                                #P 315#
                                                                #L 1#
ing some of its <Ideas>, received from Sensation and Reflection, has
been already shewed.
#S 34#. If I find, that I know some few things, and some of them, or
all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an <Idea> of knowing twice as
many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number, 5
and thus enlarge my <Idea> of Knowledge, by extending its Compre-
hension to all things existing, or possible: The same also I can do of
knowing them more perfectly; <i.e.> all their Qualities, Powers, Causes,
Consequences, and Relations, <etc.> till all be perfectly known, that is
in them, or can any way relate to them, and thus frame the <Idea> of 10
infinite or boundless Knowledge: The same may also be done of
Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the Duration
of Existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the <Idea> of an
eternal Being: The Degrees or Extent, wherein we ascribe Existence,
Power, Wisdom, and all other Perfection, (which we can have any 15
<Ideas> of) to that Sovereign Being, which we call God, being all
boundless and infinite, we frame the best <Idea> of him our Minds
are capable of; all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple
<Ideas>, we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by
Reflection; or by our Senses, from exterior things, to that vastness, 20
to which Infinity can extend them.
#S 35#. For it is Infinity, which, joined to our <Ideas> of Existence,
Power, Knowledge, <etc.> makes that complex <Idea>, whereby we
represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being. For
though in his own Essence, (which certainly we do not know, not 25
knowing the real Essence of a Peble, or a Fly, or of our own selves,)
God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have
no other <Idea> of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge,
Power, Happiness, <etc.> infinite and eternal: which are all distinct
<Ideas>, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of 30
others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from
<Sensation> and <Reflection>, go to make up the <Idea> or Notion we have
of God.
#S 36#. This farther is to be observed, that there is no <Idea> we
attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our 35
complex <Idea> of other Spirits. Because being capable of no other
simple <Ideas>, belonging to any thing but Body, but those which by
#P 316#
#L 1#
Reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can
attribute to Spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: And
all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation
of Spirits, is only in the several Extents and Degrees of their Know-
ledge, Power, Duration, Happiness, <etc.> For that in our <Ideas>, as well 5 
<of Spirits>, as of other things, we are <restrained to those we receive from>
<Sensation and Reflection>, is evident from hence, that in our <Ideas> of
Spirits, how much soever advanced in Perfection, beyond those of
Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any <Idea> of the
manner, wherein they discover their Thoughts one to another: 10 
Though we must necessarily conclude, that separate Spirits, which
are Beings that have perfecter Knowledge, and greater Happiness
than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating
their Thoughts, than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal
Signs, and particularly Sounds, which are therefore of most general 15 
use, as being the best, and quickest we are capable of. But of im-
mediate Communication, having no Experiment in our selves, and
consequently, no Notion of it at all, we have no <Idea>, how Spirits,
which use not Words, can with quickness; or much less, how
Spirits that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts, 20 
and communicate or conceal them at Pleasure, though we cannot
but necessarily suppose they have such a Power.
#S 37#. And thus we have seen, <what kind of> Ideas <we have of Sub->
<stances of all kinds>, wherein they consist, and how we come by them.
From whence, I think, it is very evident. 25 
      <First>, That all our <Ideas> of the several sorts of Substances, are
nothing but Collections of simple <Ideas>, with a Supposition of
something, to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though
of this supposed something, we have no clear distinct <Idea> at all.
<Secondly>, That all the simple <Ideas>, that thus united in one com-    
mon <Substratum> make up our complex <Ideas> of the several sorts of
Substances, are no other but such, as we have received from
<Sensation> or <Reflection>. So that even in those, which we think, we are
                                                                #P 317#
                                                                #L 1#
most intimately acquainted with, and come nearest the Compre-
hension of, our most enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond
those simple <Ideas>. And even in those, which seem most remote
from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing, we
can perceive in our selves by <Reflection>, or discover by <Sensation> 5
in other things, we can attain to nothing, but those simple <Ideas>,
which we originally received from <Sensation> or <Reflection>, as is evi-
dent in the complex <Ideas> we have of Angels, and particularly of
God himself.
<Thirdly>, That most of the simple <Ideas>, that make up our complex 10
<Ideas> of Substances, when truly considered, are only Powers, how-
ever we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; <v.g.> the greatest
part of the <Ideas>, that make our complex <Idea> of <Gold>, are Yellowness,
great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in <Aqua Regia>,
<etc.> all united together in an unknown <Substratum>; all which <Ideas>, are 15
nothing else, but so many relations to other Substances; and are not
really in the Gold, considered barely in it self, though they depend
on those real, and primary Qualities of its internal constitution,
whereby it has a fitness, differently to operate, and be operated on
by several other Substances.                                       20


#C 24#                       CHAPTER XXIV

                  <Of Collective> Ideas <of Substances>.

#S 01#. BESIDES these complex <Ideas> of several single Substances,
as of Man, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, <etc.> the Mind hath also
<complex collective Ideas> of Substances; which I so call, because such
<Ideas> are made up of many particular Substances considered
together, as united into one <Idea>, and which so joined, are looked on 25
as one; <v.g.> the <Idea> of such a collection of Men as make an Army,
though consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as
much one <Idea>, as the <Idea> of a Man: And the great collective <Idea> of
all Bodies whatsoever signified by the name World, is as much one
<Idea>, as the <Idea> of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing, 30
#P 318#
#L 1#
to the unity of any <Idea>, that it be considered as one Representation,
or Picture, though made up of never so many Particulars.
#S 02#. These collective <Ideas> of Substances, the Mind makes by its
power of Composition, and uniting severally either simple or
complex <Ideas> into one, as it does, by the same Faculty make the 5  
complex <Ideas> of particular Substances, consisting of an aggregate
of divers simple <Ideas>, united in one Substance: And as the Mind by
putting together the repeated <Ideas> of Unity, makes the collective
Mode, or complex <Idea> of any number, as a Score, or a Gross, <etc.> So
by putting together several particular Substances, it makes collec-
tive <Ideas> of Substances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a
Fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own
Mind, by one <Idea>, in one view; and so under that Notion con-
siders those several Things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one
Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten Thousand 15 
Men, should make one <Idea>, than how a Man should make one <Idea>;
it being as easie to the Mind, to unite into one, the <Idea> of a great
number of Men, and consider it as one; as it is to unite into one
particular, all the distinct <Ideas>, that make up the composition of a
Man, and consider them altogether as one. 20 
#S 03#. Amongst such kind of collective <Ideas>, are to be counted most
part of artificial Things, at least such of them as are made up of
distinct Substances: And, in truth, if we consider all these collec-
tive <Ideas> aright, as <ARMY, Constellation, Universe>; as they are
united into so many single <Ideas>, they are but the artificial Draughts 25 
of the Mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one
another, into one view, the better to contemplate, and discourse of
them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For
there are no Things so remote, nor so contrary, which the Mind
cannot, by this art of Composition, bring into one <Idea>, as is visible 30 
in that signified by the name <Universe>.
#P 319#
#C 25#                       CHAPTER XXV

                             <Of Relation>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. BESIDES the <Ideas>, whether simple or complex, that the Mind
has of Things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets
from their comparison one with another. The Understanding,
in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise
Object: It can carry any <Idea>, as it were, beyond it self, or, at least, 5
look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.
When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were,
bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to
t'other: This is, as the Words import, <Relation> and <Respect>; and the
Denominations given to positive Things, intimating that Respect, 10
and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it
self denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call
<Relatives>; and the Things so brought together, <Related>. Thus when
the Mind considers <Cajus>, as such a positive Being, it takes nothing
into that <Idea>, but what really exists in <Cajus; v.g.> when I consider 15
him, as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex <Idea> of
the Species, Man. So likewise, when I say <Cajus> is a white Man, I
have nothing but the bare consideration of Man, who hath that
white Colour. But when I give <Cajus> the name <Husband>, I intimate
some other Person: and when I give him the name <Whiter>, I 20
intimate some other thing: in both cases my Thought is led to
something beyond <Cajus>, and there are two things brought into con-
sideration. And since any <Idea>, whether simple, or complex, may be
the occasion, why the Mind thus brings two things together, and,
as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as 25
distinct: therefore any of our <Ideas>, may be the foundation of
Relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the Contract, and
Ceremony of Marriage with <Sempronia>, is the occasion of the
Denomination, or Relation of Husband; and the colour White, the
occasion why he is said whiter than Free-stone.                    30
#S 02#. These, and the like <Relations, expressed by relative terms, that>
#P 320#
#L 1#
<have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation>, as Father, and
Son; Bigger, and Less; Cause, and Effect, <are very obvious> to every
one, and every Body, at first sight, perceives the Relation. For
Father, and Son; Husband and Wife, and such other correlative
terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and, through  5 
Custom, do so readily chime, and answer one another in Peoples
Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts
are presently carried beyond the Thing so named; and no body
over-looks, or doubts of a Relation, where it is so plainly intimated.
But where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there 10 
the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. <Concubine> is no
doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where
this, and the like Words, have not a correlative term, there People
are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident Mark
of Relation, which is between Correlatives, which seem to explain 15 
one another, and not to be able to exist but together. Hence it is,
that many of those Names, which duly considered, do include
evident Relations, have been called External Denominations. But all
Names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some <Idea>,
which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then 20 
it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the
Thing to which the Denomination is given: or else it arises from the
respect the Mind finds in it, to something distinct from it, with
which it considers it; and then it includes a Relation.
#S 03#. Another sort <of relative terms> there is, which are not looked on 25   
to be either relative, or so much as external Denominations: <which>
yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something abso-
lute in the Subject do conceal a tacit, though less observable,
Relation. Such are the <seemingly positive> terms of <Old, Great, Imperfect>,
etc. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the 30 
following Chapters.
#S 04#. This farther may be observed, That the <Ideas> of Relation,
may be the same in Men, who have far different <Ideas> of the Things
that are related, or that are thus compared. <v.g.> Those who have far
different <Ideas> of a <Man>, may yet agree in the notion of a <Father>: 35 
which is a notion superinduced to the Substance, or Man, and
refers only to an act of that thing called Man; whereby he con-
                                                                #P 321#
#L 1#
tributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let Man be what
it will.
#S 05#. <The nature> therefore <of Relation>, consists in the referring, or
comparing two things, one to another; from which comparison, one
or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be 5
removed, or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination
consequent to it, though the other receive in it self no alteration at
all. <v.g. Cajus>, whom I consider to day as a Father, ceases to be so to
morrow, only by the death of his Son, without any alteration made
in himself. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object, to 10
which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having
contrary Denominations, at the same time. <v.g. Cajus>, compared
to several Persons, may truly be said to be Older, and Younger;
Stronger and Weaker, <etc.>
#S 06#. Whatsoever doth, or can exist, or be considered as one thing, 15
is positive: and so not only simple <Ideas>, and Substances, but Modes
also are positive Beings; though the parts, of which they consist,
are very often relative one to another; but the whole together
considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex <Idea> of
one thing; which <Idea> is in our Minds, as one Picture, though an 20
aggregate of divers parts; and under one name, it is a positive or
absolute Thing, or <Idea>. Thus a Triangle, though the parts thereof,
compared one to another, be <relative>, yet the <Idea> of the whole, is a
positive absolute <Idea>. The same may be said of a Family, a Tune,
<etc.> for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two Things, con- 
sidered as two Things. There must always be in relation two <Ideas>,
or Things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as
distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.
#S 07#. Concerning Relation in general, these things may be con-
sidered:                                                            30
<First>, That there is <no one thing>, whether simple <Idea>, Substance,
Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, <which is not capable>
<of almost an infinite number of> Considerations, in reference to other
things: and therefore this makes no small part of Men's Thoughts
and Words. <v.g.> One single Man may at once be concerned in, and 35
sustain all these following <Relations>, and many more, <viz.> Father,
#P 322#
#L 1#
Brother, Son, Grandfather, Grandson, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law,
Husband, Friend, Enemy, Subject, General, Judge, Patron, Client,
Professor, European, English-man, Islander, Servant, Master,
Possessor, Captain, Superior, Inferior, Bigger, Less, Older, Younger,
Contemporary, Like, Unlike, <etc.> to an almost infinite number: he 5  
being capable of as many Relations, as there can be occasions of
comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, dis-
agreement, or respect whatsoever: For, as I said, <Relation> is a way of
comparing, or considering two things together; and giving one, or
both of them, some appellation from that Comparison, and some-  
times giving even the Relation it self a Name.
#S 08#. <Secondly>, This farther may be considered concerning <Relation>,
That though it be not contained in the real existence of Things,
but something extraneous, and superinduced: yet the <Ideas> which
relative Words stand for, are often clearer, and more distinct, than 15 
of those Substances to which they do belong. The Notion we have
of a Father, or Brother, is a great deal clearer, and more distinct,
than that we have of a Man: Or, if you will, <Paternity> is a thing
whereof 'tis easier to have a clear <Idea>, than of <Humanity>: And I can
much easier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Because 20 
the knowledge of one Action, or one simple <Idea>, is oftentimes
sufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing
of any substantial Being, an accurate collection of sundry <Ideas> is
necessary. A Man, if he compares two things together, can hardly
be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: So 25 
that when he compares any Things together, he cannot but have
a very clear <Idea> of that Relation. The <Ideas> then of <Relations are>
<capable> at least of <being more perfect and distinct in our Minds, than those>
<of Substances>. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple
<Ideas>, which are really in any Substance, but for the most part easie 30 
enough to know the simple <Ideas> that make up any Relation I
think on, or have a Name for. <v.g.> Comparing two Men, in reference
to one common Parent, it is very easy to frame the <Ideas> of Brothers,
without having yet the perfect <Idea> of a Man. For significant rela-
tive Words, as well as others, standing only for <Ideas>; and those 35 
                                                               #P 323#
                                                               #L 1#
being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the
knowing the precise <Idea> the relative term stands for, to have a
clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the Relation;
which may be done without having a perfect and clear <Idea> of the
thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the 5
Egg, out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear <Idea> of
the Relation of <Dam> and <Chick>, between the two Cassiowaries in
St. <James's> Park; though, perhaps, I have but a very obscure and
imperfect <Idea> of those Birds themselves.
#S 09#. <Thirdly>, Though there be a great number of Considerations, 10
wherein Things may be compared one with another, and so a
multitude of <Relations>: yet they <all terminate in>, and are concerned
about those <simple Ideas>, either of Sensation or Reflection; which I
think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this,
I shall shew it in the most considerable Relations, that we have any 15
notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from <Sense>
or <Reflection>: which yet will appear to have their <Ideas> from thence,
and leave it past doubt, that the Notions we have of them, are
but certain simple <Ideas>, and so originally derived from Sense or
Reflection.                                                         20
#S 10#. <Fourthly>, That <Relation> being the considering of one thing
with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evident, that all Words,
that necessarily lead the Mind to any other <Ideas>, than are supposed
really to exist in that thing, to which the Word is applied, are
<relative Words. v.g.> A <Man Black, Merry, Thoughtful, Thirsty, Angry>, 25
<Extended>; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither
signify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed
really to exist in the Man thus denominated: But <Father, Brother>,
<King, Husband, Blacker, Merrier, etc.> are Words, which, together with
the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate, 30
and exterior to the existence of that thing.
#S 11#. Having laid down these Premises concerning <Relation> in
general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some instances, how all the
<Ideas> we have of <Relation>, are made up, as the others are, only of
simple <Ideas>; and that they all, how refined, or remote from Sense 35
#P 324#
#L 1#
soever they seem, terminate at last in simple <Ideas>. I shall begin
with the most comprehensive Relation, wherein all things that do,
or can exist, are concerned, and that is the Relation of <Cause> and
<Effect>. The <Idea> whereof, how derived from the two Fountains of all
our Knowledge, <Sensation> and <Reflection>, I shall in the next place  5 
consider.


#C 26#                       CHAPTER XXVI

              <Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations>.

#S 01#. IN the notice, that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude
of Things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both
Qualities, and Substances begin to exist; and that they receive this
their Existence, from the due Application and Operation of some 10 
other Being. From this Observation, we get our <Ideas> of <Cause> and 
<Effect>. That which produces any simple or complex <Idea>, we denote
by the general Name <Cause>; and that which is produced, <Effect>.
Thus finding, that in that Substance which we call Wax, Fluidity,
which is a simple <Idea>, that was not in it before, is constantly pro-  
duced by the Application of a certain degree of Heat, we call the
simple <Idea> of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cause of it,
and Fluidity the Effect. So also finding that the Substance, Wood,
which is a certain Collection of simple <Ideas>, so called, by the
Application of Fire, is turned into another Substance, called Ashes; 20 
<i.e.> another complex <Idea>, consisting of a Collection of simple <Ideas>,
quite different from that complex <Idea>, which we call Wood; we
consider Fire, in relation to Ashes, as Cause, and the Ashes, as
Effect. So that whatever is considered by us, to conduce or operate,
to the producing any particular simple <Idea>, or Collection of simple 25 
<Ideas>, whether Substance, or Mode, which did not before exist, hath
thereby in our Minds the relation of a Cause, and so is denominated
by us.
#S 02#. Having thus, from what our Senses are able to discover, in
the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of <Cause> 30 
                                                                #P 325#
#L 1#
and <Effect; viz.> That a <Cause> is that which makes any other thing,
either simple <Idea>, Substance, or Mode, begin to be; and all <Effect> is
that, which had its Beginning from some other thing. The Mind
finds no great difficulty, to distinguish the several Originals of
things into two sorts.                                              5
<First>, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part
thereof did ever exist before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth
begin to exist, <in rerum natura>, which had before no Being, and this
we call <Creation>.
<Secondly>, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of 10
them before exist, but that very thing, so constituted of pre-existing
Particles, which considered altogether make up such a Collection
of simple <Ideas>, had not any <Existence> before, as this Man, this
Egg, Rose, or Cherry, <etc.> And this, when referred to a Substance,
produced in the ordinary course of Nature, by an internal Principle, 15
but set on work by, and received from some external Agent, or
Cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we
call <Generation>; when the Cause is extrinsical, and the Effect pro-
duced by a sensible Separation, or <juxta> Position of discernible
Parts, we call it <Making>; and such are all artificial things. When any 20
simple <Idea> is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we
call it <Alteration>. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and
either of them altered, when any new sensible Quality, or simple
<Idea>, is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and
the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are 25
<Effects>; and those things, which operated to the Existence, <Causes>.
In which, and all other Cases, we may observe, that the Notion of
<Cause> and <Effect>, has its rise from <Ideas>, received by Sensation or
Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehensive soever,
terminates at last in them. For to have the <Idea> of <Cause> and <Effect>, it 30
suffices to consider any simple <Idea>, or Substance, as beginning to
exist, by the Operation of some other, without knowing the manner
of that Operation.
#S 03#. <Time> and <Place> are also the Foundations of very large
Relations, and all finite Beings at least are concerned in them. But 35
having already shewn in another Place, how we get these <Ideas>, it
may suffice here to intimate, that most of the Denominations of
#P 326#
#L 1#
things, received from time, are only Relations; thus, when any one
says, that Queen <Elizabeth> lived sixty nine, and reigned forty five
years; these Words import only the Relation of that Duration to
some other, and means no more but this, That the Duration of her
Existence was equal to sixty nine, and the Duration of her Govern-   
ment to forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun; and so are all
Words, answering, <how long>. Again, <William> the Conqueror in-
vaded <England> about the year 1070. which means this; That taking
the Duration from our Saviour's Time, till now, for one entire
great length of time, it shews at what distance this Invasion was 10 
from the two Extremes: and so do all Words of time, answering to
the Question <when>, which shew only the distance of any point of
time, from the Period of a longer Duration, from which we measure,
and to which we thereby consider it, as related.
#S 04#. There are yet besides those, other Words of time, that 15   
ordinarily are thought to stand for positive <Ideas>, which yet will,
when considered, be found to be relative, such as are <Young, Old>,
etc. which include, and intimate the Relation any thing has, to a
certain length of Duration, whereof we have the <Idea> in our Minds.
Thus having setled in our Thoughts the <Idea> of the ordinary 20 
Duration of a Man to be seventy years, when we say a Man is
<Young>, we mean, that his Age is yet but a small part of that which
usually Men attain to: And when we denominate him Old, we mean,
that his Duration is run out almost to the end of that which Men do
not usually exceed. And so 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or 25 
Duration of this or that Man, to the <Idea> of that Duration which we
have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of Animals:
Which is plain, in the application of these Names to other Things;
for a Man is called Young at Twenty years, and very Young at
Seven years old: But yet a Horse we call Old at Twenty, and a Dog 30 
at Seven years; because in each of these, we compare their Age to
different <Ideas> of Duration which are settled in our Minds, as belong-
ing to these several sorts of Animals, in the ordinary course of
Nature. But the Sun, and Stars, though they have outlasted several
Generations of Men, we call not old, because we do not know what 35 
period GOD hath set to that sort of Beings. This Term belonging
properly to those Things, which we can observe in the ordinary
course of Things, by a natural decay to come to an end, in a certain
period of time; and so have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard, to
                                                                #P 327#
                                                                #L 1#
which we can compare the several parts of their Duration; and by
the relation they bear thereunto, call them Young, or Old; which
we cannot therefore do to a Ruby, or a Diamond, things whose
usual periods we know not.
#S 05#. The <Relation> also that things have to one another, in their 5
<Places> and Distances, is very obvious to observe; as Above, Below,
a Mile distant from <Charing-cross>, in <England>, and in <London>. But as in
Duration, so in <Extension> and Bulk, there are some <Ideas> that are
relative, which we signify by Names, that are thought positive; as
<Great, and Little, are> truly <Relations>. For here also having, by obser- 
vation, settled in our Minds the <Ideas> of the Bigness of several
Species of Things, from those we have been most accustomed to,
we make them, as it were, the Standards whereby to denominate
the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, such a one as is
bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a 15
little Horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that <Idea>,
which we have in our Minds, to belong ordinarily to Horses: And
that will be a great Horse to a <Welsh->man, which is but a little one
to a <Fleming>; they two having from the different Breed of their
Countries, taken several siz'd <Ideas> to which they compare, and in 20
relation to which they denominate their Great, and their Little.
#S 06#. So likewise <Weak and Strong, are> but <relative Denominations> of
Power, compared to some <Idea> we have, at that time, of greater or
less Power. Thus when we say a Weak Man, we mean one that has
not so much Strength, or Power to move, as usually Men have, or 25
usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his Strength to
the <Idea> we have of the usual Strength of Men, or Men of such a
size. The like when we say the Creatures are all weak Things;
Weak, there, is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion
there is in the Power of GOD, and the Creatures. And so abundance 30
of Words, in ordinary Speech, stand only for Relations, (and,
perhaps, the greatest part,) which at first sight, seem to have no
such signification: <v.g.> The Ship has necessary Stores. <Necessary>, and
<Stores>, are both relative Words: one having a relation to the ac-
complishing the Voyage intended, and the other to future use. All 35
which Relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in <Ideas>
#P 328#
derived from <Sensation>, or <Reflection>, is too obvious to need any
Explication.

#C 27#                      CHAPTER XXVII

                      <Of Identity and Diversity>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. ANOTHER occasion, the mind often takes of comparing, is the
very Being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any
determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at  5 
another time, and thereon form the <Ideas> of <Identity> and <Diversity>.
When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time,
we are sure, (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not
another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like
and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And 10 
in this consists <Identity>, when the <Ideas> it is attributed to vary not
at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their
former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we
never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the
same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly 15 
conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all
of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we
demand, whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always to
something that existed such a time in such a place, which 'twas
certain, at that instant, was the same with it self and no other: 20 
From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two begin-
nings of Existence, nor two things one beginning, it being im-
possible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same
instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in differ-
ent places. That therefore that had one beginning is the same 25 
thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place
from that, is not the same but divers. That which has made the
Difficulty about this Relation, has been the little care and attention
used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attri-
buted. 30 
                                                                 #P 329#
                                                                 #L 1#
#S 02#. We have the <Ideas> but of three sorts of Substances; 1. God.
2. Finite Intelligences. 3. <Bodies>. First, God is without beginning, 
eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his
Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having
had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the 5
relation to that time and place will always determine to each of
them its Identity as long as it exists.
Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which
no Addition or Substraction of Matter being made, it is the same.
For though these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not 10
exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive
but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same
kind out of the same place: Or else the Notions and Names of
Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such
distinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For 15
Example, could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time;
then those two parcels of Matter must be one and the same, take
them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the same. For
by the same reason that two particles of Matter may be in one
place, all Bodies may be in one place: Which, when it can be sup- 20
posed, takes away the distinction of Identity and Diversity, of one
and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction,
that two or more should be one, Identity and Diversity are relations
and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the Under-
standing. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately 25
terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each
particular Existence of them too will be by the same way deter-
mined: Only as to things whose Existence is in succession, such as
are the Actions of finite Beings, <v.g. Motion> and <Thought>, both which
consist in a continued train of Succession, concerning their Diver- 
sity there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it
begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as
permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant places; and
therefore no motion or thought considered as at different times can
be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of 35
Existence.
#P 330#
#L 1#
#S 03#. From what has been said, 'tis easy to discover, what is so
much enquired after, the <principium Individuationis>, and that 'tis plain
is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a
particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the
same kind. This though it seems easier to conceive in simple 5  
Substances or Modes; yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in
compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied; <v.g.> Let
us suppose an Atom, <i.e.> a continued body under one immutable
Superficies, existing in a determined time and place: 'tis evident,
that, considered in any instant of its Existence, it is, in that instant, 10 
the same with it self. For being, at that instant, what it is, and
nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its
Existence is continued: for so long it will be the same, and no other.
In like manner, if two or more Atoms be joined together into the
same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the fore- 15 
going Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass,
consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same
Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of
these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer
the same Mass, or the same Body. In the state of living Creatures, 20 
their Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but
on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of
Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak, growing from a Plant to
a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is still the same Oak: And a Colt
grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while 25 
the same Horse: though, in both these Cases, there may he a
manifest change of the parts: So that truly they are not either of
them the same Masses of Matter, though they be truly one of them
the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The reason whereof is,
that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, 30 
<Identity> is not applied to the same thing.
#S 04#. We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a
Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is
only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other
such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and 35 
                                                                #P 331#
                                                                #L 1#
such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distri-
bute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and
Leaves, <etc.> of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life. That
being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in
one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to 5
be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that
Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to
the living Plant, in a like continued Organization, conformable to
that sort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one instant
in any one Collection of <Matter>, is in that particular concrete 10
distinguished from all other, and is that individual Life, which
existing constantly from that moment both forwards and back-
wards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united
to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity, which makes
the same Plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same Plant, 15
during all the time that they exist united in that continued Organi-
zation, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so
united.
#S 05#. The Case is not so much different in <Brutes>, but that any one
may hence see what makes an Animal, and continues it the same. 20
Something we have like this in Machines, and may serve to illus-
trate it. For Example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a
fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain end, which,
when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we
would suppose this Machine one continued Body, all whose organ- 
ized Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd, by a constant
Addition or Separation of insensible Parts, with one Common Life,
we should have something very much like the Body of an Animal,
with this difference, That in an Animal the fitness of the Organi-
zation, and the Motion wherein Life consists, begin together, the 30
Motion coming from within; but in Machines the force, coming
sensibly from without, is often away, when the Organ is in order,
and well fitted to receive it.
#S 06#. This also shews wherein the Identity of the same <Man> con-
sists; <viz.> in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, 35
#P 332#
#L 1#
by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally
united to the same organized Body. He that shall place the <Identity>
of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one fitly
organized Body taken in any one instant, and from thence continued
under one Organization of Life in several successively fleeting 5  
Particles of Matter, united to it, will find it hard, to make an
<Embryo>, one of Years, mad, and sober, the same Man, by any
Supposition, that will not make it possible for <Seth, Ismael, Socrates>,
<Pilate>, St. <Austin>, and <Caesar Borgia> to be the same Man. For if the
<Identity> of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there be nothing in 10 
the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be
united to different Bodies, it will be possible, that those Men, living
in distant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same
Man: Which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the
Word Man, applied to an <Idea>, out of which Body and Shape is ex-  
cluded: And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the
Notions of those Philosophers, who allow of Transmigration, and
are of Opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miscarriages, be
detruded into the Bodies of Beasts, as fit Habitations with Organs
suited to the satisfaction of their Brutal Inclinations. But yet I think 20 
no body, could he be sure that the Soul of <Heliogabalus> were in one
of his Hogs, would yet say that Hog were <a Man> or <Heliogabalus>.
#S 07#. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all
sorts of <Identity>, or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive,
and judge of it aright, we must consider what <Idea> the Word it is 25 
applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same <Substance>,
another the same <Man>, and a third the same <Person>, if <Person, Man>,
and <Substance>, are three Names standing for three different <Ideas>; for
such as is the <Idea> belonging to that Name, such must be the <Iden->
<tity>: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would 30 
possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often
occurs about this Matter, with no small seeming Difficulties;
especially concerning <Personal Identity>, which therefore we shall in
the next place a little consider.
#S 08#. An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently, the 35   
same Animal, as we have observed, is the same continued Life
                                                                #P 333#
                                                                #L 1#
communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen suc-
cessively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever
is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past
doubt, that the <Idea> in our Minds, of which the Sound <Man> in our
Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a 5
certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever should
see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more
reason all its Life, than a <Cat> or a <Parrot>, would call him still a <Man>;
or whoever should hear a <Cat> or a <Parrot> discourse, reason, and
philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a <Cat> or a <Parrot>; 10
and say, the one was a dull irrational <Man>, and the other a very
intelligent rational <Parrot>. A Relation we have in an Author of
great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational
<Parrot>. His Words( ) are,
I had a mind to know from <Prince Maurice's> own Mouth, the 15
account of a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard so
often from many others, of an old <Parrot> he had in <Brasil>, during his
Government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered common
Questions like a reasonable Creature; so that those of his Train
there, generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one 20
of his Chaplains, who lived long afterwards in <Holland>, would never
from that time endure a <Parrot>, but said, they all had a Devil in
them. I had heard many particulars of this Story, and assevered by
People hard to be discredited, which made me ask <Prince Maurice>
what there was of it. He said, with his usual plainess, and dryness in 25
talk, there was something true, but a great deal false, of what had
been reported. I desired to know of him, what there was of the
first; he told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an
old <Parrot> when he came to <Brasil>, and though he believed nothing
of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had so much Curiosity as to 30
send for it, that 'twas a very great and a very old one; and when it
came first into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many
<Dutch-men> about him, it said presently, <What a company of white Men>
<are here ?> They asked it what he thought that Man was, pointing at
the Prince? It answered, <Some General or other>; when they brought it 35
#P 334#
#L 1#
close to him, he asked it, <D'ou venes vous?> it answered, <De Marinnan>.
The Prince, <A qui estes vous?> The Parrot, <A un Portugais>. Prince, <Que>
<fais tu la?> Parrot, <Je garde les poulles>. The Prince laughed and said,
<Vous gardez les poulles?> The Parrot answered, <Ouy, moy et je scay bien>
<faire>; and made the Chuck four or five times that People use to 5  
make to Chickens when they call them. I set down the Words of
this worthy Dialogue in <French>, just as Prince <Maurice> said them to
me. I asked him in what Language the <Parrot> spoke, and he said, in
<Brasilian>; I asked whether he understood <Brasilian>; he said No, but
he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a 10 
<Dutch-man>, that spoke <Brasilian>, and the other a <Brasilian>, that spoke
<Dutch>; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of
them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the <Parrot> said.
I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is so much out of the
way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for 15 
I dare say this Prince, at least, believed himself in all he told me,
having ever passed for a very honest and pious Man; I leave it to
Naturalists to reason, and to other Men to believe as they please
upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven
a busie Scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the 20 
purpose or no."
      I have taken care that the Reader should have the Story at large
in the Authors own Words, because he seems to me not to have
thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a Man
as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the Testimonies he 25 
gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had
nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a Man whom he mentions
as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great
Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible,
he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who 30 
vouches this Story, and our Author who relates it from him, both of
them call this Talker a <Parrot>; and I ask any one else who thinks
such a Story fit to be told, whether if this <Parrot>, and all of its kind,
had always talked as we have a Princes word for it, this one did,
                                                                 #P 335#
                                                                 #L 1#
whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of <rational>
<Animals>, but yet whether for all that, they would have been
allowed to be Men and not <Parrots>? For I presume 'tis not the <Idea> of
a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes the <Idea> of a <Man> in
most Peoples Sense; but of a Body so and so shaped joined to it; and 5
if that be the <Idea> of a <Man>, the same successive Body not shifted all
at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the making
of the same <Man>.
#S 09#. This being premised to find wherein <personal Identity> consists,
we must consider what <Person> stands for; which, I think, is a think-  
ing intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can con-
sider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times
and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It
being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that 15
he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or
will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our
present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to
himself, that which he calls <self> It not being considered in this case,
whether the same <self> be continued in the same, or divers Sub- 
stances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and
tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls <self>; and thereby
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone
consists <personal Identity, i.e.> the sameness of a rational Being: And as
far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 25
Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that <Person>; it is
the same <self> now it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this
present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.
#S 10#. But it is farther enquir'd whether it be the same Identical
Substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, 30
if these Perceptions, with their consciousness, always remain'd
present in the Mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be
always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently
the same to it self. But that which seems to make the difficulty is
this, that this consciousness, being interrupted always by forget- 
fulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the
#P 336#
#L 1#
whole train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one view: But
even the best Memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are
viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of
our Lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our
present Thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no Thoughts at all,  5 
or at least none with that consciousness, which remarks our waking
Thoughts. I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being inter-
rupted, and we losing the sight of our past <selves>, doubts are raised
whether we are the same thinking thing; <i.e.> the same substance
or no. Which however reasonable, or unreasonable, concerns not 10 
<personal Identity> at all. The Question being what makes the same
<Person>, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which
always thinks in the same <Person>, which in this case matters not at
all. Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do
partake in it) being united into one Person; as well as different 15 
Bodies, by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose
<Identity> is preserved, in that change of Substances, by the unity of
one continued Life. For it being the same consciousness that makes
a Man be himself to himself, <personal Identity> depends on that only,
whether it be annexed only to one individual Substance, or can be 20 
continued in a succession of several Substances. For as far as any
intelligent Being can repeat the <Idea> of any past Action with the
same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same conscious-
ness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same <personal self>.
For it is by the consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and 25 
Actions, that it is <self> to it <self> now, and so will be the same <self> as far
as the same consciousness can extend to Actions past or to come;
and would be by distance of Time, or change of Substance, no more
two <Persons> than a Man be two Men, by wearing other Cloaths to
Day than he did Yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: The 30 
same consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same
<Person>, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.
#S 11#. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very
Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same
thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and 35 
are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to
them, are a part of our <selves: i.e.> of our thinking conscious <self>: Thus
                                                                #P 337#
                                                                #L 1#
the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of <himself>: He sympa-
thizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby
separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and
other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is
<himself>, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the 5
<Substance>, whereof personal <self> consisted at one time, may he varied at
another, without the change of personal <Identity>: There being no
Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now
were a part of it, be cut off:
#S 12#. But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which 10
thinks, be changed, it can be the same person, or remaining the
same, it can be different Persons.
And to this I answer first, this can be no Question at all to those,
who place Thought in a purely material, animal, Constitution, void
of an immaterial substance. For, whether their Supposition be true 15
or no, 'tis plain they conceive personal Identity preserved in some-
thing else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is pre-
served in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those,
who place thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they
can come to deal with these Men, must shew why personal Identity 20
cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial Substances, or
variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal
Identity is preserved in the change of material Substances, or variety
of particular Bodies: Unless they will say, 'tis one immaterial Spirit,
that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit 25
that makes the same Person in Men, which the <Cartesians> at least
will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.
#S 13#. But next, as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the
same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to
think) be changed, it can be the same Person. I answer, that cannot 30
be resolv'd, but by those, who know what kind of Substances they
are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past Actions
can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another. I grant,
were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could
not: But it being but a present representation of a past Action, why 35
it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind
to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And
#P 338#
#L 1#
therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to
any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will
be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is,
that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompany-
ing it, and how perform'd by thinking substances, who cannot  5 
think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the <same>
<consciousness>, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual
Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what
it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent, why I
say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of 10 
Matter of Fact, as well as several representations in Dreams are,
which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to
conclude from the Nature of things. And that it never is so, will by
us, till we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances,
be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the 15 
Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned
in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another,
that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it.
How far this may be an Argument against those who would place
Thinking in a System of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be 20 
considered. But yet to return to the Question before us, it must be
allowed, That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn,
is quite a different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion
in Body) can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another,
it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one 25 
Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the
same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd.
#S 14#. As to the second part of the Question, Whether the same
immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct
Persons; which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether 30 
the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its
past Duration, may be wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its
past Existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving
again: And so as it were beginning a new Account from a new
Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new 35 
State. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind,
since they allow the Soul to have no remaining consciousness of
what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from
                                                                #P 339#
                                                                #L 1#
Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, 'tis
plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity
reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent
Spirit not having continued so many Ages in a state of Silence,
must needs make different Persons. Suppose a Christian <Platonist> 5
or <Pythagorean>, should upon God's having ended all his Works of
Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since;
and should imagine it has revolved in several Humane Bodies, as I
once met with one, who was perswaded his had been the Soul of
<Socrates> (how reasonably I will not dispute. This I know, that in the 10
Post he fill'd, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very
rational Man, and the Press has shewn, that he wanted not Parts or
Learning) would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of
<Socrates's> Actions or Thoughts, could be the same Person with
<Socrates>? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has 15
in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him,
and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is
that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same
Soul, that was in <Nestor> or <Thersites>, at the Siege of <Troy>, (For Souls
being, as far as we know any thing of them in their Nature, in- 
different to any parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent
absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the
Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any
of the Actions either of <Nestor> or <Thersites>, does, or can he, conceive
himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concerned 25
in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them
his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed?
So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of
either of those Men, he is no more one <self> with either of them, than
if the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been 30
created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present
Body, though it were never so true, that the same Spirit that in-
formed <Nestor's> or <Thersites's> Body, were numerically the same that
now informs his. For this would no more make him the same Person
with <Nestor>, than if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a 35
part of <Nestor>, were now a part of this Man, the same immaterial
Substance without the same consciousness, no more making the
same Person by being united to any Body, than the same Particle of
#P 340#
#L 1#
Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes the same
Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions
of <Nestor>, he then finds himself the same Person with <Nestor>.
#S 15#. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to con-
ceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not 5  
exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same
consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet
the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but
to him that makes the Soul the <Man>, be enough to make the same
<Man>. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the con- 10 
sciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a
Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the
Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The
Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every 15 
Body determine the Man in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its
Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he
would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that
in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same
Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will 20 
always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what
articulate Sounds to what <Ideas> he thinks fit, and change them as
often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the
same <Spirit, Man>, or <Person>, we must fix the <Ideas> of <Spirit, Man>, or
<Person>, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we 25 
mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them,
or the like, when it is the <same>, and when not.
#S 16#. But though the same immaterial Substance, or Soul does
not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same
Man; yet 'tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, 30 
should it be to Ages past, unites Existences, and Actions, very
remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does the Existence
and Actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that what-
ever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same
Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness, 35 
                                                                #P 341#
                                                                #L 1#
that I saw the Ark and <Noah's> Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of
the <Thames> last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more
doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the <Thames> overflow'd
last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was
the same <self>, place that <self> in what Substance you please, than that 5
I that write this am the same <my self> now whilst I write (whether
I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no)
that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same <self>, it
matters not whether this present <self> be made up of the same or
other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly account-  
able for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropriated
to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last
moment.
#S 17#. <Self> is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance,
made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, 15
it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain,
capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it <self>, as far
as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst
comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as
much a part of it <self>, as what is most so. Upon separation of this 20
little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little
Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger
would be the <Person>, the <same Person>; and <self> then would have
nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the
consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is 25
separated from another, which makes the same <Person>, and con-
stitutes this inseparable <self>: so it is in reference to Substances
remote in time. That with which the <consciousness> of this present
thinking thing can join it self, makes the same <Person>, and is one <self>
with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it <self>, and owns 30
all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that conscious-
ness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.
#S 18#. In this <personal Identity> is founded all the Right and Justice
of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, for
#P 342#
#L 1#
which every one is concerned for <himself>, not mattering what
becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that con-
sciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the
consciousness went along with the little Finger, when it was cut
off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole 5  
Body Yesterday, as making a part of it <self>, whose Actions then it
cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same Body should
still live, and immediately from the separation of the little Finger
have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little Finger knew
nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of it <self>, or 10 
could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.
#S 19#. This may shew us wherein <personal Identity> consists, not in
the Identity of Substance, but, as I have sa1d, in the Identity of <con->
<sciousness>, wherein, if <Socrates> and the present Mayor of <Quinborough>
agree, they are the same Person: If the same <Socrates> waking and 15 
sleeping do not partake of the same <consciousness, Socrates> waking and
sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish <Socrates> waking,
for what sleeping <Socrates> thought, and waking <Socrates> was never
conscious of, would he no more of Right, than to punish one Twin
for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because 20 
their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished;
for such Twins have been seen.
#S 20#. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly
lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of
retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them 25 
again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had
those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now
forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice
what the Word <I> is applied to, which in this case is the Man only.
And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, <I> is 30 
easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it
be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would
at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the
Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions, 35 
Humane Laws not punishing the <Mad Man> for the <Sober Man's>
Actions, nor the <Sober Man> for what the <Mad Man> did, thereby
making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our
                                                                #P 343#
                                                                #L 1#
way of speaking in <English>, when we say such an one <is not himself> or
is <besides himself> in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who
now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that <self> was changed,
the <self> same Person was no longer in that Man.
#S 21#. But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that <Socrates> the same indivi- 
dual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must
consider what is meant by <Socrates>, or the same individual <Man>.
<First>, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking
Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.
<Secondly>, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an im- 
material Soul.
<Thirdly>, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.
Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible
to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but consciousness;
or reach any farther than that does.                                15
For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man
born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same
Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it
possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two
that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one 20
anothers Thoughts.
By the Second and Third, <Socrates> in this Life, and after it, cannot
be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so
making <Humane Identity> to consist in the same thing wherein we
place <Personal Identity>, there will be no difficulty to allow the same 25
Man to be the same Person. But then they who place <Humane>
<Identity> in consciousness only, and not in something else, must
consider how they will make the Infant <Socrates> the same Man with
<Socrates> after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes
a <Man>, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein per- 
haps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in
nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what
we call <self>) without involving us in great Absurdities.
#S 22#. But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same Person, why
else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he 35
be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person,
as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same
Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane
#P 344#
#L 1#
Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge:
Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is
real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in Drunkenness or
Sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed
to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the Drunkard  5 
perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures
justly punish him; because the Fact is proved against him, but want
of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day,
wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be
reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he 10 
knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience
accusing or excusing him.
#S 23#. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into
the same Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For what-
ever Substance there is, however framed, without consciousness, 15 
there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any
sort of Substance be so without consciousness.
      Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses
acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by
Night; and on the other side the same consciousness acting by 20 
Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the
<Day> and the <Night-man> would not be two as distinct Persons, as
<Socrates> and <Plato>; and whether in the second case, there would not
be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the
same in two distinct clothings. Nor is it at all material to say, that 25 
this same, and this distinct <consciousness> in the cases above-mentioned,
is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing
it with them to those Bodies, which whether true or no, alters not
the case: Since 'tis evident the <personal Identity> would equally be
determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were 30 
annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For grant-
ing that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily
suppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing
may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to
it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their 35 
past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a
                                                                #P 345#
                                                                #L 1#
past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together.
Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their
turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons w1th
the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two
Persons with the same Body. So that <self> is not determined by Iden- 
tity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only
by Identity of consciousness.
#S 24#. Indeed it may conceive the Substance whereof it is now
made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious
Being: But consciousness removed, that Substance is no more it 10
<self> or makes no more a part of it, than any other Substance, as is
evident in the instance, we have already given, of a Limb cut off, of
whose Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any
consciousness, it is no more of a Man's self than any other Matter of
the Universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial 15
Substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am my
<self> to my <self>: If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot
upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby
I am now my <self>, it is in that part of its Existence no more my <self>,
than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance 20
has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my conscious-
ness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to
me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been
thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where existing.
#S 25#. I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this conscious- 
ness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial
Substance.
But let Men according to their divers Hypotheses resolve of that
as they please. This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness
or Misery, must grant, that there is something that is <himself>, that 30
he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this <self> has
existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and there-
fore 'tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to
come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may
be the same <self>, by the same consciousness, continued on for the 35
future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the
<same> self which did such or such an Action some Years since, by
#P 346#
#L 1#
which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account
of <self>, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making
the same <self>: But the same continued consciousness, in which several
Substances may have been united, and again separated from it,
which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein 5  
this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same <self>. Thus
any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in
us, makes a part of our <selves>: But upon separation from the vital
union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that, which a
moment since was part of our <selves>, is now no more so, than a part 10 
of another Man's <self> is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but in a
little time may become a real part of another Person. And so we have
the same numerical Substance become a part of two different Per-
sons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various
Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly stripp'd of all its 15 
memory or consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds
always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all, the
union or separation of such a Spiritual Substance would make no
variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle
of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present 20 
thinking Being, is a part of that very <same> self which now is: Any
thing united to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also
a part of the <same self>, which is the same both then and now.
#S 26#. <Person>, as I take it, is the name for this <self>: Where-ever a
Man finds, what he calls <himself>, there I think another may say is the 25 
same <Person>. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their
Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law,
and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it <self> beyond
present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it
becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it <self> 30 
past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason,
that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for
Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that
which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that <self>, that
is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions 35 
it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present <self> by conscious-
ness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been
done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; <i.e.> Reward or Punishment,
                                                                #P 347#
                                                                #L 1#
on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or
miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For suppos-
ing a Man punish'd now, for what he had done in another Life,
whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what
difference is there between that Punishment, and being created 5
miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us,
that at the Great Day, when every one shall <receive according to his>
<doings, the secrets of> all <Hearts shall be laid open>. The Sentence shall
be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they
<themselves> in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances 10
soever that consciousness adheres to, are the <same>, that committed
those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.
#S 27#. I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject
made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers,
and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are 15
such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of
that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our
<selves>. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain
System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not
perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body 20
organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one
such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the
right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we
might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made.
But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these 25
Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent
from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature
of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may,
at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make
up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep's 30
Body yesterday should be a part of a Man's Body tomorrow, and in that
union make a vital part of <Meliboeus> himself as well as it did of his Ram.
#S 28#. To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must,
during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compo-
sitions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those   

#P 348#
#L 1#
Substances, the concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode
begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the
Composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the
same Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or
obscurity, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the    5  
Names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For
whatever makes the specifick <Idea>, to which the name is applied, if
that <Idea> be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the
same, and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no
doubt about it.   10  
#S 29#. For supposing a rational Spirit be the <Idea> of a <Man>, 'tis
easie to know, what is the <same Man, viz.> the <same Spirit>, whether
separate or in a Body will be the <same Man>. Supposing a rational
Spirit vitally united to a Body of a certain conformation of Parts to
make a <Man>, whilst that rational Spirit, with that vital conformation    15 
of Parts, though continued in a fleeting successive Body, remains, it
will be the <same Man>. But if to any one the <Idea> of a <Man> be, but the
vital union of Parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and
shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a
continued succession of fleeting Particles, it will be the same Man.    20 
For whatever be the composition whereof the complex <Idea> is made,
whenever Existence makes it one particular thing under any denom-
ination, the same Existence continued, preserves it the same
individual under the same denomination.

#C 28#                         CHAPTER XXVIII

                            <Of other Relations>.

#S 01#. Besides the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and 25    
Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there
are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.
                                                                #P 349#
                                                                #L 1#
<First>, The first I shall name, is some one simple <Idea>; which being
capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the
Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple <Idea>,
<v.g.  Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More>, etc. These Relations
depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple <Idea>, in 5
several Subjects, may be called, if one will, <Proportional>; and that
these are only conversant about those simple <Ideas> received from
Sensation or Reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to
evince it.
#S 02#. <Secondly>, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or 10
considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some
other thing, is the Circumstances of their origin or beginning;
which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations,
depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong;
<v.g. Father> and <Son, Brothers, Cousin-Germans>, etc. which have their 15
Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in
several degrees; <Country-men, i.e.> those who were born in the same
Country, or Tract of Ground; and these I call <natural Relations>:
Wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions
and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and 20
extent of Things. For 'tis certain, that in reality, the Relation
is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several
Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet 'tis seldom said,
This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pidgeons
are Cousin-Germains. It is very convenient, that by distinct 25
Names, these Relations should be observed, and marked out in
Mankind, there being occasion, both in Laws, and other Com-
munications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men,
under these Relations: From whence also arise the Obligations of
several Duties amongst Men: Whereas in Brutes, Men having very 30
little or no cause to mind these Relations, they have not thought
fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may
give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages,
which being suited only to the convenience of Communication, are
proportioned to the Notions Men have, and the commerce of 35
Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent
of Things, nor to the various Respects might be found among them;    

#P 350#
#L 1#
nor the different abstract Considerations might be framed about
them. Where they had no philosophical Notions, there they had no
Terms to express them: And 'tis no wonder Men should have
framed no Names for those Things, they found no occasion to dis-
course of. From whence it is easy to imagine, why, as in some 5  
Countries, they may not have so much as the Name for a Horse;
and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their
Horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only
Names for particular Horses, but also of their several Relations of
Kindred one to another. 10 
#S 03#. <Thirdly>, Sometimes the foundation of considering Things,
with reference to one another, is some act, whereby any one comes
by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do something. Thus a
<General> is one, that hath power to command an Army; and an Army
under a General, is a Collection of armed Men, obliged to obey 15 
one Man. A <Citizen>, or a <Burgher>, is one who has a Right to certain
Privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon Men's
Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call <Instituted>, or <Voluntary>; and
may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not
all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the 20 
Persons, to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of
the Substances, so related, be destroy'd. Now though these are all
reciprocal, as well as the rest; and contain in them a reference of two
things, one to the other: yet because one of the two things often
wants a relative Name, importing that reference, Men usually take 25 
no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd, <v.g.> A
<Patron> and <Client>, are easily allow'd to be Relations: but a <Constable>,
or <Dictator>, are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such.
Because there is no peculiar Name for those who are under the
Command of a Dictator, or Constable, expressing a Relation to 30 
either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a
certain Power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as
well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.
#S 04#. <Fourthly>, There is another sort of Relation, which is the
Conformity, or Disagreement, Men's voluntary Actions have to a 35 
Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of:
which, I think, may be called <Moral Relation>; as being that, which
                                                                #P 351#
                                                                #L 1#
denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined,
there being no part of Knowledge wherein we should be more
careful to get determined <Ideas>, and avoid, as much as may be,
Obscurity and Confusion.  Humane Actions, when with their
various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstances, they are 5
framed into distinct complex <Ideas>, are, as has been shewn, so many
<mixed Modes>, a great part whereof have Names annexed to them.
Thus supposing Gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and
return Kindness received; Polygamy to be the having more Wives
than one at once: when we frame these Notions thus in our Minds, 10
we have there so many determined <Ideas> of mixed Modes. But this is
not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have deter-
mined <Ideas> of them, and to know what Names belong to such and
such Combinations of <Ideas>. We have a farther and greater Con-
cernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions so made up, 15
are morally good, or bad.
#S 05#. Good and Evil, as hath been shewn, B.II.Ch.XX.  2. and
#S 42#. are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which
occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. <Morally Good and Evil>
then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary 20
Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from
the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil,
Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by
the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call <Reward> and <Punishment>.
#S 06#. Of these <Moral Rules>, or Laws, to which Men generally 25
refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their
Actions, there seem to me to be <three sorts>, with their three different
Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be
utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man,
without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to 30
determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose
also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be
in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the Actions of

#P 352#
#L 1#
another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance
with, and punish deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil,
that is not the natural product and consequence of the Action it
self. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience,
would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the 5  
true nature of all <Law>, properly so called.
#S 07#. The <Laws> that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge
of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three.
1. The <Divine> Law. 2. The <Civil> Law. 3. The Law of <Opinion> or <Repu->     
<tation>, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of 10 
these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the
second, whether they be Criminal, or Innocent; and by the third,
whether they be Vertues or Vices.
#S 08#. <First>, The <Divine> Law, whereby I mean, that Law which God
has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the 15 
light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. That God has given a
Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no
body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his
Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to
that which is best: and he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and 20 
Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life: for
no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touch-
stone of <moral Rectitude>; and by comparing them to this Law, it is,
that Men judge of the most considerable <Moral Good> or <Evil> of their
Actions; that is, whether as <Duties, or Sins>, they are like to procure 25 
them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.
#S 09#. <Secondly>, The <Civil> Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth,
to the Actions of those, who belong to it, is another Rule, to which
Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be <criminal>, or no.
This Law no body over-looks: the Rewards and Punishments, that 30 
enforce it, being ready at hand, and suitable to the Power that makes
it: which is the force of the Commonwealth, engaged to protect the
Lives, Liberties, and Possessions, of those who live according to its
                                                                #P 353#
                                                                #L 1#
Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods, from
him, who disobeys; which is the punishment of Offences committed
against this Law.
#S 10#.  <Thirdly>, The <Law of Opinion or Reputation>. Vertue and Vice
are Names pretended, and supposed every where to stand for actions 5
in their own nature right and wrong: And as far as they really are
so applied, they so far are co-incident with the <divine Law> above-
mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these
Names, <Vertue> and <Vice>, in the particular instances of their appli-
cation, through the several Nations and Societies of Men in the 10
World, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each
Country and Society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be
thought strange, that Men every where should give the Name of
<Vertue> to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise
worthy; and call that <Vice>, which they account blamable: Since 15
otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think
any thing <Right>, to which they allow'd not Commendation; any
thing <Wrong>, which they let pass without Blame. Thus the
measure of what is every where called and esteemed <Vertue> and
<Vice> is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret 20
and tacit consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes,
and Clubs of Men in the World: whereby several actions come to
find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment,
Maxims, or Fashions of that place. For though Men uniting into
politick Societies, have resigned up to the publick the disposing of 25
all their Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-
Citizen, any farther than the Law of the Country directs: yet they
retain still the power of Thinking well or ill; approving or dis-
approving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and
#P 354#
#L 1#
converse with: And by this approbation and dislike they establish
amongst themselves, what they will call <Vertue> and <Vice>.
#S 01#measure of Vertue and Vice>1, will
appear to any one, who considers, that though that passes for <Vice>
in one Country, which is counted a <Vertue>, or at least not <Vice>, in 5 
another; yet every-where <Vertue> and Praise, <Vice> and Blame, go
together. <Vertue> is every-where that, which is thought Praise-
worthy; and nothing else but that, which has the allowance of
publick Esteem, is called <Vertue. Vertue> and Praise are so united
                                                               #P 355#
                                                               #L 1#
that they are called often by the same Name. <Sunt sua praemia Laudi>,
says <Virgil>; and so <Cicero, Nihil habet natura praestantius, quam Hone->
#P 356#
#L 1#
<statem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus>, which he tells
you, are all Names for the same thing, <Tusc.l.> 2 This is the Lan-
guage of the Heathen Philosophers, who well understood wherein
their Notions of <Vertue> and <Vice> consisted. And though, perhaps, by
the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of 5  
different sorts of Men it fell out, that what was thought Praise-
worthy in one Place, escaped not censure in another; and so in
different Societies, <Vertues> and <Vices> were changed: Yet, as to the
Main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since
nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Esteem and 10 
Reputation that, wherein every one finds h1s Advantage; and
to blame and discountenance the contrary: 'tis no Wonder, that
Esteem and Discredit, Vertue and Vice, should in a great measure
every-where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and
Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being noth- 15 
ing, that so directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general
Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws, he has
set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion,
as the neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all
Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so 20 
constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their
Commendation and Blame on that side, that really deserved it not.
Nay, even those Men, whose Practice was otherwise, failed not to
give their Approbation right, few being depraved to that Degree,
as not to condemn, at least in others, the Faults they themselves 25 
were guilty of: whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the
true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule
of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the
Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to
common Repute. <Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if> 30 
<there be any Vertue, if there be any praise>, etc. Philippians, 4.8.
#S 12#. If any one shall imagine, that I have forgot my own Notion
of a Law, when I make <the Law>, whereby Men judge <of Vertue and>
<Vice>, to be nothing else, but the Consent of private Men, who have
not Authority enough to make a Law: Especially wanting that, 35 
which is so necessary and essential to a Law, a Power to inforce it:
I think, I may say, that he, who imagines Commendation and
Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate
themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those, with whom they
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                                                                #L 1#
converse, seems little skill'd in the Nature, or History of Mankind:
the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly,
if not solely, by this Law of Fashion; and so they do that, which
keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the
Laws of God, or the Magistrate. The Penalties that attend the 5
breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps, most Men seldom
seriously reflect on: and amongst those that do, many, whilst they
break the Law, entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation, and
making their Peace for such Breaches. And as to the Punishments,
due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter 10
themselves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man scapes the
Punishment of their Censure and Dislike, who offends against the
Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recom-
mend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and
insensible enough, to bear up under the constant Dislike, and 15
Condemnation of his own Club. He must be of a strange, and un-
usual Constitution, who can content himself, to live in constant
Disgrace and Disrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude
many Men have sought, and been reconciled to: But no Body, that
has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him, can live in 20
Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars,
and those he converses with. This is a Burthen too heavy for
humane Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable
Contradictions, who can take Pleasure in Company, and yet be
insensible of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions.         25
#S 13#. These Three then, <First>, The Law of God. <Secondly>, The Law
of politick Societies.  <Thirdly>, The Law of Fashion, or private
Censure, are those, to which Men variously compare their Actions:
And 'tis by their Conformity to one of these Laws, that they take
their measures, when they would judge of their Moral Rectitude, 30
and denominate their Actions good or bad.
#S 14#. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touch-stone, we bring
our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Good-
ness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark
#P 358#
#L 1#
of the value we set upon them: Whether, I say, we take that Rule
from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the
Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it;
and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the
Rule: and so hath a Notion of <Moral Goodness or Evil>, which is either 5  
Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And
therefore, is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing
but a Collection of several simple <Ideas>, the Conformity thereto is
but so ordering the Action, that the simple <Ideas>, belonging to it,
may correspond to those, which the Law requires. And thus we 10 
see, how Moral Beings and Notions, are founded on, and terminated
in these simple <Ideas>, we have received from Sensation or Reflection.
For Example, let us consider the complex <Idea>, we signify by the
Word Murther: and when we have taken it asunder, and examined
all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of 15 
simple <Ideas>, derived from Reflection or Sensation, <viz. First>, From
Reflection on the Operations of our own Minds, we have the <Ideas>
of Willing, Considering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wishing
Ill to another; and also of Life, or Perception, and Self-motion.
<Secondly>, From Sensation, we have the Collection of those simple 20 
sensible <Ideas> which are to be found in a Man, and of some Action,
whereby we put an end to Perception, and Motion in the Man; all
which simple <Ideas>, are comprehended in the Word Murther. This
Collection of simple <Ideas>, being found by me to agree or disagree,
with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in; and to be held 25 
by most Men there, worthy Praise, or Blame, I call the Action
vertuous or vitious: If I have the Will of a supreme, invisible Law-
maker for my Rule: then, as I supposed the Action commanded, or
forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: and if I com-
pare it to the civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative of the 30 
Country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a Crime, or no Crime. So that
whencesoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions; or by what
Standard soever we frame in our Minds the <Ideas> of Vertues or
Vices, they consist only, and are made up of Collections of simple
<Ideas>, which we originally received from Sense or Reflection: and 35 
their Rectitude, or Obliquity, consists in the Agreement, or
Disagreement, with those Patterns prescribed by some Law.
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#S 15#. To conceive rightly of <Moral Actions>, we must take notice
of them, under this two-fold Consideration. <First>, As they are in
themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple <Ideas>. Thus
<Drunkenness>, or <Lying>, signify such or such a Collection of simple
<Ideas>, which I call mixed Modes: and in this Sense, they are as much 5
<positive absolute Ideas>, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of
a Parrot. <Secondly>, Our Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, <or>
Indifferent; and in this respect, they are <Relative>, it being their
Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them
to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad: and so, as far as they are 10
compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come
under Relation. Thus the challenging, and fighting with a Man, as
it is a certain positive Mode, or particular sort of Action, by par-
ticular <Ideas>, distinguished from all others, is called <Duelling>: which,
when considered, in relation to the Law of God, will deserve the 15
Name Sin; to the Law of Fashion, in some Countries, Valour and
Vertue; and to the municipal Laws of some Governments, a capital
Crime. In this Case, when the positive Mode has one Name, and
another Name as it stands in relation to the Law, the distinction
may as easily be observed, as it is in Substances, where one Name, 20
<v.g. Man>, is used to signify the thing, another, <v.g. Father>, to signify
the Relation.
#S 16#. But because, very frequently the positive <Idea> of the Action,
and its Moral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name,
and the same Word made use of, to express both the Mode or 25
Action, and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity:  therefore the
Relation it self is less taken notice of; and there is often no <distinction>
made <between the positive Idea> of the Action, <and the reference it has to>
<a Rule>. By which confusion, of these two distinct Considerations,
under one Term, those who yield too easily to the Impressions of 30
Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often misled
in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from another what
is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly called
<Stealing>: but that Name, being commonly understood to signify
also the Moral pravity of the Action, and to denote its contrariety 35
to the Law, Men are apt to condemn, whatever they hear called
Stealing, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And
#P 360#
#L 1#
yet the private taking away his Sword from a Mad-man, to prevent
his doing Mischief, though it be properly denominated <Stealing>, as
the Name of such a <mixed Mode>: yet when compared to the Law of
God; and considered in its relation to that supreme Rule, it is no
Sin, or Transgression, though the Name <Stealing> ordinarily carries  5 
such an intimation with it.
#S 17#. And thus much for the Relation of humane Actions to a
Law, which therefore I <call Moral Relations>.
      'Twould make a Volume, to go over all sorts of <Relations>: 'tis not
therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It 10 
suffices to our present purpose, to shew by these, what the <Ideas>
are, we have <of> this comprehensive Consideration, call'd <Relation>.
Which is so <various>, and the Occasions of it so <many>, (as many as
there can be of comparing things one to another,) that it is not very
easy to reduce it to Rules, or under just Heads. Those I have 15 
mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such, as
may serve to let us see, from whence we get our <Ideas> of Relations,
and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument,
from what has been said, give me leave to observe,
#S 18#. <First>, That it is evident, That <all Relation terminates in>, and 20    
is ultimately founded on those <simple Ideas>, we have <got from Sen->
<sation, or Reflection>: So that all that we have in our Thoughts our
selves, (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning,) or would
signify to others, when we use Words, standing for Relations, is
nothing but some simple <Ideas>, or Collections of simple <Ideas>, 25 
compared one with another. This is so manifest in that sort called
<proportional>, that nothing can be more. For when a Man says, Honey
is sweeter than Wax, it is plain, that his Thoughts in this Relation,
terminate in this simple <Idea>, Sweetness, which is equally true of all
the rest; though, where they are compounded, or decompounded, 30 
the simple <Ideas>, they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken
notice of: <v.g.> when the Word Father is mentioned: <First>, There is
meant that particular Species, or collective <Idea>, signified by the
Word Man; <Secondly>, Those sensible simple <Ideas>, signified by the
Word Generation; And, <Thirdly>, The Effects of it, and all the simple 35 
<Ideas>, signified by the Word Child. So the Word Friend, being taken
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                                                                 #L 1#
for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all
those following <Ideas> to the making of it up. <First>, all the simple
<Ideas>, comprehended in the Word Man, or intelligent Being.
<Secondly>, The <Idea> of Love. <Thirdly>, The <Idea> of Readiness, or Dispo-
sition. <Fourthly>, The <Idea> of Action, which is any kind of Thought, 5
or Motion. <Fifthly>, The <Idea> of Good, which signifies any thing that
may advance his Happiness; and terminates at last, if examined, in
particular simple <Ideas>, of which the Word <Good> in general, signifies
any one, but if removed from all simple <Ideas> quite, it signifies
nothing at all. And thus also, all Moral Words terminate at last, 10
though, perhaps, more remotely, in a Collection of simple <Ideas>:
the immediate signification of Relative Words, being very often
other supposed known Relations; which, if traced one to another,
still end in simple <Ideas>.
#S 19#. <Secondly>, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not 15
always, <as clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of those simple>
Ideas, <wherein it is founded>: Agreement or Disagreement, whereon
Relation depends, being Things, whereof we have commonly as
clear <Ideas>, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distin-
guishing simple <Ideas>, or their Degrees one from another, without 20
which, we could have no distinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a
clear <Idea> of Sweetness, Light, or Extension, I have too, of equal or
more, or less, of each of these: If I know what it is for one Man to
be born of a Woman, <viz. Sempronia>, I know what it is for another
Man to be born of the same Woman, <Sempronia>; and so have as 25
clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if
I believed, that <Sempronia> digged <Titus> out of the Parsley-Bed, (as
they use to tell Children,) and thereby became his Mother; and that
afterwards in the same manner, she digged <Cajus> out of the Parsley-
Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between 30
them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife; the Notion that the same
Woman contributed, as Mother, equally to their Births, (though I
were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it,) being that on which
I grounded the Relation; and that they agreed in that Circumstance
of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their 35
descent from the same Person, without knowing the particular
Circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my Notion of
#P 362#
#L 1#
their having, or not having the Relation of Brothers. But though the
<Ideas> of particular <Relations>, are capable of being as clear and distinct
in the Minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of
mixed Modes, and more determinate, than those of Substances; yet
the Names belonging to <Relation>, are often of as doubtful, and 5  
incertain Signification, as those of Substances, or mixed Modes; and
much more than those of simple <Ideas>. Because Relative Words,
being the Marks of this Comparison, which is made only by Men's
Thoughts, and is an <Idea> only in Men's Minds, Men frequently
apply them to different Comparisons of Things, according to their 10 
own Imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of
others using the same Names.
#S 20#. <Thirdly>, That in these I <call Moral Relations>, I have a true
Notion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule,
whether the Rule be true, or false. For if I measure any thing by a 15 
Yard, I know, whether the thing I measure be longer, or shorter,
than that supposed Yard, though, perhaps, the Yard I measure by,
be not exactly the Standard: Which, indeed, is another Enquiry.
For though the Rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the
agreement, or disagreement observable in that which I compare 20 
with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Though measuring by a
wrong Rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral
Rectitude; because I have tried it by that, which is not the true
Rule; but I am not mistaken in the Relation which that Action
bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is agreement, or dis-
agreement.

#C 29#                      CHAPTER XXIX

         <Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused> Ideas.
#S 01#. HAVING shewn the Original of our <Ideas>, and taken a view of
their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple
                                                                 #P 363#
                                                                 #L 1#
and the complex; and observed how the complex ones are divided
into those of Modes, Substances, and Relations, all which, I think,
is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself
throughly with the progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and
Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt 5
long enough upon the Examination of <Ideas>. I must, nevertheless,
crave leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning
them. The first is, That some are <clear>, and others <obscure>; some
<distinct>, and others <confused>.
#S 02#. The Perception of the Mind, being most aptly explained by 10
Words relating to the Sight, we shall best understand what is meant
by <Clear>, and <Obscure> in our <Ideas>, by reflecting on what we call
<Clear> and <Obscure> in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which
discovers to us visible Objects, we give the name of <Obscure>, to that,
which is not placed in a Light sufficient to discover minutely to us 15
the Figure and Colours, which are observable in it, and which, in a
better Light, would be discernable. In like manner, our <simple Ideas>
are <clear>, when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence
they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Sensation or
Perception, present them. Whilst the Memory retains them thus, 20
and can produce them to the Mind, when-ever it has occasion to
consider them, they are <clear Ideas>. So far as they either want any
thing of that original Exactness, or have lost any of their first
Freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by Time, so far are
they <obscure. Complex Ideas>, as they are made up of Simple ones; so 25
they are <clear>, when the <Ideas> that go to their Composition, are
clear; and the Number and Order of those Simple <Ideas>, that are the
Ingredients of any Complex one, is determinate and certain.
#S 03#. The <cause of Obscurity> in simple <Ideas>, seems to be either dull
Organs; or very slight and transient Impressions made by the 30
Objects; or else a weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them
as received. For to return again to visible Objects, to help us to
apprehend this matter. If the Organs, or Faculties of Perception,
like Wax over-hardned with Cold, will not receive the Impression
of the Seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax 35
of a temper too soft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted; or
#P 364#
#L 1#
else supposing the Wax of a temper fit, but the Seal not applied
with a sufficient force, to make a clear Impression: In any of these
cases, the print left by the Seal, will be <obscure>. This, I suppose,
needs no application to make it plainer.
#S 04#. As a <clear Idea> is that whereof the Mind has such a full and 5    
evident perception, as it does receive from an outward Object
operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a <distinct Idea> is that
wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a
<confused Idea> is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable
from another, from which it ought to be different. 10 
#S 05#. If no <Idea> be <confused>, but such as is not sufficiently dis-
tinguishable from another, from which it should be different, it will
be hard, may any one say, to find any where a <confused Idea>. For let
any <Idea> be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind
perceives it to be; and that very perception, sufficiently distin- 15 
guishes it from all other <Ideas>, which cannot be other, <i.e.> different,
without being perceived to be so. No <Idea> therefore can be un-
distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different,
unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other, it
is evidently different. 20 
#S 06#. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright,
what it is, that makes the <confusion, Ideas> are at any time chargeable
with, we must consider, that Things ranked under distinct Names,
are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each
sort, by its peculiar Name, may be marked, and discoursed of apart, 25 
upon any occasion: And there is nothing more evident, than that
the greatest part of different Names, are supposed to stand for
different Things. Now every <Idea> a Man has, being visibly what it
is, and distinct from all other <Ideas> but it self, that which makes it
<confused> is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another 30 
Name, as that which it is expressed by, the difference which keeps
the Things (to be ranked under those two different Names)
distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and
some of them to the other of those Names, being left out; and so the
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                                                                #L 1#
distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different
Names, is quite lost.
#S 07#. The <Defaults which> usually <occasion> this <Confusion>, I think, are
chiefly these following.
<First>, When any complex <Idea> (for 'tis complex <Ideas> that are most 5
liable to confusion) is made up of <too small a number of simple Ideas>, and
such only as are common to other Things, whereby the differences,
that make it deserve a different Name, are left out. Thus he, that
has an <Idea> made up of barely the simple ones of a Beast with Spots,
has but a confused <Idea> of a Leopard, it not being thereby sufficiently 10
distinguished from a Lynx, and several other sorts of Beasts that
are spotted. So that such an <Idea>, though it hath the peculiar Name
Leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the Names
Lynx, or Panther, and may as well come under the Name Lynx, as
Leopard. How much the custom of defining of Words by general 15
terms, contributes to make the <Ideas> we would express by them,
confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is
evident, that confused <Ideas> are such as render the Use of Words
uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct Names. When the
<Ideas>, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answer- 
able to their distinct Names, and so cannot be distinguished by
them, there it is that they are truly confused.
#S 08#. <Secondly>, Another default, which makes our <Ideas> confused, is,
when though the particulars that make up any <Idea>, are in number
enough; yet they are so <jumbled together>, that it is not easily discern- 
able, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than
to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this
Confusion, than a sort of Pictures usually shewn, as surprizing
Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on
the Table it self, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have 30
no discernable order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up
of parts, wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is, in it self, no
more a confused Thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein
though there be as little order of Colours, or Figures to be found,
yet no body thinks it a confused Picture. What is it then, that makes 35
it be thought confused, since the want of Symmetry does not? As it
#P 366#
#L 1#
is plain it does not: for another Draught made, barely in imitation
of this, could not be called confused. I answer, That which makes it
be thought confused, is the applying it to some Name, to which it
does no more discernibly belong, than to some other. <v.g.> When it is
said to be the Picture of a Man, or <Caesar>, then any one with reason 5  
counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to
belong more to the name Man, or <Caesar>, than to the name Baboon,
or <Pompey>: which are supposed to stand for different <Ideas>, from those
signified by Man, or <Caesar>. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, placed
right, hath reduced those irregular Lines on the Table, into their 10 
due order and proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye
presently sees, that it is a Man, or <Caesar; i.e.> that it belongs to those
Names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a Baboon, or
<Pompey; i.e.> from the <Ideas> signified by those Names Just thus it is
with our <Ideas>, which are, as it were, the Pictures of Things. No one 15 
of these mental Draughts, however the parts are put together, can
be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are,) till
it be ranked under some ordinary Name, to which it cannot be
discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other Name, of
an allowed different signification. 20 
#S 09#. <Thirdly>, A third defect that frequently gives the name of
Confused, to our <Ideas>, is when any one of them is <uncertain, and>
<undetermined>. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use
the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their
precise signification, change the <Idea>, they make this or that term 25 
stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of
uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his <Idea> of
<Church>, or <Idolatry>, every time he thinks of either, and holds not
steady to any one precise Combination of <Ideas>, that makes it up, is
said to have a confused <Idea> of Idolatry, or the Church: Though this 30 
be still for the same reason that the former, <viz.> Because a mutable
<Idea> (if we will allow it to be one <Idea>) cannot belong to one Name,
rather than another; and so loses the distinction, that distinct
Names are designed for.
#S 10#. By what has been said, we may observe how much <Names>, as 35    
supposed steady signs of Things, and by their difference to stand
                                                                 #P 367#
                                                                 #L 1#
for, and keep Things distinct, that in themselves are different, are
the <occasion of denominating> Ideas <distinct or confused>, by a secret and
unobserved reference, the Mind makes of its <Ideas> to such Names.
This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words,
in the Third Book, has been read and considered. But without 5
taking notice of such a reference of <Ideas> to distinct Names, as the
signs of distinct Things, it will be hard to say what a <confused Idea> is.
And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a sort of Things,
or any one particular Thing, distinct from all others, the complex
<Idea> he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more 10
particular the <Ideas> are, and the greater and more determinate the
number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more
it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences,
whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all <Ideas> belonging to
other Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby 15
all confusion with them is avoided.
#S 11#. <Confusion>, making it a difficulty to separate two Things that
should be separated, <concerns always two Ideas>; and those most, which
most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any
<Idea> to be <confused>, we must examine what other it is in danger to be 20
confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from, and
that will always be found an <Idea> belonging to another Name, and
so should be a different Thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently
distinct: being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or, at
least, as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is ranked 25
under; and so keeps not that difference from that other <Idea>, which
the different Names import.
#S 12#. This, I think, is the <confusion> proper to <Ideas>; which still
carries with it a secret reference to Names. At least if there be any
other confusion of <Ideas>, this is that which most of all disorders 30
Men's Thoughts and Discourses: <Ideas>, as ranked under Names,
being those that for the most part Men reason of within themselves,
and always those which they commune about, with others. And
therefore where there are supposed two different <Ideas>, marked by
two different Names, which are not as distinguishable as the Sounds 35
that stand for them, there never fails to be <confusion>: And where any
#P 368#
#L 1#
<Ideas> are distinct, as the <Ideas> of those two Sounds they are marked
by, there can be between them no <confusion. The way to prevent it>, is to
collect and unite into our complex <Idea>, as precisely as is possible,
all those Ingredients, whereby it is differenced from others; and to
them so united in a determinate number and order, apply steadily the  5 
same Name. But this neither accommodating Men's ease or vanity,
or serving any design, but that of naked Truth, which is not always
the thing aimed at, such exactness, is rather to be wished, than
hoped for. And since the loose application of Names, to undeter-
mined, variable, and almost no <Ideas>, serves both to cover our own 10 
Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for
Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that most
Men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others.
Though, I think, no small part of the <confusion>, to be found in the
Notions of Men, might by care and ingenuity, be avoided; yet I am 15 
far from concluding it every-where wilful. Some <Ideas> are so com-
plex, and made up of so many parts, that the Memory does not
easily retain the very same precise Combination of simple <Ideas>,
under one Name: much less are we able constantly to divine for
what precise complex <Idea> such a Name stands in another Man's use 20 
of it. From the first of these, follows <confusion> in a Man's own
Reasonings and Opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent
<confusion> in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at
large treated of Words, their Defects and Abuses in the following
Book, I shall here say no more of it. 25 
#S 13#. Our <complex Ideas> being made up of Collections, and so
variety of simple ones, <may> accordingly <be very clear and distinct in one>
<part, and very obscure and confused in another>. In a Man who speaks of a
<Chiliaedron>, or a Body of a thousand sides, the <Idea> of the Figure may
be very confused, though that of the Number be very distinct; so 30 
that he being able to discourse, and demonstrate concerning that
part of his complex <Idea>, which depends upon the Number of a
Thousand, he is apt to think, he has a distinct <Idea> of a <Chiliaedron>;
though it be plain, he has no precise <Idea> of its Figure, so as to
distinguish it, by that, from one that has but 999 sides: The not 35 
                                                                #P 369#
                                                                #L 1#
observing whereof, causes no small Error in Men's Thoughts, and
Confusion in their Discourses.
#S 14#. He that thinks he has a distinct <Idea> of the Figure of a <Chiliae->
<dron>, let him for Trial's-sake take another parcel of the same uniform
Matter, <viz.> Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a 5
Figure of 999 sides. He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish
these two <Ideas> one from another by the Number of sides; and reason,
and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his Thoughts and
Reasoning to that part only of these <Ideas>, which is contained in
their Numbers; as that the sides of the one, could be divided into 10
two equal Numbers; and of the other, not, <etc.> But when he goes
about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently
at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two <Ideas>,
one of them distinct from the other, by the bare Figure of these two
pieces of Gold; as he could, if the same parcels of Gold were made 15
one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five sides. In which incomplete
<Ideas>, we are very apt to impose on our selves, and wrangle with
others, especially where they have particular and familiar Names.
For being satisfied in that part of the <Idea>, which we have clear; and the
Name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing 20
that part also, which is imperfect and obscure, we are apt to use it
for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure
part of its Signification, as confidently, as we do from the other.
#S 15#. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name <Eternity>, we
are apt to think, we have a positive comprehensive <Idea> of it, which 25
is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration, which is
not clearly contained in our <Idea>. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so,
may have a clear <Idea> of Duration; he may also have a very clear <Idea> of
a very great length of Duration; he may also have a clear <Idea> of the
Comparison of that great one, with still a greater: But it not being 30
possible for him to include in his <Idea> of any Duration, let it be as great
as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration, where he supposes
no end, that part of his <Idea>, which is still beyond the Bounds of
that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very
obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in Disputes and 35
Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other <Infinite>, we are very
apt to blunder, and involve our selves in manifest Absurdities.
#P 370#
#L 1#
#S 16#. In Matter, we have no clear <Ideas> of the smalness of Parts,
much beyond the smallest, that occur to any of our Senses: and
therefore when we talk of the divisibility of Matter <in infinitum>,
though we have clear <Ideas> of Division and Divisibility, and have
also clear <Ideas> of Parts, made out of a whole, by Division; yet we 5  
have but very obscure, and confused <Ideas> of Corpuscles, or minute
Bodies, so to be divided, when by former Divisions, they are reduced
to a smalness, much exceeding the perception of any of our Senses;
and so all that we have clear, and distinct <Ideas> of, is of what Division
in general, or abstractly is, and the Relation of <Totum> and <Pars>: But 10 
of the bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain
Progressions, I think, we have no clear, nor distinct <Idea> at all. For
I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever
saw, he has any distinct <Idea>, (bating still the Number which con-
cerns not Extension,) betwixt the 100 000, and the 1000 000 part 15 
of it. Or if he think he can refine his <Ideas> to that Degree, without
losing sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those
Numbers. Such a degree of smalness is not unreasonable to be
supposed, since a Division carried on so far brings it no nearer the
end of infinite Division, than the first Division into two halfs does. 20 
I must confess for my part, I have no clear, distinct <Ideas> of the differ-
ent Bulk, or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure
one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of
Bodies <in infinitum>, our <Idea> of their distinct Bulks, which is the
Subject and Foundation of Division, comes after a little progression, 25 
to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that <Idea>,
which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and
confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big,
but only by Number: so that we have clear, distinct <Ideas>, we may
say of Ten and One, but no distinct <Ideas> of two such Extensions. 30 
Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divisibility of
Body, or Extension, our distinct and clear <Ideas> are only of Numbers:
but the clear, distinct <Ideas> of Extension, after some Progress of
Division, is quite lost; and of such minute Parts, we have no dis-
tinct <Ideas> at all; but it returns, as all our <Ideas> of Infinite do, at last 35 
                                                                #P 371#
                                                                #L 1#
to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts
to any distinct <Idea> of actual, infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a
clear <Idea> of Division, as often as we will think of it; but thereby we
have no more a clear <Idea> of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a
clear <Idea> of an infinite Number, by being able still to add new 5
Numbers to any assigned Number we have: endless Divisibility
giving us no more a clear and distinct <Idea> of actually infinite Parts,
than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and
distinct <Idea> of an actually infinite Number. They both being only
in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it 10
will. So that of what remains to be added, (wherein consists the
Infinity,) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused <Idea>;
from or about which we can argue, or reason with no Certainty or
Clearness, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of
which we have no such distinct <Idea>, as we have of 4 or 100; but 15
only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is
still bigger: and we have no more a clear, positive <Idea> of it, when we
say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we
should say, it is bigger than 40, or 4: 400,000,000, having no nearer
a proportion to the end of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that 20
adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of
all Addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so
likewise in Eternity, he that has an <Idea> of but four Years, has as
much a positive complete <Idea> of Eternity, as he that has one of
400,000,000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond either 25
of these two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other;
<i.e.> neither of them has any clear positive <Idea> of it at all. For he that
adds only 4 Years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach Eternity, as
he that adds 400,000,000 of Years, and so on; or if he please,
doubles the Increase as often as he will: The remaining Abyss being 30
still as far beyond the end of all these Progressions, as it is from the
length of a Day, or an Hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion
to infinite; and therefore our <Ideas>, which are all finite, cannot bear
any. Thus it is also in our <Idea> of <Extension>, when we increase it by
Addition, as well as when we diminish it by Division, and would 35
enlarge our Thoughts to infinite Space. After a few doublings of
those <Ideas> of Extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to
have, we lose the clear distinct <Idea> of that Space: it becomes a
confusedly great one, with a Surplus of still greater; about which,
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#L 1#
when we would argue, or reason, we shall always find our selves at a
loss; confused <Ideas>, in our Arguings and Deductions from that part
of them which is confused, always leading us into confusion.




#C 30#                       CHAPTER XXX

                   <Of Real and Fantastical> Ideas.

#S 01#. BESIDES what we have already mentioned, concerning <Ideas>,
other Considerations belong to them, in reference to things from  5 
whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent;
and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and
are,
     <First>, Either real, or fantastical.
<Secondly>, Adequate, or inadequate. 10   
     <Thirdly>, True, or false.
     <First>, By <real Ideas>, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature;
such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of
Things, or with their Archetypes. <Fantastical or Chimerical>, I call
such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity 15 
with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to
their Archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of <Ideas> before-
mentioned, we shall find, that,
#S 02#. <First>, Our <simple> Ideas <are all real>, all agree to the reality of
things. Not that they are all of them the Images, or Representations 20 
of what does exist, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary
Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewed. But though White-
ness and Coldness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet those
<Ideas> of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain, <etc.> being in us the Effects of
Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce 25 
in us such Sensations; they are real <Ideas> in us, whereby we
distinguish the Qualities, that are really in things themselves.
For these several Appearances, being designed to be the Marks,
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                                                                #L 1#
whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things, which we have
to do with; our <Ideas> do as well serve us to that purpose, and are
as real distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant
Effects, or else exact Resemblances of something in the things
themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence, they 5
have with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings. But whether
they answer to those Constitutions, as to Causes, or Patterns, it
matters not; 1t suffices, that they are constantly produced by them.
And thus our simple <Ideas> are all real and true, because they answer
and agree to those Powers of Things, which produce them in our 10
Minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not
fictions at Pleasure. For in simple <Ideas>, (as has been shewn,) the
Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of things upon it; and can
make to it self no simple <Idea>, more than what it has received.
#S 03#. Though the Mind be wholly passive, in respect of its simple 15
<Ideas>: Yet, I think, we may say, it is not so, in respect of its complex
<Ideas>: For those being Combinations of simple <Ideas>, put together,
and united under one general Name; 'tis plain, that the Mind of
Man uses some kind of Liberty, in forming those complex <Ideas>:
How else comes it to pass, that one Man's <Idea> of Gold, or Justice, is 20
different from anothers? But because he has put in, or left out of his,
some simple <Idea>, which the other has not. The Question then is,
Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations:
what Collections agree to the reality of Things, and what not? And
to this I say, That                                                  25
#S 04#. <Secondly, Mixed Modes and Relations>, having no other <reality>,
but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more
required to those kind of <Ideas>, to make them <real>, but that they
be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable
to them. These <Ideas>, being themselves Archetypes, cannot differ 30
from their Archetypes, and so <cannot be chimerical>, unless any one
will jumble together in them inconsistent <Ideas>. Indeed, as any of
them have the Names of a known Language assigned to them, by
which, he that has them in his Mind, would signify them to others,
so bare Possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a 35
#P 374#
#L 1#
Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name, that is
given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a Man
would give the Name of Justice to that <Idea>, which common use
calls Liberality. But this Fantasticalness relates more to Propriety
of Speech, than Reality of <Ideas>. For a Man to be undisturbed in 5  
Danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to
execute it steadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex <Idea> of an Action
which may exist. But to be undisturbed in Danger, without using
ones Reason or Industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as
real an <Idea> as the other. Though the first of these having the Name 10 
<Courage> given to it, may, in respect of that Name, be a right or
wrong <Idea>: But the other, whilst it has not a common received
Name of any known Language assigned to it, is not capable of any
Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but it self.
#S 05#. <Thirdly>, Our <complex> Ideas <of Substances>, being made all of 15   
them in reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be
Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther
<real>, than as they are such Combinations of simple <Ideas>, as are
really united, and co-exist in Things without us. On the contrary,
those are <fantastical>, which are made up of such Collections of 20 
simple <Ideas>, as were really never united, never were found together
in any Substance; <v.g.> a rational Creature, consisting of a Horse's
Head, joined to a body of humane shape, or such as the <Centaurs> are
described: Or, a Body, yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed;
but lighter than common Water: Or, an uniform, unorganized 25 
Body, consisting as to Sense, all of similar Parts, with Perception
and voluntary Motion joined to it. Whether such Substances, as
these, can possibly exist, or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But
be that as it will, these <Ideas> of Substances, being made conformable
to no Pattern existing, that we know; and consisting of such 30 
Collections of <Ideas>, as no Substance ever shewed us united together,
they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: But much more
are those complex <Ideas> so, which contain in them any Inconsistency
or Contradiction of their Parts.


#P 375#
#C 31#                      CHAPTER XXXI

                  <Of Adequate and Inadequate> Ideas.
#L 1#
#S 01#. OF our real <Ideas> some are Adequate, and some are Inadequate.
Those I call <Adequate>, which perfectly represent those Archetypes,
which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them
to stand for, and to which it refers them. <Inadequate Ideas> are such,
which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those 5
Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is
plain,
#S 02#. <First>, That <all our simple> Ideas <are adequate>. Because being
nothing but the effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and
ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot 10
but be correspondent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are
sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us
the <Ideas>, which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure there
is a power in Sugar to produce those <Ideas> in our Minds, or else they
could not have been produced by it. And so each Sensation answer-  15
ing the Power, that operates on any of our Senses, the <Idea> so pro-
duced, is a real <Idea>, (and not a fiction of the Mind, which has no
power to produce any simple <Idea>;) and cannot but be adequate,
since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple <Ideas>
are adequate. 'Tis true, the Things producing in us these simple 20
<Ideas>, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only
the causes of them; but as if those <Ideas> were real Beings in them.
For though Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is signified
the power of producing in us the <Idea> of Pain; yet it is denominated
also Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really something in 25
the Fire, more than a power to excite these <Ideas> in us; and therefore
are called <Qualities> in, or of the Fire. But these being nothing, in
#P 376#
#L 1#
truth, but powers to excite such <Ideas> in us, I must, in that sense, be
understood, when I speak of secondary <Qualities>, as being in Things;
or of their <Ideas>, as being in the Objects, that excite them in us. Such
ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar Notions,
without which, one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify 5  
nothing, but those Powers, which are in Things, to excite certain
Sensations or <Ideas> in us. Since were there no fit Organs to receive
the impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor a Mind
joined to those Organs to receive the <Ideas> of Light and Heat, by
those impressions from the Fire, or the Sun, there would yet be no 10 
more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain if there
were no sensible Creature to feel it, though the Sun should con-
tinue just as it is now, and Mount <AEtna> flame higher than ever it
did. Solidity, and Extension, and the termination of it, Figure, with
Motion and Rest, whereof we have the <Ideas>, would be really in the 15 
World as they are, whether there were any sensible Being to per-
ceive them, or no: And therefore those we have reason to look on,
as the real modifications of Matter; and such as are the exciting
Causes of all our various Sensations from Bodies. But this being an
Enquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, 20 
but proceed to shew, what complex <Ideas> are <adequate>, and what not.
#S 03#. <Secondly>, Our <complex> Ideas <of Modes>, being voluntary Collec-
tions of simple <Ideas>, which the Mind puts together, without
reference to any real Archetypes, or standing Patterns, existing any
where, <are>, and cannot but be <adequate Ideas>. Because they not 25 
being intended for Copies of Things really existing, but for
Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by,
cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combina-
tion of <Ideas>, and thereby that perfection which the Mind intended
they should: So that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find 30 
nothing wanting. Thus by having the <Idea> of a Figure, with three
sides meeting at three Angles, I have a complete <Idea>, wherein I
require nothing else to make it perfect. That the Mind is satisfied
with the perfection of this its <Idea>, is plain, in that it does not
conceive, that any Understanding hath, or can have a more com- 35 
pleat or perfect <Idea> of that thing it signifies by the word <Triangle>,
                                                               #P 377#
                                                               #L 1#
supposing it to exist, than it self has in that complex <Idea> of three
Sides, and three Angles: in which is contained all that is, or can be
essential to it, or necessary to complete it, where-ever or however
it exists. But in our <Ideas> of <Substances>, it is otherwise. For there
desiring to copy Things, as they really do exist; and to represent 5
to our selves that Constitution, on which all their Properties depend,
we perceive our <Ideas> attain not that Perfection we intend: We find
they still want something, we should be glad were in them; and so
are all <inadequate>. But <mixed Modes> and <Relations>, being Archetypes
without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but them- 10
selves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He
that at first put together the <Idea> of Danger perceived, absence of
disorder from Fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be
done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred
by the danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex <Idea> 15
made up of that Combination: and intending it to be nothing else,
but what it is; nor to have in it any other simple <Ideas>, but what it
hath, it could not also but be an <adequate Idea>: and laying this up in
his Memory, with the name <Courage> annexed to it, to signifie it to
others, and denominate from thence any Action he should observe 20
to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to measure and denominate
Actions by, as they agreed to it. This <Idea> thus made, and laid up
for a Pattern, must necessarily be <adequate>, being referred to nothing
else but it self, nor made by any other Original, but the Good-
liking and Will of him, that first made this Combination.           25
#S 04#. Indeed, another coming after, and in Conversation learning
from him the word <Courage>, may make an <Idea>, to which he gives
that name <Courage>, different from what the first Author applied it
to, and has in his Mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he
designs, that his <Idea> in Thinking, should be conformable to the 30
other's <Idea>, as the Name he uses in speaking, is conformable in
sound to his, from whom he learned it, his <Idea> may be very wrong
and <inadequate>. Because in this case, making the other Man's <Idea>
the pattern of his <Idea> in thinking, as the other Man's Word, or
Sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his <Idea> is so far defective 35
and <inadequate>, as it is distant from the Archetype and Pattern he
referrs it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses
for it, which name he would have to be a sign of the other Man's
<Idea>, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his
#P 378#
#L 1#
own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly corre-
spond, it is faulty and inadequate.
#S 05#. Therefore these <complex> Ideas <of Modes>, when they are
referred by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the <Ideas> in
the Mind of some other intelligent Being, expressed by the Names 5  
we apply to them, they <may be> very deficient, wrong, and <inadequate>.
Because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their
Archetype, and Pattern: In which respect only, any <Idea> of <Modes>
can be wrong, imperfect, or <inadequate>. And on this account, our
<Ideas> of <mixed Modes> are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but 10 
this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing right.
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, What <Ideas we have of Substances>, I have above shewed:
Now those <Ideas> have in the Mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes
they are referred to a supposed real Essence of each Species of
Things. 2. Sometimes they are only design'd to be Pictures and 15 
Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by <Ideas> of
those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways,
these Copies of those Originals, and Archetypes, <are> imperfect and
<inadequate>.
<First>, It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand 20   
for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby
they are of this or that Species: And Names standing for nothing
but the <Ideas>, that are in Men's Minds, they must consequently
referr their <Ideas> to such real Essences, as to their Archetypes. That
Men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught 25 
in this part of the World) do suppose certain specifick Essences of
Substances, which each Individual in its several kind is made con-
formable to, and partakes of, is so far from needing proof, that it will
be thought strange, if any one should do otherwise. And thus they
ordinarily apply the specifick Names, they rank particular Sub- 30 
stances under, to Things, as distinguished by such specifick real
Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it
should be doubted, whether he call'd himself Man, with any other
meaning, than as having the real Essence of a Man? And yet if you
demand, what those real Essences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, 35 
and know them not. From whence it follows, that the <Ideas> they
                                                                #P 379#
                                                                #L 1#
have in their Minds, being referred to real Essences as to Arche-
types which are unknown, must be so far from being <adequate>, that
they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all.
The complex <Ideas> we have of Substances, are, as it has been shewn,
certain Collections of simple <Ideas>, that have been observed or 5
supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex <Idea>
cannot be the real Essence of any Substance; for then the Properties
we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex <Idea>, and
be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be
known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they 10
are discoverable, are deducible from the complex <Idea> of three Lines,
including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex <Ideas> of Sub-
stances, are not contained such <Ideas>, on which all the other Quali-
ties, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common <Idea>
Men have of <Iron>, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and 15
Hardness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is
malleableness. But yet this Property has no necessary connexion
with that complex <Idea>, or any part of it: And there is no more
reason to think, that malleableness depends on that Colour,
Weight, and Hardness, than that that Colour, or that Weight 20
depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of
these real Essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men
should attribute the sorts of Things to such Essences. The particu-
lar parcel of Matter which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is
forwardly, by most Men, supposed to have a real Essence, whereby 25
it is <Gold>; and from whence those Qualities flow, which I find in it,
<viz.> its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardness, Fusibility, Fixedness,
and change of Colour upon a slight touch of Mercury, <etc.> This
Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into
it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the 30
farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but Body,
its real Essence, or internal Constitution, on which these Qualities
depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and Connexion of its
solid Parts; of neither of which, I having any distinct perception at
all, I can have no <Idea> of its Essence, which is the cause that it has 35
that particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than any
thing I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its Colour
#P 380#
#L 1#
changed by the touch of Quicksilver. If any one will say, that the
real Essence, and internal Constitution, on which these Properties
depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arangement or Connexion of
its solid Parts, but something else, call'd its particular form; I am
farther from having any <Idea> of its real Essence, than I was before.  5 
For I have an <Idea> of Figure, Size, and Situation of solid Parts in
general, though I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting
together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mentioned are
produced; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Matter,
that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter, with 10 
which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that something
besides the Figure, Size, and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body,
is its Essence, something called <substantial form>, of that, I confess, I
have no <Idea> at all, but only of the sound <Form>; which is far enough
from an <Idea> of its real Essence, or Constitution. The like ignorance 15 
as I have of the real Essence of this particular Substance, I have also
of the real Essence of all other natural ones: Of which Essences, I
confess, I have no distinct <Ideas> at all; and I am apt to suppose
others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in
themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance. 20 
#S 07#. Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of
Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in use, and denomi-
nate it <Gold>, Do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to
give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies,
having a real internal Essence; by having of which Essence, this 25 
particular Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be called by
that Name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which Things
are marked, as having that Essence, must be referred primarily to
that Essence; and consequently the <Idea> to which that name is
given, must be referred also to that Essence, and be intended to 30 
represent it. Which Essence, since they, who so use the Names,
know not, their Ideas <of Substances> must be <all inadequate> in that
respect, as not containing in them that real Essence, which the
Mind intends they should.
#S 08#. <Secondly>, Those who, neglecting that useless Supposition of 35   
unknown real Essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour
to copy the Substances, that exist in the World, by putting
                                                               #P 381#
                                                               #L 1#
together the <Ideas> of those sensible Qualities, which are found co-
existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of
them, than those who imagine, they know not what real specifick
Essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate <Ideas> of those
Substances, they would thus copy into their Minds: nor do those 5
Copies, exactly, and fully, contain all that is to be found in their
Archetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Substances,
whereof we make their complex <Ideas>, are so many and various, that
no Man's complex <Idea> contains them all. That our abstract <Ideas> of
Substances, do not contain in them all the simple <Ideas>, that are 10
united in the Things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely
put into their complex <Idea> of any Substance, all the simple <Ideas>
they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the
signification of their specifick Names as clear, and as little cumber-
some as they can, they make their specifick <Ideas> of the sorts of 15
Substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple <Ideas> which
are to be found in them: But these having no original precedency, or
right to be put in, and make the specifick <Idea>, more than others
that are left out, 'tis plain, that both these ways, <our> Ideas <of >
<Substances> are deficient, and <inadequate>. The simple <Ideas> whereof we 20
make our complex ones of Substances, are all of them (bating only
the Figure and Bulk of some sorts) Powers; which being Relations to
other Substances, we can never be sure that we know all the Powers,
that are in any one Body, till we have tried what Changes it is fitted to
give to, or receive from other Substances, in their several ways of 25
application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one Body,
much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate <Ideas>
of any Substance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.
#S 09#. Whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance,
we denote by the word <Gold>, could not rationally take the Bulk and 30
Figure be observed in that lump, to depend on its real Essence, or
internal Constitution. Therefore those never went into his <Idea> of
that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight,
were the first be abstracted from it, to make the complex <Idea> of
that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes, 35
after such a manner, and to produce in us that <Idea>, we call Yellow;
and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal bulk, they
being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another,
#P 382#
#L 1#
perhaps, added to these, the <Ideas> of Fusibility, and Fixedness, two
other passive Powers, in relation to the operation of Fire upon it;
Another, its Ductility, and Solubility in <Aqua Regia>, two other
Powers, relating to the operation of other Bodies, in changing its
outward Figure or Separation of it, into insensible Parts. These, or 5  
part of these, put together, usually make the complex <Idea> in Men's
Minds, of that sort of Body we call <Gold>.
#S 10#. But no one, who hath considered the Properties of Bodies in
general, or this sort in particular, can doubt, that this, call'd <Gold>,
has infinite other Properties, not contained in that complex <Idea>. 10 
Some, who have examined this Species more accurately, could, I
believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in <Gold>, all of them
as inseparable from its internal Constitution, as its Colour, or
Weight: And 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties, that
are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred 15 
times as many <Ideas>, go to the complex <Idea> of <Gold>, as any one Man
yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth part of
what is to be discovered in it. The changes that that one Body is
apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due application,
exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to 20 
imagine. Which will not appear so much a Paradox to any one,
who will but consider, how far Men are yet from knowing all
the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a <Triangle>,
though it be no small numbers, that are already by Mathematicians
discovered of it. 25 
#S 11#. So that <all our complex> Ideas <of Substances are> imperfect and
<inadequate>. Which would be so also in mathematical Figures, if we
were to have our complex <Ideas> of them, only by collecting their
Properties, in reference to other Figures. How uncertain, and im-
perfect, would our <Ideas> be of an <Ellipsis>, if we had no other <Idea> of 30 
it, but some few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain <Idea>,
the whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those
Properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are in-
separable from it.
#S 12#. Thus the Mind has three sorts of abstract <Ideas>, or nominal 35   
Essences:
                                                                #P 383#
                                                                #L 1#
<First, Simple> Ideas, which <are > or <Copies>; but yet certainly
<adequate>. Because being intended to express nothing but the power
in Things to produce in the Mind such a Sensation, that Sensation,
when it is produced, cannot but be the Effect of that Power. So the
Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light, (I speak according 5
to the common Notion of Light,) to produce in me the Sensation,
which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of such a Power, in
something without the Mind; since the Mind has not the Power to
produce any such <Idea> in it self, and being meant for nothing else
but the Effect of such a Power, that simple <Idea> is real and <adequate>: 10
the Sensation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that
Power, which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly <adequate> to
that Power; or else, that Power would produce a different <Idea>.
#S 13#. <Secondly>, The <complex> Ideas <of Substances are Ectypes, Copies>
too; but not perfect ones, not <adequate>: which is very evident to the 15
Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of
simple <Ideas> it makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be
sure, that it exactly answers all that are in that Substance. Since
not having tried all the Operations of all other Substances upon it,
and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in 20
other Substances, it cannot have an exact <adequate> Collection of
all its active and passive Capacities; and so <not> have an <adequate>
complex <Idea> of the Powers of any Substance, existing, and its
Relations, which is that sort of complex <Idea> of Substances we have.
And, after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex 25
<Idea>, an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities, or Powers
of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an <Idea> of the
Essence of that Thing. For since the Powers, or Qualities, that are
observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but
depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these 30
Qualities, cannot be the real Essence of that Thing. Whereby it is
plain, that our <Ideas> of Substances are not <adequate>; are not what the
Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no <Idea> of Substance
in general, nor knows what Substance is in it self.
#S 14#. <Thirdly, Complex> Ideas <of Modes and Relations, are> Originals, 35
#P 384#
#L 1#
and <Archetypes>; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any
real Existence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable,
and exactly to answer. These being such Collections of simple <Ideas>,
that the Mind it self puts together, and such Collections, that each
of them contains in it precisely all that the Mind intends it should, 5  
they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so
are designed only for, and belong only to such Modes, as when they
do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex <Ideas>. The
<Ideas> therefore of Modes and Relations, cannot but be <adequate>.

#C 32#                      CHAPTER XXXII

                      <Of True and False> Ideas.

#S 01#. THOUGH Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech, 10 
only to Propositions; yet <Ideas> are oftentimes termed <true or false> (as
what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and
with some deviation from their strict and proper Significations?)
Though, I think, that when <Ideas> themselves are termed true or
false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the 15 
Foundation of that Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the
particular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false.
In all which, we shall find some kind of Affirmation, or Negation,
which is the Reason of that Denomination. For our <Ideas>, being
nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot 20 
properly and simply in themselves be said to be <true> or <false>, no more
than a single Name of any thing, can be said to be <true> or <false>.
#S 02#. Indeed, both <Ideas> and Words, <may> be said to be <true in a>
<metaphysical Sense> of the Word Truth; as all other Things, that any
way exist, are said to be true; <i.e.> really to be such as they exist. 25 
Though in Things called <true>, even in that Sense, there is, perhaps,
a secret reference to our <Ideas>, look'd upon as the Standards of that
Truth, which amounts to a mental Proposition, though it be usually
not taken notice of.
#S 03#. But 'tis not in that metaphysical Sense of Truth, which we 30   
enquire here, when we examine, whether our <Ideas> are capable of
                                                                #P 385#
                                                                #L 1#
being <true> or <false>; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of those
Words: And so I say, that the <Ideas> in our Minds, being only so many
Perceptions, or Appearances there, none of them are <false>. The <Idea>
of a Centaur, having no more Falshood in it, when it appears in
our Minds; than the Name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it is 5
pronounced by our Mouths, or written on Paper. For Truth or
Falshood, lying always in some Affirmation, or Negation, Mental or
Verbal, our <Ideas> are <not capable> any of them <of being false>, till the
Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies
something of them.                                                  10
#S 04#. When-ever the Mind refers any of its <Ideas> to any thing
extraneous to them, they are then <capable to be called true or false>.
Because the Mind in such a reference, makes a tacit Supposition of
their Conformity to that Thing: which Supposition, as it happens
to be <true or false>; so the <Ideas> themselves come to be denominated. 15
The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following:
#S 05#. <First>, When the Mind supposes any <Idea> it has, <conformable to>
that in <other Men's> Minds called by the same common Name; <v.g.>
when the Mind intends, or judges its <Ideas> of <Justice, Temperance>,
<Religion>, to be the same, with what other Men give those Names to. 20
<Secondly>, When the Mind supposes any <Idea> it has in it self, to be
<conformable to some real Existence>. Thus the two <Ideas>, of a Man, and
a Centaur, supposed to be the <Ideas> of real Substances, are the one
<true>, and the other false; the one having a Conformity to what has
really existed; the other not.                                      25
<Thirdly>, When the Mind <refers> any of its <Ideas to> that <real> Constitu-
tion, and <Essence> of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend: and
thus the greatest part, if not all our <Ideas> of Substances, are <false>.
#S 06#. These Suppositions, the Mind is very apt tacitly to make
concerning its own <Ideas>. But yet if we will examine it, we shall find 30
it is chiefly, if not only concerning its abstract complex <Ideas>. For
the natural tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; and
finding that, if it should proceed by, and dwell upon only particular
Things, its Progress would be very slow, and its Work endless:
Therefore to shorten its way to Knowledge, and make each 35
#P 386#
#L 1#
Perception the more comprehensive; the first Thing it does, as
the Foundation of the easier enlarging its Knowledge, either by
Contemplation of the things themselves, that it would know; or
conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles,
and rank them so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of 5  
them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and
so advance by larger steps in that, which is its great Business,
Knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shewed, is the Reason, why
we collect Things under comprehensive <Ideas>, with Names annexed
to them into <Genera> and <Species; i.e.> into kinds, and sorts. 10 
#S 07#. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the
Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to
Knowledge, we shall, I think, find, that the Mind having got any
<Idea>, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or
Discourse, the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a 15 
Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as
containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is
always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that
when any one sees a new Thing of a kind that he knows not, he
presently asks, what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but 20 
the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the
Species, or the Essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the Mark,
and is generally supposed annexed to it.
#S 08#. But this abstract <Idea>, being something in the Mind between
the thing that exists, and the name that is given to it; it is in our 25 
<Ideas>, that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety
or Intelligibleness of our Speaking consists. And hence it is, that
Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract <Ideas> they have
in their Minds, are such, as agree to the Things existing without
them, to which they are referr'd; and are the same also, to which 30 
the Names they give them, do by the Use and Propriety of that
Language belong. For without this <double Conformity of> their <Ideas>,
they find, they should both think amiss of Things in themselves,
and talk of them unintelligibly to others.
#S 09#. <First> then, I say, That <when the Truth of our> Ideas <is judged of>, 35   
<by the Conformity they have to the> Ideas <which other Men have, and com->
<monly signify by the same Name, they may be any of them false>. But yet
<simple> Ideas are <least> of all <liable to be so mistaken>. Because a Man by his




                                                              #P 387#
                                                              #L 1#
Senses and every Day's Observation, may easily satisfy himself,
what the simple <Ideas> are, which their several Names, that are in
common use stand for, they being but few in Number, and such, as
if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the Objects
they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes 5
in his Names of simple <Ideas>; or applies the Name <Red>, to the <Idea> of
Green; or the Name Sweet, to the <Idea> Bitter: Much less are Men
apt to confound the Names of <Ideas>, belonging to different Senses;
and call a Colour, by the Name of a Taste, <etc.> whereby it is evident,
that the simple <Ideas>, they call by any Name, are commonly the 10
same, that others have and mean, when they use the same Names.
#S 10#. <Complex> Ideas <are much more liable to be false in this respect; and>
<the complex> Ideas <of mixed Modes, much more than those of Substances>:
Because in Substances, (especially those, which the common and
unborrowed Names of any Language are applied to,) some remark- 15
able sensible Qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort
from another, easily preserve those, who take any Care in the use
of their Words, from applying them to sorts of Substances, to which
they do not at all belong. But in mixed Modes, we are much more
uncertain, it being not so easy to determine of several Actions; 20
whether they are to be called <Justice>, or <Cruelty; Liberality>, or
<Prodigality>. And so in referring our <Ideas> to those of other Men,
call'd by the same Names, ours may be false; and the <Idea> in our
Minds, which we express by the word <Justice>, may, perhaps, be
that, which ought to have another Name.                          25
#S 11#. But whether or no our <Ideas> of mixed Modes are more
liable than any sort, to be different from those of other Men, which
are marked by the same Names: This at least is certain, That <this>
<sort of Falshood is much more familiarly attributed to> our <Ideas> of <mixed>
<Modes, than to any other>. When a Man is thought to have a false <Idea> 30
of <Justice>, or <Gratitude>, or <Glory>, it is for no other Reason, but that
his agrees not with the <Ideas>, which each of those Names are the
Signs of in other Men.
#S 12#. <The Reason whereof> seems to me to be this, That the abstract
<Ideas> of mixed Modes, being Men's voluntary Combinations of such 35

#P 388#
#L 1#
a precise Collection of simple <Ideas>; and so the Essence of each
Species, being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other
sensible Standard, existing any where, but the Name it self, or the
definition of that Name: We have nothing else to refer these our
<Ideas> of mixed Modes to as a Standard, to which we would conform 5  
them, but the <Ideas> of those, who are thought to use those Names in
their most proper Significations; and so as our <Ideas> conform, or
differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much con-
cerning the <Truth> and <Falshood> of our <Ideas>, in reference to their
Names. 10 
#S 13#. <Secondly>, As to the <Truth and Falshood of our> Ideas, <in reference>
to the <real Existence> of Things, when that is made the Standard of
their Truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our com-
plex <Ideas> of Substances.
#S 14#. <First>, Our simple <Ideas>, being barely such Perceptions, as 15    
God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects
to produce in us by established Laws, and Ways, suitable to his
Wisdom and Goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their
Truth consists in nothing else, but in such Appearances, as are
produced in us, and must be suitable to those Powers, he has placed 20 
in external Objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And
thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, <true>
<Ideas>. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of <Falshood>, if
the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these <Ideas> to be
in the Things themselves. For God in his Wisdom, having set them 25 
as Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able to
discern one Thing from another; and so chuse any of them for our
uses, as we have Occasion, it alters not the Nature of our simple
<Idea>, whether we think, that the <Idea> of Blue, be in the Violet it self,
or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the 30 
Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light, after a certain
Manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Texture in the Object,
by a regular and constant operation, producing the same <Idea> of
Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our Eyes, that from any
other Thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in 35 
the <Violet>, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very

                                                               #P 389#
                                                               #L 1#
Colour, the <Idea> whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance.
And it is equally from that Appearance, to be denominated <Blue>,
whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that
causes in us that <Idea>: Since the Name <Blue> notes properly nothing,
but that Mark of Distinction, that is in a <Violet>, discernible only by 5
our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities
distinctly to know, and, perhaps, would be of less use to us, if we
had Faculties to discern.
#S 15#. Neither would it carry any Imputation of <Falshood> to our
simple <Ideas, if> by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so 10
ordered, That <the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds>
<different> Ideas at the same time; <v.g.> if the <Idea>, that a <Violet> pro-
duced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a <Mari->
<gold> produced in another Man's, and <vice versa^>. For since this could
never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into 15
another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were pro-
duced by those Organs; neither the <Ideas> hereby, nor the Names,
would be at all confounded, or any <Falshood> be in either. For all
Things, that had the Texture of a <Violet>, producing constantly the
<Idea>, which he called <Blue>; and those which had the Texture of a 20
<Marigold>, producing constantly the <Idea>, which he as constantly
called <Yellow>, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he
would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by
those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions,
marked by the Names <Blue> and <Yellow>, as if the Appearances, or 25
<Ideas> in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly
the same, with the <Ideas> in other Men's Minds. I am nevertheless
very apt to think, that the sensible <Ideas>, produced by any Object
in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and un-
discernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many 30
Reasons offered: but that being besides my present Business, I shall
not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the
contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either
for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life;
and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.               35

#P 390#
#L 1#
#S 16#. From what has been said concerning our simple <Ideas>, I
think it evident, That our <simple> Ideas can <none of them> be <false, in>
<respect of Things> existing without us. For the Truth of these Appear-
ances, or Perceptions in our Minds, consisting, as has been said,
only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects, 5  
to produce by our Senses such Appearances in us: and each of them
being in the Mind, such as it is, suitable to the Power that produced
it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that Account, or as
referr'd to such a Pattern, be false. <Blue> or <Yellow, Bitter> or <Sweet>, can
never be false <Ideas>, these Perceptions in the Mind, are just such as 10 
they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce
them; and so are truly, what they are, and are intended to be.
Indeed the Names may be misapply'd: but that in this respect,
makes no Falshood in the <Ideas>: As if a Man ignorant in the <English>
Tongue, should call <Purple, Scarlet>. 15 
#S 17#. <Secondly, Neither can> our <complex> Ideas <of Modes, in reference>
<to the Essence of any Thing really existing, be false>. Because whatever
complex <Idea> I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any
Pattern existing, and made by Nature: it is not supposed to contain
in it any other <Ideas>, than what it hath; nor to represent any thing, 20 
but such a Complication of <Ideas>, as it does. Thus when I have the
<Idea> of such an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himself such
Meat, Drink, and Cloathing, and other Conveniencies of Life, as
his Riches and Estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station
requires, I have no <false Idea>; but such an one as represents an 25 
Action, either as I find, or imagine it; and so is capable of neither
<Truth>, or <Falshood>. But when I give the name <Frugality>, or <Vertue>, to
this Action, then it may be called a <false Idea>, if thereby it be sup-
posed to agree with that <Idea>, to which, in propriety of Speech, the
name of <Frugality> doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, 30 
which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.
#S 18#. <Thirdly>, Our complex <Ideas of Substances, being all referred to>
<Patterns in Things themselves, may be false>. That they are all <false>, when
looked upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of
Things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I 35 
shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider
them as Collections of simple <Ideas> in the Mind, taken from Com-

                                                                #P 391#
                                                                #L 1#
binations of simple <Ideas> existing together constantly in Things, of
which Patterns, they are the supposed Copies: And in this reference
of them, to the existence of Things, they <are false> Ideas. 1. <When>
they put together simple <Ideas>, which in the real Existence of
Things, have no union: as when to the Shape, and Size, that exist 5
together in a Horse, is joined, in the same complex <Idea>, the power
of Barking like a Dog: Which three <Ideas>, however put together into
one in the Mind, were never united in Nature: and this therefore
may be called a false <Idea> of an Horse. 2. <Ideas> of Substances are, in
this respect, also <false>, when from any Collection of simple <Ideas>, 10
that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct
Negation, any other simple <Idea>, which is constantly joined with
them. Thus if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar
Weightiness, and yellow Colour of Gold, any one join in his
Thoughts the Negation of a greater degree of fixedness, than is in 15
Lead or Copper, he may be said to have a false complex <Idea>, as well
as when he joins to those other simple ones, the <Idea> of perfect
absolute Fixedness. For either way, the complex <Idea> of Gold being
made up of such simple ones, as have no union in Nature, may be
termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex <Idea>, that of 20
Fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of
it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be looked on, as an
inadequate and imperfect <Idea>, rather than a <false> one: since though
it contains not all the simple <Ideas>, that are united in Nature, yet it
puts none together, but what do really exist together.              25
#S 19#. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of Speaking,
I have shewed in what sense, and upon what ground our <Ideas> may
be sometimes called <true>, or <false>; yet if we will look a little nearer in-
to the matter in all cases, where any <Idea> is call'd <true>, or <false>, it is
from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is supposed to make, 30
that is <true>, or <false>. For <Truth, or Falshood>, being <never without some>
<Affirmation, or Negation>, Express, or Tacit, it is not to be found, but
where signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement, or
disagreement, of the Things they stand for. The signs we chiefly
use, are either <Ideas>, or Words, wherewith we make either mental, 35
or verbal Propositions. <Truth> lies in so joining, or separating these
Representatives, as the Things they stand for, do, in themselves,
agree, or disagree: and <Falshood> in the contrary, as shall be more
fully shewed hereafter.

#P 392#
#L 1#
#S 20#. Any <Idea> then which we have in our Minds, whether con-
formable, or not, to the existence of Things, or to any <Ideas> in the
Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be called <false>.
For these Representations, if they have nothing in them, but what
is really existing in Things without, cannot be thought <false>, being 5  
exact Representations of something: nor yet if they have any thing
in them, differing from the reality of Things, can they properly be
said to be false Representations, or <Ideas> of Things, they do not
represent. But the mistake and <falshood is>,
#S 21#. <First, When the Mind> having any <Idea>, it <judges> and concludes 10   
<it the same, that is in other Men's Minds, signified by the same name>; or
that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification, or
definition of that Word, when indeed it is not: Which is the most
usual mistake in mixed Modes, though other <Ideas> also are liable
to it. 15 
#S 22#. <Secondly>, When it having a complex <Idea> made up of such a
Collection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, <it judges it>
<to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing>; as when it joins the
weight of Tin, to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of Gold.
#S 23#. <Thirdly>, When in its complex <Idea>, it has united a certain 20 
number of simple <Ideas>, that do really exist together in some sorts of
Creatures, but has also left out others, as much inseparable, <it judges>
<this to be a perfect complete> Idea, <0f a sort of things which really it is not>;
<v.g.> having joined the <Ideas> of substance, yellow, malleable, most
heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex <Idea> to be the complete 25 
<Idea> of Gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in <Aqua>
<Regia> are as inseparable from those other <Ideas>, or Qualities of that
Body, as they are one from another.
#S 24#. <Fourthly>, The Mistake is yet greater, <when I judge, that this>
<complex> Idea, <contains in it the real Essence of any Body existing>; when at 30 
least it contains but some few of those Properties, which flow from
its real Essence and Constitution. I say, only some few of those
Properties; for those Properties consisting mostly in the active and

                                                                #P 393#
                                                                #L 1#
passive Powers, it has, in reference to other Things, all that are
vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex <Idea> of
that kind of Things is usually made, are but a very few, in com-
parison of what a Man, that has several ways tried and examined
it, knows of that one sort of Things; and all that the most expert 5
Man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that
Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution. The
essence of a Triangle, lies in a very little compass, consists in a very
few <Ideas>; three Lines including a Space, make up that Essence: But
the Properties that flow from this Essence, are more than can be 10
easily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Substances, their
real Essences lie in a little compass; though the Properties flowing
from that internal Constitution, are endless.
#S 25#. To conclude, a Man having no notion of any Thing with-
out him, but by the <Idea> he has of it in his Mind (which <Idea>, he has 
a power to call by what Name he pleases) he may, indeed, make an
<Idea> neither answering the reality of Things, nor agreeing to the
<Ideas> commonly signified by other Peoples Words; but cannot make
a wrong, or <false Idea> of a Thing, which is no otherwise known to
him, but by the <Idea> he has of it. <v.g.> When I frame an <Idea> of the 20
Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse's Head and
Neck, I do not make a <false Idea> of any thing; because it represents
nothing without me. But when I call it a <Man>, or <Tartar>, and ima-
gine it either to represent some real Being without me, or to lie the
same <Idea>, that others call by the same name; in either of these 25
cases, I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be
termed a <false Idea>; though, indeed, the <falshood> lie not in the <Idea>,
but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a conformity and
resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having
framed such an <Idea> in my Mind, without thinking, either that 30
Existence, or the name Man or <Tartar>, belongs to it, I will call it
<Man>, or <Tartar>, I may be justly thought fantastical in the Naming;
but not erroneous in any Judgment; nor the <Idea> any way <false>.
#S 26#. Upon the whole matter, I think, That our <Ideas>, as they are
considered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper signifi- 
cation of their Names; or in reference to the reality of Things, <may>

#P 394#
#L 1#
very fitly <be called right, or wrong> Ideas, according as they agree, or
disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one
had rather call them <true>, or <false>, 'tis fit he use a liberty which every
one has, to call Things by those Names he thinks best; though in
propriety of Speech, <Truth>, or <Falshood>, will, I think, scarce agree to 5   
them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them
some mental Proposition. The <Ideas> that are in a Man's Mind,
simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein
inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other <Ideas> are in them-
selves right; and the knowledge about them right and true Know- 
ledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their
Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as
far as they disagree with such Archetypes.


#C 33#                      CHAPTER XXXIII

                     <Of the Association of> Ideas.

#S 01#. THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that
seems odd to him, and is in it self really Extravagant in the Opinions, 15  
Reasonings, and Actions of other Men. The least flaw of this kind,
if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to
espie in another, and will by the Authority of Reason forwardly
condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in
his own Tenets and Conduct, which he never perceives, and will 20  
very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.
#S 02#. This proceeds not wholly from Self-love, though that has
often a great hand in it. Men of fair Minds, and not given up to the
over weening of Self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in
many Cases one with amazement hears the Arguings, and is 25  
astonish'd at the Obstinacy of a worthy Man, who yields not to the
Evidence of Reason, though laid before him as clear as Day-light.
#S 03#. This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to Edu-
cation and Prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though

                                                                 #P 395#
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that reaches not the bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly
enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly
assigned for the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general Name for the
thing it self: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther who
would trace this sort of Madness to the root it springs from, and 5
so explain it, as to shew whence this flaw has its Original in very
sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists.
#S 04#. I shall be pardon'd for calling it by so harsh a name as
<Madness>, when it is considered, that opposition to Reason deserves
that Name, and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free 10
from it, but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as
in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for
<Bedlam>, than Civil Conversation. I do not here mean when he is
under the power of an unruly Passion, but in the steady calm
course of his Life. That which will yet more apologize for this 15
harsh Name, and ungrateful Imputation on the greatest part of
Mankind is, that enquiring a little by the bye into the Nature of
#S 13#. I found it to spring from the very same
Root, and to depend on the very same Cause we are here speaking
of. This consideration of the thing it self, at a time when I thought 20
not the least on the Subject which I am now treating of, suggested
it to me. And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if
this be a Taint which so universally infects Mankind, the greater
care should be taken to lay it open under its due Name, thereby to
excite the greater care in its Prevention and Cure.                 25
#S 05#. Some of our <Ideas> have a natural Correspondence and Con-
nexion one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our
Reason to trace these, and hold them together in that Union and
Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides
this there is another Connexion of <Ideas> wholly owing to Chance or 30
Custom; <Ideas> that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so
united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them,
they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time
comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it;
and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole 35
gang always inseparable shew themselves together.

#P 396#
#L 1#
#S 06#. This strong Combination of <Ideas>, not ally'd by Nature, the
Mind makes in it self either voluntarily, or by chance, and hence
it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their
different Inclinations, Educations, Interests, <etc.> Custom settles
habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining 5   
in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but
Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going con-
tinue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often
treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes
easy and as it were Natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, 10  
thus <Ideas> seem to be produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this
may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual
train, when once they are put into that tract, as well as it does to
explain such Motions of the Body. A Musician used to any Tune
will find that let it but once begin in his Head, the <Ideas> of the 15  
several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Under-
standing without any care or attention, as regularly as his Fingers
move orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune
he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a
wandering. Whether the natural cause of these <Ideas>, as well as of 20  
that regular Dancing of his Fingers be the Motion of his Animal
Spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever by this Instance
it appears to be so: But this may help us a little to conceive of
Intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of <Ideas>.
#S 07#. That there are such Associations of them made by Custom in 25    
the Minds of most Men, I think no Body will question who has well
consider'd himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly
attributed most of the Sympathies and Antipathies observable in
Men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular Effects as if
they were Natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first 30  
had no other Original but the accidental Connexion of two <Ideas>,
which either the strength of the first Impression, or future In-
dulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company
together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one <Idea>. I say
most of the Antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly 35  
Natural, depend upon our original Constitution, and are born with

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us; but a great part of those which are counted Natural, would have
been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early Im-
pressions, or wanton Phancies at first, which would have been
acknowledged the Original of them if they had been warily ob-
served. A grown Person surfeiting with Honey, no sooner hears 5
the Name of it, but his Phancy immediately carries Sickness and
Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very <Idea> of it; other
<Ideas> of Dislike and Sickness, and Vomiting presently accompany it,
and he is disturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weak-
ness, and can tell how he got this Indisposition: Had this happen'd 10
to him, by an over dose of Honey, when a Child, all the same
Effects would have followed, but the Cause would have been mis-
taken, and the Antipathy counted Natural.
#S 08#. I mention this not out of any great necessity there is in this
present Argument, to distinguish nicely between Natural and 15
Acquired Antipathies, but I take notice of it for another purpose,
<viz.>) that those who have Children, or the charge of their Edu-
cation, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and
carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of <Ideas> in the Minds of
young People. This is the time most susceptible of lasting Im- 
pressions, and though those relating to the Health of the Body, are
by discreet People minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt,
that those which relate more peculiarly to the Mind, and terminate
in the understanding, or Passions, have been much less heeded than
the thing deserves; may, those relating purely to the Understanding 25
have, as I suspect, been by most Men wholly over-look'd.
#S 09#. This wrong Connexion in our Minds of <Ideas> in themselves,
loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is
of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as
Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that, per- 
haps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked
after.
#S 10#. The <Ideas> of <Goblines> and <Sprights> have really no more to do
with Darkness than Light; yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these

#P 398#
#L 1#
often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly
he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but
Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful <Ideas>,
and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than
the other. 5   
#S 11#. A Man receives a sensible Injury from another, thinks on
the Man and that Action over and over, and by ruminating on them
strongly, or much in his Mind, so cements those two <Ideas> together,
that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the Man, but the
Pain and Displeasure he suffered comes into his Mind with it, so 10  
that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for
the one as the other. Thus Hatreds are often begotten from slight
and almost innocent Occasions, and Quarrels propagated and con-
tinued in the World.
#S 12#. A Man has suffered Pain or Sickness in any Place, he saw 15   
his Friend die in such a Room; though these have in Nature nothing
to do one with another, yet when the <Idea> of the Place occurs to his
Mind, it brings (the Impression being once made) that of the Pain
and Displeasure with it, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as
little bear the one as the other. 20  
#S 13#. When this Combination is settled and whilst it lasts, it is
not in the power of Reason to help us, and relieve us from the
Effects of it. <Ideas> in our Minds, when they are there, will operate
according to their Natures and Circumstances; and here we see the
cause why Time cures certain Affections, which Reason, though in 25  
the right, and allow'd to be so, has not power over, nor is able
against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in
other cases. The Death of a Child, that was the daily delight of his
Mother's Eyes, and joy of her Soul, rends from her Heart the whole
comfort of her Life, and gives her all the torment imaginable; use 30  
the Consolations of Reason in this case, and you were as good preach
Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Discourses,
the Pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse
separated the sense of that Enjoyment and its loss from the <Idea> of
the Child returning to her Memory, all Representations, though 35  
never so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the

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                                                                 #L 1#
union between these <Ideas> is never dissolved, spend their Lives in
Mourning, and carry an incurable Sorrow to their Graves.
#S 14#. A Friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of Madness by
a very harsh and offensive Operation. The Gentleman, who was
thus recovered, with great sense of Gratitude and Acknowledg- 
ment, owned the Cure all his Life after, as the greatest Obligation he
could have received; but whatever Gratitude and Reason suggested
to him, he could never bear the sight of the Operator: That Image
brought back with it the <Idea> of that Agony which he suffer'd from
his Hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.  10
#S 15#. Many Children imputing the Pain they endured at School
to their Books they were corrected for, so joyn those <Ideas> together,
that a Book becomes their Aversion, and they are never reconciled
to the study and use of them all their Lives after; and thus Reading
becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might 15
have made the great Pleasure of their Lives. There are Rooms con-
venient enough, that some Men cannot Study in, and fashions of
Vessels, which though never so clean and commodious they cannot
Drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental <Ideas> which are
annex'd to them, and make them offensive; and who is there that 20
hath not observed some Man to flag at the appearance, or in the
company of some certain Person not otherwise superior to him, but
because having once on some occasion got the Ascendant, the <Idea>
of Authority and Distance goes along with that of the Person, and
he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them.       25
#S 16#. Instances of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if
I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a
young Gentleman, who having learnt to Dance, and that to great
Perfection, there happened to stand an old Trunk in the Room
where he learnt. The <Idea> of this remarkable piece of Houshold- 
stuff, had so mixed it self with the turns and steps of all his Dances,
that though in that Chamber he could Dance excellently well, yet it
was only whilst that Trunk was there, nor could he perform well in
any other place, unless that, or some such other Trunk had its due
position in the Room. If this Story shall be suspected to be dressed 35

#P 400#
#L 1#
up with some comical Circumstances, a little beyond precise
Nature; I answer for my self, that I had it some Years since from a
very sober and worthy Man, upon his own knowledge, as I report
it; and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive Persons, who read
this, who have not met with Accounts, if not Examples of this   5 
Nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.
#S 17#. Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted are not
less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the <Ideas> of
Being and Matter be strongly joined either by Education or much
Thought, whilst these are still combined in the Mind, what Notions,  10 
what Reasonings, will there be about separate Spirits? Let custom
from the very Childhood have join'd Figure and Shape to the <Idea> of
God, and what Absurdities will that Mind be liable to about the
Deity?
Let the <Idea> of Infallibility be inseparably join'd to any Person,  15 
and these two constantly together possess the Mind, and then one
Body in two Places at once, shall unexamined be swallowed for a
certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, when ever that imagin'd in-
fallible Person dictates and demands assent without enquiry.
#S 18#. Some such wrong and unnatural Combinations of <Ideas>  20   
will be found to establish the Irreconcilable opposition between
different Sects of Philosophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine
every one of their Followers to impose wilfully on himself, and
knowingly refuse Truth offer'd by plain Reason. Interest, though it
does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole 25  
Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one
of them to a Man should knowingly maintain Falshood: Some at
least must be allow'd to do what all pretend to, <i.e.> to pursue Truth
sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their
Understandings, and makes them not see the falshood of what 30  
they embrace for real Truth. That which thus captivates their
Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Sence,
will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are speaking of: some
independent <Ideas>, of no alliance to one another, are by Education,
Custom, and the constant din of their Party, so coupled in their 35  
Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no
more separate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one

                                                                 #P 401#
                                                                 #L 1#
<Idea>, and they operate as if they were so. This gives Sence to
<Jargon>, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Non-
sense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost sa1d, of all
the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the
most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders Men from 5
seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoin'd,
appear to the sight constantly united; if the Eye sees these things
rivetted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mis-
takes that follow in two <Ideas>, that they have been accustom'd so to
join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am 10
apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst
they are under the deceit of it, makes them uncapable of Con-
viction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for
Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the con-
fusion of two different <Ideas>, which a customary connexion of them 15
in their Minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their Heads
with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.

#S 19#. Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and
extent of our <Ideas>, with several other Considerations, about these 20
I know not whether I may say) Instruments, or Materials, of our
Knowledge, the method I at first proposed to my self, would now
require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what use the
understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by
them. This was that, which, in the first general view I had of this 25
Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a
nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between
<Ideas> and Words; and our abstract <Ideas>, and general Words, have
so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to
speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists  30
in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and
Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of
the next Book.
#P 402#
#B 3#                       BOOK III
#C 01#                      CHAPTER I

                   <Of Words or Language in General>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. GOD having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him
not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellow-
ship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with
Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye
of Society. <Man> therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned,   5 
as to be <fit to frame articulate Sounds>, which we call Words. But this
was not enough to produce Language; for Parrots, and several other
Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough,
which yet, by no means, are capable of Language.
#S 02#. Besides articulate  Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, 10    
that he should be <able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions>;
and to make them stand as marks for the <Ideas> within his own Mind,
whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of
Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another.
#S 03#. But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as 15    
they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of Language,
that Sounds can be made signs of <Ideas>, unless those <signs> can be so
made use of, as <to comprehend several particular Things>: For the multi-
plication of Words would have perplexed their use, had every
particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To 20  
remedy this inconvenience, Language had yet a farther improve-
ment in the use of general Terms, whereby one word was made to
mark a multitude of particular existences: Which advantageous use
of Sounds was obtain'd only by the difference of the <Ideas> they were
made signs of. Those names becoming general, which are made to 25  
stand for general <Ideas>, and those remaining particular, where the
<Ideas> they are used for are particular.

                                                                #P 403#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 04#. Besides these Names which stand for <Ideas>, there be other
words which Men make use of, not to signify any <Idea>, but the want
or absence of some <Ideas> simple or complex, or all <Ideas> together; such
as are <Nihil> in Latin, and in English, <Ignorance> and <Barrenness>. All
which negative or privative Words, cannot be said properly to 5
belong to, or signify no <Ideas>: for then they would be perfectly
insignificant Sounds; but they relate to positive <Ideas>, and signify
their absence.
#S 05#. It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our
Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how great a dependance our 10
<Words> have on common sensible <Ideas>; and how those, which are
made use of to stand for Actions and Notions quite removed from
sense, <have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible> Ideas <are>
<transferred to more abstruse significations>, and made to stand for <Ideas>
that come not under the cognizance of our senses; <v.g.> to <Imagine>, 15
<Apprehend, Comprehend, Adhere, Conceive, Instill, Disgust, Disturbance>,
<Tranquillity>, etc. are all Words taken from the Operations of sensible
Things, and applied to certain Modes of Thinking. <Spirit>, in its
primary signification, is Breath; <Angel>, a Messenger: And I doubt
not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in 20
all Languages, the names, which stand for Things that fall not under
our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible <Ideas>. By which
we may give some kind of guess, what kind of Notions they were,
and whence derived, which filled their Minds, who were the first
Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of 25
Things, unawares suggested to Men the Originals and Principles
of all their Knowledge: whilst, to give Names, that might make
known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other
<Ideas>, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow
Words from ordinary known <Ideas> of Sensation, by that means to 30
make others the more easily to conceive those Operations they
experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible
appearances; and then when they had got known and agreed
Names, to signify those internal Operations of their own Minds,

#P 404#
#L 1#
they were sufficiently furnished to make known by Words, all their
other <Ideas>; since they could consist of nothing, but either of out-
ward sensible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their
Minds about them; we having, as has been proved, no <Ideas> at all,
but what originally come either from sensible Objects without, or 5   
what we feel within our selves, from the inward Workings of our
own Spirits, which we are conscious to our selves of within.
#S 06#. But to understand better the use and force of Language, as
subservient to Instruction and Knowledge, it will be convenient to
consider, 10  
      <First, To what it is that Names, in the use of Language, are immediately>
<applied>.
      <Secondly>, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and so
stand not particularly for this or that single Thing; but for sorts
and ranks of Things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next 15  
place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin
Names, <what the Species and Genera of Things> are; wherein they con-
sist; and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought)
well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of
Words; the natural Advantages and Defects of Language; and the 20  
remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniencies of
obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of Words, without
which, it is impossible to discourse with any clearness, or order,
concerning Knowledge:  Which being conversant about Pro-
positions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater 25  
connexion with Words, than perhaps is suspected.
      These Considerations therefore, shall be the matter of the follow-
ing Chapters.

#C 02#                      CHAPTER II

                    <Of the Signification of Words>.

#S 01#. MAN, though he have great variety of Thoughts, and such,
from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and 30 

                                                                #P 405#
                                                                #L 1#
Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden
from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort,
and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Com-
munication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find
out some external sensible Signs, whereby those invisible <Ideas>, 5
which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to
others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for Plenty or
Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with so much Ease
and Variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive
how <Words>, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, 10
come to be made use of by Men, as <the Signs of> their <Ideas>; not by
any natural connexion, that there is between particular articulate
Sounds and certain <Ideas>, for then there would be but one Lan-
guage amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby
such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an <Idea>. The use 
then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of <Ideas>; and the <Ideas> they
stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification.
#S 02#. The use Men have of these Marks, being either to record
their own Thoughts for the Assistance of their own Memory; or as
it were, to bring out their <Ideas>, and lay them before the view of 20
others:  <Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for>
<nothing, but the> Ideas <in the Mind of him that uses them>, how imperfectly
soever, or carelesly those <Ideas> are collected from the Things,
which they are supposed to represent. When a Man speaks to
another, it is, that he may be understood; and the end of Speech is, 25
that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his <Ideas> to the
Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the <Ideas> of
the Speaker: Nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately
to any thing else, but the <Ideas>, that he himself hath: For this would
be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them 30
to other <Ideas>; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs
of h1s <Ideas> at the same time; and so in effect, to have no Signifi-
cation at all. Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be volun-
tary Signs imposed by him on Things he knows not. That would be

#P 406#
#L 1#
to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A
Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things,
or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in
his own. Till he has some <Ideas> of his own, he cannot suppose them
to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can he use 5   
any Signs for them: For thus they would be the Signs of he knows
not what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing. But when
he represents to himself other Men's <Ideas>, by some of his own, if he
consent to give them the same Names, that other Men do, 'tis still
to his own <Ideas>; to <Ideas> that he has, and not to <Ideas> that he has not. 10  
#S 03#. This is so necessary in the use of Language, that in this
respect, the Knowing, and the Ignorant; the Learned, and Un-
learned, use the <Words> they speak (with any meaning) all alike.
They, <in every Man's Mouth, stand for the> Ideas <he has>, and which he
would express by them. A Child having taken notice of nothing in 15  
the Metal he hears called Gold, but the bright shining yellow colour,
he applies the Word Gold only to his own <Idea> of that Colour, and
nothing else; and therefore calls the same Colour in a Peacocks
Tail, Gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining
yellow, great Weight: And then the Sound Gold, when he uses it, 20  
stands for a complex <Idea> of a shining Yellow and very weighty
Substance. Another adds to those Qualities, Fusibility: and then
the Word Gold to him signifies a Body, bright, yellow, fusible, and
very heavy. Another adds Malleability. Each of these uses equally
the Word Gold, when they have Occasion to express the <Idea>, 25  
which they have apply'd it to: But it is evident, that each can apply
it only to his own <Idea>; nor can he make it stand, as a Sign of such a
complex <Idea>, as he has not.
#S 04#. But though Words, as they are used by Men, can properly
and immediately signify nothing but the <Ideas>, that are in the Mind 30  
of the Speaker; yet they in their Thoughts give them a secret
reference to two other things.
      <First, they suppose their Words to be Marks of the> Ideas <in the Minds>
<also of other Men, with whom they communicate>: For else they should
talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the Sounds they applied 35  
to one <Idea>, were such, as by the Hearer, were applied to another,

                                                               #P 407#
                                                               #L 1#
which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men stand not usu-
ally to examine, whether the <Idea> they, and those they discourse
with have in their Minds, be the same: But think it enough, that
they use the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of
that Language; in which case they suppose, that the <Idea>, they make 5
it a Sign of, is precisely the same, to which the Understanding Men
of that Country apply that Name.
#S 05#. <Secondly>, Because <Men> would not be thought to talk <barely> of
their own Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; therefore
they <often suppose their Words to stand also for the reality of Things>. But 10
this relating more particularly to Substances, and their Names, as
perhaps the former does to simple <Ideas> and Modes, we shall speak
of these two different ways of applying Words more at large, when
we come to treat of the Names of mixed Modes, and Substances, in
particular: Though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting 15
the use of Words, and brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion
into their Signification, whenever we make them stand for any
thing, but those <Ideas> we have in our own Minds.
#S 06#. Concerning Words also it is farther to be considered. <First>,
That they being immediately the Signs of Mens <Ideas>; and, by that 20
means, the Instruments whereby Men communicate their Con-
ceptions, and express to one another those Thoughts and Imagina-
tions, they have within their own Breasts, <there comes by constant use>,
to be such <a Connexion between certain Sounds, and the> Ideas <they stand for>,
that the Names heard, almost as readily excite certain <Ideas>, as if the 25
Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually
affect the Senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible
Qualities; and in all Substances, that frequently, and familiarly
occur to us.
#S 07#. <Secondly>, That though the proper and immediate Signifi- 
cation of Words, are <Ideas> in the Mind of the Speaker; yet because
by familiar use from our Cradles, we come to learn certain articu-
late Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues,
and always at hand in our Memories; but yet are not always careful
to examine, or settle their Significations perfectly, it <often> happens 35
that <Men>, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive

#P 408#
#L 1#
Consideration, do <set their Thoughts more on Words than Things>. Nay,
because Words are many of them learn'd, before the <Ideas> are known
for which they stand: Therefore some, not only Children, but Men,
speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do, only because
they have learn'd them, and have been accustomed to those Sounds.   5 
But so far as Words are of Use and Signification, so far is there a
constant connexion between the Sound and the <Idea>; and a Desig-
nation, that the one stand for the other: without which Application
of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise.
#S 08#. <Words> by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to 10    
excite in Men certain <Ideas>, so constantly and readily, that they are
apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. But that they
<signify> only Men's peculiar <Ideas>, and that <by a perfectly arbitrary>
<Imposition>, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even
that use the same Language) the same <Ideas>, we take them to be 15  
the Signs of: And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make
Words stand for what <Ideas> he pleases, that no one hath the Power
to make others have the same <Ideas> in their Minds, that he has,
when they use the same Words, that he does. And therefore the
great <Augustus> himself, in the Possession of that Power which ruled 20  
the World, acknowledged, he could not make a new Latin Word:.
which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint,
what <Idea> any Sound should be a Sign of, in the Mouths and com-
mon Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common use, by a tacit
Consent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain <Ideas> in all Lan-
guages, which so far limits the signification of that Sound, that
unless a Man applies it to the same <Idea>, he does not speak properly:
And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the same <Ideas> in
the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not
speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any Man's 30  
using of Words differently, either from their general Meaning, or
the particular Sense of the Person to whom he addresses them, this
is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his
<Ideas>, and they can be Signs of nothing else.
#P 409#
#C 03#                   CHAPTER III

                     <Of General Terms>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. ALL Things, that exist, being Particulars, it may perhaps be
thought reasonable, that Words, which ought to be conformed to
Things, should be so too, I mean in their Signification: but yet we
find the quite contrary. The far <greatest part of Words>, that make all
Languages, <are general Terms>: which has not been the Effect of 5
Neglect, or Chance, but of Reason, and Necessity.
#S 02#. First, <It is impossible, that every particular Thing should have a>
<distinct peculiar Name>. For the signification and use of Words,
depending on that connexion, which the Mind makes between its
<Ideas>, and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them, it is necessary, in 10
the Application of Names to things, that the Mind should have
distinct <Ideas> of the Things, and retain also the particular Name
that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that
<Idea>. But it is beyond the Power of humane Capacity to frame and
retain distinct <Ideas> of all the particular Things we meet with: every 15
Bird, and Beast Men saw; every Tree, and Plant, that affected the
Senses, could not find a place in the most capacious Understanding.
If it be looked on, as an instance of a prodigious Memory, That some
Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army, by his
proper Name: We may easily find a Reason, why Men have never 20
attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that
flies over their Heads; much less to call every Leaf of Plants, or
Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.
#S 03#. <Secondly>, If it were possible, <it would yet be useless>; because it
would not serve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain 25
heap up Names of particular Things, that would not serve them to
communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and use them in
Talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then
only done, when by Use or Consent, the Sound I make by the
Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who hears it, the 30
<Idea> I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by

#P 410#
#L 1#
Names, applied to particular Things, whereof I alone having the
<Ideas> in my mind, the Names of them could not be significant, or
intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very
particular Things, which had fallen under my Notice.
#S 04#. <Thirdly>, But yet granting this also feasible; (which I think is 5     
not,) yet <a distinct Name for every particular Thing, would not be of any>
<great use for the improvement of Knowledge>: which though founded
in particular Things, enlarges it self by general Views; to which,
Things reduced into sorts under general Names, are properly
subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come 10  
within some compass, and do not multiply every Moment, beyond
what, either the Mind can contain, or Use requires. And therefore
in these Men have for the most part stopp'd: but yet not so, as
to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by
appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And there- 15  
fore in their own Species, which they have most to do with, and
wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons;
they make use of proper Names, and there distinct Individuals have
distinct Denominations.
#S 05#. Besides Persons, Countries also, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, 20    
and other the like Distinctions of Place, have usually found peculiar
Names, and that for the same Reason; they being such as Men have
often an Occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before
others in their Discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we
had Reason to mention particular Horses, as often as we have to 25  
mention particular Men, we should have <proper Names> for the one,
as familiar as for the other; and <Bucephalus> would be a Word as much
in use, as <Alexander>. And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys,
Horses have their proper Names to be known and distinguished by,
as commonly as their Servants: Because amongst them, there is 30  
often Occasion to mention this or that particular Horse, when he is
out of Sight.
#S 06#. The next thing to be considered is, <how general Words come to>
<be made>. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how
come we by general Terms, or where find we those general Natures 35  
they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being

                                                                #P 411#
                                                                #L 1#
made the signs of general <Ideas>: and <Ideas> become general, by
separating from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and
any other <Ideas>, that may determine them to this or that particular
Existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of
representing more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it 5
a conformity to that abstract <Idea>, is (as we call it) of that sort.
#S 07#. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps
be amiss, to trace our Notions, and Names, from their beginning,
and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we
enlarge our <Ideas> from our first Infancy. There is nothing more 10
evident, than that the <Ideas> of the Persons Children converse with,
to instance in them alone,) are like the Persons themselves, only
particular. The <Ideas> of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed
in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only
those Individuals. The Names they first give to them, are confined 15
to these Individuals; and the Names of <Nurse> and <Mamma>, the Child
uses, determine themselves to those Persons. Afterwards, when time
and a larger Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are
a great many other Things in the World, that in some common
agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their 20
Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they
frame an <Idea>, which they find those many Particulars do partake
in; and to that they give, with others, the name <Man>, for Example.
And <thus they come to have a general Name>, and a general <Idea>. Wherein
they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex <Idea> 25
they had of <Peter> and <James, Mary> and <Jane>, that which is peculiar
to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
#S 08#. By the same way, that they come by the general Name and
<Idea> of <Man>, they easily <advance to more general Names> and Notions.
For observing, that several Things that differ from their <Idea> of 30
<Man>, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name,
have yet certain Qualities, wherein they agree with <Man>, by
retaining only those Qualities, and uniting them into one <Idea>,
they have again another and a more general <Idea>; to which having
given a Name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension: 35
Which new <Idea> is made, not by any new addition, but only,
as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other Properties

#P 412#
#L 1#
signified by the name <Man>, and retaining only a Body, with Life,
Sense, and spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the Name
<Animal>.
#S 09#. That this is the <way, whereby Men first formed general> Ideas,
<and general Names to them>, I think, is so evident, that there needs no 5   
other proof of it, but the considering of a Man's self, or others, and
the ordinary proceedings of their Minds in Knowledge: And he that
thinks general Natures or Notions, are any thing else but such
abstract and partial <Ideas> of more complex ones, taken at first from
particular Existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. 10  
For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his <Idea> of
<Man> differ from that of <Peter>, and <Paul>; or his <Idea> of <Horse>, from that
of <Bucephalus>, but in the leaving out something, that is peculiar to
each Individual; and retaining so much of those particular complex
<Ideas>, of several particular Existences, as they are found to agree 15  
in? Of the complex <Ideas>, signified by the names <Man>, and <Horse>,
leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining
only those wherein they agree, and of those, making a new distinct
complex <Idea>, and giving the name <Animal> to it, one has a more
general term, that comprehends, with Man, several other Creatures. 20  
Leave out of the <Idea> of <Animal>, Sense and spontaneous Motion, and
the remaining complex <Idea>, made up of the remaining simple ones
of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under
the more comprehensive term, <Vivens>. And not to dwell longer
upon this particular, so evident in it self, by the same way the Mind 25  
proceeds to <Body, Substance>, and at last to <Being, Thing>, and such
universal terms, which stand for any of our <Ideas> whatsoever. To
conclude, this whole <mystery> of <Genera> and <Species>, which make such
a noise in the Schools, and are, with Justice, so little regarded out
of them, is nothing else but abstract <Ideas>, more or less comprehen-   
sive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant
and unvariable, That every more general term, stands for such an
<dea>, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.
#S 10#. This may shew us the reason, <why, in the defining of Words>,
which is nothing but declaring their signification, <we make use of the> 35  
<Genus>, or next general Word that comprehends it. Which is not out

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of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several
simple <Ideas>, which the next general Word, or <Genus>, stands for;
or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But
though defining by <Genus> and <Differentia>, (I crave leave to use these
terms of Art, though originally Latin, since they most properly 5
suit those Notions they are applied to;) I say, though defining by
the <Genus> be the shortest way; yet, I think, it may be doubted,
whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not
absolutely necessary. For Definition being nothing but making
another understand by Words, what <Idea>, the term defined stands 10
for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple <Ideas>
that are combined in the signification of the term Defined: and if
instead of such an enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves
to use the next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or
for greater clearness; but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I 15
think, that to one who desired to know what <Idea> the word <Man>
stood for; if it should be said, that <Man> was a solid extended Sub-
stance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of
Reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the term Man, would be
as well understood, and the <Idea> it stands for be at least as clearly 20
made known, as when it is defined to be a <rational Animal>; which by
the several definitions of <Animal, Vivens>, and <Corpus>, resolves it self
into those enumerated <Ideas>. I have in explaining the term <Man>,
followed here the ordinary Definition of the Schools: which though,
perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present 25
purpose. And one may in this instance, see what gave occasion to the
Rule, that a Definition must consist of <Genus>, and <Differentia>: and it
suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a Rule, or
advantage in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been
said, being only the explaining of one Word, by several others, so 30
that the meaning, or <Idea> it stands for, may be certainly known,
Languages are not always so made, according to the Rules of
Logick, that every term can have its signification, exactly and
clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us
to the contrary; or else those who have made this Rule, have done 35
ill, that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it.
But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

#P 414#
#L 1#
#S 11#. To return to general Words, it is plain, by what has been
said, That <General and Universal>, belong not to the real existence of
Things; but <are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding>, made
by it for its own use, <and concern only Signs>, whether Words, or <Ideas>.
Words are general, as has been said, when used, for Signs of general 5   
<Ideas>; and so are applicable indifferently to many particular Things;
And <Ideas> are general, when they are set up, as the Representatives
of many particular Things: but universality belongs not to things
themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence, even
those Words, and <Ideas>, which in their signification, are general. 10  
When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that rest, are only
Creatures of our own making, their general Nature being nothing
but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding, of signi-
fying or representing many particulars. For the signification they
have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of Man is added 15  
to them.
#S 12#. The next thing therefore to be considered, is, <What kind of>
<signification it is, that general Words have>. For as it is evident, that they
do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not
be general Terms, but proper Names: so on the other side, 'tis as 20  
evident, they do not signify a plurality; for Man and Men would
then signify the same; and the distinction of numbers (as Gram-
marians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then
which general Words signify, is a sort of Things; and each of them
does that, by being a sign of an abstract <Idea> in the mind, to which 25  
<Idea>, as Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be
ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort.
Whereby it is evident, that the <Essences of> the <sorts, or> (if the Latin
word pleases better) <Species> of Things, are nothing else but these
abstract <Ideas>. For the having the Essence of any Species, being that 30  
which makes any thing to be of that Species, and the conformity to
the <Idea>, to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a
right to that name, the having the Essence, and the having that
Conformity, must needs be the same thing: Since to be of any

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                                                                 #L 1#
Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one.
As for Example, to be a <Man>, or of the Species <Man>, and to have a
right to the name <Man>, is the same thing. Again, to be a <Man>, or of
the Species <Man>, and have the Essence of a <Man>, is the same thing.
Now since nothing can be a <Man>, or have a right to the name <Man>, 5
but what has a conformity to the abstract <Idea> the name <Man> stands
for; nor any thing be a Man, or have a right to be of the Species
<Man>, but what has the Essence of that Species, it follows, that the
abstract <Idea>, for which the name stands, and the Essence of the
Species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that 10
the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of
Things, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, since it is the
Understanding that abstracts and makes those general <Ideas>.
#S 13#. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny,
that Nature in the Production of Things, makes several of them 15
alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of
Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we
may say, the <sorting> of them under Names, <is the Workmanship of the>
<Understanding, taking occasion from the similitude> it observes amongst
them, to make abstract general <Ideas>, and set them up in the mind, 20
with Names annexed to them, as Patterns, or Forms, (for in that
sence the word Form has a very proper signification,) to which, as
particular Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of
that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that <Classis>.
For when we say, this is a <Man>, that a <Horse>; this <Justice>, that 25
<Cruelty>; this a <Watch>, that a <Jack>; what do we else but rank Things
under different specifick Names, as agreeing to those abstract <Ideas>,
of which we have made those Names the signs? And what are the
Essences of those Species, set out and marked by Names, but those
abstract <Ideas> in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between 30
particular Things that exist and the Names they are to be ranked
under? And when general Names have any connexion with par-
ticular Beings, these abstract <Ideas> are the <Medium> that unites
them:  so that the Essences of Species, as distinguished and
denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing but those 35

#P 416#
#L 1#
precise abstract <Ideas> we have in our minds. And therefore the
supposed real Essences of Substances, if different from our abstract
<Ideas>, cannot be the Essences of the Species we rank Things into.
For two Species may be one, as rationally, as two different Essences
be the Essence of one Species: And I demand, what are the altera-    
tions may, or may not be made in a <Horse>, or <Lead>, without making
either of them to be of another Species? In determining the Species
of Things by our abstract <Ideas>, this is easy to resolve: but if any
one will regulate himself herein, by supposed real Essences, he will,
I suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know when any 10  
thing precisely ceases to be of the Species of a <Horse>, or <Lead>.
#S 14#. Nor will any one wonder, that I say these <Essences>, or abstract
<Ideas>, (which are the measures of Names, and the boundaries of
Species) are <the Workmanship of the Understanding>, who considers,
that at least the complex ones are often, in several Men, different 15  
Collections of simple <Ideas>: and therefore that is <Covetousness> to one
Man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in Substances, where
their abstract <Ideas> seem to be taken from the Things themselves,
they are not constantly the same; no not in that Species, which is
most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate 20  
acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the
<Foetus> born of a Woman were a <Man>, even so far, as that it hath been
debated, whether it were, or were not to be nourished and baptized:
which could not be, if the abstract <Idea> or Essence, to which the
Name Man belonged, were of Nature's making; and were not the 25  
uncertain and various Collection of simple <Ideas>, which the Under-
standing puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a name to
it. So that in truth <every distinct abstract> Idea, <is a distinct Essence>: and
the names that stand for such distinct <Ideas>, are the names of Things
essentially different. Thus a Circle is as essentially different from an 30  
Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain is as essentially different
from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abstract <Idea> which is the
Essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other.
And thus any two abstract <Ideas>, that in any part vary one from
another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two 35  

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distinct sorts, or, if you please, <Species>, as essentially different, as any
two the most remote, or opposite in the World.
#S 15#. But since the <Essences> of Things are Thought, by some, (and
not without reason,) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to
consider the <several significations of the Word Essence>.                  5
<First, Essence> may be taken for the very being of any thing, where-
by it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in
Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their dis-
coverable Qualities depend, may be called their <Essence>. This is the
proper original signification of the Word, as is evident from the 10
formation of it; <Essentia>, in its primary notation signifying properly
<Being>. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the
<Essence> of particular things, without giving them any Name.
<Secondly>, The Learning and Disputes of the Schools, having been
much busied about <Genus> and <Species>, the Word <Essence> has almost 15
lost its primary signification; and instead of the real Constitution of
things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial Constitution
of <Genus> and <Species>. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily supposed a real
Constitution of the sorts of Things; and 'tis past doubt, there must
be some real Constitution, on which any Collection of simple <Ideas> 20
co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that Things are
ranked under Names into sorts or <Species>, only as they agree to
certain abstract <Ideas>, to which we have annexed those Names, the
<Essence> of each <Genus>, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract
<Idea>, which the General, or <Sortal> (if I may have leave so to call it 25
from <Sort>, as I do <General> from <Genus>,) Name stands for. And this we
shall find to be that, which the Word <Essence> imports, in its most
familiar use. These two sorts of <Essences>, I suppose, may not unfitly
be termed, the one the <Real>, the other the <Nominal Essence>.
#S 16#. <Between the Nominal Essence, and the Name>, there is so <near> a 30
<Connexion>, that the Name of any sort of Things cannot be attributed
to any particular Being, but what has this <Essence>, whereby it
answers that abstract <Idea>, whereof that Name is the Sign.
#S 17#. Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to
mention those only,) there are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The 35

#P 418#
#L 1#
one is of those, who using the Word <Essence>, for they know not what,
suppose a certain number of those Essences, according to which, all
natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of
them partake, and so become of this or that <Species>. The other, and
more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things 5   
to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts,
from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to dis-
tinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to
rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. The former of
these Opinions, which supposes these <Essences>, as a certain number of 10  
Forms or Molds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast,
and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the
Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent Productions of Mon-
sters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other
strange Issues of humane Birth, carry with them difficulties, not 15  
possible to consist with this <Hypothesis>: Since it is as impossible, that
two Things, partaking exactly of the same real <Essence>, should have
different Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real
<Essence> of a Circle, should have different Properties. But were there
no other reason against it, yet the <supposition of Essences, that cannot be> 20  
<known>; and the making them nevertheless to be that, which dis-
tinguishes the Species of Things, <is> so <wholly useless>, and unservice-
able to any part of our Knowledge, that that alone were sufficient,
to make us lay it by; and content our selves with such <Essences> of the
Sorts or Species of Things, as come within the reach of our Know-   
ledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have
said, to be nothing else, but those abstract complex <Ideas>, to which
we have annexed distinct general Names.
#S 18#. <Essences> being thus distinguished into <Nominal and Real>, we
may farther observe, that <in> the Species of <simple> Ideas <and Modes>, 30  
they <are always the same>: But <in Substances, always quite different>. Thus a
Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real, as well as
nominal <Essence> of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract <Idea> to
which the general Name is annexed, but the very <Essentia>, or Being,
of the thing it self, that Foundation from which all its Properties 35  
flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far

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otherwise concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring
on my Finger, wherein these two <Essences> are apparently different.
For it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which
depend all those properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness,
<etc.> which are to be found in it. Which Constitution we know not; 5
and so having no particular <Idea> of, have no Name that is the Sign
of it. But yet it is its Colour, Weight, Fusibility, and Fixedness, <etc.>
which makes it to be <Gold>, or gives it a right to that Name, which is
therefore its nominal <Essence>. Since nothing can be call'd <Gold>, but
what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract complex <Idea>, 10
to which that Name is annexed. But this Distinction of <Essences>,
belonging particularly to Substances, we shall, when we come to
consider their Names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.
#S 19#. That such <abstract> Ideas, <with Names to them>, as we have been
speaking of, <are Essences>, may farther appear by what we are told 15
concerning <Essences, viz.> that they are all ingenerable, and incorrup-
tible. Which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of Things,
which begin and perish with them. All Things, that exist, besides
their Author, are all liable to Change; especially those Things we
are acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under distinct 20
Names or Ensigns. Thus that, which was Grass to Day, is to
Morrow the Flesh of a Sheep; and within few days after, becomes
part of a Man: In all which, and the like Changes, 'tis evident, their
real <Essence, i.e.> that Constitution, whereon the Properties of these
several things depended, is destroy'd, and perishes with them. But 25
<Essences> being taken for <Ideas>, established in the Mind, with Names
annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same,
whatever mutations the particular Substances are liable to. For
whatever becomes of <Alexander> and <Bucephalus>, the <Ideas> to which
<Man> and <Horse> are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain 30
the same; and so the <Essences> of those Species are preserved whole
and undestroy'd, whatever Changes happen to any, or all of the
Individuals of those <Species>. By this means the <Essence> of a <Species> rests
safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one Individual
of that kind. For were there now no Circle existing any where in the 35

#P 420#
#L 1#
World, (as, perhaps, that Figure exists not any where exactly
marked out,) yet the <Idea> annexed to that Name would not cease to
be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern, to determine which of the
particular Figures we meet with, have, or have not a Right to the
Name <Circle>, and so to shew which of them, by having that Essence, 5   
was of that <Species>. And though there neither were, nor had been in
Nature such a Beast as an <Unicorn>, nor such a Fish as a <Mermaid>; yet
supposing those Names to stand for complex abstract <Ideas>, that
contained no inconsistency in them; the <Essence> of a <Mermaid> is as
intelligible, as that of a <Man>; and the <Idea> of an <Unicorn>, as certain, 10  
steady, and permanent, as that of a Horse. From what has been
said, it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of <Essences>,
proves them to be only abstract <Ideas>; and is founded on the
Relation, established between them, and certain Sounds as Signs of
them; and will always be true, as long as the same Name can have 15  
the same signification.
#S 20#. To conclude, this is that, which in short I would say,
    (<viz.>) that all the great Business of <Genera> and <Species>, and their
<Essences>, amounts to no more but this, That Men making abstract
<Ideas>, and settling them in their Minds, with names annexed to 20  
them, do thereby enable themselves to consider Things, and dis-
course of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier im-
provement, and communication of their Knowledge, which would
advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined only
to Particulars. 25  


#C 04#                        CHAPTER IV

                    <Of the Names of simple> Ideas.

#S 01#. THOUGH all Words, as I have shewn, signify nothing im-
mediately, but the <Ideas> in the Mind of the Speaker; yet upon
a nearer survey, we shall find that the <Names of simple> Ideas,
<mixed Modes>, (under which I comprise Relations too,) <and natural>

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                                                                #L 1#
<Substances, have each of them something peculiar>, and different from
the other. For Example:
#S 02#. <First>, The <Names of simple> Ideas <and Substances>, with the ab-
stract <Ideas> in the Mind, which they immediately signify, <intimate>
also <some real Existence>, from which was derived their original 5
pattern. But the <Names of mixed Modes, terminate in the> Idea that is in
the Mind, and lead not the Thoughts any farther, as we shall see
more at large in the following Chapter.
#S 03#. <Secondly, The Names of simple> Ideas <and Modes, signify always the>
<real, as well as nominal Essence of their Species>. But <the Names of natural> 10
<Substances, signify> rarely, if ever, any thing but <barely the nominal>
<Essences> of those Species, as we shall shew in the Chapter, that
treats of the Names of Substances in particular.
#S 04#. <Thirdly>, The <Names of simple> Ideas <are not capable of any>
<definitions>; the Names of all complex <Ideas> are. It has not, that I 15
know, hitherto been taken notice of by any Body, what Words are,
and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is (as I
am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling, and
obscurity in Men's Discourses, whilst some demand definitions of
Terms, that cannot be defined; and others think, they ought to 20
rest satisfied, in an Explication made by a more general Word, and
its Restriction, (or to speak in Terms of Art by a Genus and
Difference,) when even after such Definition made according to
rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of
the meaning of the Word, than they had before. This at least, I 25
think, that the shewing what Words are, and what are not capable
of Definitions, and wherein consists a good Definition, is not wholly
besides our present purpose; and perhaps, will afford so much
Light to the Nature of these Signs, and our <Ideas>, as to deserve a
more particular Consideration.                                      30
#S 05#. I will not here trouble my self, to prove that all Terms are
not definable from that Progress, <in infinitum>, which it will visibly
lead us into, if we should allow, that all Names could be defined.
For if the Terms of one Definition, were still to be defined by

#P 422#
#L 1#
another, Where at last should we stop? But I shall from the Nature
of our <Ideas>, and the Signification of our Words shew, <why some>
<Names can, and others cannot be defined>, and which they are.
#S 06#. I think, it is agreed, that <a Definition is> nothing else, but <the>
<shewing the meaning of one Word by several other not synonymous Terms>.   5 
The meaning of Words, being only the <Ideas> they are made to stand
for by him that uses them; the meaning of any Term is then
shewed, or the Word is defined when by other Words, the <Idea> it is
made the Sign of, and annexed to in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it
were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its 10  
Signification ascertained: This is the only use and end of Definitions;
and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good Defi-
nition.
#S 07#. This being premised, I say, that <the Names of Simple> Ideas, and
those only, <are incapable of being defined>. The reason whereof is this, 15  
That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several <Ideas>,
they can altogether by no means represent an <Idea>, which has no
Composition at all: And therefore a Definition, which is properly
nothing but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several
others not signifying each the same thing, can in the Names of 20  
simple <Ideas> have no Place.
#S 08#. The not observing this difference in our <Ideas>, and their
Names, has produced that eminent trifling in the Schools, which is
so easy to be observed, in the definitions they give us of some few of
these simple <Ideas>. For as to the greatest part of them, even those 25  
Masters of Definitions, were fain to leave them untouch'd, meerly
by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite <Jargon>
could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition, <The Act of a>
<being in Power, as far forth as in Power>, which would puzzle any
rational Man, to whom it was not already known by its famous 30  
absurdity, to guess what Word it could ever be supposed to be
the Explication of. If <Tully> asking a <Dutchman> what <Beweeginge> was,
should have received this Explication in his own Language, that it
was <Actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia>;* I ask whether any one

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                                                                #L 1#
can imagine he could thereby have understood what the Word
<Beweeginge> signified, or have guessed what <Idea> a <Dutchman> ordi-
narily had in his Mind, and would signify to another, when he used
that sound.
#S 09#. Nor have the Modern Philosophers, who have endeavoured 5
to throw off the <Jargon> of the Schools, and speak intelligibly, much
better succeeded in defining simple <Ideas>, whether by explaining
their Causes, or any otherwise. The <Atomists>, who define Motion to
be a <passage from one place to another>, What do they more than put one
synonymous Word for another? For what is <Passage> other than 10
<Motion>? And if they were asked what Passage was, How would
they better define it than by <Motion>? For is it not at least as proper
and significant, to say, <Passage is a Motion from one place to another>, as to
say, <Motion is a passage>, etc. This is to translate, and not to define,
when we change two Words of the same Signification one for 15
another; which when one is better understood than the other, may
serve to discover what <Idea> the unknown stands for; but is very far
from a <Definition>, unless we will say, every English Word in the
Dictionary, is the definition of the Latin Word it answers, and that
Motion is a definition of <Motus. Nor will the successive Application of> 20
<the parts of the> Superficies <of one Body, to those of another>, which the
<Cartesians> give us, prove a much better definition of Motion, when
well examined.
#S 10#. <The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous>, is another
Peripatetick definition of a simple <Idea>; which though not more 25
absurd than the former of <Motion>, yet betrays its Uselessness and
Insignificancy more plainly, because Experience will easily con-
vince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the Word <Light>
which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind Man: but
the definition of <Motion> appears not at first sight so useless, because 30
it scapes this way of Trial. For this simple <Idea>, entring by the
Touch as well as Sight; 'tis impossible to shew an Example of any
one, who has no other way to get the <Idea> of <Motion>, but barely by
the definition of that Name. Those who tell us, that <Light> is a
great number of little Globules, striking briskly on the bottom of 35
the Eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools: but yet these

#P 424#
#L 1#
Words never so well understood, would make the <Idea>, the Word
<Light> stands for, no more known to a Man that understands it not
before, than if one should tell him, that <Light> was nothing but a
Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all day long struck
with Rackets against some Men's Fore-heads, whilst they passed 5   
by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet
the <Idea> of the cause of <Light>, if we had it never so exact, would no
more give us the <Idea> of <Light> it self, as it is such a particular per-
ception in us, than the <Idea> of the Figure and Motion of a sharp
piece of Steel, would give us the <Idea> of that Pain, which it is able to 10  
cause in us. For the cause of any Sensation, and the Sensation it self,
in all the simple <Ideas> of one Sense, are two <Ideas>; and two <Ideas> so
different, and distant one from another, that no two can be more so.
And therefore should <Des Cartes'>s Globules strike never so long on
the <retina> of a Man, who was blind by a <Gutta^ Serena^>, he would 15  
thereby never have any <Idea> of <Light>, or any thing approaching to it,
though he understood what little Globules were, and what striking
on another Body was, never so well. And therefore the <Cartesians>
very well distinguish between that Light which is the Cause of that
Sensation in us, and the <Idea> which is produced in us by it, and is 20  
that which is properly Light.
#S 11#. <Simple Ideas>, as has been shewn, <are only> to be <got by> those
<impressions> Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the proper
Inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all
the <Words> in the World, <made use of to explain, or define any of their> 25  
<Names, will never be able to produce in us the> Idea <it stands for>. For Words
being Sounds, can produce in us no other simple <Ideas>, than of
those very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary
connexion, which is known to be between them, and those simple
<Ideas>, which common Use has made them Signs of. He that thinks 30  
otherwise, let him try if any Words can give him the taste of a Pine-
Apple, and make him have the true <Idea> of the Relish of that cele-
brated delicious Fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with
any Tastes, whereof he has the <Ideas> already in his Memory, im-
printed there by sensible Objects not Strangers to his Palate, so far 35  

                                                                #P 425#
                                                                #L 1#
may he approach that resemblance in his Mind. But this is not giv-
ing us that <Idea> by a <Definition>, but exciting in us other simple <Ideas>,
by their known Names; which will be still very different from the
true taste of that Fruit it self. In Light and Colours, and all other
simple <Ideas>, it is the same thing: for the signification of Sounds, is 5
not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of
<Light>, or <Redness>, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those
<Ideas> in us, than the sound <Light>, or <Red>, by it self. For to hope to
produce an <Idea> of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however formed, is
to expect that Sounds should be visible, or Colours audible; and to 10
make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senses. Which is all one
as to say, that we might Taste, Smell, and See by the Ears: a sort of
Philosophy worthy only of <Sanco Panca>, who had the Faculty to see
<Dulcinea> by Hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received
into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the simple <Idea> which any Word 15
stands for, can never come to know the signification of that Word,
by any other Words, or Sounds, whatsoever put together, accord-
ing to any Rules of Definition. The only way is, by applying to his
Senses the proper Object; and so producing that <Idea> in him, for
which he has Learned the name already. A studious blind Man, who 20
had mightily beat his Head about visible Objects, and made use
of the explication of his Books and Friends, to understand those
names of Light, and Colours, which often came in his way; bragg'd
one day, That he now understood what <Scarlet> signified. Upon
which his Friend demanding, what <Scarlet> was? the blind Man 25
answered, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Just such an Under-
standing of the name of any other simple <Idea> will he have, who
hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other Words made use of
to explain it.
#S 12#. The case is quite otherwise <in complex Ideas>; which consist- 
ing of several simple ones, it is in the power of Words, standing for
the several <Ideas>, that make that Composition, to imprint complex
<Ideas> in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their
Names be understood. In such Collections of <Ideas>, passing under
one name, <Definitions>, or the teaching the signification of one word, 35
by several others, has place, and <may make us understand the Names> of
Things, which never came within the reach of our Senses; and frame

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<Ideas> suitable to those in other Men's Minds, when they use those
Names: provided that none of the terms of the Definition stand for
any such simple <Ideas>, which he to whom the Explication is made,
has never yet had in his Thoughts. Thus the word <Statue> may be
explained to a blind Man by other words, when <Picture> cannot, his 5   
Senses having given him the <Idea> of Figure, but not of Colours,
which therefore Words cannot excite in him. This gain'd the Prize
to the Painter, against the Statuary; each of which contending for
the excellency of his Art, and the Statuary bragging, that his was
to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had 10  
lost their Eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it. The Painter
agreed to refer himself to the Judgment of a blind Man; who being
brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and a Picture
drawn by the other; he was first led to the Statue, in which he
traced with his Hands, all the Lineaments of the Face and Body; 15  
and with great admiration, applauded the Skill of the Work-man.
But being led to the Picture, and having his Hands laid upon it, was
told, That now he touched the Head, and then the Forehead, Eyes,
nose, <etc.> as his Hand moved over the parts of the Picture on the
Cloth, without finding any the least distinction: Whereupon he 20  
cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and
divine piece of Workmanship, which could represent to them all
those Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.
#S 13#. He that should use the word <Rainbow>, to one who knew all
those Colours, but yet had never seen that <Phaenomenon>, would, by 25  
enumerating the Figure, Largeness, Position, and Order of the
Colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly under-
stood. But yet that <Definition>, how exact and perfect soever, would
never make a blind Man understand it; because several of the
simple <Ideas> that make that complex one, being such as he never 30  
received by Sensation and Experience, no words are able to excite
them in his Mind.
#S 14#. Simple <Ideas>, as has been shewed, can only be got by
Experience, from those Objects, which are proper to produce in us
those Perceptions. <When> by this means we have our Minds stored 35  
with them, and know the Names for them, then <we are in a condition>
<to define>, and by <Definition> to understand the Names of complex

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<Ideas>, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a
simple <Idea>, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is im-
possible, by any Words, to make known its meaning to him. When
any term stands for an <Idea> a Man is acquainted with, but is
ignorant, that that term is the sign of it, there another name, of 5
the same <Idea> which he has been accustomed to, may make him
understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever, is any name,
of any simple <Idea>, capable of a <Definition>.
#S 15#. <Fourthly>, But though the Names of <simple Ideas>, have not the
help of <Definition> to determine their signification; yet that hinders 10
not but that they <are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those>
<of mixed Modes and Substances>. Because they standing only for one
simple Perception, Men, for the most part, easily and perfectly
agree in their signification: And there is little room for mistake and
wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once, that Whiteness 15
is the Name of that Colour he has observed in Snow, or Milk, will
not be apt to misapply that Word, as long as he retains that <Idea>;
which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of
it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multipli-
city of simple <Ideas> to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness 20
in the Names of mixed Modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown
real Essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise
number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in
the Names of Substances. But on the contrary, in simple <Ideas> the
whole signification of the Name is known at once, and consists not 25
of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the <Idea> may be varied,
and so the signification of its Name, be obscure, or uncertain.
#S 16#. <Fifthly>, This farther may be observed, concerning <simple>
<Ideas>, and their Names, that they <have but few Ascents in linea>
<praedicamentali>, (as they call it,) <from the lowest Species, to the summum> 30
<Genus>. The reason whereof is, that the lowest Species being but one
simple <Idea>, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference
being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one <Idea>
common to them both; which having one Name, is the <Genus> of the
other two: <v.g.> There is nothing can be left out of the <Idea> of White 35
and Red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so

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have one general name; as <Rationality> being left out of the com-
plex <Idea> of <Man>, makes it agree with Brute, in the more general
<Idea> and name of <Animal>. And therefore when to avoid unpleasant
enumerations, Men would comprehend both <White> and <Red>, and
several other such simple <Ideas>, under one general name; they have 5   
been fain to do it by a Word, which denotes only the way they get
into the Mind. For when <White, Red>, and <Yellow>, are all compre-
hended under the <Genus> or name <Colour>, it signifies no more, but
such <Ideas>, as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight, and
have entrance only through the Eyes. And when they would 10  
frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both <Colours> and
<Sounds>, and the like simple <Ideas>, they do it by a Word, that signi-
fies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense: And so
the general term <Quality>, in its ordinary acception, comprehends
Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and tangible Qualities, with dis-   
tinction from Extension, Number, Motion, Pleasure, and Pain,
which make impressions on the Mind, and introduce their <Ideas>
by more Senses than one.
#S 17#. <Sixthly>, The Names of simple <Ideas>, Substances, and mixed
Modes, have also this difference; That those <of mixed Modes> stand 20  
for <Ideas> perfectly <arbitrary>: Those <of Substances>, are not perfectly so;
but <referr to a pattern, though with some latitude: and those of simple> Ideas
<are> perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are <not arbitrary>
<at all>. Which what difference it makes in the significations of their
Names, we shall see in the following Chapters. 25  
      The Names of simple Modes, differ little from those of simple <Ideas>.



#C 05#                        CHAPTER V

              <Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations>.

#S 01#. THE Names of mixed Modes being general, they stand, as has
been shewn, for sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its
peculiar Essence. The Essences of these Species also, as has been
shewed, are nothing but the abstract <Ideas> in the Mind, to which 30  
the Name is annexed. Thus far the Names and Essences of mixed

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Modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other
<Ideas>: But if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find,
that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps, may deserve
our attention.
#S 02#. The first Particularity I shall observe in them is, that the 5
abstract <Ideas>, or, if you please, the Essences of the several Species <of>
<mixed Modes are made by the Understanding>, wherein they differ from
those of simple <Ideas>: in which sort, the Mind has no power to make
any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real
Existence of Things operating upon it.                               10
#S 03#. In the next place, these <Essences of the Species of mixed Modes>,
<are> not only <made> by the Mind, but made <very arbitrarily>, made
without Patterns, or reference to any real Existence. Wherein they
differ from those of Substances, which carry with them the Sup-
position of some real Being, from which they are taken, and to 15
which they are conformable. But in its complex <Ideas> of mixed
Modes, the Mind takes a liberty not to follow the Existence of
Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as so many
distinct specifick <Ideas>, whilst others, that as often occurr in Nature,
and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected 20
without particular Names or Specifications. Nor does the Mind,
in these of mixed Modes, as in the complex <Ideas> of Substances,
examine them by the real Existence of Things; or verifie them by
Patterns, containing such peculiar Compositions in Nature. To
know whether his <Idea> of <Adultery>, or <Incest>, be right, will a Man 25
seek it any where amongst Things existing? Or is it true, because
any one has been Witness to such an Action? No: but it suffices here,
that Men have put together such a Collection into one complex
<Idea>, that makes the <Archetype>, and specifick <Idea>, whether ever any
such Action were committed <in rerum natura>, or no.                   30
#S 04#. To understand this aright, we must consider <wherein this>
<making of these complex> Ideas <consists>; and that is not in the making
any new <Idea>, but putting together those which the Mind had
before. Wherein the Mind does these three things: First, It chuses
a certain Number. Secondly, It gives them connexion, and makes 35
them into one <Idea>. Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. If we

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#L 1#
examine how the Mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes
in them, we shall easily observe, how these essences of the Species
of mixed Modes, are the Workmanship of the Mind; and conse-
quently, that the Species themselves are of Men's making.
#S 05#. No body can doubt, but that these <Ideas> of mixed Modes, are 5    
made by a voluntary Collection of <Ideas> put together in the Mind,
independent from any original Patterns in Nature, who will but
reflect, that this sort of complex <Ideas> may be made, abstracted, and
have names given them, and so a Species be constituted, before any
one individual of that Species ever existed. Who can doubt, but the 10 
<Ideas> of <Sacrilege>, or <Adultery>, might be framed in the Mind of Men,
and have names given them; and so these Species of mixed Modes
be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and
might be as well discoursed of, and reasoned about, and as certain
Truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the 15 
Understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently
a real Existence? Whereby it is plain, how much <the sorts of mixed>
<Modes are the Creatures of the Understanding>, where they have a being
as subservient to all the ends of real Truth and Knowledge, as
when they really exist: And we cannot doubt, but Law-makers 20 
have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only
the Creatures of their own Understanding; Beings that had no
other existence, but in their own Minds. And, I think, no body can
deny, but that the <Resurrection> was a Species of mixed Modes in the
Mind, before it really existed. 25 
#S 06#. To see <how arbitrarily these Essences of mixed Modes are made> by
the Mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little
looking into them, will satisfie us, that 'tis the Mind, that combines
several scattered independent <Ideas>, into one complex one; and by
the common name it gives them, makes them the Essence of a 30 
certain Species, without regulating it self by any connexion they
have in Nature. For what greater connexion in Nature, has the <Idea>
of a Man, than the <Idea> of a Sheep with Killing, that this is made a
particular Species of Action, signified by the word <Murder>, and the
other not? Or what Union is there in Nature, between the <Idea> of 35 

                                                                #P 431#
                                                                #L 1#
the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neigh-
bour; that those are combined into one complex <Idea>, and thereby
made the Essence of the distinct Species <Parricide>, whilst the other
make no distinct Species at all? But though they have made killing
a Man's Father, or Mother, a distinct Species from killing his Son, 5
or Daughter; yet in some other cases, Son and Daughter are taken
in too, as well as Father and Mother; and they are all equally
comprehended in the same Species, as in that of <Incest>. Thus the
Mind in mixed Modes arbitrarily unites into complex <Ideas>, such as
it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much 10
union in Nature, are left loose, and never combined into one <Idea>,
because they have no need of one name. 'Tis evident then, that the
Mind, by its free choice, gives a connexion to a certain number of
<Ideas>; which in Nature have no more union with one another, than
others that it leaves out: Why else is the part of the Weapon, the 15
beginning of the Wound is made with, taken notice of, to make
the distinct Species call'd <Stabbing>, and the Figure and Matter of
the Weapon left out? I do not say, this is done without Reason, as
we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free
choice of the Mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these 20
Species of mixed Modes, are the workmanship of the Understand-
ing: And there is nothing more evident, than that for the most
part, in the framing these <Ideas>, the Mind searches not its Patterns
in Nature, nor refers the <Ideas> it makes to the real existence of
Things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own Purposes, 25
without tying it self to a precise imitation of any thing that really
exists.
#S 07#. But though these complex <Ideas>, or <Essences of mixed Modes>,
depend on the Mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet
they <are not made at random>, and jumbled together without any 30
reason at all. Though these complex <Ideas> be not always copied
from Nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which
abstract <Ideas> are made: And though they be Combinations made of
<Ideas>, that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves,
as several other, to which the Mind never gives a connexion that 35
combines them into one <Idea>; yet they are always made for the

#P 432#
#L 1#
convenience of Communication, which is the chief end of Lan-
guage. The Use of Language is, by short Sounds to signifie with
ease and dispatch general Conceptions; wherein not only abun-
dance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of
independent <Ideas>, collected into one complex one. In the making 5  
therefore of the Species of mixed Modes, Men have had regard only
to such Combinations, as they had occasion to mention one to
another. Those they have combined into distinct complex <Ideas>,
and given Names to; whilst others that in Nature have as near an
union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than 10 
humane Actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract
<Ideas>, of all the Varieties might be observed in them, the Number
must be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the Plenty, as
well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that Men make
and name so many complex <Ideas> of these, mixed Modes, as they find 15 
they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of
their Affairs. If they join to the <Idea> of Killing, the <Idea> of Father, or
Mother, and so make a distinct Species from killing a Man's Son, or
Neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the Crime,
and the distinct punishment is due to the murthering a Man's 20 
Father or Mother different from what ought to be inflicted on the
Murther of a Son or Neighbour; and therefore they find it necessary
to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the end of making that
distinct Combination. But though the <Ideas> of Mother and Daughter,
are so differently treated, in reference to the <Idea> of Killing, that the 25 
one is joined with it, to make a distinct abstract <Idea> with a name,
and so a distinct Species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal
Knowledge, they are both taken in under <Incest>; and that still for
the same convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning
of one Species, such unclean mixtures, as have a peculiar turpitude 30 
beyond others; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious
Descriptions.
#S 08#. A moderate skill <in different Languages>, will easily satisfie one
of the truth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of
<Words in one> Language, <which have not any that answer them in another>. 35 
Which plainly shews, that those of one Country, by their customs

                                                                #P 433#
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and manner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex
<Ideas>, and give names to them, which others never collected into
specifick <Ideas>. This could not have happened, if these Species were
the steady Workmanship of Nature; and not Collections made and
abstracted by the Mind, in order to naming, and for the con- 
venience of Communication. The terms of our Law, which are not
empty Sounds, will hardly find Words that answer them in the
Spanish, or Italian, no scanty Languages; much less, I think, could
any one translate them into the <Caribee>, or <Westoe> Tongues: And
the <Versura> of the <Romans>, or <Corban> of the <Jews>, have no Words in 10
other Languages to answer them: The reason whereof is plain,
from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly
into this matter, and exactly compare different Languages, we shall
find, that though they have Words, which in Translations and
Dictionaries, are supposed to answer one another; yet there is 15
scarce one of ten, amongst the names of complex <Ideas>, especially of
mixed Modes, that stands for the same precise <Idea>, which the
Word does that in Dictionaries it is rendred by. There are no
<Ideas> more common, and less compounded, than the measures of
Time, Extension, and Weight, and the Latin Names <Hora, Pes>, 20
<Libra>, are, without difficulty, rendred by the <English> names, <Hour>,
<Foot>, and <Pound>: But yet there is nothing more evident, than that
the <Ideas> a <Roman> annexed to these Latin Names, were very far
different from those which an <English->man expresses by those
English ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures 25
that those of the other Language design'd by their Names, he
would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to
be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the names of
more abstract and compounded <Ideas>; such as are the greatest part
of those which make up Moral Discourses: Whose Names, when 30
Men come curiously to compare, with those they are translated
into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly
to correspond in the whole extent of their Significations.
#S 09#. The reason why I take so particular Notice of this, is, that
we may not be mistaken about <Genera>, and <Species>, and their <Essences>,35
as if they were Things regularly and constantly made by Nature,

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#L 1#
and had a real Existence in Things; when they appear, upon a more
wary survey, to be nothing else but an Artifice of the Understand-
ing, for the easier signifying such Collections of <Ideas>, as it should
often have occasion to communicate by one general term; under
which, divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract 5  
<Idea>, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of
the word <Species>, may make it sound harsh to some, that I say, that
the <Species> of mixed Modes are made by the Understanding; yet, I
think, it can by no body be denied, that 'tis the Mind makes those
abstract complex <Ideas>, to which specifick names are given. And if 10 
it be true, as it is, that the Mind makes the Patterns, for sorting
and naming of Things, I leave it to be considered, who makes
the Boundaries of the sort, or <Species>; since with me, <Species> and <Sort>
have no other difference, than that of a Latin and English <Idiom>.
#S 10#. <The near relation> that there is <between Species, Essences, and> 15   
their <general Names>, at least in <mixed Modes>, will farther appear,
when we consider, that it is the Name that seems to preserve those
<Essences>, and give them their lasting duration. For the connexion
between the loose parts of those complex <Ideas>, being made by the
Mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in Nature, 20 
would cease again, were there not something that did, as it were,
hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Though there-
fore it be the Mind that makes the Collection, 'tis the Name which
is, as it were the Knot, that ties them fast together. What a vast
variety of different <Ideas>, does the word <Triumphus> hold together, 25 
and deliver to us as one <Species>! Had this Name been never made,
or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what
passed in that Solemnity: But yet, I think, that which holds those
different parts together, in the unity of one complex <Idea>, is that
very word annexed to it: without which, the several parts of that, 30 
would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other shew,
which having never been made but once, had never been united
into one complex <Idea>, under one denomination. How much there-
fore, in mixed Modes, the unity necessary to any Essence, depends
on the Mind; and how much the continuation and fixing of that 35 
Unity, depends on the Name in common use annexed to it, I leave

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to be considered by those, who look upon <Essences> and <Species>, as
real established Things in Nature.
#S 11#. Suitable to this, we find, that <Men speaking of mixed Modes>,
<seldom> imagine or <take any other for Species of them, but such as are set out>
<by name>: Because they being of Man's making only, in order to 5
naming, no such <Species> are taken notice of, or supposed to be, un-
less a <Name> be joined to it, as the sign of Man's having combined
into one <Idea> several loose ones; and by that <Name>, giving a lasting
Union to the Parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as
soon as the Mind laid by that abstract <Idea>, and ceased actually to 10
think on it. But when a Name is once annexed to it, wherein the
parts of that complex <Idea> have a settled and permanent Union;
then is the <Essence>, as it were established, and the <Species> look'd on as
compleat. For to what purpose should the Memory charge it self
with such Compositions, unless it were by Abstraction to make 15
them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it
were, that they might have general <Names>, for the convenience of
Discourse, and Communication? Thus we see, that killing a Man
with a Sword, or a Hatchet, are looked on as no distinct species of
Action: But if the Point of the Sword first enter the Body, it passes 20
for a distinct <Species>, where it has a distinct <Name>, as in <England>, in
whose Language it is called <Stabbing>: But in another Country, where
it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar <Name>, it passes
not for a distinct <Species>. But in the <Species> of corporeal Substances,
though it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence: yet since 25
those <Ideas>, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an
Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them or no, therefore
those are looked on as distinct <Species>, without any operation of the
Mind, either abstracting, or giving a <Name> to that complex <Idea>.
#S 12#. Conformable also to what has been said, concerning the 30
<Essences> of the <Species> of <mixed Modes>, that they are the Creatures of
the Understanding, rather than the Works of Nature: Conform-
able, I say, to this, we find, that <their Names lead our Thoughts to the>
<Mind, and no farther>. When we speak of <Justice>, or <Gratitude>, we frame
to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing, which we would 35
conceive; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract <Ideas> of those

#P 436#
#L 1#
Vertues, and look not farther; as they do, when we speak of a <Horse>,
or <Iron>, whose specifick <Ideas> we consider not, as barely in the Mind,
but as in Things themselves, which afford the original Patterns of
those <Ideas>. But in mixed Modes, at least the most considerable parts
of them, which are moral Beings, we consider the original Patterns, 5  
as being in the Mind; and to those we referr for the distinguishing
of particular Beings under Names. And hence I think it is, That these
<Essences> of the <Species> of mixed Modes, are by a more particular Name
called <Notions>; as by a peculiar Right, appertaining to the Under-
standing. 10 
#S 13#. Hence likewise we may learn, <Why the complex> Ideas <of mixed>
<Modes, are commonly more compounded, and decompounded, than those of>
<natural Substances>. Because they being the Workmanship of the
Understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency
of expressing in short those <Ideas> it would make known to another, 15 
does with great liberty unite often into one abstract <Idea> Things
that in their Nature have no coherence; and so under one Term,
bundle together a great variety of compounded, and decompounded
<Ideas>. Thus the Name of <Procession>, what a great mixture of inde-
pendant <Ideas> of Persons, Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, 20 
does it contain in that complex one, which the Mind of Man has
arbitrarily put together, to express by that one Name? Whereas
the complex <Ideas> of the sorts of Substances, are usually made up of
only a small number of simple ones; and in the <Species> of Animals,
these two, <viz.> Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole nomi- 25 
nal Essence.
#S 14#. Another thing we may observe from what has been said, is,
That <the Names of mixed Modes always signifie> (when they have any
determined Signification) <the real Essences of their Species>. For these
abstract <Ideas>, being the Workmanship of the Mind, and not re-  
ferred to the real Existence of Things, there is no supposition of any
thing more signified by that Name, but barely that complex <Idea>,
the Mind it self has formed, which is all it would have express'd by
it; and is that, on which all the properties of the <Species> depend, and

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                                                                #L 1#
from which alone they all flow: and so in these the <real> and <nominal>
<Essence> is the same; which of what Concernment it is to the certain
Knowledge of general Truths, we shall see hereafter.
#S 15#. This also may shew us the Reason, <Why for the most part the>
<Names of mixed Modes are got, before the> Ideas <they stand for are perfectly> 5
<known>. Because there being no <Species> of these ordinarily taken
notice of, but what have Names; and those <Species>, or rather their
Essences, being abstract complex <Ideas> made arbitrarily by the Mind,
it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before one
endeavour to frame these complex <Ideas>: unless a Man will fill his 10
Head with a Company of abstract complex <Ideas>, which others
having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and
forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of Languages, it was
necessary to have the <Idea>, before one gave it the Name: And so it is
still, where making a new complex <Idea>, one also, by giving it a new 15
Name, makes a new Word. But this concerns not Languages made,
which have generally pretty well provided for <Ideas>, which Men
have frequent Occasion to have, and communicate: And in such, I
ask, whether it be not the ordinary Method, that Children learn
the Names of mixed Modes, before they have their <Ideas>? What one 20
of a thousand ever frames the abstract <Idea> of <Glory> or <Ambition>,
before he has heard the Names of them. In simple <Ideas> and Sub-
stances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such <Ideas>, as have a
real Existence and Union in Nature, the <Ideas>, or Names, are got one
before the other, as it happens.                                     25
#S 16#. What has been said here of mixed Modes, is with very little
difference applicable also to Relations; which since every Man
himself may observe, I may spare my self the Pains to enlarge on:
Especially, since what I have here said concerning Words in this
Third Book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than 30
what so slight a Subject required. I allow, it might be brought into
a narrower Compass: but I was willing to stay my Reader on an
Argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I
am sure 'tis one, I thought not of, when I began to write,) That by
searching it to the bottom, and turning it on every side, some part 35

#P 438#
#L 1#
or other might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occasion
to the most averse, or negligent, to reflect on a general Miscarriage;
which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice of. When
it is considered, what a pudder is made about <Essences>, and how much
all sorts of Knowledge, Discourse, and Conversation, are pester'd 5  
and disorder'd by the careless, and confused Use and Application of
Words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while throughly to lay it
open. And I shall be pardon'd, if I have dwelt long on an Argument,
which I think therefore needs to be inculcated; because the Faults,
Men are usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hin- 
derances of true Knowledge; but are so well thought of, as to pass
for it. Men would often see what a small pittance of Reason and
Truth, or possibly none at all, is mixed with those huffing Opinions
they are swell'd with; if they would but look beyond fashionable
Sounds, and observe what <Ideas> are, or are not comprehended under 15 
those Words, with which they are so armed at all points, and with
which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have
done some Service to Truth, Peace, and Learning, if, by any en-
largement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Use
of Language; and give them Reason to suspect, that since it is 20 
frequent for others, it may also be possible for them, to have some-
times very good and approved Words in their Mouths, and
Writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signification. And
therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein them-
selves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. 25 
With this design therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to
say, concerning this matter.


#C 06#                       CHAPTER VI

                     <Of the names of Substances>.

#S 01#. <THE common Names of Substances>, as well as other general
Terms, <stand for Sorts>: which is nothing else but the being made
signs of such complex <Ideas>, wherein several particular Substances 30 

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do, or might agree, by virtue of which, they are capable to be
comprehended in one common Conception, and be signified by one
Name. I say, do or might agree: for though there be but one Sun
existing in the World, yet the <Idea> of it being abstracted, so that
more Substances (if there were several) might each agree in it; it is 5
as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns, as there are Stars.
They want not their Reasons, who think there are, and that each
fixed Star, would answer the <Idea> the name <Sun> stands for, to one
who were placed in a due distance; which, by the way, may shew
us how much the Sorts, or, if you please, <Genera> and <Species> of 10
Things (for those Latin Terms signify to me, no more than the
English word <Sort>) depend on such Collections of <Ideas>, as Men have
made; and not on the real Nature of Things: since 'tis not impossible,
but that in propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which
is a Star to another.                                                15
#S 02#. The measure and boundary of each Sort, or <Species>, whereby
it is constituted that particular Sort, and distinguished from others,
is that we call its <Essence>, which <is> nothing but that <abstract> Idea <to>
<which the Name is annexed>: So that every thing contained in that <Idea>,
is essential to that Sort. This, though it be all the <Essence> of natural 20
Substances, that we know, or by which we distinguish them into
Sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the <nominal Essence>, to dis-
tinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which
depends this <nominal Essence>, and all the Properties of that Sort;
which therefore, as has been said, may be called the <real Essence: v.g.> 25
the <nominal Essence> of <Gold>, is that complex <Idea> the word <Gold> stands
for, let it be, for instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight,
malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the <real Essence> is the constitution
of the insensible parts of that Body, on which those Qualities, and
all the other Properties of <Gold> depend. How far these two are 30
different, though they are both called <Essence>, is obvious, at first
sight, to discover.
#S 03#. For though, perhaps, voluntary Motion, with Sense and
Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain shape, be the complex <Idea>, to
which I, and others, annex the name <Man>; and so be the <nominal> 35
<Essence> of the <Species> so called: yet no body will say, that that

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complex <Idea> is the <real Essence> and Source of all those Operations,
which are to be found in any Individual of that Sort. The foundation
of all those Qualities, which are the Ingredients of our complex <Idea>,
is something quite different: And had we such a Knowledge of that
Constitution of Man, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation,  5 
and Reasoning, and other Powers flow; and on which his so regular
shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his
Maker has, we should have a quite other <Idea> of his <Essence>, than
what now is contained in our Definition of that <Species>, be it what it
will: And our <Idea> of any individual <Man> would be as far different 10 
from what it now is, as is his, who knows all the Springs and Wheels,
and other contrivances within, of the famous Clock at <Strasburg>,
from that which a gazing Country-man has of it, who barely sees
the motion of the Hand, and hears the Clock strike, and observes
only some of the outward appearances. 15 
#S 04#. That <Essence>, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to <Sorts>,
and that it is considered in particular Beings, no farther than as
they are ranked into <Sorts>, appears from hence: That take but away
the abstract <Ideas>, by which we sort Individuals, and rank them
under common Names, and then the thought of any thing <essential> 20 
to any of them, instantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one,
without the other: which plainly shews their relation. 'Tis neces-
sary for me to be as I am; GOD and Nature has made me so: But
there is nothing I have, is essential to me. An Accident, or Disease,
may very much alter my Colour, or Shape; a Fever, or Fall, may 25 
take away my Reason, or Memory, or both; and an Apoplexy
leave neither Sense, nor Understanding, no nor Life. Other Crea-
tures of my shape, may be made with more, and better, or fewer,
and worse Faculties than I have: and others may have Reason, and
Sense, in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these 30 
are essential to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatso-
ever, till the Mind refers it to some Sort or <Species> of things; and
then presently, according to the abstract <Idea> of that sort, some-
thing is found <essential>. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and
he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of <Essential>, the 35 
consideration of some <Species>, or the complex <Idea>, signified by some

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                                                                #L 1#
general name, comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to that,
that this or that Quality is said to be <essential>. So that if it be asked,
whether it be <essential> to me, or any other particular corporeal
Being to have Reason? I say no; no more than it is <essential> to this
white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular 5
Being, be to be counted of the sort <Man>, and to have the name <Man>
given it, then Reason is <essential> to it, supposing Reason to be a part
of the complex <Idea> the name <Man> stands for: as it is <essential> to this
thing I write on, to contain words, if I will give it the name <Treatise>,
and rank it under that <Species>. So that <essential, and not essential, relate> 10
<only to our abstract Ideas, and the names annexed to them>; which amounts
to no more but this, That whatever particular Thing, has not in it
those Qualities, which are contained in the abstract <Idea>, which any
general Term stands for, cannot be ranked under that <Species>, nor be
called by that name, since that abstract <Idea> is the very <Essence> of 15
that <Species>.
#S 05#. Thus if the <Idea> of <Body>, with some People, be bare Extension,
or Space, then Solidity is not <essential> to Body: If others make the
<Idea>, to which they give the name <Body>, to be Solidity and Exten-
sion, then Solidity is essential to <Body>. That therefore, and <that alone> 20
<is> considered as <essential, which makes a part of the complex> Idea <the name>
<of a Sort stands for>, without which, no particular Thing can be
reckoned of that Sort, nor be intituled to that name. Should there be
found a parcel of Matter, that had all the other Qualities that are in
<Iron>, but wanted Obedience to the Load-stone; and would neither 25
be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, Would any one ques-
tion, whether it wanted any thing <essential>? It would be absurd to
ask, Whether a thing really existing, wanted any thing <essential> to it.
Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an <essential> or <specifick>
difference, or no; since we have no other measure of <essential> or 30
<specifick>, but our abstract <Ideas>? And to talk of specifick Differences
in Nature, without reference to general <Ideas> and Names, is to talk
unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make
an <essential> difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings,
without any regard had to some abstract <Idea>, which is looked upon 35
as the Essence and Standard of a <Species>? All such Patterns and
Standards, being quite laid aside, particular Beings, considered
barely in themselves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally

#P 442# 
#L 1#
<essential>; and every thing, in each Individual, will be <essential> to it,
or, which is more true, nothing at all. For though it may be reason-
able to ask, Whether obeying the Magnet, be <essential> to <Iron>? yet,
I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, Whether it
be <essential> to the particular parcel of Matter I cut my Pen with, 5  
without considering it under the name <Iron>, or as being of a certain
<Species>? And if, as has been said, our abstract <Ideas>, which have names
annexed to them, are the Boundaries of <Species>, nothing can be
<essential> but what is contained in those <Ideas>.
#S 06#. 'Tis true, I have often mentioned a <real Essence>, distinct in 10   
Substances, from those abstract <Ideas> of them, which I call their
<nominal Essence>. By this <real Essence>, I mean, that real constitution of
any Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties, that are
combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the <nominal>
<Essence>; that particular constitution, which every Thing has within 15 
it self, without any relation to any thing without it. But <Essence>,
even in this sense, <relates to a Sort>, and supposes a <Species>: For being
that real Constitution, on which the Properties depend, it neces-
sarily supposes a sort of Things, Properties belonging only to
<Species>, and not to Individuals; <v.g.> Supposing the nominal Essence 20 
of <Gold>, to be Body of such a peculiar Colour and Weight, with
Malleability and Fusibility, the real Essence is that Constitution of
the parts of Matter, on which these Qualities, and their Union,
depend; and is also the foundation of its Solubility in <Aqua Regia>,
and other Properties accompanying that complex <Idea>. Here are 25 
<Essences> and <Properties>, but all upon supposition of a Sort, or general
abstract <Idea>, which is considered as immutable: but there is no
individual parcel of Matter, to which any of these Qualities are so
annexed, as to be <essential> to it, or inseparable from it. That which is
<essential>, belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that 30 
Sort: But take away the consideration of its being ranked under the
name of some abstract <Idea>, and then there is nothing necessary to
it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the <real Essences> of
Substances, we only suppose their Being, without precisely know-
ing what they are: But that which annexes them still to the <Species>, 35 
is the nominal Essence, of which they are the supposed foundation
and cause.

                                                                #P 443#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 07#. The next thing to be considered is, by which of those Essen-
ces it is, that <Substances are determined into> Sorts, or <Species>; and that
tis evident, is <by the nominal Essence>. For 'tis that alone, that the
name, which is the mark of the Sort, signifies. 'Tis impossible
therefore, that any thing should determine the Sorts of Things, 5
which we rank under general Names, but that <Idea>, which that
Name is design'd as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn,
which we call the <Nominal Essence>. Why do we say, This is a <Horse>,
and that a <Mule>; this is an <Animal>, that an <Herb>? How comes any
particular Thing to be of this or that <Sort>, but because it has that 10
nominal Essence, Or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract <Idea>,
that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his
own Thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those, or other
Names of Substances, to know what sort of <Essences> they stand for.
#S 08#. And that the <Species of Things to us, are nothing but the ranking> 15
<them under distinct Names, according to the complex> Ideas <in us>; and not
according to precise, distinct, real <Essences> in them, is plain from
hence; That we find many of the Individuals that are ranked into
one Sort, called by one common Name, and so received as being of
one <Species>, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitu-
tions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which
they are accounted to differ <specifically>. This, as it is easy to be
observed by all, who have to do with natural Bodies; so Chymists
especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, when they,
sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of 25
Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others.
For though they are Bodies of the same <Species>, having the same
nominal <Essence>, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon
severe ways of examination, betray Qualities so different one from
another, as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary 30
Chymists. But if Things were distinguished into <Species>, according
to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different
Properties in any two individual Substances of the same <Species>, as
it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral
Triangles. That is properly the <Essence> to us, which determines 35
every particular to this or that <Classis>; or, which is the same Thing,

#P 444#
#L 1#
to this or that general Name: And what can that be else, but that
abstract <Idea>, to which that name is annexed? and so has, in truth, a
reference, not so much to the being of particular Things, as to their
general Denominations.
#S 09#. Nor indeed <can we> rank, and <sort Things>, and consequently  5   
which is the end of sorting) denominate them <by their real Essences>,
because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther
towards the knowledge and distinction of Substances, than a
Collection of those sensible <Ideas>, which we observe in them; which
however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are 10 
capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution,
from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's
<Idea> is from the inward contrivance of that famous Clock at <Stras->
<burg>, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motions. There
is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound 15 
the most inlarged Understanding. Though the familiar use of
Things about us, take off our Wonder; yet it cures not our
Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones, we tread on;
or the Iron, we daily handle, we presently find, we know not their
Make; and can give no Reason, of the different Qualities we find 20 
in them. 'Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their
Properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the
grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is
that Texture of Parts, that real <Essence>, that makes Lead, and Anti-
mony fusible; Wood, and Stones not? What makes Lead, and Iron 25 
malleable; Antimony, and Stones not? And yet how infinitely these
come short, of the fine Contrivances, and unconceivable <real>
<Essences> of Plants and Animals, every one knows. The Workmanship
of the All-wise, and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the
Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and 30 
Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than
the best contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Con-
ceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we
in vain pretend to range Things into sorts, and dispose them into
certain Classes, under Names, by their <real Essences>, that are so far 35 
from our discovery or comprehension. A blind Man may as soon

                                                                #P 445#
                                                                #L 1#
sort Things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, as well
distinguish a Lily and a Rose by their Odors, as by those internal
Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distin-
guish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are unknown to
him, may be pleased to try his Skill in those <Species>, called <Cassiowary>, 5
and <Querechinchio>; and by their internal real Essences, determine the
boundaries of those <Species>, without knowing the complex <Idea> of
sensible Qualities, that each of those Names stands for, in the Coun-
tries where those Animals are to be found.
#S 10#. Those therefore who have been taught, that the several 10
<Species> of Substances had their distinct internal <substantial Forms>; and
that it was those <Forms>, which made the distinction of Substances
into their true <Species> and <Genera>, were led yet farther out of the way,
by having their Minds set upon fruitless Enquiries after <substantial>
<Forms>, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much 15
as any obscure, or confused Conception in general.
#S 11#. That our <ranking>, and distinguishing natural <Substances into>
<Species consists in the Nominal Essences> the Mind makes, and not in the
real Essences to be found in the Things themselves, is farther evi-
dent from our <Ideas> of <Spirits>. For the Mind getting, only by 20
reflecting on its own Operations, those simple <Ideas> which it
attributes to <Spirits>, it hath, or can have no other Notion of <Spirit>,
but by attributing all those Operations, it finds in it self, to a sort of
Beings, without Consideration of Matter. And even the most ad-
vanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple 25
<Ideas> which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our
selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them,
than would be in their absence, attributing, I say, those simple
<Ideas> to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got from reflecting
on our selves, the <Idea> of Existence, Knowledge, Power, and Pleasure, 30
each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more
we have of each, the better; joyning all these together, with infinity
to each of them, we have the complex <Idea> of an eternal, omniscient,
omnipotent, infinitely wise, and happy Being. And though we are
told, that there are different <Species of Angels>; yet we know not how 35
to frame distinct specifick <Ideas> of them; not out of any Conceit,

#P 446#
#L 1#
that the Existence of more <Species> than one of <Spirits>, is impossible;
But because having no more simple <Ideas> (nor being able to frame
more) applicable to such Beings, but only those few, taken from our
selves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and
being delighted, and moving several parts of our Bodies; we can no 5  
otherwise distinguish in our Conceptions the several <Species of>
<Spirits>, one from another, but by attributing those Operations and
Powers, we find in our selves, to them in a higher or lower degree;
and so have no very distinct specifick <Ideas> of <Spirits>, except only of
GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all those other 10 
<Ideas> with Infinity; to the other <Spirits>, with limitation: Nor, as I
humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our <Ideas>, put
any difference by any number of simple <Ideas>, which we have of one,
and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular
<Ideas> of Existence, Knowledge, Will, Power, and Motion, <etc.> being 15 
<Ideas> derived from the Operations of our Minds, we attribute all of
them to all sorts of <Spirits>, with the difference only of degrees, to the
utmost we can imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as
well as we can, an <Idea> of the first Being; who yet, 'tis certain, is
infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of his Nature, from 20 
the highest and perfectest of all created Beings, than the greatest
Man, nay, purest Seraphim, is from the most contemptible part of
Matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow
Understandings can conceive of him.
#S 12#. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, 25    
that there may be many <Species of Spirits>, as much separated and
diversified one from another by distinct Properties, whereof we
have no <Ideas>, as the <Species> of sensible Things are distinguished one
from another, by Qualities, which we know, and observe in them.
That there should be more <Species> of intelligent Creatures above us, 30 
than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me
from hence; That in all the visible corporeal World, we see no
Chasms, or Gaps. All quite down from us, the descent is by easy
steps, and a continued series of Things, that in each remove, differ

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very little one from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings,
and are not Strangers to the airy Region: and there are some Birds,
that are Inhabitants of the Water; whose Blood is cold as Fishes,
and their Flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allow'd them
on Fish-days. There are Animals so near of kin both to Birds and 5
Beasts, that they are in the middle between both: Amphibious
Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatique together; Seals live at
Land and at Sea, and Porpoises have the warm Blood and Entrails of
a Hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of Mermaids, or
Sea-men. There are some Brutes, that seem to have as much Know-  
ledge and Reason, as some that are called Men: and the Animal and
Vegetable Kingdoms, are so nearly join'd, that if you will take the
lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be
perceived any great difference between them; and so on till we
come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of Matter, we 15
shall find every-where, that the several <Species> are linked together,
and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider
the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to
think, that it is suitable to the magnificent Harmony of the Uni-
verse, and the great Design and infinite Goodness of the Architect, 20
that the <Species> of Creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend
upward from us toward his infinite Perfection, as we see they
gradually descend from us downwards: Which if it be probable, we
have reason then to be perswaded, that there are far more <Species> of
Creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being in degrees of 25
Perfection much more remote from the infinite Being of GOD, than
we are from the lowest state of Being, and that which approaches
nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct <Species>, for the
reasons above-said, we have no clear distinct <Ideas>.
#S 13#. But to return to the <Species> of corporeal Substances. If I 30
should ask any one, whether <Ice> and <Water> were two distinct
<Species> of Things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the
affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two
distinct <Species>, is in the right. But if an <English-man>, bred in <Jamaica>,
who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of <Ice>, coming into <England> 35
in the Winter, find, the Water he put in his Bason at night, in a
great part frozen in the morning; and not knowing any peculiar

#P 448#
#L 1#
name it had, should call it harden'd Water; I ask, Whether this
would be a new <Species> to him, different from Water? And, I think, it
would be answered here, It would not to him be a new <Species>, no
more than congealed Gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct <Species>,
from the same Gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid Gold, in the 5  
Fornace, is a distinct <Species> from hard Gold in the Hands of a
Workman. And if this be so, 'tis plain, that our <distinct Species, are>
<nothing but distinct complex> Ideas, <with distinct Names annexed to them>.
Tis true, every Substance that exists, has its peculiar Constitution,
whereon depend those sensible Qualities, and Powers, we observe 10 
in it: But the ranking of Things into <Species>, which is nothing but
sorting them under several Titles, is done by us, according to the
<Ideas> that we have of them: Which tho' sufficient to distinguish
them by Names; so that we may be able to discourse of them, when
we have them not present before us: yet if we suppose it to be done 15 
by their real internal Constitutions, and that Things existing are
distinguished by Nature into Species, by real Essences, according
as we distinguish them into <Species> by Names, we shall be liable to
great Mistakes.
#S 14#. To distinguish substantial Beings into <Species>, according to 20   
the usual supposition, that there are certain precise <Essences> or
<Forms> of Things, whereby all the Individuals existing, are, by
Nature, distinguished into <Species>, these Things are necessary:
#S 15#. <First>, To be assured, that Nature, in the production of
Things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated 25 
established <Essences>, which are to be the Models of all Things to be
produced. This, in that crude sense, it is usually proposed, would
need some better explication, before it can fully be assented to.
#S 16#. <Secondly>, It would be necessary to know, whether Nature
always attains that <Essence>, it designs in the production of Things. 30 
The irregular and monstrous Births, that in divers sorts of Animals
have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one, or
both of these.
#S 17#. <Thirdly>, It ought to be determined, whether those we call
<Monsters>, be really a distinct <Species>, according to the scholastick 35 
notion of the word <Species>; since it is certain, that every thing that
exists, has its particular Constitution: And yet we find, that some

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                                                                #L 1#
of these monstrous productions, have few or none of those Qualities,
which are supposed to result from, and accompany the <Essence> of
that <Species>, from whence they derive their Originals, and to which,
by their descent, they seem to belong.
#S 18#. <Fourthly>, The <real Essences> of those Things, which we 5
distinguish into <Species>, and as so distinguished we name, ought to
be known; <i.e.> we ought to have <Ideas> of them. But since we are
ignorant in these four points, <the supposed real Essences of Things, stand>
<us not in stead for the distinguishing Substances into Species>.
#S 19#. <Fifthly>, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that 10
having framed perfect complex <Ideas> of the <Properties> of things,
flowing from their different real Essences, we should thereby
distinguish them into <Species>. But neither can this be done: for being
ignorant of the real Essence it self, it is impossible to know all those
Properties, that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one 15
of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that Essence
is not there, and so the Thing is not of that <Species>. We can never
know what are the precise number of Properties depending on the
real Essence of <Gold>, any one of which failing, the real Essence of
Gold, and consequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew 20
the real Essence of Gold it self, and by that determined that <Species>.
By the Word <Gold> here, I must be understood to design a particular
piece of Matter; <v.g.> the last Guinea that was coin'd. For if it should
stand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex <Idea>,
which I, or any one else calls Gold; <i.e.> for the nominal Essence of 25
Gold, it would be <Jargon>: so hard is it, to shew the various meaning
and imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but Words
to do it by.
#S 20#. By all which it is clear, That our <distinguishing Substances into>
<Species> by Names, <is not> at <all founded on their real Essences>; nor can we 30
pretend to range, and determine them exactly into Species, accord-
ing to internal essential differences.
#S 21#. But since, as has been remarked, we have need of general
Words, tho' we know not the real Essences of Things; all we can do,
is to collect such a number of simple <Ideas>, as by Examination, we 35
find to be united together in Things existing, and thereof to make

#P 450#
#L 1#
one complex <Idea>. Which though it be not the real Essence of any
Substance that exists, is yet <the specifick Essence>, to which our Name
belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try
the Truth of these nominal Essences. For Example, there be that
say, that the Essence of <Body> is extension: If it be so, we can never 5  
mistake in putting the Essence of any thing for the Thing it self.
Let us then in Discourse, put <Extension> for <Body>; and when we
would say, that Body moves, let us say, that Extension moves, and
see how it will look. He that should say, that one Extension, by
impulse moves another extension, would, by the bare Expression, 10 
sufficiently shew the absurdity of such a Notion. The <Essence> of any
thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex <Idea>, comprehended
and marked by that Name; and in Substances, besides the several
distinct simple <Ideas> that make them up, the confused one of Sub-
stance, or of an unknown Support and Cause of their Union, is 15 
always a part: And therefore the Essence of Body is not bare
Extension, but an extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended
solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible,
as to say, <Body> moves, or impels. Likewise, to say, that a rational
Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one, as to say, a <Man>. But 20 
no one will say, That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because
it makes not the whole Essence, to which we give the Name Man.
#S 22#. There are Creatures in the World, that have shapes like
ours, but are hairy, and want Language, and Reason. There are
Naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want 25 
Reason, and some of them Language too. There are Creatures, as
tis said, (<sit fides penes Authorem>, but there appears no contradiction,
that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, and a
shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others
where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females 30 
have. If it be asked, whether these be all <Men>, or no, all of humane
<Species; 'tis> plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Essence:
For those of them to whom the definition of the Word <Man>, or the
complex <Idea> signified by that Name, agrees are <Men>, and the other
not. But if the Enquiry be made concerning the supposed real 35 
Essence; and whether the internal Constitution and Frame of these

                                                                #P 451#
                                                                #L 1#
several Creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible
for us to answer, no part of that going into our specifick <Idea>: only
we have Reason to think, that where the Faculties, or outward
Frame so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the
same: But, what difference in the internal real Constitution makes a 5
specifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilst <our measures of>
<Species> be, as they <are, only our abstract> Ideas, which we know; and
not that internal Constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall
the difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a mark of a different
internal specifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, 10
when they agree in Shape, and want of Reason, and Speech? And
shall not the want of Reason and Speech, be a sign to us of different
real Constitutions and <Species>, between a Changeling, and a reason-
able Man? And so of the rest, if we pretend, that the distinction
of <Species> or Sorts is fixedly established by the real Frame, and 15
secret Constitutions of Things.
#S 23#. Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in
animals by the mixture of Male and Female, and in Plants by Seeds,
keeps the supposed real <Species> distinct and entire. For granting this
to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the <Species> of things 20
no farther than the Tribes of Animals and Vegetables. What must
we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient: for if History
lie not, Women have conceived by Drills; and what real <Species>, by
that measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new
Question; and we have Reason to think this not impossible, since 25
Mules and Gimars, the one from the mixture of an Ass and a Mare,
the other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are so frequent in
the World. I once saw a Creature, that was the Issue of a Cat and a
Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it; wherein Nature
appear'd to have followed the Pattern of neither sort alone, but to 30
have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the
monstrous Productions, that are so frequently to be met with in

#P 452#
#L 1#
Nature, will find it hard, even in the race of Animals to determine
by the Pedigree of what <Species> every Animal's Issue is; and be at a
loss about the real Essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by
Generation, and has alone a right to the specifick name. But farther,
if the <Species> of Animals and Plants are to be distinguished only by 5  
propagation, must I go to the <Indies> to see the Sire and Dam of the
one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gather'd, that produced
the other, to know whether this be a Tiger or that Tea?
#S 24#. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident, that 'tis their own
Collections of sensible Qualities, that Men make the Essences of 10 
their several sorts of Substances; and that their real internal
Structures, are not considered by the greatest part of Men, in the
sorting them. Much less were any <substantial Forms> ever thought on
by any, but those who have in this one part of the World, learned
the Language of the Schools: and yet those ignorant Men, who 15 
pretend not any insight into the real Essences, nor trouble them-
selves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing
Things one from another, by their sensible Qualities, are often
better acquainted with their Differences; can more nicely distin-
guish them from their uses; and better know what they may expect 20 
from each, than those learned quick-sighted Men, who look so deep
into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and
essential.
#S 25#. But supposing that the <real Essences> of Substances were dis-
coverable, by those, that would severely apply themselves to that 25 
Enquiry; yet we could not reasonably think, that the <ranking of>
<things under general Names, was regulated by> those internal real Con-
stitutions, or any thing else but <their obvious appearances>. Since
Languages, in all Countries, have been established long before
Sciences. So that they have not been Philosophers, or Logicians, or 30 
such who have troubled themselves about <Forms> and <Essences>, that
have made the general Names, that are in use amongst the several
Nations of Men: But those, more or less comprehensive terms, have,
for the most part, in all Languages, received their Birth and Sig-
nification, from ignorant and illiterate People, who sorted and 35 

                                                                #P 453#
                                                                #L 1#
denominated Things, by those sensible Qualities they found in
them, thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether
they had an occasion to mention a Sort, or a particular Thing.
#S 26#. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name Substances
by their <nominal>, and not by their real <Essences>, the next thing to be 5
considered is, how, and by whom these <Essences> come to be made.
As to the latter, 'tis evident they <are made by the Mind>, and not by
Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanship, they could not be
so various and different in several Men, as experience tells us they
are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal Essence 10
of any one <Species> of Substances, in all Men the same; no not of that,
which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It
could not possibly be, that the abstract <Idea>, to which the name <Man>
is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of Nature's
making; and that to one it should be <Animal rationale>, and to another 15
<Animal implume bipes latis unguibus>. He that annexes the name <Man>,
to a complex <Idea>, made up of Sense and spontaneous Motion,
join'd to a Body of such a shape, has thereby one Essence of the
<Species Man>: And he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality,
has another Essence of the <Species> he calls <Man>: By which means, the 20
same individual will be a true Man to the one, which is not so to
the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright
Figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the <Species>
<Man>; and yet how far Men determine of the sorts of Animals, rather
by their Shape, than Descent, is very visible; since it has been 25
more than once debated, whether several humane <Foetus> should
be preserved, or received to Baptism, or no, only because of the
difference of their outward Configuration, from the ordinary Make
of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of
Reason, as Infants cast in another Mould: Some whereof, though of 30
an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of
Reason, all their Lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephant;
and never give any signs of being acted by a rational Soul. Whereby
it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found
wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no body could know 35
would be wanting in its due Season, was made essential to the

#P 454#
#L 1#
humane <Species>. The learned Divine and Lawyer, must, on such
occasions, renounce his sacred Definition of <Animal Rationale>, and
substitute some other Essence of the humane <Species>. Monsieur
<Menage> furnishes us with an Example worth the taking notice of
on this occasion. <When the Abbot of St. Martin>, says he, <was born, he>  5 
<had so little of the Figure of a Man, that it bespake him rather a Monster>.
<'Twas for some time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no>.
<However, he was baptized and declared a Man provisionally> [till time should
shew what he would prove.] <Nature had moulded him so untowardly>,
<that he was called all his Life the Abbot Malotru>, i.e. Ill shaped. <He was> 10 
<of> Caen. Menagiana 278/430. This Child we see was very near being
excluded out of the <Species> of <Man>, barely by his Shape. He escaped
very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more odly
turn'd had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be
allowed to pass for a Man. And yet there can be no Reason given, 15 
why if the Lineaments of his Face had been a little alter'd, a rational
Soul could not have been lodg'd in him; why a Visage somewhat
longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth could not have consisted,
as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as
made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the 20 
Church.
#S 27#. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists the precise
and <unmovable Boundaries of> that <Species>? 'Tis plain, if we examine,
there is <no> such thing <made by Nature>, and established by Her
amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Sub-  
stances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are so undeter-
mined in our nominal Essences, which we make our selves, that
if several Men were to be asked, concerning some odly-shaped
<Foetus>, as soon as born, whether it were a <Man>, or no, 'tis past doubt,
one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, 30 
if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the
<Species> of Substances, were not made by Man, with some liberty;
but were exactly copied from precise Boundaries set by Nature,
whereby it distinguish'd all Substances into certain <Species>. Who
would undertake to resolve, what <Species> that Monster was of, which 35 
is mentioned by <Licetus, lib.> 1. <c.> 3. with a Man's Head and Hog's

                                                                #P 455#
                                                                #L 1#
Body? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men, had the Heads
of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, <etc.> If any of these Creatures had
lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty.
Had the upper part, to the middle, been of humane shape, and all
below, Swine; Had it been Murther to destroy it? Or must the Bishop 5
have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted
to the Font, or no? As I have been told, it happen'd in <France> some
Years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the Boundaries
of <Species> of Animals to us, who have no other Measures, than the
complex <Ideas> of our own collecting: And so far are we from certainly 10
knowing what a <Man> is; though, perhaps, it will be judged great
Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say,
that the certain Boundaries of that <Species>, are so far from being
determined, and the precise number of simple <Ideas>, which make the
nominal Essence, so far from being setled, and perfectly known, 15
that very material Doubts may still arise about it: And I imagine,
none of the Definitions of the word Man, which we yet have, nor
Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact, as to
satisfie a considerate inquisitive Person; much less to obtain a
general Consent, and to be that which Men would every where 20
stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and determining of Life and Death,
Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen.
#S 28#. But though these <nominal Essences of Substances> are made by
the Mind, they are <not> yet <made so arbitrarily, as those of mixed Modes>.
To the making of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, <First>, That 25
the <Ideas> whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one
<Idea>, how compounded soever. <Secondly>, That the particular <Ideas>
so united, be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two
abstract complex <Ideas>, differ either in number, or sorts, of their
component parts, they make two different, and not one and the 30
same Essence. In the first of these, the Mind, in making its complex
<Ideas> of Substances, only follows Nature; and puts none together,
which are not supposed to have an union in Nature. No body joins
the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of
Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex 35
<Ideas> of any real Substances; unless he has a mind to fill his Head

#P 456#
#L 1#
with <Chimaera's>, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words. Men,
observing certain Qualities always join'd and existing together,
therein copied Nature; and of <Ideas> so united, made their complex
ones of Substances. For though Men may make what complex
<Ideas> they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet if 5 
they will be understood, when they speak of Things really existing,
they must, in some degree, conform their <Ideas> to the Things they
would speak of: Or else Men's Language will be like that of <Babel>;
and every Man's Words, being intelligible only to himself, would
no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if 10 
the <Ideas> they stand for, be not some way answering the common
appearances and agreement of Substances, as they really exist.
#S 29#. <Secondly>, Though the Mind of Man, <in making> its <complex>
<Ideas of Substances>, never puts any together that do not really, or are
not supposed to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that Union from 15 
Nature: Yet <the number> it combines, <depends upon the various Care>,
<Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it>. Men generally content them-
selves with some few sensible obvious Qualities; and often, if not
always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those
that they take. Of sensible Substances there are two sorts; one of 20 
organiz'd Bodies, which are propagated by Seed; and in these, the
Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality, and most charac-
teristical Part, that determines the <Species>: And therefore in Vege-
tables and Animals, an extended solid Substance of such a certain
Figure usually serves the turn. For however some Men seem to 25 
prize their Definition of <Animal Rationale>, yet should there a Crea-
ture be found, that had Language and Reason, but partaked not of
the usual shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a <Man>,
how much soever it were <Animal Rationale>. And if <Baalam's> Ass had,
all his Life, discoursed as rationally as he did once with his Master, 30 
I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the
name <Man>, or allow'd him to be of the same <Species> with himself. As
in Vegetables and Animals 'tis the Shape, so in most other Bodies,
not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we most fix on, and are
most led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to 35 
imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex <Idea>,
to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities,

                                                                 #P 457#
                                                                 #L 1#
<viz.> Shape and Colour, for so presumptive <Ideas> of several <Species>,
that in a good Picture, we readily say, this is a Lion, and that a Rose;
this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different
Figures and Colours, represented to the Eye by the Pencil.
#S 30#. But though this serves well enough for gross and confused 5
Conceptions, and unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet
<Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple>
Ideas, or Qualities, <belonging to any sort of Things, signified by its name>.
Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill,
strict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what, and how 10
many those simple <Ideas> are, which are constantly and inseparably
united in Nature, and are always to be found together in the same
Subject. Most Men, wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry
enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves
with some few obvious, and outward appearances of Things, 15
thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common
Affairs of Life: And so, without farther examination, give them
names, or take up the Names already in use. Which, though in
common Conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some
few obvious Qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from compre- 
hending, in a setled signification, a precise number of simple <Ideas>;
much less all those, which are united in Nature. He that shall
consider, after so much stir, about <Genus> and <Species>, and such a deal
of talk of specifick Differences, how few Words we have yet setled
Definitions of, may, with Reason, imagine, that those <Forms>, which 25
there hath been so much noise made about, are only <Chimaera's>;
which give us no light into the specifick Natures of Things. And
he that shall consider, how far the names of Substances are from
having Significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have
reason to conclude, that though the nominal Essences of Substances, 30
are all supposed to be copied from Nature; yet they are all, or most
of them, very imperfect. Since the Composition of those complex
<Ideas>, are, in several Men, very different: and therefore, that these
Boundaries of <Species>, are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if
at least there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds. 'Tis true, 35
that many particular Substances are so made by Nature, that they
have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a

#P 458#
#L 1#
Foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of Things by
us, or the making of determinate <Species>, being in order to naming
and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it
can be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the <Species>
of Things: Or if it be so, our Boundaries of <Species>, are not exactly 5  
conformable to those in Nature. For we, having need of general
names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those
Qualities, which would best shew us their most material differences
and agreements; but we our selves divide them, by certain obvious
appearances, into <Species>, that we may the easier, under general 10 
names, communicate our thoughts about them. For having no
other Knowledge of any Substance, but of the simple <Ideas>, that are
united in it; and observing several particular Things to agree with
others, in several of those simple <Ideas>, we make that collection our
specifick <Idea>, and give it a general name; that in recording our own 15 
Thoughts and in our Discourse with others, we may in one short
word, design all the Individuals that agree in that complex <Idea>,
without enumerating the simple <Ideas>, that make it up; and so not
waste our Time and Breath in tedious Descriptions: which we see
they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things, 20 
they have not yet a Name for.
#S 31#. But however, these <Species> of Substances pass well enough in
ordinary Conversation, it is plain, that this complex <Idea>, wherein
they observe several Individuals to agree, is, by different Men,
made very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In 25 
some, this complex <Idea> contains a greater, and in others a smaller
number of Qualities; and so is apparently such as the Mind makes
it. The yellow shining Colour, makes <Gold> to Children; others add
Weight, Malleableness, and Fusibility; and others yet other
Qualities, which they find joined with that yellow Colour, as 30 
constantly as its Weight and Fusibility: For in all these, and the
like Qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex
<Idea> of that Substance, wherein they are all join'd, as another. And
therefore <different Men> leaving out, or putting in several simple
<Ideas>, which others do not, according to their various Examination, 35 
                                                                #P 459#
                                                                #L 1#
Skill, or Observation of that subject, <have different Essences of Gold>;
which must therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making.
#S 32#. If the <number of simple> Ideas, <that make the nominal Essence> of the
lowest <Species>, or first sorting of Individuals, <depends on the Mind> of
Man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident, that they 5
do so, in the more comprehensive <Classes>, which, by the Masters of
Logick are called <Genera>. These are complex <Ideas> designedly im-
perfect: And 'tis visible at first sight, that several of those Qualities,
that are to be found in the Things themselves, are purposely left
out of <generical Ideas>. For as the Mind, to make general <Ideas>, com-  10
prehending several particulars, leaves out those of Time, and Place,
and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one
Individual, so to make other yet more general <Ideas>, that may
comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those Qualities that
distinguish them, and puts into its new Collection, only such <Ideas>, 15
as are common to several sorts. The same Convenience that made
Men express several parcels of yellow Matter coming from <Guiny>
and <Peru>, under one name, sets them also upon making of one name,
that may comprehend both Gold, and Silver, and some other Bodies
of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those Qualities, which 20
are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex <Idea>, made up
of those, that are common to them all. To which the name, Metal
being annexed, there is a <Genus> constituted; the Essence whereof
being that abstract <Idea>, containing only Malleableness and
Fusibility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixedness, wherein 25
some Bodies of several Kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other
Qualities peculiar to Gold, and Silver, and the other sorts compre-
hended under the name <Metal>. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow
not exactly the Patterns set them by Nature, when they make their
general <Ideas> of Substances; since there is no Body to be found, 30
which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it, without other
Qualities as inseparable as those. But Men, in making their general
<Ideas>, seeking more the convenience of Language and quick dispatch,
#P 460#
#L 1#
by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise
Nature of Things, as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract
<Ideas>, chiefly pursued that end, which was, to be furnished with
store of general, and variously comprehensive Names. So that in
this whole business of <Genera> and <Species>, the <Genus>, or more com- 5   
prehensive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the <Species>, and
the <Species>, but a partial <Idea> of what is to be found in each individual.
If therefore any one will think, that a <Man>, and a <Horse>, and an
Animal, and a Plant, <etc.> are distinguished by real Essences made by
Nature, he must think Nature to be very liberal of these real 10  
Essences, making one for Body, another for an Animal, and another
for a Horse; and all these Essences liberally bestowed upon <Buce->
<phalus>. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these
<Genera> and <Species>, or Sorts, we should find, that there is no new
Thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs whereby 15  
we may be enabled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of
particular Things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions,
which we have framed to that purpose. In all which, we may observe,
that the more general term, is always the name of a less complex
<Idea>; and that each <Genus> is but a partial conception of the <Species> 20  
comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general <Ideas> be
thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain estab-
lished relation, between them and certain names, which are made
use of to signifie them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as
made by Nature. 25  
#S 33#. <This> is <adjusted to the true end of Speech>, which is to be the
easiest and shortest way of communicating our Notions. For thus
he, that would make and discourse of Things, as they agreed in the
complex <Idea> of Extension and Solidity, needed but use the word
<Body>, to denote all such. He that, to these, would join others, 30  
signified by the words Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, needed
but use the word <Animal>, to signify all which partaked of those
<Ideas>: and he that had made a complex <Idea> of a Body, with Life,
Sense, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain
Shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable Man, to 35  
express all particulars that correspond to that complex <Idea>. This
                                                                #P 461#
                                                                #L 1#
is the proper business of <Genus> and <Species>: and this Men do, without
any consideration <of real Essences>, or <substantial Forms>, which come not
within the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of those things;
nor within the signification of our Words, when we discourse with
others.                                                              5
#S 34#. Were I to talk with any one, of a Sort of Birds, I lately saw
in St. <James>'s Park, about three or four Foot high, with a Covering
of something between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown colour,
without Wings, but in the place thereof, two or three little Branches,
coming down like sprigs of Spanish Broom; long great Legs, with 10
Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I must make this
Description of it, and so may make others understand me: But
when I am told, that the name of it is <Cassuaris>, I may then use that
word to stand in discourse for all my complex <Idea> mentioned in
that description; though by that word, which is now become a 15
specifick name, I know no more, of the real Essence, or Constitu-
tion of that sort of Animals, than I did before; and knew probably as
much of the nature of that <Species> of Birds, before I learn'd the name,
as many <English->men do of Swans, or Herons, which are specifick
names, very well known of sorts of Birds common in <England>.         20
#S 35#. From what has been said, 'tis evident, that <Men make sorts of>
<Things>. For it being different Essences alone, that make different
<Species>, 'tis plain, that they who make those abstract <Ideas>, which are
the nominal Essences, do thereby make the <Species>, or Sort. Should
there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, 25
except Malleableness, 'twould, no doubt, be made a question
whether it were Gold or no; <i.e.> whether it were of that <Species>. This
could be determined only by that abstract <Idea>, to which every one
annexed the name <Gold>: so that it would be true Gold to him, and
belong to that <Species>, who included not Malleableness in his nomi- 30
nal Essence, signified by the Sound <Gold>; and on the other side, it
would not be true Gold, or of that <Species> to him, who included
Malleableness in his specifick <Idea>. And who, I pray, is it, that makes
these divers <Species>, even under one and the same name, but Men
that make two different abstract <Ideas>, consisting not exactly of 35
the same collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Supposition to
imagine, that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities
#P 462#
#L 1#
of Gold may be without Malleableness; since it is certain, that Gold
it self will be sometimes so eager, (as Artists call it) that it will as
little endure the Hammer, as Glass it self. What we have said, of the
putting in, or leaving out of Malleableness out of the complex <Idea>,
the name <Gold> is, by any one, annexed to, may be said of its peculiar 5  
Weight, Fixedness, and several other the like Qualities: For what-
soever is left out, or put in, 'tis still the complex <Idea>, to which that
name is annexed, that makes the <Species>: and as any particular
parcel of Matter answers that <Idea>, so the name of the sort belongs
truly to it; and it is of that <Species>. And thus any thing is true <Gold>, 10 
perfect <Metal>. All which determination of the <Species>, 'tis plain,
depends on the Understanding of Man, making this or that com-
plex <Idea>.
#S 36#. This then, in short, is the case: <Nature makes many particular>
<Things, which do agree> one with another, in many sensible Qualities, 15 
and probably too, in their internal frame and Constitution: but 'tis
not this real Essence that distinguishes them into <Species; 'tis <1Men>,
who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find united in them,
and wherein, they observe often several individuals to agree, <range>
<them into Sorts, in order to their naming>, for the convenience of compre-  
hensive signs; under which individuals, according to their con-
formity to this or that abstract <Idea>, come to be ranked as under
Ensigns: so that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a
Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think, consists the whole business of
<Genus> and <Species>. 25 
#S 37#. I do not deny, but Nature, in the constant production of
particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but
very much alike and of kin one to another: But I think it is never-
theless true, that <the boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them>,
<are made by Men>; since the Essences of the <Species>, distinguished by 30 
different Names, are, as has been proved, of Man's making, and
seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the Things they are
taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of
Things, is the Workmanship of Men.
#S 38#. One thing, I doubt not, but will seem very strange in this 35   
                                                                #P 463#
                                                                #L 1#
Doctrine; which is, that from what hath been said, it will follow,
that <each abstract> Idea, <with a name to it, makes a distinct Species>. But who
can help it, if Truth will have it so? For so it must remain, till some
body can shew us the <Species> of Things, limited and distinguished by
something else; and let us see, that general terms signify not our 5
abstract <Ideas>, but something different from them. I would fain
know, why a Shock and a Hound, are not as distinct <Species>, as a
Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other <Idea> of the different
Essence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different
Essence of a Shock and a Hound; all the essential difference, where-  
by we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting
only in the different Collection of simple <Ideas>, to which we have
given those different names.
#S 39#. How much <the making of> Species <and> Genera <is in order to>
<general names>, and how much general Names are necessary, if not to 15
the Being, yet at least to the completing of a <Species>, and making it
pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above con-
cerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Example. A silent and a
striking <Watch>, are but one <Species>, to those who have but one name
for them: but he that has the name <Watch> for one, and <Clock> for the 20
other, and distinct complex <Ideas>, to which those names belong,
to him they are different <Species>. It will be said, perhaps, that the
inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two,
which the Watch-maker has a clear <Idea> of. And yet, 'tis plain, they
are but one <Species> to him, when he has but one name for them. For 25
what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a new <Species>?
There are some <Watches>, that are made with four Wheels, others
with five: Is this a specifick difference to the Workman? Some have
Strings and Physies, and others none; some have the Balance loose,
and others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hogs 30
Bristles: Are any, or all of these enough to make a specifick differ-
ence to the Workman, that knows each of these, and several other
different contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of <Watches>?
Tis certain, each of these hath a real difference from the rest: But
whether it be an essential, a specifick difference or no, relates only 35
to the complex <Idea>, to which the name <Watch> is given: as long as
#P 464#
#L 1#
they all agree in the <Idea> which that name stands for, and that name
does not as a generical name comprehend different <Species> under it,
they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will
make minuter Divisions from Differences, that he knows in the
internal frame of Watches; and to such precise complex <Ideas>, give 5  
Names, that shall prevail, they will then be new <Species> to them, who
have those <Ideas> with names to them; and can, by those differences,
distinguish Watches into these several sorts, and then <Watch> will
be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct <Species> to
Men, ignorant of Clock-work, and the inward Contrivances of 10 
Watches, who had no other <Idea>, but the outward shape and Bulk,
with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them, all those
other Names would be but synonymous Terms for the same <Idea>,
and signifie no more, nor no other thing but a <Watch>. Just thus, I
think, it is in natural Things. No body will doubt, that the Wheels, 15 
or Springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a <rational Man>,
and a <Changeling>, no more than that there is a difference in the frame
between a <Drill> and a <Changeling>. But whether one, or both these
differences be essential, or specifical, is only to be known to us, by
their agreement, or disagreement with the complex <Idea> that the 20 
name <Man> stands for: For by that alone can it be determined,
whether one, or both, or neither of those be a Man, or no.
#S 40#. From what has been before said, we may see the reason, <why>,
<in the Species of artificial Things, there is generally less confusion and un->
<certainty, than in natural>. Because an <artificial> Thing being a pro-  
duction of Man, which the Artificer design'd, and therefore well
knows the <Idea> of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
<Idea>, nor to import any other Essence, than what is certainly to
be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the <Idea>, or
Essence, of the several sorts of <artificial> Things, consisting, for the 30 
most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts;
and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer
fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn, it is not beyond
the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain <Idea> thereof; and so
settle the signification of the Names, whereby the Species of 35 
                                                                #P 465#
                                                                #L 1#
<artificial> Things are distinguished, with less Doubt, Obscurity, and
Equivocation, than we can in Things natural, whose differences and
Operations depend upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our
Discoveries.
#S 41#. I must be excused here, if I think, <artificial Things are of> 5
<distinct Species>, as well as natural: Since I find they are as plainly and
orderly ranked into sorts, by different abstract <Ideas>, with general
names annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of
natural Substances. For why should we not think a Watch, and
Pistol, as distinct Species one from another, as a Horse, and a Dog, 10
they being expressed in our Minds by distinct <Ideas>, and to others,
by distinct Appellations?
#S 42#. This is farther to be observed concerning <Substances>, that
they <alone> of all our several sorts of <Ideas, have> particular, or <proper>
<Names>, whereby one only particular Thing is signified. Because in 15
simple <Ideas>, Modes, and Relations, it seldom happens, that Men
have occasion to mention often this, or that particular, when it is
absent. Besides the greatest part of mixed Modes, being Actions,
which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration, as
Substances, which are the Actors; and wherein the simple <Ideas> that 20
make up the complex <Ideas> designed by the Name, have a lasting
Union.
#S 43#. I must beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long
upon this Subject, and perhaps, with some Obscurity. But I desire,
it may be considered, how <difficult> it is, <to lead another by Words into> 25
<the Thoughts of Things, stripp'd of those specifical differences> we give
them: Which Things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name
them, I thereby rank them into some sort, or other, and suggest to
the Mind the usual abstract <Idea> of that <Species>; and so cross my
purpose. For to talk of <a Man>, and to lay by, at the same time, the 30
ordinary signification of the Name Man, which is our complex
<Idea>, usually annexed to it; and bid the Reader consider <Man>, as he
is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others, in his
#P 466#
#L 1#
internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something, he
knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do, who
would speak of the supposed real Essences and <Species> of Things, as
thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it under-
stood, that there is no such thing signified by the general Names, 5  
which Substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known
familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an
Example, to make the different Consideration, the Mind has of
specifick Names and <Ideas>, a little more clear; and to shew how the
complex <Ideas> of Modes, are referred sometimes to Archetypes in 10 
the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or which is the same, to the
signification annexed by others to their received Names; and some-
times to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the
Mind always refers its <Ideas> of Substances, either to the Substances
themselves, or to the signification of their Names, as to the <Arche-> 15 
<types>; and also to make plain the Nature of <Species>, or sorting of
Things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the Essences
belonging to those <Species>, which is, perhaps, of more Moment, to
discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, than we at
first imagine. 20 
#S 44#. Let us suppose <Adam> in the State of a grown Man, with a
good Understanding, but in a strange Country, with all Things
new, and unknown about him; and no other Faculties, to attain the
Knowledge of them, but what one of this Age has now. He observes
<Lamech> more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a 25 
suspicion he has of his Wife <Adah> (whom he most ardently loved)
that she had too much Kindness for another Man. <Adam> discourses
these his Thoughts to <Eve>, and desires her to take care that <Adah>
commit not folly: And in these Discourses with <Eve>, he makes use
of these two new Words, <Kinneah> and <Niouph>. In time, <Adam>'s 30 
mistake appears, for he finds <Lamech>'s Trouble proceeded from
having kill'd a Man: But yet the two Names, <Kinneah> and <Niouph>;
the one standing for suspicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Dis-
loyalty to him, and the other, or the Act of Committing Dis-
loyalty, lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then, that 35 
                                                               #P 467#
                                                               #L 1#
here were two distinct complex <Ideas> of mixed Modes, with Names
to them, two distinct Species of Actions essentially different, I ask
wherein consisted the Essences of these two distinct Species of
Actions, and 'tis plain, it consisted in a precise combination of
simple <Ideas>, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the 5
complex <Idea> in <Adam>'s Mind, which he call'd <Kinneah>, were ade-
quate, or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a Combination of
simple <Ideas>, which he without any regard to any Archetype,
without respect to any thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together,
abstracted and gave the Name <Kinneah> to, to express in short to 10
others, by that one sound, all the simple <Ideas> contain'd and united
in that complex one, it must necessarily follow, that it was an
adequate <Idea>. His own choice having made that Combination, it
had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect,
could not but be adequate, it being referr'd to no other Archetype, 15
which it was supposed to represent.
#S 45#. These Words, <Kinneah> and <Niouph>, by degrees grew into
common use; and then the case was somewhat alter'd. <Adam>'s
Children had the same Faculties, and thereby the same Power that
he had, to make what complex <Ideas> of mixed Modes they pleased 20
in their own Minds; to abstract them, and make what Sounds, they
pleased, the signs of them: But the use of Names being to make our
<Ideas> within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the
same Sign stands for the same <Idea> in two, who would communi-
cate their Thoughts, and Discourse together. Those therefore of 25
<Adam>'s Children, that found these two Words, <Kinneah> and <Niouph>,
in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds: but
must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain <Ideas>,
abstract <Ideas>, they being general Names, which abstract <Ideas> were
the Essences of the Species distinguished by those Names. If there- 
fore they would use these Words, as Names of Species already
establish'd and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the <Ideas>,
in their Minds, signified by these Names, to the <Ideas>, that they
stood for in other Men's Minds, as to their Patterns and <Arche->
<types>; and then indeed their <Ideas> of these complex Modes were 35
liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that
consisted of Combinations of many simple <Ideas>) not to be exactly
conformable to the <Ideas> in other Men's Minds, using the same
#P 468#
#L 1#
Names; though for this, there be usually a Remedy at Hand, which
is, to ask the meaning of any word, we understand not, of him that
uses it: it being as impossible, to know certainly, what the Words
Jealousy and Adultery (which I think answer         and     )
stand for in another Man's Mind, with whom I would discourse 5  
about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of Language, to
know what <Kinneah> and <Niouph> stood for in another Man's Mind,
without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.
#S 46#. Let us now also consider after the same manner, the Names
of Substances, in their first Application. One of <Adam>'s Children, 10 
roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Substance, which
pleases his Eye; Home he carries it to <Adam>, who, upon considera-
tion of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an
exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the Quali-
ties, he takes notice of in it, and abstracting this complex <Idea>, 15 
consisting of a Substance having that peculiar bright Yellowness,
and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the
Name <Zahab>, to denominate and mark all Substances, that have
these sensible Qualities in them. 'Tis evident now that, in this Case,
<Adam> acts quite differently, from what he did before in forming 20 
those <Ideas> of mixed Modes, to which he gave the Name <Kinneah> and
<Niouph>. For there he put <Ideas> together, only by his own Imagination,
not taken from the Existence of any thing; and to them he gave
Names to denominate all Things, that should happen to agree to
those his abstract <Ideas>, without considering whether any such 25 
thing did exist, or no: the Standard there was of his own making.
But in the forming his <Idea> of this new Substance he takes the quite
contrary Course; here he has a Standard made by Nature; and
therefore being to represent that to himself, by the <Idea> he has of it,
even when it is absent, he puts in no simple <Idea> into his complex 30 
one, but what he has the Perception of from the thing it self. He
takes Care that his <Idea> be conformable to this <Archetype>, and
intends the Name should stand for an <Idea> so conformable.
#S 47#. This piece of Matter, thus denominated <Zahab> by <Adam>,
being quite different from any he had seen before, no Body, I 35 
think, will deny to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar
                                                                #P 469#
                                                                #L 1#
Essence; and that the Name <Zahab> is the mark of the Species, and a
Name belonging to all Things partaking in that Essence. But here
it is plain, the Essence, <Adam> made the Name <Zahab> stand for, was
nothing but a Body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But
the inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledge of 5
these, as I may say, superficial Qualities, puts Adam upon farther
Examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it with
Flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: He finds it yield
to Blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will bend
without breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former 10
<Idea>, and made part of the Essence of the Species, that Name
<Zahab> stands for? Farther Trials discover Fusibility, and Fixedness.
Are not they also, by the same Reason, that any of the others were,
to be put into the complex <Idea>, signified by the Name <Zahab>? If
not, What Reason will there be shewn more for the one than the 15
other? If these must, then all the other Properties, which any farther
Trials shall discover in this Matter, ought by the same Reason to
make a part of the Ingredients of the complex <Idea>, which the Name
<Zahab> stands for, and so be the Essence of the Species, marked by
that Name. Which Properties, because they are endless, it is plain, 20
that the <Idea> made after this fashion by this <Archetype>, will be always
inadequate.
#S 48#. But this is not all, it would also follow, that the <Names of>
<Substances> would not only have, (as in truth they have) but would
also be supposed to <have different Significations, as used by different> 25
<Men>, which would very much cumber the use of Language. For if
every distinct Quality, that were discovered in any Matter by any
one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex <Idea>,
signified by the common Name given it, it must follow, that Men
must suppose the same Word to signify different Things in different 30
Men: since they cannot doubt, but different Men may have dis-
covered several Qualities in Substances of the same Denomination,
which others know nothing of.
#S 49#. To avoid this therefore, they have <supposed a real Essence>
<belonging to every Species>, from which these Properties all flow, and 35
#P 470#
#L 1#
would have their name of the Species stand for that. But they not
having any <Idea> of that real Essence in Substances, and their Words
signifying nothing but the <Ideas> they have, that which is done by
this Attempt, is only to put the name or sound, in the place and
stead of the thing having that real Essence, without knowing what  5 
the real Essence is; and this is that which Men do, when they speak
of Species of Things, as supposing them made by Nature, and
distinguished by real Essences.
#S 50#. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all <Gold> is fixed,
either it means that Fixedness is a part of the Definition, part of the 10 
nominal Essence the Word <Gold> stands for; and so this Affirmation,
all <Gold is fixed>, contains nothing but the signification of the Term
<Gold>. Or else it means, that Fixedness not being a part of the
definition of the Word <Gold>, is a Property of that Substance it self:
in which case, it is plain, that the Word <Gold> stands in the place of a 15 
Substance, having the real Essence of a Species of Things, made by
Nature. In which way of Substitution, it has so confused and un-
certain a signification, that though this Proposition, <Gold is fixed>, be
in that sense an Affirmation of something real; yet 'tis a Truth will
always fail us in its particular Application, and so is of no real Use 20 
nor Certainty. For let it be never so true, that all <Gold, i.e.> all that
has the real Essence of <Gold>, is fixed, What serves this for, whilst we
know not in this sense, what is or is not <Gold>? For if we know not
the real Essence of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what
parcel of Matter has that Essence, and so whether it be true <Gold> 25 
or no.
#S 51#. To conclude; what liberty <Adam> had at first to make any
complex <Ideas> of mixed Modes, by no other Pattern, but by his own
Thoughts, the same have all Men ever since had. And the same
necessity of conforming his <Ideas> of Substances to Things without 30 
him, as to <Archetypes> made by Nature, that <Adam> was under, if he
would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever
since under too. The same Liberty also, that <Adam> had of affixing
any new name to any <Idea>; the same has any one still, (especially
the beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such,) but only 35 
with this difference, that in Places, where Men in Society have
                                                                #P 471#
                                                                #L 1#
already established a Language amongst them, the signification of
Words are very warily and sparingly to be alter'd. Because Men
being furnished already with Names for their <Ideas>, and common
Use having appropriated known names to certain <Ideas>, an affected
misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath 5
new Notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new
Terms to express them: But Men think it a Boldness, and 'tis un-
certain, whether common Use will ever make them pass for currant.
But in Communication with others, it is necessary, that we con-
form the <Ideas> we make the vulgar Words of any Language stand 10
for, to their known proper Significations, (which I have explain'd at
large already,) or else to make known that new Signification, we
apply them to.


#C 07#                        CHAPTER VII

                             <Of Particles>.

#S 01#. BESIDES Words, which are names of <Ideas> in the Mind, there
are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the <connex-> 
<ion> that the Mind gives to <Ideas, or Propositions, one with another>. The
Mind, in communicating its thought to others, does not only need
signs of the <Ideas> it has then before it, but others also, to shew or
intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating
to those <Ideas>. This it does several ways; as, <Is>, and <Is not>, are the 20
general marks of the Mind, affirming or denying. But besides
affirmation, or negation, without which, there is in Words no Truth
or Falshood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments to others,
connect, not only the parts of Propositions, but whole Sentences
one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to 25
make a coherent Discourse.
#S 02#. The Words, whereby it signifies what connection it gives to
the several Affirmations and Negations, that it unites in one con-
tinued Reasoning or Narration, are generally call'd <Particles>: and
tis in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the 30
#P 472#
#L 1#
clearness and beauty of a good Stile. To think well, it is not enough,
that a Man has <Ideas> clear and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he
observes the agreement, or disagreement of some of them; but he
must think in train, and observe the dependence of his Thoughts
and Reasonings, one upon another: And to express well such  5 
methodical and rational Thoughts, he must have words to <shew>
what <Connexion, Restriction, Distinction, Opposition, Emphasis>, etc. he
gives to each respective <part of his Discourse>. To mistake in any of
these, is to puzzle, instead of informing, his Hearer: and therefore it
is, that those words, which are not truly, by themselves, the names 10 
of any <Ideas>, are of such constant and indispensible use in Language,
and do so much contribute to Men's well expressing themselves.
#S 03#. This part of Grammar has been, perhaps, as much neglected
as some others over-diligently cultivated. 'Tis easy for Men to
write, one after another, of <Cases> and <Genders, Moods> and <Tenses>, 15 
<Gerunds> and <Supines>: In these and the like, there has been great
diligence used; and Particles themselves, in some Languages, have
been, with great shew of exactness, ranked into their several Orders.
But though <Prepositions> and <Conjunctions>, etc. are names well known
in Grammar, and the Particles contained under them carefully 20 
ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would shew the
right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have,
must take a little more pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and
observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing.
#S 04#. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to 25   
render them, as is usually in Dictionaries, by Words of another
Tongue which came nearest to their signification: For what is
meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as
another Language. They are all <marks of some Action, or Intimation of>
<the Mind>; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several 30 
views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and
several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none,
or very deficient Names, are diligently to be studied. Of these,
there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles,
that most Languages have, to express them by: and therefore it is 35 
not to be wondred, that most of these Particles have divers, and
sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew Tongue,
                                                                #P 473#
                                                                #L 1#
there is a Particle consisting but of one single Letter, of which there
are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty
several significations.
#S 05#. <BUT> is a Particle, none more familiar in our Language: and
he that says it is a discretive Conjunction, and that it answers <Sed> 5
in Latin, <or Mais> in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it.
But yet it seems to me to intimate several relations, the Mind
gives to the several Propositions or Parts of them, which it joins by
this monosyllable.
First, <BUT to say no more>: Here it intimates a stop of the Mind, in 10
the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.
Secondly, <I saw BUT two Planets>: Here it shews, that the Mind
limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.
Thirdly, <You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the>
<true Religion>.                                                        15
Fourthly, <BUT that he would confirm you in your own>: The first of
these <BUTS>, intimates a supposition in the Mind, of something
otherwise than it should be; the latter shews, that the Mind makes
a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.
Fifthly, All <Animals have sense; BUT a Dog is an Animal>: Here it 20
signifies little more, but that the latter Proposition is joined to the
former, as the <Minor> of a Syllogism.
#S 06#. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other
significations of this Particle, if it were my business to examine it in
its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: 25
which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is
made use of, it would deserve the title of <Discretive>, which Gram-
marians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this
sort of Signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give
occasion to reflect upon their use and force in Language, and lead us 30
into the contemplation of several Actions of our Minds in dis-
coursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these
Particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain construc-
tions, have the sense of a whole Sentence contain'd in them.
#P 474#
#C 08#                       CHAPTER VIII

                    <Of Abstract and Concrete Terms>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. THE ordinary Words of Language, and our common use of
them, would have given us light into the nature of our <Ideas>, if they
had been but considered with attention. The Mind, as has been
shewn, has a power to abstract its <Ideas>, and so they become
Essences, general Essences, whereby the Sorts of Things are dis- 5  
tinguished. Now each abstract <Idea> being distinct, so that of any
two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive
knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in Propositions,
no two whole <Ideas> can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see
in the common use of Language, which permits <not any two abstract> 10 
<Words, or Names of abstract Ideas>, to be <affirmed one of another>. For how
near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is,
that Man is an Animal, or rational, or white, yet every one, at first
hearing, perceives the falshood of these Propositions; <Humanity is>
<Animality>, or <Rationality>, or <Whiteness>: And this is as evident, as any 15 
of the most allow'd Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only in
concrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract <Idea> to be another,
but one abstract <Idea> to be join'd to another; which abstract <Ideas>,
in Substances, may be of any sort; in all the rest, are little else but of
Relations; and in Substances, the most frequent are of Powers; <v.g.> 20 
<a Man is White>, signifies, that the thing that has the Essence of a
Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing but a
power to produce the <Idea> of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can
discover ordinary Objects; or <a Man is rational>, signifies, that the
same thing, that hath the Essence of a Man, hath also in it the 25 
Essence of Rationality, <i.e.> a power of Reasoning.
#S 02#. This distinction of Names, shews us also the difference of our
<Ideas>: For if we observe them, we shall find, that our <simple Ideas have>
<all abstract, as well as concrete Names>: The one whereof is (to speak the
Language of Grammarians) a Substantive, the other an Adjective,; 30 
as Whiteness, White; Sweetness, Sweet. The like also holds in our
<Ideas> of <Modes> and Relations; as Justice, Just; Equality, Equal; only
with this difference, That some of the concrete Names of Relations,
                                                                 #P 475#
                                                                 #L 1#
amongst Men chiefly, are Substantives; as <Paternitas, Pater>; whereof
it were easy to render a Reason. But as to our <Ideas> of <Substances>, we
have very few or <no abstract Names> at all. For though the Schools
have introduced <Animalitas, Humanitas, Corporietas>, and some others;
yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of Names of 5
Substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt
the coining of abstract ones: and those few that the Schools forged,
and put into the mouths of their Scholars, could never yet get ad-
mittance into common use, or obtain the license of publick appro-
bation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all 10
Mankind, that they have no <Ideas> of the real Essences of Substances,
since they have not Names for such <Ideas>: which no doubt they would
have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their
ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an attempt. And there-
fore though they had <Ideas> enough to distinguish Gold from a 15
Stone, and Metal from Wood; yet they but timorously ventured
on such terms, as <Aurietas> and <Saxietas, Metallietas> and <Lignietas>, or
the like names, which should pretend to signify the real Essences
of those Substances, whereof they knew they had no <Ideas>. And
indeed, it was only the Doctrine of <substantial Forms>, and the confi- 
dence of mistaken Pretenders to a knowledge that they had not,
which first coined, and then introduced <Animalitas>, and <Humanitas>,
and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own
Schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding
Men. Indeed, <Humanitas> was a Word familiar amongst the <Romans>; 25
but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract Essence of
any Substance; but was the abstract Name of a Mode, and its
concrete <Humanus>, not <Homo>.


#C 09#                        CHAPTER IX

                     <Of the Imperfection of Words>.

#S 01#.  FROM what has been said in the foregoing Chapters, it is easy
to perceive, what imperfection there is in Language, and how the 30
#P 476#
#L 1#
very nature of Words, makes it almost unavoidable, for many of
them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To
examine the perfection, or imperfection of Words, it is necessary
first to consider their use and end: For as they are more or less
fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the 5   
former part of this Discourse, often, upon occasion, mentioned
<a double use of Words>.
      <First>, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.
      <Secondly>, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to
others. 10  
#S 02#. As to the first of these, for <the recording our own Thoughts> for
the help of our own Memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to our
selves, any Words will serve the turn. For since Sounds are volun-
tary and indifferent signs of any <Ideas>, a Man may use what Words
he pleases, to signify his own <Ideas> to himself: and there will be no 15  
imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the
same <Idea>: for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood,
wherein consists the right use and perfection of Language.
#S 03#. <Secondly>, As to <communication by Words>, that too <has a double use>.

        I. <Civil>. 20      
        II. <Philosophical>.

      <First>, By their <civil Use>, I mean such a communication of Thoughts
and <Ideas> by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conver-
sation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Convenien-
cies of civil Life, in the Societies of Men, one amongst another. 25  
      <Secondly>, By the <Philosophical Use> of Words, I mean such an use of
them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and
to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths,
which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search
after true Knowledge. These two Uses are very distinct; and a 30  
great deal less exactness will serve in the one, than in the other, as
we shall see in what follows.
#S 04#. The chief End of Language in Communication being to be
understood, Words serve not well for that end, neither in civil, nor
philosophical Discourse, when any Word does not excite in the 35  
                                                                #P 477#
#L 1#
Hearer, the same <Idea> which it stands for in the Mind of the Speaker.
Now since Sounds have no natural connexion with our <Ideas>, but
have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of Men, the
<doubtfulness> and uncertainty <of their signification>, which <is the imper->
<fection> we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the <Ideas> they 5
stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one Sound, more than in
another, to signify any <Idea>: For in that regard, they are all equally
perfect.
That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the
signification of some more than other Words, is the difference of 10
<Ideas> they stand for.
#S 05#. Words having naturally no signification, the <Idea> which each
stands for, must be learned and retained by those, who would
exchange Thoughts, and hold intelligible Discourse with others, in
any Language. But this is hardest to be done, where,                 15
<First>, The <Ideas> they stand for, are very complex, and made up of a
great number of <Ideas> put together.
<Secondly>, Where the <Ideas> they stand for, have no certain connex-
ion in Nature; and so no settled Standard, any where in Nature
existing, to rectify and adjust them by.                             20
<Thirdly>, Where the signification of the Word is referred to a
Standard, which Standard is not easy to be known.
<Fourthly>, Where the signification of the Word, and the real
Essence of the Thing, are not exactly the same.
These are difficulties that attend the signification of several 25
Words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all,
such as Names standing for any simple <Ideas>, which another has not
Organs or Faculties to attain; as the Names of Colours to a blind
Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man, need not here be mentioned.
In all these cases, we shall find an imperfection in Words; which I 30
shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our
several sorts of <Ideas>: For if we examine them, we shall find, that the
<Names of mixed Modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for>
<the two first of these Reasons; and the Names of Substances chiefly for the two>
<latter>.                                                              35
#S 06#. <First>, The Names of <mixed Modes>, are many of them liable to
great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.
#P 478#
#L 1#
      I. <Because of> that <great Composition>, these complex <Ideas> are often
made up of. To make Words serviceable to the end of Communi-
cation, it is necessary, (as has been said) that they excite, in the
Hearer, exactly the same <Idea>, they stand for in the Mind of the
Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another's Heads with noise and 5   
sounds; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before
one another their <Ideas>, which is the end of Discourse and Lan-
guage. But when a word stands for a very complex <Idea>, that is
compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for Men to form
and retain that <Idea> so exactly, as to make the Name in common use, 10  
stand for the same precise <Idea>, without any the least variation.
Hence it comes to pass, that Men's Names, of very compound
<Ideas>, such as for the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in
two different Men, the same precise signification; since one Man's
complex <Idea> seldom agrees with anothers, and often differs from 15  
his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to morrow.
#S 07#. II. <Because the names of mixed Modes>, for the most part, <want>
<Standards> in Nature, whereby Men may rectify and adjust their
significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They
are assemblages of <Ideas> put together at the pleasure of the Mind, 20  
pursuing its own ends of Discourse, and suited to its own Notions;
whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to
denominate and rank Things, as they come to agree, with those
Archetypes or Forms it has made. He that first brought the word
<Sham, Wheedle>, or <Banter> in use, put together, as he thought fit, 25  
those <Ideas> he made it stand for: And as it is with any new Names of
Modes, that are now brought into any Language; so was it with the
old ones, when they were first made use of. Names therefore, that
stand for Collections of <Ideas>, which the Mind makes at pleasure,
must needs be of doubtful signification, when such Collections are 30  
no-where to be found constantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns
to be shewn whereby Men may adjust them. What the word
<Murther>, or <Sacriledge, etc.> signifies, can never be known from
Things themselves: There be many of the parts of those complex
<Ideas>, which are not visible in the Action it self, the intention of the 35  
Mind, or the Relation of holy Things, which make a part of
                                                                #P 479#
                                                                #L 1#
<Murther>, or <Sacrilege>, have no necessary connexion with the out-
ward and visible Action of him that commits either: and the
pulling the Trigger of the Gun, with which the Murther is com-
mitted, and is all the Action, that, perhaps, is visible, has no natural
connexion with those other <Ideas>, that make up the complex one, 5
named <Murther>. They have their union and combination only from
the Understanding which unites them under one Name: but uniting
them without any Rule, or Pattern, it cannot be, but that the sig-
nification of the Name, that stands for such voluntary Collections,
should be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have 10
scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves, and their Notions
by, in such arbitrary <Ideas>.
#S 08#. 'Tis true, <common Use>, that is the Rule of Propriety, may be
supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of
Language; and it cannot be denied, but that in some measure it 15
does. Common use <regulates the meaning of Words> pretty well for
common Conversation; but no body having an Authority to estab-
lish the precise signification of Words, nor determine to what <Ideas>
any one shall annex them, common Use is not sufficient to adjust
them to philosophical Discourses; there being scarce any Name, of 20
any very complex <Idea>, (to say nothing of others,) which, in com-
mon Use, has not a great latitude, and which keeping within the
bounds of Propriety, may not be made the sign of far different <Ideas>.
Besides, the rule and measure of Propriety it self being no where
established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that way 25
of using a Word, be propriety of Speech, or no. From all which, it is
evident, that the Names of such kind of very complex <Ideas>, are
naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain
signification; and even in Men, that have a Mind to understand one
another, do not always stand for the same <Idea> in Speaker and Hearer.  30
Though the Names <Glory> and <Gratitude> be the same in every Man's
mouth, through a whole Country, yet the complex collective <Idea>,
which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently
very different in Men using the same Language.
#S 09#. <The way> also <wherein the names of mixed Modes are ordinarily> 35
<learned, does> not a little <contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification>.
For if we will observe how Children learn Languages, we shall find,
#P 480#
#L 1#
that to make them understand what the names of simple <Ideas>, or
Substances, stand for, People ordinarily shew them the thing,
whereof they would have them have the <Idea>; and then repeat to
them the name that stands for it, as <White, Sweet, Milk, Sugar, Cat>,
<Dog>. But as for mixed Modes, especially the most material of them, 5   
moral Words, the Sounds are usually learn'd first, and then to know
what complex <Ideas> they stand for, they are either beholden to the
explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left
to their own Observation and industry; which being little laid out
in the search of the true and precise meaning of Names, these moral 10  
Words are, in most Men's mouths, little more than bare Sounds;
or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and
undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused significa-
tion. And even those themselves, who have with more attention
settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to 15  
have them stand for complex <Ideas>, different from those which other,
even intelligent and studious Men, make them the signs of. Where
shall one find any, either <controversial Debate>, or <familiar Discourse>,
concerning <Honour, Faith, Grace, Religion, Church>, etc. wherein it is
not easy to observe the different Notions Men have of them; which 20  
is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification
of those Words; nor have in their minds the same complex <Ideas>
which they make them stand for: and so all the contests that
follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And
hence we see, that in the interpretation of Laws, whether Divine, 25  
or Humane, there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Ex-
plications make new matter for Explications: And of limiting, dis-
tinguishing, varying the signification of these moral Words, there
is no end. These <Ideas> of Men's making, are, by Men still having
the same Power, multiplied <in infinitum>. Many a Man, who was pretty 30  
well satisfied of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the
Code, at first reading, has by consulting Commentators, quite lost
the sense of it, and, by those Elucidations, given rise or increase to
his Doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this,
that I think Commentaries needless; but to shew how uncertain 35  
the Names of mixed Modes naturally are, even in the mouths of
those, who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as
clearly, as Language was capable to express their Thoughts.
                                                                #P 481#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 10#. What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the
Writings of Men, who have lived in remote Ages, and different
Countries, it will be needless to take notice. Since the numerous
Volumes of learned Men, employing their Thoughts that way, are
proofs more than enough, to shew what Attention, Study, Sagacity, 5
and Reasoning is required, to find out the true meaning <of ancient>
<Authors>. But there being no Writings we have any great concern-
ment to be very sollicitous about the meaning of, but those that
contain either Truths we are required to believe, or Laws we are to
obey, and draw inconveniences on us, when we mistake or trans- 
gress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other Authors;
who Writing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater
necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil
depending not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their
Notions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use 15
their Words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them
aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus with our
selves,
                <Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi>. *
#S 11#. If the signification of the Names of mixed Modes are un- 
certain, because there be no real Standards existing in Nature, to
which those <Ideas> are referred, and by which they may be adjusted,
the <Names of Substances are of a doubtful signification>, for a contrary
reason, <viz. because> the <Ideas>, they stand for, are supposed conform-
able to the reality of Things, and are <referred to Standards> made by 25
Nature. In our <Ideas> of Substances we have not the liberty as in
mixed Modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to be the
characteristical Notes, to rank and denominate Things by. In these
we must follow Nature, suit our complex <Ideas> to real Existences,
and regulate the signification of their Names by the Things them- 
selves, if we will have our Names to be the signs of them, and stand
for them. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to follow; but Patterns,
that will make the signification of their names very uncertain: For
Names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the <Ideas>
#P 482#
#L 1#
they stand for, be referred to Standards without us, <that either cannot>
<be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly>.
#S 12#. The <Names of Substances have>, as has been shewed, a double
<reference> in their ordinary use.
<First>, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signi-      
fication is supposed to agree to, <The real Constitution of Things>, from
which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But
this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be called) Essence, being
utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must
be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to 10  
know, what Things are, or ought to be called an <Horse>, or <Antimony>,
when those Words are put for real Essences, that we have no <Ideas>
of at all. And therefore in this supposition, the Names of Substances
being referred to Standards that cannot be known, their signifi-
cations can never be adjusted and established by those Standards. 15  
#S 13#. <Secondly>, The <simple Ideas> that are found to <co-exist in Sub->
<stances>, being that which their Names immediately signify, these,
as united in the several Sorts of Things, <are> the proper <Standards> to
which their Names are referred, and by which their Significations
may best be rectified. But neither will these <Archetypes> so well serve 20  
to this purpose, as to leave these Names without very various and
uncertain significations. Because these simple <Ideas> that co-exist,
and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and
having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick <Idea>,
which the specifick Name is to stand for, Men, though they pro-   
pose to themselves the very same subject to consider yet frame
very different <Ideas> about it; and so the Name they use for it,
unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different signifi-
cations. The simple Qualities which make up the complex <Ideas>,
being most of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are 30  
apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite.
He that shall but observe, what a great variety of alterations any
one of the baser Metals is apt to receive, from the different appli-
cation only of Fire; and how much a greater number of Changes
any of them will receive in the Hands of a Chymist, by the appli-   
cation of other Bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the
                                                                #P 483#
#L 1#
Properties of any sort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and com-
pletely known by the ways of enquiry, which our Faculties are
capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no Man can
know the precise and definite number, they are differently dis-
covered by different Men, according to their various skill, atten-  
tion, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuse but have
different <Ideas> of the same Substance, and therefore make the sig-
nification of its common Name very various and uncertain. For the
complex <Ideas> of Substances, being made up of such simple ones as
are supposed to co-exist in Nature, every one has a right to put into 10
his complex <Idea>, those Qualities he has found to be united together.
For though in the Substance <Gold>, one satisfies himself with Colour
and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in <Aqua Regia>, as
necessary to be joined with that Colour in his <Idea> of Gold, as any
one does its Fusibility; Solubility in <Aqua Regia>, being a Quality as 15
constantly join'd with its Colour and Weight, as Fusibility, or any
other; others put in its Ductility or Fixedness, <etc.> as they have
been taught by Tradition, or Experience. Who of all these, has
establish'd the right signification of the Word <Gold>? Or who shall
be the Judge to determine? Each has his Standard in Nature, which 20
he appeals to, and with Reason thinks he has the same right to put
into his complex <Idea>, signified by the word <Gold>, those Qualities,
which upon Trial he has found united; as another, who has not so
well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made
other Trials, has to put in others. For the Union in Nature of these 25
Qualities, being the true Ground of their Union in one complex
<Idea>, Who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left
out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow,
that the complex <Ideas> of Substances, in Men using the same Name
for them, will be very various; and so the significations of those 30
names, very uncertain.
#S 14#. Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which,
in some of its simple <Ideas>, does not communicate with a greater,
and in others with a less number of particular Beings: Who shall
determine in this Case, which are those that are to make up the 35
precise Collection, that is to be signified by the specifick Name; or
can with any just Authority prescribe, which obvious or common
Qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more particular,
are to be put into the signification of the name of any Substance?
#P 484#
#L 1#
All <which> together, seldom or never fail to <produce> that various and
<doubtful Signification in the names of Substances>, which causes such Un-
certainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical
Use of them.
#S 15#. 'Tis true, as <to civil and common Conversation>, the general 5      
<names of Substances>, regulated in their ordinary Signification by some
obvious Qualities, (as by the Shape and Figure in Things of known
seminal Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part by
Colour, join'd with some other sensible Qualities,) <do well enough>,
to design the Things Men would be understood to speak of: And 10  
so they usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the
Word <Gold>, or <Apple>, to distinguish the one from the other. <But in>
<Philosophical Enquiries and Debates>, where general Truths <are> to be
establish'd, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down,
there the precise signification of the names of Substances will be 15  
found, not only <not> to be <well established>, but also very hard to be so.
For Example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain degree
of Fixedness, a part of his complex <Idea> of <Gold>, may make Propo-
sitions concerning Gold, and draw Consequences from them, that
will truly and clearly follow from <Gold>, taken in such a signification: 20  
But yet such as another Man can never be forced to admit, nor be
convinced of their Truth, who makes not Malleableness, or the
same degree of Fixedness, part of that complex <Idea>, that the name
<Gold>, in his use of it, stands for.
#S 16#. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in 25    
almost all the names of Substances, in all Languages whatsoever,
which Men will easily find, when once passing from confused or
loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For
then they will be convinced, how doubtful and obscure those
Words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appeared 30  
very clear and determined. I was once in a Meeting of very learned
and ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question,
whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves.
The Debate having been managed a good while, by variety of
Arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the 35  
                                                                #P 485#
                                                                #L 1#
greatest part of Disputes were more about the signification of
Words, than a real difference in the Conception of Things) desired,
That before they went any farther on in this Dispute, they would
first examine, and establish amongst them, what the Word <Liquor>
signified. They at first were a little surprised at the Proposal; and 5
had they been Persons less ingenuous, they might perhaps have
taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: Since there was no
one there, that thought not himself to understand very perfectly,
what the Word <Liquor> stood for; which, I think too, none of the
most perplexed names of Substances. However, they were pleased 10
to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the
signification of that Word, was not so settled and certain, as they
had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a different
complex <Idea>. This made them perceive, that the Main of their
Dispute was about the signification of that Term; and that they 15
differed very little in their Opinions, concerning some fluid and
subtile Matter, passing through the Conduits of the Nerves; though
it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called <Liquor>, or no,
a thing which when each considered, he thought it not worth the
contending about.                                                  20
#S 17#. How much this is the Case in the greatest part of Disputes,
that Men are engaged so hotly in, I shall, perhaps, have an occasion
in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little
more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the Word <Gold>, and
we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. 25
I think all agree, to make it stand for a Body of a certain yellow
shining Colour; which being the <Idea> to which Children have
annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail, is
properly to them Gold. Others finding Fusibility join'd with that
yellow Colour in certain parcels of Matter, make of that combination 30
a complex <Idea> to which they give the name <Gold> to denote a sort of
Substances; And so exclude from being <Gold> all such yellow shining
Bodies, as by Fire will be reduced to ashes, and admit to be of that
#P 486#
#L 1#
Species, or to be comprehended under that name <Gold> only such
Substances as having that shining yellow Colour will by fire be
reduced to Fusion, and not to Ashes. Another by the same Reason
adds, the Weight, which being a Quality, as straitly join'd with that
Colour, as its Fusibility, he thinks has the same Reason to be 5   
join'd in its <Idea>, and to be signified by its name: And therefore the
other made up of Body, of such a Colour and Fusibility, to be im-
perfect; and so on of all the rest: Wherein no one can shew a Reason,
why some of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in
nature, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others left out: 10  
Or why the Word <Gold>, signifying that sort of Body the Ring on his
Finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather by its Colour,
Weight, and Fusibility; than by its Colour, Weight, and Solu-
bility in <Aqua Regia>: Since the dissolving it by that Liquor, is as
inseparable from it, as the Fusion by Fire; and they are both of them 15  
nothing, but the relation which that Substance has to two other
Bodies, which have a Power to operate differently upon it. For by
what right is it, that Fusibility comes to be a part of the Essence,
signified by the Word <Gold>, and Solubility but a property of it? Or
why is its Colour part of the Essence, and its Malleableness but a 20  
property? That which I mean, is this, That these being all but
Properties, depending on its real Constitution; and nothing but
Powers, either active or passive, in reference to other Bodies, no one
has Authority to determine the signification of the Word <Gold>, (as
referr'd to such a Body existing in Nature) more to one Collection 25  
of <Ideas> to be found in that Body, than to another: Whereby the
signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain.
Since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in
the same Substance; and, I think, I may say no body all. And there-
fore we have but very imperfect descriptions of Things, and Words 30  
have very uncertain Significations.
#S 18#. From what has been said, it is easy to observe, what has
been before remarked, <viz.> That the <Names of simple> Ideas <are>, of all
others the <least liable to Mistakes>, and that for these reasons. <First>,
                                                                #P 487#
                                                                #L 1#
Because the <Ideas> they stand for, being each but one single percep-
tion, are much easier got, and more clearly retain'd, than the more
complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which
usually attends those compounded ones of <Substances and mixed>
<Modes>, in which the precise number of simple <Ideas>, that make them 5
up, are not easily agreed, nor so readily kept in mind. And <Secondly>,
because they are never referr'd to any other Essence, but barely that
Perception they immediately signify: Which reference is that, which
renders the signification of the names of Substances naturally so
perplexed, and gives occasion to so many Disputes. Men that do not 10
perversly use their Words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil,
seldom mistake in any Language, which they are acquainted with,
the Use and Signification of the names of simple <Ideas, White> and
<Sweet, Yellow> and <Bitter>, carry a very obvious meaning with them,
which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is 15
ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise Collection
of simple <Ideas, Modesty> or <Frugality> stand for in another's use, is not
so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well
enough know, what is meant by <Gold> or <Iron>; yet the precise com-
plex <Idea>, others make them the signs of, is not so certain: And I 20
believe it is very seldom that in Speaker and Hearer, they stand for
exactly the same Collection. Which must needs produce Mistakes
and Disputes, when they are made use of in Discourses, wherein
Men have to do with universal Propositions, and would settle in
their Minds universal Truths, and consider the Consequences, that 25
follow from them.
#S 19#. By the same Rule, the <names of simple Modes are next to those of>
<simple> Ideas, <least liable to Doubt or Uncertainty>, especially those of
Figure and Number, of which Men have so clear and distinct <Ideas>.
Who ever, that had a Mind to understand them, mistook the 30
ordinary meaning of <Seven>, or <a Triangle>? And in general the least
compounded <Ideas> in every kind have the least dubious names.
#P 488#
#L 1#
#S 20#. Mixed Modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and
obvious simple <Ideas>, have usually names of no very uncertain
Signification. But the names of <mixed Modes>, which comprehend a
great number of simple <Ideas>, are commonly of a very doubtful, and
undetermined meaning, as has been shewn. The names of Sub-    
stances, being annexed to <Ideas>, that are neither the real Essences,
nor exact Representations of the patterns they are referred to, are
liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertainty, especially when
we come to a philosophical use of them.
#S 21#. The great disorder that happens in our Names of Sub-     
stances, proceeding for the most part from our want of Knowledge,
and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions, it may
probably be wondered, <Why I charge this as an Imperfection>, rather
<upon our Words> than Understandings. This Exception, has so much
appearance of Justice, that I think my self obliged to give a Reason, 15  
why I have followed this Method. I must confess then, that when I
first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while
after, I had not the least Thought, that any Consideration of Words
was at all necessary to it. But when having passed over the Original
and Composition of our <Ideas>, I began to examine the Extent and 20  
Certainty of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with
Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were
first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and
pertinently concerning Knowledge: which being conversant about
Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And though it 25  
terminated in Things, yet it was for the most part so much by the
intervention of Words, that they seem'd scarce separable from our
general Knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much
between our Understandings, and the Truth, which it would
contemplate and apprehend, that like the <Medium> through which 35  
visible Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom
cast a mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Understandings.
If we consider, in the Fallacies, Men put upon themselves, as well
as others, and the Mistakes in Men's Disputes and Notions, how
great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or mistaken 35  
                                                                 #P 489#
                                                                 #L 1#
Significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle
in the way to Knowledge, which, I conclude we are the more care-
fully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken
notice of as an Inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have
been made the business of Men's study; and obtained the Repu- 
tation of Learning and Subtilty, as we shall see in the following
Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections
of Language, as the Instrument of Knowledge, more throughly
weighed, a great many of the Controversies that make such a noise
in the World, would of themselves cease; and the way to Know-  
ledge, and, perhaps, Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.
#S 22#. Sure I am, that the signification of Words, in all Languages,
depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and <Ideas> of him
that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty, to Men
of the same Language and Country. This is so evident in the Greek 15
Authors, that he, that shall peruse their Writings, will find, in
almost every one of them, a distinct Language, though the same
Words. But when to this natural difficulty in every Country,
there shall be added different Countries, and remote Ages, wherein
the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tempers, 20
Customs, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, <etc.> every one of
which, influenced the signification of their Words then, though to
us now they are lost and unknown, <it would become us to be charitable>
<one to another in our Interpretations or Misunderstandings of> those <ancient>
<Writings>, which though of great concernment to us to be under- 
stood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of Speech, which, (if
we except the Names of simple <Ideas>, and some very obvious
Things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of
conveying the sense and intention of the Speaker, without any
manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the Hearer. And in Discourses 30
of Religion, Law, and Morality, as they are matters of the highest
concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.
#S 23#. The Volumes of Interpreters, and Commentators on the
Old and New Testament, are but too manifest proofs of this. Though
every thing said in the Text be infallibly true, yet the Reader may 35
#P 490#
#L 1#
be, nay cannot chuse but be very fallible in the understanding of it.
Nor is it to be wondred, that the Will of GOD, when cloathed in
Words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which un-
avoidably attends that sort of Conveyance, when even his Son,
whilst cloathed in Flesh, was subject to all the Frailties and Incon-    
veniencies of humane Nature, Sin excepted. And we ought to
magnify his Goodness, that he hath spread before all the World,
such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given all
Mankind so sufficient a light of Reason, that they to whom this
written Word never came, could not (when-ever they set them-   
selves to search) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the
Obedience due to Him. Since then the Precepts of Natural Religion
are plain, and very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to
be controverted; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed to
us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural 15  
obscurities and difficulties incident to Words, methinks it would
become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former,
and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own
sense and interpretations of the latter.


#C 10#                         CHAPTER X

                        <Of the Abuse of Words>.

#S 01#. BESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and 20  
the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the Use
of Words, there are several <wilful Faults and Neglects>, which Men are
guilty of, in this way of Communication, whereby they render
these signs less clear and distinct in their signification, than
naturally they need to be. 25  
#S 02#. <First>, In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the
using of Words, without clear and distinct <Ideas>; or, which is worse,
signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts:
      I. One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that if they
be examined, will be found, in their first Original, and their appro-   
priated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct <Ideas>. These, for
                                                                #P 491#
                                                                #L 1#
the most part, the several <Sects> of Philosophy and Religion have
introduced.  For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting
something singular, and out of the way of common apprehensions,
or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weakness of
their Hypothesis, seldom fail to <coin> new Words, and such as, when 5
they come to be examined, may justly be called <insignificant Terms>.
For having either had no determinate Collection of <Ideas> annexed to
them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well
examined, will be found inconsistent, 'tis no wonder if afterwards,
in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty Sounds, with 10
little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have
them often in their Mouths, as the distinguishing Characters of
their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to
examine, what are the precise <Ideas> they stand for. I shall not need
here to heap up Instances, every one's reading and conversation will 15
sufficiently furnish him: Or if he wants to be better stored, the
great Mint-Masters of these kind of Terms, I mean the Schoolmen
and Metaphysicians, (under which, I think, the disputing natural
and moral Philosophers of these latter Ages, may be comprehended,)
have wherewithal abundantly to content him.                      20
#S 03#. II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who
take so little care to lay by Words, which in their primary notation
have scarce any clear and distinct <Ideas> which they are annexed to,
that by an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly <use Words>,
which the Propriety of Language has affixed to very important <Ideas>, 25
<without any distinct meaning> at all.  <Wisdom, Glory, Grace>, etc. are
Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth; but if a great many
of those who use them, should be asked, what they mean by them?
they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: A plain
proof, that though they have learned those Sounds, and have them 30
ready at their Tongues end, yet there are no determined <Ideas> laid
up in their Minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.
#S 04#. <Men>, having been <accustomed> from their Cradles <to learn>
<Words>, which are easily got and retained, <before they knew>, or had
framed <the complex Ideas>, to which they were annexed, or which 35
#P 492#
#L 1#
were to be found in the things <they> were thought to <stand> for, they
<usually continue to do so> all their Lives, and without taking the pains
necessary to settle in their Minds determined <Ideas>, they use their
Words for such unsteady and confused Notions as they have, con-
tenting themselves with the same Words other People use; as if 5   
their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same
meaning. This, though Men make a shift with, in the ordinary
Occurrences of Life, where they find it necessary to be understood,
and therefore they make signs till they are so; Yet this insignifi-
cancy in their Words, when they come to Reason concerning either 10  
their Tenents or Interest, manifestly fills their Discourse with
abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in
moral Matters, where the Words, for the most part, standing for
arbitrary and numerous Collections of <Ideas>, not regularly and
permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only 15  
thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain Notions annexed
to them. Men take the Words they find in use amongst their Neigh-
bours; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use
them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a cer-
tain fixed meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this 20  
advantage, That as in such Discourses they seldom are in the right,
so they are as seldom to be convinced, that they are in the wrong;
it being all one to go about to draw those Men out of their Mistakes,
who have no setled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his
Habitation, who has no setled abode. This I guess to be so; and 25  
every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be, or no.
#S 05#. <Secondly>, Another great abuse of Words is, <Inconstancy> in the
use of them. It is hard to find a Discourse written of any Subject,
especially of Controversie, wherein one shall not observe, if he read
with attention, the same Words (and those commonly the most 30  
material in the Discourse, and upon which the Argument turns)
used sometimes for one Collection of simple <Ideas>, and sometimes for
another, which is a perfect abuse of Language, Words being inten-
ded for signs of my <Ideas>, to make them known to others, not by any
natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, 'tis plain cheat 35  
and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and
sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to
                                                                #P 493#
                                                                #L 1#
nothing but great Folly, or greater dishonesty. And a Man, in his
Accompts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the
Characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for
another Collection of Unites: <v.g.> this Character 3, stand sometimes
for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight; as in his 5
Discourse, or Reasoning, make the same Words stand for different
Collections of simple <Ideas>. If Men should do so in their Reckonings,
I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak
thus, in the Affairs and Business of the World, and call 8 sometimes
seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his Advantage, would 10
presently have clapp'd upon him one of the two Names Men
constantly are disgusted with. And yet in Arguings, and learned
Contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for Wit
and Learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the
misplacing of Counters, in the casting up a Debt; and the cheat the 15
greater, by how much Truth is of greater concernment and value,
than money.
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, Another abuse of Language is, an <affected Obscurity>,
by either applying old Words, to new and unusual Significations; or
introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; 20
or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary
meaning. Though the Peripatetick Philosophy has been most
eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of
it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumbred with some
Difficulties, (such is the imperfection of Humane Knowledge,) 25
which they have been fain to cover with Obscurity of Terms, and
to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Mist before
Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered.
That <Body> and <Extension>, in common use, stand for two distinct
<Ideas>, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their 30
Signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, and as
intelligible to say, the <Body of an Extension>, as <the Extension of a Body>;
and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their
signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the
#P 494#
#L 1#
Signification of Words, Logick, and the liberal Sciences, as they
have been handled in the Schools, have given Reputation; and the
admired Art of Disputing, hath added much to the natural imper-
fection of Languages, whilst it has been made use of, and fitted,
to perplex the signification of Words, more than to discover the 5   
Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that
sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more
obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their Meaning, than they
are in ordinary Conversation.
#S 07#. This is unavoidably to be so, where Men's Parts and Learn-      
ing, are estimated by their Skill in <Disputing>. And if Reputation and
Reward shall attend these Conquests, which depend mostly on the
fineness and niceties of Words, 'tis no Wonder if the Wit of Man so
employ'd, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of
Sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing or 15  
defending any Question; the Victory being adjudged not to him
who had Truth on his side, but the last word in the Dispute.
#S 08#. This, though a very useless Skill, and that which I think the
direct opposite to the ways of Knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto
under the laudable and esteemed Names of <Subtlety> and <Acuteness>; 20  
and has had the applause of the Schools, and encouragement of one
part of the learned Men of the World. And no wonder, since the
Philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling Philosophers I
mean, such as <Lucian> wittily, and with reason taxes,)* and the
Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great and 25  
universal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than
really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignor-
ance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words,
and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible
Terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be 30  
understood: whilst it appears in all History, that these profound
Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their Neighbours; and
brought but small advantage to humane Life, or the Societies,
wherein they lived: Unless the coining of new Words, where they
produced no new Things to apply them to, or the perplexing or 35  
                                                                #P 495#
                                                                #L 1#
obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing all things
into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the Life of
Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.
#S 09#. For, notwithstanding these learned Disputants, these all-
knowing Doctors, it was to the unscholastick Statesman, that the 5
Governments of the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liber-
ties; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanick, (a Name of
Disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful Arts.
Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and <learned Gibberish>, prevailed
mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, 10
who found no easier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion
they have attained, than by amusing the Men of Business, and
Ignorant, with hard Words, or imploying the Ingenious and Idle in
intricate Disputes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them
perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth. Besides, there is no 15
such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd
Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obscure,
doubtful, and undefined Words. Which yet make these Retreats,
more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses
of fair Warriours: which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for 20
the strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the
Obscurity of the Thickets they are beset with. For Untruth being
unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other defence left for
Absurdity, but Obscurity.
#S 10#. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even 25
inquisitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the
World, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the
Understanding. For we see, that other well-meaning and wise Men,
whose Education and Parts had not acquired that <acuteness>, could
intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use, 30
make a benefit of Language. But though unlearned Men well
enough understood the Words <White> and <Black, etc.> and had con-
stant Notions of the <Ideas> signified by those Words; yet there were
Philosophers found, who had learning and <subtlety> enough to prove,
that <Snow> was <black; i.e.> to prove, that <White> was <Black>. Whereby 35
they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of
Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society; whilst with great
Art and <Subtlety> they did no more but perplex and confound the
#P 496#
#L 1#
signification of Words, and thereby render Language less useful,
than the real Defects of it had made it, a Gift, which the illiterate
had not attained to.
#S 11#. These learned Men did equally instruct Men's Under-
standings, and profit their Lives, as he who should alter the signifi-    
cation of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning,
far surpassing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and Vulgar,
should, in his Writing, shew, that he could put <A.> for <B.> and
<D.> for
<E, etc.> to the no small admiration and benefit of his Reader. It being
as sensless to put <Black>, which is a Word agreed on to stand for one 10  
sensible <Idea>, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary <Idea, i.e.> to
call <Snow Black>, as to put this mark <A>. which is a Character agreed
on to stand for one modification of Sound, made by a certain motion
of the Organs of Speech, for <B.> which is agreed on to stand for
another Modification of Sound, made by another certain motion of 15  
the Organs of Speech.
#S 12#. Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical Niceties, or
curious empty Speculations; it hath invaded the great Concern-
ments of Humane Life and Society; obscured and perplexed the
material Truths of Law and Divinity; brought Confusion, Disorder, 20  
and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not destroyed,
yet in great measure rendred useless, those two great Rules,
Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part of the Comments
and Disputes, upon the Laws of GOD and Man served for, but to
make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What 25  
have been the effect of those multiplied curious Distinctions, and
acute Niceties, but Obscurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words
more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a loss? How else comes
it to pass, that Princes, speaking or writing to their Servants, in
their ordinary Commands, are easily understood; speaking to their 30  
People, in their Laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it
not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity, very well
understands a Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he consults an
Expositor, or goes to Council; who by that time he hath done
explaining them, makes the Words signifie either nothing at all, 35  
or what he pleases.
                                                                #P 497#
#L 1#
#S 13#. Whether any by Interests of these Professions have occa-
sioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered,
whether it would not be well for Mankind, whose concernment it is
to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought; and not to
spend their Lives in talking about them, or tossing Words to and 5
fro; Whether it would not be well, I say, that the Use of Words were
made plain and direct; and that Language, which was given us for
the improvement of Knowledge, and bond of Society, should not be
employ'd to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights; to raise
Mists, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion? Or 10
that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought Learning
or Knowledge to do so?
#S 14#. <Fourthly>, Another great <abuse of Words is, the taking them for>
<Things>. This, though it, in some degree, concerns all Names in
general; yet more particularly affects those of Substances. To this 15
Abuse, those Men are most subject, who confine their Thoughts to
any one System, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the
Perfection of any received Hypothesis: whereby they come to be
persuaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are so suited to the Nature
of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence. 20
Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy,
who does not think the Ten Names, under which are ranked the
Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of
Things? Who is there, of that School, that is not persuaded, that
<substantial Forms, vegetative Souls, abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional> 25
<Species>, etc. are something real? These Words Men have learned
from their very entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their
Masters and Systems lay great Stress upon them: and therefore
they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature,
and are the Representations of something that really exists. The 30
<Platonists> have their <Soul of the World>, and the <Epicureans> their
<endeavour towards Motion> in their Atoms, when at rest. There is
scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct set of Terms, that
others understand not. But yet this Gibberish, which in the weak-
ness of Humane Understanding, serves so well to palliate Men's 35
Ignorance, and cover their Errours, comes by familiar use amongst
those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important part of
#P 498#
#L 1#
Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant: And
should <Aerial> and <AEtherial Vehicles> come once, by the prevalency of
that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those
Terms would make impressions on Men's Minds, so as to estab-
lish them in the persuasion of the reality of such Things, as much as 5   
<peripatetick Forms>, and <intentional Species> have heretofore done.
#S 15#. How much <names taken for Things>, are apt to <mislead the>
<Understanding>, the attentive reading of philosophical Writers would
abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in Words little suspected
of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very 10  
familiar one. How many intricate Disputes have there been about
<Matter>, as if there were some such thing really in Nature, distinct
from <Body>; as 'tis evident, the Word <Matter> stands for an <Idea>
distinct from the <Idea> of Body? For if the <Ideas> these two Terms
stood for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all 15  
places be put one for another. But we see, that tho' it be proper to
say, There is <one Matter of all Bodies>, one cannot say, There is <one>
<Body of all Matters>: We familiarly say, one <Body> is bigger than
another, but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one
<Matter> is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? <Viz.> from 20  
hence, that though <Matter> and <Body>, be not really distinct, but
where-ever there is the one, there is the other; <Yet Matter> and <Body>,
stand for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete,
and but a part of the other. For <Body> stands for a solid extended
figured Substance, whereof <Matter> is but a partial and more con-   
fused Conception, it seeming to me to be used for the Substance
and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure:
And therefore it is that speaking of <Matter>, we speak of it always as
one, because in truth, it expresly contains nothing but the <Idea> of a
solid Substance, which is every where the same, every where uni-   
form. This being our <Idea of Matter>, we no more conceive, or speak
of different <Matters> in the World, than we do of different Solidities;
though we both conceive, and speak of different Bodies, because
Extension and Figure are capable of variation. But since Solidity
cannot exist without Extension, and Figure, the taking <Matter> to be 35  
                                                               #P 499#

the name of something really existing under that Precision, has no
doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible Discourses and
Disputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philosophers
concerning <Materia prima>; which Imperfection or Abuse, how far it
may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be con- 
sidered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a
great many fewer Disputes in the World, if Words were taken for
what they are, the Signs of our <Ideas> only, and not for Things them-
selves. For when we argue about <Matter>, or any the like Term, we
truly argue only about the <Idea> we express by that Sound, whether 10
that precise <Idea> agree to any thing really existing in Nature, or no.
And if Men would tell, what <Ideas> they make their Words stand for,
there could not be half that Obscurity or Wrangling, in the search
or support of Truth, that there is.
#S 16#. But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of 15
Words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar use, they
charm Men into Notions far remote from the Truth of Things.
Twould be a hard Matter, to persuade any one, that the Words
which his Father or Schoolmaster, the Parson of the Parish, or such
a Reverend Doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in 20
Nature: Which, perhaps, is <none of the least Causes, that Men are so>
<hardly drawn to quit their Mistakes>, even in Opinions purely Philo-
sophical, and where they have no other Interest but Truth. For the
Words, they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in
their Minds, 'tis no wonder, that the wrong Notions annexed to 25
them, should not be removed.
#S 17#. <Fifthly>, Another <Abuse of Words, is the setting them in the place>
<of Things, which they do or can by no means signify>. We may observe, that
in the general names of Substances, whereof the nominal Essences
are only known to us, when we put them into Propositions, and 30
affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly
suppose, or intend, they should stand for the real Essence of a
certain sort of Substances. For when a Man says <Gold is Malleable>,
he means and would insinuate something more than this, that <what>
<I call Gold is malleable>, (though truly it amounts to no more) but 35
would have this understood, <viz.> that <Gold>; i.e. <what has the real>
<Essence of Gold is malleable>, which amounts to thus much, that
#P 500#
#L 1#
<Malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real Essence of Gold>.
But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Essence consists, the
connexion in his Mind of Malleableness, is not truly with an
Essence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold he puts for
it Thus when we say, that <Animal rationale> is, and <Animal implume> 5   
<bipes latis unguibus>, is not a good definition of a Man; 'tis plain, we
suppose the Name <Man> in this case to stand for the real Essence of
a Species, and would signifie, that a <rational Animal> better described
that real Essence, than <a two-leg'd Animal with broad Nails, and without>
<Feathers>. For else, why might not <Plato> as properly make the Word 10  
              or <Man> stand for his complex <Idea>, made up of the <Ideas>
of a Body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other
outward appearances, <as Aristotle>, make the complex <Idea>, to which
he gave the Name            or <Man>, of Body, and the Faculty of
reasoning join'd together; unless the Name             or <Man>, 15  
were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies;
and to be put in the place of some other thing, than the <Idea> a
Man professes he would express by it?
#S 18#. 'Tis true, the names of Substances would be much more
useful, and Propositions made in them much more certain, were the 20  
real Essences of Substances the <Ideas> in our Minds, which those
words signified. And 'tis for want of those real Essences, that our
Words convey so little Knowledge or Certainty in our Discourses
about them: And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection
as much as it can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for 25  
a Thing, having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer
approaches to it. For though the Word Man or <Gold>, signify nothing
truly but a complex <Idea> of Properties, united together in one sort of
Substances: Yet there is scarce any Body in the use of these Words,
but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having 30  
the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. Which is so far
from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain
Abuse, it adds to it, when we would make them stand for some-
thing, which not being in our complex <Idea>, the name we use, can no
ways be the sign of. 35  
#S 19#. This shews us the Reason, Why in <mixed Modes> any of the
<Ideas> that make the Composition of the complex one, being left out,
                                                                #P 501#
                                                                #L 1#
or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, <i.e.> to be of another
Species, as is plain in <Chance-medly, Man-slaughter, Murther, Parricide>,
etc. The Reason whereof is, because the complex <Idea> signified by
that name, is the real, as well as nominal Essence; and there is no
secret reference of that name to any other Essence, but that. But in 5
<Substances> it is not so. For though in that called <Gold>, one puts into h1s
complex <Idea>, what another leaves out; and <Vice Versa^>: yet Men do
not usually think, that therefore the Species is changed: Because
they secretly in their Minds referr that name, and suppose it
annexed to a real immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which 10
those Properties depend. He that adds to his complex <Idea> of <Gold>,
that of Fixedness or Solubility in <Aqua Regia>, which he put not in it
before, is not thought to have changed the Species; but only to have
a more perfect <Idea>, by adding another simple <Idea>, which is always
in fact, joined with those other, of which his former complex <Idea> 15
consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we
have not the <Idea>, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the
more to involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the
real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the Word <Gold> (which by
standing for a more or less perfect Collection of simple <Ideas>, serves 20
to design that sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) comes to
have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we
have no <Idea> at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the Body
it self is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well
considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about 25
<Gold> in name, and about a parcel of the Body it self, <v.g.> a piece
of <Leaf-Gold> laid before us; though in Discourse we are fain to
substitute the name for the thing.
#S 20#. That which, I think, very much disposes Men to substitute
their names for the real Essences of <Species>, is the supposition before 30
mentioned, that Nature works regularly in the Production of
Things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those <Species>, by giving
exactly the same real internal Constitution to each individual,
which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who
observes their different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the 35
#P 502#
#L 1#
Individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal Consti-
tution, as different one from another, as several of those which are
ranked under different specifick Names. <This supposition>, however
<that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with the same specifick>
<name, makes Men forward to take> those <names for the Representatives> of 5   
those real <Essences>, though indeed they signify nothing but the
complex <Ideas> they have in their Minds when they use them. So
that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for,
or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind
of use, cause a great deal of Uncertainty in Men's Discourses; 10  
especially in those, who have throughly imbibed the Doctrine of
<substantial Forms>, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of
Things to be determined and distinguished.
#S 21#. But however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our
names stand for <Ideas> we have not, or (which is all one) Essences 15  
that we know not, it being in effect to make our Words the signs of
nothing; yet 'tis evident to any one, whoever so little reflects on the
use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar.
When a Man asks, whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a
Drill, or a monstrous <Foetus>, be a <Man>, or no; 'tis evident, the 20  
Question is not, Whether that particular thing agree to his com-
plex <Idea>, expressed by the name <Man>: But whether it has in it the
real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his name <Man>
to stand for. In which way of using the names of Substances, there
are these false suppositions contained. 25  
      <First>, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which
Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are distin-
guished into <Species>. That every Thing has a real Constitution,
whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible Qualities depend,
is past doubt: But I think it has been proved, that this makes not 30  
the distinction of <Species>, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of
their names.
      <Secondly>, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had <Ideas> of these
proposed Essences. For to what purpose else is it, to enquire
whether this or that thing have the real Essence of the Species <Man>, 35  
if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick Essence
known? Which yet is utterly false: And therefore such Application
of names, as would make them stand for <Ideas> which we have not,

                                                          #P 503#
                                                          #L 1#
must needs cause great Disorder in Discourses and Reasonings
about them, and be a great inconvenience in our Communication
by Words.
#S 22#. <Sixthly>, There remains yet another more general, though,
perhaps, less observed <Abuse of Words>; and that is, that Men having 5
by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain <Ideas>, they are
apt <to imagine so near and necessary a connexion between the names and the>
<signification> they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one
cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one
ought to acquiesce in the Words delivered, as if it were past doubt, 10
that in the use of those common received sounds, the Speaker and
Hearer had necessarily the same precise <Ideas>. Whence presuming,
that when they have in Discourse used any Term, they have there-
by, as it were, set before others the very thing they talk of. And so
likewise taking the Words of others, as naturally standing for just 15
what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they
never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand
clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noise,

and Wrangling, without Improvement or Information; whilst Men
take Words to be the constant regular marks of agreed Notions, 20
which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs
of their own <Ideas>. And yet Men think it strange, if in Discourse, or
where it is often absolutely necessary) in Dispute, one sometimes
asks the meaning of their Terms: Though the Arguings one may
every day observe in Conversation, make it evident, that there are 25
few names of complex <Ideas>, which any two Men use for the same
just precise Collection. 'Tis hard to name a Word, which will not be
a clear instance of this. <Life> is a Term, none more familiar. Any one
almost would take it for an Affront, to be asked what he meant by
it. And yet if it comes in Question, whether a Plant, that lies ready 30
formed in the Seed, have Life; whether the Embrio in an Egg before
Incubation, or a Man in a Swound without Sense or Motion, be
alive, or no, it is easy to perceive, that a clear distinct settled <Idea>
does not always accompany the Use of so known a Word, as that of
<Life> is. Some gross and confused Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily 35
have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language,
and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their
#P 504#
#L 1#
ordinary Discourses and Affairs. But this is not sufficient for philo-
sophical Enquiries.  Knowledge and Reasoning require precise
determinate <Ideas>. And though Men will not be so importunately
dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding
an explication of their Terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to  5 
correct others in the use of the Words they receive from them: yet
where Truth and Knowledge are concerned in the Case, I know not
what Fault it can be to desire the explication of Words, whose Sense
seems dubious; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his
Ignorance, in what Sense another Man uses his Words, since he has 10 
no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This
Abuse of taking Words upon Trust, has no where spread so far, nor
with so ill Effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The multiplication
and obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual
World, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill use of Words. For 15 
though it be generally believed, that there is great diversity of
Opinions in the Volumes and Variety of Controversies, the World is
distracted with; yet the most I can find, that the contending learned
Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is,
that they speak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that 20 
when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know
what they think, they think all the same: Though perhaps, what
they would have, be different.
#S 23#. To conclude this Consideration of the Imperfection, and
Abuse of Language; the <ends of Language in our Discourse with others>, 25 
being chiefly these three: <First, To make known> one Man's Thoughts
or <Ideas> to another. <Secondly>, To do it <with> as much ease and <quickness>,
as is possible; and <Thirdly>, Thereby <to convey> the <Knowledge> of
Things. Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails in any
of these Three. 30 
     <First>, Words fail in the first of these Ends, and lay not open one
Man's <Ideas> to anothers view. <First>, When Men have names in their
Mouths without any determined <Ideas> in their Minds, whereof they
are the signs: or <Secondly>, When they apply the common received
names of any Language to <Ideas>, to which the common use of that 35 
Language does not apply them: or <Thirdly>, When they apply them
                                                           #P 505#
                                                           #L 1#
very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for
another <Idea>.
#S 24#. <Secondly>, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts, with all the
quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex <Ideas>,
without having distinct names for them. This is sometimes the 5
Fault of the Language it self, which has not in it a Sound yet apply'd
to such a Signification: and sometimes the Fault of the Man, who
has not yet learn'd the name for that <Idea> he would shew another.
#S 25#. <Thirdly>, There is no Knowledge of Things conveyed by
Men's Words, when their <Ideas> agree not to the Reality of Things. 10
Though it be a Defect, that has its Original in our <Ideas>, which are
not so conformable to the Nature of Things, as Attention, Study,
and Application might make them: Yet it fails not to extend it self
to our Words too, when we use them as Signs of real Beings, which
yet never had any Reality or Existence.                          15
#S 26#. <First>, He that hath Words of any Language, without dis-
tinct <Ideas> in his Mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he
uses them in Discourse, only make a noise without any Sense or
Signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of
hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby 20
in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in
his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the
Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse,
according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the
Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but 25
bare Sounds, and nothing else.
#S 27#. <Secondly>, He that has complex <Ideas>, without particular
names for them, would be in no better a Case than a Bookseller,
who had in his Ware-house Volumes, that lay there unbound, and
without Titles; which he could therefore make known to others, 30
only by shewing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by
Tale. This Man is hindred in his Discourse, for want of Words to
communicate his complex <Ideas>, which he is therefore forced to make
known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them;
and so is fain often to use twenty Words, to express what another 35
Man signifies in one.
#S 28#. <Thirdly>, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the
#P 506#
#L 1#
same <Idea>, but uses the same Words sometimes in one, and some-
times in another Signification, ought to pass in the Schools and
Conversation, for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Ex-
change, who sells several Things under the same Name.
#S 29#. <Fourthly>, He that applies the Words of any Language to 5    
<Ideas>, different from those, to which the common use of that Country
applies them, however his own Understanding may be fill'd with
Truth and Light, will not by such Words be able to convey much
of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however, the Sounds
are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the Ears of those 10 
who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other <Ideas> than
those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the
Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of
him who thus uses them.
#S 30#. <Fifthly>, He that hath imagined to himself Substances such 15   
as never have been, and fill'd his Head with <Ideas> which have not
any correspondence with the real Nature of Things, to which yet he
gives settled and defined Names, may fill his Discourse, and, per-
haps, another Man's Head, with the fantastical Imaginations of his
own Brain; but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in 20 
real and true Knowledge.
#S 31#. He that hath Names without <Ideas>, wants meaning in his
Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex <Ideas>
without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his
Expressions, and is necessitated to use Periphrases. He that uses his 25 
Words loosly and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not
understood. He that applies his Names to <Ideas>, different from their
common use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gib-
berish. And he that hath <Ideas> of Substances, disagreeing with the
real Existence of Things, so far wants the Materials of true Know-  
ledge in his Understanding, and hath, instead thereof, <Chimaeras>.
#S 32#. In our Notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all
the former Inconveniencies: <v.g.> 1. He that uses the word <Tarantula>,
without having any Imagination or <Idea> of what it stands for, pro-
                                                           #P 507#
                                                           #L 1#
nounces a good Word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He
that, in a new-discovered Country, shall see several sorts of Animals
and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true <Ideas> of
them, as of a Horse, or a Stag; but can speak of them only by a
description, till he shall either take the Names the Natives call them 5
by, or give them Names himself. 3. He that uses the word <Body>
sometimes for pure Extension, and sometimes for Extension and
Solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the
Name <Horse>, to that <Idea> which common usage calls <Mule>, talks im-
properly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the Name 10
<Centaur> stands for some real Being, imposes on himself, and mistakes
Words for Things.
#S 33#. In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the
four first of these Inconveniencies, (viz.) 1. I may have in my
Memory the Names of Modes, as <Gratitude>, or <Charity>, and yet not 15
have any precise <Ideas> annexed in my Thoughts to those Names.
1. I may have <Ideas>, and not know the Names that belong to them; 
<v.g.> I may have the <Idea> of a Man's drinking, till his Colour and
Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red,
and his Feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called 20
<Drunkenness>. 3. I may have the <Ideas> of Vertues, or Vices, and Names
also, but apply them amiss: <v.g.> When I apply the Name <Frugality>
to that <Idea> which others call and signify by this sound, <Covetousness>.
I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in Modes
and Relations, I cannot have <Ideas> disagreeing to the Existence of 25
Things: for Modes being complex <Ideas>, made by the Mind at
pleasure; and Relation being but my way of considering, or com-
paring two Things together, and so also an <Idea> of my own making,
these <Ideas> can scarce be found to disagree with any Thing existing;
since they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly 30
made by Nature, nor as Properties inseparably flowing from the
internal Constitution or Essence of any Substance; but, as it were,
Patterns lodg'd in my Memory, with names annexed to them, to
denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exist. But
the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my Con- 
ceptions; and so using Words in a different sense from other People,
I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong <Ideas> of them,
#P 508#
#L 1#
when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my <Ideas> of
mixed Modes or Relations, any inconsistent <Ideas> together, I fill my
Head also with <Chimaeras>; since such <Ideas>, if well examined, cannot
so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being, be ever
denominated from them. 5  
#S 34#. Since Wit and Fancy finds easier entertainment in the
World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, <figurative Speeches>, and
allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as <an> imperfection or
<abuse> of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure
and Delight, than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments 10 
as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if
we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the
Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and
figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for
nothing else but to insinuate wrong <Ideas>, move the Passions, and 15 
thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat: And
therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them
in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Dis-
courses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided;
and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be 20 
thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person that makes
use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous
here to take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the
world, will instruct those, who want to be informed: Only I can-
not but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of 25 
Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since
the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and preferred. 'Tis evident how
much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick, that
powerful instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Pro-
fessors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great 30 
Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness,
if not brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. <Eloquence>,
like the fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer it self ever
to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find fault with those Arts
of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be Deceived. 35 
#P 509#
#C 11#                     CHAPTER XI

<Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. THE natural and improved Imperfections of Language, we
have seen above at large: and Speech being the great Bond that
holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the
Improvements of Knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one
Generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious 5
Thoughts, to consider what <Remedies> are to be found <for these In->
<conveniences> above-mentioned.
#S 02#. I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt
the perfect <Reforming> the <Languages> of the world, no not so much
as that of his own Country, without rendring himself ridiculous. To 10
require that Men should use their words constantly in the same
sense, and for none but determined and uniform <Ideas>, would be to
think, that all Men should have the same Notions, and should talk
of nothing but what they have clear and distinct <Ideas> of. Which is
not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to 15
imagine he can prevail with Men, to be very knowing, or very
silent. And he must be very little skill'd in the world, who thinks
that a voluble Tongue, shall accompany only a good Understand-
ing; or that Men's talking much or little, shall hold proportion only
to their Knowledge.                                            20
#S 03#. But though the Market and Exchange must be left to their
own ways of Talking, and Gossippings not be robb'd of their
ancient Privilege: though the Schools, and Men of Argument
would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered, to abate the
length, or lessen the number of their Disputes; yet, methinks those, 25
<who> pretend <seriously> to <search after>, or maintain <Truth>, should think
themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves
without Obscurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation, to which Men's
Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.
#S 04#. For he that shall well consider the <Errors> and Obscurity, the 30
Mistakes and Confusion, that is <spread in the World by an ill use of>
#P 510#
#L 1#
<Words>, will find some reason to doubt, whether Language, as it
has been employ'd, has contributed more to the improvement or
hindrance of Knowledge amongst Mankind. How many are there,
that when they would think on Things, fix their Thoughts only on
Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to Moral 5  
Matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such Contem-
plations and Reasonings, about little more than Sounds, whilst the
<Ideas> they annexed to them, are very confused, or very unsteady, or
perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such Thoughts and
Reasonings, end in nothing but Obscurity and Mistake, without 10 
any clear Judgment or Knowledge?
#S 05#. This Inconvenience, in an ill use of Words, Men suffer in
their own private Meditations: but much more manifest are the
Disorders which follow from it, in Conversation, Discourse, and
Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, 15 
whereby Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Know-
ledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he
does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things
themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the
Pipes, whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of 20 
Mankind. He that uses Words without any clear and steady mean-
ing, What does he but lead himself and others into Errors? And he
that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to
Truth and Knowledge. And yet, who can wonder, that all the
Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have been so over-charged with 25 
obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Ex-
pressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted,
very little, or not at all the more Knowing or Orthodox; since
Subtilty, in those who make Profession to teach or defend Truth,
hath passed so much for a Vertue: A Vertue, indeed, which con-  
sisting, for the most part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory
use of <obscure> or <deceitful Terms>, is only fit to <make Men> more <conceited>
in their Ignorance, and <obstinate> in their Errors.
#S 06#. Let us look into the Books of Controversy of any kind, there
we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal 35 
Terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds, without
convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. For if the <Idea> be
                                                           #P 511#
                                                           #L 1#
not agreed on, betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words
stand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as
such a Word, whose Signification is not ascertained betwixt them,
comes in use, their Understandings have no other Object wherein
they agree, but barely the Sound, the Things, that they think on at 5
that time as expressed by that Word, being quite different.
#S 07#. Whether a <Bat> be a <Bird>, or no, is not a question, whether a
Bat be another Thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than
indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of: But
the question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledged them-  
selves to have but imperfect <Ideas> of one or both of those sorts of
Things, for which these Names are supposed to stand; and then
it is a real Enquiry, concerning the Nature of a <Bird>, or a <Bat>, to
make their yet imperfect <Ideas> of it more complete, by examining,
whether all the simple <Ideas>, to which combined together, they 15
both give the name <Bird>, be all to be found in a <Bat>: But this is a
question only of Enquirers, (not Disputers,) who neither affirm, nor
deny, but examine: Or, 2. It is a question between Disputants;
whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a <Bat> is a <Bird>.
And then the Question is barely about the signification of one, or 20
both these Words; in that they not having both the same complex
<Ideas>, to which they give these two Names, one holds, and t'other
denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were
they agreed in the Signification of these two Names, it were im-
possible they should dispute about them. For they would presently 25
and clearly see, (were that adjusted between them,) whether all the
simple <Ideas>, of the more general name <Bird>, were found in the
complex <Idea> of a <Bat>, or no; and so there could be no doubt,
whether a <Bat> were a <Bird>, or no. And here I desire it may be con-
sidered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the 30
Disputes in the World, are not meerly Verbal, and about the
Signification of Words; and whether if the terms they are made in,
were defined, and reduced in their Signification (as they must be,
where they signify any thing) to determined Collections of the
simple <Ideas> they do or should stand for, those Disputes would not 35
#P 512#
#L 1#
end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be
considered, what the learning of Disputation is, and how well they
are employed for the advantage of themselves, or others, whose
business is only the vain ostentation of Sounds; <i.e.> those who spend
their Lives in Disputes and Controversies. When I shall see any of 5  
those Combatants, strip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obscurity,
which every one may do in the Words he uses himself) I shall
think him a Champion for Knowledge, Truth, and Peace, and not
the Slave of Vain-glory, Ambition, or a Party.
#S 08#. <To remedy the Defects of Speech> before-mentioned, to some 10   
degree, and to prevent the Inconveniencies that follow from them, I
imagine, the observation of these following Rules may be of use,
till some body better able shall judge it worth his while, to think
more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his
Thoughts on it. 15 
     <First>, A Man should take care <to use no word without a signification>,
no Name without an <Idea> for which he makes it stand. This Rule
will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the
pains to recollect how often he has met with such Words; as <Instinct>,
<Sympathy>, and <Antipathy>, etc. in the Discourse of others, so made use 20 
of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them, had no
<Ideas> in their Minds to which they applied them; but spoke them
only as Sounds, which usually served instead of Reasons, on the
like occasions. Not but that these Words, and the like, have very
proper Significations in which they may be used; but there being no 25 
natural connexion between any Words, and any <Ideas>, these, and
any other, may be learn'd by rote, and pronounced or writ by Men,
who have no <Ideas> in their Minds, to which they have annexed
them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary
they should, if Men would speak intelligibly even to themselves 30 
alone.
#S 09#. <Secondly>, 'Tis not enough a Man <uses> his <Words as signs of>
some <Ideas>; those <Ideas> he annexes them to, if they be <simple> must be
                                                           #P 513#
                                                           #L 1#
clear and distinct; if <complex> must be <determinate, i.e.> the precise Collec-
tion of simple <Ideas> settled in the Mind, with that Sound annexed
to it, as the sign of that precise determined Collection, and no
other. This is very necessary in Names of Modes, and especially
moral Words; which having no settled Objects in Nature, from 5
whence their <Ideas> are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be
very confused. <Justice> is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but most
commonly with a very undetermined loose signification: Which
will always be so, unless a Man has in his Mind a distinct compre-
hension of the component parts, that complex <Idea> consists of; and 10
if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at
last comes to the simple <Ideas>, that make it up: And unless this be
done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it be <Justice>, for
example, or any other. I do not say, a Man needs stand to recollect,
and make this Analysis at large, every time the word <Justice> comes 15
in his way: But this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined
the signification of that Name, and settled the <Idea> of all its Parts in
his Mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one, who makes his
complex <Idea> of <Justice>, to be such a treatment of the Person or
Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a clear and 20
distinct <Idea> what <Law> is, which makes a part of his complex <Idea>
of Justice, 'tis plain, his <Idea> of Justice it self, will be confused and
imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very trouble-
some: and therefore most Men will think, they may be excused
from settling the complex <Ideas> of mixed Modes so precisely in their 25
Minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondred,
that they have a great deal of Obscurity and Confusion in their own
Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their Discourses with others.
#S 10#. In the Names of <Substances>, for a right use of them, some-
thing more is required than barely <determined Ideas>: In these <the> 30
<Names must also be conformable to Things>, as they exist: But of this,
I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This
Exactness is absolutely necessary in Enquiries after philosophical
#P 514#
#L 1#
Knowledge, and in Controversies about Truth. And though it would
be well too, if it extended it self to common Conversation, and the
ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think, that is scarce to be expected.
Vulgar Notions suit vulgar Discourses: and both, though con-
fused enough, yet serve pretty well the Market, and the Wake. 5  
Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have Words where-
withal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and so, I think, might
Philosophers and Disputants too, if they had a Mind to under-
stand, and to be clearly understood.
#S 11#. <Thirdly>, 'Tis not enough that Men have <Ideas>, determined 10 
<Ideas>, for which they make these signs stand; but they <must> also
take care to <apply their Words>, as near as may be, <to such> Ideas <as>
<common use has annexed them to>. For Words, especially of Languages
already framed, being no Man's private possession, but the com-
mon measure of Commerce and Communication, 'tis not for any 15 
one, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in; nor alter
the <Ideas> they are affixed to; or at least when there is a necessity to
do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's Intentions in speaking
are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be
without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other the like in-  
commodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common Use.
Propriety of Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into
other Men's Minds with the greatest ease and advantage: and there-
fore deserves some part of our Care and Study, especially in the
names of moral Words. The proper signification and use of Terms 25 
is best to be learned from those, who in their Writings and Dis-
courses, appear to have had the clearest Notions, and apply'd to
them their Terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way
of using a Man's Words, according to the Propriety of the Lan-
guage, though it have not always the good Fortune to be under-  
stood: Yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so
unskilful in the Language he speaks, as not to understand it, when
made use of, as it ought to be.
#S 12#. <Fourthly>. But because common use has not so visibly
annexed any signification to Words, as to make Men know always 35 
                                                           #P 515#
                                                           #L 1#
certainly what they precisely stand for: And because Men in the
Improvement of their Knowledge, come to have <Ideas> different from
the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either
make new Words, (which Men seldom venture to do, for fear of
being thought guilty of Affectation, or Novelty) or else <must> use 5
old ones, in a new Signification. Therefore after the Observation of
the foregoing Rules, it is sometimes necessary for the ascertaining
the signification of Words, to <declare their Meaning>; where either
common Use has left it uncertain and loose; (as it has in most
Names of very complex <Ideas>) or where a Man uses them in a 10
Sense any way peculiar to himself; or where the Term, being very
material in the Discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is
liable to any Doubtfulness, or Mistake.
#S 13#. As the <Ideas>, Men's Words stand for, are of different sorts:
so the way of making known the <Ideas>, they stand for, when there is 15
Occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the
proper <way, to make known the proper signification of Words>; yet there be
some Words, that will not be defined, as there be others, whose
precise Meaning cannot be made known, but by Definition: and,
perhaps, a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we 20
shall see in the names of simple <Ideas>, Modes, and Substances.
#S 14#. <First>, When a Man makes use of the <name> of <any simple> Idea,
which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken,
he is obliged by the Laws of Ingenuity, and the end of Speech, to
declare his Meaning, and make known what <Idea> he makes it stand 25
for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by Definition: and
therefore, when a synonymous Word fails to do it, there is but one of
these ways left. <First>, Sometimes the <naming the Subject, wherein that>
<simple> Idea <is> to be found, will make its name be understood by
those, who are acquainted with that Subject, and know it by that 30
name. So to make a Country-man understand what <Feuillemorte>
Colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, 'tis the Colour of wither'd
Leaves falling in <Autumn. Secondly>, But the only sure way of making
known the signification of the name of any simple <Idea>, is <by pre->
<senting to his Senses that Subject, which may produce it in his Mind>, and 35
make him actually have the <Idea>, that Word stands for.
#P 516#
#L 1#
#S 15#. <Secondly, Mixed Modes>, especially those belonging to Moral-
ity, being most of them such Combinations of <Ideas>, as the Mind
puts together of its own choice; and whereof there are not always
standing Patterns to be found existing, the signification of their
Names cannot be made known, as those of simple <Ideas>, by any  5 
shewing: but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly
<defined>. For they being Combinations of several <Ideas>, that the Mind
of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any Arche-
types, Men may, if they please, exactly know the <Ideas>, that go to
each Composition, and so both use these Words in a certain and un-  
doubted Signification, and perfectly declare, when there is Occasion,
what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame
on those, who make not their Discourses about moral things very
clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of
mixed Modes, or which is all one, the real Essence of each Species, 15 
is to be known, they being not of Nature's, but Man's making, it is
a great Negligence and Perverseness, to discourse of moral Things
with Uncertainty and Obscurity, which is much more pardonable
in treating of natural Substances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to
be avoided, for a quite contrary Reason, as we shall see by and by. 20 
#S 16#. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that Moral-
<ity is capable of Demonstration>, as well as Mathematicks: Since the
precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may
be perfectly known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the
Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which consists 25 
perfect Knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of
Substances are often to be made use of in Morality, as well as those
of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances,
when concerned in moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not
so much enquir'd into, as supposed; <v.g.> when we say that <Man is> 30 
<subject to Law>: We mean nothing by <Man>, but a corporeal rational
Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities of that Creature
are in this Case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a
Child or Changeling be a <Man> in a physical Sense, may amongst the
Naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the 35 
<moral Man>, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchange-
                                                          #P 517#
                                                          #L 1#
able <Idea, a corporeal rational Being>. For were there a Monkey, or any
other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason, to such a
degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce
Consequences about general <Ideas>, he would no doubt be subject to
Law, and, in that Sense, be a <Man>, how much soever he differ'd in 5
Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Substances, if they
be used in them, as they should, can no more disturb Moral, than
they do Mathematical Discourses: Where, if the Mathematicians
speak of a <Cube> or <Globe> of <Gold>, or any other Body, he has his clear
setled <Idea>, which varies not, though it may, by mistake, be applied 10
to a particular Body, to which it belongs not.
#S 17#. This I have here mentioned by the bye, to shew of what
Consequence it is for Men, in their names of mixed Modes, and
consequently, in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words
when there is Occasion: Since thereby moral Knowledge may be 15
brought, to so great Clearness and Certainty. And it must be great
want of Ingenuity, (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: Since a
<Definition is the only way, whereby the precise Meaning of moral Words can>
<be known>; and yet a way, whereby their Meaning may be known
<certainly>, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. 20
And therefore the Negligence or Perverseness of Mankind, cannot
be excused, if their Discourses in Morality be not much more clear,
than those in natural Philosophy: since they are about <Ideas> in the
Mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; they
having no external Beings for <Archetypes> which they are referr'd to, 25
and must correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in their
Minds an <Idea>, which shall be the Standard to which they will give
the Name <Justice>, with which Pattern so made, all Actions that agree
shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen <Aristides>, to
frame an <Idea>, that shall in all things be exactly like him, who is as 30
he is, let Men make what <Idea>, they please of him. For the one, they
need but know the combination of <Ideas>, that are put together
within in their own Minds; for the other, they must enquire into
the whole Nature, and abstruse hidden Constitution, and various
Qualities of a Thing existing without them.                      35
#P 518#
#L 1#
#S 18#. Another Reason that makes the <defining of mixed Modes> so
necessary, <especially of moral Words>, is what I mentioned a little
before, <viz.> That it is <the only way whereby the signification of the most of>
them can be known with certainty. For the <Ideas> they stand for,
being for the most part such, whose component Parts no where 5  
exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the
Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one
<Idea>: and it is only by Words, enumerating the several simple <Ideas>
which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others,
what their Names stand for; the assistance of the senses in this case 10 
not helping us, by the proposal of sensible Objects, to shew the
<Ideas>, which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in
the names of sensible simple <Ideas>, and also to some degree in those
of Substances.
#S 19#. <Thirdly, For the explaining> the signification of <the Names of> 15   
<Substances> as they stand for the <Ideas> we have of their distinct Species,
both the fore-mentioned ways, <viz.> of <shewing and defining, are>
<requisite>, in many cases, to be made use of. For there being ordinarily
in each Sort some leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other
<Ideas>, which make up our complex <Idea> of that Species, annexed, 20 
we forwardly give the specifick Name to that thing, wherein that
characteristical Mark is found, which we take to be the most
distinguishing <Idea> of that Species. These leading or characteristical
as I may so call them) <Ideas>, in the sorts of Animals and Vegetables,
#S 29#. and <Ch.> IX. $ 15.) 25 
mostly Figure, and in inanimate Bodies Colour, and in some both
together. Now,
#S 20#. These <leading sensible Qualities> are those, which make <the>
<chief Ingredients of our Specifick Ideas>, and consequently the most
observable and unvariable part in the Definitions of our specifick 30 
Names, as attributed to Sorts <of Substances> coming under our Know-
ledge. For though the Sound <Man>, in its own Nature, be as apt to
signifie a complex <Idea> made up of Animality and Rationality, united
                                                           #P 519#
                                                           #L 1#
in the same Subject, as to signify any other combination; yet used
as a mark to stand for a sort of Creatures we count of our own kind,
perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our
complex <Idea>, signified by the word <Man>, as any other we find in it.
And therefore why <Plato's Animal implume Bipes latis unguibus>, should 5
not be as good a Definition of the Name <Man>, standing for that sort
or Creatures, will not be easy to shew: for 'tis the Shape, as the
leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a
Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never.
And if this be not allow'd to be so, I do not know how they can be 10
excused from Murther, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call
them,) because of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether
they have a Rational Soul, or no; which can be no more discerned in
a well-formed, than ill-shaped Infant, as soon as born. And who is it
has informed us, that a Rational Soul can inhabit no Tenement, 15
unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join it self to,
and inform no sort of Body, but one that is just of such an outward
Structure?
#S 21#. Now <these leading Qualities, are best made known by shewing>, and
can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an <Horse>, or 20
<Cassuary>, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the Mind
by Words, the sight of the Animals doth it a thousand times
better: And the <Idea> of the particular Colour of <Gold>, is not to be got
by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the
Eyes about it; as is evident in those who are used to this Metal, who 25
will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adul-
terate, by the sight, where others, (who have as good Eyes, but yet,
by use, have not got the precise nice <Idea> of that peculiar Yellow)
shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other
simple <Ideas>, peculiar in their kind to any Substance; for which 30
precise <Ideas>, there are no peculiar Names. The particular ringing
sound there is in <Gold>, distinct from the sound of other Bodies, has
no particular Name annexed to it, no more than the particular
Yellow, that belongs to that Metal.
#S 22#. But because many of the simple <Ideas> that make up our 35
specifick <Ideas> of Substances, are Powers, which lie not obvious to
#P 520#
#L 1#
our Senses in the Things as they ordinarily appear; therefore, <in> the
signification of our <Names of Substances, some part of the signification will>
<be better made known, by enumerating those simple> Ideas, <than in shewing>
<the Substance it self>. For he that, to the yellow shining Colour of <Gold>
got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the <Ideas> of  5 
great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility, in <Aqua Regia>,
will have a perfecter <Idea> of <Gold>, than he can have by seeing a piece
of <Gold>, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Quali-
ties. But if the formal Constitution of this shining, heavy, ductil
Thing (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our 10 
Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does,
the signification of the word <Gold>, might as easily be ascertained, as
that of <Triangle>.
#S 23#. Hence we may take notice, how much the Foundation of all
<our Knowledge of corporeal Things, lies in our Senses>. For how Spirits, 15 
separate from Bodies, (whose Knowledge and <Ideas> of these Things,
is certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no
Notion, no <Idea> at all. The whole extent of our Knowledge, or
Imagination, reaches not beyond our own <Ideas>, limited to our ways
of Perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted, that Spirits of a 20 
higher rank than those immersed in Flesh, may have as clear <Ideas>
of the radical Constitution of Substances, as we have of a Triangle,
and so perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from
thence: but the manner how they come by that Knowledge, exceeds
our Conceptions. 25 
#S 24#. But though Definitions will serve to explain the Names of
Substances, as they stand for our <Ideas>; yet they leave them not
without great imperfection, as they stand for Things. For our
Names of Substances being not put barely for our <Ideas>, but being
made use of ultimately to represent Things, and so are put in their 30 
place, their signification must agree with the Truth of Things, as
well as with Men's <Ideas>. And therefore in Substances, we are not
always to rest in the ordinary complex <Idea>, commonly received as
the signification of that Word, but must go a little farther, and
enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, 35 
and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our <Ideas> of their distinct
                                                            #P 521#
                                                            #L 1#
Species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of
Things, and are experienced in them. For since 'tis intended their
Names should stand for such Collections of simple <Ideas>, as do really
exist in Things themselves, as well as for the complex <Idea> in other
Men's Minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: 5
therefore <to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquired>
<into>; and their Properties are, with care and examination, to be
found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniencies in
Discourses and Arguings about natural Bodies and substantial
Things, to have learned, from the Propriety of the Language, the 10
common but confused, or very imperfect <Idea>, to which each Word
is applied, and to keep them to that <Idea> in our use of them: but we
must, by acquainting our selves with the History of that sort of
Things, rectify and settle our complex <Idea>, belonging to each
specifick Name; and in discourse with others, (if we find them 15
mistake us) we ought to tell, what the complex <Idea> is, that we make
such a Name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all
those, who search after Knowledge, and philosophical Verity, in
that Children being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect
Notions of Things, apply them at random, and without much 20
thinking, and seldom frame determined <Ideas> to be signified by
them. Which Custom, (it being easy, and serving well enough for
the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation) they are apt to
continue, when they are Men: And so begin at the wrong end,
learning Words first, and perfectly, but make the Notions, to which 25
they apply those Words afterwards, very overtly. By this means it
comes to pass, that Men speaking the proper Language of their
Country, <i.e.> according to Grammar-Rules of that Language, do yet
speak very improperly of Things themselves; and by their arguing
one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of 30
useful Truths, and the Knowledge of Things, as they are to be
found in themselves, and not in our Imaginations; and it matters
not much, for the improvement of our Knowledge, how they are
call'd.
#S 25#. It were therefore to be wished, That Men, versed in physi-
cal Enquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural
#P 522#
#L 1#
Bodies, would set down those simple <Ideas>, wherein they observe the
Individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy
a great deal of that confusion, which comes from several Persons,
applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller, or greater
number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been 5  
more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities
of any sort of Things, which come under one denomination. But a
Dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a Natural History,
requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and
sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must 10 
content our selves with such Definitions of the Names of Substances,
as explain the sense Men use them in. And 'twould be well, where
there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not
usually done; but Men talk to one another, and dispute in Words,
whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that 15 
the signification of common Words, are certainly established, and
the precise <Ideas>, they stand for, perfectly known; and that it is a
shame to be ignorant of them. Both which Suppositions are false:
no Names of complex <Ideas> having so setled determined Signifi-
cations, that they are constantly used for the same precise <Ideas>. 20 
Nor is it a shame for a Man not to have a certain Knowledge of any
thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no
discredit not to know, what precise <Idea> any Sound stands for in
another Man's Mind, without he declare it to me, by some other
way than barely using that Sound, there being no other way, 25 
without such a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed, the
necessity, of Communication by Language, brings Men to an agree-
ment in the signification of common Words, within some tolerable
latitude, that may serve for ordinary Conversation: and so a Man
cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the <Ideas>, which are annexed 30 
to Words by common Use, in a Language familiar to him. But
common Use, being but a very uncertain Rule, which reduces it
self at last to the <Ideas> of particular Men, proves often but a very
variable Standard. But though such a Dictionary, as I have above
mentioned, will require too much time, cost, and pains, to be hoped 35 
for in this Age; yet, methinks, it is not unreasonable to propose,
that Words standing for Things, which are known and distinguished
by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little Draughts and
Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this fashion, would,
                                                           #P 523#
                                                           #L 1#
perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signifi-
cation of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Countries
or Ages, and settle truer <Ideas> in Men's Minds of several Things,
whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large
and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. Naturalists, that 5
treat of Plants and Animals, have found the benefit of this way: And
he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess,
that he has a clearer <Idea> of <Apium>, or <Ibex> from a little Print of that
Herb, or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the
Names of either of them. And so, no doubt, he would have of 10
<Strigil> and <Sistrum>, if instead of a <Curry-comb>, and <Cymbal>, which are
the English Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see
stamp'd in the Margin, small Pictures of these Instruments, as they
were in use amongst the Ancients. <Toga, Tunica, Pallium>, are Words
easily translated by <Gown, Coat>, and <Cloak>: but we have thereby no 15
more true <Ideas> of the Fashion of those Habits amongst the <Romans>,
than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them. Such
things as these, which the Eye distinguishes by their shapes,
would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of them, and
more determine the signification of such Words, than any other 20
Words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by
the bye.
#S 26#. <Fifthly>, If Men will not be at the pains to declare the mean-
ing of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had;
yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all Discourses, 25
wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he
should <use the same Word constantly in the same sense>: If this were done,
which no body can refuse, without great disingenuity) many of the
Books extant might be spared; many of the Controversies in Dispute
would be at an end; several of those great Volumes, swollen with 30
ambiguous Words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another,
would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the Philo-
sophers (to mention no other,) as well as Poets Works, might be
contained in a Nut-shell.
#S 27#. But after all, the provision of Words is so scanty in respect 35
of that infinite variety of Thoughts, than Men, wanting Terms to
#P 524#
#L 1#
suit their precise Notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost
caution, be forced often to use the same Word, in somewhat differ-
ent Senses. And though in the continuation of a Discourse, or the
pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digress into a
particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the signification of  5 
any Term; yet the import of the Discourse will, for the most part,
if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelli-
gent Readers, into the true meaning of it: but where that is not
sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to
explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he there uses that 10 
Term.
#P 525#
#B 4#                              BOOK IV



#C 01#                     CHAPTER I

                    <Of Knowledge in General>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. SINCE <the Mind>, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no
other immediate Object but its own <Ideas>, which it alone does or
can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only con-
versant about them.
#S 02#. <Knowledge> then seems to me to be nothing but <the perception of> 5
<the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our>
<Ideas>. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is
Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess,
or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. For when we
know that <White is not Black>, what do we else but perceive, that 10
these two <Ideas> do not agree? When we possess our selves with the
utmost security of the Demonstration, that <the three Angles of a>
<Triangle are equal to two right ones>, What do we more but perceive,
that Equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is
inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle?               15
#S 03#. But to Understand a little more distinctly, wherein this
agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to
these four sorts:.
               1. <Identity>, or <Diversity>.               
               2. <Relation>.                                    20               
               3. <Co-existence>, or <necessary connexion>.                 
               4. <Real Existence>.
#S 04#. <First>, As to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, <viz.>
<Identity>, or <Diversity>. 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any
#P 526#
#L 1#
Sentiments or <Ideas> at all, to perceive its <Ideas>, and so far as it per-
ceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive
their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely
necessary, that without it there could be no Knowledge, no
Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at all. By this 5 
the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each <Idea> to agree with it
self, and to be what it is; and all distinct <Ideas> to disagree, <i.e.> the
one not to be the other: And this it does without any pains, labour,
or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of Perception
and Distinction. And though Men of Art have reduced this into 10 
those general Rules, <What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to>
<be, and not to be>, for ready application in all cases, wherein there may
be occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first exercise of
this Faculty, is about particular <Ideas>. A Man infallibly knows, as
soon as ever he has them in his Mind that the <Ideas> he calls <White> 15 
and <Round>, are the very <Ideas> they are, and that they are not other
<Ideas> which he calls <Red> or <Square>. Nor can any Maxim or Proposition
in the World make him know it clearer or surer than he did before,
and without any such general Rule. This then is the first agree-
ment, or disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its <Ideas>; 20 
which it always perceives at first sight: And if there ever happen
any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Names,
and not the <Ideas> themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will
always be perceived, as soon and as clearly as the <Ideas> themselves
are, nor can it possibly be otherwise. 25 
#S 05#. <Secondly>, The next sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, the
Mind perceives in any of its <Ideas>, may, I think, be called <Relative>,
and is nothing but <the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas>, of
what kind soever, whether Substances, Modes, or any other. For
since all distinct <Ideas> must eternally be known not to be the same, 30 
and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there
could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not
perceive any Relation between our <Ideas>, and find out the Agree-
ment or Disagreement, they have one with another, in several ways
the Mind takes of comparing them. 35 
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, The third sort of Agreement, or Disagreement to be
found in our <Ideas>, which the Perception of the Mind is employ'd
                                                           #P 527#
                                                           #L 1#
about, is <Co-existence>, or <Non-co-existence> in the same Subject; and this
belongs particularly to Substances. Thus when we pronounce
concerning <Gold>, that it is fixed, our Knowledge of this Truth
amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain
in the Fire unconsumed, is an <Idea>, that always accompanies, and is 5
join'd with that particular sort of Yellowness, Weight, Fusibility,
Malleableness, and Solubility in <Aqua Regia>, which make our
complex <Idea>, signified by the word <Gold>.
#S 07#. <Fourthly>, The fourth and last sort is, that of <actual real>
<Existence> agreeing to any <Idea>. Within these four sorts of Agreement 10
or Disagreement, is, I suppose contained all the Knowledge we have,
or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make, concern-
ing any of our <Ideas>, all that we know, or can affirm concerning any
of them, is, That it is, or is not the same with some other; that it
does, or does not always co-exist with some other <Idea> in the same 15
Subject; that it has this or that Relation to some other <Idea>; or that
it has a real existence without the Mind. Thus <Blue is not Yellow>, is of
Identity. <Two Triangles upon equal Basis, between two Parallels are equal>,
is of Relation. <Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions>, is of Co-
existence, <GOD is>, is of real Existence. Though Identity and Co- 
existence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar
ways of Agreement, or Disagreement of our <Ideas>, that they deserve
well to be considered as distinct Heads, and not under Relation in
general; since they are so different grounds of Affirmation and
Negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on 25
what is said in several places of this Essay. I should now proceed to
examine the several degrees of our Knowledge, but that it is neces-
sary first, to consider the different acceptations of the word
<Knowledge>.
#S 08#. There are several ways wherein the Mind is possessed of 30
Truth; each of which is called <Knowledge>.
  1. There is <actual Knowledge>, which is the present view the Mind    
has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its <Ideas>, or of the
Relation they have one to another.
  3. A Man is said to know any Proposition, which having been 35    
once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agreement,
#P 528#
#L 1#
or Disagreement of the <Ideas> whereof it consists; and so lodg'd it in
his Memory, that whenever that Proposition comes again to be
reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right
side, assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one
may call <habitual Knowledge>: And thus a Man may be said to know 5  
all those Truths, which are lodg'd in his Memory, by a foregoing
clear and full perception, whereof the Mind is assured past doubt,
as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite Under-
standings being able to think, clearly and distinctly, but on one
thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they 10 
actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: And he that
knew most, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able
to think on at one time.
#S 09#. Of habitual Knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking,
two degrees: 15 
     <First>, The one is of <such Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever>
<they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is between those>
<Ideas>. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an <intuitive>
<Knowledge>, where the <Ideas> themselves, by an immediate view, dis-
cover their Agreement or Disagreement one with another. 20 
     <Secondly>, The other is of <such Truths, whereof the Mind having been>
<convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs>. Thus
a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the
Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two
right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of 25 
the truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, where the Demon-
stration, by which it was at first known, is forgot, though a Man
may be thought rather to believe his Memory, than really to know,
and this way of entertaining a Truth seem'd formerly to me like
something between Opinion and Knowledge, a sort of Assurance 30 
which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Testimony of
another; Yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of
                                                           #P 529#
                                                           #L 1#
perfect certainty, and is in effect true Knowledge. That which is
apt to mislead our first Thoughts into a mistake in this Matter is,
that the Agreement or Disagreement of the <Ideas> in this Case is not
perceived, as it was at first, by an actual view of all the inter-
mediate <Ideas> whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of those in 5
the Proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate
<Ideas>, that shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the <Ideas> con-
tained in the Proposition whose certainty we remember. For
Example in this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are
equal to two right ones, one, who has seen and clearly perceived 10
the Demonstration of this Truth, knows it to be true, when that
Demonstration is gone out of his Mind; so that at present it is not
actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: But he knows
it in a different way, from what he did before. The Agreement of
the two <Ideas> join'd in that Proposition is perceived, but it is by the 15
intervention of other <Ideas> than those which at first produced that
Perception. He remembers, <i.e.> he knows (for remembrance is but
the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of
the truth of this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are
equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same relations 20
between the same immutable things, is now the <Idea> that shews
him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two
right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence
he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case is
always true; what <Ideas> once agreed will always agree; and con- 25
sequently what he once knew to be true he will always know to
be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon
this ground it is, that particular demonstrations in Mathematicks
afford general Knowledge. If then the Perception that the same
<Ideas> will eternally have the same Habitudes and Relations be not 30
a sufficient ground of Knowledge, there could be no knowledge
of general Propositions in Mathematicks, for no mathematical
Demonstration would be any other than particular: And when a
man had demonstrated any Proposition concerning one Triangle or
Circle, his Knowledge would not reach beyond that particular 35
#P 530#
#L 1#
Diagram. If he would extend it farther, he must renew his Demon-
stration in another instance, before he could know it to be true in
another like Triangle, and so on: by which means one could never
come to the knowledge of any general Propositions. No Body, I
think, can deny that Mr. <Newton> certainly knows any Proposition, 5  
that he now at any time reads in his Book, to be true, though he has
not in actual view that admirable Chain of intermediate <Ideas>,
whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a Memory is that,
able to retain such a train of Particulars, may be well thought
beyond the reach of humane Faculties. When the very Discovery, 10 
Perception, and laying together that wonderful connection of <Ideas>
is found to surpass most Readers Comprehension. But yet 'tis
evident, the Author himself knows the Proposition to be true,
remembring he once saw the connection of those <Ideas>, as certainly
as he knows such a Man wounded another, remembring that he 15 
saw him run him through. But because the Memory is not always
so clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or less
decay in length of time, this amongst other Differences is one,
which shews, that <demonstrative Knowledge>, is much more imperfect
than <intuitive>, as we shall see in the following Chapter. 20 



#C 02#                     CHAPTER II

                <Of the Degrees of our Knowledge>.

#S 01#. ALL our Knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the
Mind has of its own <Ideas>, which is the utmost Light and greatest
Certainty, we with our Faculties, and in our way of Knowledge are
capable of, it may not be amiss, to consider a little the degrees of
its Evidence. The different clearness of our Knowledge seems to me 25 
to lie in the different way of Perception, the Mind has of the Agree-
ment, or Disagreement of any of its <Ideas>. For if we will reflect on
our own ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind
perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two <Ideas> immediately
                                                           #P 531#
                                                           #L 1#
by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this,
I think, we may call <intuitive Knowledge>. For in this, the Mind is at no
pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye
doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind per-
ceives, that <White> is not <Black>, That a <Circle> is not a <Triangle>, That 5
<Three> are more than <Two>, and equal to <One> and <Two>. Such kind of
Truths, the Mind perceives at the first sight of the <Ideas> together,
by bare <Intuition>, without the intervention of any other <Idea>; and
this kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, that
humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresistible, 10
and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be per-
ceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves
no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is
presently filled with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this <Intuition>, that
depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge, which 15
Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine,
and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive
himself capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any <Idea>
in his Mind is such, as he perceives it to be; and that two <Ideas>,
wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely 20
the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands
he knows not what, and shews only that he has a Mind to be a
Sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly
on this Intuition, that in the next degree of <Knowledge>, which I call
<Demonstrative>, this intuition is necessary in all the Connexions of the 25
intermediate <Ideas>, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and
Certainty.
#S 02#. The next degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives
the Agreement or Disagreement of any <Ideas>, but not immediately.
Though where-ever the Mind perceives the Agreement or Dis- 
agreement of any of its <Ideas>, there be certain Knowledge; Yet it
does not always happen, that the Mind sees that Agreement or
Disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is dis-
coverable; and in that case, remains in Ignorance, and at most, gets
no farther than a probable conjecture. The Reason why the Mind 35
cannot always perceive presently the Agreement or Disagreement
of two <Ideas> is, because those <Ideas>, concerning whose Agreement or
#P 532#
#L 1#
Disagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be so put
together, as to shew it. In this Case then, when the Mind cannot so
bring its <Ideas> together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it
were Juxta-position, or application one to another, to perceive their
Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other 5  
<Ideas> (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or
Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which we call
<Reasoning>. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or
Disagreement in bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle,
and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing 10 
them, do it: Because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be
brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two
Angles; and so of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive
Knowledge. In this Case the Mind is fain to find out some other
Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; 15 
and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their
Equality to two right ones.
#S 03#. Those intervening <Ideas>, which serve to shew the Agreement
of any two others, are called <Proofs>; and where the Agreement or
Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is 20 
called <Demonstration>, it being <shewn> to the Understanding, and the
Mind made see that it is so. A quickness in the Mind to find out
these intermediate <Ideas>, (that shall discover the Agreement or
Disagreement of any other,) and to apply them right, is, I suppose,
that which is called <Sagacity>. 25 
#S 04#. <This Knowledge by intervening Proofs>, though it be certain, yet
the evidence of it is <not> altogether <so clear> and bright, nor the assent
so ready, <as> in <intuitive> Knowledge. For though in <Demonstration>, the
Mind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of the
<Ideas> it considers; yet 'tis not without pains and attention: There 30 
must be more than one transient view to find it. A steddy appli-
cation and pursuit is required to this Discovery: And there must
be a Progression by steps and degrees, before the Mind can in this
way arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement or
Repugnancy between two <Ideas> that need Proofs and the Use of 35 
Reason to shew it.
#S 05#. <Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge>,
is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed, when by the
                                                           #P 533#
                                                           #L 1#
Intervention of the intermediate <Ideas>, the Agreement or Dis-
agreement is perceived; yet before the Demonstration there was a
doubt, which in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind
that has its Faculty of Perception left to a degree capable of distinct
<Ideas>, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye, (that can distinctly 5
see White and Black,) Whether this Ink, and this Paper be all of a
Colour. If there be Sight in the Eyes, it will at first glimpse, without
Hesitation, perceive the Words printed on this Paper, different
from the Colour of the Paper: And so if the Mind have the Faculty
of distinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Disagree-  
ment of those <Ideas> that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes
have lost the Faculty of seeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in
vain enquire after the quickness of Sight in one, or clearness of
Perception in the other.
#S 06#. 'Tis true, the Perception, produced by <Demonstration>, is also 15
very clear; yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident
lustre and full assurance, that always accompany that which I call
<intuitive>; like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another,
where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the
Object, it produces a Knowledge; but 'tis still in every successive 20
reflection with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinct-
ness, which is in the first, till at last, after many removes, it has a
great mixture of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable,
especially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a
long train of Proofs.                                            25
#S 07#. Now, <in every step Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge, there>
<is an intuitive Knowledge> of that Agreement or Disagreement, it
seeks, with the next intermediate <Idea>, which it uses as a Proof: For
if it were not so, that yet would need a Proof. Since without the
Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement, there is no Know- 
ledge produced: If it be perceived by it self, it is intuitive Know-
ledge: If it cannot be perceived by it self, there is need of some
intervening <Idea>, as a common measure to shew their Agreement or
Disagreement. By which it is plain, that every step in Reasoning,
that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty; which when the 35
#P 534#
#L 1#
Mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it to
make the Agreement or Disagreement of the <Ideas>, concerning
which we enquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a
<Demonstration>, it is necessary to perceive the immediate Agreement
of the intervening <Ideas>, whereby the Agreement or Disagreement 5  
of the two <Ideas> under Examination (whereof the one is always the
first, and the other the last in the Account) is found. This intuitive
Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate
<Ideas>, in each Step and Progression of the <Demonstration>, must also be
carried exactly in the Mind, and a Man must be sure that no part is 10 
left out; which because in long Deductions, and the use of many
Proofs, the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain:
therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive
Knowledge, and Men embrace often Falshoods for Demonstrations.
#S 08#. The necessity of this intuitive Knowledge, in each step of 15   
scientifical or demonstrative Reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine,
to that <mistaken Axiom, that all Reasoning was ex praecognitis et praecon->
<cessis>; which how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew
more at large, where I come to consider Propositions, and particu-
larly those Propositions, which are called Maxims; and to shew that 20 
tis by a mistake, that they are supposed to be the foundations of all
our Knowledge and Reasonings.
#S 09#. It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematicks
alone are capable of demonstrative certainty: But to have such an
agreement or disagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, 25 
as I imagine, not the privilege of the <Ideas> of <Number, Extension>, and
<Figure> alone, it may possibly be the want of due method, and
application in us; and not of sufficient evidence in things, that
Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other
parts of Knowledge, and been scarce so much as aim'd at by any 30 
but Mathematicians. For whatever <Ideas> we have, wherein the
Mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that
is between them, there the Mind is capable of intuitive Knowledge;
                                                           #P 535#
                                                           #L 1#
and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two
<Ideas>, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement
they have with any intermediate <Ideas>, there the Mind is capable of
Demonstration, which is not limited to <Ideas> of Extension, Figure,
Number, and their Modes.                                     5
#S 10#. The Reason why it has been generally sought for, and
supposed to be only in those, I imagine, has been, not only the
general usefulness of those Sciences; But because, in comparing
their Equality or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the
least difference very clear and perceivable: and though in Extension, 10
every the least Excess is not so perceptible; yet the Mind has found
out ways, to examine and discover demonstratively the just
equality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures, and both these,
<i.e.> Numbers and Figures, can be set down, by visible and lasting
marks, wherein the <Ideas> under consideration are perfectly deter- 
mined, which for the most part they are not, where they are marked
only by Names and Words.
#S 11#. But in other simple <Ideas>, whose Modes and Differences are
made, and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so
nice and accurate a distinction of their differences, as to perceive, or 20
find ways to measure their just Equality or the least Differences.
For those other simple <Ideas>, being appearances or sensations, pro-
duced in us, by the Size, Figure, Number, and Motion of minute
Corpuscles singly insensible, their different degrees also depend
upon the variation of some, or all of those Causes; which since it 25
cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too
subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact
Measures of the different degrees of these simple <Ideas>. For suppos-
ing the Sensation or <Idea> we name <Whiteness>, be produced in us by a
certain number of Globules, which having a verticity about their 30
own Centres, strike upon the <Retina> of the Eye, with a certain
degree of Rotation, as well as progressive Swiftness; it will hence
easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any Body are so
ordered, as to reflect the greater number of Globules of light, and
to give them that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this 35
Sensation of White in us, the more White will that Body appear,
#P 536#
#L 1#
that, from an equal space sends to the <Retina> the greater number of
such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say,
that the nature of Light consists in very small round Globules, nor
of Whiteness, in such a texture of parts as gives a certain Rotation
to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating 5  
physically of Light, or Colours: But this, I think, I may say, that I
cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that
he did) conceive how Bodies without us, can any ways affect our
Senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible Bodies them-
selves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the impulse of some insensible 10 
Particles coming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling;
by the different impulse of which Parts, caused by their different
Size, Figure, and Motion, the variety of Sensations is produced in us.
#S 12#. Whether then they be Globules, or no; or whether they
have a Verticity about their own Centres, that produce the <Idea> of 15 
<Whiteness> in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are
reflected from a Body, fitted to give them that peculiar Motion,
which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in us; and possibly too,
the quicker that peculiar Motion is, the whiter does the Body
appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident 20 
in the same piece of Paper put in the Sun-beams, in the Shade, and
in a dark Hole; in each of which, it will produce in us the <Idea> of
Whiteness in far different degrees.
#S 13#. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles, nor what
Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of <Whiteness>, we 25 
cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of
<Whiteness>, because we have no certain Standard to measure them
by, nor Means to distinguish every the least real difference, the
only help we have being from our Senses, which in this point fail us.
But where the difference is so great, as to produce in the Mind 30 
clearly distinct <Ideas>, whose differences can be perfectly retained,
there these <Ideas> of Colours, as we see in different kinds, as Blue and
Red, are as capable of Demonstration, as <Ideas> of Number and
Extension. What I have here said of <Whiteness> and Colours, I think,
holds true in all secondary Qualities and their Modes. 35 
#S 14#. These two, (viz.) Intuition and Demonstration, are the
degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these,
                                                           #P 537#
                                                           #L 1#
with what assurance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but
not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed,
another <Perception> of the Mind, employ'd about <the particular>
<existence of finite Beings> without us; which going beyond bare
probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the fore- 
going degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.
There can be nothing more certain, than that the <Idea> we receive
from an external Object is in our Minds; this is intuitive Know-
ledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that <Idea> in
our Minds, whether we can thence certainly inferr the existence 10
of any thing without us, which corresponds to that <Idea>, is that,
whereof some Men think there may be a question made, because
Men may have such <Ideas> in their Minds, when no such Thing
exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But yet here, I think,
we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us past doubting: For 15
I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of
a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and thinks
on it by night; when he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a
Rose, or only thinks on that Savour, or Odour? We as plainly find
the difference there is between any <Idea> revived in our Minds by our 20
own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses,
as we do between any two distinct <Ideas>. If any one say, a Dream
may do the same thing, and all these <Ideas> may be produced in us,
without any external Objects, he may please to dream that I make
him this Answer, 1. That 'tis no great matter, whether I remove his 25
Scruple, or no: Where all is but Dream, Reasoning and Arguments
are of no use, Truth and Knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he
will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in
the Fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear
so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the 30
Fire, is nothing but a Dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly
know, that any such thing as Fire actually exists without us: I
answer, That we certainly finding, that Pleasure or Pain follows
upon the application of certain Objects to us, whose Existence we
perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our Senses, this certainty is 35
as great as our Happiness, or Misery, beyond which, we have no
concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the
two former sorts of <Knowledge>, this also, of the existence of particular
#P 538#
#L 1#
external Objects, by that perception and Consciousness we have of
the actual entrance of <Ideas> from them, and allow these <three degrees>
<of Knowledge>, viz. <Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive>: in each of
which, there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and
Certainty. 5  
#S 15#. But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employ'd
about our <Ideas> only, will it not follow from thence, that it is con-
formable to our <Ideas>; and that where our <Ideas> are clear and
distinct, or obscure and confused, our Knowledge will be so too?
To which I answer, No: For our Knowledge consisting in the per-  
ception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two <Ideas>, its
clearness or obscurity, consists in the clearness or obscurity of that
Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the <Ideas> them-
selves: <v.g.> a Man that has as clear <Ideas> of the Angles of a Triangle,
and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the 15 
World, may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their
Agreement, and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But
<Ideas>, which by reason of their Obscurity or otherwise, are confused,
cannot produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because as far as
any <Ideas> are confused, so far the Mind cannot perceive clearly, 20 
whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a
way less apt to be misunderstood. He that hath not determined the
<Ideas> to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of
whose Truth he can be certain.



#C 03#                    CHAPTER III

               <Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge>.

#S 01#. KNOWLEDGE, as has been said, lying in the Perception of the 25 
Agreement, or Disagreement, of any of our <Ideas>, it follows from
hence, That,
<First>, We can have <Knowledge> no farther than we have <Ideas>.
                                                           #P 539#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 02#. <Secondly>, That we can have no <Knowledge> farther, than we can
have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement: Which Per-
ception being, 1. Either by <Intuition>, or the immediate comparing
any two <Ideas>; or, 2. By <Reason>, examining the Agreement, or Dis-
agreement of two <Ideas>, by the Intervention of some others: Or, 3. 5
By <Sensation>, perceiving the Existence of particular Things. Hence it
also follows,
#S 03#. <Thirdly>, That we cannot have an <intuitive Knowledge>, that
shall extend it self to all our <Ideas>, and all that we would know about
them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations 10
they have one to another by <juxta>-position, or an immediate com-
parison one with another. Thus having the <Ideas> of an obtuse, and
an acute angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bases, and between
Parallels, I can by intuitive Knowledge, perceive the one not to be
the other; but cannot that way know, whether they be equal, or no; 15
because their Agreement, or Disagreement in equality, can never
be perceived by an immediate comparing them: The difference of
Figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact immediate appli-
cation; and therefore there is need of some intervening Quantities
to measure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Know- 
ledge.
#S 04#. <Fourthly>, It follows also, from what is above observed, that
our <rational Knowledge>, cannot reach to the whole extent of our <Ideas>.
Because between two different <Ideas> we would examine, we cannot
always find such <Mediums>, as we can connect one to another with an 25
intuitive Knowledge, in all the parts of the Deduction; and where-
ever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.
#S 05#. <Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge> reaching no farther than the
Existence of Things actually present to our Senses, is yet much
narrower than either of the former.                              30
#S 06#. From all which it is evident, that <the extent of our Knowledge>
comes not only short of the reality of Things, but even of the
extent of our own <Ideas>. Though our Knowledge be limited to our
<Ideas>, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection; and
though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of 35
#P 540#
#L 1#
Allbeing, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some
even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow
Information, is to be received from some few, and not very acute
ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with
us, if our Knowledge were but as large as our <Ideas>, and there were  5 
not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the <Ideas> we have,
whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this World,
resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question, but that Humane Know-
ledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Consti-
tutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if 10 
Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that
Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of dis-
covering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of
Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once
engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without Injury to 15 
humane Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledge would never
reach to all we might desire to know concerning those <Ideas> we
have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all
the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the
<Ideas> of a <Square>, a <Circle>, and <Equality>; and yet, perhaps, shall never 20 
be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it
is so. We have the <Ideas> of <Matter> and <Thinking>, but possibly shall
never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or
no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own
<Ideas>, without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has 25 
not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to
perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a
                                                          #P 541#
                                                          #L 1#
thinking immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions,
not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that
GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking,
than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a
Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, 5
nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to
give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely
by the good pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. For I see no contra-
diction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he
pleased, give to certain Systems of created sensless matter, put 10
together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and
thought: Though, as I think, I have proved, <Lib.> 4. <c.> 10<th.> it is no
less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in
its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal
first thinking Being. What certainty of Knowledge can any one 15
have that some perceptions, such as <v.g.> pleasure and pain, should
not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified
and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Sub-
stance, upon the Motion of the parts of Body: Body as far as we can
conceive being able only to strike and affect body; and Motion, 20
according to the utmost reach of our <Ideas>, being able to produce
nothing but Motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure
or pain, or the <Idea> of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our
Reason, go beyond our <Ideas>, and attribute it wholly to the good
Pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed 25
Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to
produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he could not order
them as well to be produced in a Subject we cannot conceive capable
of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the motion of
Matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any 30
way lessen the belief of the Soul's Immateriality: I am not here
speaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I think not only,
that it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy, not to pronounce
Magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce
#P 542#
#L 1#
Knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us, to discern how far our
Knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in, not being
that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content our selves with
Faith and Probability: and in the present Question, about the im-
materiality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demon-   
strative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great
Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without
philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident,
that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelli-
gent Beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can 10 
and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in another World,
and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed
to Men, according to their doings in this Life. And therefore 'tis
not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or t'other, as
some over zealous for, or against the Immateriality of the Soul, have 15 
been forward to make the World believe. Who, either on the one
side, indulging too much to their Thoughts immersed altogether in
Matter, can allow no existence to what is not material: Or, who on
the other side, finding not <Cogitation> within the natural Powers of
Matter, examined over and over again, by the utmost Intention of 20 
Mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it self,
cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance, which has the
Modification of Solidity. He that considers how hardly Sensation is,
in our Thoughts, reconcilable to extended Matter; or Existence to
any thing that hath no Extension at all, will confess, that he is very 25 
far from certainly knowing what his Soul is. 'Tis a Point, which
seems to me, to be put out of the reach of our Knowledge: And he
who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the
dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis, will scarce find his
Reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against the Soul's 30 
Materiality. Since on which side soever he views it, either as an
unextended Substance, or as a thinking extended Matter; the diffi-
culty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his Thoughts,
still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some Men
take with themselves: who, because of the unconceivableness of 35 
something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the
contrary Hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an
unbiassed Understanding. This serves, not only to shew the Weak-
ness and the Scantiness of our Knowledge, but the insignificant
                                                           #P 543#
                                                           #L 1#
Triumph of such sort of Arguments, which, drawn from our own
Views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side
of the Question; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth, by
running into the opposite Opinion, which, on examination, will be
found clogg'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety, what Ad- 
vantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming Absurdities,
and, to him, unsurmountable Rubs he meets with in one Opinion,
to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something alto-
gether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his Comprehension?
Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks, our 10
very Doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being,
though we must content our selves in the Ignorance of what kind of
<Being> it is: And 'tis in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is
unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being
of any thing, because we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I 15
would fain know what Substance exists that has not something in it,
which manifestly baffles our Understandings. Other Spirits, who
see and know the Nature and inward Constitution of things, how
much must they exceed us in Knowledge? To which if we add
larger Comprehension, which enables them at one Glance to see the 20
Connexion and Agreement of very many <Ideas>, and readily supplys
to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by single and slow Steps,
and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often
ready to forget one before we have hunted out another, we may
guess at some part of the Happiness of superior Ranks of Spirits, 25
who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger
Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Argument in hand, our
<Knowledge>, I say, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections
of the <Ideas> we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes
short of that too: But how far it reaches, let us now enquire.       30
#S 07#. The affirmations or negations we make concerning the <Ideas> we
have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these
four sorts, <viz.> Identity, Co-existence, Relation, and real Existence. I
shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these:
#S 08#. <First, As to Identity and Diversity>, in this way of the Agree- 
ment, or Disagreement of our <Ideas, our intuitive Knowledge is as far>
#P 544#
#L 1#
<extended as our Ideas> themselves: and there can be no <Idea> in the
Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge,
perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.
#S 09#. <Secondly, As to> the second sort, which is the <Agreement, or>
<Disagreement> of our <Ideas in Co-existence>, in this our Knowledge is very 5 
short, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of
our Knowledge concerning Substances. For our <Ideas> of the Species
of Substances, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain Collec-
tions of simple <Ideas> united in one Subject, and so co-existing
together: <v.g.> Our <Idea> of <Flame> is a Body hot, luminous, and moving 10 
upward; of <Gold>, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malle-
able, and fusible. These or some such complex <Ideas> as these in
Men's Minds, do these two names of the different Substances,
<Flame> and <Gold>, stand for. When we would know any thing farther
concerning these, or any other sort of Substances, what do we 15 
enquire but what other Qualities, or Powers, these Substances have,
or have not? which is nothing else but to know, what other simple
<Ideas> do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex
<Idea>.
#S 10#. This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of 20   
Humane Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The
reason whereof is, that the simple <Ideas> whereof our complex <Ideas>
of Substances are made up, are, for the most part such, as carry
with them, in their own Nature, no visible necessary connexion, or
inconsistency with any other simple <Ideas>, whose <co-existence> with 25 
them we would inform our selves about.
#S 11#. The <Ideas>, that our complex ones of Substances are made up
of, and about which our Knowledge, concerning Substances, is most
employ'd, are those of their <secondary Qualities>; which depending all
as has been shewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute 30 (
and insensible parts; or if not upon them, upon something yet more
remote from our Comprehension, 'tis impossible we should know,
which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another:
                                                           #P 545#
                                                           #L 1#
For not knowing the Root they spring from, not knowing what
size, figure, and texture of Parts they are, on which depend and from
which result those Qualities which make our complex <Idea> of Gold,
tis impossible we should know what other Qualities result from, or
are incompatible with the same Constitution of the insensible parts 5
of <Gold>; and so consequently must always <co-exist> with that complex
<Idea> we have of it, or else are <inconsistent> with it.
#S 12#. Besides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the in-
sensible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their secondary
Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of Ignorance, 10
which sets us more remote from a certain Knowledge of the <Co->
<existence>, or <Inco-existence> (if I may so say) of different <Ideas> in the
same Subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable connection
between any <secondary Quality, and those primary Qualities> that it
depends on.                                                   15
#S 13#. That the size, figure, and motion of one Body should cause
a change in the size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not
beyond our Conception; the separation of the Parts of one Body,
upon the intrusion of another; and the change from rest to motion,
upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some <connexion> 20
one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies,
we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great
deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our
Minds not being able to discover any <connexion> betwixt these pri-
mary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us 25
by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted
Rules, of the Consequence or <Co-existence> of any secondary Qualities,
though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those
invisible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far
from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow 30
Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means
conceive how any <size, figure, or motion> of any Particles, can possibly
produce in us the <Idea> of any <Colour, Taste>, or <Sound> whatsoever;
there is no conceivable <connexion> betwixt the one and the other.
#S 14#. In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our 35
<Ideas>, (the only true way of certain and universal Knowledge,) what
#P 546#
#L 1#
other <Ideas> are to be found constantly joined with that of our com-
plex <Idea> of any Substance: since we neither know the real Con-
stitution of the minute Parts, on which their Qualities do depend;
nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary <connexion>
between them, and any of the <secondary Qualities>: which is necessary  5 
to be done, before we can certainly know their <necessary co-existence>.
So that let our complex <Idea> of any Species of Substances, be what it
will, we can hardly, from the simple <Ideas> contained in it, certainly
determine the <necessary co-existence> of any other Quality whatsoever.
Our Knowledge in all these Enquiries, reaches very little farther 10 
than our Experience. Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities
have a necessary dependence, and visible connexion one with
another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extension, receiving or
communicating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity. But though
these, and perhaps some others of our <Ideas> have: yet there are so 15 
<few> of them, that have a <visible Connexion> one with another, that we
can by Intuition or Demonstration, discover the co-existence of
very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Substances: and
we are left only to the assistance of our Senses, to make known to us,
what Qualities they contain. For of all the Qualities that are <co-> 20 
<existent> in any Subject, without this dependence and evident con-
nexion of their <Ideas> one with another, we cannot know certainly
any two to <co-exist> any farther, than Experience, by our Senses,
informs us. Thus though we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial
find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are 25 
united in a piece of Gold; yet because no one of these <Ideas> has any
evident <dependence>, or necessary connexion with the other, we can-
not certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will
be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: Because the
highest Probability, amounts not to Certainty; without which, 30 
there can be no true Knowledge. For this <co-existence> can be no
farther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived but
either in particular Subjects, by the observation of our Senses, or in
general, by the necessary <connexion> of the <Ideas> themselves.
#S 15#. <As to incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence>, we may 35   
know, that any Subject can have of each sort of primary Qualities,

                                                                #P 547#
                                                                #L 1#
but one particular at once, <v.g.> each particular Extension, Figure,
number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like
also is certain of all sensible <Ideas> peculiar to each Sense; for what-
ever of each kind is present in any Subject, excludes all other of that
sort; <v.g.> no one Subject can have two Smells, or two Colours, at the 5
same time. To this, perhaps, will be said, has not an <Opall>, or the
infusion of <Lignum Nephriticum>, two Colours at the same time? To
which I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently placed, may
at the same time afford different Colours: But I take Liberty also to
say, that to Eyes differently placed, 'tis different parts of the object, 10
that reflect the Particles of Light: And therefore 'tis not the same
part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which at the
same time appears both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impossible that
the very same Particle of any Body, should at the same time
differently modify, or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it should 15
have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.
#S 16#. But <as to the Powers of Substances> to change the sensible
Qualities of other Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries
about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge; I
doubt, as to these, whether <our Knowledge reaches> much farther than 20
our Experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most
of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject by the
connexion with any of those <Ideas>, which to us make its Essence.
Because the Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of
operating, consisting in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we 25
cannot by any means come to discover: 'Tis but in very few Cases,
we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to
any of those <Ideas>, which make our complex one of that sort of
Things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hypothesis, as
that which is thought to go farthest in in intelligible Explication of 30
the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of humane Under-
standing is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a
fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion, and <Co->
<existence>, of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several
#P 548#
#L 1#
sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be
clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,)
our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little
advanced by any of them, till we are made see, what Qualities and
Powers of Bodies have a <necessary Connexion or Repugnancy> one with 5  
another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know
but to a very small degree: And, I doubt, whether with those
Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Know-
ledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther.
Experience is that, which in this part we must depend on. And it 10 
were to be wish'd, that it were more improved. We find the ad-
vantages some Men's generous pains have this way brought to the
stock of natural Knowledge. And if others, especially the Philoso-
phers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their obser-
vations, and sincere in their reports, as those who call themselves 15 
Philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies
here about us, and our insight into their Powers and Operations had
been yet much greater.
#S 17#. If we are at this loss in respect of the Powers, and Operations
of Bodies, I think it is easy to conclude, <we are much more in the dark in> 20 
<reference to Spirits>; whereof we naturally have no <Ideas>, but what we
draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our
own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Obser-
vation. But how inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our
Bodies hold amongst those various, and possibly innumerable, 25 
kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the Endow-
ments and Perfections of Cherubims, and Seraphims, and infinite
sorts of Spirits above us, is what by a transient hint, in another
place, I have offered to my Reader's Consideration.
#S 18#. As to the third sort of our Knowledge, <viz.> the <Agreement or> 30   
<Disagreement of any of our> Ideas <in any other Relation>: This, as it is the
largest Field of our Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it
may extend: Because the Advances that are made in this part of
Knowledge, depending on our Sagacity, in finding intermediate
<Ideas>, that may shew the <Relations> and <Habitudes> of <Ideas>, whose Co-  
existence is not considered, 'tis a hard Matter to tell, when we are
                                                                #P 549#
                                                                #L 1#
at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the helps it
is capable of, for the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement
or Disagreement of remote <Ideas>. They that are ignorant of <Algebra>
cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and
what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other parts 5
of Knowledge, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, 'tis not
easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the <Ideas> of Quantity
are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge;
and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation,
would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering Inter- 
est did not oppose, or menace such Endeavours.
The <Idea> of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and
Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend;
and the <Idea> of our selves, as understanding, rational Beings, being
such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and 15
pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action,
as might place <Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstratiom>:
wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by neces-
sary Consequences, as incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the
measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that 20
will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the
one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The <Relation> of other
<Modes> may certainly be perceived, as well as those of Number and
Extension: and I cannot see, why they should not also be capable of
Demonstration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or 25
pursue their Agreement or Disagreement. <Where there is no Property>,
<there is no Injustice>, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration
in <Euclid>: For the <Idea> of <Property>, being a right to any thing; and
the <Idea> to which the Name <Injustice> is given, being the Invasion or
Violation of that right; it is evident, that these <Ideas> being thus 30
established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as certainly
know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three
#P 550#
#L 1#
Angles equal to two right ones. Again, <No Government allows absolute>
<Liberty>: The <Idea> of Government being the establishment of Society
upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them;
and the <Idea> of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever
he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this 5  
Proposition, as of any in Mathematicks.
#S 19#. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the
<Ideas> of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty
and Demonstration, is,
<First>, That they can be set down, and represented by sensible 10   
marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them
than any Words or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper
are Copies of the <Ideas> in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty
that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle, or
Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mis-  
taken: It remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered,
and examined, and the Demonstration be revised, and all the parts
of it may be gone over more than once, without any danger of the
least change in the <Ideas>. This cannot be thus done in <moral Ideas>,
we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can 20 
set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by:
which though, when written, they remain the same, yet the <Ideas>
they stand for, may change in the same Man; and 'tis very seldom,
that they are not different in different Persons.
<Secondly>, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in 25 
<Ethicks>, is, That <moral Ideas> are commonly more complex than those
of the Figures ordinarily considered in Mathematicks. From whence
these two Inconveniencies follow. <First>, That their names are of
more uncertain Signification, the precise Collection of simple <Ideas>
they stand for not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign, that is 30 
used for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often,
does not steadily carry with it the same <Idea>. Upon which the same
Disorder, Confusion, and Error follows, as would if a Man, going to
demonstrate something of an <Heptagon>, should in the Diagram he
took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by over-sight make the 35 
                                                                #P 551#
                                                                #L 1#
Figure with one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or
he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration.
This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral
<Ideas>, where the same name being retained, one Angle, <i.e.> one simple
<Idea> is left out or put in, in the complex one, (still called by the 5
same name) more at one time than another. <Secondly>, From the
Complexedness of these moral <Ideas> there follows another Incon-
venience, (viz.) that the Mind cannot easily retain those precise
Combinations, so exactly and perfectly, as is necessary in the Exam-
ination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies, Agreements or 10
Disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially
where it is to be judg'd of by long Deductions, and the Intervention
of several other complex <Ideas>, to shew the Agreement or Disagree-
ment of two remote ones.
The great help against this, which Mathematicians find in 15
Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts,
is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty
otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the Mind went over the
parts of them, step by step, to examine their several Correspon-
dencies: And though in casting up a long Sum, either in <Addition>, 20
<Multiplication>, or <Division>, every part be only a Progression of the
Mind, taking a view of its own <Ideas>, and considering their Agree-
ment or Disagreement; and the Resolution of the Question be
nothing but the Result of the whole, made up of such particulars,
whereof the Mind has a clear Perception: yet without setting down 25
the several Parts by marks, whose precise Significations are known,
and by marks, that last and remain in view, when the memory had
let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different
<Ideas> in Mind, without confounding, or letting slip some parts of
the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Reasonings about it 30
useless.  In which Case, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at
all to perceive the Agreement of any two, or more Numbers, their
Equalities or Proportions: That the Mind has only by Intuition of its
own <Ideas> of the Numbers themselves. But the numerical Characters
are helps to the memory, to record and retain the several <Ideas> 35
about which the Demonstration is made, whereby a Man may know
how far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the par-
ticulars, has proceeded; that so he may without Confusion go on
#P 552#
#L 1#
to what is yet unknown; and, at last, have in one view before him
the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.
#S 20#. One part of <these Disadvantages>, in moral <Ideas>, which has
made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good
measure be <remedied> by Definitions, setting down that Collection of 5  
simple <Ideas>, which every Term shall stand for; and then using the
Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection. And what
methods <Algebra>, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest,
to remove the other difficulties, is not easy to fore-tell. Confident
I am, that if Men would in the same method, and with the same 10 
indifferency, search after moral, as they do mathematical Truths,
they would find them to have a stronger Connection one with
another, and a more necessary Consequence from our clear and
distinct <Ideas>, and to come nearer perfect Demonstration, than is
commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst 15 
the desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the
well endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments,
either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over, and cover their
Deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to
the Mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the Under- 20 
standing, as a Lye. For though many a Man can with satisfaction
enough own a no very handsome Wife in his Bosom; yet who is
bold enough openly to avow, that he has espoused a Falshood, and
received into his Breast so ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilst the Parties
of Men, cram their Tenets down all Men's Throats, whom they 25 
can get into their Power, without permitting them to examine
their Truth or Falshood; and will not let Truth have fair play in
the World, nor Men the Liberty to search after it; What Improve-
ments can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be
hoped for in the moral Sciences? The Subject part of Mankind, 30 
in most Places, might, instead thereof, with <AEgyptian> Bondage,
expect <AEgyptian> Darkness, were not the Candle of the Lord set up
by himself in Men's minds, which it is impossible for the Breath or
Power of Man wholly to extinguish.
#S 21#. As to the fourth sort of our Knowledge, <viz. of> the <real>, 35   
<actual, Existence> of Things, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our
                                                                #P 553#
                                                                #L 1#
own <Existence>; a demonstrative Knowledge of the <Existence> of a
God; of the <Existence> of any thing else, we have no other but a
sensitive Knowledge, which extends not beyond the Objects present
to our Senses.
#S 22#. Our Knowledge being so narrow, as I have shew'd, it will, 5
perhaps, give us some Light into the present State of our minds, if
we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of <our Ignorance>:
which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may serve much
to the quieting of Disputes, and Improvement of useful Knowledge;
if discovering how far we have clear and distinct <Ideas>, we confine 10
our Thoughts within the Contemplation of those Things, that are
within the reach of our Understandings, and lanch not out into
that Abyss of Darkness (where we have not Eyes to see, nor
Faculties to perceive any thing,) out of a Presumption, that nothing
is beyond our Comprehension. But to be satisfied of the Folly of 15
such a Conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing,
knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for Instances
of his Ignorance. The meanest, and most obvious Things that come
in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot pene-
trate into. The clearest, and most enlarged Understandings of 20
thinking Men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every
Particle of Matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we
consider the <Causes of our Ignorance>, which, from what has been said,
I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:
<First>, Want of <Ideas>.                                             25
<Secondly>, Want of a discoverable Connexion between the <Ideas> we
have.
<Thirdly>, Want of tracing, and examining our <Ideas>.
#S 23#. <First>, There are some Things, and those not a few, that we
are ignorant of for <want of Ideas>.                                  30
<First>, All the simple <Ideas> we have are confined (as I have shewn)
to those we receive from corporeal Objects by <Sensation>, and from
the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of <Reflection>.
But how much these few and narrow Inlets are disproportionate
#P 554#
#L 1#
to the vast whole Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to persuade
those, who are not so foolish, as to think their span the measure of
all Things. What other simple <Ideas> 'tis possible the Creatures in
other parts of the Universe may have, by the Assistance of Senses
and Faculties more or perfecter, than we have, or different from 5  
ours, 'tis not for us to determine. But to say, or think there are no
such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argu-
ment, than if a blind Man should be positive in it, that there was no
such thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no manner of
<Idea>, of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself 10 
any Notions about Seeing. The Ignorance, and Darkness that is in
us, no more hinders, nor confines the Knowledge, that is in others,
than the blindness of a Mole is an Argument against the quick-
sightedness of an Eagle. He that will consider the Infinite Power,
Wisdom, and Goodness of the Creator of all Things, will find 15 
Reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable,
mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who in all
probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. What
Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate
into the Nature, and inmost Constitutions of Things; what <Ideas> 20 
they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not.
This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views
of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more
perfect. And we may be convinced that the <Ideas>, we can attain to
by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, 25 
when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the
Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of <Ideas>
of this kind being a Part, as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot
be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the
intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; That 30 
that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion
with what we see not; And whatsoever we can reach with our
Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost
nothing, in comparison of the rest.
#S 24#. <Secondly>, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the <want of> 35   
Ideas <we are capable of>. As the want of <Ideas>, which our faculties are
not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of Things,
                                                                #P 555#
                                                                #L 1#
which 'tis reasonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we, have,
of which we know nothing; so the want of <Ideas>, I now speak of,
keeps us in ignorance of Things, we conceive capable of being
known to us. <Bulk, Figure>, and <Motion>, we have <Ideas> of. But though
we are not without <Ideas> of these primary qualities of Bodies in 5
general, yet not knowing what is the particular <Bulk, Figure>, and
<Motion>, of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are
ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation,
whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are
hid from us in some Things, by being <too remote; and> in others, by 10
being too <minute>. When we consider the vast distance of the known
and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think,
that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense
Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What
are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter, which 15
make up the whole stupendious frame of Corporeal Beings; how
far they are extended; what is their Motion, and how continued, or
communicated; and what Influence they have one upon another, are
Contemplations, that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves
in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to 20
this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser
Masses of Matter, that visibly move about it, what several sorts of
Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely
different from those of our little spot of Earth, may there probably
be in the other Planets, to the Knowledge of which, even of their 25
outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are
confined to this Earth, there being no natural Means, either by
Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain <Ideas> into our
Minds? They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Know-
ledge: and what sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions 30
contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear,
and distinct <Ideas> of them.
#S 25#. If a great, nay far the greatest part of the several ranks of
<Bodies> in the Universe, scape our notice by their remoteness, there
are others that are no less concealed from us by their <Minuteness>. 35
These insensible Corpuscles, being the active parts of Matter, and
#P 556#
#L 1#
the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not only all
their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations,
our want of precise distinct <Ideas> of their primary Qualities, keeps
us in an uncurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them.
I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and 5  
Motion of the minute Constituent parts of any two Bodies, we
should know without Trial several of their Operations one upon
another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle.
Did we know the Mechanical affections of the Particles of <Rhubarb>,
<Hemlock, Opium>, and a <Man>, as a Watchmaker does those of a 10 
Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File which by
rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels, we
should be able to tell before Hand, that <Rhubarb will> purge, <Hemlock>
kill, and <Opium> make a Man sleep; as well as a Watch-maker can,
that a little piece of Paper laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch 15 
from going, till it be removed; or that some small part of it, being
rubb'd by a File, the Machin would quite lose its Motion, and the
Watch go no more. The dissolving of Silver in <aqua fortis>, and Gold
in <aqua Regia>, and not <vice versa>, would be then, perhaps, no more
difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to understand, why the turn-  
ing of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another.
But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough, to discover the
minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us <Ideas> of their mechanical
Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and
ways of Operation; nor can we be assured about them any farther, 25 
than some few Trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they
will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This
hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning
natural Bodies: and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond
particular matter of Fact. 30 
#S 26#. And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever
humane Industry may advance useful and <experimental> Philosophy <in>
<physical Things, scientifical> will still be out of our reach: because we
want perfect and adequate <Ideas> of those very Bodies, which are
                                                               #P 557#
                                                               #L 1#
nearest to us, and most under our Command. Those which we have
ranked into Classes under names, and we think our selves best
acquainted with, we have but very imperfect, and incompleat
<Ideas> of. Distinct <Ideas> of the several sorts of Bodies, that fall under
the Examination of our Senses, perhaps, we may have: but adequate 5
<Ideas>, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though
the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse: yet
whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of <scientifical Know->
<ledge>; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, un-
questionable Truths concerning them. <Certainty> and <Demonstration>, 10
are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to. By the Colour,
Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as
clear, and distinct <Ideas> of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle
and a Triangle: But having no <Ideas> of the particular primary
Qualities of the minute parts of either of these Plants, nor of other 15
Bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects
they will produce; Nor when we see those Effects, can we so much
as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having
no <Ideas> of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute parts
of Bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of 20
their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations: and of Bodies more
remote, we are yet more ignorant not knowing so much as their
very outward Shapes or the sensible and grosser parts of their
Constitutions.
#S 27#. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our 25
Knowledge is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to
which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of
<Spirits> that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote
from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can
frame to our selves any distinct <Ideas> of their several ranks and sorts, 30
we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an im-
penetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual World; a
greater certainly, and more beautiful World, than the material.
For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial
#P 558#
#L 1#
<Ideas> of Spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence,
the best we can, collect, of the Father of all Spirits, the eternal
independent Author of them and us and all Things, we have no
certain information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits,
but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our dis-   
covery: And all those intelligences, whereof 'tis likely there are
more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are Things, whereof our
natural Faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are
Minds, and thinking Beings in other Men as well as himself, every
Man has a reason, from their Words and Actions, to be satisfied: 10 
And the Knowledge of his own Mind cannot suffer a Man, that
considers, to be ignorant, that there is a GOD. But that there are
degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great GOD, who
is there, that by his own search and ability can come to know?
Much less have we distinct <Ideas> of their different Natures, Condi-  
tions, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they
agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore in what
concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an
absolute ignorance.
#S 28#. <Secondly>, What a small part of the substantial Beings, that are 20   
in the Universe, the want of <Ideas> leave open to our Knowledge, we
have seen. In the next place, another cause of Ignorance, of no less
moment, is a want of <a discoverable Connection> between those <Ideas>
which we have. For wherever we want that, we are utterly un-
capable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the 25 
former case, left only to Observation and Experiment: which how
narrow and confined it is, how far from general Knowledge, we
need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our
Ignorance and so leave it. 'Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and
motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, 30 
as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, <etc.> These
mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those
                                                               #P 559#
                                                               #L 1#
<Ideas>, they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion
between any impulse of any sort of Body, and any perception of a
Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no
distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience;
and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced 5
by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly
surpass our Comprehensions. As the <Ideas> of sensible secondary
Qualities, which we have in our Minds, can, by us, be no way de-
duced from bodily Causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be
found between them and those primary Qualities which (Experience 10
shews us) produce them in us; so on the other side, the Operation
of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought
should produce a motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our
<Ideas>, as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind.
That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Consideration 15
of the Things themselves would never be able, in the least, to dis-
cover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and
regular connexion, in the ordinary course of Things: yet that
connexion being not discoverable in the <Ideas> themselves, which
appearing to have no necessary dependance one on another, we can 20
attribute their connexion to nothing else, but the arbitrary Deter-
mination of that All-wise Agent, who has made them to be, and to
operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Understandings
to conceive.
#S 29#. In some of our <Ideas> there are certain Relations, Habitudes, 25
and Connexions, so visibly included in the Nature of the <Ideas>
themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them, by
any Power whatsoever. And in these only, we are capable of certain
and universal Knowledge. Thus the <Idea> of a right-lined Triangle
necessarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two right 30
ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this connexion of these
two <Ideas>, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary
Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise.
But the coherence and continuity of the parts of Matter; the pro-
duction of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds, <etc.> by impulse 35
#P 560#
#L 1#
and motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion
being such, wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any
<Ideas> we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will
and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, I think, here
mention the Resurrection of the dead, the future state of this 5  
Globe of Earth, and such other Things, which are by every one
acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free
Agent. The Things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we
constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a
Law set them; but yet by a Law, that we know not: whereby, 10 
though Causes work steadily, and Effects constantly flow from
them, yet their <Connexions> and <Dependancies> being not discoverable
in our <Ideas>, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them.
From all which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are
involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that 15 
we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our
Knowledge when we modestly think with our selves, that we are
so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the Uni-
verse, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of
a philosophical <Knowledge> of the Bodies that are about us, and make 20 
a part of us: Concerning their secondary Qualities, Powers, and
Operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come
every day within the notice of our Senses, of which we have so far
<sensitive Knowledge>: but the causes, manner, and certainty of their
production, for the two foregoing Reasons, we must be content 25 
to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular
Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guess
what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other tryals, like to produce.
But as to a perfect <Science> of natural Bodies, (not to mention
spiritual Beings,) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any 30 
such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.
#S 30#. <Thirdly>, Where we have adequate <Ideas>, and where there is a
certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often
ignorant, for want of <tracing> those <Ideas> which we have, or may have;
and for want of finding out those intermediate <Ideas>, which may 35 
shew us, what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have
                                                                #P 561#
                                                                #L 1#
one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical
Truths, not out of any imperfection of their Faculties, or uncertainty
in the Things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring,
examining, and by due ways comparing those <Ideas>. That which
has most contributed to hinder the due <tracing> of our <Ideas>, and 5
finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements
one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of <Words>. It is
impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover
the Agreement or Disagreement of <Ideas> themselves, whilst their
Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and un-  
certain significations. Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts
from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their
Minds, the <Ideas> themselves, that they would consider, and not
Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that
perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred 15
Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge. For whilst they stick
in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are
unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable,
Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions. This having
been the fate or misfortune of a great part of the men of Letters, 20
the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been
very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings,
the World has been fill'd with; whilst students, being lost in the
great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far
their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, 25
or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in the discoveries of
the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World,
involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of
talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and
Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships 30
built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond
the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as
when it was declared Heresy to hold there were any. But having
spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use, that is
commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of 35
it here.
#P 562#
#L 1#
#S 31#. Hitherto we have examined the <extent> of our Knowledge, in
respect of the several sorts of Beings that are. There is another
<extent of it, in respect of universality>, which will also deserve to be
considered: and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature
of our <Ideas>. If the <Ideas> are abstract, whose agreement or disagree-   
ment we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. For what is known
of such general <Ideas>, will be true of every particular thing, in whom
that Essence, <i.e.> that abstract <Idea> is to be found: and what is once
known of such <Ideas>, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that
as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our 10 
own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own <Ideas>, that
furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to Essences of Things,
that is, to abstract <Ideas>) are eternal, and are to be found out by the
contemplation only of those Essences: as the Existence of Things is
to be known only from Experience. But having more to say of this 15 
in the Chapters, where I shall speak of general and real Knowledge,
this may here suffice, as to the Universality of our Knowledge in
general.


#C 04#                        CHAPTER IV

                   <Of the Reality of our Knowledge>.

#S 01#. I Doubt not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to
think, that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the 20 
Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir?
Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or
disagreement of our own <Ideas>: but who knows what those <Ideas>
may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the Imaginations of
Men's Brains? Where is the Head that has no <Chimeras> in it? Or if 25 
there be a sober and a wise Man, what difference will there be, by
your Rules, between his Knowledge, and that of the most extrava-
gant Fancy in the World? They both have their <Ideas>, and perceive
their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be
any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-  
headed Man's side, as having the more <Ideas>, and the more lively.
                                                               #P 563#
#L 1#
And so, by your Rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true,
that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or
disagreement of our own <Ideas>, the Visions of an Enthusiast, and the
Reasonings of a sober Man, will be equally certain. 'Tis no matter
how Things are: so a Man observe but the agreement of his own 5
Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty.
Such Castles in the Air, will be as strong Holds of Truth, as the
Demonstrations of <Euclid>. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by
this way as certain knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a
Square is not a Circle.                                              10
But <of what use is all this> fine <Knowledge of Men's own Imaginations>,
to a Man that enquires after the reality of Things? It matters not
what Men's Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of things that is only
to be prized: 'tis this alone gives a value to our Reasonings, and
preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of 15
Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.
#S 02#. To which I answer, That if our Knowledge of our <Ideas>
terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something
farther intended, our most serious Thoughts will be of little more
use, than the Reveries of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built 20
thereon of no more weight, than the Discourses of a Man, who sees
Things clearly in a Dream, and with great assurance utters them.
But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way
of certainty, by the Knowledge of our own <Ideas>, goes a little farther
than bare Imagination: and, I believe it will appear, that all the 25
certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing else.
#S 03#. 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but
only by the intervention of the <Ideas> it has of them. <Our Knowledge>
therefore is <real>, only so far as there is a conformity between our
<Ideas> and the reality of Things. But what shall be here the Criterion? 30
How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own <Ideas>,
know that they agree with Things themselves? This, though it
seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think there be two sorts of
<Ideas>, that, we may be assured, agree with Things.
#S 04#. <First>, The first are simple <Ideas>, which since the Mind, as has 35
been shewed, can by no means make to it self, must necessarily be
#P 564#
#L 1#
the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and
producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and
Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence
it follows, that <simple> Ideas <are not fictions> of our Fancies, but the
natural and regular productions of Things without us, really 5  
operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity
which is intended; or which our state requires: For they represent
to us Things under those appearances which they are fitted to
produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of
particular Substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to 10 
take them for our Necessities, and apply them to our Uses. Thus
the <Idea> of Whiteness, or Bitterness, as it is in the Mind, exactly
answering that Power which is in any Body to produce it there,
has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with Things
without us. And this conformity between our simple <Ideas>, and the 15 
existence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge.
#S 05#. <Secondly, All our complex> Ideas, <except those of Substances>, being
<Archetypes> of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies
of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their
Originals, <cannot want any conformity necessary to real Knowledge>. For 20 
that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can
never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the
true apprehension of any thing, by its dislikeness to it: and such,
excepting those of Substances, are all our complex <Ideas>. Which, as
I have shewed in another place, are Combinations of <Ideas>, which 25 
the Mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any
connexion they have in Nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts
the <Ideas> themselves are considered as the <Archetypes>, and Things
no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So
that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledge we 30 
attain concerning these <Ideas> is real, and reaches Things themselves.
Because in all our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Discourses of this
kind, we intend Things no farther, than as they are conformable
to our <Ideas>. So that in these, we cannot miss of a certain undoubted
reality. 35 
                                                                #P 565#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 06#. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the <Knowledge> we
may have of <Mathematical Truths, is> not only certain, but <real know->
<ledge>; and not the bare empty Vision of vain insignificant <Chimeras>
of the Brain: And yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only
of our own <Ideas>. The Mathematician considers the Truth and 5
Properties belonging to a Rectangle, or Circle, only as they are in
<Idea> in his own Mind. For 'tis possible he never found either of them
existing mathematically, <i.e.> precisely true, in his Life. But yet the
knowledge he has of any Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle,
or any other mathematical Figure, are nevertheless true and certain, 10
even of real Things existing: because real Things are no farther
concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions,
than as Things really agree to those <Archetypes> in his Mind. Is it
true of the <Idea> of a <Triangle>, that its three Angles are equal to two
right ones? It is true also of a <Triangle>, where-ever it really exists.  15
Whatever other Figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that
<Idea> of a <Triangle> in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that Proposi-
tion. And therefore he is certain all his Knowledge concerning such
<Ideas>, is real Knowledge: because intending Things no farther than
they agree with those his <Ideas>, he is sure what he knows concerning 20
those Figures, when they have barely <an Ideal Existence> in his Mind,
will hold true of them also, when they have a real existence in
Matter; his consideration being barely of those Figures, which are
the same, where-ever, or however they exist.
#S 07#. And hence it follows, that <moral Knowledge> is as <capable of real> 25
<Certainty>, as Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception
of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our <Ideas>; and Demonstration
nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention
of other <Ideas>, or Mediums, our <moral Ideas>, as well as mathematical,
being <Archetypes> themselves, and so adequate, and complete <Ideas>, 30
all the Agreement, or Disagreement, which we shall find in them,
will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.
#S 08#. For the attaining of <Knowledge> and Certainty it is requisite,
that we have determined <Ideas>: and to make our Knowledge <real>, it
is requisite, that the <Ideas> answer their <Archetypes>. Nor let it be 35
#P 566#
#L 1#
wondred, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Con-
sideration of our <Ideas>, with so little Care and Regard (as it may
seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those Discourses,
which take up the Thoughts and engage the Disputes of those who
pretend to make it their Business to enquire after Truth and Cer-   
tainty, will, I presume, upon Examination be found to be <general>
<Propositions>, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concerned.
All the Discourses of the Mathematicians about the squaring of a
Circle, conick Sections, or any other part of Mathematicks, <concern>
<not> the <Existence> of any of those Figures: but their Demonstrations, 10 
which depend on their <Ideas>, are the same, whether there be any
Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same manner,
the Truth and Certainty of <moral> Discourses abstracts from the
Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World,
whereof they treat: Nor are <Tully>'s Offices less true, because there 15 
is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives
up to that pattern of a vertuous Man, which he has given us, and
which existed no where, when he writ, but in <Idea>. If it be true in
Speculation, <i.e.> in <Idea>, that <Murther deserves Death>, it will also be
true in Reality of any Action that exists conformable to that <Idea> of 20 
<Murther>. As for other Actions, the Truth of that Proposition con-
cerns them not. And thus it is of all other Species of Things, which
have no other Essences, but those <Ideas>, which are in the Minds
of Men.
#S 09#. But it will here be said, that if <moral Knowledge> be placed in 25   
the Contemplation of our own <moral Ideas>, and those, as other Modes,
be of our own making, What strange Notions will there be of
<Justice> and <Temperance>? What confusion of Vertues and Vices, if
every one may make what <Ideas> of them he pleases? No confusion
nor disorder in the Things themselves, nor the Reasonings about 30 
them; no more than (in Mathematicks) there would be a Disturb-
ance in the Demonstration, or a change in the Properties of Figures,
and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make a Triangle
with four Corners, or a <Trapezium> with four right Angles: that is, in
plain <English>, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one 35 
Name, which Mathematicians call'd ordinarily by another. For let
a Man make to himself the <Idea> of a Figure with three Angles,
                                                                #P 567#
                                                                #L 1#
whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, <Equilaterum> or
<Trapezium>, or any thing else, the Properties of, and Demonstrations
about that <Idea>, will be the same, as if he call'd it a <Rectangular->
<Triangle>. I confess, the change of the Name, by the impropriety of
Speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what <Idea> it 5
stands for: but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences
and Demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in <moral>
Knowledge, let a Man have the <Idea> of taking from others, without
their Consent, what their honest Industry has possessed them of,
and call this <Justice>, if he please. He that takes the Name here 10
without the <Idea> put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another <Idea>
of his own to that Name: But strip the <Idea> of that Name, or take it
such as it is in the Speaker's Mind, and the same Things will agree
to it, as if you call'd it <Injustice>. Indeed, wrong Names in moral
Discourses, breed usually more disorder, because they are not so 15
easily rectified, as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn
and seen, makes the Name useless and of no force. For what need
of a Sign, when the Thing signified is present and in view? But in
moral Names, that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of
the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex 20
<Ideas> of those Modes. But yet for all this the <miscalling of> any of
those <Ideas>, contrary to the usual signification of the Words of that
Language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demon-
strative Knowledge of their several Agreements and Disagreements,
if we will carefully, as in Mathematicks, keep to the same precise 25
<Ideas>, and trace them in their several Relations one to another,
without being led away by their Names. If we but separate the
<Idea> under consideration from the Sign that stands for it, our Know-
ledge goes equally on in the discovery of real Truth and Certainty,
whatever Sounds we make use of.                                   30
#S 10#. One thing more we are to take notice of, That where GOD,
or any other Law-maker, hath defined any Moral Names, there they
have made the Essence of that Species to which that Name belongs;
and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise: But in other
cases 'tis bare impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the 35
#P 568#
#L 1#
common usage of the Country. But yet even this too disturbs
not the certainty of <that> Knowledge, which is still to be had by a
due contemplation and comparing of those even nick-nam'd <Ideas>.
#S 11#. <Thirdly>, There is another sort of <complex Ideas>, which being
referred to <Archetypes> without us, may differ from them, and so our  5 
Knowledge about them, may come short of being real. Such are our
<Ideas> of Substances, which consisting of a Collection of simple <Ideas>,
supposed taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them,
by having more or different <Ideas> united in them, than are to be
found united in the things themselves: From whence it comes to 10 
pass, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable
to Things themselves.
#S 12#. I say then, that to have <Ideas> of <Substances>, which, by being
conformable to Things, may afford us <real> Knowledge, it is not
enough, as in Modes, to put together such <Ideas> as have no in-  
consistence, though they did never before so exist. <V.g.> the <Ideas> of
<Sacrilege> or <Perjury, etc.> were as real and true <Ideas> before, as after the
existence of any such fact. But <our Ideas of Substances> being supposed
Copies, and referred to <Archetypes> without us, must still be taken
from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of 20 
<Ideas> put together at the pleasure of our Thoughts, without any
real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no in-
consistence in such a Combination. The reason whereof is, because
we knowing not what real Constitution it is of Substances, whereon
our simple <Ideas> depend, and which really is the cause of the strict 25 
union of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of
others; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are
not inconsistent in Nature, any farther than Experience and sensible
Observation reaches. Herein therefore is founded the <reality> of our
Knowledge concerning <Substances>, that all our complex <Ideas> of them 30 
must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as
have been discovered to co-exist in Nature. And our <Ideas> being thus
true, though not, perhaps, very exact Copies, are yet the Subjects of
<real> (as far as we have any) <Knowledge> of them. Which (as has been
already shewed) will not be found to reach very far: But so far as it 35 
does, it will still be <real Knowledge>. Whatever <Ideas> we have, the
                                                                #P 569#
                                                                #L 1#
Agreement we find they have with others, will still be knowledge.
If those <Ideas> be abstract, it will be general Knowledge. But to make
it <real> concerning Substances, the <Ideas> must be taken from the real
existence of things. Whatever simple <Ideas> have been found to co-
exist in any Substance, these we may with confidence join together 5
again, and so make abstract <Ideas> of Substances. For whatever have
once had an union in Nature, may be united again.
#S 13#. This, if we rightly consider, and <confine not our Thoughts> and
abstract <Ideas> to Names, as if there were, <or> could be no other <Sorts>
of Things, than what known Names had already determined, and 10
as it were set out, we should think of Things with greater freedom
and less confusion, than perhaps we do. 'Twould possibly be thought
a bold Paradox, if not a very dangerous Falshood, if I should say, that
some <Changelings>, who have lived forty years together, without any
appearance of Reason, are something between a Man and a Beast:  15
Which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false Supposi-
tion, that these two Names, <Man> and <Beast>, stand for distinct
Species so set out by real Essences, that there can come no other
Species between them: Whereas if we will abstract from those
Names, and the Supposition of such specifick Essences made by 20
Nature, wherein all Things of the same Denominations did exactly
and equally partake; if we would not fansy, that there were a
certain number of these Essences, wherein all Things, as in Molds,
were cast and formed, we should find that the <Idea> of the Shape,
Motion, and Life of a Man without Reason, is as much a distinct 25
<Idea>, and makes as much a distinct <sort> of Things from Man and
Beast, as the <Idea> of the Shape of an <Ass> with Reason, would be
different from either that of Man or Beast, and be a Species of an
Animal between, or distinct from both.
#S 14#. Here every body will be ready to ask, if <Changelings> may be 30
supposed something between Man and Beast, 'Pray what are they?
I answer, <Changelings>, which is as good a Word to signify something
different from the signification Of <MAN or BEAST>, as the Names
Man and Beast are to have significations different one from the
other. This, well considered, would resolve this matter, and shew 35
#P 570#
#L 1#
my meaning without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted
with the Zeal of some Men, which enables them to spin Conse-
quences, and to see Religion threatned, whenever any one ventures
to quit their Forms of Speaking, as not to foresee, what Names such
a Proposition as this is like to be charged with: And without doubt 5  
it will be asked, If <Changelings> are something between Man and
Beast, what will become of them in the other World? To which I
answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own
Master they stand or fall. <*> It will make their state neither better nor
worse, whether we determine any thing of it, or no. They are in the 10 
hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not
of his Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts or Opinions, nor
distinguishes them according to Names and Species of our Contri-
vance. And we that know so little of this present World we are in,
may, I think, content our selves without being peremptory in 15 
defining the different states, which Creatures shall come into, when
they go off this Stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known
to all those, who are capable of Instruction, Discourse, and Reason-
ing, that they shall come to an account, and receive according to
what they have done in this Body.<**> 20 
#S 15#. But, <Secondly>, I answer, The force of these Men's Question,
viz. will you deprive <Changelings> of a future state?) is founded on
one of two Suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all
Things that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a Man,
must necessarily be designed to an immortal future Being, after 25 
this Life. Or, secondly, that whatever is of humane Birth, must be
so. Take away these Imaginations, and such Questions will be
groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those, who think there is no
more but an accidental difference between themselves and <Change->
<lings>, the Essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, 30 
whether they can imagine Immortality annexed to any outward
shape of the Body; the very proposing it, is, I suppose, enough to
make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much
soever immersed in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure
of the gross sensible outward parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, 35 
or necessary consequence of it; or that any mass of Matter should,
                                                                #P 571#
                                                                #L 1#
after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an ever-
lasting state of Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, only because it
was molded into this or that Figure, and had such a particular
frame of its visible parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality
in a certain superficial Figure, turns out of doors all consideration of 5
Soul or Spirit, upon whose account alone some corporeal Beings
have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to
attribute more to the outside, than inside of Things; to place the
Excellency of a Man, more in the external Shape of his Body, than
internal Perfections of his Soul: which is but little better than to 10
annex the great and inestimable advantage of Immortality and
Life everlasting, which he has above other material Beings, to
annex it, I say, to the Cut of his Beard, or the Fashion of his Coat.
For this or that outward Make of our Bodies, no more carries with
it the hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Fashion of a Man's 15
Suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear
out, or that it will make him immortal. 'Twill perhaps be said, that
no Body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but 'tis
the Shape is the sign of a rational Soul within, which is immortal. I
wonder who made it the sign of any such Thing: for barely saying 20
it, will not make it so. It would require some Proofs to persuade one
of it. No Figure that I know speaks any such Language. For it may
as rationally be concluded, that the dead Body of a Man, wherein
there is to be found no more appearance or action of Life, than there
is in a Statue, has yet nevertheless a living Soul in it, because of its 25
shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a <Changeling>, because he has
the outside of a rational Creature, when his Actions carry far less
marks of Reason with them, in the whole course of his Life, than
what are to be found in many a Beast.
#S 16#. But 'tis the issue of rational Parents, and must therefore be 30
concluded to have a rational Soul. I know not by what Logick you
must so conclude. I am sure this is a Conclusion, that Men no
where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every-
where they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions.
Ay, but these are <Monsters>. Let them be so; What will your drivling, 35
unintelligent, intractable <Changeling> be? Shall a defect in the Body
#P 572#
#L 1#
make a <Monster>; a defect in the Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in
the common phrase, the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the want
of a Nose, or a Neck, make a <Monster>, and put such Issue out of the
rank of Men; the want of Reason and Understanding, not? This is
to bring all back again, to what was exploded just now: This is to  5 
place all in the Shape, and to take the measure of a Man only by his
out-side. To shew that according to the ordinary way of Reasoning
in this Matter, People do lay the whole stress on the Figure, and
resolve the whole Essence of the Species of Man (as they make it)
into the outward Shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how 10 
much soever they disown it, we need but trace their Thoughts and
Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-
shaped <Changeling> is a Man, has a rational Soul, though it appear
not; this is past doubt, say you. Make the Ears a little longer, and
more pointed, and the Nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then 15 
you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, and
longer, and then you are at a stand: Add still more and more of the
likeness of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some
other Animal, then presently 'tis a <Monster>; and 'tis demonstration
with you, that it hath no rational Soul, and must be destroy'd. 20 
Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost
Bounds of that Shape, that carries with it a rational Soul? For since
there has been humane <Foetus>'s produced, half Beast, and half Man;
and others three parts one, and one part t'other; and so it is possible
they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other 25 
Shape, and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a
Man, or a Brute, I would gladly know what are those precise
Lineaments, which according to this Hypothesis, are, or are not
capable of a rational Soul to be joined to them. What sort of outside
is the certain sign that there is, or is not such an Inhabitant within? 30 
For till that be done, we talk at random of <Man>: and shall always, I
fear, do so, as long as we give our selves up to certain Sounds, and
the Imaginations of setled and fixed Species in Nature, we know not
what. But after all, I desire it may be considered, that those who
think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that a mis-
shaped <Foetus> is a <Monster>, run into the same Fault they are arguing
against, by constituting a Species between Man and Beast. For what
                                                               #P 573#
                                                               #L 1#
else I pray is their Monster in the case (if the word <Monster> signi-
fies any thing at all) but something neither Man nor Beast, but
partaking somewhat of either: And just so is the <Changeling> before-
mentioned. So necessary is it to quit the common notion of Species
and Essences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and 5
examine them, by what our Faculties can discover in them as they
exist, and not by groundless Fancies, that have been taken up
about them.
#S 17#. I have mentioned this here, because I think we cannot be too
cautious, that <Words> and <Species>, in the ordinary Notions which we 10
have been used to of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think,
therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct Knowledge,
especially in reference to Substances; and from thence has rose a
great part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we
accustom our selves to separate our Contemplations and Reasonings 15
from Words, we might, in a great measure, remedy this Inconveni-
ence within our own Thoughts: But yet it would still disturb us in
our Discourse with others, as long as we retained the Opinion, that
<Species> and their Essences were any thing else but our abstract <Ideas>,
such as they are) with Names annexed to them, to be the signs 20
of them.
#S 18#. Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement
of any of our <Ideas> there is certain Knowledge: and where-ever we
are sure those <Ideas> agree with the reality of Things, there is
certain real Knowledge. Of which Agreement of our <Ideas> with the 25
reality of Things, having here given the marks, I think I have
shewn wherein it is, that <Certainty, real Certainty>, consists. Which
whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of
those <Desiderata> which I found great want of.
#P 574#
#C 05#                        CHAPTER V

                         <Of Truth in general>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. WHAT is <Truth>, was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being
that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it
cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it
consists; and so acquaint our selves with the Nature of it, as to
observe how the Mind distinguishes it from Falshood. 5  
#S 02#. <Truth> then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to
signify nothing but <the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things>
<signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another>. The <joining> or
<separating> of signs here meant is what by another name, we call
Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions: 10 
whereof there are two sorts, <viz.> Mental and Verbal; as there are
two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, <viz. Ideas> and Words.
#S 03#. To form a clear Notion of <Truth>, it is very necessary to con-
sider <Truth> of Thought, and <Truth> of Words, distinctly one from
another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because 15 
it is unavoidable, in treating of mental Propositions, to make use
of Words: and then the Instances given of <Mental Propositions>, cease
immediately to be barely Mental, <and> become <Verbal>. For a <mental>
<Proposition> being nothing but a bare consideration of the <Ideas>, as
they are in our Minds stripp'd of Names, they lose the Nature of 20 
purely <mental Propositions>, as soon as they are put into Words.
#S 04#. And that which makes it yet <harder to treat of mental> and
verbal <Propositions separately>, is, That most Men, if not all, in their
Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words
instead of <Ideas>; at least when the subject of their Meditation con-  
tains in it complex <Ideas>. Which is a great evidence of the imperfec-
tion and uncertainty of our <Ideas> of that kind, and may, if attentively
made use of, serve for a mark to shew us, what are those Things,
we have clear and perfect established <Ideas> of, and what not. For if
we will curiously observe the way our Mind takes in Thinking and 30 
                                                                #P 575#
                                                                #L 1#
Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any Propo-
sitions within our own Thoughts, about <White> or <Black, Sweet> or
<Bitter>, a <Triangle> or a <Circle>, we can and often do frame in our
Minds the <Ideas> themselves, without reflecting on the Names. But
when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more com- 
plex <Ideas>, as of a <Man, Vitriol, Fortitude, Glory>, we usually put the
Name for the <Idea>: Because the <Ideas> these Names stand for, being
for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we
reflect on the <Names> themselves, because they are more clear,
certain, and distinct, and readier occurr to our Thoughts, than the 10
pure <Ideas>: and so we make use of these Words instead of the <Ideas>
themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within our
selves, and make tacit mental Propositions. In <Substances>, as has
been already noted, this is occasioned by the imperfection of our
<Ideas>: we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we 15
have no <Idea> at all. In <Modes>, it is occasioned by the great number of
simple <Ideas>, that go to the making them up. For many of them being
very much compounded, the <Name> occurs much easier, than the com-
plex <Idea> it self, which requires time and attention to be recollected,
and exactly represented to the Mind, even in those Men, who have 20
formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be
done by those, who though they have ready in their Memory, the
greatest part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps
never troubled themselves in all their Lives, to consider what
precise <Ideas> the most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure 25
Notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of
<Religion> and <Conscience>, of <Church> and <Faith>, of <Power> and <Right>, of
<Obstructions> and <Humours, Melancholy> and <Choler>, would, perhaps,
have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one should
desire them to think only of the Things themselves, and lay by 30
those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not
seldom themselves also.
#S 05#. But to return to the consideration of Truth. We must, I say,
observe two sorts of Propositions, that we are capable of making.
<First, Mental, wherein> the <Ideas> in our Understandings <are> without 35
the use of Words <put together, or separated> by the Mind, perceiving, or
judging of their Agreement, or Disagreement.
#P 576#
#L 1#
<Secondly, Verbal Propositions>, which <are Words> the signs of our
<Ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative Sentences>. By
which way of affirming or denying, these Signs, made by Sounds,
are as it were put together or separated one from another. So that
Proposition consists in joining, or separating Signs, and Truth con-   
sists in the putting together, or separating these Signs, according
as the Things, which they stand for, agree or disagree.
#S 06#. Every one's Experience will satisfie him, that the Mind,
either by perceiving or supposing the Agreement or Disagreement
of any of its <Ideas>, does tacitly within it self put them into a kind 10 
of Proposition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to
express by the terms <Putting together> and <Separating>. But this Action
of the Mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning
Man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us,
when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by Words. When a 15 
Man has in his Mind the <Idea> of two Lines, <viz.> the <Side> and <Diagonal>
of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he may have the
<Idea> also of the division of that Line, into a certain number of equal
parts; <v.g.> into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thousand, or any other
Number, and may have the <Idea> of that Inch Line, being divisible or 20 
not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will
be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or
supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree or disagree to his <Idea>
of that Line, he, as it were, <joins> or <separates> those two <Ideas, viz.> the
<Idea> of that Line, and the <Idea> of that kind of Divisibility, and so 25 
makes a mental Proposition, which is true or false, according as such
a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such <aliquot> parts, does
really agree to that Line, or no. When <Ideas> are so put together, or
separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do
agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, <mental Truth>. But <Truth of> 30 
<Words> is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of
Words one of another, as the <Ideas> they stand for agree or disagree:
And this again is twofold. Either <purely Verbal>, and trifling, which
I shall speak of, <Chap.> 10. <or Real> and instructive; which is the Object
of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already. 35 
                                                                #P 577#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 07#. But here again will be apt to occurr the same doubt about
Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, That if
Truth be nothing but the joining or separating of Words in Propo-
sitions, as the <Ideas> they stand for agree or disagree in Men's Minds,
the Knowledge of <Truth is not so valuable a Thing>, as it is taken to 5
be; nor worth the Pains and Time Men imploy in the search of it:
since <by this account>, it amounts to no more than the conformity of
Words, to the <Chimaeras> of Men's Brains. Who knows not what odd
Notions many Men's Heads are fill'd with, and what strange <Ideas>
all Men's Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the 10
Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our
own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much con-
cerns <Harpies> and <Centaurs>, as Men and Horses. For those, and the
like, may be <Ideas> in our Heads, and have their agreement and dis-
agreement there, as well as the <Ideas> of real Beings, and so have as 15
true Propositions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as
true a Proposition, to say <all Centaurs are Animals>, as that <all Men are>
<Animals>; and the certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both
the Propositions, the Words are put together according to the agree-
ment of the <Ideas> in our Minds: And the agreement of the <Idea> of 20
<Animal>, with that of <Centaur>, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as
the agreement of the <Idea> of <Animal>, with that of <Man>; and so these
two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use
is all such Truth to us?
#S 08#. Though what has been said in the fore-going Chapter, to 25
distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in
answer to this Doubt, to distinguish <real Truth> from <chimerical>, or
(if you please,) <barely nominal>, they depending both on the same
foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that
though our Words signifie nothing but our <Ideas>, yet being designed 30
by them to signifie Things, the <Truth> they contain, when put into
Propositions, will be only <Verbal>, when they stand for <Ideas> in the
Mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of Things. And
therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the
distinction of <Verbal> and <Real>; that being only <verbal Truth>, wherein 35
Terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the
#P 578#
#L 1#
<Ideas> they stand for, without regarding whether our <Ideas> are such,
as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But
then it is they contain <real Truth>, when these signs are joined, as our
<Ideas> agree; and when our <Ideas> are such, as we know are capable of
having an Existence in Nature: which in Substances we cannot 5  
know, but by knowing that such have existed.
#S 09#. <Truth> is the marking down in Words, the agreement or
disagreement of <Ideas> as it is. <Falshood> is the marking down in Words,
the agreement or disagreement of <Ideas> otherwise than it is. And so
far as these <Ideas>, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, 10 
so far only is the <Truth real>. The knowledge of this Truth, consists
in knowing what <Ideas> the Words stand for, and the perception of
the agreement or disagreement of those <Ideas>, according as it is
marked by those Words.
#S 10#. But because Words are looked on as the great Conduits of 15   
Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of
Truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of Words
and Propositions, I shall more at large enquire, wherein the certainty
of real Truths, contained in Propositions, consists, and where it is
to be had; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal Proposi-  
tions we are capable of being <certain> of their real Truth, or Falshood.
     I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most
employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. <General>
<Truths> are most looked after by the Mind, as those that most
enlarge our Knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying 25 
us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our
way to Knowledge.
#S 11#. Besides Truth taken in the first sense before-mentioned,
there are other sorts of Truths; as, 1. <Moral Truth>, which is speaking
Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds, though the 30 
Proposition we speak agree not to the reality of Things. 2. <Meta->
<physical Truth>, which is nothing but the real Existence of Things,
conformable to the <Ideas> to which we have annexed their names.
This, though it seems to consist in the very Beings of Things,
yet when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit 35 

                                                               #P 579#
                                                               #L 1#
Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that particular Thing, to the
<Idea> it had before settled with a name to it. But these Considerations
of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being
much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have
mentioned them.                                                   5


#C 06#                       CHAPTER VI

        <Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty>.

#S 01#. THOUGH the examining and judging of <Ideas> by themselves,
their Names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to
clear and distinct Knowledge: yet through the prevailing custom
of using Sounds for <Ideas>, I think it is very seldom practised. Every
one may observe how common it is for Names to be made use of, 10
instead of the <Ideas> themselves, even when Men think and reason
within their own Breasts; especially if the <Ideas> be very complex,
and made up of a great Collection of simple ones. This makes <the>
<consideration of Words and Propositions>, so <necessary a part of the Treatise>
<of Knowledge>, that 'tis very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, 15
without explaining the other.
#S 02#. All the Knowledge we have, being only of particular or
<general Truths>, 'tis evident, that whatever may be done in the former
of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought
after, can never be well made known, and is very <seldom apprehended>, 20
<but as conceived and expressed in Words>. It is not therefore out of our
way, in the Examination of our Knowledge, to enquire into the
Truth and Certainty of universal Propositions.
#S 03#. But that we may not be mis-led in this case, by that which is
the danger every-where, I mean by the doubtfulness of Terms, 'tis 25
fit to observe that Certainty is twofold; <Certainty of Truth>, and
<Certainty of Knowledge. Certainty of Truth> is, when Words are so put
together in Propositions, as exactly to express the agreement or
disagreement of the <Ideas> they stand for, as really it is. <Certainty of>
<Knowledge> is, to perceive the agreement or disagreement of <Ideas>, as 30
#P 580#
#L 1#
expressed in any Proposition. This we usually call knowing, or
being certain of the Truth of any Proposition.
#S 04#. Now because <we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general>
<Proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the Species its>
<Terms stand for>, it is necessary we should know the Essence of each  5 
<Species>, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all
simple <Ideas> and Modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and
nominal Essence being the same; or which is all one, the abstract
<Idea>, which the general Term stands for, being the sole Essence and
Boundary, that is or can be supposed, of the <Species>, there can be no 10 
doubt, how far the <Species> extends, or what Things are compre-
hended under each Term: which, 'tis evident, are all, that have an
exact conformity with the <Idea> it stands for, and no other. But in
Substances, wherein a real Essence, distinct from the nominal, is
supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the Species, the 15 
extent of the general Word is very uncertain: because not knowing
this real Essence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that <Species>;
and consequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed
of it. And thus speaking of a <Man>, or <Gold>, or any other <Species>
of natural Substances, as supposed constituted by a precise real 20 
Essence, which Nature regularly imparts to every individual of that
Kind, whereby it is made to be of that Species, we cannot be certain
of the truth of any Affirmation of Negation made of it. For <Man>,
or <Gold>, taken in this sense, and used for <Species> of Things, consti-
tuted by real Essences, different from the complex <Idea> in the Mind of 25 
the Speaker, stand for we know not what: and the extent of these
Species, with such Boundaries, are so unknown and undetermined,
that it is impossible, with any certainty, to affirm, that all Men are
rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Essence
is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men extend the 30 
application of any general Term no farther than to the particular
Things, in which the complex <Idea> it stands for is to be found,
there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each <Species>,
nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any Proposition be
true, or no. I have chose to explain this uncertainty of Propositions 35 
                                                                #P 581#
                                                                #L 1#
in this scholastick way, and have made use of the Terms of <Essences>
and <Species>, on purpose to shew the absurdity and inconvenience
there is to think of them, as of any other sort of Realities, than
barely abstract <Ideas> with Names to them. To suppose, that the
<Species> of Things are any thing, but the sorting of them under 5
general Names, according as they agree to several abstract <Ideas>, of
which we make those Names the Signs, is to confound Truth,
and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propositions, that can
be made about them. Though therefore these Things might, to
People not possessed with scholastick Learning, be perhaps treated 10
of, in a better and clearer way: yet those wrong Notions of <Essences>
and <Species>, having got root in most Peoples Minds, who have
received any tincture from the Learning, which has prevailed
in this part of the World, are to be discovered and removed, to
make way for that use of Words, which should convey certainty 15
with it.
#S 05#. <The Names of Substances> then, <whenever made to stand for Species>,
<which are supposed to be constituted by real Essences>, which we know not,
<are not capable to convey Certainty to the Understanding>: Of the Truth of
general Propositions made up of such Terms we cannot be sure. 20
The reason whereof is plain. For how can we be sure that this or
that quality is in <Gold>, when we know not what is or is not <Gold>.
Since in this way of speaking nothing is <Gold>, but what partakes of
an Essence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is, or is
not, and so cannot be sure, that any parcel of Matter in the World 25
is or is not in this sense <Gold>; being incurably ignorant, whether it
has or has not that which makes any thing to be called <Gold, i.e.>
that real Essence of <Gold> whereof we have no <Idea> at all. This being
as impossible for us to know, as it is for a blind Man to tell in what
Flower the Colour of a <pansie> is, or is not to be found, whilst he has 30
no <Idea> of the Colour of a <pansie> at all. Or if we could (which is
impossible) certainly know where a real Essence, which we know
not, is, <v.g.> in what parcels of matter the real Essence of <Gold> is, yet
could we not be sure, that this or that quality could with truth be
affirm'd of <Gold>; since it is impossible for us to know, that this or 35
#P 582#
#L 1#
that quality or <Idea> has a necessary connexion with a real Essence,
of which we have no <Idea> at all, whatever Species that supposed real
Essence may be imagined to constitute.
#S 06#. On the other side, the <Names of Substances>, when made use of
as they should be, for the <Ideas> Men have in their Minds, though  5 
they carry a clear and determinate signification with them, <will not>
yet <serve us to make many universal Propositions, of whose Truth we can be>
<certain>. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what Things
are signified by them, but because the complex <Ideas> they stand for,
are such Combinations of simple ones, as carry not with them any 10 
discoverable connexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other
<Ideas>.
#S 07#. The complex <Ideas>, that our Names of the Species of Sub-
stances properly stand for, are Collections of such Qualities, as have
been observed to co-exist in an unknown <Substratum> which we call 15 
<Substance>; but what other Qualities necessarily co-exist with such
Combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover
their natural dependence; which in their primary Qualities, we can
go but a very little way in; and in all their secondary Qualities, we
can discover no connexion at all, for the Reasons mentioned, <Chap.> 20 
3. <viz.> 1. Because we know not the real Constitutions of Substances,    
on which each <secondary Quality> particularly depends. 2. Did we
know that, it would serve us only for experimental (not universal)
Knowledge; and reach with certainty no farther, than that bare
instance. Because our Understandings can discover no conceivable 25 
connexion between any <secondary Quality>, and any modification
whatsoever of any of the <primary> ones. And therefore there are very
few general Propositions to be made concerning Substances, which
can carry with them <undoubted Certainty>.
#S 08#. <All Gold is fixed>, is a Proposition whose Truth we cannot be 30   
certain of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to
the useless Imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term
<Gold> to stand for a Species of Things set out by Nature, by a real
Essence belonging to it, 'tis evident he knows not what particular
Substances are of that Species; and so cannot, with certainty, 35 
                                                                #P 583#
                                                                #L 1#
affirm any thing universally of <Gold>. But if he makes <Gold> stand for a
Species, determined by its nominal Essence, let the nominal Essence,
for example, be the complex <Idea> of a <Body>, of a certain <yellow> colour,
<malleable, fusible>, and <heavier> than any other known; in this proper
use of the word <Gold>, there is no difficulty to know what is, or is not 5
<Gold>. But yet no other Quality can with certainty be universally
affirmed or denied of <Gold>, but what hath a discoverable connexion,
or inconsistency with that nominal Essence. <Fixedness>, for example,
having no necessary connexion, that we can discover, with the
Colour, Weight, or any other simple <Idea> of our complex one, or with 10
the whole Combination together; it is impossible that we should
certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, That <all Gold is fixed>.
#S 09#. As there is no discoverable connexion between <Fixedness>, and
the Colour, Weight, and other simple <Ideas> of that nominal Essence of
<Gold>; so if we make our complex <Idea> of <Gold>, a <Body yellow, fusible>, 15
<ductile, weighty>, and <fixed>, we shall be at the same uncertainty con-
cerning <Solubility> in <Aqua regia>; and for the same reason. Since we can
never, from consideration of the <Ideas> themselves, with certainty
affirm or deny, of a Body, whose complex <Idea> is made up of yellow,
very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in <Aqua> 20
<regia>: And so on of the rest of its Qualities. I would gladly meet
with one general Affirmation, concerning any Quality of <Gold>, that
any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently
objected, Is not this an universal certain Proposition, <All Gold is>
<malleable>? To which I answer, It is a very certain Proposition, if 25
<Malleableness> be a part of the complex <Idea> the word <Gold> stands for.
But then here is nothing affirmed of <Gold>, but that that Sound stands
for an <Idea> in which <Malleableness> is contained: And such a sort of
Truth and Certainty as this, it is to say <a Centaur is four-footed>. But
if <Malleableness> makes not a part of the specifick Essence the name 30
<Gold> stands for, 'tis plain, <All Gold is Malleable>, is not a certain
Proposition. Because let the complex <Idea> of <Gold>, be made up of
which soever of its other Qualities you please, <Malleableness> will not
appear to depend on that complex <Idea>; nor follow from any simple
one contained in it. The connexion that <Malleableness> has (if it has 35
any) with those other Qualities, being only by the intervention of
the real Constitution of its insensible parts, which, since we know
not, 'tis impossible we should perceive that connexion, unless we
could discover that which ties them together.
#P 584#
#L 1#
#S 10#. The more, indeed, of these co-existing Qualities we unite
into one complex <Idea>, under one name, the more precise and deter-
minate we make the signification of that Word; But yet never make
it thereby more capable of <universal Certainty>, in respect of other
Qualities, not contained in our complex <Idea>; since we perceive not  5 
their connexion, or dependence one on another; being ignorant
both of that real Constitution in which they are all founded; and
also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our Knowledge
concerning Substances is not, as in other Things, barely of the
relation of two <Ideas>, that may exist separately; but is of the neces-  
sary connexion and co-existence of several distinct <Ideas> in the same
Subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Could we begin at
the other end, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour
consisted, what made a Body lighter or heavier, what texture of
Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in 15 
this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such an
<Idea> as this of Bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible
Qualities originally consist, and how they are produced; we might
frame such abstract <Ideas> of them, as would furnish us with matter
of more general Knowledge, and enable us to make universal 20 
Propositions, that should carry <general Truth> and <Certainty> with
them. But whilst our complex <Ideas> of the sorts of Substances, are
so remote from that internal real Constitution, on which their
sensible Qualities depend; and are made up of nothing but an
imperfect Collection of those apparent Qualities our Senses can 25 
discover, there can be very few general Propositions concerning
Substances, of whose real Truth we can be <certainly> assured; since
there are but few simple <Ideas>, of whose connexion and necessary
co-existence, we can have certain and undoubted Knowledge. I
imagine, amongst all the <secondary Qualities> of Substances, and the 30 
Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose
necessary co-existence, or repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be
known, unless in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude
one another, as I have elsewhere shewed. No one, I think, by the
Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, Taste, 35 
Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations it is
                                                                #P 585#
                                                                #L 1#
capable to make, or receive, on, or from other Bodies. The same
may be said of the Sound, or Taste, <etc.> Our specifick Names of
Substances standing for any Collections of such <Ideas>, 'tis not to be
wondred, that we can, with them, make very few general Proposi-
tions of <undoubted real certainty>. But yet so far as any complex <Idea>, 5
of any sort of Substances, contains in it any simple <Idea>, whose
necessary co-existence with any other may be discovered, so far
<universal Propositions> may <with certainty> be made concerning it: <v.g.>
Could any one discover a necessary connexion <between Malleable->
<ness>, and the <Colour> or <Weight> of <Gold>, or any other part of the com-
plex <Idea> signified by that Name, he might make a <certain> universal
Proposition concerning <Gold> in this respect; and the real Truth of this
Proposition, That <all Gold is malleable>, would be as <certain> as of this,
<The three Angles of all right-lined Triangles, are equal to two right ones>.
#S 11#. Had we such <Ideas> of Substances, as to know what real Con- 
stitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them, and
how those Qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specifick
<Ideas> of their real Essences in our own Minds, more certainly find
out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had
not, than we can now by our Senses: and to know the Properties of 20
<Gold>, it would be no more necessary, that <Gold> should exist, and
that we should make Experiments upon it, than it is necessary for
the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should
exist in any Matter, the <Idea> in our Minds would serve for the one,
as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the 25
Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the
first entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Sub-
stances we meet with, each of them, as an entire thing by it self,
having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other Things;
overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible 30
Fluids, they are encompassed with; and upon whose Motions and
operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are
taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of
Distinction, whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece
of <Gold> any where by it self, separate from the reach and influence 35
#P 586#
#L 1#
of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight,
and perhaps Malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be
changed into a perfect Friability. <Water>, in which to us <Fluidity> is
an essential Quality, left to it self, would cease to be fluid. But if
inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other 5  
Bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to
us, were those Bodies that environ them removed, it is yet more
so in <Vegetables>, which are nourished, grow, and produce Leaves,
Flowers, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And if we look a little
nearer into the state of <Animals>, we shall find, that their Dependence, 10 
as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be
observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsecal Causes and Qualities
of other Bodies, that make no part of them, that they cannot sub-
sist a moment without them: though yet those Bodies on which
they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the 15 
complex <Ideas>, we frame of those Animals. Take the Air but a minute
from the greatest part of Living Creatures, and they presently lose
Sense, Life, and Motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced
into our Knowledge. But how many other extrinsecal, and possibly
very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those admirable Machines 20 
depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought
on; and how many are there, which the severest Enquiry can never
discover? The Inhabitants of this spot of the Universe, though
removed so many millions of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so
much on the duly tempered motion of Particles coming from, or 25 
agitated by it, that were this Earth removed, but a small part of
that distance, out of its present situation, and placed a little farther
or nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable, that the
greatest part of the Animals in it, would immediately perish: since
we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect of the Sun's 30 
warmth, which an accidental position, in some parts of this our little
Globe, exposes them to. The Qualities observed in a <Load-stone>, must
needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body; and
the ravage made often on several sorts of Animals, by invisible
Causes, the certain death (as we are told) of some of them, by 35 
barely passing the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by being
removed into a Neighbouring Country, evidently shew, that the
Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with which, they are
seldom thought, to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to
                                                                #P 587#
                                                                #L 1#
make them be, what they appear to us, and to preserve those
Qualities, by which we know, and distinguish them. We are then
quite out of the way, when we think, that Things contain within
themselves the Qualities, that appear to us in them: And we in
vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an 5
Elephant, upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe
in them. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought
to look, not only beyond this our Earth and Atmosphere, but even
beyond the Sun, or remotest Star our Eyes have yet discovered.
For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in 10
this our Globe, depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is
impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the
Motions and grosser Operations of Things here about us; but whence
the Streams come that keep all these curious Machines in motion
and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and 15
apprehension; and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of
this stupendious Structure of the Universe, may, for ought we
know, have such a connexion and dependence in their Influences
and Operations one upon another, that, perhaps, Things in this our
Mansion, would put on quite another face, and cease to be what 20
they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies incomprehensibly
remote from us, should cease to be, or move as it does. This is cer-
tain, Things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves,
are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for that which they are
most taken notice of by us. Their observable Qualities, Actions, 25
and Powers, are owing to something without them; and there is
not so complete and perfect a part, that we know, of Nature,
which does not owe the Being it has, and the Excellencies of it, to
its Neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts within the
surface of any body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend 30
perfectly those Qualities that are in it.
#S 12#. If this be so, it is not to be wondred, that <we have very>
<imperfect> Ideas <of Substances>; and that the real Essences, on which
depend their Properties and Operations, are unknown to us. We
cannot discover so much as that <size, figure>, and <texture> of their 35
minute and active Parts, which is really in them; much less the
#P 588#
#L 1#
different Motions and Impulses made in and upon them by Bodies
from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed the
greatest and most remarkable part of those Qualities we observe in
them, and of which our complex <Ideas> of them are made up. This
consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of ever  5 
having the <Ideas> of their real Essences; which, whilst we want, the
nominal Essences, we make use of instead of them, will be able
to furnish us but very sparingly with any <general Knowledge>, or
universal Propositions capable of real <Certainty>.
#S 13#. We are not therefore to wonder, if <Certainty> be to be found 10   
in very few general Propositions made concerning Substances:
Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties go very seldom
farther than our Senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and
observing Men may, by strength of <Judgment>, penetrate farther,
and on Probabilities taken from wary Observation, and Hints well 15 
laid together, often guess right at what Experience has not yet
discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only
to Opinion, and has not that <certainty>, which is requisite to Know-
ledge. For all <general Knowledge> lies only in our own Thoughts, and
consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract <Ideas>. Where-  
ever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them,
there we have <general Knowledge>; and by putting the Names of those
<Ideas> together accordingly in Propositions, can with certainty pro-
nounce <general Truths>. But because the abstract <Ideas> of Substances,
for which their specifick Names stand, whenever they have any 25 
distinct and determinate signification, have a discoverable connexion
or inconsistency with but a very few other <Ideas>, the <certainty of>
<universal Propositions concerning Substances>, is very narrow and scanty
in that part, which is our principal enquiry concerning them; and
there is scarce any of the Names of Substances, let the <Idea> it is 30 
applied to be what it will, of which we can generally, and with
certainty pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other
Quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent
with that <Idea>, where-ever it is to be found.
#S 14#. Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we 35   
                                                                #P 589#
                                                                #L 1#
must first know what Changes the <primary Qualities> of one Body, do
regularly produce in the <primary Qualities> of another, and how.
Secondly, we must know what <primary Qualities> of any Body,
produce certain Sensations or <Ideas> in us. This is in truth, no less
than to know all the Effects of Matter, under its divers modifica- 
tions of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion, and Rest. Which,
I think, every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by
us, without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us, what sort of
Figure, Bulk, and Motion of Corpuscles, would produce in us the
Sensation of a <yellow> Colour, and what sort of Figure, Bulk, and 10
Texture of Parts in the superficies of any Body, were fit to give
such Corpuscles their due motion to produce that Colour, Would
that be enough to make <universal> Propositions with <certainty>,
concerning the several sorts of them, unless we had Faculties acute
enough to perceive the precise Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion 15
of Bodies in those minute Parts, by which they operate on our
Senses, that so we might by those frame our abstract <Ideas> of them.
I have mentioned here only <corporeal> Substances, whose Operations
seem to lie more level to our Understandings: For as to the <Opera->
<tions of Spirits>, both their thinking and moving of Bodies, we at first 20
sight find our selves at a loss; though perhaps, when we have applied
our Thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of Bodies, and
their Operations, and examined how far our Notions, even in these,
reach, with any clearness, beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall
be bound to confess, that even in these too, our Discoveries amount 25
to very little beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity.
#S 15#. This is evident, <the abstract complex> Ideas <of Substances>, for
which their general Names stand, not comprehending their real
Constitutions, <can afford us but very little universal Certainty>. Because
our <Ideas> of them are not made up of that, on which those Qualities 30
we observe in them, and would inform our selves about, do depend,
or with which they have any certain connexion. <V.g.> Let the <Idea> to
which we give the name <Man>, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the
ordinary shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, and Reason join'd
#P 590#
#L 1#
to it. This being the abstract <Idea>, and consequently the Essence
of our Species <Man>, we can make but very few general certain
Propositions concerning <Man>, standing for such an <Idea>. Because
not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation, power of
Motion, and Reasoning, with that peculiar Shape, depend, and 5  
whereby they are united together in the same Subject, there are
very few other Qualities, with which we can perceive them to have
a necessary connexion: and therefore we cannot with Certainty
affirm, That <all Men sleep by intervals>; That <no Man can be nourished by>
<Wood or Stones>; That <all Men will be poisoned by Hemlock>: because 10 
these <Ideas> have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our
nominal Essence of <Man>, with this abstract <Idea> that Name stands
for. We must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular
Subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content our
selves with Probability in the rest: but can have no general Cer-  
tainty, whilst our specifick <Idea> of <Man>, contains not that real Con-
stitution, which is the root, wherein all his inseparable Qualities are
united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our <Idea>, the word <Man>
stands for, is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Quali-
ties and Powers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repug-  
nance between our specifick <Idea>, and the Operation of either the
Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Constitution. There are
Animals that safely eat Hemlock, and others that are nourished by
Wood and Stones: But as long as we want <Ideas> of those real Consti-
tutions of different sorts of Animals, whereon these, and the like 25 
Qualities and Powers depend, we must not hope to reach <Certainty>
in universal Propositions concerning them. Those few <Ideas> only,
which have a discernible connexion with our nominal Essence, or
any part of it, can afford us such Propositions. But these are so few,
and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain 30 
<general Knowledge of Substances>, as almost none at all.
#S 16#. To conclude, <General Propositions>, of what kind soever, are
then only capable of <Certainty>, when the Terms used in them, stand
for such <Ideas>, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed,
is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their 35 
Truth or Falshood, when we perceive the <Ideas> the Terms stand for,
to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one
                                                                #P 591#
                                                                #L 1#
of another. Whence we may take notice, that <general Certainty> is
never to be found but in our <Ideas>. Whenever we go to seek it else-
where in Experiment, or Observations without us, our Knowledge
goes not beyond particulars. 'Tis the contemplation of our own
abstract <Ideas>, that alone is able to afford us <general Knowledge>.       5


#C 07#                       CHAPTER VII

                             <Of Maxims>. 

#S 01#. THERE are a sort of Propositions, which under the name of
<Maxims> and <Axioms>, have passed for Principles of Science: and
because they are <self-evident>, have been supposed innate, without
that any Body (that I know) ever went about to shew the reason
and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may however be 10
worth while, to enquire into the reason of their evidence, and see
whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they
influence and govern our other Knowledge.
#S 02#. <Knowledge>, as has been shewn, consists in the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of <Ideas>: Now where that agreement or 15
disagreement is perceived immediately by it self, without the inter-
vention or help of any other, there our <Knowledge is self-evident>. This
will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those
Propositions, which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight:
for in all of them he will find, that the reason of his Assent, is from 20
that agreement or disagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate
comparing them, finds in those <Ideas> answering the Affirmation or
Negation in the Proposition.
#S 03#. This being so, in the next place let us consider, whether this
<Self-evidence> be peculiar only to those Propositions, which commonly 25
pass under the Name of Maxims, and have the dignity of Axioms
allowed them. And here 'tis plain, that several other Truths, not
allow'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this <Self-evidence>.
#P 592#
#L 1#
This we shall see, if we go over those several sorts of agreement or
disagreement of <Ideas>, which I have above-mentioned, <viz.> Identity,
Relation, Co-existence, and real Existence; which will discover to us,
that not only those few Propositions, which have had the credit of
<Maxims>, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite 5   
number of <other Propositions> are such.
#S 04#. For, <First>, the immediate perception of the agreement or
disagreement of <Identity>, being founded in the Mind's having
distinct <Ideas>, this affords us as many <self-evident> Propositions, as we
have distinct <Ideas>. Every one that has any Knowledge at all, has, 10  
as the Foundation of it, various and distinct <Ideas>: And it is the first
act of the Mind, (without which, it can never be capable of any
Knowledge,) to know every one of its <Ideas> by it self, and distin-
guish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the
<Ideas> he has; That he knows also, when any one is in his Under-   
standing, and what it is; And that when more than one are there,
he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another.
Which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should
perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any
<Idea> is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that <Idea> it is; and that 20  
two distinct <Ideas>, when they are in his Mind, are there, and are not
one and the same <Idea>. So that all such Affirmations, and Negations,
are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesita-
tion, and must necessarily be assented to, as soon as understood;
that is, as soon as we have, in our Minds, determined <Ideas>, which 25  
the Terms in the Proposition stand for. And therefore where-ever the
mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the
two <Ideas>, signified by the terms and affirmed or denyed one of
the other, to be the same or different; it is presently and infallibly
certain of the truth of such a proposition, and this equally whether 30  
these propositions be in terms standing for more general <Ideas> or
such as are less so, <v.g.> whether the general <Idea> of <Being> be affirmed
of it self, as in this proposition <whatsoever is, is>; or a more particular
<Idea> be affirmed of it self, as <a man is a man>, or <whatsoever is white is>
<white>. Or whether the <Idea> of <Being> in general be denied of <not Being>, 35  
                                                                #P 593#
                                                                #L 1#
which is the only (if I may so call it) <Idea> different from it, as in this
other Proposition, <It is impossible for the same to be and not to be>; or any
<Idea> of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as
<a man is not a horse; Red is not Blew>. The difference of the <Ideas> as soon
as the Terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition 5
presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in
the less as well as the more general propositions, and all for the
same reason, <viz.> Because the mind perceives in any <Ideas>, that it
has the same <Idea> to be the same with it self, And two different
<Ideas> to be different and not the same. And this it is equally certain 10
of, whether these <Ideas> be more or less general, abstract, and com-
prehensive. It is not therefore alone to these two general Proposi-
tions, <Whatsoever is, is>; and, <It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and>
<not to be>, that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The
perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague 15
<Ideas>, signified by the terms <Whatsoever>, and <Thing>, than it does to
any other <Ideas>. These two general Maxims amounting to no more
in short but this, that <the same is the same>, and <the same is not different>,
are truths known in more particular instances, as well as in these
general Maxims, and known also in particular instances, before 20
these general Maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force
from the discernment of the mind employed about particular <Ideas>.
There is nothing more visible, than that the Mind, without the
help of any Proof, or Reflection on either of these general Proposi-
tions perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the <Idea> of 25
<White>, is the <Idea> of White, and not the <Idea> of Blue; and that the
<Idea> of White, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not absent,
that the consideration of these Axioms can add nothing to the Evi-
dence or certainty of its Knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may
experiment in himself) in all the <Ideas> a man has in his Mind: He 30
knows each to be it self, and not to be another; and to be in his
Mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannot
be greater, and therefore the truth of no general Proposition can be
known with a greater certainty, nor add any thing to this. So
that in respect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledge reaches as far 35
#P 594#
#L 1#
as our <Ideas>. And we are capable of making as many self-evident
Propositions, as we have names for distinct <Ideas>. And I appeal to
every one's own Mind, whether this Proposition, <A Circle is a Circle>,
be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more
general terms, <Whatsoever is, is>: And again, whether this Proposition, 5   
<Blue is not Red>, be not a Proposition that the Mind can no more doubt
of, as soon as it understands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, <It>
<is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>? and so of all the like.
#S 05#. <Secondly>, As to <Co-existence>, or such a necessary connexion
between two <Ideas>, that in the Subject where one of them is supposed, 10  
there the other must necessarily be also: Of such agreement, or
disagreement as this, the Mind has an immediate perception but in
very few of them. And therefore in this sort, we have but very little
intuitive Knowledge: nor are there to be found very many Proposi-
tions that are self-evident, though some there are; <v.g.> the <Idea> of 15  
filling of a place equal to the Contents of its superficies, being
annexed to our <Idea> of Body, I think it is a self-evident Proposition,
<That two Bodies cannot be in the same place>.
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, As to the <Relations> of Modes, Mathematicians have
framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality. 20  
As <Equals taken from Equals, the remainder will be Equals>; which, with
the rest of that kind, however they are received for Maxims
by the Mathematicians, and are unquestionable Truths; yet,
I think, that any one who considers them, will not find, that
they have a clearer self-evidence than these, that <one and one, are> 25  
<equal to two>; that <if you take from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and>
<from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining numbers will be>
<equal>. These, and a thousand other such Propositions, may be found
in Numbers, which, at very first hearing, force the assent, and
carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness, than those 30  
mathematical Axioms.
#S 07#. <Fourthly>, As to <real Existence>, since that has no connexion
with any other of our <Ideas>, but that of our selves, and of a first
Being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other
Beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident 35  
Knowledge: And therefore concerning those there are no Maxims.
                                                                #P 595#
#L 1#
#S 08#. In the next place let us consider, what <influence> these received
<Maxims> have, upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The Rules
established in the Schools, that all Reasonings are <ex praecognitis, et>
<praeconcessis>, seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge, in
these Maxims, and to suppose them to be <praecognita>; whereby, I 5
think, is meant these two things: First, That these Axioms, are
those Truths that are first known to the Mind; and, secondly,
That upon them, the other parts of our Knowledge depend.
#S 09#. <First>, That they are not the <Truths first known> to the Mind, is
evident to Experience, as we have shewn in another place, B.I. <Ch>.II. 10
Who perceives not, that a Child certainly knows, that a Stranger
is not its Mother; that its Sucking-bottle is not the Rod, long
before he knows, that 'tis <impossible for the same thing to be, and not to>
<be>? And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is
obvious to observe, that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and 15
fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims,
to which Mathematicians, in their Arguings, do sometimes referr
them? Whereof the reason is very plain: For that which makes the
Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the per-
ception it has of the agreement, or disagreement of its <Ideas>, accord- 
ing as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another, in Words it
understands; and every <Idea> being known to be what it is, and every
two distinct <Ideas> being known not to be the same, it must neces-
sarily follow, that such self-evident Truths, must be <first> known,
which consist of <Ideas> that are first in the Mind: and the <Ideas first> in 25
the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular Things, from whence,
by slow degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general
ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of
Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus
particular <Ideas> are <first> received and distinguished, and so Knowledge 30
got about them: and next to them, the less general, or specifick,
which are next to particular. For abstract <Ideas> are not so obvious
or easie to Children, or the yet unexercised Mind, as particular ones.
If they seem so to grown Men, 'tis only because by constant and
#P 596#
#L 1#
familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them,
we shall find, that general <Ideas> are Fictions and Contrivances of the
Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer
themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not
require some pains and skill to form the <general Idea> of a <Triangle>, 5  
which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and diffi-
cult,) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither
Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at
once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an <Idea>
wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent <Ideas> are 10 
put together. 'Tis true, the Mind in this imperfect state, has need
of such <Ideas>, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the con-
veniency of Communication, and Enlargement of Knowledge; to
both which, it is naturally very much enclined. But yet one has
reason to suspect such <Ideas> are marks of our Imperfection; at least, 15 
this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general <Ideas>, are
not those that the Mind is <first> and most easily acquainted with,
nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about.
#S 10#. <Secondly>, From what has been said, it plainly follows, that
these magnified Maxims, are not the Principles and <Foundations> of 20 
all our other <Knowledge>. For if there be a great many other Truths,
which have as much self-evidence as they, and a great many that
we know before them, it is impossible they should be the <Principles>,
from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it impossible to know
that <One> and <Two> are equal to <Three>, but by virtue of this, or some 25 
such Axiom, <viz. the Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together>?
Many a one knows that <One> and <Two> are equal to <Three>, without
having heard, or thought on that, or any other Axiom, by which
it might be proved; and knows it as certainly, as any other Man
knows, that the <Whole is equal to all its Parts>, or any other Maxim; 30 
and all from the same Reason of self-evidence; the Equality of
those <Ideas>, being as visible and certain to him without that, or any
other Axiom, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived.
Nor after the Knowledge, <That the Whole is equal to all its parts>, does
he know that <one and two are equal to three>, better, or more certainly 35 
                                                                #P 597#
                                                                #L 1#
than he did before. For if there be any odds in those <Ideas>, the <Whole>
and <Parts> are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in
the Mind, than those of <One, Two>, and <Three>. And indeed, I think,
I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledge besides
those general Principles themselves, to <depend> on general, innate, 5
and self-evident Principles, What Principle is requisite to prove,
that <One> and <One> are <Two>, that <Two> and <Two> are <Four>, that <Three> times
<Two> are <Six>? Which being known without any proof, do evince,
That either all Knowledge does not <depend> on certain <Praecognita> or
general Maxims, called Principles; or else that these are Principles:  10
and if these are to be counted Principles, a great part of Numeration
will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions, which
may be made about all our distinct <Ideas>, Principles will be almost
infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge
of, at different Ages; and a great many of these innate Principles, 15
they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come
in view of the Mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they
are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent,
receive no Light, nor are capable of any proof one from another,;
much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more 20
simple, from the more compounded: the more simple, and less
abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier appre-
hended. But which ever be the clearest <Ideas>, the Evidence and
<Certainty> of all such Propositions is in this, That a Man sees the
same <Idea> to be the same <Idea>, and infallibly perceives two different 25
<Ideas> to be different <Ideas>. For when a Man has in his Understanding,
the <Ideas> of <one> and of <two>, the <Idea> of <Yellow> and the <Idea> of <Blue>,
he cannot but certainly know, that the <Idea> of One is the <Idea> of One,
and not the <Idea> of Two; and that the <Idea> of Yellow is the <Idea> of
Yellow, and not the <Idea> of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the 30
<Ideas> in his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have
them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a contradic-
tion: And to have none distinct, is to have no use of our Faculties,
to have no Knowledge at all. And therefore what <Idea> soever is
affirmed of it self; or whatsoever two entire distinct <Ideas> are denied 35
one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition,
as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the Terms, without
Hesitation or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more
general Terms, and called Maxims.
#P 598#
#L 1#
#S 11#. What shall we then say. Are these <general Maxims> of no use?
By no means, Though perhaps their use is not that, which it is
commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least of what
hath been by some Men ascribed to these <Maxims> may be apt to be
cried out against, as overturning the Foundations of all the Sciences; 5  
it may be worth while to consider them, with respect to other
parts of our Knowledge, and examine more particularly to what
Purposes they serve, and to what not.
  1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of       
no use to prove or confirm less general self-evident Propositions. 10 
  2. 'Tis as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foundations       
whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal
of Talk, propagated from Scholastick Men, of Sciences and the
<Maxims> on which they are built: But it has been my ill luck, never
to meet with any such Sciences; much less any one built upon these 15 
two <Maxims, What is, is>; and <It is impossible for the same to be and not to be>.
And I would be glad to be shewn where any such Science erected
upon these, or any other general <Axioms> is to be found: and should
be obliged to any one who would lay before me the Frame and
System of any Science so built on these, or any such like <Maxims>, 20 
that could not be shewn to stand as firm without any Consideration
of them. I ask, Whether these general Maxims have not the same use
in the Study of Divinity, and in Theological Questions, that they
have in the other Sciences? They serve here too, to silence Wranglers,
and put an end to dispute. But I think that no body will therefore 25 
say, that the <Christian> Religion is built on these <Maxims>, or that the
Knowledge we have of it, is derived from these <Principles>. 'Tis
from Revelation we have received it, and without Revelation these
<Maxims> had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an
<Idea>, by whose Intervention we discover the Connexion of two 30 
others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason.
For we then come to know a Truth that we did not know before.
When God declares any Truth to us, this is a Revelation to us by
the Voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our Knowledge.
But in neither of these do we receive our Light or Knowledge from 35 
<Maxims>. But in the one the things themselves afford it, and we see
the Truth in them by perceiving their Agreement or Disagree-
                                                               #P 599#
                                                               #L 1#
ment. In the other, God himself affords it immediately to us, and
we see the Truth of what he says in his unerring Veracity.
  3. They are not of use to help Men forwards in the Advancement    
of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. <Newton>,
in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several 5
Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to
the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge:
But for the Discovery of these, it was not the general <Maxims, What>
<is, is>; or <The whole is bigger than a part>, or the like, that help'd him.
These were not the Clues that lead him into the Discovery of the 10
Truth and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that
he got the Knowledge of those Demonstrations; but by finding out
intermediate <Ideas>, that shew'd the Agreement or Disagreement of
the <Ideas>, as expressed in the Propositions he demonstrated. This
is the great Exercise and Improvement of Humane Understanding 15
in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; wherein
they are far enough from receiving any Help from the Contem-
plation of these, or the like magnified <Maxims>. Would those who
have this Traditional Admiration of these Propositions, that they
think no Step can be made in Knowledge without the support of an 20
<Axiom>, no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences without a
general Maxim, but distinguish between the Method of acquiring
Knowledge, and of communicating it; between the Method of rais-
ing any Science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is
advanced, they would see that those general <Maxims> were not the 25
Foundations on which the first Discoverers raised their admirable
Structures, nor the Keys that unlocked and opened those Secrets of
Knowledge. Though afterwards, when Schools were erected, and
Sciences had their Professors to teach what others had found out,
they often made use of <Maxims, i.e.> laid down certain Propositions 30
which were self-evident, or to be received for true, which being
setled in the Minds of their Scholars as unquestionable Verities,
they on occasion made use of, to convince them of Truths in particu-
lar Instances, that were not so familiar to their Minds as those
general <Axioms> which had before been inculcated to them and care-  
fully setled in their Minds. Though these particular Instances,
when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the Understanding
than the general Maxims brought to confirm them: And it was in
#P 600#
#L 1#
those particular Instances, that the first Discoverer found the Truth,
without the help of the general <Maxims>: And so may any one else
do, who with Attention considers them.
        To come therefore to the use that is made of <Maxims>.
  1. They are of use, as has been observed, in the ordinary Methods 5     
of teaching Sciences as far as they are advanced: But of little or
none in advancing them farther.
  2. They are of use in Disputes, for the silencing of obstinate       
Wranglers, and bringing those Contests to some Conclusion.
Whether a need of them to that end, came not in, in the manner 10 
following, I crave leave to enquire. The Schools having made Dis-
putation the Touchstone of Mens Abilities, and the <Criterion> of
Knowledge, adjudg'd Victory to him that kept the Field: and he
that had the last Word was concluded to have the better of the
Argument, if not of the Cause. But because by this means there 15 
was like to be no Decision between skilful Combatants, whilst one
never fail'd of a <medius terminus> to prove any Proposition; and the
other could as constantly, without, or with a Distinction, deny the
<Major> or <Minor>; To prevent, as much as could be, the running out
of Disputes into an endless train of Syllogisms, certain general 20 
Propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, were introduced
into the Schools, which being such as all Men allowed and agreed
in, were look'd on as general Measures of Truth, and serv'd instead
of Principles, (where the Disputants had not laid down any other
between them) beyond which there was no going, and which must 25 
not be receded from by either side. And thus these <Maxims> getting
the name of <Principles>, beyond which Men in dispute could not re-
treat, were by mistake taken to be the Originals and Sources, from
whence all Knowledge began, and the Foundations whereon the
Sciences were built. Because when in their Disputes they came to 30 
any of these, they stopped there, and went no farther, the Matter
was determined. But how much this is a mistake hath been already
shewn.
      This Method of the Schools, which have been thought the
Fountains of Knowledge, introduced as I suppose the like use of 35 
these Maxims, into a great part of Conversation out of the Schools,
to stop the Mouths of Cavillers, whom any one is excused from
                                                               #P 601#
                                                               #L 1#
arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-
evident Principles received by all reasonable Men, who have once
thought of them: But yet their use herein, is but to put an end to
wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing:
That is already done by the intermediate <Ideas> made use of in the 5
Debate, whose Connexion may be seen without the help of those
Maxims, and so the truth known before the Maxim is produced,
and the Argument brought to a first Principle. Men would give off
a wrong Argument before it came to that, if in their Disputes they
proposed to themselves the finding and imbracing of Truth, and not 10
a Contest for Victory. And thus Maxims have their use to put a
stop to their perverseness, whose Ingenuity should have yielded
sooner. But the Method of the Schools, having allowed and en-
couraged Men to oppose and resist evident Truth, till they are
baffled, <i.e.> till they are reduced to contradict themselves, or some 15
established Principle; 'tis no wonder that they should not in civil
Conversation be ashamed of that, which in the Schools is counted
a Vertue and a Glory; <viz.> obstinately to maintain that side of
the Question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last
extremity; even after Conviction. A strange way to attain Truth 20
and Knowledge: And that which I think the rational part of Mankind
not corrupted by Education, could scarce believe should ever be
admitted amongst the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Religion
or Nature; or introduced into the Seminaries of those who are
to propagate the Truths of Religion or Philosophy, amongst the 25
Ignorant and Unconvinced. How much such a way of Learning is
likely to turn young Men's Minds from the sincere Search and Love
of Truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such
thing, or at least worth the adhering to, I shall not now enquire.
This, I think, that bating those places, which brought the <Peripa-> 
<tetick> Philosophy into their Schools, where it continued many Ages,
without teaching the World any thing but the Art of Wrangling; these
Maxims were no where thought the Foundations on which the Sciences
were built, nor the great helps to the Advancement of Knowledge.
As to these <General Maxims> therefore, they are as I have said of 35
great <Use> in Disputes, <to stop the Mouths of Wranglers>; but not of
much <Use> to the Discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind
#P 602#
#L 1#
forwards, in its Search after Knowledge. For whoever began to
build his Knowledge on this General Proposition, <What is, is>: or,
<It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be>: and from either of
these, as from a Principle of Science, deduced a <System> of Useful
Knowledge? Wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one 5  
of these Maxims, as a Touch-stone, may <serve> well to shew whither
they lead. But yet, however fit, to lay open the Absurdity or
Mistake of a Man's Reasoning or Opinion, they are of very little
<Use> for enlightning the Understanding: And it will not be found,
that the Mind receives much help from them in its Progress in 10 
Knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these
two <General Propositions> never thought on. 'Tis true, as I have said,
they sometimes <serve> in Argumentation to stop a Wrangler's Mouth,
by shewing the Absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him
to the shame of contradicting what all the World knows, and he 15 
himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing, to shew a
Man that he is in an Error; and another, to put him in possession of
Truth: and I would fain know what Truths these two Propositions
are able to teach, and by their Influence make us know, which we
did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us 20 
reason from them, as well as we can, they are only about Identical
Predications, and <Influence>, if any at all, none but such. Each par-
ticular Proposition concerning Identity or Diversity, is as clearly
and certainly known in it self, if attended to, as either of these
general ones: Only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are 25 
therefore more inculcated and insisted on. As to other less general
Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propositions,
and teach us nothing but the Respect and Import of Names one to
another. <The Whole is equal to all its Parts>; What real Truth, I be-
seech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that Maxim, 30 
than what the Signification of the word <Totum>, or the <Whole>, does
of it self import? And he that knows that the word <Whole>, stands
for what is made up of all its Parts, knows very little less, than that
the <Whole> is equal to all its <Parts>. And upon the same ground, I
think that this Proposition, <A Hill is higher than a Valley>, and several 35 
                                                                #P 603#
                                                                #L 1#
the like, may also pass for Maxims. But yet Masters of <Mathematicks>,
when they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate others
in that Science, do not without Reason place this, and some other
such Maxims, at the entrance of their <Systems>; that their Scholars,
having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with 5
these Propositions, made in such general Terms, may be used to
make such Reflections, and have these more general Propositions,
as formed Rules and Sayings, ready to apply to all particular Cases.
Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident
than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm; but that 10
being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them, is enough
to satisfy the Understanding. But this, I say, is more from our
Custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our
Minds, by our often thinking of them, than from the different Evi-
dence of the Things. But before Custom has settled Methods of 15
Thinking and Reasoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is
quite otherwise; and that the Child, when a part of his Apple is
taken away, knows it better in that particular Instance, than by this
General Proposition, <The Whole is equal to all its Parts>; and that if
one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the 20
general has more need to be let into his Mind by the particular,
than the particular by the general. For in particulars, our Know-
ledge begins, and so spreads it self, by degrees, to generals. Though
afterwards, the Mind takes the quite contrary course, and having
drawn its Knowledge into as general Propositions as it can, makes 25
those familiar to its Thoughts, and accustoms it self to have recourse
to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falshood. By which
familiar <Use> of them, as Rules to measure the Truth of other Propo-
sitions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular Propo-
sitions have their Truth and Evidence from their Conformity to 30
these more general ones, which in Discourse and Argumentation,
are so frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this, I
think, to be the Reason why amongst so many Self-evident Proposi-
tions, the most general only have had the Title of Maxims.
#S 12#. One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiss to observe 35
#P 604#
#L 1#
concerning these general Maxims, That they are so far from im-
proving or establishing our Minds in true Knowledge, that if
our Notions be wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our
Thoughts to the sound of Words, rather than fix them on settled
determined <Ideas> of Things; I say, these <General Maxims> will <serve> 5  
to confirm us in Mistakes; and in such a way of use of Words,
which is most common, will <serve> to prove Contradictions: <v.g.> He
that with <Des-Cartes>, shall frame in his Mind an <Idea> of what he
calls <Body>, to be nothing but Extension, may easily demonstrate, that
there is no <Vacuum; i.e.> no Space void of Body, by this Maxim, 10 
<What is, is>. For the <Idea> to which he annexes the name <Body>, being
bare Extension, his Knowledge, that Space cannot be without Body,
is certain. For he knows his own <Idea> of Extension clearly and
distinctly, and knows that it is <what it is>, and not another <Idea>,
though it be called by these three names, <Extension, Body, Space>. 15 
Which three Words standing for one and the same <Idea>, may no
doubt, with the same evidence and certainty, be affirmed one of
another, as each of it self: And it is as certain, that whilst I use them
all to stand for one and the same <Idea>, this Predication is as true and
identical in its signification, <That Space is Body>, as this Predication 20 
is true and identical, <that Body is Body>, both in signification and
sound.
#S 13#. But if another shall come, and make to himself another
<Idea>, different from <Des-Cartes'>s of the thing, which yet, with <Des->
<Cartes> he calls by the same name <Body>, and make his <Idea>, which he 25 
expresses by the word <Body>, to be of a thing that hath both <Exten->
<sion> and <Solidity> together, he will as easily demonstrate, that there
may be a <Vacuum>, or Space without a Body, as <Des-Cartes> demon-
strated the contrary. Because the <Idea> to which he gives the name
<Space>, being barely the simple one of <Extension>; and the <Idea>, to 30 
which he gives the name <Body>, being the complex <Idea> of <Extension>
and <Resistibility>, or <Solidity> together in the same subject, these two
<Ideas> are not exactly one and the same, but in the Understanding as
distinct as the <Ideas> of One and Two, White and Black, or as of
<Corporeity> and <Humanity>, if I may use those barbarous Terms: And 35 
                                                                #P 605#
                                                                #L 1#
therefore the Predication of them in our Minds, or in Words
standing for them is not identical, but the Negation of them one
of another; <viz.> this Proposition Extension or <Space is not Body>, is as
true and evidently certain, as this Maxim, <It is impossible for the>
<same thing to be, and not to be>, can make any Proposition.             5
#S 14#. But yet though both these Propositions (as you see) may
be equally demonstrated, <viz.> That there may be a <Vacuum>, and
that there cannot be a <Vacuum>, by these two certain Principles,
<(viz.) What is, is>, and <The same thing cannot be, and not be>: yet neither
of these Principles will serve to prove to us, that any, or what 10
Bodies do exist: For that we are left to our Senses, to discover to us
as far as they can. Those Universal and Self-evident Principles,
being only our constant, clear, and distinct Knowledge of our own
<Ideas>, more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that
passes without the Mind, their certainty is founded only upon the 15
Knowledge we have of each <Idea> by it self, and of its Distinction
from others; about which, we cannot be mistaken whilst they are
in our Minds, though we may, and often are mistaken, when we
retain the Names without the <Ideas>; or use them confusedly some-
times for one, and sometimes for another <Idea>. In which cases, the 20
force of these <Axioms> reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signi-
fication of the Words, <serves> only to lead us into Confusion, Mis-
take, and Errour. 'Tis to shew Men, that these Maxims, however
cry'd up for the great guards to Truth, will not secure them from
Errour in a careless loose use of their Words, that I have made this 25
Remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for
the Improvement of Knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined
<Ideas>, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should
be <laid aside>, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm
them to be Truths, Self-evident Truths; and so cannot be <laid aside>. 30
As far as their influence will reach, 'tis in vain to endeavour, nor
would I attempt to abridge it. But yet without any injury to
Truth or Knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not
answerable to the great Stress which seems to be laid on them, and
I may warn Men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming 35
themselves in Errours.
#P 606#
#L 1#
#S 15#. But let them be of what <Use> they will in verbal Propositions,
they cannot discover or prove to us the least Knowledge of the
Nature of Substances, as they are found and exist without us,
any farther than grounded on Experience. And though the Conse-
quence of these two Propositions, called Principles, be very clear, 5  
and their <Use> not dangerous, or hurtful, in the Probation of such
Things, wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but such
as are clear by themselves without them, <viz.> where our <Ideas> are
determined, and known by the Names that stand for them: yet
when these Principles, <viz. What is, is>; and, <It is impossible for the> 10 
<same thing to be, and not to be>, are made use of in the Probation of
Propositions, wherein are Words standing for complex <Ideas, v.g.>
<Man, Horse, Gold, Vertue>; there they are of infinite danger, and most
commonly make Men receive and retain Falshood for manifest
Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonstration: upon which follows 15 
Errour, Obstinacy, and all the Mischiefs that can happen from
wrong Reasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these Principles
are less true, or of less force in proving Propositions made of Terms
standing for complex <Ideas>, than where the Propositions are about
simple <Ideas>. But because Men mistake generally, thinking that 20 
where the same Terms are preserved, the Propositions are about the
same things, though the <Ideas> they stand for are in truth different.
Therefore these Maxims are made use of to support those, which
in sound and appearance are contradictory Propositions; as is clear
in the Demonstrations above-mentioned about a <Vacuum>. So that 25 
whilst Men take Words for Things, as usually they do, these
Maximes may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory
Propositions. As shall yet be farther made manifest.
#S 16#. For Instance: Let <Man> be that, concerning which you
would by these first Principles demonstrate any thing, and we shall 30 
see, that so far as Demonstration is by these Principles, it is only
verbal, and gives us no certain universal true Proposition, or
knowledge of any Being existing without us. First, a Child having
                                                                #P 607#
                                                                #L 1#
framed the <Idea> of a <Man>, it is probable, that his <Idea> is just like
that Picture, which the Painter makes of the visible Appearances
joyned together; and such a Complication of <Ideas> together in his
Understanding, makes up the single complex <Idea> which he calls
<Man>, whereof White or Flesh-colour in <England> being one, the Child 5
can demonstrate to you, that <a Negro is not a Man>, because White-
colour was one of the constant simple <Ideas> of the complex <Idea> he
calls <Man>: And therefore he can demonstrate by the Principle, <It is>
<impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be>, that <a Negro is not a>
<Man>; the foundation of his Certainty being not that universal 10
Proposition, which, perhaps, he never heard nor thought of, but
the clear distinct Perception he hath of his own simple <Ideas> of Black
and White, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever
mistake one for another, whether he knows that Maxim or no: And
to this Child, or any one who hath such an <Idea>, which he calls 15
<Man>, Can you never demonstrate that a <Man> hath a Soul, because
his <Idea> of Man includes no such Notion or <Idea> in it. And therefore
to him, the Principle of <What is, is>, proves not this matter; but it
depends upon Collection and Observation, by which he is to make
his complex <Idea> called <Man>.                                     20
#S 17#. <Secondly>, Another that hath gone farther in framing and
collecting the <Idea> he calls <Man>, and to the outward shape adds
<Laughter>, and <Rational Discourse>, may demonstrate, that Infants,
and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, <It is impossible for the>
<same Thing to be, and not to be>: And I have discoursed with very 25
Rational Men, who have actually denied that they are <Men>.
#S 18#. <Thirdly>, Perhaps, another makes up the complex <Idea> which
he calls <Man>, only out of the <Ideas> of Body in general, and the
Powers of Language and Reason, and leaves out the Shape wholly:
This Man is able to demonstrate, that a Man may have no Hands, 30
but be <Quadrupes>, neither of those being included in his <Idea> of
<Man>; and in whatever Body or Shape he found <Speech> and <Reason>
joyn'd, that was a <Man>: because having a clear Knowledge of such
a complex <Idea>, it is certain, that <What is, is>.
#S 19#. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That 35
where our <Ideas> are determined in our Minds, and have annexed to
#P 608#
#L 1#
them by us known and steady, Names under those settled Deter-
minations, there is <little need>, or <no use> at all of these <Maxims>, to
prove the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of them. He that
cannot discern the Truth or Falshood of such Propositions, without
the help of these, and the like Maxims, will not be <helped> by these 5 
Maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the Truth
of these Maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the
Truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these.
Upon this ground it is, that intuitive Knowledge neither requires,
nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that 10 
will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all Knowledge,
and Certainty: And he that needs any proof to make him certain,
and give his Assent to this Proposition, that <Two are equal to Two>,
will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that <What is, is>.
He that needs a probation to convince him, that <Two are not Three>, 15 
that <White is not Black>, that <a Triangle is not a Circle, etc.> or any
other two determined distinct <Ideas> are not one and the same, will
need also a Demonstration to convince him, that <it is impossible for>
<the same thing to be, and not to be>.
#S 20#. And as these Maxims are of <little use>, where we have deter- 20   
mined <Ideas>, so they are, as I have shewed, of <dangerous use>, where
our <Ideas> are not determined; and where we use Words that are not
annexed to determined <Ideas>, but such as are of a loose and wander-
ing signification sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for
another <Idea>; from which follows Mistake and Errour, which these 25 
Maxims (brought as proofs to establish Propositions, wherein the
terms stand for undetermined <Ideas>) do by their Authority con-
firm and rivet.
#P 609#
#C 08#                      CHAPTER VIII

                      <Of Trifling Propositions>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. WHETHER the Maxims treated of in the fore-going Chapter,
be of that use to real Knowledge, as is generally supposed, I leave
to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That
there are Universal Propositions; that though they be certainly
true, yet they add no Light to our Understandings, bring no increase 5
to our Knowledge. Such are,
#S 02#. <First, All purely identical Propositions>. These obviously, and at
first blush, appear to contain no Instruction in them. For when we
affirm the same Term of it self, whether it be barely verbal, or
whether it contains any clear and real <Idea>, it shews us nothing, 10
but what we must certainly know before, whether such a Proposi-
tion be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed, that most general
one, <What is, is>, may serve sometimes to shew a Man the absurdity
he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he
would, in particular Instances, deny the same thing of it self; 15
because no body will so openly bid defiance to common Sense, as to
affirm visible and direct Contradictions in plain Words: Or if he
does, a Man is excused if he breaks off any farther Discourse with
him. But yet, I think, I may say, that neither that received Maxim,
nor any other identical Proposition teaches us any thing: And 20
though in such kind of Propositions, this great and magnified
Maxim, boasted to be the foundation of Demonstration, may be, and
often is made use of to confirm them, yet all it proves, amounts to
no more than this, That the same Word may with great certainty
be affirmed of it self, without any doubt of the Truth of any such 25
Proposition; and let me add also, without any real Knowledge.
#S 03#. For at this rate, any very ignorant Person, who can but make
a Proposition, and knows what he means when he says, <Ay>, or <No>,
may make a million of Propositions, of whose truth he may be
infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the World thereby; 30
#P 610#
#L 1#
<v.g.> what is a Soul, is a Soul; or <a Soul is a Soul; a Spirit is a Spirit; a>
<Fetiche is a Fetiche, etc>. These all being equivalent to this Proposition,
<viz. What is, is>, i.e. <what hath Existence, hath Existence>; or, <who hath a>
<Soul, hath a Soul>. What is this more than trifling with Words? It is
but like a Monkey shifting his Oyster from one hand to the other;  5 
and had he had but Words, might, no doubt, have said, Oyster in
right hand is <Subject>, and Oyster in left hand is <Predicate>: and so
might have made a self-evident Proposition of Oyster, <i.e. Oyster is>
<Oyster>; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiser, or
more knowing: and that way of handling the matter, would much 10 
at one have satisfied the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Under-
standing; and they two would have improved in Knowledge and
Bulk together.
      I know there are some, who because <Identical Propositions> are self-
evident, shew a great concern for them, and think they do great 15 
service to Philosophy by crying them up, as if in them was con-
tained all Knowledge, and the Understanding were led into all
Truth by them only. I grant as forwardly as any one, that they are
all true and self-evident. I grant farther, that the foundation of all
our Knowledge lies in the Faculty we have of perceiving the same 20 
<Idea> to be the same, and of discerning it, from those that are differ-
ent, as I have shewn in the fore-going Chapter. But how that
vindicates the making use of <Identical Propositions>, for the Improve-
ment of Knowledge, from the imputation of Trifling, I do not see.
Let any one repeat as often as he pleases, that <the Will is the Will>, 25 
or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is this, and an
infinite the like Propositions, for the enlarging our Knowledge?
Let a Man abound as much as the plenty of Words, which he has,
will permit him in such Propositions as these. <A Law is a Law>, and
<Obligation is Obligation: Right is Right>, and <Wrong is Wrong>, will 30 
these and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with <Ethicks>?
or instruct him or others, in the Knowledge of <Morality>? Those
who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is <Right>, and
what is <Wrong>; nor the measures of them, can with as much
assurance make, and infallibly know the truth of these and all such 35 
Propositions, as he that is best instructed in <Morality>, can do. But
what advance do such Propositions give in the Knowledge of any
thing necessary, or useful for their conduct?


                                                               #P 611#
                                                               #L 1#
He would be thought to do little less than Trifle, who for the
enlightning the Understanding in any part of Knowledge, should
be busie with <Identical Propositions>, and insist on such Maxims as
these. <Substance is Substance>, and <Body is Body; a Vacuum is a Vacuum>,
and <a Vortex is a Vortex>: A <Centaure is a Centaure>, and a <Chimaera is a> 5
<Chimaera, etc.> For these, and all such are equally true, equally certain,
and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted
trifling, when made use of as Principles of Instruction, and stress
laid on them, as helps to Knowledge: since they teach nothing but
what every one, who is capable of Discourse, knows without being 10
told: <viz.> That the same Term is the same Term, and the same <Idea>
the same <Idea>. And upon this Account it was that I formerly did,
and do still think, the offering and inculcating such Propositions,
in order to give the Understanding any new light, or inlet into the
Knowledge of things, no better than trifling.                       15
Instruction lies in something very different, and he that would
enlarge his own, or another's Mind, to Truths he does not yet
know, must find out intermediate <Ideas>, and then lay them in such
order one by another, that the Understanding may see the agree-
ment, or disagreement of those in question. Propositions that do 20
this, are instructive: But they are far from such as affirm the same
Term of it self, which is no way to advance ones self or others, in
any sort of Knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help
any one in his Learning to read, to have such Propositions as these
inculcated to him, <an A is an A>, and <a B is a B>; which a Man may 25
know as well as any School-Master, and yet never be able to read a
word as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any such Identical Propo-
sitions help him one jot forwards in the skill of Reading, let him
make what use of them he can.
If those who blame my calling them <Trifling Propositions>, had but 30
read, and been at the pains to understand what I had above writ in
very plain <English>, they could not but have seen that by <Identical>
<Propositions>, I mean only such, wherein the same Term importing
the same <Idea>, is affirmed of it self: which I take to be the proper
signification of <Identical Proposition>; and concerning all such, I think 35
I may continue safely to say, That to propose them as instructive,
is no better than trifling. For no one who has the use of Reason can

#P 612#
#L 1#
miss them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of;
nor doubt of their truth, when he does take notice of them.
      But if Men will call Propositions <Identical>, wherein the same Term
is not affirmed of it self, whether they speak more properly than I,
others must judge: This is certain, all that they say of Propositions 5  
that are not <Identical>, in my sense, concerns not me, nor what I have
said; all that I have said relating to those Propositions, wherein the
same Term is affirmed of it self. And I would fain see an Instance,
wherein any such can be made use of, to the Advantage and Im-
provement of any one's Knowledge. Instances of other kinds, 10 
whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being
such as I call <Identical>.
#S 04#.<Secondly>, Another sort of Trifling Propositions is, <when a part of>
<the complex> Idea <is predicated of the Name of the whole>; a part of the
Definition of the Word defined. Such are all Propositions wherein 15 
the <Genus> is predicated of the <Species>, or more comprehensive of less
comprehensive Terms: For what Information, what Knowledge
carries this Proposition in it, <viz. Lead is a Metal>, to a Man, who
knows the complex <Idea> the name <Lead> stands for. All the simple
<Ideas> that go to the complex one signified by the Term <Metal>, 20 
being nothing but what he before comprehended, and signified by
the name <Lead>. Indeed, to a Man that knows the Signification of
the word <Metal>, and not of the word <Lead>, it is a shorter way to
explain the Signification of the word <Lead>, by saying it is a <Metal>,
which at once expresses several of its simple <Ideas>, than to enumer- 
ate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very <heavy, fusible>, and
<malleable>.
#S 05#. Alike trifling it is, <to predicate any other part of the Definition of>
<the Term defined>, or to affirm any one of the simple <Ideas> of a complex
one, of the Name of the whole complex <Idea>; as <All Gold is fusible>. 30 
For <Fusibility> being one of the simple <Ideas> that goes to the making
up the complex one the sound <Gold> stands for, what can it be but
playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the name <Gold>, which is
comprehended in its received Signification? 'Twould be thought
little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a Truth of moment, 35 
That <Gold is yellow>; and I see not how it is any jot more material to

                                                                #P 613#
                                                                #L 1#
say, <It is fusible>, unless that Quality be left out of the complex <Idea>,
of which the Sound <Gold> is the mark in ordinary Speech. What
Instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath
been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am
supposed to know the Signification of the word another uses to me, 5
or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name <Gold> stands for
this complex <Idea> of <Body, Yellow, Heavy, Fusible, Malleable>, 'twill not
much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a Proposition,
and gravely say, <All Gold is fusible>. Such Propositions can only serve
to shew the Disingenuity of one, who will go from the Definition 10
of his own Terms, by re-minding him sometimes of it; but carry no
Knowledge with them, but of the Signification of Words, however
certain they be.
#S 06#. <Every> Man <is an Animal>, or living Body, is as certain a Pro-
position as can be; but no more conducing to the Knowledge of 15
Things, than to say, <A Palfry is an ambling Horse>, or a neighing
ambling <Animal>, both being only about the signification of Words,
and make me know but this; That <Body, Sense>, and <Motion>, or power
of Sensation and Moving, are three of those <Ideas>, that I always com-
prehend and signify by the word <Man>; and where they are not to 20
be found together, the name <Man> belongs not to that Thing: And
so of the other, that <Body, Sense>, and <a certain way of going>, with <a>
<certain kind of Voice>, are some of those <Ideas> which I always compre-
hend, and signify by the word <Palfry>; and when they are not to be
found together, the name <Palfry> belongs not to that thing. 'Tis 25
just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for
any one or more of the simple <Ideas>, that altogether make up that
complex <Idea> which is called a <Man>, is affirmed of the term <Man: v.g.>
suppose a <Roman>, signified by the word <Homo>: all these distinct
<Ideas> united in one subject, <Corporeitas, Sensibilitas, Potentia se movendi>, 30
<Rationalitas, Risibilitas>, he might, no doubt, with great certainty,
universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word
<Homo>, but did no more than say, that the word <Homo>, in his Country,
comprehended in its signification, all these <Ideas>. Much like a
<Romance> Knight, who by the word <Palfry>, signified these <Ideas; Body> 35
<of a certain figure, fourlegg'd, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing>,
<white, used to have a Woman on his back>, might with the same certainty,

#P 614#
#L 1#
universally affirm also any, or all of these of the word <Palfry>: but
did thereby teach no more, but that the word <Palfry>, in his, or
Romance Language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied
to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that shall
tell me, that in whatever thing <Sense, Motion, Reason>, and <Laughter>, 5  
were united, that Thing had actually a notion of GOD, or would be
cast into a sleep by <Opium>, made indeed an instructive Proposition:
because neither <having the notion of GOD>, nor <being cast into sleep by>
<Opium>, being contained in the <Idea> signified by the Word <Man>, we
are by such Propositions taught something more than barely what 10 
the word <Man> stands for: And therefore the Knowledge contained
in it, is more than <verbal>.
#S 07#. Before a Man makes any Proposition, he is supposed to under-
stand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot, only
making a noise by imitation, and framing certain Sounds, which he 15 
has learnt of others; but not, as a rational Creature, using them for
signs of <Ideas>, which he has in his Mind. The Hearer also is supposed
to understand the Terms as the Speaker uses them, or else he
talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he
trifles with Words, who makes such a Proposition, which when it 20 
is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a
Man was supposed to know before: <v.g. a Triangle hath three sides>, or
<Saffron is yellow>. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a Man
goes to explain his Terms, to one who is supposed or declares him-
self not to understand him: and then <it teaches only the signification of> 25 
<that Word>, and the use of that Sign.
#S 08#. We can know then the Truth of two sorts of Propositions,
with perfect <certainty>; the one is, of those trifling Propositions,
which have a certainty in them, but 'tis but a <verbal Certainty>, but
not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the Truth, and so 30 
may be <certain> in Propositions, which affirm something of another,
which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex <Idea>, but not
contained in it. As that <the external Angle of all Triangles, is bigger>
<than either of the opposite internal Angles>; which relation of the out-
ward Angle, to either of the opposite internal Angles, making no 35 
part of the complex <Idea>, signified by the name Triangle, this is a
real Truth, and conveys with it instructive <real Knowledge>.
                                                                #P 615#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 09#. We having little or no knowledge of what Combinations
there be of simple <Ideas> existing together in Substances, but by our
Senses, we cannot make any universal <certain> Propositions concern-
ing them, any farther than our nominal Essences lead us: which
being to a very few and inconsiderable Truths, in respect of those 5
which depend on their real Constitutions, the general <Propositions>
that are made <about Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part>
<but trifling>; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we
can have no knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever con-
stant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in guess-
ing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very
clear and coherent Discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For 'tis
plain, that Names of substantial Beings, as well as others, as far as
they have relative Significations affixed to them, may, with great
Truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, as
their relative Definitions make them fit to be so joined; and Proposi-
tions consisting of such Terms, may, with the same clearness, be
deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real
Truths; and all this, without any knowledge of the Nature or
Reality of Things existing without us. By this method, one may 20
make Demonstrations and undoubted Propositions in Words, and
yet thereby advance not one jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of
Things; <v.g.> he that having learnt these following Words, with
their ordinary mutually relative Acceptations annexed to them;
<v.g. Substance, Man, Animal, Farm, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational>,
may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without
knowing at all what the Soul really is; and of this sort, a Man may
find an infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings, and Conclu-
sions, in Books of Metaphysicks, School-Divinity, and some sort
of natural Philosophy; and after all, know as little of GOD, <Spirits>, 30
or <Bodies>, as he did before he set out.
#S 10#. He that hath liberty to define, <i.e.> determine the signification
of his Names of Substances, (as certainly every one does in effect,
who makes them stand for his own <Ideas,>) and makes their Signifi-
cations at a venture, taking them from his own or other Men's
Fancies, and not from an Examination or Enquiry into the Nature of

#P 616#
#L 1#
Things themselves, may, with little Trouble, demonstrate them
one of another, according to those several Respects, and mutual
Relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however
Things agree, or disagree, in their own Nature, he needs mind
nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath bestowed 5  
upon them: but thereby no more increases his own Knowledge,
than he does his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one in
a certain place a <Pound>, another in another place, a <Shilling>, and a
third in a third place, a <Penny>; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly
reckon right, and cast up a great Sum, according to his Counters so  
placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being
one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a Pound,
Shilling, or Penny is, but only that one is contained in the other
twenty times, and contains the other twelve; which a Man may
also do in the signification of Words, by making them in respect of 15 
one another, more, or less, or equally comprehensive.
#S 11#. Though yet concerning most Words used in Discourses,
especially Argumentative and Controversial, there is this more to
be complained of, which is the worst sort of <Trifling>, and which sets
us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain 20 
by them, or find in them, <viz.> that most Writers are so far from
instructing us in the Nature and Knowledge of Things, that they
<use their Words loosly> and uncertainly, and do not, by using them
constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and
clear deductions of Words one from another, and make their Dis-  
courses coherent and clear, (how little soever it were instructive,)
which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to
shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy, under the Obscurity and
perplexedness of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency,
and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute. 30 
#S 12#. To conclude, <barely verbal Propositions> may be known by
these following <Marks>:
      <First>, All Propositions, wherein two abstract Terms are affirmed
one of another, are barely about the signification of Sounds. For
since no abstract <Idea> can be the same with any other but it self, 35 

                                                                #P 617#
                                                                #L 1#

when its abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can signify
no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that Name;
or that these two Names signify the same <Idea>. Thus should any
one say, that <Parsimony is Frugality>, that <Gratitude is Justice>; that
this or that Action is, or is not <Temperance>: However specious these 5
and the like Propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we
come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall
find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the signification of those
Terms.
#S 13#. <Secondly>, All <Propositions, wherein a part of the complex> Idea, 10
which any Term stands for, <is predicated of that Term, are only> verbal,
<v.g.> to say, <that Gold is a Metal>, or <heavy>. And thus all Propositions,
wherein more comprehensive Words, called <Genera>, are <affirmed> of
subordinate, or less comprehensive, called <Species, or Individuals>,
are barely verbal.
When by these two Rules, we have examined the Propositions,
that make up the Discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and
out of Books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than
is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of Words,
and contain nothing in them, but the Use and Application of these
Signs.
This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that where-
ever the distinct <Idea> any Word stands for, is not known and con-
sidered, and something not contained in the <Idea>, is not affirmed,
or denied of it, there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are 25
able to attain no real Truth or Falshood. This, perhaps, if well
heeded, might save us a great deal of useless Amusement and
Dispute; and very much shorten our Trouble, and wandring in
the search of real and true Knowledge.
#P 618#
#C 09#                        CHAPTER IX

                    <Of our Knowledge of Existence>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. HITHERTO we have only considered the Essences of Things,
which being only abstract <Ideas>, and thereby removed in our
Thoughts from particular Existence, (that being the proper Opera-
tion of the Mind, in Abstraction, to consider an <Idea> under no other
Existence, but what it has in the Understanding,) gives us no 5  
Knowledge of real Existence at all. Where by the way we may take
notice, that <universal Propositions>, of whose Truth or Falshood we
can have certain Knowledge, concern not <Existence>; and farther,
that all <particular Affirmations or Negations>, that would not be
certain if they were made general, are only concerning <Existence>; 10 
they declaring only the accidental Union or Separation of <Ideas> in
Things existing, which in their abstract Natures, have no known
necessary Union or Repugnancy.
#S 02#. But leaving the Nature of Propositions, and different ways of
Predication to be considered more at large in another place, Let us 15 
proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the <Existence>
of Things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the
Knowledge of <our own Existence> by Intuition; of the <Existence> of GOD
by Demonstration; and of other Things by Sensation.
#S 03#. As for <our own Existence>, we perceive it so plainly, and so cer-    
tainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing
can be more evident to us, than our own Existence. <I think, I>
<reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain>; Can any of these be more evident to
me, than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other Things, that very
doubt makes me perceive my own <Existence>, and will not suffer me 25 
to doubt of that. For if I know <I feel Pain>, it is evident, I have as
certain a Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the
Pain I feel: Or if I know <I doubt>, I have as certain a Perception of the
Existence of the thing doubting, as of that Thought, which I call
<doubt>. Experience then convinces us, that <we have an intuitive Know->  
<ledge of our own Existence>, and an internal infallible Perception that
                                                           #P 619#
                                                           #L 1#
we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are
conscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come
not short of the highest degree of <Certainty>.


#C 10#                      CHAPTER X

           <Of our knowledge of the Existence of a GOD>.

#S 01#. THOUGH GOD has given us no innate <Ideas> of himself; though
he has stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we 5
may read his Being: yet having furnished us with those Faculties,
our Minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without
witness: since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot
want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our selves about us. Nor
can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since 10
he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover, and
know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our Being, and the
great concernment of our Happiness. But though this be the most
obvious Truth that Reason discovers; and though its Evidence be
(if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires 15
Thought and Attention; and the Mind must apply it self to a regu-
lar deduction of it from some part of our intuitive Knowledge, or
else we shall be as uncertain, and ignorant of this, as of other Propo-
sitions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration.
To shew therefore, that we are capable of <knowing>, i.e. <being certain> 20
<that there is a> GOD, and how we may come by this certainty, I
think we need go no farther than our selves, and that undoubted
Knowledge we have of our own Existence.
#S 02#. I think it is beyond Question, that <Man has a clear Perception of>
<his own Being>; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is 25
something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I
speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or
endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were something. If any
one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence, (for
#P 620#
#L 1#
really to doubt of it, is manifestly impossible,) let him for me enjoy
his beloved Happiness of being nothing, until Hunger, or some
other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may
take for a Truth, which every ones certain Knowledge assures him
of, beyond the liberty of doubting, <viz.> that he is something that 5   
actually exists.
#S 03#. In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that
bare <nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two>
<right Angles>. If a Man knows not that Non-entity, or the Absence of
all Being cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impossible he 10  
should know any demonstration in <Euclid>. If therefore we know
there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any
real Being, it is an evident demonstration, that from Eternity there
has been something; Since what was not from Eternity, had a
Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced by some-   
thing else.
#S 04#. Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning
from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its
Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and
received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all being 20  
must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so <this eternal>
<Being must be also the most powerful>.
#S 05#. Again, a Man finds in himself <Perception>, and <Knowledge>. We
have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there
is not only some Being, but some knowing intelligent Being in the 25  
World.
      There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and
when Knowledge began to be; or else, there has been also <a knowing>
<Being from Eternity>. If it be said, there was a time when no Being had
any Knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Under-   
standing. I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever
have been any Knowledge. It being as impossible, that Things
wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any
Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible,
that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two 35  
right ones. For it is as repugnant to the <Idea> of senseless Matter,    
                                                       #P 621#
#L 1#
that it should put into it self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as
it is repugnant to the <Idea> of a Triangle, that it should put into it
self greater Angles than two right ones.
#S 06#. Thus from the Consideration of our selves, and what we
infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the 5
Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That <there is an>
<eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being>; which whether any one
will please to call <God>, it matters not. The thing is evident, and
from this <Idea> duly considered, will easily be deduced all those
other Attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. 10
If nevertheless any one should be found so senslesly arrogant, as to
suppose Man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere
ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the Universe acted
only by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very
Rational and Emphatical rebuke of <Tully> l.2. <de leg.> to be considered 15
at his leisure. "What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming,
than for a Man to think that he has a Mind and Understanding in
him, but yet in all the Universe beside, there is no such thing? Or
that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his Reason he
can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without 20
any Reason at all?" <Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere>
<tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in coelo>
<mundoque non putet? Aut ea quae vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat>,
<nulla ratione moveri putet>?
From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain 25
Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, than of any thing our Senses
have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say,
that we more certainly know that there is a GOD, than that there
is any thing else without us. When I say we <know>, I mean there is such
a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but 30
apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.
#S 07#. <How far the> Idea <of a most perfect Being>, which a Man may
frame in his Mind, does, or does not prove the <Existence of a> GOD,
I will not here examine. For in the different Make of Men's Tempers,
and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more 35
#P 622#
#L 1#
on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same
Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of
establishing this Truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole
stress of so important a Point, as this, upon that sole Foundation.
And take some Men's having that <Idea> of GOD in their Minds, (for 5   
    'tis evident, some Men have none, and some worse than none, and
the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an
over-fondness of that Darling Invention, cashier, or at least endeav-
our to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to
those proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own Existence, 10  
and the sensible parts of the Universe, offer so clearly, and cogently
to our Thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering Man
to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a Truth, as
can any where be delivered, That <the invisible Things of GOD are>
<clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the> 15  
<Things that are made, even his Eternal Power, and God-head>. Though our
own Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident, and in-
contestable proof of a Deity; And I believe no Body can avoid the
Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other
Demonstration of so many parts: Yet this being so fundamental a 20  
Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and genuine
Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by
my Reader, if I go over some parts of this Argument again, and
enlarge a little more upon them.
#S 08#. There is no Truth more evident, than that <something> must 25     
be <from Eternity>. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or
that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time, where-
in there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the
greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and
Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence. 30  
      It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures, to conclude,
that something has existed from Eternity; Let us next see what
kind of thing that must be.
#S 09#. There are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man
knows or conceives. 35  
                                                           #P 623#
                                                           #L 1#
<First>, Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception,
or Thought, as the clippings of our Beards, and paring of our
Nails.
<Secondly>, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find
our selves to be, which if you please, we will hereafter call <cogitative> 5
<and incogitative> Beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing
else, are, perhaps, better Terms, than material and immaterial.
#S 10#. If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort
of Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that
it must necessarily be a <cogitative> Being. For it is as impossible to 10
conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a
thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce
Matter. Let us suppose any parcel of Matter eternal, great or
small, we shall find it, in it self, able to produce nothing. For
Example; let us suppose the Matter of the next Pebble, we meet 15
with, eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together,
if there were no other Being in the World, Must it not eternally
remain so, a dead inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can
add Motion to it self, being purely Matter, or produce any thing?
Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self so 20
much as Motion: the Motion it has, must also be from Eternity, or
else be produced, and added to Matter by some other Being more
powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not Power to
produce Motion in it self. But let us suppose Motion eternal too;
yet Matter, <incogitative Matter> and Motion, whatever changes it 25
might produce of Figure and Bulk, <could never produce Thought>:
Knowledge will still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and
Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of <nothing>, or <non->
<entity> to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether
he cannot as easily conceive Matter produced by <nothing>, as Thought 30
to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no such
thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being existing. Divide Matter
into as minute parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort
of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the Figure
and Motion of it, as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone, 35
Prism, Cylinder, <etc.> whose Diameters are but 1000000th part of a
#P 624#
#L 1#
<Gry (a)> will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportion-
able Bulk, than those of an inch or foot Diameter; and you may as
rationally expect to produce Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by
putting together in a certain Figure and Motion, gross Particles of
Matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where 5   
exist. They knock, impell, and resist one another, just as the
greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose
nothing first, or eternal; <Matter> can never begin to be: If we suppose
bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; <Motion> can never begin to be.
If we suppose only Matter and Motion first, or eternal; <Thought> can 10  
never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that Matter
either with or without Motion could have originally in and from it
self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence,
that then Sense, Perception, and Knowledge must be a property
eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of it. Not to 15  
add, that though our general or specifick conception of Matter
makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all Matter is not one
individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one
material Being or one single Body that we know or can conceive.
And therefore if Matter were the eternal first cogitative Being, 20  
there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative Being, but an
infinite number of eternal finite cogitative Beings, independent
one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could
never produce that order, harmony, and beauty which is to be found
in Nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal <Being> must 30  
necessarily be cogitative; And whatsoever is first of all Things,
must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the
Perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another
any perfection that it hath not, either actually in it self, or at least
in a higher degree; It necessarily follows, that the first eternal Being 30  
cannot be Matter.
                                                           #P 625#
#L 1#
#S 11#. <If> therefore it be evident, that <something> necessarily must
<exist from Eternity>, 'tis also as evident, that <that Something must>
necessarily <be a cogitative Being>: For it is as impossible, that incogi-
tative Matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that nothing,
or the negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being or 5
Matter.
#S 12#. Though this discovery of the <necessary Existence of an eternal>
<Mind>, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of GOD; since it
will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings that have a begin-
ning, must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, or 10
extent of Power, than what he gives them; And therefore if he made
those, he made also the less-excellent pieces of this Universe, all
inanimate Beings, whereby his <Omniscience, Power>, and <Providence>,
will be established and all his other Attributes necessarily follow:
Yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what Doubts can be 15
raised against it.
#S 13#. <First>, Perhaps it will be said, that though it be as clear as
demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and
that Being must also be knowing: yet it does not follow, but that
thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still 20
follows, that there is a GOD. For if there be an Eternal, Omniscient,
Omnipotent Being, it is certain, that there is a GOD, whether you
imagine that Being to be material, or no. But, herein, I suppose, lies
the danger and deceit of that Supposition: There being no way to
avoid the demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, 25
Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it granted, that this
knowing Being is material; and then letting slide out of their
Minds, or the Discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal
knowing Being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to
be Matter, and so deny a GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: 30
whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their
own Hypothesis. For if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal
Matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly sepa-
rate Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of
the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal 35
Spirit, but not of Matter; since it has been proved already, that
an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if
#P 626#
#L 1#
Thinking and Matter may be separated, <the eternal Existence of>
<Matter, will not follow from the eternal Existence of a cogitative Being>,
and they suppose it to no purpose.
#S 14#. But now let us see how they can satisfie themselves, or
others, that this <eternal thinking Being> is <material>. 5   
     <First>, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all Matter,
<every particle of Matter, thinks>? This, I suppose, they will scarce say;
since then there would be as many eternal thinking Beings, as there
are Particles of Matter, and so an infinity of Gods. And yet if they
will not allow Matter as Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to 10  
be as well cogitative, as extended, they will have as hard a task to
make out to their own Reasons, a cogitative Being out of incogi-
tative Particles, as an extended Being, out of unextended Parts,
if I may so speak.
#S 15#. <Secondly>, If all Matter does not think, I next ask, whether it 15    
be <only one Atom that does so>? This has as many Absurdities as the
other; for then this Atom of Matter must be alone eternal, or not.
If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought,
or Will, made all the rest of Matter. And so we have the creation
of Matter by a powerful Thought, which is that the Materialists 20  
stick at. For if they suppose one single thinking Atom, to have
produced all the rest of Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-
eminency to it upon any other account, than that of its Thinking,
the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other way,
which is above our conception, it must be still Creation; and these 25  
Men must give up their great Maxim, <Ex nihilo nil fit>. If it be said,
that all the rest of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom,
it will be to say any thing at pleasure, though never so absurd: For
to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in Knowledge
and Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least 30  
appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis. Every particle of
Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Figures and Motions
of any other; and I challenge any one in his Thoughts, to add any
Thing else to one above another.
                                                           #P 627#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 16#. <Thirdly>, If then neither one peculiar Atom alone, can be this
eternal thinking Being; nor all Matter, as Matter; <i.e.> every particle
of Matter can be it, it only remains, that it is <some certain System of>
<Matter> duly put together, that is this <thinking eternal Being>. This is
that, which, I imagine, is that Notion, which Men are aptest to 5
have of GOD, who would have him a material Being, as most readily
suggested to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves,
and other Men, which they take to be material thinking Beings.
But this Imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than
the other: For to suppose the eternal thinking Being, to be nothing 10
else but a composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is
incogitative, is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that
eternal Being, only to the <juxta->position of parts; than which,
nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter,
however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, 15
but a new relation of Position, which 'tis impossible should give
thought and knowledge to them.
#S 17#. But farther, this <corporeal System> either has all its parts at
rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its Thinking
consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have 20
no priviledges above one Atom.
If it be the motion of its parts, on which its Thinking depends, all
the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental, and limited;
since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought, being each of
them in it self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own 25
Motions, much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole;
since that Thought is not the cause of Motion, (for then it must be
antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the consequence of it,
whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise think-
ing or acting will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking 30
Being will be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Matter; since to
resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind Matter,
or into Thought depending on unguided motions of blind Matter,
is the same thing; not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts
and Knowledge, that must depend on the motion of such parts. 35
But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Im-
possibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than
that before-mentioned; since let this thinking System be all, or a
#P 628#
#L 1#
part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one
Particle, should either know its own, or the motion of any other
Particle, or the Whole know the motion of every Particular; and so
regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought
resulting from such Motion. 5   
#S 18#. Others would have <Matter> to be <eternal>, notwithstanding
that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This,
tho' it take not away the Being of a GOD, yet since it denies one
and the first great piece of his Workmanship, the Creation, let us
consider it a little. <Matter> must be allowed eternal: Why? Because 10  
you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do
you not also think your self eternal? You will answer, perhaps,
Because about twenty or forty Years since, you began to be. But if
I ask you what that <You> is, which began then to be, you can scarce
tell me. The Matter whereof you are made, began not then to be: 15  
for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together
in such a fashion and frame, as makes up your Body; but yet that
frame of Particles, is not You, it makes not that thinking Thing
You are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal,
immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter 20  
eternal too;) therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be?
If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking
Thing from Eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute,
till I meet with one, who is so void of Understanding, as to own it.
If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing, to be made out of 25  
nothing, (as all Things that are not eternal must be,) why also can
you not allow it possible, for a material Being to be made out of
nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the experience of
the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well con-
sidered, Creation of a Spirit will be found to require no less Power, 30  
than the Creation of Matter. Nay possibly, if we would emancipate
our selves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts, as far as
they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might
be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how Matter
might at first be made, and begin to exist by the power of that 35  
                                                           #P 629#
                                                           #L 1#
eternal first being: But to give beginning and being to a Spirit,
would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent Power.
But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the Notions,
on which the Philosophy now in the World is built, it would not
be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to enquire, so far as 5
Grammar it self would authorize, if the common setled Opinion
opposes it: Especially in this place, where the received Doctrine
serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past
doubt, that the Creation or Beginning of any one SUBSTANCE
out of nothing, being once admitted, the Creation of all other, but 10
the CREATOR himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.
#S 19#. But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the <making>
<any thing out of nothing>, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I
answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an
infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its Operations. We 15
do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot
possibly conceive the manner of their Production. We cannot con-
ceive how any thing but impulse of Body can move Body; and yet
that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against
the constant Experience, we have of it in our selves, in all our 20
voluntary Motions, which are produced in us only by the free
Action or Thought of our own Minds; and are not, nor can be the
effects of the impulse or determination of the Motion of blind
Matter, in or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our power
or choice to alter it. For example: My right Hand writes, whilst 25
my left Hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the
other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought
only changing, the right Hand rests, and the left Hand moves.
This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: Explain this, and
make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand 30
Creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the
animal Spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary
motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the determination
of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than to give motion
it self: Since the new determination given to the animal Spirits 35
must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put
in their way by thought, which was not in their way before, and
#P 630#
#L 1#
so must owe its motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary
motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, 'tis an
overvaluing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our
Capacities; and to conclude, all things impossible to be done, whose
manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our 5   
Comprehension infinite, or GOD finite, when what he can do, is
limitted to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the
Operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within
you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the
Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all 10  
Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.


#C 11#                     CHAPTER XI

       <Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things>.

#S 01#. THE Knowledge of our own Being, we have by intuition. The
Existence of a GOD, Reason clearly makes known to us, as has
been shewn.
The <Knowledge of the Existence> of any other thing we can have only 15  
by <Sensation>: For there being no necessary connexion of <real Existence>,
with any <Idea> a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence
but that of GOD, with the Existence of any particular Man; no
particular Man can know the <Existence> of any other Being, but only
when by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceived by 20  
him. For the having the <Idea> of any thing in our Mind, no more
proves the Existence of that Thing, than the picture of a Man
evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make
thereby a true History.
#S 02#. 'Tis therefore the actual receiving of <Ideas> from without, that 25     
gives us notice of the <Existence> of other Things, and makes us know,
that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes
that <Idea> in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how
it does it: For it takes not from the certainty of our Senses, and the
<Ideas> we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein 30  
                                                           #P 631#
                                                           #L 1#
they are produced: <v.g.> whilst I write this, I have, by the Paper
affecting my Eyes, that <Idea> produced in my Mind, which whatever
Object causes, I call <White>; by which I know, that that Quality or
Accident <i.e.> whose appearance before my Eyes, always causes that
<Idea> doth really exist, and hath a Being without me. And of this, 5
the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my Faculties
can attain, is the Testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and
sole Judges of this thing, whose Testimony I have reason to rely on,
as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I
see White and Black, and that something really exists, that causes 10
that Sensation in me, than that I write or move my Hand; which is
a Certainty as great, as humane Nature is capable of, concerning
the Existence of any thing, but a Man's self alone, and of GOD.
#S 03#. <The notice we have by our Senses, of the existing of Things without>
us, though it be not altogether so certain, as our intuitive Know- 
ledge, or the Deductions of our Reason, employ'd about the clear
abstract <Ideas> of our own Minds; yet it is an assurance that <deserves>
<the name of Knowledge>. If we persuade our selves, that our Faculties
act and inform us right, concerning the existence of those Objects
that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: For 20
I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of
the Existence of those Things which he sees and feels. At least, he
that can doubt so far,(whatever he may have with his own Thoughts)
will never have any Controversie with me; since he can never be
sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion. As to my self, I think 25
GOD has given me assurance enough of the Existence of Things
without me: since by their different application, I can produce in
my self both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concernment of
my present state. This is certain, the confidence that our Faculties
do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable 30
of, concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we cannot act
any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Knowledge it self, but
by the help of those Faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even
what Knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have from our
#P 632#
#L 1#
Senses themselves, that they do not err in the Information they
give us, of the Existence of Things without us, when they are
affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this assurance, by
other concurrent Reasons.
#S 04#. <First>, 'Tis plain, those Perceptions are produced in us by 5      
exteriour Causes affecting our Senses: Because <those that want the>
<Organs of any Sense, never can have the> Ideas <belonging to that Sense> pro-
duced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and
therefore we cannot but be assured, that they come in by the
Organs of that Sense, and no other way. The Organs themselves, 10  
    'tis plain, do not produce them: for then the Eyes of a Man in the
dark, would produce Colours, and his Nose smell Roses in the
Winter: but we see no body gets the relish of a Pine-apple, till he
goes to the <Indies>, where it is, and tastes it.
#S 05#. <Secondly>, Because <sometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having> 15 
<those> Ideas <produced in my Mind>. For though when my Eyes are shut,
or Windows fast, I can at Pleasure re-call to my Mind the <Ideas>
of <Light>, or the <Sun>, which former Sensations had lodg'd in my
Memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that <Idea>, and take into my view
that of the <smell> of a Rose, or <taste> of Sugar. But if I turn my Eyes at 20  
noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the <Ideas>, which the Light,
or Sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference,
between the <Ideas> laid up in my Memory; (over which, if they were
there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of
them, and lay them by at pleasure) and those which force themselves 25  
upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs
be some exteriour cause, and the brisk acting of some Objects
without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those
<Ideas> in my Mind, whether I will, or no. Besides, there is no body who
doth not perceive the difference in himself, between contemplating 30  
the Sun, as he hath the <Idea> of it in his Memory, and actually look-
ing upon it: Of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few
of his <Ideas> are more distinguishable one from another. And there-
fore he hath certain knowledge, that they are not both Memory,
or the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but that 35  
actual seeing hath a Cause without.
                                                           #P 633#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, Add to this, that <many of those> Ideas <are produced in us>
<with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence>. Thus
the pain of Heat or Cold, when the <Idea> of it is revived in our
Minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very
troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated: which is oc-
casioned by the disorder the external Object causes in our Bodies,
when applied to it: And we remember the pain of <Hunger, Thirst>, or
the <Head-ach>, without any pain at all; which would either never dis-
turb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were
there nothing more but <Ideas> floating in our Minds, and appearances 10
entertaining our Fancies, without the real Existence of Things
affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of Pleasure,
accompanying several actual Sensations: And though mathematical
demonstrations depend not upon sense, yet the examining them by
Diagrams, gives great credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems 15
to give it a Certainty approaching to that of the Demonstration it
self. For it would be very strange, that a Man should allow it for an
undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, which he measures
by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, should be bigger one than the
other; and yet doubt of the Existence of those Lines and Angles, 20
which by looking on, he makes use of to measure that by.
#S 07#. <Fourthly>, Our <Senses>, in many cases bear <witness> to the Truth of
each other's report, concerning the Existence of sensible Things
without us. He that sees a <Fire>, may, if he doubt whether it be any
thing more than a bare Fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by 25
putting his Hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into
such exquisite pain, by a bare <Idea> or Phantom, unless that the pain
be a fancy too: Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by
raising the <Idea> of it, bring upon himself again.
Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the Appearance of the 30
Paper; and by designing the Letters, tell before-hand what new
<Idea> it shall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my
Pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I
will) if my Hand stands still; or though I move my Pen, if my Eyes
#P 634#
#L 1#
be shut: Nor when those Characters are once made on the Paper, can
I chuse afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the <Ideas>
of such Letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are
not barely the Sport and Play of my own Imagination, when I find,
that the Characters, that were made at the pleasure of my own 5   
Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall
fancy it, but continue to affect my Senses constantly and regularly,
according to the Figures I made them. To which if we will add,
that the sight of those shall, from another Man, draw such Sounds,
as I before-hand design they shall stand for, there will be little reason 10  
left to doubt, that those Words, I write, do really exist without me,
when they cause a long series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears,
which could not be the effect of my Imagination, nor could my
Memory retain them in that order.
#S 08#. But yet, if after all this, any one will be so sceptical, as to 15     
distrust his Senses, and to affirm, that all we see and hear, feel and
taste, think and do, during our whole Being, is but the series and
deluding appearances of a long Dream, whereof there is no reality;
and therefore will question the Existence of all Things, or our
Knowledge of any thing: I must desire him to consider, that if all be 20  
a Dream, then he doth but dream, that he makes the Question; and
so it is not much matter, that a waking Man should answer him.
But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer,
That <the certainty of >Things existing <in rerum Natura>, when we have
<the testimony of our Senses> for it, is not only <as great> as our frame can 25  
attain to, but <as our Condition needs>. For our Faculties being suited not
to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive
Knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the
preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use
of Life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give 30  
us certain notice of those Things, which are convenient or incon-
venient to us. For he that sees a Candle burning, and hath experi-
mented the force of its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will
little doubt, that this is something existing without him, which
does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance 35  
enough, when no Man requires greater certainty to govern his
                                                           #P 635#
                                                           #L 1#
Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves. And
if our Dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass
Furnace, be barely a wandring Imagination in a drowsy Man's
Fancy, by putting his Hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into
a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more 5
than bare Imagination. So that this Evidence is as great, as we can
desire, being as certain to us, as our Pleasure or Pain; <i.e.> Happiness
or Misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of Know-
ing or Being. Such an assurance of the Existence of Things without
us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good and avoiding 10
the Evil, which is caused by them, which is the important concern-
ment we have of being made acquainted with them.
#S 09#. In fine then, when our Senses do actually convey into our
Understandings any <Idea>, we cannot but be satisfied, that there
doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth 15
affect our Senses, and by them give notice of it self to our apprehen-
sive Faculties, and actually produce that <Idea>, which we then per-
ceive: and we cannot so far distrust their Testimony, as to doubt,
that such Collections of simple <Ideas>, as we have observed by our
Senses to be united together, do really exist together. But <this> 20
<Knowledge extends as far as the present Testimony of our Senses>, employ'd
about particular Objects, that do then affect them, <and no farther>.
For if I saw such a Collection of simple <Ideas>, as is wont to be called
<Man>, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I
cannot be certain, that the same Man exists now, since there is no 25
necessary connexion of his Existence a minute since, with his
Existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had
the Testimony of my Senses for his Existence. And if I cannot be
certain, that the Man I saw last to day, is now in Being, I can less be
certain, that he is so, who hath been longer removed from my 30
Senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year.:
and much less can I be certain of the Existence of Men, that I never
saw. And therefore though it be highly probable, that Millions of
Men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not
that Certainty of it, which we strictly call Knowledge; though the 35
#P 636#
#L 1#
great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for
me to do several things upon the confidence, that there are Men
    (and Men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now
in the World: But this is but probability, not Knowledge.
#S 10#. Whereby yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a thing 5        
it is, for a Man of narrow Knowledge, who having Reason given
him to judge of the different evidence and probability of Things,
and to be sway'd accordingly; how <vain>, I say, it is <to expect Demon->
<stration> and Certainty <in things not capable of it>; and refuse Assent to
very rational Propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear 10  
Truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to sur-
mount every the least (I will not say Reason, but) pretence of
doubting. He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of
nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure of nothing,
in this World, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomness of his 15  
Meat or Drink would not give him reason to venture on it: And I
would fain know, what 'tis he could do upon such grounds, as were
capable of no Doubt, no Objection.
#S 11#. As when our Senses are actually employ'd about any
Object, we do know that it does exist; so <by our Memory> we may 20  
be assured, that heretofore Things, that affected our Senses, have
existed. And thus <we have knowledge of the past Existence> of several
Things, whereof our Senses having informed us, our Memories
still retain the <Ideas>; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we
remember well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than 25  
our Senses have formerly assured us. Thus seeing Water at this
instant, 'tis an unquestionable Truth to me, that Water doth exist:
and remembring that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true;
and as long as my Memory retains it, always an undoubted Proposi-
tion to me, that Water did exist 10th. <July>, 1688. as it will also be 30  
equally true, that a certain number of very fine Colours did exist,
which, at the same time, I saw upon a Bubble of that Water: But
being now quite out of the sight both of the Water and Bubbles too,
it is no more certainly known to me, that the Water doth now exist,
                                                           #P 637#
#L 1#
than that the Bubbles or Colours therein do so; it being no more
necessary that Water should exist to day, because it existed yester-
day, than that the Colours or Bubbles exist to day, because they
existed yesterday, though it be exceedingly much more probable,
because Water hath been observed to continue long in Existence, 5
but Bubbles, and the Colours on them quickly cease to be.
#S 12#. What <Ideas> we have of Spirits, and how we come by them, I
have already shewn. But though we have those <Ideas> in our Minds,
and know we have them there, the having the <Ideas> of Spirits does
not make us <know>, that any such Things do exist without us, or 10
<that there are any finite Spirits>, or any other spiritual Beings, but the
Eternal GOD. We have ground from revelation, and several other
Reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such Creatures:
but our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the means
of knowing their particular Existences. For we can no more know, 15
that there are finite Spirits really existing, by the <Idea> we have of
such Beings in our Minds, than by the <Ideas> any one has of Fairies, or
Centaurs, he can come to know, that Things answering those <Ideas>,
do really exist.
And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well 20
as several other Things, we must content our selves with the
Evidence of Faith; but universal certain Propositions concerning
this matter are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, <v.g.>
that all the intelligent Spirits that GOD ever created, do still exist;
yet it can never make a part of our certain Knowledge. These and 25
the like Propositions, we may assent to, as highly probable, but are
not, I fear, in this state, capable of knowing. We are not then to put
others upon demonstrating, nor our selves upon search of universal
Certainty in all those matters, wherein we are not capable of any
other Knowledge, but what our Senses give us in this or that par- 
ticular.
#S 13#. By which it appears, that there are two sorts of <Propositions>.
1. There is one sort of Propositions <concerning> the <Existence> of any 
thing answerable to such an <Idea>: as having the <Idea> of an <Elephant>,
<Phoenix, Motion>, or an <Angel>, in my Mind, the first and natural 35
enquiry is, Whether such a thing does any where exist? And this
#P 638#
#L 1#
Knowledge is only of <Particulars>. No existence of any thing without
us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known farther than our
Senses inform us. 2. There is another sort of <Propositions>, wherein is
expressed the Agreement, or Disagreement of our abstract <Ideas>,
and their dependence one on another. Such Propositions may be 5   
<universal> and certain. So having the <Idea> of GOD and my self, of
Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that GOD is to be feared
and obeyed by me: And this Proposition will be certain, concerning
<Man> in general, if I have made an abstract <Idea> of such a Species,
whereof I am one particular. But yet this Proposition, how certain 10  
soever, That Men ought to fear and obey GOD, proves not to me
the Existence of Men in the World, but will be true of all such Crea-
tures, whenever they do exist: Which <certainty> of such general
Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagreement is to be
discovered in those abstract <Ideas>. 15  
#S 14#. In the former case, our Knowledge is the consequence of the
Existence of Things producing <Ideas> in our Minds by our Senses: in
the latter, Knowledge is the consequence of the <Ideas> (be they what
they will) that are in our Minds producing there general certain
Propositions. Many of these are called <aeternae veritates>, and all of 20  
them indeed are so; not from being written all or any of them in the
Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propositions in any
ones Mind, till he, having got the abstract <Ideas>, joyn'd or separated
them by affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose
such a creature as <Man> is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby 25  
furnished with such <Ideas>, as we have, we must conclude, he must
needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his
<Ideas>, know the truth of certain Propositions, that will arise from the
Agreement or Disagreement, which he will perceive in his own
<Ideas>. Such Propositions are therefore called <Eternal Truths>, not 30  
because they are Eternal Propositions actually formed, and ante-
cedent to the Understanding, that at any time makes them; nor
because they are imprinted on the Mind from any patterns, that
                                                           #P 639#
                                                           #L 1#
are any where of them out of the Mind, and existed before: But
because being once made, about abstract <Ideas>, so as to be true, they
will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time
past or to come, by a Mind having those <Ideas>, always actually be
true. For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same 5
<Ideas>; and the same <Ideas> having immutably the same Habitudes
one to another, Propositions, concerning any abstract <Ideas>, that
are once true, must needs be <eternal Verities>.



#C 12#                     CHAPTER XII

              <Of the Improvement of our Knowledge>.

#S 01#. IT having been the common received Opinion amongst Men of
Letters, that <Maxims> were the foundations of all Knowledge; and 10
that the Sciences were each of them built upon certain <praecognita>,
from whence the Understanding was to take its rise, and by which
it was to conduct it self, in its enquiries into the matters belonging
to that Science; the beaten Road of the Schools has been, to lay
down in the beginning one or more general Propositions, as Foun- 
dations whereon to build the Knowledge that was to be had of that
Subject. These Doctrines thus laid down for Foundations of any
Science, were called <Principles>, as the beginnings from which we
must set out, and look no farther backwards in our Enquiries, as we
have already observed                                          20
#S 02#. One Thing, which might probably give an occasion to this
way of proceeding in other Sciences, was (as I suppose) the good
success it seemed to have in <Mathematicks>, wherein Men, being
observed to attain a great certainty of Knowledge, these Sciences
came by pre-eminence to be called , and , 25
Learning, or things learn'd, throughly learn'd, as having of all
others the greatest certainty, clearness, and evidence in them.
#P 640#
#L 1#
#S 03#. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that <the>
<great advancement> and certainty of <real Knowledge>, which Men arrived
to in these Sciences, was not owing to the influence of these Prin-
ciples, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received
from two or three general Maxims laid down in the beginning; but 5   
<from> the <clear, distinct, complete Ideas> their Thoughts were employ'd
about, and the relation of Equality and Excess so clear between
some of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledge, and by that,
a way to discover it in others, and this without the help of those
<Maxims>. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young Lad to know, that 10  
his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this
Axiom, that <the whole is bigger than a part>; nor be assured of it, till he
has learned that Maxim? Or cannot a Country-Wench know, that
having received a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a Shil-
ling also from another that owes her three, that the remaining Debts 15  
in each of their Hands are equal? cannot she know this, I say,
without she fetch the certainty of it from this Maxim, That <if you>
<take Equals from Equals, the remainder will be Equals>, a Maxim which
possibly she never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider,
from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest 20  
by most People, the particular instance, or the general Rule; and
which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These general Rules
are but the comparing our more general and abstract <Ideas>, which are
the Workmanship of the Mind, made, and Names given to them,
for the easier dispatch in its Reasonings, and drawing into compre-
hensive Terms, and short Rules, its various and multiplied Obser-
vations. But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on
particulars; though afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof:
it being natural for the Mind (forward still to enlarge its Knowledge)
most attentively to lay up those general Notions, and make the 30  
proper use of them, which is to disburden the Memory of the cum-
bersome load of Particulars. For I desire it may be considered what
more certainty there is to a Child, or any one, that his Body, Little-
Finger and all, is bigger than his Little-Finger alone, after you have
given to his Body the Name <whole>, and to his Little-Finger the Name 35  
                                                           #P 641#
                                                           #L 1#
<part>, than he could have had before; or what new Knowledge con-
cerning his Body, can these two relative Terms give him, which he
could not have without them? Could he not know that his Body was
bigger than his Little-Finger, if his Language were yet so imperfect,
that he had no such relative Terms as <whole> and <part>? I ask farther 5
when he has got these Names, how is he more certain that his
Body is a <whole>, and his Little-Finger a <part>, than he was or might
be certain before, he learnt those Terms, that his Body was bigger
than his Little-Finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny
that his Little-Finger is a part of his Body, as that it is less than his 10
Body. And he that can doubt whether it be less, will as certainly
doubt whether it be a Part. So that the Maxim, <The whole is bigger>
<than a part>, can never be made use of to prove the Little-Finger less
than the Body, but when it is useless, by being brought to con-
vince one of a truth which he knows already. For he that does not 15
certainly know that any parcel of matter, with another parcel of
matter joyn'd to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never
be able to know it by the help of these two relative Terms <whole> and
<part>, make of them what Maxim you please.
#S 04#. But be it in the Mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, 20
that taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch
from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining parts of the two Lines
will be equal, or that <if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be>
<equals>: Which, I say, of these two, is the clearer and first known, I
leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my present 25
occasion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether if it
be the readiest way to Knowledge, to begin with general Maxims,
and build upon them, it be yet a safe way to take the <Principles>,
which are laid down in any other Science, as unquestionable Truths;
and so receive them without examination, and adhere to them, 30
without suffering them to be doubted of, because Mathematicians
have been so happy, or so fair, to use none but self-evident and
undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for Truth
in Morality, what may not be introduced and proved in Natural
Philosophy.                                                    35
Let that Principle of some of the old Philosophers, That all is Matter,
and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable,
#P 642#
#L 1#
and it will be easy to be seen by the Writings of some that have
revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into.
Let any one, with <Polemo>, take the World; or, with the <Stoicks>,
the <AEther>, or the Sun; or, with <Anaximenes>, the Air, to be <God>; and
what a Divinity, Religion, and Worship must we needs have! 5   
<Nothing> can be <so dangerous, as Principles> thus <taken up without question->
<ing or examination>; especially if they be such as concern Morality,
which influence Men's Lives, and give a biass to all their Actions.
Who might not justly expect another kind of Life in <Aristippus>, who
placed Happiness in bodily Pleasure; and in <Antisthenes>, who made 10  
Virtue sufficient to Felicity? And he who, with <Plato>, shall place
Beatitude in the Knowledge of GOD, will have his Thoughts raised
to other Contemplations, than those who look not beyond this spot
of Earth, and those perishing Things which are to be had in it. He
that, <with Archelaus>, shall lay it down as a Principle, That Right 15  
and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest, are defined only by Laws, and
not by Nature, will have other measures of moral Rectitude and
Pravity, than those who take it for granted, that we are under
Obligations antecedent to all humane Constitutions.
#S 05#. If therefore those that pass for <Principles>, are <not certain>, 20    
    (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to
distinguish them from those that are doubtful,) but are only made
so to us by our blind assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and
instead of being guided into Truth, we shall, by Principles, be only
confirmed in Mistake and Errour. 25  
#S 06#. But since the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, as
well as of all other Truths, depends only upon the perception, we
have, of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our <Ideas, the way to>
<improve our Knowledge>, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit
Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but is, I think, <to> get and 30  
<fix in our Minds clear, distinct, and complete> Ideas, as far as they are to
be had, <and annex to them proper and constant Names>. And thus, perhaps,
without any other Principles, but barely considering those <Ideas>,
and by <comparing them one with another>, finding their Agreement, and
Disagreement, and their several Relations and Habitudes; we shall 35  
get more true and clear Knowledge, by the conduct of this one
                                                           #P 643#
                                                           #L 1#
Rule, than by taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds
into the disposal of others.
#S 07#. <We must> therefore, if we will proceed, as Reason advises,
<adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of the> Ideas <we examine>, and
the Truth we search after. General and certain Truths, are only 5
founded in the Habitudes and Relations of abstract <Ideas>. A sagacious
and methodical application of our Thoughts, for the finding out
these Relations, is the only way to discover all, that can be put,
with Truth and Certainty concerning them, into general Proposi-
tions. By what steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in 10
the Schools of the Mathematicians, who from very plain and easy
beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued Chain of Reasonings,
proceed to the discovery and demonstration of Truths, that appear
at first sight beyond humane Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs,
and the admirable Methods they have invented for the singling out, 15
and laying in order those intermediate <Ideas>, that demonstratively
shew the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities, is that
which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful and
unexpected discoveries: but whether something like this, in respect
of other <Ideas>, as well as those of magnitude, may not in time be 20
found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if
other <Ideas>, that are the real, as well as nominal Essences of their
Species, were pursued in the way familiar to Mathematicians, they
would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater evidence and
clearness, than possibly we are apt to imagine.                   25
#S 08#. This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture,
which I suggest, <Chap.> 3. viz. That <Morality is capable of Demonstra->
<tion>, as well as Mathematicks. For the <Ideas> that Ethicks are conver-
sant about, being all real Essences, and such as, I imagine, have a
discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; so far as 30
we can find their Habitudes and Relations, so far we shall be
possessed of certain, real, and general Truths: and I doubt not, but
if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made
out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering Man, no
more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth 35
#P 644#
#L 1#
of Propositions in Mathematicks, which have been demonstrated
to him.
#S 09#. In our search after the Knowledge of <Substances>, our want of
<Ideas>, that are suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a
quite different method. We advance not here, as in the other (where 5   
our abstract <Ideas> are real as well as nominal Essences) by contem-
plating our <Ideas>, and considering their Relations and Correspon-
dencies; that helps us very little, for the Reasons, that in another
place we have at large set down. By which, I think, it is evident,
that Substances afford Matter of very little general Knowledge; and 10  
the bare Contemplation of their abstract <Ideas>, will carry us but a
very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty. What then are
we to do for the improvement of our <Knowledge in substantial Beings>?
Here we are to take a quite contrary Course, the want of <Ideas> of
their real <Essences> sends us from our own Thoughts, to the Things 15  
themselves, as they exist. <Experience here must teach me>, what Reason
cannot: and 'tis by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what
other Qualities co-exist with those of my complex <Idea, v.g.> whether
that <yellow, heavy, fusible> Body, I call <Gold>, be <malleable>, or no; which
Experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular Body, I 20  
examine) makes me not certain, that it is so, in all, or any other
<yellow, heavy,fusible> Bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it is
no Consequence one way or t'other from my complex <Idea>; the
Necessity or Inconsistence of <Malleability>, hath no visible connexion
with the Combination of that <Colour, Weight>, and <Fusibility> in any 25  
body. What I have said here of the nominal Essence of <Gold>, supposed
to consist of a Body of such a determinate <Colour, Weight>, and
<Fusibility>, will hold true, <if Malleableness, Fixedness>, and <Solubility> in
<Aqua Regia> be added to it. Our Reasonings from these <Ideas> will
carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other 30  
Properties in those Masses of Matter, wherein all these are to be
found. Because the other Properties of such Bodies, depending not
on these, but on that unknown real Essence, on which these also
depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther
than the simple <Ideas> of our nominal Essence will carry us, which is 35  
                                                           #P 645#
                                                           #L 1#
very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly
any certain, universal, and useful Truths. For upon Trial, having
found that particular piece (and all others of that Colour, Weight,
and Fusibility, that I ever tried) <malleable>, that also makes now
perhaps, a part of my complex <Idea>, part of my nominal Essence of 5
<Gold>: Whereby though I make my complex <Idea>, to which I affix the
Name <Gold>, to consist of more simple <Ideas> than before: yet still, it
not containing the real Essence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me
not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps, it may to conjecture)
the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther than they have 10
a visible connexion, with some or all of the simple <Ideas>, that make
up my nominal Essence. For Example, I cannot be certain from
this complex <Idea>, whether <Gold> be fixed, or no: Because, as before,
there is no necessary connexion, or inconsistence to be discovered
betwixt a complex <Idea> of a Body, <yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable>, 15
betwixt these, I say, and <Fixedness>, so that I may certainly know,
that in whatsoever Body these are found, there <Fixedness> is sure to be.
Here again for assurance, I must apply my self to <Experience>; as far
as that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.
#S 10#. I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular 20
Experiments shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies,
and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one, that is
a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but Judgment and
Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This <way> of getting, and
<improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience> and History, 25
which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of
<Mediocrity>, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me
suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a
Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Know-
ledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties. 30
Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which
we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase
our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear
our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to
advance.                                                      35
#P 646#
#L 1#
#S 11#. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our
Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and
real Essences of Bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the Being of
a GOD, and the Knowledge of our selves, enough to lead us into a
full and clear discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment, it 5   
will become us, as rational Creatures, to imploy those Faculties we
have about what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction
of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to
conclude, that our proper Imployment lies in those Enquiries, and in
that sort of Knowledge, which is most suited to our natural Capaci-   
ties, and carries in it our greatest interest, <i.e.> the Condition of our
eternal Estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that <Morality> is <the>
<proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general>; (who are both con-
cerned, and fitted to search out their <Summum Bonum,>) as several
Arts, conversant about several parts of Nature, are the Lot and 15  
private Talent of particular Men, for the common use of humane
Life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World. Of what
Consequence the discovery of one natural Body, and its Properties
may be to humane Life, the whole great Continent of <America> is a
convincing instance: whose Ignorance in useful Arts, and want of 20  
the greatest part of the Conveniences of Life, in a Country that
abounded with all sorts of natural Plenty, I think, may be attributed
to their Ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary
despicable Stone, I mean the Mineral of <Iron>. And whatever we
think of our Parts or Improvements in this part of the World, where 25  
Knowledge and Plenty seem to vie each with other; yet to any one,
that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose, it will appear past doubt,
that were the use of <Iron> lost among us, we should in a few Ages be
unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the ancient
savage <Americans>, whose natural Endowments and Provisions come 30  
no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite Nations.
So that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible
Mineral, may be truly styled the Father of Arts, and Author of
Plenty.
                                                           #P 647#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 12#. I would <not therefore> be thought to dis-esteem, or <dissuade the>
<Study of Nature>. I readily agree the Contemplation of his Works
gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and
if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to Mankind, than the
Monuments of exemplary Charity, that have at so great Charge 5
been raised, by the Founders of Hospitals and Alms-houses. He
that first invented Printing; discovered the Use of the Compass; or
made publick the Virtue and right Use of <Kin Kina>, did more for the
propagation of Knowledge; for the supplying and increase of useful
commodities; and saved more from the Grave, than those who 10
built Colleges, Work-houses, and Hospitals. All that I would say,
is, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the Opinion,
or Expectation of Knowledge, where it is not to be had; or by ways,
that will not attain it: That we should not take doubtful Systems,
for complete Sciences; nor unintelligible Notions, for scientifical 15
Demonstrations. In the Knowledge of Bodies, we must be content
to glean, what we can, from particular Experiments: since we can-
not from a Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole
Sheaves; and in bundles, comprehend the Nature and Properties
of whole Species together. Where our Enquiry is concerning Co- 
existence, or Repugnancy to co-exist, which by Contemplation of
our <Ideas>, we cannot discover; there Experience, Observation, and
natural History, must give us by our Senses, and by retail, an
insight into corporeal Substances. The Knowledge of Bodies we
must get by our Senses, warily employed in taking notice of their 25
Qualities, and Operations on one another: And what we hope to
know of separate Spirits in this World, we must, I think, expect
only from Revelation. He that shall consider, <how little general>
<Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at Pleasure, have>
<promoted true Knowledge>, or helped to satisfy the Enquiries of rational 30
Men after real Improvements; How little, I say, the setting out at
that end, has for many Ages together advanced Men's Progress
towards the Knowledge of natural Philosophy, will think, we have
Reason to thank those, who in this latter Age have taken another
Course, and have trod out to us, though not an easier way to learned 35
Ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable Knowledge.
#P 648#
#L 1#
#S 13#. Not that we may not, to explain any <Phoenomena> of Nature,
make use of any probable <Hypothesis> whatsoever: <Hypotheses>, if they
are well made, are at least great helps to the Memory, and often
direct us to new discoveries. But my Meaning is, that we should
<not take up any one too hastily>, (which the Mind, that would always 5   
penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on,
is very apt to do,) till we have very well examined Particulars, and
made several Experiments, in that thing which we would explain
by our Hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all;
whether our Principles will carry us quite through, and not be as 10  
inconsistent with one <Phoenomenon> of Nature, as they seem to
accommodate, and explain another. And at least, that we take care,
that the Name of <Principles> deceive us not, nor impose on us, by
making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is
really, at best, but a very doubtful conjecture, such as are most 15  
    (I had almost said all) of the <Hypotheses> in natural Philosophy.
#S 14#. But whether natural Philosophy be capable of Certainty, or
no, the <ways to enlarge our Knowledge>, as far as we are capable, seem
to me, in short, to be these two:
<First>, The <First> is <to get and settle in our Minds> determined <Ideas> of 20  
those Things, whereof we have general or specific Names; at least
of so many of them as we would consider and improve our Know-
ledge in, or reason about. And if they be <specific> Ideas of <Substances>,
we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can,
whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple 25  
Ideas, as being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly
determine the <Species>: And each of those simple Ideas, which are the
ingredients of our Complex one, should be clear and distinct in our
Minds. For it being evident, that our Knowledge cannot exceed our
<Ideas>; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we 30  
cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge.
      <Secondly>, The other is the Art <of finding out> those <Intermediate Ideas>,
which may shew us the Agreement, or Repugnancy of other <Ideas>,
which cannot be immediately compared.
                                                           #P 649#
                                                           #L 1#
#S 15#. That these two (and not the relying on Maxims, and draw-
ing Consequences from some general Propositions) are the right
Method of improving our Knowledge in the <Ideas> of other Modes
besides those of quantity, the Consideration of Mathematical
Knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find, that he, 5
that has not a perfect, and clear <Idea> of those Angles, or Figures of
which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby uncapable
of any Knowledge about them. Suppose but a Man, not to have a
perfect exact <Idea> of a <right Angle>, a <Scalenum>, or <Trapezium>; and
there is nothing more certain than, that he will in vain seek any 10
Demonstration about them. Farther it is evident, that it was not
the influence of those Maxims, which are taken for Principles in
Mathematicks, that hath led the Masters of that Science into those
wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts
know all the Maxims generally made use of in Mathematicks 15
never so perfectly, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences,
as much as he pleases, he will by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce
ever come to know that <the square of the Hypotenuse in a right angled>
<Triangle, is equal to the squares of the two other sides>. The Knowledge,
that <the Whole is equal to all its Parts>, and <if you take Equals from> 20
<Equals, the remainder will be Equal>, etc. helped him not, I presume, to
this Demonstration: And a Man may, I think, pore long enough on
those Axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical
Truths. They have been discovered by the Thoughts otherways
applied: The Mind had other Objects, other Views before it, far 25
different from those Maxims, when it first got the Knowledge of
such kind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough ac-
quainted with those received Axioms, but ignorant of their Method,
who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently ad-
mire. And who knows what Methods, to enlarge our Knowledge 30
in other parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, answering
that of <Algebra> in Mathematicks, which so readily finds out <Ideas> of
Quantities to measure others by, whose Equality or Proportion we
could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

#P 650#
#C 13#                    CHAPTER XIII

     <Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. OUR <Knowledge>, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Con-
formity with our Sight, that it is <neither wholly necessary, nor wholly>
<voluntary>. If our Knowledge were altogether necessary, all Men's
Knowledge would not only be alike, but every Man would know all
that is knowable: and if it were wholly voluntary, some Men so 5   
little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or
none at all. Men that have Senses, cannot chuse but receive some
<Ideas> by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain
some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot
but perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of some of them one 10  
with another: As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day,
cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a difference in them. But
though a Man with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see; yet
there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whether he will turn
his Eyes to; there may be in his reach a Book containing Pictures, and 15  
Discourses, capable to delight, or instruct him, which yet he may
never have the Will to open, never take the Pains to look into.
#S 02#. There is also another thing in a Man's Power, and that is,
though he turns his Eyes sometimes towards an Object, yet he may
chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent 20  
application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it.
But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It
depends not on his Will to see that <Black>, which appears <Yellow>; nor
to persuade himself, that what actually <scalds> him, feels <cold>: The
Earth will not appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields covered 25  
with Verdure, whenever he has a Mind to it: in the cold Winter, he
cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. just
thus is it with our Understanding, all that is <voluntary> in our Know-
ledge, is the <employing>, or with-holding any of <our Faculties> from
this or that sort of Objects, and a more, or less accurate survey of 30  
them: But they being employed, <our Will hath no Power to determine>
                                                           #P 651#
                                                           #L 1#
<the Knowledge of the Mind> one way or other; that is done only by the
Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And
therefore, as far as Men's Senses are conversant about external
Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those Ideas, which are presented
by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without: and 5
so far as Men's Thoughts converse with their own determined
<Ideas>, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the Agreement,
and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which
is so far Knowledge: and if they have Names for those <Ideas> which
they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the Truth 10
of those Propositions, which express that Agreement, or Disagree-
ment, they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of
those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see; and what
he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.
#S 03#. Thus he that has got the <Ideas> of Numbers, and hath taken 15
the Pains to compare <One, Two>, and <Three>, to <Six>, cannot chuse but
know that they are equal: He that hath got the <Idea> of a Triangle,
and found the ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is
certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones. And can as
little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that <it is impossible for the same> 20
<to be, and not to be>.
He also that hath the <Idea> of an intelligent, but frail and weak
Being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipo-
tent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that Man is to
honour, fear, and obey GOD, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. 25
For if he hath but the <Ideas> of two such Beings in his mind, and will
turn his Thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly
find that the Inferior, Finite, and Dependent, is under an Obligation
to obey the Supreme and Infinite, as he is certain to find, that <Three>,
<Four>, and <Seven>, are less than <Fifteen>, if he will consider, and compute 30
those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun
is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that way. But
yet these Truths, being never so certain, never so clear, he may be
ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the Pains to
employ his Faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them.  35

#P 652#
#C 14#                 CHAPTER XIV


                        <Of Judgment>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. THE Understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely
for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be
at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the
Certainty of true <Knowledge>. For that being very short and scanty,
as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in 5   
most of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing
to guide him in the absence of clear and certain Knowledge. He
that will not eat, till he has Demonstration that it will nourish
him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the Business he
goes about will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still and 10  
perish.
#S 02#. Therefore as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as
he has given us some certain Knowledge, though limited to a few
Things in comparison, probably, as a Taste of what intellectual
Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour 15  
after a better State: So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he
has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of <Probability>,
suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationer-
ship, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to check our
over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day's Experi-
ence be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to
Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to
spend the days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in
the search, and following of that way, which might lead us to a
State of greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, even 25  
were Revelation silent in the Case, That as Men employ those
Talents, God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive
their Rewards at the close of the day, when their Sun shall set, and
Night shall put an end to their Labours.



                                                                #P 653#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 03#. The Faculty, which God has given Man to supply the want
of clear and certain Knowledge in Cases where that cannot be had,
is <Judgment>: whereby the Mind takes its <Ideas> to agree, or disagree;
or which is the same, any Proposition to be true, or false, without
perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind 5
sometimes exercises this <Judgment> out of necessity, where demon-
strative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and
sometimes out of Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where
demonstrative and certain Proofs are to be had. Men often stay not
warily to examine the Agreement or Disagreement of two <Ideas>, 10
which they are desirous, or concerned to know; but either in-
capable of such Attention, as is requisite in a long Train of Grada-
tions, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their Eyes on, or wholly
pass by the Proofs; and so without making out the Demonstration,
determine of the Agreement or Disagreement of two <Ideas>, as it 15
were by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to
be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such
a loose survey. This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exercised
immediately about Things, is called <Judgment>; when about Truths
delivered in Words, is most commonly called <Assent> or <Dissent>: 20
which being the most usual way, wherein the Mind has occasion to
employ this Faculty, I shall under these Terms treat of it, as least
liable in our Language to Equivocation.
#S 04#. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, conversant about Truth
and Falshood.                                                      25
<First, Knowledge>, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly
satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any <Ideas>.
<Secondly, Judgment>, which is the putting <Ideas> together, or
separating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain
Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but <presumed> to be so; 30
which is, as the Word imports, taken to be so before it certainly
appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in Reality Things
are, it is <right Judgment>.

#P 654#
#C 15#                        CHAPTER XV

                           <Of Probability>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. As Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or Disagree-
ment of two <Ideas>, by the intervention of one or more Proofs,
which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with
another: so <Probability> is nothing but the appearance of such an
Agreement, or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose 5  
connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not per-
ceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is
enough to induce the Mind to <judge> the Proposition to be true, or
false, rather than the contrary. For example: In the demonstration
of it, a Man perceives the certain immutable connexion there is of 10 
Equality, between the three Angles of a <Triangle>, and those inter-
mediate ones, which are made use of to shew their Equality to two
right ones: and so by an intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement, or
Disagreement of the intermediate <Ideas> in each step of the progress,
the whole Series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shews 15 
the Agreement, or Disagreement, of those three Angles, in equality
to two right ones: And thus he has certain Knowledge that it is so.
But another Man who never took the pains to observe the Demon-
stration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of credit, affirm the three
Angles of a Triangle, to be equal to two right ones, <assents> to it; <i.e.> 20 
receives it for true. In which case, the foundation of his Assent is the
Probability of the thing, the Proof being such, as for the most part
carries Truth with it: The Man, on whose Testimony he receives
it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or besides his
Knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that that which 25 
causes his Assent to this Proposition, that the three Angles of a
Triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take
these <Ideas> to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted
Veracity of the Speaker in other cases, or his supposed Veracity
in this. 30 
#S 02#. Our Knowledge, as has been shewn, being very narrow, and
we not happy enough to find certain Truth in every thing which we
                                                                #P 655#
                                                                #L 1#
have occasion to consider; most of the Propositions we think, reason,
discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted
Knowledge of their Truth: yet some of them border so near upon
Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but <assent> to
them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as if 5
they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them
was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the
very neighbourhood of Certainty and Demonstration, quite down
to Improbability and Unlikeliness, even to the Confines of Impossi-
bility; and also degrees of <Assent> from full <Assurance> and Confidence, 10
quite down to <Conjecture, Doubt>, and <Distrust>. I shall come now,
having, as I think, found out the bounds of humane Knowledge and
Certainty,) in the next place to consider <the several degrees and grounds>
<of Probability, and Assent or Faith>.
#S 03#. <Probability> is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the 15
Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments
or Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment
the Mind gives this sort of Propositions, is called <Belief, Assent>, or
<Opinion>, which is the admitting or receiving any Proposition for
true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to perswade us to 20
receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is so. And
herein lies the <difference between Probability> and <Certainty, Faith> and
<Knowledge>, that in all the parts of Knowledge, there is intuition; each
immediate <Idea>, each step has its visible and certain connexion; in
belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous 25
to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides
to, and so not manifestly shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement
of those <Ideas>, that are under consideration.
#S 04#. <Probability> then, being to supply the defect of our Knowledge,
and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about Propo- 
sitions, whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to
#P 656#
#L 1#
receive them for true. The <grounds of it> are, in short, these <two>
following:
      <First>, The conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge,
Observation, and Experience.
<Secondly>, The Testimony of others, vouching their Observation 5     
and Experience. In the Testimony of others, is to be considered,
1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses.   
4. The Design of the Author, where it is a Testimony out of a
Book cited. 5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of
the Relation. 6. Contrary Testimonies. 10 
#S 05#. Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence, which infallibly
determines the Understanding, and produces certain Knowledge,
<the Mind if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of>
<Probability>, and see how they make more or less, for <or against> any
probable Proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it, and 15 
upon a due ballancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or
less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater
grounds of Probability on one side or the other. For example.:
      If I my self see a Man walk on the Ice, it is past <Probability>, 'tis
Knowledge: but if another tells me he saw a Man in <England> in the 20 
midst of a sharp Winter, walk upon Water harden'd with cold; this
has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen,
that I am disposed by the nature of the thing it self to assent to it,
unless some manifest suspicion attend the Relation of that matter
of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the 25 
Tropicks, who never saw nor heard of any such Thing before,
there the whole Probability relies on Testimony:  And as the
Relators are more in number, and of more Credit, and have no
Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that matter of Fact
is like to find more or less belief. Though to a Man, whose 30 
Experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard
of any thing like it, the most untainted Credit of a Witness will
scarce be able to find belief. And as it happened to a <Dutch> Ambassa-

                                                                #P 657#
                                                                #L 1#
dor, who entertaining the King of <Siam> with the particularities of
<Holland>, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told
him, that the Water in his Country, would sometimes, in cold
weather, be so hard, that Men walked upon it, and that it would
bear an Elephant, if he were there. To which the King replied, 5
<Hitherto I have believed the strange Things you have told me, because I look>
<upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am sure you lye>.
#S 06#. Upon these grounds depends the <Probability> of any Proposi-
tion: And as the conformity of our Knowledge, as the certainty of
Observations, as the frequency and constancy of Experience, and 10
the number and credibility of Testimonies, do more or less agree,
or disagree with it, so is any Proposition in itself, more or less
probable. There is another, I confess, which though by it self it be
no true ground of <Probability>, yet is often made use of for one, by
which Men most commonly regulate their Assent, and upon which 15
they pin their Faith more than any thing else, and, that is, <the>
<Opinion of others>; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to
rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more
Falshood and Errour amongst Men, than Truth and Knowledge.
And if the Opinions and Perswasions of others, whom we know 20
and think well of, be a ground of Assent, Men have Reason to be
Heathens in <Japan>, Mahumetans in <Turkey>, Papists in <Spain>, Pro-
testants in <England>, and Lutherans in <Sueden>. But of this wrong
ground of Assent, I shall have occasion to speak more at large in
another place.                                                      25


#C 16#                       CHAPTER XVI

                      <Of the Degrees of Assent>.

#S 01#. THE grounds of Probability, we have laid down in the fore-
going Chapter, as they are the Foundations on which our <Assent> is
built; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are,
or ought to be <regulated>: only we are to take notice, that whatever
grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on 30
the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge
#P 658#
#L 1#
right, than they appear; at least in the first Judgment or Search that
the Mind makes. I confess, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly
stick to, in the World, their <Assent> is not always from an actual view
of the Reasons that it first prevailed with them: It being in many
cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who 5  
have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon
a due examination, made them embrace that side, of the Question.
It suffices, that they have once with care and fairness, sifted the
Matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the
Particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the Ques-  
tion; and with the best of their Skill, cast up the account upon the
whole Evidence: and thus having once found on which side the Prob-
ability appeared to them, after as full and exact an enquiry as they
can make, they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories, as a Truth
they have discovered; and for the future, they remain satisfied with 15 
the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by
the Proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a <degree> of their
<Assent> as they afford it.
#S 02#. This is all that the greatest part of Men are capable of doing,
in regulating their <Opinions> and Judgments; unless a Man will exact 20 
of them, either to retain distinctly in their Memories all the Proofs
concerning any probable Truth, and that too in the same order, and
regular deduction of Consequences, in which they have formerly
placed or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large
Volume upon one single (Question: Or else they must require a Man, 25 
for every Opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the
Proofs: both which are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore, that
the Memory be relied on in the case, and that Men <be perswaded of >
<several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts>; nay,
which perhaps they are not able actually to re-call. Without this, 30 
the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks, or change
every Moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately
studied the Question, offers them Arguments; which for want of
Memory, they are not able presently to answer.
#S 03#. I cannot but own, that Men's <sticking to> their <past Judgment>, 35   
and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made, is  often the
                                                                #P 659#
                                                                #L 1#
cause of great obstinacy in Errour and Mistake. But the fault is not
that they rely on their Memories, for what they have before well
judged; but because they judged before they had well examined.
May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of
Men, that think they have formed right Judgments of several 5
matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never
thought otherwise? That imagine themselves to have judged right,
only because they never questioned, never examined their own
Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they
never judged at all: And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions 10
with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce
and firm in their Tenets, who have least examined them. What we
once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there
are no latent Proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our Know-
ledge, or bring it in doubt. But in matters of Probability, 'tis not in 15
every case we can be sure, that we have all the Particulars before us,
that any way concern the Question; and that there is no evidence
behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the Probability on the
other side, and out-weigh all, that at present seems to preponderate
with us. Who almost is there, that hath the leisure, patience, and 20
means, to collect together all the Proofs concerning most of the
Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude, that he hath a clear and
full view; and that there is no more to be alledged for his better
information? And yet we are forced to determine our selves on the
one side or other. The conduct of our Lives, and the management 25
of our great Concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the
most part, on the determination of our Judgment in points, wherein
we are not capable of certain and demonstrative Knowledge, and
wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side, or the other.
#S 04#. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of Men, 30
if not all, to have several <Opinions>, without certain and indubitable
Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an imputation of
ignorance, lightness, or folly, for Men to quit and renounce their
former Tenets, presently upon the offer of an Argument, which they
cannot immediately answer, and shew the insufficiency of: It 35
would, methinks, become all Men to maintain <Peace>, and the com-
mon Offices of Humanity, <and Friendship, in the diversity of Opinions>,
#P 660#
#L 1#
since we cannot reasonably expect, that any one should readily and
obsequiously quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours with a blind
resignation to an Authority, which the Understanding of Man
acknowledges not. For however it may often mistake, it can own
no other Guide but Reason, nor blindly submit to the Will and 5  
Dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your Sentiments,
be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave,
at his leisure, to go over the account again, and re-calling what is
out of his Mind, examine all the Particulars, to see on which side the
advantage lies: And if he will not think our Arguments of weight 10 
enough to engage him anew in so much pains, 'tis but what we do
often our selves in the like case; and we should take it amiss, if
others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if
he be one who takes his Opinions upon trust, How can we imagine
that he should renounce those Tenets, which Time and Custom 15 
have so settled in his Mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and
of an unquestionable Certainty; or which he takes to be impressions
he has received from GOD Himself, or from Men sent by Him? How
can we expect, I say, that Opinions thus settled, should be given
up to the Arguments or Authority of a Stranger, or Adversary,; 20 
especially if there be any suspicion of Interest, or Design, as there
never fails to be, where Men find themselves ill treated? We should
do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to
remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of Information; and not
instantly treat others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they 25 
will not renounce their own, and receive our Opinions, or at least
those we would force upon them, when 'tis more than probable,
that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For
where is the Man, that has uncontestable Evidence of the Truth of
all that he holds, or of the Falshood of all he condemns; or can say, 30 
that he has examined, to the bottom, all his own, or other Men's
Opinions? The necessity of believing, without Knowledge, nay,
often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of Action and
Blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform
our selves, than constrain others. At least those, who have not 35 
throughly examined to the bottom all their own Tenets, must
confess, they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable
in imposing that as a Truth on other Men's Belief, which they them-
selves have not searched into, nor weighed the Arguments of
                                 #P 661#
                                 #L 1#
Probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who
have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all
the Doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would have a
juster pretence to require others to follow them: But these are so
few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their 5
Opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected
from them: And there is reason to think, that if Men were better
instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.
#S 05#. But to return to the grounds of Assent, and the several degrees
of it, we are to take notice, that the Propositions we receive upon 10
Inducements of <Probability>, are <of two sorts>; either concerning some
particular Existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact,
which falling under Observation, is capable of humane Testimony,
or else concerning Things, which being beyond the discovery of
our Senses, are not capable of any such Testimony.                 15
#S 06#. Concerning the <first> of these, <viz. particular matter of fact>,
<First>, Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant
Observation of our selves and others, in the like case, comes attested
by the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as
easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge; 20
and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were
perfect demonstration. Thus, if all <English->men, who have occasion
to mention it, should affirm, that it froze in <England> the last Winter,
or that there were Swallows seen there in the Summer, I think a Man
could almost as little doubt of it, as that Seven and Four are Eleven. 25
The first therefore, and <highest degree of Probability>, is, when the
general consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known,
concurrs with a Man's constant and never-failing Experience in
like cases, to confirm the Truth of any particular matter of fact
attested by fair Witnesses: such are all the stated Constitutions and 30
Properties of Bodies, and the regular proceedings of Causes and
Effects in the ordinary course of Nature. This we call an Argument
from the nature of Things themselves. For what our own and other
Men's constant Observation has found always to be after the same
manner, that we with reason conclude to be the Effects of steady 35
and regular Causes, though they come not within the reach of our
#P 662#
#L 1#
Knowledge. Thus, That Fire warmed a Man, made Lead fluid, and
changed the colour or consistency in Wood or Charcoal: that Iron
sunk in Water, and swam in Quicksilver: These and the like
Propositions about particular facts, being agreeable to our constant
Experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being 5  
generally spoke of, (when mentioned by others,) as things found
constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by
any body, we are put past doubt, that a relation affirming any such
thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in
the same manner, is very true. These <Probabilities> rise so near to 10 
<Certainty>, that they govern our Thoughts as absolutely, and influence
all our Actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration: and in
what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and
certain Knowledge: our Belief thus grounded, rises to <Assurance>.
#S 07#. <Secondly, The next degree of Probability> is, when I find by my 15   
own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a
thing to be, for the most part, so; and that the particular instance
of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses: <v.g.> History
giving us such an account of Men in all Ages; and my own Ex-
perience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, 20 
that most Men preferr their private Advantage, to the publick. If
all Historians that write of <Tiberius>, say that <Tiberius> did so, it is
extremely probable. And in this case, our Assent has a sufficient
foundation to raise it self to a degree, which we may call <Confidence>.
#S 08#. <Thirdly>, In things that happen indifferently, as that a Bird 25    
should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a Man's right
or left Hand, <etc.> when any particular matter of fact is vouched by
the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there our
Assent is also unavoidable. Thus: That there is such a City in
<Italy> as <Rome>: That about 1700 years ago, there lived in it a Man, 30 
called <Julius Caesar>; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel
against another called <Pompey>. This, though in the nature of the
thing, there be nothing for, nor against it, yet, being related by
Historians of credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man
cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of 35 
                                 #P 663#
                                 #L 1#
the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself
is a Witness.
#S 09#. Thus far the matter goes easie enough. Probability upon such
grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally deter-
mines the Judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or 5
disbelieve, as a Demonstration does, whether we will know, or be
ignorant. The difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common
Experience, and the reports of History and Witnesses clash with the
ordinary course of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where
Diligence, Attention, and Exactness is required, to form a right 10
Judgment, and to proportion the <Assent> to the different Evidence
and Probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as
those two foundations of Credibility, <viz.> Common Observation
in like cases, and particular Testimonies in that particular instance,
favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of 15
contrary Observations, Circumstances, Reports, different Qualifi-
cations, Tempers, Designs, Over-sights, <etc.> of the Reporters,
that 'tis impossible to reduce to precise Rules, the various
degrees wherein Men give their Assent. This only may be said in
general, That as the Arguments and Proofs, <pro> and <con>, upon due 20
Examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumstance, shall
to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less
degree, to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce
in the Mind such different Entertainment, as we call <Belief, Con->
<jecture  Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief> etc.               25
#S 10#. This is what concerns Assent in matters wherein Testimony
is made use of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to
take notice of a Rule observed in the Law of <England>; which is, That
though the attested Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the Copy
of a Copy never so well attested, and by never so credible Witnesses, 30
will not be admitted as a proof in Judicature. This is so generally
approved as reasonable, and suited to the Wisdom and Caution
to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths, that I never yet
heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in
the Decisions of Right and Wrong, carries this Observation along 35
with it, <viz.> That any Testimony, the farther off it is from the
#P 664#
#L 1#
original Truth, the less force and proof it has. The Being and
Existence of the thing it self, is what I call the original Truth. A
credible Man vouching his Knowledge of it, is a good proof: But if
another equally credible, do witness it from his Report, the Testi--
mony is weaker; and a third that attests the Hear-say of an Hear-   
say, is yet less considerable. So that <in traditional Truths, each remove>
<weakens the force of the proof>: And the more hands the Tradition has
successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it
receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of:
Because I find amongst some Men, the quite contrary commonly 10 
practised, who look on Opinions to gain force by growing older; and
what a thousand years since would not, to a rational Man, contem-
porary with the first Voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now
urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have
since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground Propo-  
sitions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning,
come by an inverted Rule of Probability, to pass for authentick
Truths; and those which found or deserved little credit from the
Mouths of their first Authors, are thought to grow venerable by
Age, and are urged as undeniable. 20 
#S 11#. I would not be thought here to lessen the Credit and use of
<History>: 'tis all the light we have in many cases; and we receive
from it a great part of the useful Truths we have, with a convincing
evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of
Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But 25 
this, Truth it self forces me to say, That no <Probability> can arise
higher than its first Original. What has no other Evidence than the
single Testimony of one only Witness, must stand or fall by his only
Testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited
afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from 30 
receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion,
Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd
Reasons, or Caprichio's, Men's Minds are acted by, (impossible to
be discovered,) may make one Man quote another Man's Words or
Meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the Cita-  
tions of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations
deserve, where the Originals are wanting; and consequently how
                                                                #P 665#
                                                                #L 1#
much less Quotations of Quotations can be relied on. This is certain,
that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never
after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated.
But the farther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and
has always less force in the mouth, or writing of him that last made 5
use of it, that in his from whom he received it.
#S 12#. The Probabilities we have hitherto mentioned, are only such
as concern matter of fact, and such Things as are capable of Obser-
vation and Testimony. There remains that other sort <concerning>
which, Men entertain Opinions with variety of Assent, though the 10
<Things> be such, that falling <not under the reach of our Senses, they are not>
<capable of Testimony>. Such are, 1. The Existence, Nature, and Opera-
tions of finite immaterial Beings without us; as Spirits, Angels,
Devils, <etc.> Or the Existence of material Beings; which either for
their smallness in themselves, or remoteness from us, our Senses 15
cannot take notice of, as whether there be any Plants, Animals, and
intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, and other Mansions of the
vast Universe. 2. Concerning the manner of Operation in most
parts of the Works of Nature: wherein though we see the sensible
effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways 20
and manner how they are produced. We see Animals are generated,
nourished, and move; the Load-stone draws Iron; and the parts of a
Candle successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light
and heat. These and the like Effects we see and know: but the causes
that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only 25
guess, and probably conjecture. For these and the like coming not
within the scrutiny of humane Senses, cannot be examined by
them, or be attested by any body, and therefore can appear more
or less probable, only as they more or less agree to Truths that are
established in our Minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts 30
of our Knowledge and Observation. <Analogy> in these matters is the
only help we have, and 'tis from that alone we draw all our grounds
of Probability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies
violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire it
self, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, 35
#P 666#
#L 1#
consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of
the burning matter: Observing likewise that the different refrac-
tions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different appear-
ances of several Colours; and also that the different ranging and lay-
ing the superficial parts of several Bodies, as of Velvet, watered Silk, 5  
<etc.> does the like, we think it probable that the Colour and shining
of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arangement and
Refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus finding in all
parts of the Creation, that fall under humane Observation, that
there is a gradual connexion of one with another, without any great 10 
or discernable gaps between, in all that great variety of Things we
see in the World, which are so closely linked together, that, in the
several ranks of Beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds be-
twixt them, we have reason to be perswaded, that by such gentle
steps Things ascend upwards in degrees of Perfection. 'Tis an hard 15 
Matter to say where Sensible and Rational begin, and where In-
sensible and Irrational end: and who is there quick-sighted enough
to determine precisely, which is the lowest Species of living Things,
and which the first of those which have no Life? Things, as far as we
can observe, lessen, and augment, as the quantity does in a regular 20 
Cone, where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness
of the Diameter at remote distance: yet the difference between the
upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discern-
able. The difference is exceeding great between some Men, and
some Animals: But if we will compare the Understanding and 25 
Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little dif-
ference, that 'twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either
clearer or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents
downwards in those parts of the Creation, that are beneath Man,
the rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in 30 
Things above us, and our Observation; and that there are several
ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several degrees of Per-
fection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the
Creator, by gentle steps and differences, that are every one at no
great distance from the next to it. This sort of Probability, which is 35 
the best conduct of rational Experiments, and the rise of Hypothesis,
has also its Use and Influence; and a wary Reasoning from Analogy
                                                                #P 667#
                                                                #L 1#
leads us often into the discovery of Truths, and useful Productions,
which would otherwise lie concealed.
#S 13#. Though the common Experience, and the ordinary Course
of Things have justly a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to
make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their 5
Belief; yet there is one Case, wherein the strangeness of the Fact
lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. For where
such supernatural Events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him, who
has the Power to change the course of Nature, there, under such
Circumstances, they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how 10
much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observa-
tion. This is the proper Case of <Miracles>, which well attested, do
not only find Credit themselves; but give it also to other Truths,
which need such Confirmation.
#S 14#. Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort 15
of Propositions that challenge the highest Degree of our Assent,
upon bare Testimony, whether the thing proposed, agree or dis-
agree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of Things,
or no. The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an
one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God himself.  20
This carries with it Assurance beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond
Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, <Revelation>, and our
Assent to it, <Faith>: which as absolutely determines our Minds, and
as perfectly excludes all wavering as our Knowledge it self, and we
may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any 25
Revelation from GOD be true. So that Faith is a setled and sure
Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room
for Doubt or Hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a divine
Revelation, and that we understand it right: else we shall expose
our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the Error of 30
wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not
divine Revelation. And therefore in those Cases, our Assent can be
rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and
that this is the meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in. If the
Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this its true Sense be 35
#P 668#
#L 1#
only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an
Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more, or less apparent
Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought
to have before other Arguments of Perswasion, I shall speak more
hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradis-   
tinction to Reason; though in Truth, it be nothing else but an
Assent founded on the highest Reason.



#C 17#                       CHAPTER XVII

                              <Of Reason>.

#S 01#. <THE Word Reason> in the <English> Language <has different Significa->
<tions>: sometimes it is taken for true, and clear Principles: Sometimes
for clear, and fair deductions from those Principles: and sometimes 10 
for the Cause, and particularly the final Cause. But the Considera-
tion I shall have of it here, is in a Signification different from all
these; and that is, as it stands for a Faculty in Man, That Faculty,
whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and
wherein it is evident he much surpasses them. 15 
#S 02#. If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Per-
ception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own <Ideas>; and
the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us (except
only of a GOD whose existence every Man may certainly know and
demonstrate to himself from his own existence) be had only by our 20 
Senses; What room then is there for the Exercise of any other
Faculty, but outward Sense and inward Perception? What need is
there of Reason? Very much; both for the enlargement of our Know-
ledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do, both in Know-
ledge and Opinion, and is necessary, and assisting to all our other 25 
intellectual Faculties, and indeed contains two of them, <viz.>
<Sagacity and Illation>. By the one, it finds out, and by the other, it so
orders the intermediate <Ideas>, as to discover what connexion there is
in each link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together;
and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth sought for, 30 

#P 669#
#L 1#
which is that we call <Illation> or <Inference>, and consists in nothing but
the Perception of the connexion there is between the <Ideas>, in each
step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the
certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two <Ideas>, as in Demon-
stration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable con- 
nexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion.
Sense and Intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part
of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate
<Ideas>: And in those Cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent
instead of Knowledge, and take Propositions for true, without being 10
certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare
the grounds of their Probability. In both these Cases, the Faculty
which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover
Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we
call Reason. For as Reason perceives the necessary, and indubitable 15
connexion of all the <Ideas> or Proofs one to another, in each step of any
Demonstration that produces Knowledge: so it likewise perceives the
probable connexion of all the <Ideas> or Proofs one to another, in every
step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due. This is the
lowest degree of that, which can be truly called Reason. For where 20
the Mind does not perceive this probable connexion; where it does
not discern, whether there be any such connexion, or no, there
Men's Opinions are not the product of Judgment, or the Con-
sequence of Reason; but the effects of Chance and Hazard, of a
Mind floating at all Adventures, without choice, and without 25
direction.
#S 03#. So that we may in <Reason> consider these <four Degrees>; the first
and highest, is the discovering, and finding out of Proofs; the second,
the regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in
a clear and fit Order, to make their Connexion and Force be plainly 30
and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their Connexion;
and the fourth, the making a right conclusion. These several degrees
may be observed in any mathematical Demonstration: it being one
thing to perceive the connexion of each part, as the Demonstration
is made by another; another to perceive the dependence of the con- 
clusion on all the parts; a third to make out a Demonstration clearly
and neatly ones self, and something different from all these, to
#P 670#
#L 1#
have first found out those intermediate <Ideas> or Proofs by which it
is made.
#S 04#. There is one thing more, which I shall desire to be considered
concerning Reason; and that is, whether <Syllogism>, as is generally
thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of 5  
exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these.
      <First>, Because Syllogism serves our Reason, but in one only of the
forementioned parts of it; and that is, to shew the connexion of the
Proofs in any one instance, and no more: but in this, it is of no great
use, since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is, 10 
as easily, nay, perhaps, better without it.
      If we will observe the Actings of our own Minds, we shall find,
that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the con-
nexion of the Proofs, without reducing our Thoughts to any Rule of
Syllogism. And therefore we may take notice, that there are many 15 
Men that Reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how
to make a Syllogism. He that will look into many parts of <Asia> and
<America>, will find Men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself,
who yet never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argu-
ment to those Forms: and I believe scarce any one ever makes Syllo- 20 
gisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed Syllogism is made use of
on occasion to discover a Fallacy hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or
cunningly wrapp'd up in a smooth Period; and stripping an Absurd-
ity of the Cover of Wit, and good Language, shew it in its naked
Deformity. But the weakness or fallacy of such a loose Discourse 25 
it shews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to those who have
throughly studied <Mode and Figure>, and have so examined the many
Ways, that three Propositions may be put together, as to know
which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and
upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far con- 
sidered <Syllogism>, as to see the Reason, why, in three Propositions
laid together in one Form, the Conclusion will be certainly right,
but in another, not certainly so, I grant are certain of the Conclusion
they draw from the Premisses in the allowed <Modes> and <Figures>: But
they who have not so far looked into those Forms, are not sure by 35 
                                                                #P 671#
                                                                #L 1#
Virtue of Syllogism, that the Conclusion certainly follows from
the Premisses; They only take it to be so by an implicit Faith in
their Teachers, and a Confidence in those Forms of Argumentation;
but this is still but believing, not being certain. Now if of all Man-
kind, those who can make Syllogisms are extremely few in compari-
son of those who cannot, and if of those few who have been taught
Logick, there is but a very small Number, who do any more than
believe that Syllogisms in the allowed <Modes> and <Figures> do con-
clude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; If Syllo-
gisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and 10
means of Knowledge, it will follow, that before <Aristotle> there was
not one Man that did or could know any thing by Reason; and
that since the invention of Syllogisms, there is not one of Ten
Thousand that doth.
But God has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely 15
two-legged Creatures, and left it to <Aristotle> to make them Rational,
<i.e.> those few of them that he could get so to examine the Grounds
of Syllogisms, as to see, that in above threescore ways, that three
Propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen
wherein one may be sure that the Conclusion is right, and upon 20
what ground it is, that in these few the Conclusion is certain, and
in the other not. God has been more bountiful to Mankind than so.
He has given them a Mind that can reason without being instructed
in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding is not taught to
reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the 25
Coherence, or Incoherence of its <Ideas>, and can range them right,
without any such perplexing Repetitions. I say not this any way to
lessen <Aristotle>, whom I look on as one of the greatest Men amongst
the Antients; whose large Views, acuteness and penetration of
Thought, and strength of Judgment, few have equalled: And who 30
in this very invention of Forms of Argumentation, wherein the
Conclusion may be shewn to be rightly inferred, did great service
against those, who were not ashamed to deny any thing. And I
readily own, that all right reasoning may be reduced to his Forms
of Syllogism. But yet I think without any diminution to him I may 35
truly say, that they are not the only, nor the best way of reasoning,
for the leading of those into Truth who are willing to find it, and
desire to make the best use they may of their Reason, for the
#P 672#
#L 1#
attainment of Knowledge. And he himself it is plain, found out some
Forms to be conclusive, and others not, not by the Forms them-
selves but by the original way of Knowledge, <i.e.> by the visible agree-
ment of <Ideas>. Tell a Country Gentlewoman, that the Wind is
South-West, and the Weather louring, and like to rain, and she will 5  
easily understand, 'tis not safe for her to go abroad thin clad, in
such a day, after a Fever: she clearly sees the probable Connexion
of all these, <viz.> South-West-Wind, and Clouds, Rain, wetting,
taking Cold, Relapse, and danger of Death, without tying them
together in those artificial and cumbersome Fetters of several 10 
Syllogisms, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds from
one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the
Probability which she easily perceives in Things thus in their
native State, would be quite lost, if this Argument were managed
learnedly, and proposed in Mode and Figure. For it very often 15 
confounds the connexion: and, I think, every one will perceive in
mathematical Demonstrations, that the Knowledge gained thereby,
comes shortest and clearest without Syllogism.
      Inference is looked on as the great Act of the Rational Faculty,
and so it is when it is rightly made; But the Mind, either very 20 
desirous to inlarge its Knowledge, or very apt to favour the Senti-
ments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make Inferences, and
therefore often makes too much hast, before it perceives the con-
nexion of the <Ideas> that must hold the Extremes together.
To infer is nothing but by virtue of one Proposition laid down as 25  
true, to draw in another as true, <i.e.> to see or suppose such a con-
nexion of the two <Ideas>, of the inferr'd Proposition. <v.g.> Let this be
the Proposition laid down, <Men shall be punished in another World>, and
from thence be inferred this other, <then Men can determine themselves>.
The Question now is to know, whether the Mind has made this 30 
Inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the inter-
mediate <Ideas>, and taking a view of the connexion of them, placed in
a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right Inference.
If it has done it without such a View, it has not so much made an
Inference that will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as shewn 35 
a willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither Case
is it <Syllogism> that discovered those <Ideas>, or shewed the connexion
of them, for they must be both found out, and the connexion every
                                                                #P 673#
                                                                #L 1#
where perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in <Syllo->
<gism>: unless it can be said, that any <Idea> without considering what
connexion it hath with the two other, whose Agreement should be
shewn by it, will do well enough in a <Syllogism>, and may be taken at
a venture for <the Medius Terminus>, to prove any Conclusion. But 5
this no body will say, because it is by vertue of the perceived Agree-
ment of the intermediate <Idea> with the Extremes, that the Extremes
are concluded to agree, and therefore each intermediate <Idea> must
be such, as in the whole Chain hath a visible connexion with those
two it is placed between, or else thereby, the Conclusion cannot be 10
inferr'd or drawn in; for wherever any Link of the Chain is loose,
and without connexion, there the whole strength of it is lost, and it
hath no force to infer or draw in any thing. In the instance above
mentioned, what is it shews the force of the Inference, and conse-
quently the reasonableness of it, but a view of the connexion of all 15
the intermediate <Ideas> that draw in the Conclusion, or Proposition
inferr'd.  <v.g.  Men shall be punished,------ God the punisher,----- just>
<Punishment,------ the Punished guilty ------ could have done otherwise ------>
<Freedom ------ self-determination>, by which Chain of <Ideas> thus visibly
link'd together in train, <i.e.> each intermediate <Idea> agreeing on each 20
side with those two it is immediately placed between, the <Ideas>
of Men and self-determination appear to be connected, <i.e.> this
Proposition <Men can determine themselves> is drawn in, or inferr'd from
this <that they shall be punished in the other World>. For here the Mind
seeing the connexion there is between the <Idea of Men's Punishment> 25
<in the other World>, and the <Idea of God punishing>, between <God punish->
<ing>, and <the Justice of the Punishment>; between <Justice of Punishment>
and <Guilt>, between <Guilt> and a <Power to do otherwise>, between a
<Power to do otherwise> and <Freedom>, and between <Freedom> and <self->
<determination>, sees the connexion between <Men>, and <self-determina-> 30
<tion>.
Now I ask whether the connexion of the Extremes be not more
clearly seen in this simple and natural Disposition, than in the
perplexed Repetitions, and jumble of five or six <Syllogisms>. I must
beg Pardon for calling it Jumble, till some Body shall put these <Ideas> 35
into so many <Syllogisms>, and then say, that they are less jumbled, and
their connexion more visible, when they are transposed and repeated,
and spun out to a greater length in artificial Forms; than in that
#P 674#
#L 1#
short natural plain order, they are laid down in here, wherein every
one may see it; and wherein they must be seen, before they can be
put into a Train of <Syllogisms>. For the natural order of the connect-
ing <Ideas> must direct the order of the <Syllogisms>, and a Man must see
the connexion of each intermediate <Idea> with those that it connects, 5  
before he can with Reason make use of it in a <Syllogism>. And when
all those Syllogisms are made, neither those that are, nor those
that are not Logicians will see the force of the Argumentation, <i.e.>
the connexion of the Extremes one jot the better. [For those that are
not Men of Art, not knowing the true Forms <of Syllogism>, nor the 10 
Reasons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right and
conclusive <Modes> and <Figures> or no, and so are not at all helped by
the Forms they are put into, though by them the natural order,
wherein the Mind could judge of their respective connexion, being
disturb'd renders the illation much more incertain than without 15 
them.] And as for Logicians themselves they see the connexion of
each intermediate <Idea> with those it stands between (on which the
Force of the inference depends) as well before as after the <Syllogism>
is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a <Syllogism> neither shews
nor strengthens the connexion of any two <Ideas> immediately put 20 
together, but only by the connexion seen in them shews what
connexion the Extremes have one with another. But what con-
nexion the intermediate has with either of the Extremes in that
Syllogism, that no Syllogism does or can shew. That the Mind only
doth, or can perceive as they stand there in that <juxta-position> only 25 
by its own view, to which the Syllogistical Form it happens to be in,
gives no help or light at all; it only shews that if the intermediate
<Idea> agrees with those it is on both sides immediately applied to,
then those two remote ones, or as they are called <Extremes> do
certainly agree, and therefore the immediate connexion of each 30 
<Idea> to that which it is applyed to on each side, on which the force
of the reasoning depends, is as well seen before as after the <Syllogism>
is made, or else he that makes the Syllogism could never see it at all.
This as has been already observed, is seen only by the Eye or the
perceptive Faculty of the Mind, taking a view of them laid together, 35 
in <a juxta-position>, which view of any two it has equally, whenever
they are laid together in any Proposition, whether that Proposition
be placed as a <Major>, or a <Minor>, in a <Syllogism> or no.
                                                                #P 675#
                                                                #L 1#
Of what use then are <Syllogisms>? I answer, Their chief and main
use is in the Schools, where Men are allowed without Shame to deny
the Agreement of <Ideas>, that do manifestly agree; or out of the Schools
to those, who from thence have learned without shame to deny the
connexion of <Ideas>, which even to themselves is visible. But to an 5
ingenuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other aim, but to find
it, there is no need of any such Form, to force the allowing of the
Inference: the Truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in
ranging of the <Ideas> in a simple and plain order; And hence it is, that
Men in their own inquiries after Truth never use <Syllogisms> to con- 
vince themselves, (or in teaching others to instruct willing Learners).
Because, before they can put them into a <Syllogism> they must see the
connexion, that is between the intermediate <Idea>, and the two other
<Ideas> it is set between, and applied to, to shew their Agreement, and
when they see that, they see whether the inference be good or no, 15
and so <Syllogism> comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of
the former Instance; I ask whether the Mind considering the <Idea>
of Justice, placed as an intermediate <Idea> between the <punishment> of
Men, and the guilt of the punished, (and till it does so consider it,
the Mind cannot make use of it as a <medius terminus>) does not as 20
plainly see the force and strength of the Inference, as when it is
formed into Syllogism. To shew it in a very plain and easy Example;
let <Animal> be the intermediate <Idea> or <medius terminus> that the Mind
makes use of to shew the connexion <of Homo> and <vivens>: I ask whether
the Mind does not more readily and plainly see that connexion, in 25
the simple and proper Position of the connecting <Idea> in the middle;
thus,
                       <Homo---Animal---vivens>,
Than in this perplexed one,
                   <Animal---vivens---Homo---Animal>.
                                                                    30
Which is the Position these <Ideas> have in a Syllogism, to shew the
connexion between <Homo> and <vivens> by the intervention of <Animal>.
Indeed Syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, even to the
Lovers of Truth, to shew them the Fallacies, that are often con-
cealed in florid, witty, or involved Discourses. But that this is a
mistake will appear, if we consider, that the Reason why sometimes 35
Men, who sincerely aim at Truth, are imposed upon by such loose,
#P 676#
#L 1#
and as they are called Rhetorical Discourses, is that their Phancies
being struck with some lively metaphorical Representations, they
neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive what are the true <Ideas>,
upon which the Inference depends. Now to shew such Men the
weakness of such an Argumentation, there needs no more but to 5   
strip it of the superfluous <Ideas>, which blended and confounded with
those on which the Inference depends, seem to shew a connexion,
where there is none; or at least do hinder the discovery of the want
of it; and then to lay the naked <Ideas> on which the force of the Argu-
mentation depends, in their due order, in which Position the Mind 10  
taking a view of them, sees what connexion they have, and so is
able to judge of the Inference, without any need of a Syllogism at all.
      I grant that <Mode> and <Figure> is commonly made use of in such
Cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of such loose Dis-
courses, were wholly owing to the Syllogistical Form; and so I my 15  
self formerly thought, till upon a stricter Examination, I now find
that laying the intermediate <Ideas> naked in their due order, shews
the incoherence of the Argumentation better, than Syllogism; not
only as subjecting each Link of the Chain, to the immediate view
of the Mind in its proper place, whereby its connexion is best 20  
observed; But also because Syllogism shews the incoherence only to
those (who are not one of Ten Thousand) who perfectly understand
<Mode> and <Figure>, and the Reason upon which those Forms are
established; whereas a due and orderly placing of the <Ideas>, upon
which the Inference is made, makes every one both Logician or not 25  
Logician, who understands the Terms, and hath the Faculty to per-
ceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of such <Ideas> (without which,
in or out of Syllogism, he cannot perceive the strength or weakness,
coherence or incoherence of the Discourse) see the want of Con-
nexion in the Argumentation, and the absurdity of the Inference. 30  
      And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogism, who at
first hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of a
long artificial and plausible Discourse, wherewith others better
skill'd in Syllogism have been misled. And I believe there are few of
my Readers who do not know such. And indeed if it were not so, 35  
the Debates of most Princes Councels, and the Business of Assemblies
would be in danger to be mismanaged, since those who are relied
upon, and have usually a great stroke in them, are not always such,
who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the Forms of
                                                               #P 677#
                                                               #L 1#
<Syllogism>, or expert at <Mode> and <Figure>. And if Syllogism were the
only, or so much as the surest way to detect the Fallacies of artifi-
cial Discourses; I do not think that all Mankind, even Princes in
Matters that concern their Crowns and Dignities, are so much in
Love with Falshood and Mistake, that they would every where 5
have neglected to bring Syllogism into the debates of Moment; or
thought it ridiculous, so much as to offer them in affairs of Conse-
quence; a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Penetration
who were not idly to dispute at their Ease, but were to act accord-
ing to the result of their debates, and often pay for their mistakes 10
with their Heads or Fortunes, found those scholastique Forms
were of little use to discover Truth or Fallacy, whilst both the one
and the other might be shewn, and better shewn without them,
to those, who would not refuse to see, what was visibly shewn
them.                                                              15
<Secondly>, Another reason that makes me doubt whether Syllogism
be the only proper Instrument of Reason in the discovery of Truth,
is, that of whatever use <Mode> and <Figure> is pretended to be in the
laying open of Fallacy (which has been above consider'd) those
scholastique Forms of Discourse, are not less liable to Fallacies, 20
than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to
common observation, which has always found these artificial
Methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind,
that to instruct and inform the Understanding. And hence it is,
that Men even when they are bafled and silenced in this Scholastique 25
way, are seldom or never convinced, and so brought over to the
conquering side; they perhaps acknowledge their Adversary to
be the more skilful Disputant; but rest nevertheless perswaded of
the truth on their side; and go away, worsted as they are, with the
same Opinion they brought with them, which they could not do, 30
if this way of Argumentation carryed Light and Conviction with
it, and made Men see where the truth lay. And therefore Syllogism
has been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in dispute,
#P 678#
#L 1#
than for the Discovery or Confirmation of Truth, in fair Enquiries.
And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be couch'd in Syllogisms, as it
cannot be denied, it must be something else, and not Syllogism
that must discover them.
I have had Experience, how ready some Men are, when all the use 5     
which they have been wont to ascribe to any thing, is not allow'd,
to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such
unjust and groundless Imputations, I tell them, that I am not for
taking away any helps to the Understanding, in the attainment of
Knowledge. And if Men skill'd in, and used to Syllogisms, find 10  
them assisting to their Reason in the discovery of Truth, I think
they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is, that they should
not ascribe more to these Forms than belongs to them; And think
that Men have no use, or not so full a use of their reasoning Faculty
without them. Some Eyes want Spectacles to see things clearly and 15  
distinctly; but let not those that use them therefore say, no body
can see clearly without them: Those who do so, will be thought in
favour of Art (which perhaps they are beholding to) a little too
much to depress and discredit Nature. Reason by its own Penetra-
tion where it is strong, and exercised, usually sees, quicker and 20  
clearer without Syllogism. If use of those Spectacles has so dimmed
its Sight, that it cannot without them see consequences or in-
consequences in Argumentation, I am not so unreasonable as to be
against the using them. Every one knows what best fits his own
Sight. But let him not thence conclude all in the dark, who use not 25  
just the same Helps that he finds a need of.
#S 05#. But however it be in Knowledge, I think I may truly say, it
is of <far> less, or <no use> at all <in Probabilities>. For the Assent there, being
to be determined by the preponderancy, after a due weighing of all
the Proofs, with all Circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit 30  
to assist the Mind in that, as Syllogism; which running away with
one assumed Probability, or one topical Argument, pursues that
till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the thing under Con-
sideration; and forcing it upon some remote Difficulty, holds it
fast there, intangled perhaps, and as it were, manacled in the Chain 35  
of Syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording
                                                                #P 679#
                                                                #L 1#
it the Helps requisite to shew on which side, all Things considered,
is the greater Probability.
#S 06#. But let it help us (as, perhaps, may be said) in convincing
Men of their Errors and Mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the
Man, that was forced out of his Opinion by dint of <Syllogism>,) yet 5
still it <fails our Reason in> that part, which if not its highest Perfection,
is yet certainly its hardest Task, and that which we most need its
help in; and that is <the finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries>.
The Rules of <Syllogism> serve not to furnish the Mind with those
intermediate <Ideas>, that may shew the connexion of remote ones. 10
This way of reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of
marshalling, and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th.
Proposition of the First Book of <Euclid> is very true; but the dis-
covery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick.
A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So 15
that <Syllogism> comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or
no need of it. But 'tis chiefly by the finding out those <Ideas> that
shew the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of Knowledge is
increased, and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced. <Syllogism>,
at best, is but the Art of fencing with the little Knowledge we have, 20
without making any Addition to it. And if a Man should employ
his Reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise, than he,
who having got some Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, should
have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands
to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of <Spain> imployed 25
the Hands of his People, and his <Spanish> Iron so, he had brought to
Light but little of that Treasure, that lay so long hid in the dark
Entrails of <America>. And I am apt to think, that he who shall employ
all the force of his Reason only in brandishing of <Syllogisms>, will
discover very little of that Mass of Knowledge, which lies yet con- 
cealed in the secret recesses of Nature; and which I am apt to think,
native rustick Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a
way to, and add to the common stock of Mankind, rather than any
scholastick Proceeding by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure.
#S 07#. I doubt not nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to 35
assist our Reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious
#P 680#
#L 1#
#S 06#. speaks
thus: <If there might be added the right helps of true Art and Learning>,
<(which helps I must plainly confess, this Age of the World carrying the>
<Name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard,)>
<there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in Maturity of> 5  
<Judgment between Men therewith inured, and that which now Men are, as>
<between Men that are now, and Innocents>. I do not pretend to have found,
or discovered here any of those <right helps of Art>, this great Man of
deep Thought mentions: but this is plain, that <Syllogism>, and the
Logick now in Use, which were as well known in his days, can be 10 
none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse,
perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure as to me wholly new,
and unborrowed, I shall have given Occasion to others, to cast about
for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those
<right Helps of Art>, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who 15 
servilely confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others.
For beaten Tracts lead these sort of Cattel, (as an observing <Roman>
calls them,) whose Thoughts reach only to Imitation, <non quo>
<eundum est, sed quo itur>. But I can be bold to say, that this Age is
adorned with some Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Large-  
ness of Comprehension, that if they would employ their Thoughts
on this Subject, could open new and undiscovered Ways to the
Advancement of Knowledge.
#S 08#. Having here had an occasion to speak of <Syllogism> in general,
and the Use of it, in Reasoning, and the Improvement of our Know-  
ledge, 'tis fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one
manifest Mistake in the Rules of <Syllogism; viz.> That no Syllogistical
Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has, at least, one
general Proposition in it. As if we could not <reason>, and have Know-
ledge <about Particulars>. Whereas, in truth, the Matter rightly con-  
sidered, the immediate Object of all our Reasoning and Knowledge,
is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledge,
is only about the <Ideas> existing in his own Mind, which are truly,
every one of them, particular Existences: and our Knowledge and
Reasoning about other Things, is only as they correspond with those 35 
                                                                #P 681#
                                                                #L 1#
our particular <Ideas>. So that the Perception of the Agreement, or
Disagreement of our particular <Ideas>, is the whole and utmost of all
our Knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists
only in this, That the particular <Ideas>, about which it is, are such, as
more than one particular Thing can correspond with, and be rep- 
resented by. But the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagree-
ment of any two <Ideas>, and consequently, our Knowledge, is equally
clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those <Ideas>
be capable of representing more real Beings than one, or no. One
thing more I crave leave to offer about Syllogism, before I leave it, 10
<viz.> May one not upon just Ground enquire whether the Form
Syllogism now has, is that which in Reason it ought to have? For
the <Medius Terminus> being to joyn the Extremes, <i.e.> the intermediate
<Ideas> by its Intervention, to shew the Agreement or Disagreement
of the two in Question, would not the Position of the <Medius> 15
<Terminus> be more natural, and shew the Agreement or Disagree-
ment of the Extremes clearer and better, if it were placed in the
Middle between them? Which might be easily done by transposing
the Propositions, and making the <Medius Terminus> the predicate of
the First, and the Subject of the Second. As thus,                  20

             <Omnis Homo est Animal>,
             <Omne Animal est vivens>,
             <Ergo omnis Homo est vivens>.

             <Omne corpus est extensum et solidum>,
             <Nullum extensum et solidum est pura extensio>,          25
             <Ergo corpus non est pura extensio>.

I need not trouble my Reader with Instances in <Syllogisms>, whose
conclusions are particular. The same Reason holds for the same form
in them, as well as in the general.
#S 09#. <Reason>, Though it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and 30
Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us
through the vast Spaces, and large Rooms of this mighty Fabrick,
yet it comes far short of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and
there are many Instances wherein it <fails us>: As,
#P 682#
#L 1#
      <First>, It perfectly fails us, <where our> Ideas <fail>. It neither does, nor
can extend it self farther than they do. And therefore, where-ever
we have no <Ideas>, our Reasoning stops, and we are at an End of our
Reckoning: And if at any time we reason about Words, which do
not stand for any <Ideas>, 'tis only about those Sounds, and nothing else. 5  
#S 10#. <Secondly>, Our Reason is often puzled, and at a loss, <because of>
<the obscurity, Confusion, or Imperfection of the> Ideas <it is employed about>;
and there we are involved in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus,
not having any perfect <Idea> of the least Extension of Matter, nor of
Infinity, we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter; but having 10 
perfect, clear, and distinct <Ideas> of Number, our Reason meets with
none of those inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds it self
involved in any Contradictions about them. Thus, we having but
imperfect <Ideas> of the Operations of our Minds, and of the Beginning
of Motion or Thought how the Mind produces either of them in us, 15 
and much imperfecter yet, of the Operation of GOD, run into great
Difficulties about free created Agents, which Reason cannot well
extricate it self out of.
#S 11#. <Thirdly>, Our Reason is often at a stand, <because it perceives not>
<those> Ideas, <which could serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement, or> 20 
<Disagreement of any two other> Ideas: and in this, some Men's Faculties
far out-go others. Till <Algebra>, that great Instrument and Instance
of Humane Sagacity, was discovered, Men, with Amazement,
looked on several of the Demonstrations of ancient Mathematicians,
and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those Proofs 25 
to be something more than humane.
#S 12#. <Fourthly>, The Mind <by proceeding upon false Principles> is often
engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and
Contradictions, without knowing how to free it self: And in that
case it is in vain to implore the help of Reason, unless it be to 30 
discover the falshood, and reject the influence of those wrong
Principles. Reason is so far from clearing the Difficulties which the
                                                                #P 683#
#L 1#
building upon false foundations brings a Man into, that if he will
pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in
Perplexities.
#S 13#. <Fifthly>, As obscure and imperfect <Ideas> often involve our
Reason, so, upon the same Ground, do <dubious Words>, and uncertain 5
Signs, <often>, in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended
to, <puzzle Men's Reason>, and bring them to a <Non-plus>. But these two
latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet, the Con-
sequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the Perplexities, or
Errors, they fill Men's Minds with, are every where observable.    10
#S 14#. Some of the <Ideas> that are in the Mind, are so there, that they
can be, by themselves, immediately compared, one with another:
And in these, the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree or dis-
agree, as clearly, as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives,
that an Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it 15
does the <Idea> of a Circle: And this, therefore, as has been said, I call
<Intuitive Knowledge>; which is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no
Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all Humane
Certainty. In this consists the Evidence of all those <Maxims>, which
no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, 20
only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are pro-
posed to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to
these Truths, there is no Use of the discursive Faculty, <no need of>
<Reasoning>, but they are known by a superior, and higher Degree of
Evidence. And such, if I may guess at Things unknown, I am apt 25
to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made
perfect, shall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which
now, either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-
sighted Reason having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the Dark,
grope after.                                                        30
#S 15#. But though we have, here and there, a little of this clear
Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledge: yet the greatest part of
our <Ideas> are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement, or
Disagreement, by an immediate Comparing them. And in all these,
we have <Need of Reasoning>, and must, by Discourse and Inference, 35
#P 684#
#L 1#
make our Discoveries. Now of these, there are two sorts, which I
shall take the liberty to mention here again.
      <First>, Those whose Agreement, or Disagreement, though it
cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may
be examined by the Intervention of other <Ideas>, which can be com-   
pared with them. In this case when the Agreement, or Disagree-
ment of the intermediate <Idea>, on both sides with those which we
would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts to Demonstra-
tion, whereby Knowledge is produced, which though it be certain,
yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear, as <Intuitive Knowledge>. 10 
Because in that there is barely one simple Intuition, wherein there
is no room for any the least mistake or doubt: the Truth is seen all
perfectly at once. In demonstration, 'tis true, there is Intuition too,
but not altogether at once; for there must be a Remembrance of the
Intuition of the Agreement of the <Medium>, or intermediate <Idea>, 15 
with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the
other: and where there be many <Mediums>, there the danger of the
Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement, or Disagreement of
the <Ideas> must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train,
and retained in the Memory,just as it is, and the Mind must be sure 20 
that no part of what is necessary to make up the Demonstration is
omitted, or overlooked. This makes some Demonstrations long and
perplex'd, and too hard for those who have not strength of Parts
distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly
in their Heads. And even those, who are able to master such intri-  
cate Speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and
there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at
Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it
had of the Agreement of any <Idea> with another, and that with
a third, and that with a fourth, <etc.> there the Agreement of 30 
the first and the fourth is a Demonstration, and produces certain
Knowledge, which may be called <Rational Knowledge>, as the other
is <Intuitive>.
                                                                #P 685#
                                                                #L 1#
#S 16#. <Secondly>, There are other <Ideas>, whose Agreement, or Dis-
agreement, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention
of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes,
but an usual or likely one: And in these it is, that the <Judgment> is
properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any 5
<Ideas> do agree, by comparing them with such probable <Mediums>.
This, though it never amounts to Knowledge, no not to that which
is the lowest degree of it: yet sometimes the intermediate <Ideas> tie
the Extremes so firmly together, and the Probability is so clear and
strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does 10
Demonstration. The great Excellency and Use of the Judgment, is
to observe Right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight
of each Probability; and then casting them up all right together,
chuse that side, which has the over-balance.
#S 17#. <Intuitive Knowledge>, is the perception of the certain Agree- 
ment, or Disagreement of two <Ideas> immediately compared together.
<Rational Knowledge>, is the perception of the certain Agreement, or
Disagreement of any two <Ideas>, by the intervention of one or more
other <Ideas>.
<Judgment>, is the thinking or taking two <Ideas> to agree, or disagree, 20
by the intervention of one or more <Ideas>, whose certain Agreement,
or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed
to be frequent and usual.
#S 18#. Though the deducing one Proposition from another, or
making <Inferences in Words>, be a great part of Reason, and that which 25
it is usually employ'd about: yet the principal Act of Ratiocination
is the finding the Agreement, or Disagreement of two <Ideas> one
with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard,
finds two Houses to be of the same length, which could not be
brought together to measure their Equality by <juxta->position. 30
Words have their Consequences, as the signs of such <Ideas>: and
Things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only
by our <Ideas>.
#S 19#. Before we quit this Subject, it may be worth our while a little
to reflect on <four sorts of Arguments>, that Men in their Reasonings 35
#P 686#
#L 1#
with others do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their Assent;
or at least so to awe them, as to silence their Opposition.
      <First>, The first is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts,
Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other cause has gained a
name, and settled their Reputation in the common esteem with 5  
some kind of Authority. When Men are established in any kind of
Dignity, 'tis thought a breach of Modesty for others to derogate
any way from it, and question the Authority of Men, who are in
possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too
much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determina-  
tion of approved Authors, which is wont to be received with
respect and submission by others: and 'tis looked upon as insolence,
for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the
current Stream of Antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that
of some learned Doctor, or otherwise approved Writer. Whoever 15 
backs his Tenets with such Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to
carry the Cause, and is ready to style it Impudence in any one,
who shall stand out against them. This, I think, may be called
<Argumentum ad Verecundiam>.
#S 20#. <Secondly>, Another way that Men ordinarily use to drive 20   
others, and force them to submit their Judgments, and receive the
Opinion in debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they
alledge as a proof, or to assign a better. And this I call <Argumentum>
<ad Ignorantiam>.
#S 21#. <Thirdly>, A third way is, to press a Man with Consequences 25    
drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already
known under the Name of <Argumentum ad Hominem>.
#S 22#. <Fourthly>, The fourth is, the using of Proofs drawn from
any of the Foundations of Knowledge, or Probability. This I call
<Argumentum ad Judicium>. This alone of all the four, brings true 30 
Instruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For,
1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I out     
of respect, or any other consideration, but that of conviction, will
not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right
way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know 35 
                                                               #P 687#
                                                               #L 1#
not a better. 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right
way, because he has shewn me, that I am in the wrong. I may be
modest, and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion: I may
be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an
Errour, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose 5
me, perhaps, for the reception of Truth, but helps me not to it;
That must come from Proofs, and Arguments, and Light arising
from the nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shame-
facedness, Ignorance, or Errour.
#S 23#. By what has been before said of <Reason>, we may be able to 10
make some guess at the distinction of Things, into those that are
according to, above, and contrary to Reason. 1. <According to Reason>
are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining
and tracing those <Ideas> we have from <Sensation> and <Reflexion>; and by
natural deduction, find to be true, or probable. 2. <Above Reason> are 15
such Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason
derive from those Principles. 3. <Contrary to Reason> are such Proposi-
tions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and
distinct <Ideas>. Thus the Existence of one GOD is according to
Reason; the Existence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reason; 20
the Resurrection of the Dead, above Reason. Farther, as <Above>
<Reason> may be taken in a double Sense, <viz.> either as signifying above
Probability, or above Certainty: so in that large Sense also, Con-
trary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.
#S 24#. There is another use of the Word <Reason>, wherein it is 25
<opposed to Faith>; which though it be in it self a very improper way of
speaking, yet common Use has so authorized it, that it would be
folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it: Only I think it may not
be amiss to take notice, that however <Faith> be opposed to Reason,
<Faith> is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind: which if it be regu- 
lated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good
Reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without
having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own
Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedi-
ence due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning 35
#P 688#
#L 1#
Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour.
He that does not this to the best of his Power, however he some-
times lights on Truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not
whether the luckiness of the Accident will excuse the irregularity
of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be account-   
able for whatever Mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use
of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and seeks sincerely
to discover Truth, by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have
this satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that though
he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he 10 
governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any
Case or Matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves, according as
Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against
his own Light, and misuses those Faculties, which were given him
to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and 15 
greater Probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some Men
opposed, we will so consider them in the following Chapter.



#C 18#                      CHAPTER XVIII

          <Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces>.

#S 01#. IT has been above shewn, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant,
and want Knowledge of all sorts, where we want <Ideas>. 2. That
we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want 20 
Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far
as we want clear and determined specifick <Ideas>. 4. That we want
Probability to direct our Assent in Matters where we have neither
Knowledge of our own, nor Testimony of other Men to bottom our
Reason upon. 25 
     From these Things thus premised, I think we may come to lay
down the Measures and <Boundaries between Faith and Reason>: the want
whereof, may possibly have been the cause, if not of great Disorders,
yet at least of great Disputes, and perhaps Mistakes in the World.
For till it be resolved, how far we are to be guided by Reason, and 30 
                                                               #P 689#
#L 1#
how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to con-
vince one another in Matters of Religion.
#S 02#. I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make use of
it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, <'Tis matter of Faith>,
<and above Reason>. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, 5
or ever convince a Gainsayer, who makes use of the same Plea, with-
out setting down strict Boundaries between <Faith> and <Reason>; which
ought to be the first Point established in all Questions, where <Faith>
has any thing to do.
<Reason> therefore here, as contradistinguished to <Faith>, I take to be 10
the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or
Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such
<Ideas>, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, <viz.> by
Sensation or Reflection.
<Faith>, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus 15
made out by the Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of
the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in some extraordinary way
of Communication. This way of discovering Truths to Men we call
<Revelation>.
#S 03#. <First>, Then, I say, That <no Man inspired by GOD, can by any> 20
<Revelation communicate to others any new simple Ideas> which they had not
before from Sensation or Reflexion. For whatsoever Impressions he
himself may have from the immediate hand of GOD, this Revela-
tion, if it be of new simple <Ideas>, cannot be conveyed to another,
either by Words, or any other signs. Because Words, by their im- 
mediate Operation on us, cause no other <Ideas>, but of their natural
Sounds: and 'tis by the Custom of using them for Signs, that they
excite, and revive in our Minds latent <Ideas>; but yet only such <Ideas>,
as were there before. For Words seen or heard, re-call to our
Thoughts those <Ideas> only, which to us they have been wont to be 30
Signs of: But cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly
unknown simple <Ideas>. The same holds in all other Signs, which
cannot signify to us Things, of which we have before never had any
<Idea> at all.
#P 690#
#L 1#
     Thus whatever Things were discovered to St. <Paul>, when he was
rapp'd up into the Third Heaven; whatever new <Ideas> his Mind
there received, all the description he can make to others of that
Place, is only this, That there are such Things, <as Eye hath not seen>,
<nor Ear heard, nor hath it entred into the Heart of Man to conceive>. And, 5  
supposing GOD should discover to any one, supernaturally, a
Species of Creatures inhabiting, For Example, <Jupiter>, or <Saturn>
for that it is possible there may be such, no body can deny) which
had six Senses; and imprint on his Mind the <Ideas> convey'd to theirs
by that sixth Sense, he could no more, by Words, produce in the 10 
Minds of other Men those <Ideas>, imprinted by that sixth Sense, than
one of us could convey the <Idea> of any Colour, by the sound of
Words into a Man, who having the other four Senses perfect, had
always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our simple <Ideas> then,
which are the Foundation, and sole Matter of all our Notions, and 15 
Knowledge, we must depend wholly on our Reason, I mean, our
natural Faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of
them, from <Traditional Revelation>. I say, <Traditional Revelation>, in
distinction to <Original Revelation>. By the one, I mean that first
Impression, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of 20 
any Man, to which we cannot set any Bounds; and by the other,
those Impressions delivered over to others in Words, and the
ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.
#S 04#. <Secondly>, I say, that <the same Truths may be discovered, and con->
<veyed down from Revelation, which are discoverable to us by Reason>, and by 25 
those <Ideas> we naturally may have. So GOD might, by Revelation,
discover the Truth of any Proposition in <Euclid>; as well as Men, by
the natural use of their Faculties, come to make the discovery them-
selves. In all Things of this Kind, there is little need or use of
<Revelation> GOD having furnished us with natural, and surer means 30 
to arrive at the Knowledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we
come to the clear discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contem-
plation of our own <Ideas>, will always be certainer to us, than those

                                                               #P 691#
                                                               #L 1#
which are conveyed to us by <Traditional Revelation>. For the Know-
ledge, we have, that this <Revelation> came at first from GOD, can
never be so sure, as the Knowledge we have from the clear and
distinct Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own
<Ideas, v.g.> If it were revealed some Ages since, That the three Angles 5
of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the
Truth of that Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it
was revealed: But that would never amount to so great a Certainty,
as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own
<Ideas> of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The 10
like holds in matter of Fact, knowable by our Senses, <v.g.> the History
of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their
Original from Revelation: And yet no Body, I think, will say, he
has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as <Noah> that saw
it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and 15
seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his Senses,
that it is writ in the Book supposed writ by <Moses> inspired: But he
has not so great an assurance, <that, Moses> writ that Book, as if he had
seen <Moses> write it. So that the assurance of its being a Revelation,
is less still than the assurance of his Senses.                        20
#S 05#. In Propositions then, whose Certainty is built upon the clear
Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our <Ideas> attained
either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident Propositions, or by
evident deductions of Reason, in demonstrations, we need not the
assistance of <Revelation>, as necessary to gain our Assent, and intro- 
duce them into our Minds. Because the natural ways of Knowledge
could settle them there, or had done it already, which is the
greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where
GOD immediately reveals it to us: And there too our Assurance
can be no greater, than our Knowledge is, that it is a <Revelation> 30
from GOD. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that Title, shake
or over-rule plain Knowledge; or rationally prevail with any Man,
to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence
of his own Understanding. For since no evidence of our Faculties, by
which we receive such <Revelations>, can exceed, if equal, the certainty 35
#P 692#
#L 1#
of our intuitive Knowledge, we can never receive for a Truth
any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Know-
ledge, <v.g.> The <Ideas> of one Body, and one Place, do so clearly agree;
and the Mind has so evident a Perception of their Agreement, that
we can never assent to a Proposition, that affirms the same Body to 5  
be in two distant Places at once, however it should pretend to the
Authority of a divine <Revelation>: Since the Evidence, <First>, That we
deceive not our selves in ascribing it to GOD; <Secondly>, That we
understand it right, can never be so great, as the Evidence of our
own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible, for 10 
the same Body to be in two Places at once. And therefore, <no>
<Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation>, or obtain the Assent
due to all such, <if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge>.
Because this would be to subvert the Principles, and Foundations of
all Knowledge, Evidence, and Assent whatsoever: And there would 15 
be left no difference between Truth and Falshood, no measures
of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubtful Propositions
shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know,
give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In Propositions
therefore contrary to the clear Perception of the Agreement or 20 
Disagreement of any of our Ideas, 'twill be in vain to urge them as
Matters of <Faith>. They cannot move our Assent under that, or any
other Title whatsoever. For <Faith> can never convince us of any
Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because though <Faith> be
founded on the Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any 25 
Proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth
of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge.
Since the whole strength of the Certainty depends upon our Know-
ledge, that GOD revealed it, which in this Case, where the Proposi-
tion supposed revealed contradicts our Knowledge or Reason, will 30 
always have this Objection hanging to it, (<viz.>) that we cannot tell
how to conceive that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our
Being, which if received for true, must overturn all the Principles and
                                                                #P 693#
#L 1#
Foundations of Knowledge he has given us; render all our Faculties
useless; wholly destroy the most excellent Part of his Workman-
ship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a Condition, wherein
he will have less Light, less Conduct than the Beast that perisheth.
For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and, perhaps, not 5
so clear) Evidence of any thing to be a divine <Revelation>, as it has
of the Principles of its own Reason, it can never have a ground to
quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give place to a Proposition,
whose <Revelation> has not a greater Evidence, than those Principles
have.                                                               10
#S 06#. Thus far a Man has use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it,
even in immediate and original <Revelation>, where it is supposed to be
made to himself: But to all those who pretend not to immediate
<Revelation>, but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive the
Truths revealed to others, which, by the Tradition of Writings, or 15
Word of Mouth, are conveyed down to them, Reason has a great
deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive
them. For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing
else, <Faith>, as we use the Word, (called commonly, <Divine Faith>)
has to do with no Propositions, but those which are supposed to be 20
divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those, who make Revela-
tion alone the sole Object of <Faith>, can say, That it is a Matter of
<Faith>, and not of <Reason>, to believe, That such or such a Proposition,
to be found in such or such a Book, is of Divine Inspiration; unless
it be revealed, That that Proposition, or all in that Book, was 25
communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without such a <Revelation>,
the believing, or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to be
of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of <Faith>, but Matter of
Reason; and such, as I must come to an Assent to, only by the use of
my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that, 30
which is contrary to it self: It being impossible for Reason, ever to
procure any Assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.
In all Things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our
<Ideas>, and those Principles of Knowledge, I have above mentioned,
<Reason> is the proper Judge; and <Revelation>, though it may in consent- 
ing with it, confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in such Cases, invalidate
#P 694#
#L 1#
its Decrees: <Nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident>
<Sentence of Reason, to quit it, for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that>
<it is Matter of Faith>; which can have no Authority against the plain
and clear Dictates of <Reason>.
#S 07#. But <Thirdly>, There being many Things, wherein we have 5     
very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whose
past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our
Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all; these, as being beyond
the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above <Reason>, are, when
revealed, <the proper Matter of Faith>. Thus that part of the Angels 10  
rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state: And
that the dead shall rise, and live again: These, and the like, being
beyond the Discovery of <Reason>, are purely Matters of <Faith>; with
which <Reason> has, directly, nothing to do.
#S 08#. But since GOD in giving us the light of <Reason> has not there- 15    
by tied up his own Hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the
light of <Revelation> in any of those Matters, wherein our natural
Faculties are able to give a probable Determination, <Revelation>,
where God has been pleased to give it, <must carry it, against the>
<probable Conjectures of Reason>. Because the Mind, not being certain of 20  
the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to
the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its Assent to
such a Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one, who cannot
err, and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to <Reason>, to judge
of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the signification of the 25  
Words, wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought
<Revelation>, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason, and
the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and distinct
<Ideas>; there <Reason> must be hearkned to, as to a Matter within its
Province. Since a Man can never have so certain a Knowledge, that 30  
a Proposition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence
of his own Knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he under-
stands the Words rightly, wherein it is delivered, as he has, that
                                                                #P 695#
                                                                #L 1#
the contrary is true, and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a
Matter of Reason, and not swallow it, without Examination, as a
Matter of <Faith>.
#S 09#. <First>, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose Truth our
Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judge, that is 5
purely <Matter of Faith>, and above Reason.                    
<Secondly>, All Propositions, whereof the Mind, by the use of its
natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally
acquired <Ideas>, are <Matter of Reason>; with this difference still, that in
those, concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and so 10
is perswaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds, which
still admit a Possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing
violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and over-
turning the Principles of all Reason, in such probable Propositions,
I say, an evident <Revelation> ought to determine our Assent even 15
against Probability. For where the Principles of Reason have not
evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear
<Revelation>, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent,
may determine; and so it may be Matter of <Faith>, and be also above
<Reason>. Because <Reason>, in that particular Matter, being able to 20
reach no higher than Probability, <Faith> gave the Determination,
where <Reason> came short; and <Revelation> discovered on which side
the Truth lay.
#S 10#. Thus far the Dominion of <Faith> reaches, and that without
any violence, or hindrance to <Reason>; which is not injured, or dis- 
turbed, but assisted and improved, by new Discoveries of Truth,
coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever
GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it.
This is the proper Object of <Faith>: But whether it be a divine
Revelation, or no, <Reason> must judge; which can never permit the 30
Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident,
nor allow it to entertain Probability in opposition to Knowledge and
Certainty. There can be no evidence, that any traditional Revela-
tion is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the
Sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain, as that of the 35
#P 696#
#L 1#
Principles of Reason: And therefore, <Nothing that is contrary to, and>
<inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a Right to>
<be urged, or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath nothing>
<to do>. Whatsoever is divine <Revelation>, ought to over-rule all our
Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a right to be received 5   
with full Assent: Such a Submission as this of our <Reason> to <Faith>,
takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This shakes not the
Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for
which they were given us.
#S 11#. <If the Provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept distinct by these> 10     
<Boundaries>, there will, in matter of Religion, be no room for <Reason>
at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to
be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to
be blamed. For, to this crying up of <Faith>, in opposition to <Reason>,
we may, I think, in good measure, ascribe those Absurdities, that 15  
fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind. For
Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must
not consult <Reason> in the Things of Religion, however apparently
contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their
Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; 20  
and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extrava-
gant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand
amazed at their Follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable
to the great and wise GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them
ridiculous, and offensive to a sober, good Man. So that, in effect 25  
Religion which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought
most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is
that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more senseless
than Beasts themselves. <Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because>
<it is impossible>, might, in a good Man, pass for a Sally of Zeal; but 30  
would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions, or
Religion by.
#P 697#
#C 19#                      CHAPTER XIX

                           <Of Enthusiasm>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. HE that would seriously set upon the search of Truth, ought
in the first Place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that
Loves it not, will not take much Pains to get it; nor be much concerned
when he misses it. There is no Body in the Commonwealth of
Learning, who does not profess himself a lover of Truth: and there 5
is not a rational Creature that would not take it amiss to be thought
otherwise of. And yet for all this one may truly say, there are very
few lovers of Truth for Truths sake, even amongst those, who
perswade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know
whether he be so in earnest is worth enquiry: And I think there is 10
this one unerring mark of it, <viz.> The not entertaining any Proposi-
tion with greater assurance than the Proofs it is built upon will
warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of Assent, 'tis plain
receives not Truth in the Love of it; loves not Truth for Truths
sake, but for some other bye end. For the evidence that any Proposi- 
tion is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the Proofs
a Man has of it, whatsoever degrees of Assent he affords it beyond
the degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain all that surplusage of assur-
ance is owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love of
Truth: It being as impossible, that the Love of Truth should carry 20
my Assent above the Evidence, that there is to me, that it is true, As
that the Love of Truth should make me assent to any Proposition,
for the sake of that Evidence, which it has not, that it is true: which
is in effect to Love it as a Truth, because it is possible or probable
that it may not be true. In any Truth that gets not possession of our 25
Minds by the irresistible Light of Self-evidence, or by the force of
Demonstration, the Arguments that gain it Assent, are the vouchers
and gage of its Probability to us; and we can receive it for no other
than such as they deliver it to our Understandings. Whatsoever
Credit or Authority we give to any Proposition more than it 30
receives from the Principles and Proofs it supports it self upon, is
#P 698#
#L 1#
owing to our Inclinations that way, and is so far a Derogation from
the Love of Truth as such: which as it can receive no Evidence
from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no Tincture
from them.
#S 02#. The assuming an Authority of Dictating to others, and a for-     
wardness to prescribe to their Opinions, is a constant concomitant   
of this bias and corruption of our Judgments. For how almost can it
be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others
Belief, who has already imposed on his own? Who can reasonably
expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in dealing with others, 10 
whose Understanding is not accustomed to them in his dealing
with himself? Who does Violence to his own Faculties, Tyrannizes
over his own Mind, and usurps the Prerogative that belongs to
Truth alone, which is to command Assent by only its own Author-
ity, <i.e.> by and in proportion to that Evidence which it carries 15 
with it.
#S 03#. Upon this occasion I shall take the Liberty to consider a third
Ground of Assent, which with some Men has the same Authority,
and is as confidently relied on as either <Faith> or <Reason>, I mean
<Enthusiasm>. Which laying by Reason would set up Revelation 20 
without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reason and Reve-
lation, and substitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies
of a Man's own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation both of
Opinion and Conduct.
#S 04#. <Reason> is natural <Revelation>, whereby the eternal Father of 25   
Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge communicates to Mankind
that portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their
natural Faculties: <Revelation> is natural <Reason> enlarged by a new set
of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which <Reason>
vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that 30 
they come from GOD. So that he that takes away <Reason>, to make
way for <Revelation>, puts out the Light of both, and does much what
the same, as if he would perswade a Man to put out his Eyes the
better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star by a Tele-
scope. 35 
#S 05#. Immediate <Revelation> being a much easier way for Men to
establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the
                                                                #P 699#
#L 1#
tedious and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, it is
no wonder, that some have been very apt to pretend to Revelation,
and to perswade themselves, that they are under the peculiar
guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, especially in
those of them, which they cannot account for by the ordinary 5
Methods of Knowledge, and Principles of Reason. Hence we see,
that in all Ages, Men, in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devo-
tion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an
Opinion of a greater familiarity with GOD, and a nearer admittance
to his Favour than is afforded to others, have often flatter'd them-  
selves with a perswasion of an immediate intercourse with the
Deity, and frequent communications from the divine Spirit. GOD
I own cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the Understanding
by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of
Light: This they understand he has promised to do, and who then 15
has so good a title to expect it, as those who are his peculiar People,
chosen by him and depending on him?
#S 06#. Their Minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless
Opinion comes to settle it self strongly upon their Fancies, is
an Illumination from the Spirit of GOD, and presently of divine 20
Authority: And whatsoever odd Action they find in themselves a
strong Inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or
direction from Heaven, and must be obeyed; 'tis a Commission
from above, and they cannot err in executing it.
#S 07#. This I take to be properly Enthusiasm, which though founded 25
neither on Reason, nor Divine Revelation, but rising from the Con-
ceits of a warmed or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once
gets footing, more powerfully on the Perswasions and Actions of Men,
than either of those two, or both together: Men being most forward-
ly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves; And the 30
whole Man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole Man is
carried by a natural Motion. For strong conceit like a new Principle
carries all easily with it, when got above common Sense, and freed
from all restraint of Reason, and check of Reflection, it is heightened
into a Divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and 35
Inclination.
#S 08#. Though the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions, <Enthusi->
<asm> has run Men into, were enough to warn them against this wrong
#P 700#
#L 1#
Principle so apt to misguide them both in their Belief and Conduct:
yet the Love of something extraordinary, the Ease and Glory it is to
be inspired and be above the common and natural ways of Know-
ledge so flatters many Men's Laziness, Ignorance, and Vanity, that
when once they are got into this way of immediate Revelation; of 5  
Illumination without search; and of certainty without Proof, and  
without Examination, 'tis a hard matter to get them out of it.
Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the Light
infused into their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis
clear and visible there; like the Light of bright Sunshine, shews it 10 
self, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: they feel the
Hand of GOD moving them within, and the impulses of the Spirit,
and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support them-
selves, and are sure Reason hath nothing to do with what they see
and feel in themselves: what they have a sensible Experience of 15 
admits no doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ridiculous
who should require to have it proved to him, that the Light shines,
and that he sees it? It is its own Proof, and can have no other. When
the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it dispels Darkness. We see
it, as we do that of the Sun at Noon, and need not the twilight of 20 
Reason to shew it us. This Light from Heaven is strong, clear,
and pure, carries its own Demonstration with it, and we may as
rationally take a Glow-worme to assist us to discover the Sun, as
to examine the celestial Ray by our dim Candle, Reason.
#S 09#. This is the way of talking of these Men: they are sure, because 25   
they are sure: and their Perswasions are right, only because they are
strong in them. For, when what they say is strip'd of the Metaphor
of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these Similes
so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves,
and demonstration to others. 30 
#S 10#. But to examine a little soberly this internal Light, and this
feeling on which they build so much. These Men have, they say,
clear Light, and they see; They have an awaken'd Sense, and they
feel: This cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For when a Man
says he sees or he feels, no Body can deny it him, that he does so. 35 
But here let me ask: This seeing is it the perception of the Truth of
                                                               #P 701#
                                                               #L 1#
the Proposition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from GOD? This
feeling is it a perception of an Inclination or Fancy to do something,
or of the Spirit of GOD moving that Inclination? These are two
very different Perceptions, and must be carefully distinguish'd, if
we would not impose upon our selves. I may perceive the Truth of a 5
Proposition, and yet not perceive, that it is an immediate Revela-
tion from GOD. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition in
<Euclid>, without its being, or my perceiving it to be, a Revelation:
Nay I may perceive I came not by this Knowledge in a natural way,
and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving that it is a 10
Revelation from GOD. Because there be Spirits, which, without
being divinely commissioned, may excite those <Ideas> in me, and lay
them in such order before my Mind, that I may perceive their Con-
nexion. So that the Knowledge of any Proposition coming into my
Mind, I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from GOD.  15
Much less is a strong Perswasion, that it is true, a Perception that it
is from GOD, or so much as true. But however it be called light
and seeing; I suppose, it is at most but Belief, and Assurance: and the
Proposition taken for a Revelation is not such, as they know, to be
true, but take to be true. For where a Proposition is known to be 20
true, Revelation is needless: And it is hard to conceive how there can
be a Revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it
be a Proposition which they are perswaded, but do not know, to be
true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing. For
these are two ways, whereby Truth comes into the Mind, wholly 25
distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see I know to be so by
the Evidence of the thing it self: what I believe I take to be so upon
the Testimony of another: But this Testimony I must know to be
given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is
GOD that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question 30
then here is, How do I know that GOD is the Revealer of this to
me; that this Impression is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit,
and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great
soever the Assurance is, that I am possess'd with, it is groundless;
whatever Light I pretend to, it is but <Enthusiasm>. For whether the 35
Proposition supposed to be revealed, be in it self evidently true, or
visibly probable, or by the natural ways of Knowledge uncertain,
the Proposition that must be well grounded, and manifested to be
true is this, that GOD is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to
#P 702#
#L 1#
be a Revelation is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an
Illusion drop'd in by some other Spirit, or raised by my own phancy.
For if I mistake not, these Men receive it for true, because they
presume GOD revealed it. Does it not then stand them upon, to
examine upon what Grounds they presume it to be a Revelation 5  
from GOD? or else all their Confidence is mere Presumption: and
this Light, they are so dazled with, is nothing, but an <ignis fatuus>
that leads them continually round in this Circle. <It is a Revelation>,
<because they firmly believe it>, and <they believe it, because it is a Revelation>.
#S 11#. In all that is of Divine <Revelation> there is need of no other 10   
Proof but that it is an Inspiration from GOD: For he can neither
deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be known, that any Pro-
position in our Minds is a Truth infused by God; a Truth that is
reveal'd to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we
ought to believe? Here it is that <Enthusiasm> fails of the Evidence it 15 
pretends to. For Men thus possessed boast of a Light whereby they
say, they are enlightened, and brought into the Knowledge of this
or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they must know
it to be so either by its own self-evidence to natural Reason; or by
the rational Proofs that make it out to be so. If they see and know 20 
it to be a Truth, either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to
be a Revelation: For they know it to be true by the same way, that
any other Man naturally may know, that it is so without the help
of Revelation. For thus all the Truths of what kind soever, that
Men uninspired are enlightened with, came into their Minds, and 25 
are established there. If they say they know it to be true, because
it is a <Revelation> from GOD, the reason is good: but then it will be
demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from GOD. If they
say by the Light it brings with it, which shines bright in their
Minds, and they cannot resist; I beseech them to consider, whether 30 
this be any more, than what we have taken notice of already, <viz.>
that it is a Revelation because they strongly believe it to be true.
For all the Light they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded
perswasion of their own Minds that it is a Truth. For rational
Grounds from Proofs that it is a Truth they must acknowledge to 35 
have none, for then it is not received as a <Revelation>, but upon the
ordinary Grounds, that other Truths are received: And if they believe
                                                               #P 703#
                                                               #L 1#
it to be true, because it is a <Revelation>, and have no other reason for
its being a <Revelation>, but because they are fully perswaded without
any other reason that it is true, they believe it to be a Revelation
only because they strongly believe it to be a Revelation, which
is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets, or 5
Actions: And what readier way can there be to run our selves into   
the most extravagant Errors and Miscarriages than thus to set up
phancy for our supreme and sole Guide, and to believe any Proposi-
tion to be true, any Action to be right, only because we believe it
to be so? The strength of our Perswasions are no Evidence at all of 10
their own rectitude: Crooked things may be as stiff and unflexible
as streight: and Men may be as positive and peremptory in Error
as in Truth. How come else the untractable Zealots in different and
opposite Parties? For if the Light, which every one thinks he has in
his Mind, which in this Case is nothing but the strength of his own 15
Perswasion, be an Evidence that it is from GOD, contrary Opinions
may have the same title to be inspirations; and GOD will be not
only the Father of Lights, but of opposite and contradictory Lights,
leading Men contrary ways; and contradictory Propositions will
be divine Truths, if an ungrounded strength of Assurance be an 20
Evidence, that any Proposition is a Divine Revelation.
#S 12#. This cannot be otherwise, whilst firmness of Perswasion is
made the cause of Believing, and confidence of being in the Right,
is made an Argument of Truth; St. <Paul> himself believed he did
well, and that he had a call to it, when he persecuted the Christians, 25
whom he confidently thought in the Wrong: But yet it was he,
and not they, who were mistaken. Good Men are Men still, liable
to Mistakes, and are sometimes warmly engaged in Errors, which
they take for divine Truths, shining in their Minds with the
clearest Light.                                                     30
#S 13#. Light, true Light in the Mind is, or can be nothing else but
the Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition; and if it be not a
self-evident Proposition, all the Light it has, or can have, is from the
clearness and validity of those Proofs, upon which it is received. To
talk of any other light in the Understanding is to put our selves in 35
the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkness, and by our own
consent, to give ourselves up to Delusion to believe a Lie. For if
strength of Perswasion be the Light, which must guide us; I ask
#P 704#
#L 1#
how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of Satan, and
the inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into
an Angel of Light. And they who are led by this Son of the Morning
are as fully satisfied of the Illumination, <i.e.> are as strongly per-
swaded, that they are enlightned by the Spirit of God, as any one 5  
who is so: They acquiesce and rejoyce in it, are acted by it: and no       
body can be more sure, nor more in the right (if their own strong
belief may be judge) than they.
#S 14#. He therefore that will not give himself up to all the Extrava-
gancies of Delusion and Error must bring this Guide of his <Light> 10 
<within> to the Tryal. God when he makes the Prophet does not un-
make the Man. He leaves all his Faculties in their natural State, to
enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of divine
Original or no. When he illuminates the Mind with supernatural
Light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have 15 
us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, he either evidences that
Truth by the usual Methods of natural Reason, or else makes it
known to be a Truth, which he would have us assent to, by his
Authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by some Marks
which Reason cannot be mistaken in. <Reason> must be our last Judge 20 
and Guide in every Thing. I do not mean, that we must consult
Reason, and examine whether a Proposition revealed from God
can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then
we may reject it: But consult it we must, and by it examine, whether
it be a <Revelation> from God or no: And if <Reason> finds it to be revealed 25 
from GOD, <Reason> then declares for it, as much as for any other
Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that
throughly warms our Fancies must pass for an Inspiration, if there
be nothing but the Strength of our Perswasions, whereby to judge
of our Perswasions: If <Reason> must not examine their Truth by 30 
something extrinsical to the Perswasions themselves; Inspirations
and Delusions, Truth and Falshood will have the same Measure,
and will not be possible to be distinguished.
#S 15#. If this internal Light, or any Proposition which under that
Title we take for inspired, be conformable to the Principles of 35 
Reason or to the Word of GOD, which is attested Revelation,
<Reason> warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be
                                                                #P 705#
                                                                #L 1#
guided by it in our Belief and Actions: If it receive no Testimony
nor Evidence from either of these Rules, we cannot take it for a
<Revelation>, or so much as for true, till we have some other Mark that
it is a <Revelation>, besides our believing that it is so. Thus we see the
holy Men of old, who had <Revelations> from GOD, had something else 5
besides that internal Light of assurance in their own Minds, to
testify to them, that it was from GOD. They were not left to their
own Perswasions alone, that those Perswasions were from GOD;
But had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those
Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a 10
Power given them to justify the Truth of their Commission from
Heaven; and by visible Signs to assert the divine Authority of the
Message they were sent with. <Moses> saw the Bush burn without being
consumed, and heard a Voice out of it. This was something besides
finding an impulse upon his Mind to go to <Pharaoh>, that he might 15
bring his Brethren out of <Egypt>: and yet he thought not this enough
to authorise him to go with that Message, till GOD by another
Miracle, of his Rod turned into a Serpent, had assured him of a
Power to testify his Mission by the same Miracle repeated before
them, whom he was sent to. <Gideon> was sent by an Angel to deliver 20
<Israel> from the <Mideanites>, and yet he desired a Sign to convince
him, that this Commission was from GOD. These and several the
like Instances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough
to shew, that they thought not an inward seeing or perswasion of
their own Minds without any other Proof a sufficient Evidence, 25
that it was from GOD, though the Scripture does not every where
mention their demanding or having such Proofs.
#S 16#. In what I have said I am far from denying, that GOD can,
or doth sometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of
certain Truths, or excite them to Good Actions by the immediate 30
influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extra-
ordinary Signs accompanying it. But in such Cases too we have
Reason and the Scripture, unerring Rules to know whether it be
from GOD or no. Where the Truth imbraced is consonant to the
<Revelation> in the written word of GOD; or the Action conformable 35
to the dictates of right <Reason> or Holy Writ, we may be assured that
we run no risque in entertaining it as such, because though perhaps
it be not an immediate Revelation from GOD, extraordinarily
#P 706#
#L 1#
operating on our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that
Revelation which he has given us of Truth. But it is not the strength
of our private perswasion within our selves, that can warrant it
to be a Light or Motion from Heaven: Nothing can do that but the
written Word of GOD without us, or that Standard of Reason 5  
which is common to us with all Men. Where Reason or Scripture is   
express for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of divine
Authority: But 'tis not the strength of our own Perswasions which
can by it self give it that Stamp. The bent of our own Minds may
favour it as much as we please; That may shew it to be a Fondling 10 
of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an Offspring of
Heaven, and of divine Original.


#C 20#                    CHAPTER XX

                     <Of wrong Assent, or Errour>.

#S 01#. KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible certain Truth,
<Errour> is not a Fault of our Knowledge, but a Mistake of our Judg-
ment giving Assent to that, which is not true. 15 
     But if Assent be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Object and
Motive of our Assent be Probability, and that Probability consists
in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded,
how Men come to give their Assents contrary to Probability. For
there is nothing more common, than Contrariety of Opinions; 20 
nothing more obvious, than that one Man wholly disbelieves what
another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly
adheres to. The Reasons whereof, though they may be very various,
yet, I suppose, may all be reduced to these four.


     1. <Want of Proofs>. 25 
     2. <Want of Ability to use them>.
     3. <Want of Will to use them>.     
     4. <Wrong Measures of Probability>.

#S 02#. <First>, By <Want of Proofs>: I do not mean, only the Want of
those Proofs which are no where extant, and so are no where to be 30 
                                                               #P 707#
#L 1#
had;  but the Want even of those Proofs which are in Being, or 
might be procured. And thus Men want Proofs, who have not the
Convenience, or Opportunity to make Experiments and Obser-
vations themselves, tending to the Proof of any Proposition; nor
likewise the Convenience to enquire into, and collect the Testi- 
monies of others: And in this State are the greatest part of Mankind,
who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the Necessity of their
mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions
for Living. These Men's Opportunity of Knowledge and Enquiry,
are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings 10
are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is
laid out, to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of
their Children. 'Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges
on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the
variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is 15
driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and
dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of
the Country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he who wants
Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity of Conversing
with variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those 20
Testimonies and Observations, which are in Being, and are neces-
sary to make out many, nay most of the Propositions, that, in the
Societies of Men, are judged of the greatest Moment; or to find out
Grounds of Assurance so great, as the Belief of the points he would
build on them, is thought necessary. So that a great part of Mankind 25
are, by the natural and unalterable State of Things in this World,
and the Constitution of humane Affairs, unavoidably given over to
invincible Ignorance of those Proofs, on which others build, and
which are necessary to establish those Opinions: The greatest
part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are 30
not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious
Enquiries.
#S 03#. What shall we say then? Are the greatest part of Mankind,
by the necessity of their Condition, subjected to unavoidable
Ignorance in those Things, which are of greatest Importance to 35
them? (for of those, 'tis obvious to enquire.) Have the Bulk of
Mankind no other Guide, but Accident, and blind Chance, to
#P 708#
#L 1#
conduct them to their Happiness, or Misery? Are the current Opini-
ons, and licensed Guides of every Country sufficient Evidence and
Security to every Man, to venture his greatest Concernments on;
nay, his everlasting Happiness, or Misery? Or can those be the cer-
tain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one 5  
Thing in <Christendom>, and another in <Turkey>? Or shall a poor Country-
man be eternally happy, for having the Chance to be born in <Italy>;
or a Day-Labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill Luck
to be born in <England>? How ready some Men may be to say some
of these Things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that 10 
Men must allow one or other of these to be true, (let them chuse
which they please;) or else grant, That GOD has furnished Men
with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should
take, if they will but seriously employ them that Way, when their
ordinary Vocations allow them the Leisure. No Man is so wholly 15 
taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have
no spare Time at all to think of his Soul, and inform himself in
Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on
Things of lower Concernment, there are none so enslaved to the
Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies, that might 20 
be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge.
#S 04#. Besides those, whose Improvements and informations are
straitned by the narrowness of their Fortunes, there are others,
whose largeness of Fortune would plentifully enough supply
Books, and other Requisites for clearing of Doubts, and discovering 25 
of Truth: But they are <cooped in> close, <by the Laws> of their Countries,
and the strict guards of those, whose Interest it is to keep them
ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in
them. These are as far, nay farther from <the Liberty and Opportunities of>
<a fair Enquiry>, than those poor and wretched Labourers, we before 30 
spoke of. And, however they may seem high and great, are confined
to narrowness of Thought, and enslaved in that which should be
the freest part of Man, their Understandings. This is generally the
                                                                #P 709#
                                                                #L 1#
Case of all those, who live in Places where Care is taken to propagate
Truth, without Knowledge; where Men are forced, at a venture, to
be of the Religion of the Country; and must therefore swallow
down Opinions, as silly People do Empiricks Pills, without know-
ing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing 5
to do, but believe that they will do the Cure: but in this, are much 
more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse
swallowing, what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuse the
Physician, to whose Conduct they would trust themselves.
#S 05#. <Secondly>, Those who <want skill to use those Evidences they have> of 10
Probabilities; who cannot carry a train of Consequences in their
Heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and
Testimonies, making every Circumstance its due allowance, may
be easily misled to assent to Positions that are not probable. There
are some Men of one, some but of two Syllogisms, and no more; and 15
others that can but advance one step farther. These cannot always
discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie; cannot constantly
follow that which in it self is the more probable Opinion. Now
that there is such a difference between Men, in respect of their
Understandings, I think no body, who has had any Conversation 20
with his Neighbours, will question:  though he never was at
<Westminster-hall>, or the <Exchange> on the one hand; nor at <Alms->
<Houses>, or <Bedlam> on the other. Which great difference in Men's
Intellectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the Organs of the
Body, particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the dulness or 25
untractableness of those Faculties, for want of use; or, as some
think, in the natural differences of Men's Souls themselves; or
some, or all of these together, it matters not here to examine: Only
this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in Men's Under-
standings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so great a latitude, 30
that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm, that there
is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect,
than between some Men and some Beasts. But how this comes about,
is a Speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to
our present purpose.                                               35
#P 710#
#L 1#
#S 06#. <Thirdly>, There are another sort of People that <want Proofs>, not
because they are out of their reach, but <because they will not use them>:
Who though they have Riches and Leisure enough, and want
neither Parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them.
Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business  5 
engages some Men's thoughts elsewhere: Laziness and Oscitancy
in general, or a particular aversion for Books, Study, and Meditation
keep others from any serious thoughts at all: And some out of fear,
that an impartial enquiry would not favour those Opinions, which
best suit their Prejudices, Lives, and Designs, content themselves 10 
without examination, to take upon trust, what they find conven-
ient, and in fashion. Thus most Men, even of those that might do
otherwise, pass their Lives without an acquaintance with, much
less a rational assent to Probabilities, they are concerned to know,
tho they lie so much within their view, that to be convinced of 15 
them, they need but turn their Eyes that way. But we know some
Men will not read a Letter, which is supposed to bring ill news; and
many Men forbear to cast up their Accompts, or so much as think
upon their Estates, who have reason to fear their Affairs are in no
very good posture. How Men, whose plentiful Fortunes allow them 20 
leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves
with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low
Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions
for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps
of Knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and 25 
splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse
Cloaths, or a patched Coat, and yet contentedly suffer their Minds
to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of coarse Patches, and
borrowed Shreds, such as it has pleased Chance, or their Country-
Tailor, (I mean the common Opinion of those they have conversed 30 
with,) to cloath them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable
this is for Men that ever think of a future state, and their con-
cernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes:
nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is, to the greatest
                                                                #P 711#
                                                                #L 1#
Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in Things they
are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the consideration
of those who call themselves Gentlemen, That however they may
think Credit, Respect, Power, and Authority the Concomitants of
their Birth and Fortune, yet they will find all these still carried 5
away from them, by Men of lower Condition who surpass them in 
Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by those that
see, or else fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected,
the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing
instances, some of the Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, 10
and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always
received with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons, which are
to be had for their Probability: but hitherto we have considered
only such Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appear
to him that embraces the Errour.                                     15
#S 07#. <Fourthly>, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where
the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do
not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but
do either , suspend their Assent, or give it to the less prob-
able Opinion. And to this danger are those exposed, who have 20
taken up <wrong measures of Probability>, which are,
  1. <Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful>    
<and false, taken up for Principles>.
  2. <Received Hypotheses>.    
  3. <Predominant Passions or Inclinations>.                          25    
  4. <Authority>.
#S 08#. <First>, The first and firmest ground of Probability, is the con-
formity any thing has to our own Knowledge; especially that part of
our Knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on
as <Principles>. These have so great an influence upon our Opinions, 30
that 'tis usually by them we judge of Truth, and measure Prob-
ability, to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our <Principles>,
is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed
possible. The reverence is born to these <Principles> is so great, and
#P 712#
#L 1#
their Authority so paramount to all other, that the Testimony not
only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often
rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these
established Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate <Principles>, and
that <Principles> are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed 5   
to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one Truth
cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to say, that
every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a
<Principle>, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows
it to be true of it self by its own Evidence, or whether he does only 10  
with assurance believe it to be so, upon the Authority of others.
For he hath a strong biass put into his Understanding, which will
unavoidably misguide his Assent, who hath imbibed <wrong Prin->
<ciples>, and has blindly given himself up to the Authority of any
Opinion in it self not evidently true. 15  
#S 09#. There is nothing more ordinary, than that <Children> should
receive into their Minds Propositions (especially about Matters of
Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them: which
being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiass'd Under-
standings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether 20  
true or false) riveted there by long Custom and Education beyond
all possibility of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are
grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those of this
sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Memories, not
having observed their early Insinuation, nor by what means they 25  
got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred Things, and not
to suffer them to be prophaned, touched, or questioned: They look
on them as the <Urim> and <Thummim> set up in their Minds immediately
by GOD Himself, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth
and Falshood, and the Judges to which they are to appeal in all 30  
manner of Controversies.
#S 10#. This Opinion of his <Principles> (let them be what they will)
being <once established in any one's Mind>, it is easy to be imagined, what
reception any Proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that
shall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with these internal 35  
Oracles; whereas the grossest Absurdities and Improbabilities,
being but agreeable to such Principles, go down glibly, and are
easily digested. The great obstinacy, that is to be found in Men
firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, though many times
                                                                #P 713#
                                                                #L 1#
equally absurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident
a Proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of
Reasoning from received traditional Principles. So that Men will
disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses,
and give their own Experience the lye, rather than admit of any 5
thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets. Take an intelligent
<Romanist>, that from the very first dawning of any Notions in his
Understanding, hath had this Principle constantly inculcated, <viz.>
That he must believe as the Church (<i.e.> those of his Communion)
believes, or that the Pope is Infallible; and this he never so much as 10
heard questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of
other Principles; How is he prepared easily to swallow, not only
against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senses,
the Doctrine of <Transubstantiation>? This Principle has such an
influence on his Mind that he will believe that to be Flesh, which 15
he sees to be Bread. And what way will you take to convince a Man
of any improbable Opinion he holds, who with some Philosophers,
hath laid down this as a foundation of Reasoning, That he must
believe his Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments drawn
from their Principles) against their Senses? Let an <Enthusiast> be 20
principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an
immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain
bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrines. Whoever
therefore have imbibed wrong <Principles>, are not, in Things incon-
sistent with these Principles, to be moved by the most apparent 25
and convincing Probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous
to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very <Prin->
<ciples>, which many never suffer themselves to do.
#S 11#. <Secondly>, Next to these, are Men whose Understandings are
cast into a Mold, and fashioned just to the size of a <received Hypothesis>. 30
The difference between these and the former, is, that they will
   #P 714#
#L 1#
admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but
differ only in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the manner of
Operation. These are not at that open defiance with their Senses, as
the former: they can endure to hearken to their information a little
more patiently; but will by no means admit of their Reports, in the 5  
Explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on by Probabilities, which
would convince them, that Things are not brought about just after
the same manner, that they have decreed within themselves, that
they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned Pro-
fessor, and that which his Scarlet would blush at, to have his 10 
Authority of forty years standing wrought out of hard Rock Greek
and Latin, with no small expence of Time and Candle, and confirmed
by general Tradition, and a reverend Beard, in an instant overturned
by an upstart Novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made
to confess, That what he taught his Scholars thirty years ago, was 15 
all Errour and Mistake; and that he sold them hard Words and
Ignorance at a very dear rate? What Probabilities, I say, are suffi-
cient to prevail in such a Case? And who ever by the most cogent
Arguments will be prevailed with, to disrobe himself at once of
all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, 20 
which with hard Study, he hath all his Time been labouring for;
and turn himself out stark naked, in quest a-fresh of new Notions?
All the Arguments can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as
the Wind did with the Traveller, to part with his Cloak, which he
held only the faster. To this of wrong Hypothesis, may be reduced 25 
the Errors, that may be occasioned by a true <Hypothesis>, or right
Principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more
familiar than this. The Instances of Men, contending for different
Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the
Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves 30 
Christians, allow the Text, that says, , to carry in it
the Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erroneous
will one of their Practices be, who understanding nothing but
the <French>, take this Rule with one Translation to be <repentez vous>,
repent; or with the other, <faitez> <Penitence>, do Penance. 35 
#S 12#. <Thirdly>, Probabilities, which cross Men's Appetites, and
                                                               #P 715#
                                                               #L 1#
<prevailing Passions>, run the same Fate. Let never so much Probability
hang on one side of a covetous Man's Reasoning, and Money on the
other; and it is easie to foresee which will out-weigh. Earthly Minds,
like Mud-Walls, resist the strongest Batteries: and though, perhaps,
sometimes the force of a clear Argument may make some Impres- 
sion, yet they nevertheless stand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, 
that would captivate, or disturb them. Tell a Man, passionately in
Love, that he is jilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the Falshood of
his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of hers, shall
invalidate all their Testimonies. <Quod volumus, facile credimus; what> 10
<suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed>, is, I suppose, what every one
hath more than once experimented: and though Men cannot always
openly gain-say, or resist the force of manifest Probabilities, that
make against them; yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but
that it is the Nature of the Understanding constantly to close with 15
the more probable side, but yet a Man hath a Power to suspend and
restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Exami-
nation, as far as the matter in Question is capable, and will bear it to
be made. Until that be done, there will be always these <two ways left>
<of evading the most apparent Probabilities>.                              20
#S 13#. <First>, That the Arguments being (as for the most part they
are) brought in Words, <there may be a Fallacy latent> in them: and the
Consequences being, perhaps, many in Train, they may be some
of them incoherent. There be very few Discourses, are so short, clear,
and consistent, to which most Men may not, with satisfaction 25
enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose <conviction>
they may not, without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonable-
ness, set themselves free with the old Reply, <Non persuadebis>,
<etiamsi persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I will not yield>.
#S 14#. <Secondly>, Manifest Probabilities may be evaded, and the 30
Assent withheld upon this Suggestion, That <I know not yet> all <that>
<may be said on the contrary side>. And therefore though I be beaten, 'tis
not necessary I should yield, not knowing what Forces there are
in reserve behind. This is a refuge against <Conviction> so open and so
#P 716#
#L 1#
wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the
Verge of it.
#S 15#. But yet there is some end of it, and a Man having carefully
enquired into all the grounds of Probability and Unlikeliness; done
his utmost to inform himself in all Particulars fairly; and cast up 5  
the Summ total on both sides, may in most Cases come to acknow-
ledge, upon the whole Matter, on which side the Probability rests: 
wherein some Proofs in Matter of Reason, being suppositions upon
universal Experience, are so cogent and clear; and some Testi-
monies in Matter of Fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his 10 
Assent. So that, I think, we may conclude, that in Propositions,
where though the Proofs in view are of most Moment, yet there are
sufficient grounds, to suspect that there is either Fallacy in Words,
or certain Proofs, as considerable, to be produced on the contrary
side, there Assent, Suspense, or Dissent, are often voluntary 15 
Actions: But <where> the Proofs are such as make it highly probable
and there is not sufficient ground to suspect, that there is either
Fallacy of Words, (which sober and serious Consideration may dis-
cover,) nor equally valid Proofs yet undiscovered latent on the
other side, (which also the Nature of the Thing, may, in some Cases, 20 
make plain to a considerate Man,) there, I think, <a Man>, who has
weighed them, <can scarce refuse his Assent> to the side, on which the
greater Probability, appears. Whether it be probably, that a prom-
iscuous jumble of printing Letters should often fall into a Method
and order, which should stamp on Paper a coherent Discourse; or 25 
that a blind fortuitous concourse of Atoms, not guided by an
understanding Agent, should frequently constitute the Bodies of
any Species of Animals: in these and the like Cases, I think, no Body
that considers them, can be one jot at a stand which side to take,
nor at all waver in his Assent. Lastly, when there can be no Supposi-  
tion, (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending
upon the Testimony of Witnesses,) that there is as fair Testi-
mony against, as for the Matter of Fact attested; which by Enquiry,
is to be learned, v.g. whether there was 1700 years agone such a
Man at <Rome> as <Julius Caesar>:In all such Cases, I say, I think it is not 35 
                                                               #P 717#
                                                               #L 1#
in any rational Man's Power to refuse his Assent; but that it neces-
sarily follows, and closes with such Probabilities. In other less clear
Cases, I think, it is in a Man's Power to suspend his Assent; and,
perhaps, content himself with the Proofs he has, if they favour the
Opinion that suits with his Inclination, or Interest, and so stop 5
from farther search. But that a Man should afford his Assent to that      
side, on which the less Probability appears to him, seems to me
utterly impracticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same
thing probable and improbable at the same time.
#S 16#. As Knowledge, is no more arbitrary than Perception: so, 10
I think, Assent is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When
the Agreement of any two <Ideas> appears to our Minds, whether
immediately, or by the Assistance of Reason, I can no more refuse
to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those
Objects, which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in day-light: And 15
what upon full Examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny
my Assent to. But though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where
the Agreement is once perceived; nor our Assent, where the Prob-
ability manifestly appears upon due Consideration of all the Measures
of it: Yet <we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our> 20
<Enquiry>, and not imploying our Faculties in the search of any Truth.
If it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any
Case be a Fault. Thus in some Cases, we can prevent or suspend
our Assent: But can a Man, versed in modern or ancient History,
doubt whether there be such a Place as <Rome>, or whether there was 25
such a Man as <Julius Caesar>? Indeed there are millions of Truths,
that a Man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know; as
whether our King <Richard> the Third was crook-back'd, or no; or
whether <Roger Bacon> was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In these
and such like Cases, where the Assent one way or other, is of no 30
Importance to the Interest of any one, no Action, no Concernment
of his following, or depending thereon, there 'tis not strange, that
the Mind should give it self up to the common Opinion, or render
it self to the first Comer. These and the like Opinions, are of so
#P 718#
#L 1#
little weight and moment, that like Motes in the Sun, their Tenden-
cies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by
Chance, and the Mind lets them float at liberty. But where the
Mind judges that the Proposition has concernment in it; where
the Assent, or not Assenting is thought to draw Consequences 5  
of Moment after it, and Good or Evil to depend on chusing, or      
refusing the right side, and the Mind sets it self seriously to enquire,
and examine the Probability: there, I think, it is not in our Choice,
to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either.
The greater Probability, I think, in that Case, will determine the 10 
Assent: and a Man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be
true, where he perceives the greater Probability, than he can avoid
knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or
Disagreement of any two <Ideas>.
If this be so, the Foundation of Errour will lie in wrong Measures 15   
of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Measures of
Good.
#S 17#. <Fourthly>, The fourth and last <wrong Measure of Probability> I
shall take notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance, or Errour, more
People than all the other together, is that which I have mentioned 20 
in the fore-going Chapter, I mean, the <giving up our Assent to the>
<common received Opinions>, either of our Friends, or Party; Neighbour-
hood, or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their
Tenets, than the supposed Honesty, or Learning, or Number of
those of the same Profession? As if honest, or bookish Men could not 25 
err; or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude:
yet this with most Men serves the Turn. The Tenet has had the
attestation of reverend Antiquity, it comes to me with the Pass-port
of former Ages, and therefore I am secure in the Reception I give it:
other Men have been, and are of the same Opinion, (for that is all 30 
is said,) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man
may more justifiably throw up Cross and Pile for his Opinions,
than take them up by such Measures. All Men are liable to Errour,
and most Men are in many Points, by Passion or Interest, under
Temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives, that 35 
influenced the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the
                                                               #P 719#
#L 1#
Leaders of Parties, we should not always find, that it was the em-
bracing of Truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the
Doctrines, they owned and maintained. This at least is certain,
there is not an Opinion so absurd, which a Man may not receive
upon this ground. There is no Errour to be named, which has not 5
had its Professors: And a Man shall never want crooked Paths to
walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, where-ever he has  
the Foot-steps of others to follow.
#S 18#. But notwithstanding the great Noise is made in the World
about Errours and Opinions, I must do Mankind that Right, as to 10
say, <There are not so many Men in Errours, and wrong Opinions, as is>
<commonly supposed>. Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but
indeed, because, concerning those Doctrines they keep such a stir
about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one
should a little catechize the greatest part of the Partisans of most of 15
the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those Matters
they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own:
much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them
upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability.
They are resolved to stick to a Party, that Education or Interest has 20
engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army,
shew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without
ever examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they contend
for. If a Man's Life shews, that he has no serious Regard to Religion;
for what Reason should we think, that he beats his Head about the 25
Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds
of this or that Doctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders,
to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the support of the com-
mon Cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give
him Credit, Preferment, or Protection in that Society. Thus Men 30
become Professors of, and Combatants for those Opinions, they
were never convinced of, nor Proselytes to; no, nor ever had so
much as floating in their Heads: And though one cannot say, there
are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than
there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer, that actually assent to 35
them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.
#P 720#
#C 21#                        CHAPTER XXI

                   <Of the Division of the Sciences>.
#L 1#
#S 01#. ALL that can fall within the compass of Humane Understanding,
being either, <First>, The Nature of Things, as they are in themselves,
their Relations, and their manner of Operation: Or, <Secondly>, That
which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent,
for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, <Thirdly>, 5   
The ways and means, whereby the Knowledge of both the one and
the other of these, are attained and communicated; I think, <Science>
may be divided properly into these <Three sorts>.
#S 02#. <First>, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own
proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, 10  
whereby I mean not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which
have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations as well
as Bodies. This in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call
<or natural Philosophy>. The end of this, is bare speculative
Truth, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls 15  
under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits,
Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, <etc.>
#S 03#. <Secondly, >, The Skill of Right applying our own
Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of Things good and useful.
The most considerable under this Head, is <Ethicks>, which is the 20  
seeking out those Rules, and Measures of humane Actions, which
lead to Happiness, and the Means to practise them. The end of this
is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right,
and a Conduct suitable to it.
#S 04#. <Thirdly> The Third Branch may be called        , or <the> 25    
<Doctrine of Signs>, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly
enough termed also       , Logick; the business whereof, is to con-
sider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of for the under-
standing of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For
since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides 30  
                                                               
#P 721#
#L 1#
it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something
else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be
present to it: And these are <Ideas>. And because the Scene of <Ideas>
that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the im-
mediate view of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, 5
a no very sure Repository: Therefore to communicate our Thoughts
to one another as well as record them for our own use, Signs of our
<Ideas> are also necessary. Those which Men have found most con-
venient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate Sounds.
The Consideration then of <Ideas> and <Words>, as the great Instruments 10
of Knowledge, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation,
who would take a view of humane Knowledge in the whole Extent
of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly con-
sidered, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick,
than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.                 15
#S 05#. <This> seems to me <the first and most general, as well as natural divi->
<sions> of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his
Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of <Things>
themselves for the discovery of Truth; Or about the Things in his
own Power, which are his own <Actions>, for the Attainment of his 20
own Ends; Or the <Signs> the Mind makes use of, both in the one and
the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information.
All which three, <viz. Things> as they are in themselves knowable;
<Actions> as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right
use of <Signs> in order to Knowledge, being <toto coelo> different, they 25
seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual
World, wholly separate and distinct one from another.

                             FINIS