<A LD CHESTERFIELD>
<T HANOVER>
<E 1743>
((THE
CASE
OF THE
HANOVER FORCES
IN THE PAY OF
GREAT-BRITAIN,
IMPARTIALLY AND FREELY EXAMINED:
WITH SOME
SEASONABLE REFLECTIONS
ON THE
PRESENT CONJUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. COOPER AT THE GLOBE IN PATER-+
NOSTER / ROW. M,DCC,XLIII.))
((A
LETTER
FROM THE
HON. THOMAS HERVEY,
TO
SIR THOMAS HANMER, BART.
NE QUID FALSI DICERE AUDEAM,
NE QUID VERI NON AUDEAM.
CICERO.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, AND SOLD BY J.H. ON LUDGATE HILL.))
<P 1>
((THE
CASE
OF THE
HANOVER FORCES, ETC.))
<L 5>
WHOEVER HATH ATTENDED TO
THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OPPOSI-+
TION / TO THE LATE MINISTER, MUST
NECESSARILY CONCLUDE FROM THE WRITINGS,
SPEECHES, AND OTHER DECLARATIONS OF THOSE
WHO HAD THEN THE HONOUR TO BE AT THE HEAD
OF IT, THAT IT WAS FOUNDED ON TWO KNOWN
AND AVOWED FACTS, VIZ((.)) NOTORIOUS CORRUP-+
TION / AND WASTE OF THE PUBLIC TREASURE AT
HOME, FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE SAID MINISTER'S
OWN POWER AND PROJECTS; AND THE OPEN AND
MANIFEST SACRIFICE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST
AND GLORY ABROAD, TO THOSE FOREIGN DOMI-+
NIONS, / IN WHICH IT WAS EVEN A CONDITION
<P 2>
IN THE ACT OF SETTLEMENT, THAT WE SHOULD
HAVE NO CONCERN: INSOMUCH, THAT THE NE-+
CESSITY / OF THE FIRST WAS CONTENDED FOR, AND
THE USE OF IT JUSTIFIED BOTH WITHIN DOORS
AND WITHOUT; AND, AS TO THE LAST, IT WAS,
EVEN BY OUR MINISTERS THEMSELVES, ACKNOW-+
LEDGED / TO BE THE TOUCHSTONE OF ALL OUR NE-+
GOTIATIONS, / AT EVERY COURT IN EUROPE.
NOW AS THE EFFECT OF PENSIONS, PLACES,
ETC((.)) CONTINUES TO BE AS VISIBLE, NAY, IS BECOME
MORE GLARING THAN EVER, THERE IS NO NEED
TO THROW ANY ADDITIONAL LIGHT, ON WHAT IS
SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISHED BY IT'S OWN: BUT
AS OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE MORE INTRICATE IN
THEIR OWN NATURE, AND ARE BESIDES GLOSSED
OVER WITH SPECIOUS PRETENCES, WHICH ARE AT
ONCE BOTH ARTIFICAL AND DELUSIVE, IT BECOMES
MOST CRITICALLY NECESSARY, ESPECIALLY WITH RE-+
GARD / TO THE TAKING NO LESS THAN SIXTEEN
THOUSAND HANOVERIANS INTO BRITISH
PAY, TO INTRODUCE WHAT WE HAVE MORE IM-+
MEDIATELY / TO LAY BEFORE THE PUBLIC, WITH A
SHORT REVIEW OF OUR FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS,
FROM THE HAPPY ACCESSION OF THE PRESENT
ROYAL FAMILY.
<P 3>
BE IT REMEMBERED, THEREFORE, THAT HIS LATE
MAJESTY HAD NO SOONER TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE
THRONE, THAN HE ENTERTAINED THOUGHTS OF AG-+
GRANDIZING / HIS ELECTORAL DOMINIONS, THOUGH
A REBELLION THEN RAGED IN THE HEART OF THE
KINGDOM, THOUGH ALMOST HALF HIS SUBJECTS
WERE DISAFFECTED, AND THE PRETENDER ACTUALLY
LANDED IN SCOTLAND, WITH AN INTENT TO STRUGGLE
WITH HIM IN PERSON FOR THE CROWN.
IN PURSUANCE OF THIS FAVOURITE PROJECT,
BREMEN AND VERDEN WERE ALMOST INSTANTLY
PURCHASED OF DENMARK; AND GREAT-BRITAIN
FOUND HERSELF AT ONCE ENGAGED TO GUARANTY
THE POSSESSION OF SLESWICK TO THAT CROWN;
AND SADDLED WITH A VOTE OF CREDIT FOR
((250,000 L.)) TO PUT US IN SECURITY AGAINST THE
RESENTMENTS OF THE KING OF SWEDEN, WHO,
OF AN OLD ALLY, BECAME A MOST EXASPERATED
ENEMY; AS, HAD HIS LIFE BEEN PROLONGED,
WE MIGHT HAVE HAD MORE FATAL EXPERIENCE.
AS IT WAS, A RUPTURE BETWEEN THE TWO
KINGDOMS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED; THE KING,
AS ELECTOR OF HANOVER, HAVING FIRST DECLARED
WAR, IN VIRTUE OF HIS LATE ALLIANCE WITH DEN-+
MARK, / AND A BRITISH FLEET BEING NEXT DIS-+
PATCHED /
<P 4>
UP THE BALTIC, TO COMPEL SWEDEN
TO CONNIVE AT THE WRONG WHICH HAD BEEN
DONE HER; OR ACCEPT OF A LARGE SUM OF STER-+
LING / MONEY BY WAY OF RECOMPENCE.
IN THIS DISTRESS THE SWEDES THOUGHT THE
LAST THE MOST ELIGIBLE EXPEDIENT, AND FOR THE
PRESENT, PUT UP A QUARREL THEY WERE NOT IN
A PROPER CONDITION TO PROSECUTE TO ADVAN-+
TAGE. /
<L 10>
BUT THE DRUDGERY IMPOSED ON THE BRITISH
FLEET DID NOT END HERE: RUSSIA HAD GIVEN
OFFENCE TO THE COURT OF HANOVER, BY INTER-+
FERING / IN THE AFFAIR OF MECKLENBOURG, WHICH,
ON ACCOUNT BOTH OF IT'S EXTENT AND SITUA-+
TION, / WOULD HAVE MADE A NOBLE ADDITION TO
HIS MAJESTY'S ELECTORAL DOMINIONS; RUSSIA
THEREFORE WAS TO BE HUMBLED, AND GREAT-
BRITAIN WAS TASKED TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT WAS
OUT OF THE POWER OF HANOVER.
BUT DURING THESE COMMOTIONS IN THE
NORTH, IT WAS FOUND CONVENIENT TO ENTER IN-+
TO / A TREATY WITH THE EMPEROR; A TREATY
ACCORDINGLY WAS AGREED UPON IN ((1716)), BY
WHICH HIS LATE MAJESTY AND THE EMPEROR
ENGAGE MUTUALLY TO DEFEND AND PRESERVE EACH
<P 5>
OTHER IN THE POSSESSION OF WHATEVER KING-+
DOMS, / PROVINCES AND RIGHTS (IN THE CON-+
DITION / THEY NOW ARE) THEY THEN ACTUALLY
HELD AND ENJOYED, OR WHICH, DURING THE
CONTINUANCE OF THAT LEAGUE, THEY SHOULD,
BY MUTUAL CONSENT, ACQUIRE; WHICH WAS
TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE
FOR WHATEVER HANOVER HAD, OR SHOULD AC-+
QUIRE / IN THE NORTH.
THE ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM IT TO
GREAT-BRITAIN WE SHALL SEE PRESENTLY: A
MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HIS IMPERIAL MA-+
JESTY / AND SPAIN TAKES PLACE, AND THE LAST
FORMS OF DESIGN TO MAKE HIMSELF MASTER OF
SICILY: UPON WHICH, THE EMPEROR CALLS UP-+
ON / US TO FULFIL OUR ENGAGEMENTS; THIS DRAWS
ON THE BOLD STROKE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN ((1718)), UNDER THE CONDUCT OF SIR GEORGE
BYNG. IN CONSEQUENCE WHEREOF, AS SWEDEN
BEFORE, SPAIN OF A FIRM FRIEND BECOMES
AN IMPLACABLE ENEMY, AND TAKES ALL AD-+
VANTAGES / OF MANIFESTING IT'S RESENTMENTS;
THE SAD EFFECTS OF WHICH, WE BOTH FEEL
AND LAMENT TO THIS DAY.
<P 6>
BUT THOUGH THIS CAVALIER STEP, SO INFI-+
NITELY / DETRIMENTAL TO GREAT-BRITAIN, HAD
BEEN TAKEN IN FAVOUR OF THE EMPEROR, HIS
IMPERIAL MAJESTY WAS NOW, FOR CERTAIN REA-+
SONS, / WHICH WILL SPEEDILY BE EXPLAINED, TO
BE MADE SENSIBLE OF OUR IMPORTANCE IN MAK-+
ING / PEACE AS WELL AS WAR; IN ORDER THAT
HANOVER MIGHT, FOR THE FUTURE, RELY THE
MORE SECURELY UPON HIS FRIENDSHIP AND PRO-+
TECTION: / ACCORDINGLY, AS GREAT-BRITAIN HAD
ALREADY BEEN MADE THE BUBBLE OF THE WAR,
SHE WAS NOW TO BE MADE THE BUBBLE OF THE
PEACE: AS SPAIN HAD BEEN PROVOKED, SO LIKE-+
WISE / SPAIN WAS TO BE APPEASED: THUS TO BRING
BACK THE COURT OF VIENNA TO A PROPER SENSE
OF THINGS, AND PACIFY THE HEART-BURNINGS
OF THAT OF MADRID, GIBRALTAR WAS TO BE SUR-+
RENDERED / ON ONE HAND, AND THE EVENTUAL
SUCCESSION OF DON CARLOS TO TUSCANY, PARMA
AND PLACENTIA, WAS TO BE PROVIDED FOR BY
THE QUADRUPLE-ALLIANCE UPON THE OTHER:
NOR COULD THIS BE DONE 'TILL EVEN THE LATE
KING HIMSELF, BY A LETTER UNDER HIS OWN
HAND, HAD SIGNIFY'D, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE
HIS FAULT IF GIBRALTAR WAS NOT RESTORED.
<P 7>
IT MUST HERE BE REMEMBERED, THAT THE
YEAR BEFORE THIS WAS RENDERED MEMORABLE BY
THE MULTIPLICITY OF TREATIES AND PARTITIONS
THEN AGITATING, OR CONCLUDED IN THE NORTH;
DURING WHICH, IT APPEARED THAT THE EMPE-+
ROR / WAS NOT ALTOGETHER SO IMPLICITLY THE HUM-+
BLE / SERVANT OF THE COURT OF HANOVER, AS HAD
BEEN EXPECTED FROM HIM, IN VIRTUE OF THE
TREATY OF ((1716)), AND THE SERVICES DONE HIM
BY GREAT-BRITAIN SINCE: IN PARTICULAR, HE
WAS FAR FROM JOINING IN THE PROJECT, BEFORE-+
MENTIONED, / OF HUMBLING RUSSIA, AS MORE
CLEARLY APPEARS, BY THE WORDS OF A CERTAIN
GREAT WRITER FOR THE LATE ADMINISTRATION,
WHO, WHEN HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY WAS TO BE
VILIFIED, IS PLEASED, HOWEVER INJUDICIOUSLY,
TO EXPRESS HIMSELF AS FOLLOWS;  *HAD THE
ANCIENT PROVERB OF GERMAN FAITH BEEN
INFALLIBLE, A CERTAIN GREAT PRINCE HAD
GRANTED AN INVESTITURE WHICH HE ONCE SO-+
LEMNLY / PROMISED, ON A VERY VALUABLE CON-+
SIDERATION; / NOR WOULD HE HAVE EXPECTED A
MILLION STERLING FOR A REFRESHING FEE.*
FROM THE MOMENT THEREFORE THAT THE
EMPERIOR CEASED TO CO-OPERATE IN THE GREAT
<P 8>
WORK OF AGGRANDISING HANOVER, IT WAS BOTH
DISCOVERED, THAT THE OVER-GROWN POWER OF
THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA BECAME DANGEROUS TO
THE LIBERTIES OF EUROPE, AND RESOLVED TO RE-+
DUCE / IT AGAIN WITHIN A PROPER BOUND: BUT AS
THIS WAS NOT TO BE EFFECTED ONLY BY THE SE-+
CRET / TREATY OF MADRID, WE, AT THE SAME
TIME, THREW OURSELVES INTO THE ARMS OF
FRANCE, AND ACTED BY THE DIRECTIONS OF HER
MINISTERS WITHOUT RESERVE; WHICH WILL SERVE
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PART WE TOOK IN THE
QUARREL, BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND SPANISH
COURTS; THE REFUSING THE SOLE MEDIATION BE-+
TWEEN / SPAIN AND THE EMPEROR; AND THE IN-+
VOLVING / OURSELVES IN THE HANOVER-ALLIANCE:
FROM ALL WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE
TAUGHT, THAT THE INTEREST OF GREAT-BRITAIN
WAS NEVER ONCE THOUGHT OF ALL THIS TIME,
UNLESS TO BE SACRIFICED.
NOW THAT THE SAID ALLIANCE WAS CALCU-+
LATED / ONLY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF LOWER-
SAXONY, OR, RATHER TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND
THE NEW POSSESSIONS AND CLAIMS OF THE E-+
LECTORATE / OF HANOVER, IS, BEYOND ALL CONTRO-+
VERSY, / MADE APPEAR BY THE WRITINGS AND
<P 9>
SPEECHES OF THOSE IN THE OPPOSITION TO THE
LATE MINISTER; AS, LIKEWISE, THAT THE PRESENT
EXORBITANT POWER OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA
WAS NO BETTER THAN A POLITICAL BUGBEAR, TO BE
FOUND NO WHERE; NO NOT IN THE BRAIN OF THOSE
WHO ENDEAVOURED MOST TO HAVE IT MISTAKEN
FOR A REALITY: CONSEQUENTLY THAT ALL THE MIL-+
LIONS / SQUANDERED BY US ON THAT OCCASION, AND
UNDER THAT PRETENCE, SERVED ONLY TO EXHAUST
OURSELVES, AND AVENGE THE CAUSE OF HANOVER
UPON THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA.
INDEED THE VERY BASIS OF THAT PERNICIOUS AL-+
LIANCE / WAS GROUNDED ON ABSURDITIES AND IM-+
PRACTICABILITIES, / TO SAY NO WORSE: THAT WE WERE
NOT DRAWN BY IT INTO A WAR WITH THE EMPERIOR,
IS NOT TO BE IMPUTED TO THOSE WHO ADVISED IT,
AND THAT A WAR WITH SPAIN WAS THE CONSE-+
QUENCE / OF IT CANNOT BE DENIED; AT LEAST A HALF
WAR; A WAR ON ONE SIDE, IF NOT ON THE OTHER:
THIS HALF WAR AGAIN GENERATED A HALF PEACE;
THE WHICH, IF HANOVER WAS NOT A GAINER BY,
THE EMPEROR IN THE END BECAME, VERY SUFFI-+
CIENTLY, / A LOSER: THE EQUITABLE DESIGNS ON
MECKLENBOURG, ETC((.)) WERE NOT YET RELISHED AT
<P 10>
VIENNA, THOUGH SO MIGHTY A CONFEDERACY WAS
FORMED TO PERSUADE HIM TO IT; AND THEREFORE
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY WAS STILL TOO GREAT AND FOR-+
MIDABLE. / TO BE FRIENDS WITH SPAIN WAS THEN
OUR INTEREST UPON ANY TERMS; WE NOT ONLY
TREAT, BUT HUMOUR, CONCEDE, NAY, SOLICIT THE
HONOUR OF BEING CONVOYS TO DON CARLOS INTO
ITALY; THAT VERY DON CARLOS, WHO WAS SO LATELY
SET FORTH, AS LIKELY TO BECOME THE SO LONG DREAD-+
ED / UNIVERSAL MONARCH OF EUROPE. - NOW TO
WHAT DID ALL THIS CONTRIBUTE? NOT TO THE PEACE,
SECURITY, WEALTH, OR HONOUR OF ENGLAND:
NO; BUT TO THE REDUCTION OF THE STILL TOO PO-+
TENT / HOUSE OF AUSTRIA: FOR, THOUGH THAT
HOUSE WAS ALREADY INVOLVED IN ALMOST INSUPE-+
RABLE / DIFFICULTIES; THOUGH THAT OF BOURBON
FLOURISHED IN EXACT PROPORTION AS THE OTHER DE-+
CLINED; / NAY, THOUGH WE HAD INCONTESTABLE
EVIDENCE THAT DUNKIRK WAS EVEN THEN REPAIR-+
ING, / YET OUR MINISTERS PERSISTED NOTWITHSTAND-+
ING, / AND THE WHOLE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH EM-+
PIRE / WAS TO BE STEER'D BY THE HANOVER RUDDER.
BUT ALL WOULD NOT DO: AT THE MOMENT
OF PROJECTION ALL BLEW UP; AND WHEN THEIR
<P 11>
HOPES WERE AT THE HIGHEST, THEY FOUND THEY
HAD BUILT UPON THE SANDS.
THOUGH THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND HAD STOOP-+
ED / LIKE A CAMEL TO BE LOADED, AND PATIENTLY
SUFFERED PLACEMEN AND PENSIONERS TO HANG UP-+
ON / THEM LIKE SO MANY HORSE-LEECHES; THEY
COULD NOT BE INDUCED TO SUBMIT TO NEW TAXES
AND IMPOSITIONS, IN ORDER TO DESTROY THAT BA-+
LANCE / OF POWER, WHICH, AT SUCH AN INCREDIBLE
EXPENCE OF BLOOD AND TREASURE, THEY HAD EN-+
DEAVOURED / TO RENDER IMMOVEABLE, NOR THE
HOUSE OF AUSTRIA TO BE UNDONE, THAT THE
PETTY PRINCES OF GERMANY MIGHT AGGRANDIZE
THEMSELVES OUT OF THEIR SPOILS.
FINDING, THEREFORE, THE GROUND TO SINK
BENEATH THEIR TOIL, OUR WISE MINISTERS WERE
FORCED TO THEIR OLD TRACK OF NEGOTIATIONS,
EVEN WITH THE VERY POWER THEY HAD SO
HEARTILY ENDEAVOURED TO RUIN; ACCORDINGLY,
WE GUARANTY THE PRAGMATIC SANCTION HAND
OVER HEAD, AS THE MOST POPULAR STEP WHICH
COULD THEN BE TAKEN IN FAVOUR OF THE BA-+
LANCE / OF EUROPE, ALREADY ALMOST RUINED BE-+
YOND / REDEMPTION: BUT EVEN IN THIS AFFAIR,
HANOVER ACTS UPON A SEPARATE BOTTOM, PRO-+
VIDES /
<P 12>
FOR HER OWN SATISFACTION, WITH ALL IMA-+
GINABLE / SECRECY AND ADDRESS, AND THEN AC-+
CEDES / TO A TREATY, WHICH WAS IRRECONCILEABLE
WITH ALL HER FORMER PURSUITS, AND WHICH ACTU-+
ALLY / CLASH'D WITH HER APPARENT INTEREST, IF THAT
INTEREST CONSISTED, AS WAS MORE THAN SUSPECTED,
IN DELIVERING GERMANY FROM THAT VERY POWER,
IT NOW STIPULATED TO PRESERVE. - BUT WHAT HAS
SINCE BEEN TRANSACTED BY PRUSSIA AND SAXONY,
HAS FURNISHED US WITH A SOLUTION OF THIS POLITI-+
CAL / PROBLEM: NOR CAN IT BE SUPPOSED THAT THE
FORCES AND TREASURES OF GREAT-BRITAIN WERE
TO BE DOLED AWAY WITHOUT A VALUABLE CONSIDER-+
ATION, / AS WILL BE MADE MORE FULLY APPEAR WHEN
WE COME TO EXAMINE THE MYSTERIES OF LAST
YEAR, WHICH WE SHALL NOT FAIL TO DO IN THEIR
PROPER PLACE.
IT MUST HERE BE OBSERVED, THAT THIS NEW
TREATY, WHICH THUS DISSOLVED THE NEVER-TO-BE-
FORGOTTEN HANOVER TREATY, WAS ENTERED INTO
CONTRARY TO AN EXPRESS ARTICLE OF THE LAST, WHICH
OBLIGED EACH OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES NOT TO
ENTER INTO ANY NEW ENGAGEMENTS WITH ANY
OTHER POWER, WITHOUT A COMMUNICATION FIRST
<P 13>
MADE TO THE REST OF THE CONFEDERACY: THIS
PEACE FRANCE AT ONCE RESENTED AND DESPISED;
BUT, TO TAKE A PLEASANT REVENGE, ONLY CHANG-+
ED / A FEW GARRISONS ON THEIR FRONTIERS, WHICH
THREW OUR GALLANT MINISTERS INTO SUCH A PANIC
AS IF THE BEACONS WERE ON FIRE ALL ROUND OUR
COASTS, AND THE PRETENDER ALREADY ON HIS
MARCH TO LONDON.
IT APPEARS LIKEWISE, THAT THIS NEW NEGOTIA-+
TION / WAS A MUCH A SECRET AT THE HAGUE AS VER-+
SAILLES; / FOR WHEN IT WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE
STATES, THEY WERE AT THE SAME TIME INFORMED,
THAT HANOVER WAS ALREADY SATISFIED: BUT
THOUGH GREAT-BRITAIN FOLLOWED THE EXAMPLE,
OR PERHAPS OBEYED THE PRESCRIPTION OF HANO-+
VER, / HOLLAND DID NOT APPEAR IN HASTE TO DO THE
SAME; AND THOUGH THE ACCESSION OF THE STATES
WAS AT LAST OBTAINED, IT WAS NOT WITHOUT DIFFI-+
CULTIES / AND LIMITATIONS; THOUGH WE WERE
OBLIGED TO SWALLOW THE DOSE WITHOUT GILD-+
ING, OR ANY PALLIATIVE WHATEVER.
THUS WE SEE THE EMPERIOR, ENGLAND, AND
HOLLAND ONCE MORE IN ARTICLES WITH HANOVER
FOR THE HEAD OF THE CONFEDERACY: BUT WHE-+
THER /
<P 14>
THE FIRST WAS BEFORE-HAND SUFFICIENTLY
HUMBLED, OR WHETHER THE LAST WAS SUFFICIENTLY
COMPENSATED IS NOT AS YET TO BE DECIDED. THIS
HOWEVER IS MOST CERTAIN, THAT GREAT-BRITAIN
IS STILL SICK AT HEART FOR HAVING THROWN HER
WEIGHT INTO THE WRONG SCALE, AND BEING AT
THE SOLE EXPENCE OF THESE UNGRATEFUL EXPERI-+
MENTS. /
<L 9>
BUT WHETHER THIS REUNION WAS PLACED ON
RIGHT PRINCIPLES OR WRONG; WHETHER IT WAS A
MERCENARY BARGAIN, OR AN HONEST ENDEAVOUR
TO PRESERVE THE PUBLICK PEACE; ONE WOULD HAVE
THOUGHT THAT THE TRUE INTEREST OF THE MARITIME
POWERS WOULD, ONCE MORE, HAVE BEEN LINKED
WITH THAT OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, AND ALL
IN CONJUNCTION, HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO ACT
WITH THEIR WHOLE POWER FOR THE COMMON
SAFETY; ESPECIALLY SINCE THE VERY TERROR, EX-+
CITED / BY A CHANGE OF FRENCH GARRISONS ONLY,
HAD SUFFICIENTLY CONVINCED EVERY BODY WHERE
THE REAL DANGER LAY.
I SAY, THIS IS WHAT ONE MIGHT HAVE REASON-+
ABLY / EXPECTED. BUT LET US TURN OUR EYES TO
THE EVENT.
<P 15>
AFFAIRS WERE IN THIS SITUATION WHEN THE
KING OF POLAND DIES; AND THE CHANGE WHICH
SUCCEEDED THEREUPON, SUFFICIENTLY PROVES HOW
IMPOSSIBLE IT IS TO UNITE OPPOSITE INTERESTS.
WHILE HANOVER WAS MOST INTENT UPON HER
FAVOURITE PROJECT OF HUMBLING THE HOUSE OF
AUSTRIA, SHE HAD CAST HER EYE ON THE DE-+
CLINING / CONDITION OF KING AUGUSTUS, AND,
APPREHENDING A NEW ELECTION MUST SPEEDILY
COME ON, ENTERED INTO MEASURES WITH FRANCE,
FOR ADVANCING STANISLOUS ONCE MORE TO THE
THRONE; IT BEING A POINT IN WHICH THE IN-+
TERESTS / OF THE TWO COURTS WERE IN A MANNER THE
SAME: A PRINCE IN THE INTEREST EITHER OF THE
HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, OR OF RUSSIA, GIVING EQUAL
UMBRAGE TO BOTH, AS BEING BOTH EQUALLY E-+
NEMIES / TO THE POWER OF THE ONE, AND THE IN-+
FLUENCE / OF THE OTHER: IF HANOVER, IN PARTI-+
CULAR, / HAD NOT MET WITH THE RETURNS SHE
EXPECTED FROM VIENNA, IN THE AFFAIR OF MECK-+
LENBOURG, / ETC((.)) SHE HAD AS LITTLE REASON TO BE
SATISFY'D WITH RUSSIA; WHO WAS STRONGLY IN-+
CLINED / TO RECOVER SLESWICK FOR THE DUKE OF
HOLSTEIN, ON THE SECURITY OF WHICH, TO THE
<P 16>
KING OF DENMARK, DEPENDED THE CONTINU-+
ANCE / OF BREMEN AND VERDEN TO THE ELECTORATE
OF HANOVER: RUSSIA HAD, BESIDES, BUSIED HER-+
SELF / IN THWARTING THE DESIGNS OF THAT COURT
UPON MECKLENBOURG, WHICH WERE NOT ONLY OB-+
VIOUS / TO, BUT GAVE A GENERAL ALARM TO ALL THE
POWERS OF THE NORTH: AS THERFORE FRANCE
STOOD ENGAGED, FROM ALL CONSIDERATIONS, TO
SUPPORT KING STANISLAUS; HANOVER MADE HER
OVERTURES, ON THAT HEAD, WITH THE MORE
FRANKNESS, AND HAD THE PLEASURE OF FINDING
THEM RECEIVED ACCORDING TO HER OWN WISHES.
THAT THE COURT OF VERSAILLES WAS THERFORE
SO LONG BEFORE PREPARED FOR THE DEATH OF KING
AUGUSTUS, IS ENTIRELY OWING TO THE POLITICS OF
HANOVER; AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE IMME-+
DIATELY / THEREUPON SENT TO THE ENGLISH MINISTER
AT WARSAW, TO ACT ACCORDINGLY, DID NOT LONG
CONTINUE A SECRET TO THE COURTS WHO WERE CON-+
CERNED / IN THE EVENT: EVEN HERE AT HOME, SUS-+
PICIONS / OF THAT KIND AROSE SOON AFTER, AND WHICH
IT BECAME NECESSARY TO CLEAR UP: TO THIS END,
A MOTION WAS MADE IN PARLIAMENT FOR THE IN-+
STRUCTIONS / GIVEN TO THE SAID MINISTER AT THAT
<P 17>
TIME; BUT THE INTEREST OF THE PREMIER, AS
USUAL, WAS TOO MIGHTY FOR THAT OF HIS COUN-+
TRY, / AND A NEGATIVE DEFEATED THE EVIDENCE
FROM FACTS WHICH MUST OTHERWISE HAVE
BEEN PRODUCED; THOUGH A MORAL CERTAINTY,
THAT THESE SUSPICIONS WERE TRUE, AROSE EVEN
FROM THE NEGATIVE ITSELF: FOR, AS THESE IN-+
STRUCTIONS / COULD, AND DID ONLY RELATE TO THE
ELECTION, WHICH WAS NOW OVER, THERE COULD
BE NO OTHER REASON FOR CONCEALING THEM,
BUT THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THEIR BEING MORE
CALCULATED FOR THE INTERESTS OF HANOVER, THAN
FOR THOSE OF GREAT-BRITAIN.
THUS SUPPORTED BY FRANCE ON ONE HAND,
AND HANOVER ON THE OTHER, STANISLAUS WAS ELECT-+
ED / KING OF POLAND, WHEREBY THE INFLUENCE OF
THE FIRST (THOUGH ALREADY SO MUCH DREADED)
WAS LIKE TO RECEIVE A VERY CONSIDERABLE ACCES-+
SION / IN THE NORTH, AND THE LAST WAS GRATIFIED
IN HER DARLING POINT OF MORTIFYING AND HUM-+
BLING / THE COURT OF VIENNA; THOUGH FOR THESE
VERY REASONS IT IS APPARENT THAT SCARCE ANY
EVENT UPON THE CONTINENT COULD BE MORE
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE TO THE INTEREST OF
<P 18>
THESE KINGDOMS IN PARTICULAR, OR THE BA-+
LANCE / OF EUROPE IN GENERAL.
THE WAR, IN WHICH THE EMPEROR WAS
INVOLVED UPON THIS OCCASION, CALLED LOUDLY
UPON ENGLAND, HOLLAND AND HANOVER, FOR
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GUARANTEE THEY HAD
SO LATELY ENGAGED IN: AND OUR EAGLE-EYED
MINISTERS DID NOT FAIL TO MAKE A PROPER
USE OF IT; THAT IS TO SAY, THEY MADE IT A
PRETENCE TO RISE HIGHER THAN EVER IN THEIR
DEMANDS UPON THE PEOPLE; AND DENMARK,
AS USUAL, LENT HER NAME FOR SUBSIDIES, WHICH
HANOVER WAS NOT THE WORSE FOR. SHOULD
IT BE ASKED, WHAT PART THAT WISE ELECTORATE
TOOK UPON THIS OCCASION? WHY, IT LOOKED ON
THE FRAY WITH IT'S HANDS IN HIS POCKETS;
ESTEMMING TREATIES BUT PARCHMENT, AND READY
MONEY TOO SCARCE A COMMODITY TO BE PART-+
ED / WITH IN ANY CAUSE, OR FOR ANY ENGAGE-+
MENT / WHATEVER.
IN HOLLAND, HOWEVER, THAT THE FARCE,
WHICH WAS PLAYING AT HOME, MIGHT BE CAR-+
RIED / ON WITH SOME DECENCY AND CON-+
SISTENCY, / OUR RESIDENT THERE HAD ORDERS TO
BE AS LOUD AND IMPORTUNATE AS POSSIBLE
<P 19>
WITH THE STATES, TO ENTER WITH US INTO INSTANT
MEASURES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE HOUSE OF
AUSTRIA, AND SETTING A BOUND TO THE GROWING
POWER OF FRANCE: AND THIS OUR MINISTERS
THOUGHT THEY MIGHT DO VERY SECURELY; SINCE,
THE STATES BEING IN THE SECRET OF OUR INVETERATE
ANTIPATHY TO THE EMPEROR, IT WAS NOT REA-+
SONABLE / TO SUPPOSE THAT THEY WOULD LAUNCH
INTO EXPENCES, WHICH THEY KNEW BEFORE-HAND
WOULD, FOR THAT VERY REASON, BE RENDERED VAIN
AND FRUITLESS. BUT IN THIS ONE PARTICULAR OUR
<P 19>
<L 12>
TRUE AND TRUSTY FRIENDS REFINED TOO MUCH.
THE STATES, WITH SOME REASON, BELIEVED, THAT
WHEN IT APPEARED, THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA WAS
IN REAL DANGER, EVEN THE DARLING INTEREST OF
THE ELECTORATE WOULD BE FORCED TO RECEDE A
LITTLE TO THOSE OF THE KINGDOM; AND THAT
EVEN THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND WOULD HAVE SO
MUCH INFLUENCE AS TO CARRY ONE POINT IN FA-+
VOUR / OF THAT FAMILY, ON WHICH THE GENERAL
BALANCE OF POWER PRINCIPALLY DEPENDED: UP-+
ON / THE REPEATED URGENT AND ALMOST DAILY AP-+
PLICATIONS / OF OUR SAID RESIDENT, THEY AT LAST
THEREFORE GAVE HIM TO UNDERSTAND, THAT THEY
<P 20>
WERE WILLING TO MEET HIS OFFERS HALF-WAY:
WHEN LO! - IT APPEARED - HE HAD NO
POWER TO TREAT.
THUS, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THIS BLESSED PO-+
LISH / ELECTION, ENGLAND WAS MORE AND MORE
TAXED AND EXHAUSTED, AND THE EMPEROR RE-+
MAINED / UNASSISTED, NOTWITHSTANDING; INSO-+
MUCH / THAT HE WAS COMPELLED TO THROW HIM-+
SELF / INTO THE VERY BOSOM OF HIS CAPITAL ENEMY,
UPON ANY TERMS HE COULD GET. AND THOUGH,
BY THE INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, POLAND WAS ONCE
MORE SNATCH'D FROM KING STANISLAUS, THE
HOUSE OF BOURBON MADE A SHIFT TO PROCURE A
NOBLE EQUIVALENT IN THE DUTCHY OF LORRAIN;
NOT TO MENTION THE KINGDOMS OF NAPLES AND
SICILY, ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS OF FRANCE
AND SPAIN, AND BESTOWED UPON DON CARLOS.
BUT IF THE BALANCE OF EUROPE WAS THUS
DISJOINTED, THAT OF GERMANY WAS NOW SUFFI-+
CIENTLY / PROVIDED FOR. THERE WAS NO ROOM
TO SET FORTH ANY LONGER, IN SUCH TERRIFYING
COLOURS, THE OVERGROWN POWER OF THE HOUSE
OF AUSTRIA. - ALAS! IT WAS NOW IN RUINS;
AND WHAT HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY HAD
<P 21>
CONDESCENDED TO LEAVE STANDING AS A MONUMENT
OF HIS MERCY, THE GRAND SIGNIOR THREATENED TO
DESTROY; THE WAR IN HUNGARY WITH THE TURKS
TAKING PLACE, BEFORE THE WOUNDS LEFT BY THOSE
IN GERMANY AND ITALY WERE CLOSED; AND THE
ISSUE PROVING AS FATAL TO THE IMPERIALISTS AS
EITHER OF THOSE WHICH PRECEDED IT.
IN THIS MELANCHOLY INTERVAL THE EMPE-+
ROR / DIES, LEAVING NOTHING BUT THE PRAG-+
MATIC / SANCTION FOR THE SECURITY OF HIS HEIRS;
WHICH PROVED OF SO LITTLE SIGNIFICATION, NOT-+
WITHSTANDING / THE GREAT NAMES WITH WHICH
IT WAS FILLED, THAT ALMOST EVERY ONE OF THE
ELECTORS, LIKE MOST OTHER ELECTORS, THOUGHT
IT A PROPER OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE MOST
OF HIS VOTE; AND ALL AT THE EXPENCE OF THE
HELPLESS, ABANDONED HOUSE OF AUSTRIA. A
WEAK, PITIFUL, DEPENDENT EMPEROR, EVERY ONE
COULD FIND HIS ACCOUNT IN; WHOEVER THEN
THEY PREFERRED, THEY RESOLVED TO STRIP FIRST AS
BARE AS POSSIBLE.
BUT IN THE MIDST OF THESE ROYAL DREAMS
OF DOMINION, HAVOCK, SPOIL AND PLUNDER,
THE KING OF PRUSSIA STARTS FIRST INTO ACTION,
<P 22>
PLEADS A RIGHT, BUT TAKES POSSESSION BY FORCE,
AND AVOWS A RESOLUTION TO HOLD IT BY THE SAME
MEANS; WHICH UNEXPECTED INCIDENT GAVE A
NEW ASPECT OF THE FACE OF GERMANY.
IN THE MEAN WHILE, THE DEATH OF THE
EMPEROR, AND THE DEPLORABLE SITUATION OF
HIS FAMILY, AFFECTED EVERY ENGLISH HEART AS
IT OUGHT; THOUGH, AT THE SAME TIME, THEY
WERE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SUPERIOR
ABILITY OF THAT GREAT MINISTER, WHO HAD SO
SOON REDUCED THAT ASPIRING HOUSE FROM BE-+
ING / THE TERROR TO THE PITY OF THE WORLD. IN
HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD TESTIFY THE
SAME ABILITY IN RAISING UP, AS PULLING DOWN,
THEY VERY WILLINGLY AGREED TO ALL HIS DEMANDS
OF AIDS, LOANS, AND WHAT NOT: FLATTERING
THEMSELVES THAT HE WOULD NOW, AT LEAST, AP-+
PLY / THEM AS HE OUGHT FOR THE SERVICE OF
GREAT-BRITAIN, NOT, AS BEFORE, - HATH
BEEN SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED: NOR INDEED WERE
THEY WHOLLY DECEIVED: FOR THE IMMEDIATE
INTEREST OF HANOVER HAD TAKEN A NEW TURN
FROM THIS BOLD STROKE OF THE KING OF PRUS-+
SIA. / THE TIES OF BLOOD HAVE BUT A FEEBLE
<P 23>
HOLD ON PRINCES. THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
COURTS OF BERLIN AND HANOVER WERE SO NEARLY
RELATED, INTEREST HAD SET THEM AT VARIANCE; NOT
ALONE WITH REGARD TO THE AFFAIR OF MECKLEN-+
BOURG, / IN WHICH THE UNDENIABLE RIGHTS OF THE
FIRST WERE MANIFESTLY INJURED, BUT ALSO ON AC-+
COUNT / OF CERTAIN FAMILY-CLAIMS AT THAT TIME
UNADJUSTED; AS, LIKEWISE, THAT THERE WAS A SORT
OF RIVALSHIP BETWEEN THE FAMILIES, AND ANY
ACCESS OF INTEREST AND POWER TO THE ONE, WAS
SURE TO GIVE UMBRAGE TO THE OTHER.
BUT TO RETURN - THE PRETENSIONS OF PRUS-+
SIA / WERE LIMITED TO CERTAIN DUTCHIES AND
LORDSHIPS IN SILESIA, AND, AS THE EVENT HAS
PROVED, THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISFIED
WITH MUCH LESS THAN HE CLAIMED, IT CANNOT
BE ENOUGH WONDERED AT, THAT WAYS AND
MEANS HAD NOT BEEN USED TO BRING HIM TO
TERMS BY TREATY AND NEGOTIATION (SO MUCH
USED UPON MORE INCONSIDERABLE OCCASI-+
ONS) / BEFORE THE DISPUTE WAS LEFT TO BE DE-+
CIDED / BY THE SWORD: BUT INSTEAD OF EX-+
PERIMENTS / TO SOFTEN HIM, WHICH MIGHT GAIN
SO POTENT AN ALLY TO ASSIST IN THE PRESER-+
VATION /
<P 24>
OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, AND INCREASE
OF POWER TO THE PROTESTANT INTEREST, THE SPI-+
RIT / OF WAR ALONE PREVAILED AGAINST HIM, AND
THE COURT OF VIENNA WAS CONTINUALLY PRESSED
TO ACTION, AND CALLED UPON FOR PLANS OF OPE-+
RATIONS / AGAINST HIM; NAY, SO LITTLE WAS ANY
THOUGHT OR DESIRE ENTERTAINED OF GAINING HIM
IN A FRIENDLY MANNER, AND SO LITTLE WAS APPRE-+
HENDED / FROM FRANCE AT THAT TIME, THAT CER-+
TAIN / PERSONS, FOR A WHILE, ENJOYED A SCHEME
FOR THE PARTITION OF HIS DOMINIONS, AND A
CONVENTION WAS ACTUALLY FORMED FOR THAT PUR-+
POSE; / BY WHICH VERY CONVENTION IT APPEARS,
THAT THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY WAS THE ONLY CON-+
TRACTING / POWER THAT DISCLAIMED ANY SHARE IN
THE SPOILS. NOW THE GAINS AS WELL AS THE
DESIRES OF SUCH A PARTITION, POINTS OUT TOO
PLAINLY FROM WHENCE IT TOOK IT'S RISE: BUT IF
ANY DOUBT REMAINS, LET ANY ONE CONSIDER THE
ANSWER GIVEN BY THE COURT OF VIENNA, MAY ((13)),
((1741((, N.S. TO A MEMORIAL OF MR. ROBINSON'S
OF APRIL ((17)), WHICH IS A DOWNRIGHT REMON-+
STRANCE / AGAINST OUR ADVISING AN ACCOMMO-+
DATION, / WHEN IT WAS TOO LATE - A DENIAL OF
<P 25>
HAVING EVER CONCERTED OR CONSENTED TO ANY
CONVENTION FOR THE PARTITION OF PRUSSIA;
THOUGH ACQUAINTED WITH, AND APPRISED OF IT,
SHE WENT NO FARTHER THAN TO COMPLY WITH THE
DESIRES OF OTHERS AS SHE HAS MATERIALS TO PROVE
- AND THAT THE CONVENTION SENT FROM VI-+
ENNA / WAS FORMED IN CONFORMITY TO THE RE-+
PRESENTATIONS / OF THE COURT DE OSTEIN (WHO
WAS THE QUEEN'S MINISTER AT LONDON.) GOOD
GOD! WHAT A REPROACH IS THIS TO THE MARTIAL
SPIRIT WHICH AT FIRST WAS FROTHED FORTH FROM
THIS SIDE OF THE WATER! WHAT A PLAIN THOUGH
POLITE DECLARATION DOTH IT CONTAIN OF THE POWER,
TO WHOSE ACCOUNT THIS NEW PARTITION-TREATY
OUGHT TO BE PLACED! SINCE IT WAS FOUNDED ON
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COUNT DE OSTEIN;
AND WHAT REPRESENTATIONS COULD HE MAKE,
BUT SUCH AS WERE CONFORMABLE TO THE SENTI-+
MENTS / OF THE COURT WHERE HE RESIDED, AND WHOSE
ASSISTANCE WAS TO BE OBTAINED AT ANY PRICE?
NOT IS THIS REMONSTRANCE THE ONLY AUTHO-+
RITIES / OF THIS FACT, FOR MANY OTHER PARTI-+
CULARS / OF THE LIKE NATURE OCCUR IN THE PA-+
PERS / LAID BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT LAST YEAR -
<P 26>
BUT A THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE WHOLE
EVIDENCE WOULD CARRY US TOO FAR FROM THE
PRESENT POINT.
AMIDST THESE BEWITCHING PLAYS OF MILI-+
TARY / OPERATIONS AND IMAGINARY DIVISIONS OF
THE PRUSSIAN BEAR-SKIN, FRANCE, NOT ONCE,
AS YET, THOUGHT OF STEPS BETWEEN; AND OUR
LATE GOLDEN PROJECTS EVAPORATE TO AIR; FROM
WHICH UNLUCKY PERIOD, MORE CAUTION AND
LESS PRESUMPTION HAS APPEARED IN THOSE
COUNCILS, WHICH THEN UNDERTOOK TO CANTON
OUT GERMANY AT WILL.
IN PARTICULAR, HANOVER, THAT LATELY WAS SO
FORWARD TO HAVE SUPPORTED THE PRAGMATIC
SANCTION, NOT ONLY WITH THE 4000 MEN IT
WAS ENGAGED TO DO, BUT WITH IT'S WHOLE
FORCE, AS LIKEWISE THE DANES AND HESSIANS,
TAKEN INTO THE PAY OF ENGLAND, AGAINST
PRUSSIA, WAS NOW ABLE TO GIVE TO THE QUEEN
OF HUNGARY ANY ASSISTANCE, NAY, NOT TO PRE-+
SERVE / ITSELF WITHOUT THE HELP OF A BRACE OF
EXPEDIENTS, IN WHICH, NOT A SPARK OF THAT
SPIRIT, WHICH BLAZED OUT SO FIERCELY BEFORE, IS
VISIBLE; VIZ((.)) A NEUTRALITY WITH FRANCE, WHICH
HAD SO EXTENSIVE AN OPERATION AS TO GIVE
<P 27>
SAFETY TO OUR MERCHANT-SHIPS, OR EVEN A MAN
OF WAR SAILING THROUGH THE SPANISH FLEET, TO
SAY NOTHING OF THE SAID FLEET'S SAILING THROUGH
THE STRAITS IN SIGHT OF ADMIRAL HADDOCK, WHO
HAD WAITED WHOLE YEARS TO INTERCEPT THEM.
SECONDLY, TO RESIGN NOT ONLY ALL HOPES OF AG-+
GRANDIZING / ITSELF AT THE EXPENCE OF PRUSSIA,
BUT TO EMPTY IT'S SACRED COFFERS, FOR THE SATIS-+
FACTION / OF SOME PECUNIARY DEMANDS OF A VERY
EXTRAORDINARY NATURE, WHICH MAKES IT A VERY
DESIRABLE THING AT PRESENT TO TAKE THE FIRST
FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO REPLENISH THEM.
UNDER THIS NEUTRALITY THE PARLIAMENT MET
LAST YEAR; THE WHOLE NATION HAVING ALREADY
LEARNED THE CAUSE OF THAT TREATY BY THE
EFFECTS; HAVING LIKEWISE BY THE SAME CLUE
TRACED OUT THE MYSTERIOUS ORIGIN OF THE
HANOVER TREATY, TO WHICH THEY MADE NO
SCRUPLE TO ASCRIBE THE REDUCTION OF THE EX-+
ORBITANT / POWER OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA;
AND ALMOST TO A MAN CONVINC'D, THAT HANOVER
ROBBED US OF THE BENEFIT OF BEING AN ISLAND,
AND WAS ACTUALLY A PLEDGE FOR OUR GOOD BE-+
HAVIOUR / ON THE CONTINENT.
<P 28>
THE CHANGE THAT, SOON AFTER, HAPPENED IN
OUR ADMINISTRATION NATURALLY EXCITED A BELIEF
THAT OUR MEASURES WOULD BE CHANGED LIKEWISE;
AND MORE ESPECIALLY FROM THE UNIVERSAL DISSA-+
TISFACTION / WHICH HAD PREVAILED FROM THE WEAK
AND WICKED CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
THE NATION EXPECTED A THOROUGH ENQUI-+
RY; / AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THOSE
WHO HAD DESTROYED THE BALANCE OF POWER
IN EUROPE, WHO HAD EXHAUSTED AND IMPO-+
VERISHED / THIS NATION; AND ALL FOR THE SAKE
OF THE SUPPORT AND PRIVATE INTEREST OF A RE-+
SOLUTE / MINISTER; WHO HAD GIVEN INTO EVERY
DESPERATE MEASURE EXACTED FROM HIM ON ONE
HAND, THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COMMAND
AN INDEMNITY ON THE OTHER.
BUT AN ENQUIRY MAY TAKE PLACE, AND YET
JUSTICE BE TOO LAME TO FOLLOW; AND THE CLA-+
MOUR / ARISING FROM THE DISAPPOINTMENT IS
TO BE STIFLED BY THE NOISE OF ARMS AND WAR;
UNDER THE PRETENCE OF RECOVERING THE BA-+
LANCE / OF EUROPE, WHICH WE HAD OUR SELVES
GIVEN AWAY; AND TO RE-ESTABLISH THE HOUSE
<P 29>
OF AUSTRIA, WHICH WE HAD BEEN FIRST AND
PRINCIPALLY INSTRUMENTAL TO PULL DOWN.
IN WHAT IS PASSED, NO-BODY CAN DISPUTE BUT
OUR FOLLY IS SUFFICIENTLY VISIBLE; AND IN WHAT
NOW IS, OUR MADNESS IS AS VISIBLE: SINCE THE
GRAND ALLIANCE COULD SCARCE ACCOMPLISH, WHAT
ENGLAND NOW VENTURES UPON ALONE; OR IF ALL
IS STILL BUT MATTER OF AMUSEMENT, WHAT
ENGLAND ALONE MUST PAY FOR.
WITH THE REDUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF
AUSTRIA, THE LATE MINISTER'S FAVOURITE SCHEME
OF FOREIGN POLITICS WAS WORN OUT: HIS SUC-+
CESSORS, / THEREFORE, WERE UNDER A NECESSITY TO
FORM A NEW, OUT OF WHICH, THEY MIGHT FIND
MEANS TO RENDER THEMSELVES OF EQUAL IMPOR-+
TANCE / TO THE THRONE, AND DERIVE EQUAL ADVAN-+
TAGES / FROM THE PEOPLE.
IF, THEREFORE, THE FIRST DEMOLISHED THE
HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, IT IS THEIR BUSINESS TO
RESTORE IT TO IT'S ANCIENT SPLENDOR; AND AS
HE FOUND HIS ACCOUNT BY FREQUENT AND
LARGE REMITTANCES TO DENMARK, SWEDEN, HESSE
AND WOLFENBUTTLE, BY THE WAY OF HANOVER,
THEY HOLD IT MORE ADVISEABLE TO TRADE WITH
<P 30>
HANOVER DIRECT; AND, THEREFORE, MAKE NO
BONES OF TAKING SIXTEEN THOUSAND HA-+
NOVERIANS / INTO BRITISH PAY AT ONCE.
AS THIS IS A POINT OF VAST CONSEQUENCE
TO THIS NATION, AND PLAINLY SHEWS THE HA-+
NOVER-RUDDER / IS STILL TO STEER GREAT-BRITAIN,
ALL POSSIBLE MEANS AND ARTS WILL BE USED TO
DISGUISE AND CONCEAL IT; WHICH MAKES IT
MORE NECESSARY TO ENTER INTO A FULL DISQUISI-+
TION / OF IT.
THE DEPLORABLE SITUATION THE QUEEN OF
HUNGARY WAS REDUCED TO, BY PASSED MEA-+
SURES, / AND THE CONCERN THIS NATION FELT FOR
HER MISFORTUNES, WAS AT LAST ALLEVIATED; AND
WE REJOICED IN THE HAPPY TURN OF HER AFFAIRS
AND THE ASSURANCES WE RECEIVED, THAT THE
DUTCH WOULD NOW JOIN WITH US IN ASSISTING
HER, AND LIKEWISE IN THE HOPES WHICH WERE
THROWN OUT THAT PRUSSIA WOULD DO THE SAME.
IN THIS SITUATION IT HAPPENED, ON THE ((23 D))
OF MARCH, THAT, VERY LATE AT NIGHT, A QUE-+
STION / WAS CARRIED FOR ENQUIRY INTO THE CON-+
DUCT / OF THE LATE MINISTER; IMMEDIATELY AFTER
WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE ANCIENT USAGE
<P 31>
OF PARLIAMENTS, TO GIVE LIBERALLY TO THE
CROWN UPON A PROSPECT OF REDRESS OF GRIE-+
VANCES, / THEY CAME TO A RESOLUTION, DE-+
CLARING, / THAT *AS THE LATE FAVOURABLE TURN
OF AFFAIRS AFFORDS REASONABLE GROUNDS TO
HOPE, THAT IF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY IS
TIMELY AND PROPERLY ASSISTED BY THOSE
POWERS WHO ARE ENGAGED BY
TREATIES, AND BOUND BY INTEREST
TO SUPPORT HER, THE BALANCE OF POW-+
ER / MAY BE AGAIN RESTORED, AND THE TRAN-+
QUILLITY / OF EUROPE RE-ESTABLISHED; THIS
HOUSE WILL THEREFORE PROCEED WITH UNA-+
NIMITY, / VIGOUR AND DISPATCH, TO SUPPORT
HIS MAJESTY IN ALL SUCH MEASURES AS SHALL
BE NECESSARY TO ATTAIN THESE GREAT AND DE-+
SIRABLE / ENDS, ETC/
BY WHICH IT PLAINLY APPEARS, THAT THE
PRINCIPLE AND FOUNDATION OF THE WHOLE,
WAS RELATIVE TO THOSE OTHER POWERS, ENGAGED
BY TREATY AND BOUND BY INTEREST; WITHOUT
WHOM NOTHING CAN BE DONE, OR OUGHT TO
BE ATTEMPTED: 'TIS NOT ONLY A DECLARATION
OF OUR READINESS TO ASSIST AND SUPPORT THAT
CAUSE, BUT ADVICE HOW TO PURSUE IT; THAT
<P 32>
IS TO SAY, IF THOSE POWERS, WHO ARE EQUALLY EN-+
GAGED / BY TREATIES, AND BOUND BY INTEREST, WOULD
DO THE SAME: AND UPON THAT, AND THAT ONLY,
THE RESOLUTION WAS, AND COULD BE FOUNDED;
THE SENSE AND LANGUAGE SPEAK NO LESS, AS WELL
AS THE HOPES THAT WERE THEN INFUSED INTO US,
OF PRUSSIA AND HOLLAND'S JOINING IN THE SAME
CAUSE; THE ASSURANCES OF VIGOUR AND DISPATCH,
IN THE SUPPORT OF IT, THEREFORE, CAN BE UNDER-+
STOOD / AS GIVEN ONLY ON THESE CONDITIONS, AND
ARE ACTUALLY RESTRAINED TO THAT IMMEDIATE PE-+
RIOD / OF TIME: FOR WHAT MORTAL THEN IMAGIN-+
ED, / THAT WE ALONE, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
EITHER OF THOSE TWO OTHER GREAT POWERS, SHOULD
ENGAGE AND CARRY ON, AT OUR SOLE EXPENCE, THE
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA?
THE VERY SUPPOSITION WOULD, AT THAT TIME,
HAVE BEEN TREATED AS AN EXTRAVAGANCE THAT DID
NOT DESERVE AN ANSWER.
BUT TO CLEAR AWAY THE RUBBISH AS WE
GO; THE PARLIAMENT LOST NO TIME TO MAKE
GOOD THESE ASSURANCES, AND ENABLE THE KING
TO FOLLOW THEIR ADVICE, FOR HIS MAJESTY HAV-+
ING, / BY A MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF COM-+
MONS, /
<P 33>
ON THE ((1ST)) OF APRIL, GROUNDED ON,
AND REPEATING THE MOST ESSENTIAL WORDS OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE ((23D)) OF MARCH, ASKED
AN EXTRAORDINARY SUPPLY TO ANSWER THE ENDS
EXPRESSED IN IT; THE HOUSE, AS SOON AS THE
FORMS WOULD PERMIT, AGREED TO GRANT HIS
MAJESTY ((500,000 I.)) TO ENABLE HIM TO CONCERT
PROPER MEASURES FOR SUCH ALLIANCES, OR ENTER
INTO SUCH ENGAGEMENTS WITH OTHER POWERS, AS
HIS MAJESTY SHALL JUDGE NECESSARY FOR THE SUP-+
PORT / OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA.
ACCORDINGLY, THIS RESOLUTION PASSED INTO
A LAW, AND THE WHOLE AFFAIR WAS, TO ALL
INTENTS AND PURPOSES, CLOSED.
THE VOTE OF CREDIT, THUS CIVILLY INTRO-+
DUCED, / BEING FOUNDED ON THE ADVICE OF PAR-+
LIAMENT, / AND THE DISPOSITION OF THIS SUM
BEING UNDERSTOOD AND ALLOWED TO BE, ((300,000 1.))
TO THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, AND ((200,000 1.))
FOR THE KING OF SARDINIA.
BUT THAT THIS WAS THE WHOLE THAT WAS
DESIGNED AT THAT TIME APPEARS YET MORE
FULLY BY THAT VERY EXTRAORDINARY PARAGRAPH
IN HIS MAJESTY'S SPEECH AT THE END OF THE
LAST SESSION, WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES THE SAID
<P 34>
SUM TO BE GRANTED FOR THE FARTHER SUPPORT
AND DEFENCE OF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, AND
TO RESTORE AND SECURE THE BALANCE OF POWER SO
PARTICULARLY RECOMMENDED TO ME BY MY PAR-+
LIAMENT; / IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY FOR ME
TO CONTRACT NEW ENGAGEMENTS, OR TO ENTER IN-+
TO / FARTHER MEASURES, I RELY UPON YOUR ZEAL
AND PERSERVERANCE IN SO JUST A CAUSE, TO EN-+
ABLE / ME TO MAKE THEM GOOD; WHICH PLAINLY
SHEWS THE NEW MEASURES AND EXPENCES THEN
TO BE ENTERED INTO, WERE NEITHER WHAT THE
PARLIAMENT HAD ADVISED OR ENGAGED TO PAY:
THE WHOLE WAS PLACED ON THE HOPES OF
THEIR ZEAL AND PERSEVERANCE; THE THING WAS
EITHER SO DISAGREEABLE TO THE NATION, OR THE
MEASURE SO WRONG IN ITSELF, THAT EVEN AT
THE LATTER END OF THAT LONG SESSION, THE
MINISTERS DARED NOT COMMUNICATE IT TO, AND
TAKE THE SENSE OF PARLIAMENT ON IT; TIME
AND FUTURE CONTINGENCIES, IT WAS HOPED, WOULD
MAKE IT PASS THE EASIER.
AND IT MUST HERE BE OBSERVED, THAT THIS
METHOD OF ASKING AND SPENDING THE MONEY
OF THE PEOPLE IS ENTIRELY NEW, AND WAS
NEVER ATTEMPTED OR PERHAPS THOUGHT OF BE-+
FORE: /
<P 35>
TO BESPEAK AIDS AND PREPARE THE
NATION TO PART WITH THEIR MONEY WHEN THE
KING PARTED WITH HIS PARLIAMENT, AND NOT
BEFORE, SUFFICIENTLY ALARMED THEM, AS BEING
AN UNUSUAL STRETCH OF THE PREROGATIVE, AND
WHAT AFFORDED THEM NO VERY PLEASING O-+
MENS. / BUT THEN THE VERY COMMUNICATION
OF THIS DESIGN IN THIS WAY, WAS, AT THE
SAME TIME, THE STRONGEST NEGATIVE PROOF
THAT COULD BE GIVEN, THAT THE PARLIAMENT
HAD NOT ENGAGED TO MAKE GOOD ANY SUCH
EXPENCES AS WERE THEN HINTED AT. NOW
IT WAS DESIGNED, SOME TIME BEFORE THE END
OF THE SESSION, TO TAKE THESE HANOVERIANS
INTO OUR PAY; WHY WAS IT NOT, THEREFORE,
COMMUNICATED TO THE PARLIAMENT? THE REA-+
SON / IS OBVIOUS, NOR CAN THE FACT BE DISPUTED:
FOR HIS MAJESTY, IN HIS SPEECH AT THE CLOSE
OF THE LAST SESSION, SAYS, I FORESAW AND
POINTED OUT TO YOU THAT IT MIGHT BE INCUMBENT
UPON ME TO ENTER INTO FARTHER MEASURES, ETC((.))
WHICH IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD OF TAKING THE
SAID ((16000)) HANOVERIANS INTO OUR PAY. BUT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PLAIN AND VISIBLE MOTIVE
OF TAKING THESE ((16000)) TROOPS INTO OUR PAY,
<P 36>
IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT THE POINT WILL BE
ENDEAVOURED TO BE EVADED AND CONFOUNDED
WITH ALL THE REST OF THE AFFAIRS OF EUROPE,
AND SUCCESSES WILL BE BOASTED OF, THAT NO-+
BODY / SEES OR UNDERSTANDS; AND, AS WE HAVE
BEEN ALREADY TAUGHT, THAT THE MARCH OF
THESE DOUGHTY TROOPS INTO FLANDERS, INSTEAD
OF BOHEMIA, OR FOLLOWING MAILLELOIS, PRE-+
VENTED / THE RAISING THE SIEGE OF PRAGUE; SO
IT WILL BE AGAIN, WITH EQUAL MODESTY AND
PROBABILITY, ASSERTED, THAT THEY HAVE SECURED
FLANDERS, PRESERVED HOLLAND, UNITED IT WITH
ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA. THAT THEY NOT ONLY
MADE THE NEUTRALITY FOR THE KINGDOM OF NA-+
PLES, / BUT SAVED AND SECURED THE KING OF SAR-+
DINIA: / ALL WHICH IS AS CERTAIN AS THAT THEY
WILL ENABLE US TO TAKE AND HOLD THE WEST-IN-+
DIES, / AND HUMBLE SPAIN INTO GIVING US A REAL
SECURITY FOR THE FREEDOM OF OUR NAVIGATION
THERE FOR THE FUTURE.
IF ANY SCRIBE OR ORATOR CAN ADD ANY OTHER
PARTICULAR TO THIS LIST OF THEIR EXPLOITS, HE
HAS MY FREE LEAVE: AND I DARE SAY IT WILL
BE TAKEN KINDLY OF HIM - BUT FIRST LET HIM
LEND HIS HAND IN HELPING TO REMOVE THE
<P 37>
TRIFLING OBJECTION, WHICH PRESENTS ITSELF IN
THE FOLLOWING QUERY, VIZ ((.)) WHETHER, WHEN
THESE TROOPS WERE FIRST TAKEN INTO BRITISH
PAY, IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE OF ANY
SERVICE TO GREAT-BRITAIN? AND IN ORDER TO
DO THIS, WE MUST ONCE MORE REFRESH THE
MEMORIES OF CERTAIN PERSONS, BY AGAIN
HAVING RECOURSE TO THE FAMOUR TREATY OF
HANOVER.
BE IT RECOLLECTED, THEREFORE, THAT WHEN
THAT MEASURE WAS FIRST MADE PUBLIC, GREAT
THINGS WERE GIVEN OUT OF THE ADVANTAGES
RESULTING TO THE POWERS ENGAGED IN THAT AL-+
LIANCE, / ESPECIALLY ENGLAND, FROM THE MIGHTY
ASSISTANCES TO BE GIVEN BY HANOVER AND
PRUSSIA AGAINST THE EMPEROR, WHICH WE
WERE TOLD THEY WOULD NOT FAIL TO DO, THOUGH
EXPRESSLY CONTRARY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS
OF THE EMPIRE: ACCORDINGLY, TO DECEIVE
THE WORLD INTO THE VAIN EXPECTATION THAT
THEY WOULD HAZARD THEIR DOMINIONS FOR THE
SAKE OF THE COMMON CAUSE, THEY ENGAGE
THEMSELVES, AND DECLARE BY THE SECOND SE-+
PARATE / ARTICLE OF THAT TREATY, THAT THEY WILL
NOT FURNISH THEIR CONTINGENCY NEITHER IN
<P 38>
TROOPS NOR ANY OTHER SUCCOURS TO THE EM-+
PIRE, / IN CASE IT DECLARES WAR AGAINST FRANCE,
WHICH WAS THEN THE ONLY CONTRACTING POWER
OF THIS TREATY; AND THIS WAS HELD SUFFICIENT
TO TAKE OFF THE OBJECTION MADE IN ENGLAND, THAT
HANOVER COULD NEITHER ASSIST US, NOR ACT TO
ANY PURPOSE, AN EXPRESS STIPULATION SEEMING
TO BE SUCH AN EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, AS
COULD NOT BE CONTRADICTED. BUT NOTWITH-+
STANDING / THIS EXPLICIT ENGAGEMENT THOSE TWO
ELECTORAL POWERS ACTED WITH SUCH CAUTION,
AND KNEW SO WELL THE CONSEQUENCE OF ACTING
AGAINST THE EMPEROR AND EMPIRE, OR EVEN
OF THEIR REFUSING THEIR CONTINGENCIES TO THE
EMPIRE, THAT, THE VERY SAME DAY, THEY
SIGNED A THIRD SEPARATE ARTICLE, BY WHICH
THEY WERE LEFT AT LIBERTY TO FURNISH THEIR
QUOTA'S OF TROOPS TO THE EMPIRE AGAINST
FRANCE, FOR FEAR OF CERTAIN DISAGREEABLE CON-+
SEQUENCES / THAT WOULD ARISE FROM THEIR RE-+
FUSAL. / AND IF THEY DARE NOT REFUSE THEIR
ASSISTANCE, CERTAINLY THEY DARED NOT HAVE
ACTED AGAINST IT: THE CLANDESTINE MANNER
THEREFORE OF MAKING THESE SEPARATE ARTICLES,
AS WELL AS THE VIEWS WITH WHICH THEY WERE
<P 39>
MADE, PLAINLY SHEWS US WE ARE NEVER TO TRUST
TO ANY TREATIES HOWEVER SPECIOUS, OR ASSU-+
RANCES / HOWEVER POSITIVE, IN THOSE POINTS
WHERE THE INTERESTS OF HANOVER ARE TO BE JOINTLY
PROVIDED FOR: FOR THE TRUE MOTIVES OF SUCH
TREATIES AND ASSURANCES WILL ALWAYS BE
COUCHED IN THOSE ARTICLES, WHICH ARE NOT TO
BE MADE PUBLIC: AND THOSE THAT ARE MADE
PUBLIC, WILL BE NO BETTER THAN A POLITICAL
BLIND; AS HATH BEEN ALREADY DEMONSTRATED.
THE DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT, AND THE PO-+
LITICAL / WRITINGS OF THOSE TIMES, SO FAR AT
LAST, AND SO EFFECTUALLY EXPOSED THE ABSUR-+
DITY / OF EXPECTING GERMAN TROOPS TO ACT A-+
GAINST / THE EMPEROR, THAT THE ONLY PRETENCE
FOR KEEPING ((12000)) HESSIANS IN OUR PAY WAS
REDUCED TO THIS SINGLE POINT, THE REST BEING
GIVEN UP, THAT THE STATES-GENERAL HAD AN
EQUITABLE DEMAND FOR THEM; BECAUSE THE
((12000)) MEN WE WERE ENGAGED TO FURNISH TO
THEM IN CERTAIN CASES COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN
ANSWERED BY THE KING, IF HE HAD RAISED NO
TROOPS BUT IN ENGLAND, BECAUSE THE DUTCH ARE
TOO WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE ACCIDENTS OF THE
SEA, AND THE DIFFICULTIES AND DELAYS WHICH
<P 40>
ATTEND THE TRANSPORTING GREAT BODIES OF TROOPS.
BUT EVEN THIS PRETENCE WAS SUFFICIENTLY RI-+
DICULED / AND EXPLODED AT THAT TIME, AS MAY
BE SEEN AT LARGE IN A PIECE CALLED, THE CASE
OF THE HESSIAN FORCES IN THE PAY OF GREAT-
BRITAIN, ETC((.)) WHICH IS TO BE FOUND IN THE
<6TH VOL.)) OF THE CRAFTSMAN.
WHAT WE HAVE NEXT TO CONSIDER, IS, THE
CONDUCT AND SITUATION OF HANOVER SINCE THE
DEATH OF THE EMPEROR: IT'S ORIGINAL VIEWS,
I MEAN SINCE IT'S CONNEXION WITH ENGLAND,
AND THE NECESSITY IT LAY UNDER OF ENGAGING
IN A NEUTRALITY, WHEN MAILLEBOIS WAS WITH-+
IN / REACH OF IT'S FRONTIERS, HAVE BEEN AL-+
READY / EXPLAINED; BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN MEN-+
TIONED, / THAT, DURING THE TIME THAT ALL THE
FORCES OF HANOVER, TOGETHER WITH THE HES-+
SIANS / AND DANES IN BRITISH PAY, WERE IN
READINESS TO SUPPORT AND PRESERVE THE BA-+
LANCE / OF POWER IN THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA.
THE ELECTOR OF HANOVER FIRST ENGAGED HIS
VOTE, AND AFTERWARDS GAVE IT FOR THE ELEC-+
TOR / OF BAVARIA'S BEING EMPEROR, WHO WAS
CHOSEN UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES; AS CLAIM-+
ING / THE GREATEST PART OF THE LATE EMPEROR'S
<P 41>
HEREDITARY DOMINIONS, AND THEY BEING IN
ACTUAL POSSESSION OF A GREAT PART OF AUSTRIA,
AND OF BOHEMIA: TO WHICH MAY BE ADDED,
THAT HE WAS NO SOONER MOUNTED INTO THE IM-+
PERIAL / THRONE, BUT ALL THE LAWS AND CONSTI-+
TUTION / OF THE EMPIRE CONCURRED IN SUPPORT-+
ING / AND CARRYING ON HIS PRETENSIONS TO THE
RESIDUE OF THE AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS IN THE
STRONGEST MANNER IMAGINABLE: FOR THE EVI-+
DENCE / OF WHICH, WE NEED ONLY APPEAL TO
THE SUPPLIES HE RECEIVED FROM ALL PARTS, AND
TO THAT VOTE, IN PARTICULAR, OF THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE, FOR GRANTING HIM AN AID OF AS
MANY ROMAN MONTHS, AS IS USUAL WHEN THE
CAUSE IS COMMON, AND THE WHOLE EMPIRE
INVADED. LET US BE ALLOWED TO ASK, THERE-+
FORE, / WHETHER THE ELECTOR OF HANOVER ONCE
PROTESTED AGAINST THAT VOTE? WHETHER HE
REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH IT? WHETHER BY ANY
NEW LAW THAT ELECTORATE WAS ABSOLVED FROM
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE EMPIRE, AND LEFT AT
LIBERTY TO ACT AGAINST THE EMPEROR, IT SO
LATELY CONTRIBUTED TO FIX IN THE IMPERIAL
THRONE? WHETHER THE SAID ELECTORATE HATH
SINCE ASSISTED THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY WITH
<P 42>
THE ((4000)) MEN, THE LATTER HAD A RIGHT TO
CLAIM BY TREATY, THOUGH BEFORE IT SEEMED
DETERMINED TO ENGAGE IN HER QUARREL WITH
FAR GREATER FORCES? WHETHER THE HESSIAN
MERCENARIES WERE NOT CONTINUED IN OUR PAY
THIS YEAR, AFTER IT WAS AVOWED IN PARLIA-+
MENT / THAT THEY COULD NOT ACT AGAINST THE
EMPEROR? AND WHETHER THIS WAS NOT DE-+
SIRED / ONLY THAT THEY MIGHT NOT BE HIRED BY
FRANCE AGAINST THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY? FOR
IF IT CAN BE STILL THOUGHT THAT THESE HANO-+
VERIANS / AND HESSIAN TROOPS DARED TO HAVE
ACTED IN GERMANY, WHY DID THEY NOT FOLLOW
MAILLEBOIS, WHO WAS SO NIGH A NEIGHBOUR
TO THEM, AND ENDEAVOUR TO DISTRESS AND RE-+
TARD / HIS MARCH? OR, IF THE NEUTRALITY OF
HANOVER WOULD NOT PERMIT THAT, WHY DID
THEY NOT MARCH INTO BOHEMIA TO SUPPORT THE
QUEEN OF HUNGARY, IN THE CAPACITY OF AL-+
LIES / TO HER, AS THE FRENCH SUPPORTED THE
EMPEROR?
NOW, IF IN BAR OF ALL FARTHER QUERIES,
IT SHOULD BE URGED, THAT AS WELL THE NEU-+
TRALITY / WITH FRANCE, AS THE LAWS OF THE
EMPIRE, PUT A STOP TO ALL PROCEEDINGS THAT
<P 43>
WAY, WE HAVE NO MORE TO SAY, BUT THAT,
WHAT WITH THE LAWS OF THE EMPIRE, AND
WHAT WITH THE HANOVER-NEUTRALITY, ((16,000))
HANOVERIANS COULD MARCH NO WHERE BUT IN-+
TO / FLANDERS FOR A PRETENCE TO RECEIVE SO VAST
A SUM OF MONEY FROM THIS NATION: AND
IN THIS POINT OF LIGHT WE MUST SEE AND
CONSIDER EVERY STEP AND ACTION IN OUR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS FOR THIS LAST YEAR; AND WITHOUT THIS
CLUE WE MAY AND SHALL BE BEWILDERED IN
TRACING THE MANY, OTHERWISE CONTRADICTORY
PRETENCES AND ACTIONS, THAT WILL BE URGED
FOR JUSTIFYING THIS MEASURE.
IT IS UNNECESSARY TO GO ANY FARTHER BACK
NOW IN THIS ENQUIRY THAN THE SITUATION AND
DISPOSITION OF THAT NATION AT THE MEETING
OF THE PARLIAMENT LAST YEAR, AND OF WHAT
HAS PASSED SINCE UPON THE NEW PLAN OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
FIRST THEN, THE PARLIAMENT MET UNDER THE
GREATEST CONCERN AND ASTONISHMENT AT THE
HANOVER-NEUTRALITY, AT THE SPANIARDS REIGN-+
ING / TRIUMPHANT OVER THE MEDITERRANEAN, AT
THE INACTIVITY OF OUR FLEET THERE; WITH THE
MOST SENSIBLE CONCERN FOR THE DEPLORABLE
<P 44>
SITUATION TO WHICH THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA WAS
REDUCED, AND WITH THE MOST SINCERE DISPOSI-+
TIONS / TO ACT VIGOROUSLY AND EFFECTUALLY IN HER
BEHALF. BUT NO-BODY WAS SANGUINE, I SHOULD
SAY DESPERATE ENOUGH, TO IMAGINE THAT THIS
MIGHT ENTERPRIZE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
THE STRENGTH, OR AT THE EXPENCE OF ENGLAND
ALONE: BUT LEST THE WANT OF CONFEDE-+
RATES / SHOULD DAMP OUR ZEAL, AND DIVERT US
FROM ALL PROJECTS IN HER FAVOUR, HOLLAND
AND PRUSSIA WERE AGAIN PLAYED OFF UPON US,
AS NOT ONLY INCLINED TO COME INTO MEASURES
WITH US, BUT AS WAITING ONLY TO BE CON-+
VINCED / THAT WE WERE REALLY IN EARNEST, AND
THAT THEY MIGHT DEPEND ON US, IN ORDER TO
JOIN US UPON OUR OWN TERMS - THAT,
THEREFORE, NO PROOF OF SINCERITY MIGHT BE
WANTING ON OUR SIDE ((16,000)) OF OUR TROOPS
WERE IMMEDIATELY TO BE SENT OVER INTO FLAN-+
DERS; / AND IT WAS DECLARED AT THE SAME TIME
BY THE ZEALOUS PROMOTERS OF THIS MEASURE,
THAT IN CASE THE DUTCH WERE NOT INDUCED,
THEREBY, TO CO-OPERATE WITH US FOR THE DE-+
LIVERANCE / OF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, WE OUGHT
<P 45>
IMMEDIATELY TO RECAL OUR TROOPS AND INTRENCH
OURSELVES WITHIN OUR OWN ISLAND.
THAT, THEREFORE, SO GREAT AN ARMY WAS AL-+
LOWED / LAST YEAR, WAS IN ORDER TO DISPATCH THESE
((16,000)) MEN ON THIS IMPORTANT ERRAND; AND
THAT THESE ((16,000)) MEN WERE, ACCORDINGLY, DIS-+
PATCHED, / WAS IN ORDER TO RETRIEVE OUR CREDIT
WITH THE DUTCH, WITHOUT WHOM WE WERE TO
ATTEMPT NOTHING; BUT, FROM HENCEFORWARD,
MAKE IT OUR ONLY CARE TO PROVIDE FOR OUR OWN
SECURITY.
WHOEVER COMPARES THE SITUATION OF AFFAIRS
AT THAT TIME, WITH THE DEAR-BOUGHT EXPERI-+
ENCE / OF THE PAST, MUST BE CONVINCED, AND
OUGHT TO ACKNOWLEDGE, THAT EXCEPT WHEN
THE DUTCH ARE IN DANGER, IT CAN NEVER BE
THE INTEREST OF THIS NATION TO EMBARK IN THE
TROUBLES OF THE CONTINUENT.
NOW THE RAPID SUCCESS WITH WHICH THE
HOUSE OF AUSTRIA HAD BEEN OVERRUN AT THAT
TIME BY THE VICTORIOUS ARMS OF FRANCE, BA-+
VARIA, / PRUSSIA AND SAXONY (WHILE IT'S ONLY ALLY
HANOVER WAS AT THE SAME TIME SEVERED FROM
IT BY A NEUTRALITY) GAVE JUST APPREHENSIONS,
CONSISTENT WITH FORMER EXPERIENCE, TO THE
<P 46>
DUTCH, THAT THEIR BARRIER WAS IN DANGER;
ESPECIALLY AS FRANCE HAD SO LATELY PURCHASED
LORRAIN UNDER PRETENCE OF INDEMNIFICATION
FOR THE CHARGE IT HAD BEEN AT IN THE WAR
AGAINST THE EMPEROR, ON ACCOUNT OF STANIS-+
LAUS; / THOUGH IT HAD, ALL THE WHILE, MADE THE
MOST SOLEMN DECLARATIONS THAT IT WOULD TAKE
NOR HOLD ANY THING FOR ITSELF. AS THERE-+
FORE / REIMBURSEMENT AND INDEMNIFICATION
MADE AS EFFECTUAL ACQUISITIONS AS ANY OTHER
PRETENCE WHATEVER; AS FRANCE SEEMED NOW
TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING IN A LARGER
BILL OF CHARGES THAN EVER; AS SHE WAS STRONG
ENOUGH TO ENFORCE THE PAYMENT WITHOUT ANY
DEDUCTION OR ABATEMENT WHATEVER, AND AS
THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS LAY MOST OPPORTUNE-+
LY / TO ANSWER HER DEMANDS, THE STATES HAD
THEN REASON TO BE ON THEIR GUARD; AND
THEY ACCORDINGLY APPEARED SO SENSIBLE OF THIS
DANGER, THAT THEY ADDED TO THEIR FORCES
((30,000)) MEN: THIS ALARM CALLED UPON
ENGLAND TO ENTER INTO AS VIGOROUS MEASURES,
AT LEAST, FOR THE SUPPORT OF THEM AND THE
QUEEN OF HUNGARY, AS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED
WHILE THE FORMER PLAN WAS IN FORCE FOR
<P 47>
REDUCING THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA; AND IT WAS
WITH THIS VIEW THE ((16,000)) ENGLISH TROOPS
WERE TO BE SENT OVER.
'TILL THIS ALARM WAS GIVEN, 'TILL THIS
DANGER APPEARED, SUBSIDIES TO OUR REMOTER
ALLIES COULD ONLY BE EXPECTED FROM US, AND
EVEN THOSE OUGHT TO BE PROPORTIONED TO OUR
OWN NECESSITIES AS WELL AS THEIRS.
WE ARE NO LONGER IN SUCH FLOURISHING
CIRCUMSTANCES, AS WHEN WE DOLED ABOUT OUR
SUBSIDIES TO EVERY PRINCE ALMOST, THAT PLEAD-+
ED / INABILITY TO PAY EVEN FOR HIS OWN PRE-+
SERVATION; / AND YET, EVEN THEN, THOUGH COL-+
LEAGUED / WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE POWERS
OF EUROPE, SOME OF WHICH CARRIED ON THEIR
SHARES OF THE WAR AT THEIR OWN CHARGE;
THOUGH SUCCESS ADDED AN ANNUAL LUSTRE BOTH
TO OUR POLITICKS AND ARMS, WE FOUND OUR-+
SELVES, / AT LAST, SINKING UNDER THE BURDEN OF
OUR OWN VICTORIES, AND, TO THIS HOUR, WE
HAVE REASON TO LAMENT THE TROPHIES SO
DEARLY PURCHASED.
IF, THEREFORE, WE GAINED NOTHING ELSE, WE
MIGHT HAVE GAINED A LITTLE MORE DISCRETION,
IN EXCHANGE FOR SO MANY LEGIONS LOST, AND
<P 48>
SO MANY MILLIONS SQUANDERED, AND LAID IT
DOWN AS AN INVARIABLE MAXIM, NEVER TO EN-+
TER / INTO A LAND-WAR, NEVER, BUT WHEN THE
DUTCH BARRIER WAS IN DANGER, OR, AT LEAST,
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THAT WISE AND CAU-+
TIOUS / PEOPLE: A PEOPLE, THAT CONSIDER THE
COMMOTIONS OF THEIR NEIGHBOURS AS SO MANY
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM TO ENLARGE THEIR
TRADE AND INCREASE THEIR WEALTH, AS THEY
HAVE UNIFORMLY DONE, FROM THE TREATY OF
UTRETCHT 'TILL NOW.
BUT TO RETURN TO OUR IMMEDIATE POINT:
ALL THE DESIGNS AND PROSPECTS OF LAST YEAR
<P 48>
<L 14>
WERE PLACED ON ASSISTING AND BEING ASSISTED
BY THE DUTCH: IF THEY STOOD OUT, WE KNEW
VERY WELL, THERE WOULD BE NO REAL NECESSITY
FOR OUR MEDDLING AT ALL; AND THAT IT WOULD
PROVE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO RAISE THE NECESSARY
SUMS IN CASE WE DID: FOR AS TO HUNGARY
AND SARDINIA, THEY HAD NO MONEY; AND AS
TO HANOVER IT WOULD PART WITH NONE: AND
IF WE GREW WEARY OF PAYING ANNUALLY
((5,000,000 L .)) IN EXCHANGE FOR ANNUAL VICTO-+
RIES, / BEFORE WE WERE YET EXHAUSTED, THERE
WAS LITTLE REASON TO THINK WE SHOULD NOW
<P 49>
BE EITHER WILLING OR ABLE TO FURNISH SEVEN OR
EIGHT MILLIONS TO SUPPORT WHAT WE HAD NO
CONCERN IN, AND, FROM WHICH, WE HAD NO
PROSPECT OF RETURNS EITHER IN PROFIT OR HO-+
NOUR. /
<L 6>
IT SO HAPPENED, WHILE THESE MEASURES
WERE PURSUED, AS WE IMAGINED, ON THOSE
PRINCIPLES, THAT THE AFFAIRS OF THE QUEEN OF
HUNGARY TOOK A HAPPY AND UNEXPECTED
TURN; SHE BECAME NOT ONLY SUCCESSFUL IN
HER OWN ENTERPRIZES, BUT FOUND MEANS TO
DISENGAGE PRUSSIA AND SAXONY FROM FRANCE:
NAY, EVEN FRANCE HERSELF BECAME PERPLEXED
AND ENTANGLED TO SUCH A DEGREE, AS TO FIND HER-+
SELF / OBLIGED TO OFFER TERMS TO THE QUEEN OF
HUNGARY, FOR THE SAVING BOTH HER FORCES AND
HER HONOUR: FROM THAT MOMENT THEREFORE,
THE INTEREST, AND OF COURSE, THE POLICY OF THE
DUTCH WAS TO CHANGED; THE DREAD OF FRANCE,
AND IT'S BEING TO BE PAID AT THE EXPENCE OF
THEIR BARRIER, WAS LOST; THEIR ANCIENT AND WISE
MAXIMS FOR THE GAIN OF WEALTH, AND THE
PRESERVATION OF THEIR OWN QUIET, WERE REVI-+
VED / IN THEIR FULL FORCE; ONE OF WHICH WAS
<P 50>
NEVER TO ENGAGE IN ANY WAR BUT FOR THE
SAKE OF TRADE, AND THE IMMEDIATE CON-+
CERNS / OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY: THE CON-+
SUMING / WARS OF OTHER NATIONS, AS BEFORE
OBSERVED, MADE THEM NOT ONLY RICHER, BUT
MORE POWERFUL, AT THE SAME TIME THAT THEY
EXHAUSTED AND IMPOVERISHED THE PARTIES CON-+
CERNED / IN THEM.
THERE ARE, INDEED, MANY REMARKABLE PAS-+
SAGES / IN DE WITT ON THE TRUE INTEREST AND
POLITICAL MAXIMS OF THE REPUBLIC OF HOLLAND,
WHICH ARE SO ADAPTED TO THEIR PRESENT SITU-+
ATION / AND CONDUCT, AND STILL SO EXACTLY OB-+
SERVED, / THAT ONE CANNOT HELP THINKING HIM
TO BE AT THE HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC STILL.
IN A WORD, TO BE SAFE SEEMS TO BE THEIR
FIRST CONCERN, AND TO BE RICH THEIR SECOND:
AND, THOUGH ALARMED, WHEN CONVINCED
THERE IS NO REAL DANGER, THEY RETURN TO THEIR
GRAND PURSUIT OF WEALTH AS BEFORE: THUS
FOR THE FRENCH TO EXHAUST THEIR STRENGTH ON
ONE HAND, WITHOUT ENCROACHING UPON THEM,
AND FOR US TO NEGLECT OUR COMMERCE ON THE
OTHER, IN ORDER TO BUILD CASTLES IN THE AIR,
PUTS THEM IN POSSESSION OF ALL THEY HAVE TO
<P 51>
ASK OF HEAVEN: AND SUCH BEING APPARENTLY
THEIR CASE AT PRESENT, NOTHING BUT DOWNRIGHT
PHRENSY COULD HAVE INDUCED THEM TO DROP THE
SUBSTANCE, IN ORDER TO CATCH AT THE SHADOW.
THE TERMS WHICH WERE OFFERED BY FRANCE TO
THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY THEY THEN PLAINLY PER-+
CEIVED, / AS WELL AS WE DO NOW, WITH NO VERY
MATERIAL ALTERATION WOULD, SOONER OR LATER, BE
THE TERMS OF ACCOMODATION BETWEEN
THEM; PERHAPS NOT MORE THAN MIGHT THEN
HAVE BEEN OBTAINED, HAD THOSE TERMS BEEN
ADMITTED FOR THE FOUNDATION OF A TREATY
BY OUR MINISTERS: THEY ARE LIKEWISE CON-+
VINCED, / AS WELL AS WE, OF THE IMPRACTICABILITY
OF RAISING THIS PHANTOM OF THE HOUSE OF
AUSTRIA TO BE AGAIN CAPABLE OF BALANCING THE
POWER OF THE HOUSE OF BOURBON: THEY
KNOW AS WELL AS WE WHAT INTEREST AND WHAT
MOTIVES HAVE DESTROY'D IT; AND AS THEY KNOW
IT WAS THE INTEREST OF THIS NATION ONLY TO
HAVE PRESERVED IT; AND EVEN NOW, IF THERE
WAS A POSSIBILITY OF DOING IT, TO RAISE IT TO
IT'S FORMER POWER AND SPLENDOR; SO LIKE-+
WISE / THEY KNOW TOO WELL THAT IT IS AGAINST
THE INTEREST OF EVERY PRINCE IN GERMANY, AND
<P 52>
EVEN OF THE KING OF SARDINIA HIMSELF, THAT
SUCH AN EVENT SHOULD TAKE PLACE: THEY
MOREOVER KNOW, THAT THE IMPERIAL POWER SO
NECESSARY FOR THAT PURPOSE IS IRRECOVERABLY LOST;
THAT THE UNITED VOICES THAT RAISED THIS PRE-+
SENT / EMPEROR TO THE THRONE ARE UNITED IN
INTEREST, THAT NEITHER HE NOR HIS SUCCESSORS
SHALL BECOME SO FORMIDABLE AS HIS PREDECESSORS
WERE: THAT PRUSSIA, SAXONY, AND EVERY PRINCE
OF THE EMPIRE BUT ONE, ARE SATISFIED WITH THE
TERMS OFFERED BY FRANCE, AND THAT EVEN HE,
PERHAPS, BLUSTERS ONLY TO SAVE APPEARANCES,
OR IN RESENTMENT OF A CERTAIN INDIGNITY LATELY
PUT UPON HIM BY FRANCE; OR TILL A FAVOURABLE
OPPORTUNITY OFFERS OF MAKING SOME FARTHER
ACQUISITION TO THE DOMINION HE IS SO PAR-+
TIAL / TO, AND SO FOND  OF.
HAVING THUS MENTIONED THE TERMS OFFERED
BY FRANCE TO THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, 'TIS NE-+
CESSARY / TO CONSIDER WHAT HAS OR MAY HAVE
BEEN THE CONDUCT OF OUR MINISTERS ON THAT
HEAD. IN THE FIRST PLACE THEN IT IS VISIBLE,
THAT, IF THEY HAVE NOT MADE IT A POINT WITH
THAT PRINCESS TO REJECT THE OFFERS OF FRANCE,
WHICH THERE IS SOME REASON TO SUSPECT, BY
<P 53>
GOING SUCH LENGTHS IN PRETENDING TO SERVE
HER, AND APPEARING SO IMMODERATELY ZEALOUS
IN HER CAUSE, THEY HAVE LED HER TO TAKE HER
ALL IN A MANNER ON OUR FRIENDSHIP AND SUP-+
PORT, / AND THEREBY INVOLVED THIS NATION, AL-+
READY / BUT TOO MUCH ENCUMBERED, IN ENGAGE-+
MENTS / WE CAN HARDLY QUIT WITH HONOUR AND
EXPENCES THAT WILL BEGGAR US TO SUPPORT. AS
IT WAS THE HIGHEST PRESUMPTION IN US TO UN-+
DERTAKE / SUCH MIGHTY THINGS, WITHOUT THE
CONCURRENCE OF THE DUTCH, SO IT WAS TO THE
LAST DEGREE IMPOLITIC, TO SAY NO WORSE, NOT
TO ADVISE HER TO ACCEPT THE OFFERS OF FRANCE,
WHEN IT APPEARED THAT THE STATES HAD DETER-+
MINED / TO LEAVE HER WHOLLY UPON US - OUR MI-+
NISTERS / HAD THEN A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID
OF WHAT THEY COULD NEVER ACCOMPLISH, AND SAVE
THEIR COUNTRY FROM THE REPROACH OF BEING
THE WIND-MILL-FIGHTER OF EUROPE. INSTEAD
OF WHICH, BY TENACIOUSLY ADHERING NOTWITH-+
STANDING, / THEY HAVE IN A MANNER PUT THEM-+
SELVES / INTO THE POWER OF THE QUEEN OF HUN-+
GARY, / WHO WILL NO LONGER HUMBLY BESEECH
THE COMPASSION AND SUCCOUR OF THE PEOPLE
OF ENGLAND, BUT AFFECT TO COMMAND IT, BY
<P 54>
THREATENING FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE UP
WITH FRANCE ON THE LEAST DEMUR, AND LEAVE
US TO SHIFT FOR OURSELVES. SO THAT, IN CONSE-+
QUENCE / OF SUCH RASH AND PRECIPITATE, OR CORRUPT
AND TREACHEROUS, MEASURES, THE SUBSTANCE OF
THIS NATION MUST BE SPREAD ALL OVER GERMANY,
AND IT'S FORCES WASTED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
OF EITHER TIMES OR SEASON, OR THE NECESSARY
PREPARATION FOR THEIR SAFETY OR SUBSISTENCE:
AND YET IN SPITE OF ALL, AS ENGLAND CAN NEVER
SUPPLY WEALTH OR POWER ENOUGH TO RAISE HER
TO THAT HEIGHT WE PROMISED, NOR EVEN TO
GAIN HER AN EQUIVALENT FOR SILESIA, SHE MUST
AT LAST SUBMIT TO SUCH TERMS OF PEACE AS
FRANCE OFFERS, AND WE SHALL ALL HAVE REASON
TO WISH SHE HAD ACCEPTED NOW. FOR WHEN-+
EVER / THAT TIME COMES, SUBMISSION MUST BE
OUR LOT AS WELL AS HER'S, AND WE SHALL FIND
WE HAVE PARTED WITH SUCH INFINITE SUMS ONLY
TO PURCHASE INFAMY AND RUIN.
WITH EVERY OTHER TRUE ENGLISHMAN I SIN-+
CERELY / WISH MY APPREHENSIONS OF THE CON-+
SEQUENCES / OF THAT FATAL STEP MAY NEVER PROVE
TRUE; BUT THE SITUATION OF EUROPE AT PRESENT
ADMINISTERS NO HOPES OF THE CONTRARY. IT
<P 55>
WILL, IT MUST, BE ASKED, BOTH NOW AND HER-+
AFTER, / WHAT COULD INDUCE US TO ENGAGE OUR
ALL IN THIS DESPERATE UNDERTAKING? THE IN-+
TRIGUES / OF THE CABINET, THE CONTENTION FOR
DOMESTIC POWER, AND THE PAY OF THE HA-+
NOVERIAN / TROOPS OCCUR BY WAY OF REPLY:
BUT THEN IT IS SUCH A REPLY AS WILL NEVER BE CAN-+
DIDLY / MADE BY ONE SIDE, NOR BE ALLOWED, IF IT
WAS, BY THE OTHER. NO, WE ARE RATHER TO EXPECT
DISGUISES AND PALLIATIONS OF ALL SORTS; BUT
THEN THEY WILL BE THE THINEST THAT WERE EVER
YET BROUGHT INTO USE. WHEN THE TWO GREAT
POINTS COME TO BE CANVASSED, VIZ ((.)) WHY WE,
IN THE PRESENT TERRIBLE SITUATION OF OUR AF-+
FAIRS, / PLUNGED OURSELVES ALONE INTO AN UN-+
DERTAKING / SO VAST IN IT'S OWN NATURE, AND SO
PERNICIOUS IN IT'S CONSEQUENCES; AND WHE-+
THER / WE COULD HAVE ACTED MORE TO THE PRE-+
JUDICE / OF OUR OWN COUNTRY, THAN BY IN-+
FLUENCING / THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, NO MAT-+
TER / BY WHAT MEANS, TO REJECT THE OFFERS OF
FRANCE: I SAY, WHEN THESE TWO CAPITAL
POINTS COME TO BE CANVASSED, ALL IMAGINABLE
ARTS WILL BE USED TO PUT US ON A DIFFERENT
SCENT; IN PARTICULAR WE SHALL BE CALLED UPON
<P 56>
TO TAKE NOTICE OF THE WONDERS PERFORMED BY
THE TROOPS OF HANOVER, AND AMUSED WITH
STORIES OF A GREAT ARMY'S BEING PARTICULARLY
NECESSARY TO BE ASSEMBLED IN FLANDERS, AT THE
REQUISITION OF THE KING OF SARDINIA, AT THE
REQUISITION OF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY; AND
THAT SUCH WAS HER DISTRESSED CASE, THAT NO
OTHER TROOPS COULD BE GOTTEN FOR LOVE OR
MONEY BUT HANOVERIANS; THAT THE NOISE OF
THESE MIGHTY PREPARATIONS DREW OFF THE
FRENCH FORCES FROM DAUPHINY; THAT THEY
PREVENTED MORE FORCES BEING SENT INTO GER-+
MANY; / AND THAT IT WAS SHEWING A SEASONABLE
SPIRIT AND VIGOUR IN DEFENCE OF OUR ALLIES;
BUT, OBSERVE, NOT A WORD WILL BE SAID OF
THE DUTCH, THOUGH THE FOUNDATION UPON
WHICH ALONE THE BRITISH TROOPS WERE SENT
ABROAD; NOR A WORD OF THOSE OTHER POWERS,
WHO ARE ENGAGED BY TREATY AND BOUND BY
INTEREST TO SUPPORT THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY
AS WELL AS WE.
BUT TO BESTOW A FEW WORDS UPON WHAT IS
UTTERED IN DEFENCE OF THIS MEMORABLE AND
MIGHTY TRANSACTION. DID THE KING OF SAR-+
DINIA, / FROM HIS OWN MERE MOTION, DESIRE
<P 57>
THIS DIVERSION IN FLANDERS, RATHER THAN ANY
WHERE ELSE? WERE NOT THE TROOPS IN DAU-+
PHINY / REMOVED FROM THENCE LONG BEFORE THE
APPEARANCE OF THIS WARLIKE PARADE THERE?
WHITHER DID THOSE VERY TROOPS MARCH? HAD
THE HANOVERIANS AND OTHERS MARCHED DI-+
RECTLY / TO MENTZ, COULD IT HAVE BEEN LESS A
DIVERSION FOR THE FRENCH FORCES? DOES IT
NOT APPEAR VISIBLY TO HAVE BEEN THE INTEREST
OF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY, THAT THEY SHOULD
HAVE MARCHED THITHER AT FIRST? AND, IF IT IS SO
MUCH INSISTED UPON NOW, EVEN SO LATE IN THE
YEAR, WOULD IT NOT THEN HAVE BEEN A GREATER
ASSISTANCE TO HER, AND A DISTRESS TO THE
FRENCH? WAS IT NOT SOLICITED AND DESIRED
THEY SHOULD MARCH THITHER BEFORE? OR, AT
LEAST, WAS IT NOT VERY WELL KNOWN HERE AS THE
SENSE OF THAT COURT THAT THEY WISHED IT?
IF, THEREFORE, THESE WISHES OF THEIRS COULD
NOT BE OBTAINED, IS IT AT ALL SURPRIZING THAT
THEY SHOULD HAVE SO MUCH COMPLAISANCE AS
TO DESIRE OUR COURT TO SEND THEM TO THAT PLACE
ONLY WHERE THEY FOUND THEY HAD ANY INCLI-+
NATION / TO SEND THEM? WERE THE DUTCH CON-+
SULTED / IN THIS?  WAS IT BY THEIR ADVICE AND
<P 58>
APPROBATION? WHY DON'T THEY SAY A WORD
ABOUT THEM IN THIS AFFAIR? DID NOT HIS MA-+
JESTY, / IN HIS SPEECH, LAST SESSION, TELL
THE PARLIAMENT, *THAT THE PRESENT FAVOURA-+
BLE / DISPOSITION OF THE STATES-GENERAL AND
OF OTHER GREAT POWERS ARE, UNDER GOD,
CHIEFLY OWING TO THE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE
AFFORDED BY THIS NATION TO IT'S ANCIENT
AND NATURAL ALLIES?* MAY WE NOT ASK,
THEREFORE, WHAT ARE BECOME OF ALL THOSE ALLIES
NOW? THAT THE MARCH OF ((16000)) HANOVE-+
RIANS / INTO FLANDERS, SO LATE AS OCTOBER, TO
OPEN A CAMPAIGN, SHOULD PROVE SO POWERFUL
A DIVERSION TO THE FRENCH FORCES IN ALL PARTS
AT ONCE, MAY BE UTTERED GRAVELY OUT OF THE
MOUTH OF A STATESMAN, BUT IT WILL BE TREATED
WITH RIDICULE BY ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD.
BUT ONE THING SHALL BE CONSIDERED AND
GRANTED, FOR THE ARGUMENT SAKE ONLY, UPON
THEIR STRONGEST STATE OF THE QUESTION: VIZ ((.))
THAT THE ASSEMBLING OF THIS GREAT BODY OF
FORCES IN FLANDERS RENDERED THE FRENCH UNABLE
TO SEND ANY REINFORCEMENT TO ANY OTHER PARTS.
BUT IF SO, THE HANOVERIANS WERE ENTIRELY UN-+
NECESSARY, / EXCEPTING PERHAPS THE ((4000)) MEN
<P 59>
THEY WERE OBLIGED TO FURNISH TO THE QUEEN
OF HUNGARY; SINCE THE REST OF THE ((16,000)),
MIGHT VERY WELL HAVE BEEN SPARED FROM
HENCE, WITHOUT ANY DANGER ARISING TO US FROM
THEIR ABSENCE; SINCE AS MANY WOULD STILL HAVE
BEEN LEFT AT HOME AS WERE EVER EMPLOYED FOR
OUR OWN DEFENCE, DURING THE MOST DANGEROUS
PART OF THE LATE WAR WITH FRANCE; AND CER-+
TAINLY / OUR TROOPS WOULD HAVE ARRIVED THERE LONG
BEFORE THE HANOVERIANS. BUT THEN, PERHAPS,
IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOO SOON FOR THE WINDING
UP THE FARCE OF THE YEAR; AND CERTAINLY
WOULD HAVE ROBBED SOME PEOPLE OF THE PRE-+
TENCE / FOR PAYING THE HANOVER-SUBSIDY AT ALL.
WHEN THE VIGOROUS RESOLUTION WAS TAKEN
FOR SENDING OVER ((16,000)) MEN INTO FLANDERS,
A MORE CONSIDERABLE EMBASSY THAN USUAL OF LATE
YEARS, WAS SENT TO HOLLAND, AND IT WAS NOT
LONG BEFORE WE WERE SENSIBLE OF THE DISPOSITION
OF THE STATES, BY THE MEMORIALS THAT WERE PRE-+
SENTED, / WHICH APPEAR TO BE RATHER ADDRESSED TO
THE OPINION OF THE DUTCH PEOPLE, THAN WHAT
WAS THOUGHT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF
THE STATES, WHO SOON SHEWED US WHAT WAS
TO BE EXPECTED FROM THEM; AND THOUGH
<P 60>
THERE APPEARED NO HOPES OF DRAWING THEM
INTO THE VIEW OF THE COURT OF GREAT-BRITAIN
IN RESPECT OF FLANDERS; YET THE BRITISH MINI-+
STERS, / EVEN THE LAST, WERE VERY ASSIDUOUS AND
IMPORTUNATE TO OBTAIN THEIR HIGH MIGHTINESS-+
SES / GUARANTY FOR THE ELECTORATE OF HANOVER.
UNCOMMON AND EXTRAORDINARY AS THIS
WAS, THAT THE SAID BRITISH MINISTERS SHOULD
BE SO ENGAGED, YET IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE
SO, TO FIND IT WAS FUNDAMENTALLY THE PRINCI-+
PAL / OBJECT OF NEGOTIATION: NOR MUST WE FOR-+
GET / THOSE ROMANTIC SCHEMES ABOUT THE SAME
TIME GIVEN OUT OF INCLOSING MAILLEBOIS BETWEEN
THE HANOVERIAN FORCES, AND THE ((16,000)) ENG-+
LISH / THAT WERE TO BE SENT OVER FROM HENCE, AND
THEIR DESIGNED MARCH AT FIRST TOWARDS THAT
ELECTORATE; NEITHER MUST IT BE FORGOTTEN,
THAT, UPON CERTAIN REMOURS BEING SPREAD A-+
BROAD / THAT THE NEUTRALITY OF HANOVER CEASED,
THAT THE FRENCH MINISTER DECLARED, BY ORDER OF
HIS MASTER, IN A MEMORIAL TO THE STATES GENE-+
RAL, / THAT IT STILL SUBSISTED, AND THAT HIS MASTER
HAD FRESH PROOFS OF IT IN HIS HANDS; AND IT
IS CERTAIN, THE HANOVERIANS DID NOT MARCH
AFTER MAILLEBOIS. LET US ADD HERE, STILL BY
<P 61>
WAY OF QUERY, WHY THESE WARM SOLICITA-+
TIONS / WERE CARRIED ON NOT ONLY AT THE HAGUE,
BUT AT EVERY COURT OF EUROPE, WHERE THERE
WERE ANY HOPES TO GET A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE,
AND A GUARANTY FOR HANOVER? WHY SUCH
EXTRAORDINARY JOY APPEARS UPON THE LATE OB-+
TAINING / A BRACE OF ALLIANCES, AND PARTICULARLY
THAT OF PRUSSIA, WHICH IS SO PRUDENTLY BOAST-+
ED / TO BE FOR THE PROTECTION AND GUARANTY OF
HANOVER? DOES IT NOT POINT OUT, AND PLAIN-+
LY / TELL US, THAT HANOVER COULD NOT, CON-+
SISTENT / WITH IT'S OWN SAFETY AND ENGAGE-+
MENTS, / ACT EITHER AGAINST THE NEUTRALITY
WITH FRANCE, OR AGAINST THE LAWS OF THE
EMPIRE? BUT THE DANGERS THAT MIGHT EN-+
SUE / TO IT ARE TOO OBVIOUS TO LEAVE A DOUBT OF
THAT FUNDAMENTAL AND FIRST PRINCIPLE, IT'S OWN
PRESERVATION, IN ALL CONSIDERATIONS WHATSO-+
EVER. / DO NOT THESE REJOICINGS THEREFORE, AS
WELL AS THE URGING THAT THE HANOVER TROOPS
MAY NOW ACT, SINCE THE GUARANTY OF PRUSSIA
HATH BEEN OBTAINED, PLAINLY CONFESS THAT THEY
COULD NOT DO IT BEFORE? THAT IT'S ENGAGE-+
MENTS / TO THE CONTRARY ARE STILL THE SAME,
AND THAT THEREFORE THE SWORD OF PRUSSIA IS
<P 62>
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR IT'S PROTECTION? AND
HOW FAR THAT MAY BE RELIED ON, IN CASE
FRANCE SHOULD BE VICTORIOUS, HIS ACTIONS IN
SILESIA VERY SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE.
THE LATE ORDERS SAID TO BE SENT FOR THE
MARCH BOTH OF THE BRITISH AND HANOVER
TROOPS TO MENTZ, ARE URGED TO PALLIATE THE
INACTIVITY AND USELESSNESS OF THEM LAST YEAR,
AND TO BE A PRETENCE FOR PAYING THEM THIS:
BUT LET US NOT FORGET, WHILE WE ARE CONSIDER-+
ING / THIS EXTRAORDINARY STEP, THE MIGHTY
AND WARLIKE PREPARATIONS OF LAST SUMMER,
AND HOW LONG THE NATION WAS MADE TO BE-+
LIEVE / THAT HIS MAJESTY WOULD, EVEN SO LATE IN
OCTOBER, PUT HIMSELF AT THE HEAD OF HIS UNITED
FORCES: THESE APPEARANCES PORTENDED AC-+
TIONS / THAT SEEMED THEN TO JUSTIFY THE TAKING OF
((16,000)) HANOVERIANS INTO OUR PAY, BECAUSE
OUR OWN FORCES WERE TOO SMALL FOR A ROYAL
COMMAND WITHOUT THEM; AND THAT HIS MA-+
JESTY / MIGHT APPEAR EQUALLY THE SOVEREIGN OF
BOTH PEOPLE, AND THAT THEY MIGHT EQUALLY
SHARE IN THE CLORY OF SUCH A COMMAND, IT
WAS THAT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO HAVE ((16,000))
HANOVERIANS AS ((16,000)) ENGLISH.
<P 63>
BUT, UNLUCKILY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE EVER TO
THINK OF THE ORDERS FOR THIS EXTRAORDINARY
MARCH WITHOUT IT'S ETERNALLY OCCURING TO ONE'S
THOUGHTS, WHY THEY DID NOT (IF DESIGNED
FOR ANY REAL USE) MARCH THITHER AT FIRST; SINCE
THE ASSISTANCE BY IT, TO THE QUEEN OF HUN-+
GARY, / MUST HAVE BEEN GREATER, AND OF COURSE,
THE DIVERSION TO FRANCE LIKEWISE. THE UNDER-+
TAKING / OF IT NOW, THEREFORE, IS EXTREMELY
SURPRIZING, WHEN THE DIFFICULTY OF PERFORM-+
ING / IT IS CONSIDERED, AS WELL AS THE UTILITY
TO ARISE FROM IT: EVEN IN SUMMER, GREAT
PREPARATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR SUCH AN EN-+
TERPRIZE; / NOR COULD THE UNDERTAKING, EVEN
THEN, BE JUSTIFIED, UNLESS SUCH PREPARATIONS
HAD FIRST BEEN MADE. IN WINTER THEN, IN
A COUNTRY ALREADY HARASSED WITH THE MARCH
BOTH OF FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, WHERE ALL
FOREIGNERS ARE CONSIDERED AS FOES; WHERE
NO ONE MAGAZINE IS FORMED, AND NECESSA-+
RIES / ARE EVEN SCARCER THAN MONEY, AND WHERE
THE ROADS ARE ALMOST IMPASSABLE; HOW IS IT
TO BE CONCEIVED THAT SUCH A MARCH IS PRAC-+
TICABLE / TO SUCH UNHARDNED TROOPS AS OURS,
OR AT LEAST WITHOUT THE LOSS OF GREAT NUM-+
BERS /
<P 64>
WHO WILL DIE OF FATIGUE ALONE, EVEN IF
SUPPLY'D WITH PROVISIONS, AND UNOPPOSED BY
ANY ENEMY?
TO ALL THIS LET US ADD THE PRESENT IMPOSSI-+
BILITY / CARRYING THITHER OUR ARTILLARY; THE
DIFFICULTIES OF SENDING RECRUITS; THE PROBA-+
BILITY / OF HAVING EVERY CONVOY CUT OFF THAT
SHOULD BE SENT TO THEIR RELIEF; AND THE CER-+
TAIN / PERDITION THAT MUST ATTEND EVERY SMALL
PARTY THAT RAPINE AND HUNGER MAY DETACH
FROM THE ARMY TO SEEK THEIR FORTUNE AMONG
THOSE PEASANTS, WHO ARE INFAMOUS FOR SHEW-+
ING / NO MERCY.
THEN AS TO THE UTILITY (I DO NOT MEAN AT
HOME BUT ABROAD) WHEN THAT IS CONSIDERED,
THE QUESTION WILL BE AGAINST WHOM, AND
WHEN THEY CAN ACT? IT MUST BE AGAINST THE
EMPEROR, THE EMPIRE, OR FRANCE: AND CAN
THE HESSIANS, WHO WERE TAKEN INTO OUR PAY
LAST YEAR, WHEN IT WAS KNOWN AND AVOWED
THAT THEY COULD NOT SERVE AGAINST THE EM-+
PEROR, / AND WHO WERE RETAINED TO PREVENT
THEIR GOING INTO THAT PART OF FRANCE, CAN
THESE HESSIANS, I SAY, ACT AGAINST THE EM-+
PEROR / NOW, OR AGAINST THE HESSIANS, THEIR
<P 65>
FELLOW-SUBJECTS IN THE IMPERIAL SERVICE?
CAN THE HANOVERIANS ACT WITHOUT BREACH
OF THE IMPERIAL LAWS, OR OF THE NEUTRA-+
LITY / WITH FRANCE? NO CERTAINLY; FOR
THOUGH, UPON ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS, IT
MIGHT POSSIBLY BE VENTURED, YET, WHILE IT
REMAINS A DOUBT, THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE
BAN OF THE EMPIRE AND THE RESENTMENT OF
FRANCE, (WHICH MAY BE HEREAFTER FELT, EVEN
IN HANOVER ITSELF) WILL AND MUST BE WELL
CONSIDERED BEFORE HOSTILITIES ARE COMMITTED,
OR THE BLOW STRUCK.
AS THEREFORE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOW, AS
LAST YEAR, FOR THE HESSIANS TO ACT AGAINST THE
EMPEROR; AS HANOVER LYES UNDER THE VERY
SAME DIFFICULTY, AND, HOWEVER GUARDED AND
FENCED ROUND BY GUARANTEES, MAY BE A GRIE-+
VOUS / SUFFERER BY SO HAZARDOUS AN EXPERI-+
MENT, / IT IS SCARCE TO BE CREDITED, THAT IT WILL
RUN THE RISQUE, ESPECIALLY UNDER ALL THE
ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES ABOVE SPECIFIED.
LURED BY AN INSATIABLE THIRST OF GAIN,
IN WHATEVER SHAPE, IN LOVE WITH MILITARY
SPECTACLES, AND TO MAKE A SOLDIER-LIKE FI-+
GURE / IN THE FIELD, HANOVER MAY PROCEED AS
<P 66>
FAR AS A MARCH, OR A COUNTER-MARCH -
MORE WOULD BE TOO MUCH - AND ONE
BREACH OF THE PRESENT NEUTRALITY MIGHT REN-+
DER / A NEUTRALITY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TIME TO
COME.
ON THESE PRINCIPLES, HOW LITTLE PENETRA-+
TION / WOULD HAVE SERVED TO FORESEE, THAT NO-+
THING / COULD BE DONE IN FLANDERS; THAT NO-+
THING / CAN BE DONE ELSEWHERE.
<P 66>
<L 10>
IN DEFECT, THEREFORE, OF REAL SERVICES,
IMAGINARY ONES MUST BE PRETENDED, (FOR IT IS
BECOME NECESSARY THAT GREAT-BRITAIN SHOULD
BE DUPED, THAT HANOVER MAY BE ENRICHED)
AND OF THESE, NO OTHER POWER CAN PRETEND
TO THE LEAST SHARE OF THE GLORY.
IT IS TRUE, WE VERY COURTEOUSLY INVITED
THEM TO PARTICIPATE; BUT IT WAS, PERHAPS,
BECAUSE WE FORESAW WE SHOULD BE REFUSED:
AND THAT THIS REFUSAL WAS FORESEEN, IS OB-+
VIOUS / BY OUR HAVING BEEN AT THE EXPENCE
OF SENDING OVER A VERY SPLENDID AND EXPEN-+
SIVE / TRAIN OF ARTILLERY; WHICH IN TIMES OF
REAL ACTION, WE NEVER DID; THAT ARTICLE HAV-+
ING / ALWAYS BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE DUTCH.
<P 67>
BUT HOWEVER SIGNAL THE SUCCESSES OF THIS
FLEMISH CAMPAIGN HAVE PROVED, THEY HAVE
NOT ALTOGETHER ANSWERED THE FIRST GIV-+
INGS-OUT / CONCERNING IT. THE GREAT MAGA-+
ZINES / OF POWDER, AND ALL THE OTHER PREPARA-+
TIONS / OF WAR AMASSED AT GHENT, WE WERE
TOLD PORTENDED DESTRUCTION TO PARIS ITSELF;
TALKERS WERE FOUND, WHO UNDERTOOK TO SHEW
IS WAS FEASIBLE. THE DEMOLISHING OF DUN-+
KIRK / WAS HOWERVER SOUNDED LOUDEST, IN OR-+
DER / TO AMUSE, TO ANIMATE, AND PREPOSSES
THIS NATION INTO A TOLERABLE OPINION OF THE
MEASURES THEN PURSUED, BUT WHICH HAVE ONLY
SERVED AS A PRETENCE FOR MAKING IT IMPREG-+
NABLE / AGAIN; NAY, IT IS PERMITTED TO BE A
PORT, AND AS SUCH, IS RECKONED IN OUR CUS-+
TOM-HOUSE, / UNDER THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATI-+
ON, / AS WELL AS THE LAST: TO COMPLETE THE
FARCE; WE WERE TO LEAVE THE WHOLE FRON-+
TIERS / BEHIND US, AND TO ENTER INTO THE HEART
OF FRANCE, SUBSIST THERE, AND COME BACK AS
WE COULD: BESIDE ALL THIS, THERE WAS YET
ANOTHER DESIGN NOT ALTOGETHER SO EXTRAVAGANT,
WHICH WAS THE MARCH OF OUR TROOPS INTO
GERMANY, IN ORDER TO HAVE MET THE HANO-+
VERIANS /
<P 68>
THERE, RATHER THAN FIRST TO BRING THEM
INTO FLANDERS, AND THEN TO MARCH THEM
THERE AT THIS TIME OF THE YEAR: BUT, ALAS!
THE FIRST COURTLY STEP OF TAKING THEM INTO OUR
PAY, WAS, UPON OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: IN
FLANDERS, THEY MIGHT MAKE A SHEW, IF NOT
VENTURE, AS THE HIRED TROOPS OF ENGLAND, TO
GUILTY OF THE BREACH OF THE HANOVER-NEU-+
TRALITY, / OR THE LAWS OF THE EMPIRE; BUT
HAD THEY DARED TO ACT IN GERMANY THEN, OR
DARE TO DO IT NOW, SUCCESS WILL JUSTIFY THE
ACTION, OR MAKE IT CRIMINAL. BUT WHAT-+
EVER / OUR SCHEMES WERE, FRANCE LAUGHED,
MAILLEBOIS MARCHED TO BOHEMIA, AND THE REST
OF EUROPE RIDICULED EVERY STEP WE TOOK, AS
WELL FORESEEING, THAT THIS MIGHTY EXPENCE
COULD NOT SO MUCH AS PURCHASE US A SINGLE
TOWN. UPON THE WHOLE, WHAT ARE WE TO
EXPECT WILL BE THE ISSUE OF THESE COURTLY PO-+
LITICS? / FRANCE IS NEITHER EXHAUSTED, NOR TO
BE BULLIED INTO ANY SUBMISSIONS, BY ALL WE
HAVE DONE OR CAN DO; AND THE INTEREST OF
THE MINISTERS AND HANOVER ARE, AT PRESENT,
RENDERED INCOMPATIBLE. IT IS THE INTEREST
OF THE MINISTERS THAT THESE TROOPS SHOULD
<P 69>
DO SOMETHING ABROAD TO EXCUSE THEM FOR SO
INFLAMING THE PUBLICK CHARGE AT HOME: IT
IS THE INTEREST OF HANOVER AND HESSE TO DO
NOTHING TO DESERVE THAT PAY, WHICH MAY
BRING RUIN UPON THEMSELVES. BUT IF ANY
OTHER INTEREST SHOULD, FOR ONCE, PREVAIL, HA-+
NOVER / MAY BE CAUGHT, AND AT LAST BE A SUF-+
FERER / AT A TIME IT LEAST EXPECTED IT: BUT
WHATEVER IS THE INTEREST OF OUR MINISTERS, AS
THE INTEREST OF ENGLAND AND HANOVER, AT PRE-+
SENT, / PERFECTLY CONCIDE IN THIS POINT, BAR-+
RING / THE TRIFLING PECUNIARY CONSIDERATIONS;
'TIS THE DUTY OF TRUE ENGLISHMEN, AS WELL AS
LOYAL SUBJECTS, WHO SINCERELY WISH WELL TO
THE PRESENT ROYAL FAMILY, TO BE AGAINST THE
TAKING THESE ((16000)) HANOVERIANS INTO OUR
PAY.
IN VAIN ARE THOSE IDLE EXPECTATIONS, WHICH
ARE FOUNDED ON THE EXHAUSTING AND IM-+
POVERISHMENT OF FRANCE; HAS SHE YET RAISED
THE HUGE SUMS SHE RAISED DURING THE LATE
WAR? HAS SHE EMPLOYED THE THIRD PART OF
THE FORCES SHE DID THEN? OR LOST ANY NUM-+
BER / OF MEN IN COMPARISON OF WHAT SHE
DID THEN? HAS NOT THE PRICE OF HER ACTIONS
<P 70>
ROSE VERY CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE TIMES OF
THEIR SENDING A FLEET TO THE WEST-INDIES?
SOME DIFFICULTIES IN RESPECT OF BORROWING NEW
SUMS, THE FOUNDATION AND FORMS OF THEIR
GOVERNMENT MUST CREATE. BUT HOW LITTLE
DO THEY WEIGH, WHEN IT IS CONSIDERED, THAT
THEIR ACTIONS STILL KEEP UP AS HIGH AS EVER?
BESIDES, IF THEY HAVE THEIR DIFFICULTIES, HAVE
NOT WE THE LIKE; AND IF THE HIGH PRICE OF
STOCKS IS MADE USE OF AS A PALLIATIVE ON OUR
SIDE, WHY ARE THEY NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME
PRIVILEGE? ACCORDING TO MY CONCEPTIONS,
THE DISADVANTAGES THAT ATTEND CREDIT IN AN
ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT LIKE THEIRS, RENDERS
THE CONCLUSION MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THEM
THAN US. IN FEW WORDS, THEY NEITHER RAISE
THE MEN NOR THE MONEY, NOR ANY OTHER
WAY EXERT THEIR STRENGTH OR VIGOUR, AS
THEY DID IN THE LATE WAR; WHILST WE EX-+
CEED / IT BY MILLIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
WANT OF MONEY, AND THE UNIVERSAL DECAY
OF OUR MANUFACTURES.
THE POVERTY OF SPAIN, IT WAS EXPECTED
AND MUCH INSISTED ON, WOULD REDUCE IT TO
A COMPLIANCE TO THE HANOVER ALLIANCE: BUT,
<P 71>
THOUGH SHE HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY EXHAUSTING
HERSELF EVER SINCE, AND NOW LABOURS UNDER
THE DIFFICULTY OF AN OPEN WAR WITH US,
WHICH, THOUGH NOT SUCCESSFUL ENOUGH TO
TAKE AND HOLD, MUST NEVERTHELESS SHORTEN HER
REMITTANCES FROM THE WEST-INDIES, SHE IS
STILL ABLE NOT ONLY TO MAKE HEAD AGAINST US,
BUT TO MAINTAIN AND SUPPORT TWO GREAT ARMIES
FOR THE CONQUEST OF PART OF ITALY.
WHAT MAY WE NOT THEN EXPECT FROM FRANCE,
WHICH SO LONG SUPPORTED ITSELF AGAINST THE VICTO-+
RIOUS / GRAND ALLIANCE, IN THE LATE WAR, AND FEAR
FOR OURSELVES WHEN, WE ALONE, WITHOUT THE
DUTCH AND THE REST OF THAT MIGHTY CON-+
FEDERACY, / ARE TO REDUCE THAT HAUGHTY POWER,
AND RE-ESTABLISH THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA IN IT'S
ANCIENT GLORY, AT THE SOLE EXPENCE OF GREAT-
BRITAIN.
GREAT-BRITAIN HATH BEEN HITHERTO STRONG
AND VIGOROUS ENOUGH TO BEAR UP HANOVER
ON IT'S SHOULDERS; AND, THOUGH WASTED AND
WEARIED OUT WITH THE CONTINUED FATIGUE, SHE
IS STILL GUADED ON, AS IS ALREADY SOLD TO VAS-+
SALLAGE, / AND, BY COMPULSION, OBLIGED TO
<P 72>
PERSIST IN THE UNGRATEFUL DRUDGERY WITHOUT
HOPE OF, OR A TITLE TO REDEMPTION.
THUS THE VERY CONDITION OF SENDING OVER
((16000)) OF OUR TROOPS, VIZ ((.)) TO ACT IN CON-+
JUNCTION / WITH THE DUTCH, OR OTHERWISE TO BE
COUNTERMANDED IMMEDIATELY, IS TO BE NOW
MOST ARTIFICIALLY AND COMPLAISANTLY FORGOT;
AND WE ARE TO BE TOLD THAT, BECAUSE THESE
WERE TOO FEW FOR ACTION, AND THE HESSIANS
WOULD NOT ACT AT ALL, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ADD
((16000)) HANOVERIANS, THAT THE QUEEN OF
HUNGARY MIGHT BE EFFECTUALLY SERVED, AND
THE STATES BE CONVINCED THAT WE WERE FOOL-+
HARDY / AND PRODIGAL ENOUGH TO DRAWCANSIR-IT
ALONE.
BUT SURE WE HAVE TOO MUCH GOOD SENSE TO
BE SO IMPOSED UPON, TOO MUCH SPIRIT NOT
TO RESENT THE VERY ATTEMPT, AND TOO MUCH
DISCRETION TO BEGGAR OURSELVES FOR THE SAKE
OF AN INTEREST THAT HAS BEEN A SNARE AND A
CURSE TO US FROM THE BEGINNING.
I DO NOT KNOW ANY THING MORE IMPOLITIC,
NAY, MORE DANGEROUS, THAN FOR A SUSPICION
TO PREVAIL, THAT WE ARE GOVERNED BY TRICKS
AND FRAUDS TO ANSWER BAD PURPOSES, INSTEAD
<P 73>
OF NOBLE AND GENEROUS MEASURES, WORTHY OF
A JUST KING, AND A GREAT PEOPLE.
WITH WHAT CONCERN THEREFORE MUST WE
LOOK UPON THAT FOUNTAIN OF TRUTH, WHICH
TOLD US, AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION, OF
THE THEN FAVOURABLE DISPOSITION OF THE STATES-
GENERAL, / IF IT SHALL APPEAR, THAT, LONG BE-+
FORE, / IT WAS DESIGNED, AND WE ARE NOW
ACTUALLY TO PAY FOR ((16000)) HANOVER TROOPS?
OR WHAT OPINION MUST WE HOLD OF OUR PRE-+
SENT / MOST EXCELLENT MINISTERS, WHEN IT IS
MADE MANIFEST, THAT EITHER THEY EXPECTED
NOTHING FROM THE DUTCH AT THAT TIME, OR
THAT THE HANOVER TROOPS WERE TAKEN INTO
OUR PAY FOR PRIVATE CONSIDERATIONS ONLY?
EITHER WAY, BE IT AGAIN, AND FOR EVER
REMEMBERED, THAT IT WAS LAST SESSION DECLARED,
THAT WITHOUT THE DUTCH WE NEITHER COULD,
WOULD, NOR OUGHT TO DO ANY THING. LET IT
LIKEWISE BE REMEMBERED, HOW LARGE A BODY
OF USELESS TROOPS WERE CONTINUED AT HOME,
HOW STRONGLY IT WAS URGED, UPON TAKING
THE ((4000)) ADDITIONAL MEN INTO OUR PAY FROM
IRELAND, OVER AND ABOVE THE GREAT ARMY WHICH
WAS AT FIRST VOTED ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEND-+
ING /
<P 74>
THESE ((16000)) MEN ABROAD, THAT THIS
AUGMENTATION WAS NOT MADE FOR OUR DE-+
FENCE / AT HOME, FOR THAT WAS RIDICULOUS;
BUT BECAUSE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SEND
YET MORE FORCES ABROAD, WHEN WE SHOULD
BEGIN TO ACT; THE SMALNESS OF THE NUMBER
FIRST SENT, AND THE ABSURDITY OF ACTING WITH-+
OUT / THE DUTCH, BEING LIKEWISE STRONGLY INSI-+
NUATED, / AS WELL AS THE EXPENCE AND TIME RE-+
QUISITE / FOR THE SENDING A PROPER REINFORCEMENT
OF OUR OWN TROOPS; THEREFORE THAT THIS REIN-+
FORCEMENT / WAS NOT SENT, IF WE HAD ANY IN-+
TENTIONS / TO DRAW THE SWORD AT ALL, NO OTHER
ANSWER CAN BE SINCERELY GIVEN, BUT THAT WE
SHOULD THEREBY HAVE LOST THE HAPPY OP-+
PORTUNITY / OF PAYING ((16000)) HANOVERIANS.
BUT HOW CRUEL, HOW PROVOKING, HOW BE-+
YOND / ALL FORGIVENESS, DOTH THIS EXTRAVA-+
GANCE / APPEAR? WHEN IT IS CONSIDERED, THAT,
BY WAY OF ENCOURAGEMENT FOR US TO EM-+
BARK / IN THE TROUBLES OF EUROPE, WHICH WE
HAD NO IMMEDIATE CONCERN IN, IT WAS GIVEN
OUT, THAT NOW WAS THE TIME, THE ONLY
PROPER TIME, BECAUSE FRANCE WAS ALREADY
<P 75>
EXHAUSTED, CONSEQUENTLY MUST BE UTTERLY UN-+
ABLE / TO MAKE ANY ATTEMPT UPON GREAT-BRI-+
TAIN, / AND THAT NEVERTHELESS, WHILE OUR OWN
TOWNS AND VILLAGES WERE EATEN UP BY RED
LOCUSTS, WE SHOULD MAKE SUCH AN UNMERCIFUL
ADDITION TO THE PUBLIC GRIEVANCES, AS TO HIRE
((16,000)) MERCENARIES, THOUGH CONVINCED THEY
WOULD PROVE AS LITTLE SERVICEABLE ABROAD AS
OUR OWN JANIZARIES AT HOME. LET ME BE
ALLOWED TO ADD, THAT WHEN ONE RECOLLECTS
WHAT GREAT NUMBERS OF NATIONAL TROOPS WERE
EMPLOYED DURING THE LAST GENERAL WAR IN
FLANDERS, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, AND THE FEW
THAT WERE THOUGHT AND FOUND SUFFICIENT FOR
OUR OWN DEFENCE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO BE
EXTREMELY SURPRIZED TO FIND THERE ARE AS
MANY EFFECTIVE MEN OF OUR OWN NOW IN
PAY AS THEN; THAT OF THESE BUT ((16,359)) MEN
ARE IN FLANDERS, AND THAT THE GUARDS AND
GARRISONS FOR THIS ISLAND THIS YEAR ARE TO BE
((23,610)) LAND-FORCES, AND ((11,550)) MARINES,
THE GREATEST PART OF WHICH WILL BE ALWAYS
IN READINESS TO MARCH.
NOW FOR WHAT END IS THIS FORMIDABLE
CORPS TO BE KEPT UP IN GREAT-BRITAIN?
<P 76>
NOT FOR FEAR OF OURSELVES; THAT PRETENCE
HATH ALREADY BEEN GIVEN UP; AND FRANCE,
AS BEFORE HINTED, WE HAVE LIKEWISE BEEN TOLD,
IS IN NO CONDITION OF MOLESTING US; BEING
SO DISABLED BY HER EXPENCES, LOSSES, ETC((.)) AS
TO BE GLAD OF A PEACE UPON ANY TERMS; AND
AS TO SPAIN, HER WHOLE FLEET IS ALREADY LOCK-+
ED / UP IN TOULON, AND HER FORCES ENDEAVOUR-+
ING / TO MAKE CONQUESTS IN ITALY: WITH THE
ADVANTAGE, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A SUPERIOR NA-+
VAL / FORCE TO COVER OUR COASTS, WOULD NOT
((10,000)) MEN BE SUFFICIENT TO ANSWER THE END
OF GUARDS AND GARRISONS? AND IF WE MUST
BE SADDLED WITH THESE ((16,000)) HANOVERIANS,
OUGHT WE NOT TO DISBAND AS MANY AT LEAST,
OF OUR OWN COUNTRYMEN, THAT WE MAY BE
ABLE TO GIVE THEIR BREAD TO STRANGERS; FOR
WE BEGIN TO BE ALREADY SENSIBLE THAT THE
TREASURES OF GREAT-BRITAIN HAVE A BOTTOM;
AND THAT IF WE PROCEED IN THIS MANNER FOR A
YEAR OR TWO LONGER, THAT BOTTOM WILL BE
FOUND?
I CANNOT, HOWEVER, DISMISS THESE NOTABLE
FRIENDS OF OURS WITHOUT A PARAGRAPH OR TWO
RELATING TO THE TIME, WHEN THEY ARE TO
<P 77>
ENTER INTO PAY; WHICH, AS IT IS GIVEN OUT,
IS FIXED FOR SOME DAY IN MARCH LAST; BUT
WITH WHAT REASON WILL BEST APPEAR FROM THE
FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS, VIZ .
IT WAS NOT 'TILL THE ((23D)) OF MARCH THAT
THE PARLIAMENT-ADDRESS TOOK ANY NOTICE OF
THE KING'S ENGAGEMENTS; IT WAS NOT TILL
JULY ((15)) THAT HIS MAJESTY SIGNIFIED THAT HE
FORESAW THE FORCES ALREADY PROVIDED FOR,
WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT: AND WHEN HIS MA-+
JESTY / OPENED THE PRESENT SESSION, HE DOTH
NOT EXTEND HIS ROYAL FORESIGHT BEYOND THE
CLOSE OF THE LAST - AT THE CLOSE OF THE LAST
SESSION I FORESAW, I POINTED OUT, ETC((.)) NOW A
THING CANNOT BE FORESEEN THAT HATH ACTUALLY
TAKEN PLACE, AND THEREFORE, WE WILL NOT, NAY,
WE CANNOT SUPPOSE, THAT A FORESIGHT AND A
RETROSPECT WILL BE MADE TO SIGNIFY THE SAME
THING.
BESIDES, THOUGH IT DOTH NOT APPEAR
WHEN THE REFUSAL OF THE DUTCH TO CO-OPE-+
RATE / WAS FORESEEN, MOST CERTAIN IT IS, THAT OUR
OWN TROOPS DID NOT ARRIVE IN FLANDERS TILL
AUGUST, NOR THOSE OF HANOVER TILL OCTOBER:
NOW IN A CONVENTION WITH HANOVER IN
<P 78>
((1702)), FOR TAKING CERTAIN TROOPS OF THAT
ELECTORATE INTO BRITISH PAY, WHICH WAS SIGN-+
ED / JUNE ((21)), THE FIRST ARTICLE DECLARES, THAT
PART OF THE SAID TROOPS WERE ALREADY AR-+
RIVED / ON THE LOWER RHINE, WHERE IT WAS STI-+
PULATED / THEY SHOULD SERVE; AND, BY THE SE-+
QUEL, / WE LEARN, THAT THEIR PAY WAS TO COM-+
MENCE / JUNE ((1)). BUT THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE
TREATY WAS SIGNED, AND PERHAPS, NOT A DAY
BEFORE THE PART ABOVE-MENTIONED WERE AT
THEIR POSTS.
WITH WHAT FACE THEREFORE, CAN IT BE URG'D
IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, THAT TROOPS HIRED OF
THE SAME POWER, FOR THE SERVICE OF GER-+
MANY, / NOT GREAT-BRITAIN, SHOULD BE PAID
BEFORE THE FIRST OF THAT MONTH, IN WHICH
THEY BEGAN TO OBEY WHAT WILL BE CALLED BRI-+
TISH / ORDERS?
BUT THAT THEY SHOULD BE PAID ONLY FROM
THAT DAY IS NOT ALL: THE BRITISH NATION
PRESUME TO HOPE AND EXPECT THAT EITHER THE
((4000)) MEN WHICH HANOVER WAS TO FURNISH
THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY WITH, WILL BE DEDUCT-+
ED / FROM THE ((16000)), OR, THAT AT LEAST, WE
SHALL ONLY PAY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR
<P 79>
OWN PAY AND THAT WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR
THEIR SERVICE ABRAOD, AS WE OFTEN DO THE DIF-+
FERENCE / BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND IRISH PAY,
ALL BEING SUBJECTS OF THE SAME PRINCE: FOR
NO MAN THINKS SO MEANLY OF HIS MAJESTY, AS
TO IMAGINE HE DESIGNS, WHATEVER HIS MINI-+
STERS / MAY DO, TO SAVE THE POCKET WHAT WOULD
BE THEIR OWN PAY AT HOME, AS WELL AS THE EN-+
TIRE / EXPENCE OF THE ((4000)) MEN, DUE FROM
HANOVER TO THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY: ON THE
CONTRARY, SO MUCH MORE NOBLY DO WE CON-+
CEIVE / OF HIS MAJESTY'S FATHERLY COMPASSION
OF HIS PEOPLE, THAT WE DEPEND ON HIS PLA-+
CING, / EVEN TO HIS OWN ACCOUNT, THE DIFFER-+
ENCE / OF THE PAY, AS DISDAINING TO BE OUT-+
DONE / IN GENEROSITY BY A DAUGHTER OF JAMES
((11)). I MEAN HER LATE MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
QUEEN ANNE, WHOSE MEMORY WILL EVER BE
DEAR TO THESE KINGDOMS, TILL TIME SHALL BE
NO MORE, IN THAT SHE FREELY CONTRIBUTED A FULL
SIXTH OF HER REVENUE TO THE RELIEF OF HER
PEOPLE AND THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR.
HITHERTO INDEED, HER ROYAL EXAMPLE HATH
ONLY BEEN PRAISED WITHOUT BEING IMITATED;
THE OVERFLOWINGS OF THE PRESENT PRODIGAL CIVIL
<P 80>
LIST HAVING BEEN DIVERTED ANOTHER WAY;
AND THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA REDUCED AT THE
EXPENCE OF THE PEOPLE ONLY: BUT WHILE
WE WERE RICH, WE DID NOT STAND IN NEED
OF THE CHARITY OF THE CROWN; AND, I PRE-+
SUME, / IT WAS ONLY WITHHELD, TILL NECESSITY
SHOULD RENDER IT DOUBLY WELCOME. AND WHE-+
THER / THE SAVINGS OUT OF IT WOULD NOT AN-+
SWER / THESE EXTRA-EXPENCES OF HANOVERIAN
MERCENARIES, LET THE LATE REPORT OF THE SE-+
CRET / COMMITTEE DETERMINE.
PERHAPS THE PERUSAL OF THE FOREGOING SHEETS
MAY REDUCE THE ADVOCATES FOR THE PRESENT
MEASURES TO THE NECESSITY OF A GENERAL CON-+
FESSION, / THAT, 'TIS TRUE, WE HAVE ACTED CON-+
TRARY / TO OUR INTEREST, IN ENGAGING IN A LAND-+
WAR / WITHOUT THE DUTCH; AND THAT THE
AFFAIR OF THE HANOVER TROOPS WE CAN NEI-+
THER / DEFEND NOR APPROVE OF; BUT THAT, NE-+
THELESS, / NOW WE ARE IN, WE MUST GO ON, OR
ELSE GIVE UP THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY; AND
THAT, WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, IT WILL BE PRO-+
PER / TO ENQUIRE INTO THE ADVISERS OF THESE
MEASURES, AND TO PUNISH THE AUTHORS, IF
THEY APPEAR TO DESERVE IT.
<P 81>
THIS, OR SOMETHING TO THE LIKE EFFECT,
THEY MAY BE EITHER LED OR DROVE TO CONFESS
AND PLEAD; BUT SURELY, NEITHER THE NATION NOR
THE PARLIAMENT CAN BE SO INFLUENCED BY IT,
AS TO PERSIST IN MEASURES ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE
DESTRUCTIVE TO THE INTEREST, PERHAPS TO THE VERY
BEING OF THEIR COUNTRY, ON THE DISTANT PRO-+
SPECT / OF A FUTURE ENQUIRY, WHICH THE LIKE
INFLUENCE MAY THEN OVER-RULE, OR OF FUTURE
PUNISHMENT, WHICH, BY A RECENT EXAMPLE,
WE ARE TAUGHT ALREADY TO DESPAIR OF.
'TIS, ON THE CONTRARY, OUR DUTY TO PUT
A STOP TO SUCH FATAL MEASURES IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, AND COMPEL OUR PRESENT UNDER-+
TAKERS / TO ACT ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIGINAL PLAN,
OR NOT AT ALL.
WHEN WE HAVE ONCE ADOPTED OR PROCEEDED
UPON A BAD SCHEME, IT WILL BE SAID WE HAVE
AUTHORIZED IT; THAT IT CEASES TO BE THE MI-+
NISTER'S, / AND BECOMES OUR OWN: AND IN THIS
PRESUMPTION, SUPPLIES WILL BECOME DEBTS,
WHICH WILL BE EXACTED, NOT SOLICITED, AND
BOTH THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY ABROAD, AND OUR
OWN BASHAWS AT HOME, WILL MEASURE THE PUB-+
LIC / WANTS BY THEIR OWN WILL AND PLEASURE.
<P 82>
AGREEABLE THEN TO THE DICTATES OF RIGHT
REASON AND SOUND POLICY, AND THE DUTY WE
OWE TO OUR PARENT-COUNTRY, LET US DECLARE
AND RESOLVE, THAT, AS THE DUTCH HAVE LEFT US
TO BE CRUSHED UNDERNEATH THE BURTHEN, WHILE
THEY RUN AWAY WITH EVERY ADVANTAGE, THE
KEEPING OF ((16000)) MEN ABROAD IS BURTHEN-+
SOM / AND UNNECESSARY, AND CAN SERVE ONLY TO
COLOUR OUR PAYING FOR ((16000)) AS BURTHENSOME
AND UNCESSARY HANOVERIANS. AND THAT, AS
WE CERTAINLY OUGHT GREATLY AND GENEROUSLY
TO SUPPORT THIS PRINCESS AS AN ALLY, BUT NOT
ENGAGE IN HER QUARREL AS A PRINCIPAL, IT WOULD
BE MORE FOR HER ADVANTAGE AND OURS, TO GIVE
HER AN ADDITIONAL SUBSIDY OF ((540,000 L .))
WHICH IS THE PAY OF THE ((16000)) ENGLISH
NOW IN FLANDERS; SINCE, THEREBY, SHE WOULD
BE ENABLED TO KEEP UP AN ARMY OF DOUBLE
THE NUMBER, WE NOW PRETEND TO COMPLI-+
MENT / HER WITH, AND WE SHOULD BE RID OF ALL
FARTHER CLAIMS, WITH RESPECT TO THESE OB-+
NOXIOUS / HANOVERIANS.
SUPPOSING WHICH TO BE DONE, WE MAY
SAFELY DISBAND ((16,000)) OF OUR OWN FORCES,
SINCE THE RESIDUE WILL AMOUNT TO ((46,887))
EFFECTIVE MEN: A NUMBER NOT ONLY SUFFI-+
CIENT /
<P 83>
FOR ALL GOOD PURPOSES, BUT BY TWO
THIRDS TOO MANY, WHEN FRANCE IS TOO MUCH
EXHAUSTED TO THINK OF INVADING US, AND THE
STATES MOST CERTAINLY REFUSE TO CO-OPERATE
WITH US.
UPON THE WHOLE, THE PRESENT DEPLORABLE
AND MELANCHOLY SITUATION OF EUROPE, THE
CAUSES TO WHICH IT WAS OWING, THE CONSTANT
AND UNIFORM CONDUCT AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
ALL OUR MINISTERS IN OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS EVER
SINCE ((1714)), AND THE PRESENT CONTEST WHE-+
THER / WE SHALL SACRIFICE THE TRUE INTEREST OF
THIS NATION, AND ALL IT'S REMAINING SUB-+
STANCE / TO THE LITTLE, LOW INTEREST OF HANOVER,
FOR MINISTERIAL VIEWS, CONSPIRE TO MAKE THE
DETERMINATION OF THIS QUESTION OF THE UT-+
MOST / IMPORTANCE: FOR THE INTERESTS OF THIS
ISLAND MUST, FOR THIS ONCE, PREVAIL; OR WE
MUST SUBMIT TO THE IGNOMINY OF BE-+
COMING / ONLY A MONEY-PROVINCE TO THAT
ELECTORATE, AND RUSH UPON THE DANGER OF
BEING SUNDERED INTO TWO MORE OPPOSITE AND
IRRECONCILEABLE PARTIES, THAN EVER YET DISTURB-+
ED / THE PUBLIC PEACE, VIZ ((.)) ENGLISHMAN, AND
HANOVERIANS.
((FINIS.))
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$
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